**1NC**

**1**

**Interpretation “restriction” is a method of prohibiting authority**

P.A. **Mohammed**, J. Sri Chithira Aero And Adventure ... vs The Director General Of Civil ... on 24 January, 1997¶ Equivalent citations: AIR 1997 Ker 121¶ Sri Chithira Aero And Adventure ... vs The Director General Of Civil ... on 24 January, **1997**. http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/255504/?type=print

10. **Microlight aircrafts or hang gliders shall not be flown over an assembly of persons or over congested areas or restricted areas including cantonment areas, defence installations etc**. unless prior permission in writing is obtained from appropriate authorities. **These provisions do not create any restrictions. There is no total prohibition of operation of microlight aircraft or hang gliders. The distinction between 'regulation' and 'restriction' must be clearly perceived. The 'regulation' is a process which aids main function within the legal precinct whereas 'restriction' is a process which prevents the function without legal sanction**. Regulation is allowable but restriction is objectionable. What is contained in the impugned clauses is, only **regulations and not restrictions**, complete or partial. They **are issued with authority conferred on the first respondent**, under Rule 133A of the Aircraft Rules consistent with the provisions contained in the Aircraft Act 1934 relating to the operation, use etc. of aircrafts flying in India. Microlight aircrafts, hang gliders and powered hang gliders are all coming within the definition of 'aircraft' contained in Section 2( 1) of the Act. Section 5 of **the Act authorises** the Central Government to make rules regulating among other things use and operation of aircraft and lor securing the safety of aircraft operation. Rule 133A authorises the first respondent to issue directions relating to the operation and use of the aircraft. Thus the analysis of the above provisions would sufficiently indicate that **the** impugned **clauses** contained in Exts. P4 and P5 **are** purely **measures regulating** the use and **operation** of aircrafts.

**Increase means to become greater**

Increase:

in·crease verb \in-ˈkrēs, ˈin-ˌ\

intransitive verb

**1: to become progressively greater (as in size, amount, number, or intensity)**

2: to multiply by the production of young

**That’s Merriam-Webster 12**, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/increase?show=0&t=1348112715

**Executive authority stems from the constitution or statutory delegation.**

**Gaziano**, **2001**

(Todd, senior fellow in Legal Studies and Director of the Center for Legal Judicial Studies at the Heritage Foundation, 5 Texas Review of Law & Politics 267, Spring, lexis)

Although President Washington's Thanksgiving Proclamation was hortatory, other proclamations or orders that communicate presidential decisions may be legally binding. n31 Ultimately **the authority for all presidential orders or directives must come from either the Constitution or from statutory delegations**. **The source of authority (constitutional versus statutory) carries important implications for the extent to which that authority may be legitimately exercised or circumscribed**. Regardless of the source of substantive power, however, the authority to use written directives in the exercise of that power need not be set forth in express terms in the Constitution or federal statutes. As is explained further below, the authority to issue directives may be express, implied, or inherent in the substantive power granted to the President. The Constitution expressly mentions certain functions that are to be performed by the President. Congress has augmented the President's power by delegating additional authority within these areas of responsibility. The following are among the more important grants of authority under which the President may issue at least some directives in the exercise of his constitutional and statutorily delegated powers: Commander in Chief, Head of State, Chief Law Enforcement Officer, and Head of the Executive Branch.

**Violation – The Aff increases presidents war powers authority – It doesn’t prohibit the president from doing anything**

**Coronogue 12** – **1AC Author** (Graham, JD at duke, “A NEW AUMF: DEFINING COMBATANTS IN THE WAR ON TERROR”, http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1294&context=djcil, zzx)

This **congressional authorization gave the president the authority to use force against those involved in the 9/11 attacks and their allies**, but the war on terror has moved beyond this mandate. **In 2001, al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Osama bin Laden were clearly the “enemy.**”3 **The AUMF addressed this threat by providing domestic authorization for the use of force against all entities closely tied to 9/11.** However, ten years after the attacks, bin Laden is dead and the Taliban is a shadow of its former self.4 Yet the United States still uses the AUMF to justify the use of force against new terrorist and extremist groups, many of which were not closely involved in 9/11 and may not have even existed in 2001. Given this disconnect, politicians have advocated amending, scrapping, or reaffirming the AUMF to have it reflect the present reality of the conflict. The Obama administration argues that the AUMF should remain the same and has taken pains to expand the authorization to cover new terrorist threats from organizations unrelated to al-Qaeda.5 However, this ten-year-old authorization must be revised. **The United States is facing a new and still evolving enemy; our law on conflict must evolve with it.** We should not expect the President to simply reinterpret or stretch statutory language when considering such fundamentally important issues as national security, deadly force, and indefinite detention. This "stretching" out of the statute will create significant questions of legality and authorization in times when we cannot afford to hesitate or second-guess. **The President and the armed forces need an updated, clear, and explicit authorization to execute this war effectively** and know the limits of their power. In short. Congress must amend or update the AUMF to reflect the current reality of conflict and guide the President's prosecution of this war.

**Vote Neg**

**Limits – Their aff justifies any aff that has the judiciary or Congress clarify in ways that expand war powers - 1000s of ways to do that**

**Ground – Increasing restrictions is key to stable neg link and cp ground – clarifications to authority make all DA links non-unique – bidirectional affs are especially bad because they are reading neg ground on the aff**

**The aff is extra-topical – AUMF applies to things outside the resolution -**

**Justice.gov 2006** (January 27, “THE NSA PROGRAM TO DETECT AND PREVENT TERRORIST ATTACKS

MYTH V. REALITY” <http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/nsa_myth_v_reality.pdf>)

**Myth: The NSA program is illegal. Reality: The President’s authority** to authorize the terrorist surveillance program is **firmly based both in** his constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief, and in **the** Authorization for Use of Military Force (**AUMF**) passed by Congress after the September 11 attacks. • As Commander-in-Chief and Chief Executive, the President has legal authority under the Constitution to authorize the NSA terrorist surveillance program. ¾ The Constitution makes protecting our Nation from foreign attack the President’s most solemn duty and provides him with the legal authority to keep America safe. ¾ It has long been recognized that the President has inherent authority to conduct warrantless surveillance to gather foreign intelligence even in peacetime. Every federal appellate court to rule on the question has concluded that the President has this authority and that it is consistent with the Constitution. ¾ Since the Civil War, wiretaps aimed at collecting foreign intelligence have been authorized by Presidents, and the authority to conduct warrantless surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes has been consistently cited and used when necessary. • **Congress confirmed and supplemented the President's constitutional authority to authorize this program when it passed the AUMF**. ¾ **The AUMF authorized the President to use “all necessary and appropriate military force against those** nations, **organizations**, or persons **he determines planned**, authorized, committed, or aided in the terrorist attacks that occurred on **September 11**, 2001.” **¾ In its Hamdi decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the AUMF also authorizes the “fundamental incident[s] of waging war.”** **The history of warfare makes clear that electronic surveillance** of the enemy **is** a **fundamental** incident to the use of military force.

**Extra T is a voter for limits – surveillance was rejected from the topic and is a whole new set of advantage ground and disads – it has to be a voting issue or it becomes a no risk issue for the Aff**

**2**

**The aff’s ontological commitment to security causes endless war and serial policy failure**

**Burke 2007** (Anthony Burke, Int'l Studies @ U of New South Wales, “Ontologies of War,” in Theory & Event, Vol. 10, Iss. 2)

This tells us much about the enduring power of crude **instrumental versions of strategic thought**, which **relate not merely to the actual use of force but to broader geopolitical strategies that see**, as limited war theorists like Robert Osgood did, **force as an 'instrument of policy short of war'. It was from within this strategic ontology that** figures like the Nobel prize-winning economist Thomas Schelling **theorised the strategic role of threats and coercive diplomacy**, and spoke of strategy as 'the power to hurt'.[79](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html#_edn79) In the 2006 Lebanon war we can see such thinking in the remark of a U.S. analyst, a former Ambassador to Israel and Syria, who speculated that by targeting civilians and infrastructure Israel aimed 'to create enough pain on the ground so there would be a local political reaction to Hezbollah's adventurism'.[80](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html#_edn80) Similarly a retired Israeli army colonel told the Washington Post that 'Israel is attempting to create a rift between the Lebanese population and Hezbollah supporters by exacting a heavy price from the elite in Beirut. The message is: If you want your air conditioning to work and if you want to be able to fly to Paris for shopping, you must pull your head out of the sand and take action toward shutting down Hezbollah-land.'[81](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html#_edn81) Conclusion: Violent Ontologies or Peaceful Choices?      I was motivated to begin the larger project from which this essay derives by a number of concerns. I felt that **the available critical, interpretive or performative languages of war -- realist and liberal international relations theories, just war theories, and various Clausewitzian derivations of strategy -- failed us, because they either perform or refuse to place under suspicion the underlying political ontologies that I have sought to unmask and question** here. **Many realists have quite nuanced and critical attitudes to the use of force, but ultimately affirm strategic thought and remain embedded within  the existential framework of the nation-state. Both liberal internationalist and just war doctrines seek mainly to improve the accountability of decision-making in security affairs and to limit some of the worst moral enormities of war, but** (apart from the more radical versions of cosmopolitanism) **they fail to question the ontological claims of political community or strategic theory**.[82](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html#_edn82)      In the case of a theorist like Jean Bethke Elshtain, just war doctrine is in fact allied to a softer, liberalised form of the Hegelian-Schmittian ontology. She dismisses Kant'sPerpetual Peace as 'a fantasy of at-oneness...a world in which differences have all been rubbed off' and in which 'politics, which is the way human beings have devised for dealing with their differences, gets eliminated.'[83](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html#_edn83) She remains a committed liberal democrat and espouses a moral community that stretches beyond the nation-state, which strongly contrasts with Schmitt's hostility to liberalism and his claustrophobic distinction between friend and enemy. However her image of politics -- which at its limits, she implies, requires the resort to war as the only existentially satisfying way of resolving deep-seated conflicts -- reflects much of Schmitt's idea of the political and Hegel's ontology of a fundamentally alienated world of nation-states, in which war is a performance of being. She categorically states that any effort to dismantle security dilemmas 'also requires the dismantling of human beings as we know them'.[84](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html#_edn84) Whilst this would not be true of all just war advocates, I suspect that even as they are so concerned with the ought, moral theories of violence grant too much unquestioned power to the is. The problem here lies with the confidence in being -- of 'human beings as we know them' -- which ultimately fails to escape a Schmittian architecture and thus eternally exacerbates (indeed reifies) antagonisms. Yet we know from the work of Deleuze and especially William Connolly that exchanging an ontology of being for one ofbecoming, where the boundaries and nature of the self contain new possibilities through agonistic relation to others, provides a less destructive and violent way of acknowledging and dealing with conflict and difference.[85](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html#_edn85)      My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.[86](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html#_edn86) Even as I am arguing that **war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy** -- that **it is** rather **the product of hegemonic forms of knowledge about political action and community** -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. **Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies** I have described here in fact **dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have come**, against everything Kant hoped for, **to stand in for progress, modernity and reason**. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that **the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing**, argues Heidegger, **'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it drives out every other possibility of revealing**...the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'[87](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html#_edn87)      What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and security -- is **a view that the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence**. **Many of the most destructive features of contemporary modernity -- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from calculative, 'empirical' discourses of scientific and political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being. Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe, policymakers' choices become necessities, their actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die. Viewed in this light, 'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It creates both discursive constraints -- available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic**.

**Reject the aff as an instance of the violent logic of security**

**Burke**, School of Political Science and International Studies, University of Queensland **2002** [Anthony, Aporias of Security, Alternatives 27]

It is perhaps easy to become despondent, but as countless struggles for freedom, justice, and social transformation have proved, a sense of seriousness can be tempered with the knowledge that many tools are already available—and where they are not, the ef­fort to create a productive new critical sensibility is well advanced. **There is** also **a crucial political opening within the liberal problematic itself**, in the sense that **it assumes that power is most effec­tive when it is absorbed as truth, consented to and desired—which creates an important space for refusal**. As Colin Gordon argues, Foucault thought that **the very possibility of governing was condi­tional on it being credible to the governed as well as the govern­ing. This throws weight onto the question of how security works as a technology of subjectivity. It is to take up Foucault's challenge,** framed as a reversal of the liberal progressive movement of being we have seen in Hegel, **not to discover who or what we are so much as to refuse what we are. Just as security rules subjectivity as both a totalizing and individualizing blackmail and promise, it is at these levels that we can intervene. We can critique the machinic frame­works of possibility represented by law, policy, economic regulation, and diplomacy, while challenging the way these institutions deploy language to draw individual subjects into their consensual web. This suggests**, at least provisionally, **a dual strategy. The first as­serts the space for agency, both in challenging available possibilities for being and their larger** socioeconomic **implications**. Roland Bleiker formulates **an idea of agency that shifts away from the lone** (male) **hero overthrowing the social order in a decisive act of re­bellion to one that understands both the thickness of social power and its "fissures," "fragmentation," and "thinness." We must**, he says, "**observe how an individual may be able to escape the discur­sive order and influence its shifting boundaries. ... By doing so, discursive terrains of dissent all of a sudden appear where forces of domination previously seemed invincible**." **Pushing beyond security requires tactics** that can work at many-levels—**that empower individuals to recognize the larger social, cul­tural, and economic implications of the everyday forms of desire, subjection, and discipline they encounter, to challenge and rewrite them, and that in turn contribute to collective efforts to transform the larger structures of being, exchange, and power that sustain (and have been sustained by) these forms**. As Derrida suggests, **this is to open up** aporetic **possibilities that transgress and call into question the boundaries of the self, society, and the international that security seeks to imagine and police. The second seeks new ethical principles based on a critique of the rigid and repressive forms of identity that security has heretofore offered**. Thus writers such as Rosalyn Diprose, William Con­nolly, **and** Moira Gatens have sought **to imagine a new ethical rela­tionship that thinks difference not on the basis of the same but on the basis of a dialogue with the other that might, allow space for the unknown and unfamiliar, for a "debate and engagement with the other's law and the other's ethics"—an encounter that involves a transformation of the self rather than the other**. Thus **while the sweep and power of security must be acknowledged, it must also be refused: at the simultaneous levels of individual identity, social order**, and macroeconomic possibility, **it would entail another kind of work on "ourselves"—a political refusal of the One, the imagination of an other that never returns to the same. It would be to ask if there is a world after security, and what its shimmering possibilities might be**.

**3**

**Obama pressure ensures debt limit will be raised now**

Edward **Dovere**, “Government Shutdown: President Obama Holds the Line,” POLITICO, **10—1**—13,

<http://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/government-shutdown-president-obama-holds-the-line-97646.html?hp=f3>

President Barack **Obama started September in an agonizing, extended display of how little sway he had in Congress. He ended the month with a display of resolve and strength that could redefine his presidency**. All it took was a government shutdown. This was less a White House strategy than simply staying in the corner the House GOP had painted them into — to the White House’s surprise, **Obama was forced to do what he so rarely has as president: he said no, and he didn’t stop saying no.** For two weeks ahead of Monday night’s deadline, Obama and aides rebuffed the efforts to kill Obamacare with the kind of firm, narrow sales pitch they struggled with in three years of trying to convince people the law should exist in the first place. There was no litany of doomsday scenarios that didn’t quite come true, like in the run-up to the fiscal cliff and the sequester. No leaked plans or musings in front of the cameras about Democratic priorities he might sacrifice to score a deal. After five years of what’s often seen as Obama’s desperation to negotiate — to the fury of his liberal base and the frustration of party leaders who argue that he negotiates against himself. Even his signature health care law came with significant compromises in Congress. Instead, **over and over and over again, Obama delivered the simple line: Republicans want to repeal a law that was passed and upheld by the Supreme Court** — to give people health insurance **— or they’ll do something that everyone outside the GOP caucus meetings**, including Wall Street bankers, **seems to agree would be a ridiculous risk.** “If we lock these Americans out of affordable health care for one more year,” Obama said Monday afternoon as he listed examples of people who would enjoy better treatment under Obamacare, “if we sacrifice the health care of millions of Americans — then they’ll fund the government for a couple more months. Does anybody truly believe that we won’t have this fight again in a couple more months? Even at Christmas?” The president and his advisers weren’t expecting this level of Republican melee, a White House official said. Only during Sen. Ted Cruz’s (R-Texas) 21-hour floor speech last week did the realization roll through the West Wing that they wouldn’t be negotiating because they couldn’t figure out anymore whom to negotiate with. And even then, they didn’t believe the shutdown was really going to happen until Saturday night, when the House voted again to strip Obamacare funding. This wasn’t a credible position, Obama said again Monday afternoon, but rather, bowing to “extraneous and controversial demands” which are “all to save face after making some impossible promises to the extreme right wing of their political party.” Obama and aides have said repeatedly that they’re not thinking about the shutdown in terms of political gain, but the situation’s is taking shape for them. Congress’s approval on dealing with the shutdown was at 10 percent even before the shutters started coming down on Monday according to a new CNN/ORC poll, with 69 percent of people saying the House Republicans are acting like “spoiled children.” “The Republicans are making themselves so radioactive that the president and **Democrats can win this debate in the court of public opinion” by waiting them out**, said Jim Manley, a Democratic strategist and former aide to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid who has previously been critical of Obama’s tactics. Democratic pollster Stan Greenberg said the Obama White House learned from the 2011 debt ceiling standoff, when it demoralized fellow Democrats, deflated Obama’s approval ratings and got nothing substantive from the negotiations. “They didn’t gain anything from that approach,” Greenberg said. “I think that there’s a lot they learned from what happened the last time they ran up against the debt ceiling.” While the Republicans have been at war with each other, the White House has proceeded calmly — a breakthrough phone call with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani Friday that showed him getting things done (with the conveniently implied juxtaposition that Tehran is easier to negotiate with than the GOP conference), his regular golf game Saturday and a cordial meeting Monday with his old sparring partner Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. White House press secretary Jay Carney said Monday that the shutdown wasn’t really affecting much of anything. “It’s busy, but it’s always busy here,” Carney said. “It’s busy for most of you covering this White House, any White House. We’re very much focused on making sure that the implementation of the Affordable Care Act continues.” Obama called all four congressional leaders Monday evening — including Boehner, whose staff spent Friday needling reporters to point out that the president hadn’t called for a week. According to both the White House and Boehner’s office, the call was an exchange of well-worn talking points, and changed nothing. **Manley advised Obama to make sure people continue to see Boehner and the House Republicans as the problem and not rush into any more negotiations until public outrage forces them to bend**. “He may want to do a little outreach, but not until the House drives the country over the cliff,” Manley said Monday, before the shutdown. “Once the House has driven the country over the cliff and failed to fund the government, then it might be time to make a move.” The White House believes Obama will take less than half the blame for a shutdown – with the rest heaped on congressional Republicans. The divide is clear in a Gallup poll also out Monday: over 70 percent of self-identifying Republicans and Democrats each say their guys are the ones acting responsibly, while just 9 percent for both say the other side is. **If Obama is able to turn public opinion against Republicans, the GOP won’t be able to turn the blame back on Obama**, Greenberg said. “Things only get worse once things begin to move in a particular direction,” he said. “They don’t suddenly start going the other way as people rethink this.”

**Plan guts Obama’s negotiating cred, spills over**

**Seeking Alpha 9-10**, 9-10-2013, “Syria Could Upend Debt Ceiling Fight,” http://seekingalpha.com/article/1684082-syria-could-upend-debt-ceiling-fight

Unless President Obama can totally change a reluctant public's perception of another Middle-Eastern conflict, it seems unlikely that he can get 218 votes in the House, though he can probably still squeak out 60 votes in the Senate. **This defeat would be to**tally **unprecedented as a President has never lost a military authorization vote** in American history. **To forbid the Commander-in-Chief** of his **primary power renders him** all but **impotent**. At this point, a rebuff from the House is a 67%-75% probability. I reach this probability by looking within the whip count. I assume the 164 declared "no" votes will stay in the "no" column. To get to 218, Obama needs to win over 193 of the 244 undecided, a gargantuan task. Within the "no" column, there are 137 Republicans. Under a best case scenario, Boehner could corral 50 "yes" votes, which would require Obama to pick up 168 of the 200 Democrats, 84%. Many of these Democrats rode to power because of their opposition to Iraq, which makes it difficult for them to support military conflict. The only way to generate near unanimity among the undecided Democrats is if they choose to support the President (recognizing the political ramifications of a defeat) despite personal misgivings. The idea that all undecided Democrats can be convinced of this argument is relatively slim, especially as there are few votes to lose. In the best case scenario, the House could reach 223-225 votes, barely enough to get it through. Under the worst case, there are only 150 votes. Given the lopsided nature of the breakdown, the chance of House passage is about one in four. While a failure in the House would put action against Syria in limbo, I have felt that the market has overstated the impact of a strike there, which would be limited in nature. Rather, investors should focus on the profound ripple through the power structure in Washington, which would greatly impact impending battles over spending and the debt ceiling. Currently, the government loses spending authority on September 30 while it hits the debt ceiling by the middle of October. Markets have generally felt that Washington will once again strike a last-minute deal and avert total catastrophe. Failure in the Syrian vote could change this. **For the Republicans to beat Obama on a President's strength (foreign military action), they will likely be emboldened that they can beat him on domestic** spending **issues**. Until now, consensus has been that the two sides would compromise to fund the government at sequester levels while passing a $1 trillion stand

**Thrashes the economy**

Paul **Krugman,** Nobel Prize winning economist, “Rebels without a Clue,” NEW YORK TIMES, **9—29**—13,

<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/30/opinion/krugman-rebels-without-a-clue.html>

Still, **a government shutdown looks benign compared** with the possibility that Congress might refuse **to** raise **the debt ceiling.**

First of all, **hitting the ceiling would force a huge, immediate spending cut**, almost surely **pushing America back into recession**. Beyond that, **failure to raise the ceiling would mean missed payments on existing U.S. government debt. And that might have terrifying consequences**.

Why? **Financial markets have long treated U.S. bonds as the ultimate safe asset; the assumption that America will always honor its debts is the bedrock on which the world financial system rests**. In particular, Treasury bills — short-term U.S. bonds — are what investors demand when they want absolutely solid collateral against loans. Treasury bills are so essential for this role that in times of severe stress they sometimes pay slightly negative interest rates — that is, they’re treated as being better than cash.

Now suppose it became clear that U.S. bonds weren’t safe, that America couldn’t be counted on to honor its debts after all. Suddenly, the whole system would be disrupted. Maybe, if we were lucky, financial institutions would quickly cobble together alternative arrangements. But it looks quite possible that **default would create a huge financial crisis, dwarfing the crisis set off by the failure of Lehman Brothers** five years ago.

**Nuclear war.**

Cesare **Merlini 11**, nonresident senior fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe and chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Italian Institute for International Affairs (IAI) in Rome. He served as IAI president from 1979 to 2001. Until 2009, he also occupied the position of executive vice chairman of the Council for the United States and Italy, which he co-founded in 1983. His areas of expertise include transatlantic relations, European integration and nuclear non-proliferation, with particular focus on nuclear science and technology. A Post-Secular World? Survival, 53:2, 117 – 130

Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails **the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system**. One or more of the acute tensions apparent today **evolves into** an open and traditional conflict between **states**, perhaps even **involving** **the use of nuclear weapons**. **The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of the global economic** and financial **system**, the vulnerability of which we have just experienced, and the prospect of **a second Great Depression, with consequences for peace and democracy similar to those of the first.** Whatever the trigger, the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection of outside interference would self-interest and rejection of outside interference would likely be amplified, emptying, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of multilateralism, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as those related to immigration might become unbearable. Familiar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated. One way or another, the secular rational approach would be sidestepped by a return to theocratic absolutes, competing or converging with secular absolutes such as unbridled nationalism.

**4**

**The Executive branch of the United States federal government should restrict the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force to al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or those nations, organizations, or persons who enjoy close and well-established collaboration with al-Qaeda or the Taliban, issue a public announcement of the decision based on International Law Justifications, and implement this through self-binding mechanisms including, but not limited to independent commissions to review and ensure compliance with the order and transparency measures that gives journalists access to White House decisionmaking.**

**CP solves- functional limits create accountability and don’t link to politics**

**Michaels 11** (Jon, Professor, UCLA School of Law, “The (Willingly) Fettered Executive: Presidential Spinoffs in National Security Domains and Beyond,” *Virginia Law Review,* <http://www.virginialawreview.org/content/pdfs/97/801.pdf>)

These are revealing **case studies**, weighty in their own right and interesting complements to one another. They **give us insight into how** these strategically **important, but largely unknown, responsibilities are administered.** They show how **the Executive, rather than the** Executive’s **usual rivals—Congress and the courts—can constrain public administration**, through mechanisms within the administrative state and outside of it. And, they suggest why **the Executive might welcome those constraints (and possibly others as well)**. The studies bring into focus a new template, one with significant descriptive attributes and predictive power. They reveal an underappreciated phenomenon **where** (1) **legal constraints and political accountability checks over administrative responsibilities are** disabled**, inapplicable, or dangerous;** (2) the Executive seems surprisingly hamstrung by virtue of the absence of constraints; and (3) **the Executive appears to take steps to impose an alternative regime of administrative discipline to better carry out the responsibilities in question**. Combined, the studies reveal two alternative paths **to compensate for the lack of conventional accountability assurances.** With In-Q-Tel, **the Executive uses an external institutional redesign** seemingly **to insulate** the technology incubation process **from perverse political pressures** and to better align principal-agent interests. With CFIUS, **the President employs an internal institutional redesign with the apparent effect of limiting White House control, both for the good of the parties engaged** in the foreign-investment deal **and in service of the President’s larger foreign-policy goals.** Taken in tandem, In-Q-Tel and CFIUS present a **challenge** to **the dominant view of the Executive as power-aggrandizing.** **Equally important, however, is the fact that the acts and mechanisms of self-constraint are not obvious or celebrated. The Executive’s subtlety in these domains thus itself serves as testament to the durability and primacy of the dominant understanding.**

**5**

**Congressional restrictions cause adversaries to doubt the credibility of our threats – causes nuclear escalation**

Matthew **Waxman** 8/25/**13**, Professor of Law @ Columbia and Adjunct Senior Fellow for Law and Foreign Policy @ CFR, “The Constitutional Power to Threaten War,” Forthcoming in Yale Law Journal, vol. 123, August 25, 2013, SSRN

A claim previously advanced from a presidentialist perspective is that **stronger¶ legislative checks on war powers is harmful to coercive and deterrent strategies**, **because¶ it establishes easily-visible impediments to the President’s authority to follow through on¶ threats.** This was a common policy argument during the War Powers Resolution debates¶ in the early 1970s. Eugene Rostow, an advocate inside and outside the government for¶ executive primacy, remarked during consideration of legislative drafts that **any** serious**¶ restrictions on presidential use of force would mean in practice that “no President could¶ make a credible threat to use force as an instrument of deterrent diplomacy, even to head¶ off explosive confrontations**.”178 He continued:¶ In the tense and cautious diplomacy of our present relations with the Soviet¶ Union, as they have developed over the last twenty-five years, **the authority of the¶ President to set clear** and silent **limits** in advance **is** perhaps **the most important of**¶ **all the powers in our constitutional armory** **to prevent confrontations that could¶ carry nuclear implications. …¶** [I]t is the diplomatic power the President needs most under the¶ circumstance of modern life—**the power to make a credible threat to use force in¶ order to prevent a confrontation which might escalate**.179¶ In his veto statement on the War Powers Resolution, President Nixon echoed these¶ concerns, arguing that the law would undermine the credibility of U.S. deterrent and¶ coercive threats in the eyes of both adversaries and allies – they would know that¶ presidential authority to use force would expire after 60 days, so absent strong¶ congressional support they could assume U.S. withdrawal at that point.180 In short, those¶ who oppose tying the president’s hands with mandatory congressional authorization¶ requirements to use force sometimes argue that doing so incidentally and dangerously ties¶ his hands in threatening it. A critical assumption here is that **presidential flexibility**,¶ preserved in legal doctrine, **enhances the credibility of presidential threats to escalate**

**Solvency: 1NC (4)**

**Obama will resist the plan**

**Lobel, Pittsburgh law professor, 2008**

(Jules, “Conflicts Between the Commander in Chief and Congress: Concurrent Power over the Conduct of War”, Ohio State Law Journal, vol 69, lexis)

The critical difficulty with a contextual approach is its inherent ambiguity and lack of clarity, which tends to sharply shift the balance of power in favor of a strong President acting in disregard of congressional will. For example, the application of the Feldman and Issacharoff test asking whether the **congressional restriction** makes realistic sense in the modern world would yield no coherent separation of powers answer if applied to the current Administration’s confrontation with Congress. It **would** undoubtedly **embolden the President to ignore Congress’s strictures**. **The President’s** **advisors would argue that the** McCain Amendment’s ban on cruel and inhumane treatment, or FISA’s **requirement of a warrant, does not make realistic sense in the context of the contemporary realities of the war on terror** in which we face a shadowy, ruthless nonstate enemy that has no respect for laws or civilized conduct, a conclusion hotly disputed by those opposed to the President’s policies. Focusing the debate over whether Congress has the power to control the treatment of detainees on the President’s claim that the modern realities of warfare require a particular approach will merge the separation of powers inquiry of who has the power with the political determination of what the policy ought to be. Such an approach is likely to encourage the President to **ignore and violate legislative wartime enactments** whenever he or she believes that a statute does not make realistic sense—that is, when it conflicts with a policy the President embraces. 53 The contextual approach has a “zone of twilight” quality that Justice Jackson suggested in Youngstown. 54 Often constitutional norms matter less than political realities—**wartime reality often favors a strong President who will overwhelm** both **Congress** and the courts. While it is certainly correct— as Jackson noted—that neither the Court nor the Constitution will preserve separation of powers where Congress is too politically weak to assert its authority, a fluid contextual approach is an invitation to **Presidents** to push beyond the constitutional boundaries of their powers and **ignore legislative enactments that seek to restrict their wartime authority**. Moreover, another substantial problem with a contextual approach in the war powers context is that **the judiciary is unlikely to resolve the dispute**. 55 The persistent refusal of the judiciary to adjudicate the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution strongly suggests that courts will often refuse to intervene to resolve disputes between the President and Congress over the constitutionality of a statute that a President claims impermissibly interferes with her conduct of an ongoing war. 56 **This result leaves the political branches to engage in an intractable dispute over the statute’s constitutionality that saps the nation’s energy, diverts focus from the political issues in dispute, and endangers the rule of law**. Additionally, in wartime it is often important for issues relating to the exercise of war powers to be resolved quickly. Prompt action is not usually the forte of the judiciary. If, however, a constitutional consensus exists or could be consolidated that Congress has the authority to check the President’s conduct of warfare, that consensus might help embolden future Congresses to assert their power. Such a consensus might also help prevent the **crisis, chaos, and stalemate** **that may result when the two branches assert competing constitutional positions and**, as a practical matter, judicial review is unavailable to resolve the dispute. Moreover, the adoption of a contextual, realist approach **will** **undermine rather than aid the cooperation and compromise** **between the political branches that is so** **essential to success in wartime**. In theory, an unclear, ambiguous division of power between the branches that leaves each branch uncertain of its legal authority could further compromise and cooperation. However, **modern social science research** **suggests** that the opposite occurs. 57 Each side in the dispute is likely to grasp onto aspects or factors within the ambiguous or complex reality to support its own self-serving position. This **self-serving bias** **hardens each side’s position and allows the** **dispute to drag on**, as has happened with the ongoing, unresolved dispute over the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution. Pg. 407-409

**Means Obama just arbitrarily defines words to shirk enforcement**

**Pollack, 13** -- MSU Guggenheim Fellow and professor of history emeritus [Norman, "Drones, Israel, and the Eclipse of Democracy," Counterpunch, 2-5-13, www.counterpunch.org/2013/02/05/drones-israel-and-the-eclipse-of-democracy/, accessed 9-1-13]

Bisharat first addresses the transmogrification of international law by Israel’s military lawyers. We might call this damage control, were it not more serious. When the Palestinians first sought to join the I.C.C., and then, to receive the UN’s conferral of nonmember status on them, Israel raised fierce opposition. Why? He writes: “Israel’s frantic opposition to the elevation of Palestine’s status at the United Nations was motivated precisely by the fear that it would soon lead to I.C.C. jurisdiction over Palestinian claims of war crimes. Israeli leaders are unnerved for good reason. The I.C.C. could prosecute major international crimes committed on Palestinian soil anytime after the court’s founding on July 1, 2002.” **In response to the threat, we see the deliberate reshaping of the law:** Since 2000, “the Israel Defense Forces, guided by its **military lawyers, have attempted to remake the laws of war by consciously violating them and then creating new legal concepts to provide juridical cover** for their misdeeds.” (Italics, mine) In other words, habituate the law to the existence of atrocities; **in the US‘s case, targeted assassination, repeated often enough, seems permissible**, indeed clever and wise, **as pressure is steadily applied to the laws of war.** Even then, “collateral damage” is seen as unintentional, regrettable, but hardly prosecutable, and in the current atmosphere of complicity and desensitization, never a war crime. (**Obama is hardly a novice at this game of stretching the law to suit the convenience of**, shall we say, the **national interest**? **In order to ensure the distortion in counting civilian casualties, which would bring the number down, as Brennan with a straight face claimed, was “zero,” the Big Lie** if ever there was one, placing him in distinguished European company, **Obama redefined the meaning of “combatant” status to be any male of military age throughout the area** (which we) declared a combat zone, which noticeably led to a higher incidence of sadism, because it allowed for “second strikes” on funerals—the assumption that anyone attending must be a terrorist—and first responders, those who went to the aid of the wounded and dying, themselves also certainly terrorists because of their rescue attempts.) These guys play hardball, perhaps no more than in using—by report—the proverbial baseball cards to designate who would be next on the kill list. But funerals and first responders—verified by accredited witnesses–seems overly much, and not a murmur from an adoring public.

**Congress won’t exercise limits**

Gene **Healy 2009** (vice president at the Cato Institute) “Reclaiming the War Power” http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-handbook-policymakers/2009/9/hb111-10.pdf

 Each of these proposals has the merit of demanding that Congress carry the burden the Constitution places upon it: responsibility for the decision to go to war. **The Gelb-Slaughter plan shows particular promise.** Although Congress hasn’t declared war since 1942, reviving the formal declaration would make it harder for legislators to punt that decision to the president, as they did in Vietnam and Iraq. Hawks should see merit in making declarations mandatory, since a declaration commits those who voted for it to support the president and provide the resources he needs to prosecute the war successfully. Doves too should find much to applaud in the idea: forcing Congress to take a stand might concentrate the mind wonderfully and reduce the chances that we will find ourselves spending blood and treasure in conflicts that were not carefully examined at the outset. But we should be clear about the difficulties that comprehensive war powers reform entails. **Each of these reforms presupposes a Congress eager to be held accountable for its decisions, a judiciary with a stomach for interbranch struggles, and a voting public that rewards political actors who fight to put the presidency in its place.** Representative Jones’s Consti- tutional War Powers Resolution, which seeks to draw the judiciary into the struggle to constrain executive war making, ignores the Court’s resistance to congressional standing, as well as the 30-year history of litigation under the War Powers Resolution, a history that shows how adept the federal judiciary is at constructing rationales that allow it to avoid picking sides in battles between Congress and the president. Even if Jones’s Constitutional War Powers Resolution or Ely’s Combat Authorization Act could be passed today, and even if the courts, defying most past practice, grew bold enough to rule on whether hostilities were imminent, there would be still another difficulty; as Ely put it: **‘‘When we got down to cases and a court remanded the issue to Congress, would Congress actually be able to follow through and face the issue whether the war in question should be permitted to proceed?** Admittedly, the matter is not entirely free from doubt.’’ It’s worth thinking about how best to tie Ulysses to the mast. **But the problem with legislative schemes designed to force Congress to ‘‘do the right thing’’ is that Congress seems always to have one hand free. Statutory schemes designed to precommit legislators to particular procedures do not have a terribly promising track record. Historically, many such schemes have proved little more effective than a dieter’s note on the refrigerator. No mere statute can truly bind a future Congress,** and in areas ranging from agricultural policy to balanced budgets, **Congress has rarely hesitated to undo past agreements in the pursuit of short-term political advantage**. A : 14431$CH10 11-11-08 14:18:58 Page 113 Layout: 14431 : Odd 113 C ATO H ANDBOOK FOR P OLICYMAKERS **If checks on executive power are to be restored, we will need far less Red Team–Blue Team politicking**—**and many more legislators than we currently have who are willing to put the Constitution ahead of party loyalty**. That in turn will depend on a public willing to hold legislators accountable for ducking war powers fights and ceding vast authority to the president. Congressional courage of the kind needed to reclaim the war power will not be forthcoming unless and until American citizens demand it.

**No solvency—Covert Action Statute**

**Lawfare**, “Legality of U.S. Government’s Targeted Killing Program under Domestic Law,” 20**12**,

www.lawfareblog.com/wiki/the-lawfare-wiki-document-library/targeted-killing/legality-of-targeted-killing-program-under-u-s-domestic-law/

Nevertheless, Bradley and Goldsmith explain, **even if Congress did not authorize the U.S. government’s targeted killing program with the AUMF, the President could in theory act against terrorists presenting an imminent threat under the Covert Action Statute** (CAS), 50 U.S.C. §413b. **The CAS is potentially an important authorizing authority, as its scope extends beyond that of the AUMF, namely in that it is not limited to those terrorist groups** linked to the September 11, 2001 attacks. In other ways, though, the CAS may be narrower than the AUMF. For instance, Robert Chesney sets forth the argument that **the CAS merely authorizes that which is otherwise lawful under Article II,** and thus does not expand the scope of the President’s authority.

**Terrorism: 1NC (5)**

**No AQAP threat**

**Boone**, Former Managing Editor of Yemen Times, **‘11**

[Jeb, 5-7-11, “Yemen: the new front line in the war for Obama’s second term”,

http://jebboone.com/2011/05/07/yemen-the-new-front-line-in-the-war-for-obamas-second-term/]

However, **contrary to popular belief, AQAP is most likely comprised of around 100 religious fanatics** somewhere in Shabwa. The **operational strength and resources of AQAP is highly overestimated by western governments** and analysts. If we **look back on AQAP’s three biggest operations** since the organization’s founding in January of 2009, we can clearly see that **not only are they executed fairly cheaply** (AQAP even bragged about this in an issue of inspire) but **they really don’t take much skill to pull off. Not to mention, all the following operations ended in failure.**

**AND, they don’t have a reason AQAP will even attack Bab Al Mandab. They just read an impact without a link.**

**AND, no Bab al Mandab risk—empirically denied, and no future risk of attack.**

By Jonathan **Saul** LONDON | Fri Jun 3, 20**11** 2:57pm BST *Analysis - Vital shipping lanes can weather turmoil in Yemen* <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/06/03/uk-yemen-shipping-idUKTRE75240220110603>

At stake is **the Bab al-Mandab gateway** off Yemen's coast, through which more than 3 million barrels of oil are shipped daily to Europe, the United States and Asia.¶ "In theory, should the regime collapse, security in the region could very well spiral downward," J. Peter Pham of U.S. think tank the Atlantic Council said. "Yemen has a long 1,900-km (1,181-mile) coastline fronting both the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea."¶ **Militants have launched successful maritime attacks in the area before**. An al Qaeda suicide bombing killed 17 sailors on the U.S. warship Cole in Aden's port in 2000. Two years later, al Qaeda hit a French tanker in the Gulf of Aden, south of Bab al-Mandab.¶ Al Qaeda also plotted to hijack or sink oil tankers last year, U.S. officials said last month, based on intelligence found in Osama bin Laden's [Pakistan](http://uk.reuters.com/places/pakistan) compound.¶ Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the Yemen-based wing of the militant group, is seen by analysts as one of the main groups that could target shipping in strategic sea lane.¶ Yet **while the risks would rise if Yemen collapsed, analysts played down the likelihood of an upswing in major AQAP attacks.**¶ "**It is unlikely that AQAP would be able to gain enough of a foothold to really impact upon the Bab al-Mandab, despite past statements indicating they would aim to disrupt the strait," said** Alan Fraser, **Middle East analyst with security firm AKE**.¶ "**Sporadic** maritime **attacks are a possibility. However,** as was shown by the attack on the [Japan](http://uk.reuters.com/places/japan)ese tanker near the Strait of Hormuz in July 2010, **these are logistically hard to carry out so the threat would be unlikely to escalate beyond a sporadic threat**."¶ One seaman was hurt in the Japanese tanker attack and there was no oil spill or disruption to shipping, suggesting that the way **modern vessels are built minimises the risk of major damage**.¶ With international **naval warships now operating an anti-piracy sea corridor that passes by Yemen, maritime analysts say AQAP could also find it harder to operate without detection.**¶John Dalby, with **maritime security specialists MRM, said** that to mount a maritime attack, **AQAP would need to "marshal resources**, hardware and personnel somewhere on the coastline."¶ "It's to be hoped that **such a move would be detected by the intelligence community and in real time by the naval and military assets stationed there,"** he said.¶ Peter **Hinchliffe** with the **International Chamber of Shipping, said there appeared to be a will "to maintain the current level of warships** to **protect shipping."**¶ PIRATE RISK¶ Turmoil in Yemen could embolden the Islamist al Shabaab group, which analysts say has ties with AQAP and operates in nearby Somalia, to try and launch attacks.¶ "**While there is no evidence that AQAP and its Somali friends possess the weapons and boats necessary to shut down the strait**, this does not mean that they do not have the capability to disrupt navigation through this vital sea lane," said Pham.¶ Maritime specialists said **it was difficult to blow up or sink a tanker as they are built with a large number of separate cargo tanks, making the hull able to withstand a lot of damage.** Trying to attack a moving tanker can also be made difficult.¶ "A **tanker can deflect small boats if it knows they are approaching, by altering course to create a wash effect**. So attacks can be planned, but to carry them out you need people who know what they are doing and have a good degree of luck," a shipping source said.¶ "As **all large tankers are now built with a double hull**, or skin, around the cargo tanks, any attack would need to penetrate both hulls. These have a gap of around 3.5 metres between them. Sinking such a ship would be very difficult."¶ Despite fears that Somali pirates, who have been operating along the Yemeni coastline, could also try exploit the turmoil, **analyst say it is unlikely they would link up with militant groups because they have different objectives**.¶ "**Even if AQAP takes over large swathes of Yemen along with rebel tribesmen, we don't anticipate Somali pirates and Islamist terrorists creating some new alliance from hell," said** Michael Frodl, with **Washington-based C-Level Maritime Risks** and an adviser to Lloyd's of London underwriters.¶ "**Their interests are still very different. Pirates won't help terrorists blow up ships as long as they can still hijack them and fetch fat ransoms."**

**No WMD terrorism – lack of desire and capability – empirically the threat is overblown**

**Mueller 11**. John Mueller, Professor and Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Department of Political Science, “The Truth About al Qaeda”, 8/2/2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68012/john-mueller/the-truth-about-al-qaeda?page=show>, CMR

The chief lesson of 9/11 should have been that small bands of terrorists, using simple methods, can exploit loopholes in existing security systems. But instead, **many** preferred to **engage in mass**ive **extrapolation**: **If 19 men could hijack four airplanes** simultaneously, the thinking went, then **surely al Qaeda would soon make an atomic bomb.** As a misguided Turkish proverb holds, "If your enemy be an ant, imagine him to be an elephant." The new information unearthed in Osama bin Laden's hideout in Abbottabad, Pakistan, suggests that the United States has been doing so for a full decade. **Whatever al Qaeda's threatening rhetoric and occasional nuclear fantasies, its potential as a menace**, particularly as an atomic one, **has been much inflated**. **The public has** now **endured a decade of dire warnings about** the imminence of a **terrorist atomic attack**. In 2004, the former CIA spook Michael Scheuer proclaimed on television's 60 Minutes that it was "probably a near thing," and in 2007, the physicist Richard Garwin assessed the likelihood of a nuclear explosion in an American or a European city by terrorism or other means in the next ten years to be 87 percent. By 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates mused that what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is "the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear." **Few**, it seems, **found** much **solace in** the fact **that** **an al Qaeda computer** seized in Afghanistan in 2001 **indicated** that **the group's budget for research on w**eapons of **m**ass **d**estruction (almost all of it focused on primitive chemical weapons work) **was** some **$2,000** to $4,000. In the wake of the killing of Osama bin Laden, officials now have more al Qaeda computers, which reportedly contain a wealth of information about the workings of the organization in the intervening decade. A multi-agency task force has completed its assessment, and according to first reports, it has found that **al Qaeda members have** **primarily been engaged in dodging drone strikes and complaining about how cash-strapped they are**. Some **reports suggest** **they've** also **been looking at quite a bit of porn**ography. The full story is not out yet, but **it seems breathtakingly unlikely that the miserable little group has** had **the time or inclination, let alone the money, to set up and staff a uranium-seizing operation, as well as a** fancy, super-high-tech **facility to fabricate a bomb**. **It** is a process that **requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators** and other criminals, **obtaining and transporting** highly guarded **material**, **setting up a** machine **shop staffed with top scientists** and technicians, **and rolling the** heavy, cumbersome, and untested finished **product into position to be detonated by a skilled crew**, all the **while attracting no attention from outsiders.** The documents also reveal that after fleeing Afghanistan, bin Laden maintained what one member of the task force calls an "obsession" with attacking the United States again, even though 9/11 was in many ways a disaster for the group. It led to a worldwide loss of support, a major attack on it and on its Taliban hosts, and a decade of furious and dedicated harassment. And indeed, bin Laden did repeatedly and publicly threaten an attack on the United States. He assured Americans in 2002 that "the youth of Islam are preparing things that will fill your hearts with fear"; and in 2006, he declared that his group had been able "to breach your security measures" and that "operations are under preparation, and you will see them on your own ground once they are finished." Al Qaeda's animated spokesman, Adam Gadahn, proclaimed in 2004 that "the streets of America shall run red with blood" and that "the next wave of attacks may come at any moment." The **obsessive desire notwithstanding**, such **fulminations have clearly lacked substance**. Although hundreds of millions of people enter the United States legally every year, and countless others illegally, **no true al Qaeda cell has been found in the country since 9/11** and exceedingly few people have been uncovered who even have any sort of "link" to the organization. The closest effort at an al Qaeda operation within the country was a decidedly nonnuclear one by an Afghan-American, Najibullah Zazi, in 2009. Outraged at the U.S.-led war on his home country, Zazi attempted to join the Taliban but was persuaded by al Qaeda operatives in Pakistan to set off some bombs in the United States instead. Under surveillance from the start, he was soon arrested, and, however "radicalized," he has been talking to investigators ever since, turning traitor to his former colleagues. Whatever training Zazi received was inadequate; he repeatedly and desperately sought further instruction from his overseas instructors by phone. At one point, he purchased bomb material with a stolen credit card, guaranteeing that the purchase would attract attention and that security video recordings would be scrutinized. Apparently, his handlers were so strapped that they could not even advance him a bit of cash to purchase some hydrogen peroxide for making a bomb. For al Qaeda, then, the operation was a failure in every way -- except for the ego boost it got by inspiring the usual dire litany about the group's supposedly existential challenge to the United States, to the civilized world, to the modern state system. Indeed, **no** Muslim **extremist has succeeded in detonating** even **a simple bomb in the U**nited **S**tates **in the last ten years**, and except for the attacks on the London Underground in 2005, neither has any in the United Kingdom. **It seems wildly unlikely that al Qaeda is remotely ready to go nuclear**. Outside of war zones, the amount of killing carried out by **al Qaeda** and al Qaeda linkees, maybes, and wannabes throughout the entire world since 9/11 stands at perhaps a few hundred per year. That's a few hundred too many, of course, but it **scarcely presents an existential**, or elephantine, **threat**. And **the likelihood that a**n **American will be killed by a terrorist** of any ilk **stands at one in 3.5 million per year**, even with 9/11 included. **That probability will remain unchanged** unless terrorists are able to increase their capabilities massively -- and obtaining nuclear weapons would allow them to do so. Although al Qaeda may have dreamed from time to time about getting such weapons, no other terrorist group has even gone so far as to indulge in such dreams, with the exception of the Japanese cult **Aum Shinrikyo**, which leased the mineral rights to an Australian sheep ranch that sat on uranium deposits, purchased some semi-relevant equipment, and tried to buy a finished bomb from the Russians. That experience, however, **cannot be very encouraging to** the would-be atomic **terrorist**. Even though it was flush with funds and undistracted by drone attacks (or even by much surveillance), **Aum Shinrikyo abandoned its atomic efforts in frustration very early on. It then moved to bio**logical **weapons**, another complete failure that inspired its leader to suggest that fears expressed in the United States of a biological attack were actually a ruse to tempt terrorist groups to pursue the weapons. **The group did** finally **manage to release some sarin gas** in a Tokyo subway **that killed 13 and led to the group's terminal shutdown, as well as to 16 years** (and counting) **of pronouncements that WMD terrorism is the wave of the future. No elephants there, either**.

**They don’t solve Bioterror—their Allison evidence just says Al Qaeda but doesn’t pass the smell test. No warrant Al Qaeda is the only terror group that do bioterror. Their MSNBC evidence is unqualified and says that bioterror is so easy that it’s logically inevitable.**

**--No extinction**

**Easterbrook ’01**

[Gregg, Editor of the New Republic, Wired, Nov. 17, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday\_pr.html]

Like chemical agents, **biological weapons have never lived up to their billing in popular culture**. Consider the 1995 medical thriller Outbreak, in which a highly contagious virus takes out entire towns. The reality is quite different. Weaponized smallpox escaped from a Soviet laboratory in Aralsk, Kazakhstan, in 1971; three people died, no epidemic followed. In 1979, weapons-grade anthrax got out of a Soviet facility in Sverdlovsk (now called Ekaterinburg); 68 died, no epidemic. The loss of life was tragic, but no greater than could have been caused by a single conventional bomb. In 1989, workers at a US government facility near Washington were accidentally exposed to Ebola virus. They walked around the community and hung out with family and friends for several days before the mistake was discovered. No one died. The fact is, evolution has spent millions of years conditioning mammals to resist germs. Consider the Black Plague. It was the worst known pathogen in history, loose in a Middle Ages society of poor public health, awful sanitation, and no antibiotics. Yet it didn't kill off humanity. **Most people who were caught in the epidemic survived. Any superbug introduced into today's Western world would encounter top-notch public health, excellent sanitation, and an array of medicines specifically engineered to kill bioagents**. Perhaps one day some aspiring Dr. Evil will invent a bug that bypasses the immune system. Because it is possible some novel superdisease could be invented, or that existing pathogens like smallpox could be genetically altered to make them more virulent (two-thirds of those who contract natural smallpox survive), biological agents are a legitimate concern. **They may turn increasingly troublesome as time passes and knowledge of biotechnology becomes harder to control, allowing individuals or small groups to cook up nasty germs as readily as they can buy guns today. But no superplague has ever come close to wiping out humanity before, and it seems unlikely to happen in the future**.

**Plan crushes counterterror**

Geoffrey **Corn**, Professor, Law, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, 5—16—**13**, LN.

Because I do not believe there is inconsistency between the nature of U.S. operations to date and these inherent limitations, I do not believe it is necessary at this point in time to modify the AUMF. Instead, I believe that Congress should continue to engage in oversight to remain fully apprised of the strategic, operational, and at times tactical decisionmaking processes that result in the employment of U.S. combat power pursuant to the statute, enabling Congress to ensure that such use falls within the scope of an authorization targeted at al Qaeda, intended to protect the Nation from future terrorist attacks, and that these operations reflect unquestioned commitment to the principles of international law that regulate the use of military force during any armed conflict. I believe the AUMF effectively addresses the belligerent threat against the United States posed by terrorist groups. I emphasize the term ‘‘belligerent’’ for an important reason. It is obvious that the AUMF has granted authority to use the Nation’s military power against threats falling within its scope. Therefore, only those organizations that pose a risk of sufficient magnitude to justify invoking the authority associated with armed conflict should be included within that scope as a result of their affiliation with al Qaeda. Determining what groups properly fall within this scope is, therefore, both critical and challenging. **The AUMF provides the President with the necessary flexibility to tailor U.S. operations to the evolving nature of this unconventional enemy, maximizing the efficacy of U.S. efforts to deny al Qaeda the freedom of action** they possessed in Afghanistan prior to Operation Enduring Freedom. In reaction to this evolution, the United States has employed combat power against what the prior panel referred to as associated forces or co-belligerents of al Qaeda, belligerent groups assessed to adhere to the overall terrorist objectives of the organization and engage in hostilities alongside al Qaeda directed against the United States or its interests. The focused on shared ideology, tactics, and indicia of connection between high-level group leaders seems both logical and legitimate for including these offshoots of al Qaeda within the scope of the AUMF as co-belligerents, a determination that, based on publicly available information, has to date been limited to groups seeking the sanctuary of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas, Yemen, or Somalia. If Congress does, however, choose to revise the AUMF, I do not believe that the revision should incorporate **an exclusive list of defined co-belligerent groups, a geographic scope limitation, or some external oversight of targeting decisions, all of which would undermine the efficacy of U.S. operations by signaling to the enemy limits on U.S. operational and tactical reach. It is an operational and tactical axiom that insurgent and non- state threats rarely seek the proverbial toe-to-toe confrontation** with clearly superior military forces. Al Qaeda is no different. Indeed, their attempts to engage in such tactics in the initial phases of Operation Enduring Freedom proved disastrous. Incorporating such **limitations into the AUMF would, therefore, be inconsistent with the operational objective of seizing and retaining the initiative against this unconventional enemy** and the strategic objective of preventing future terrorist attacks against the United States. Finally, I believe to target decisionmaking during armed conflict is a quintessential command function and that **the President,** acting in his own capacity or through subordinate officers, **should make these decisions**. He and his subordinates bear an obligation to ensure compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict and other principles of international law when employing U.S. combat power. Every subordinate officer in the chain of command is sworn to uphold and defend the constitution which, by implication, also requires compliance with this law. I believe the level of commitment to ensuring such compliance in structure, process, education, training, and internal oversight is more significant today than at any time in our Nation’s history. As one familiar with all these aspects of the compliance process, I am discouraged by the common assertion that there is insufficient oversight for targeting decisions. Furthermore, I believe few people better understand the immense moral burden associated with a decision to order lethal attack than experienced military leaders who never take these decisions lightly. If our confidence in these leaders to make sound military decisions is sufficient to entrust to them the lives of our sons and daughters—and on this point, again I must admit my self-interest as my son is a second-year cadet in the U.S. Air Force Academy and my brother is a serving colonel in the United States Army—I believe it must be sufficient to judge when and how to employ lethal combat power against an enemy. These leaders spend their entire professional careers immersed in the operational, moral, ethical, and legal aspects of employing combat power. I just do not believe some external oversight mechanism or a Federal judge is more competent to make these extremely difficult and weighty judgments as the people that this Nation entrusts for that responsibility. Finally, I would like to make one comment on the very hotly discussed issue of associated forces and the scope of the AUMF. In my view, when the administration refers to an associated or affiliated force, it is referring to a process of mutation that this organization undergoes. Obviously, we are dealing with an enemy that is going to seek every asymmetrical tactic to avoid the capability of the United States to disrupt or disable its operations. Part of that tactic, I think is to recruit and grow affiliated organizations. I certainly understand the logic of wanting to include those organizations within the scope of a revised AUMF. My concern echoes that of Senator Inhofe, which is the risk is **if you open that Pandora’s box, what other changes to this authority might be included in the statute which I believe could denigrate or limit the effectiveness of U.S. military operations**. And so while I believe Congress absolutely has an important function to ensure that the use of force under the statute is consistent with the underlying principles that frame the enactment of the AUMF, which is to defeat al Qaeda as an entity in the corporate sense and protect the United States from future terrorist attacks, I do not believe at this point in time it is necessary to modify the statute.

#### No oil shocks-several factors check.

**Whitehouse 10** (12-19, Mark, deputy bureau chief for The Wall Street Journal “Oil Prices Seen as a Threat Again”, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703395904576025762319723364.html>

In the physical market, oil producers have ample capacity to keep prices in check. The International Energy Agency estimates spare capacity among Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries at 6.4% of global demand, nearly double the level of late 2007. As of the end of November, the world had enough oil in its inventories to cover demand for 20 days without drying out pipelines and refineries, according to data provider Oil Market Intelligence. That's up from 14 days in November 2007. Thanks to the added inventories, "the broader economy is now more insulated from oil shocks" than it was back in 2008, says Philip Verleger, an energy economist at the University of Calgary's Haskayne School of Business. While many see speculative investment as a source of volatility, it might actually help prevent a spike, says Mr. Verleger. By pushing up the price of oil to be delivered in future months, investors have made it more attractive for traders to buy oil now and hold it for future sale. That, in turn, keeps inventories higher, providing a cushion that can limit price swings in the event of sudden changes in supply and demand. If the price of oil does rise further, it won't necessarily do economic damage. For one, the price spike of 2008 led many people and companies to cut back on energy consumption, a shift that could make them more resilient to price increases this time around. Beyond that, oil-price increases can have little to no impact if they correspond to a decrease in the value of the dollar against other currencies. Because oil is bought and sold in dollars, it doesn't become more expensive for most of the world's buyers unless the price increase exceeds the drop in the dollar. And in the U.S., the export boost from a cheaper dollar can create more jobs, offsetting the pain of higher prices at the gas pump.

### New Advantage

#### Realist theory disproves the advantage

JM Greico- professor of political science at Duke University, 1993 “Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate”¶ edited by David Allen Baldwin, chapter entitled “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism” p. 116-118

Realism has dominated international relations theory at least since World War II.' For realists, international anarchy fosters competition and conflict among states and inhibits their willingness to cooperate even when they share common interests. Realist theory also argues that international institutions are unable to mitigate anarchy's constraining effects on interstate cooperation. Realism, then, presents a pessimistic analysis of the prospects for international cooperation and of the capabilities of international institutions.2¶ The major challenger to realism has been what I shall call liberal institutionalism. Prior to the current decade, it appeared in three successive presentations—functionalist integration theory in the 1940s and early 1950s, neofunctionalist regional integration theory in the 1950s and 1960s, and interdependence theory in the 1970s.3 All three versions rejected realism's propositions about states and its gloomy understanding of world politics. Most significantly, they argued that international institutions can help states cooperate. Thus, compared to realism, these earlier versions of liberal institutionalism offered a more hopeful prognosis for international cooperation and a more optimistic assessment of the capacity of institutions to help states achieve it.¶ International tensions and conflicts during the 1970s undermined liberal institutionalism and reconfirmed realism in large measure. Yet that difficult decade did not witness a collapse of the international system, and in the light of continuing modest levels of interstate cooperation, a new liberal institutionalist challenge to realism came forward during the early 1980s (Stein 1983:115-40; Axelrod 1984; Keohane 1984; Lipson 1984; Axelrod and Keohane 1985). What is distinctive about this newest liberal institutionalism is its claim that it accepts a number of core realist propositions, including, apparently, the realist argument that anarchy impedes the achievement of international cooperation. However, the core liberal arguments—that realism overemphasizes conflict and underestimates the capacities of international institutions to promote cooperation—remain firmly intact. The new liberal institutionalists basically argue that even if the realists are correct in believing that anarchy constrains the willingness of states to cooperate, states nevertheless can work together and can do so especially with the assistance of international institutions.¶ This point is crucial for students of international relations. If neo-liberal institutionalists are correct, then they have dealt realism a major blow while providing ine intellectual justification for treating their own approach, and the tradition from which it emerges, as the most effective for understanding world politics.¶ This essay's principal argument is that, in fact, neoliberal institutionalism misconstrues the realist analysis of international anarchy and therefore it misunderstands the realist analysis of the impact of anarchy on the preferences and actions of states. Indeed, the new liberal institutionalism fails to address a major constraint on the willingness of states to cooperate which is generated by international anarchy and which is identified by realism. As a result, the new theory's optimism about international cooperation is likely to be proven wrong.¶ Neoliberalism's claims about cooperation are based on its belief that states are atomistic actors. It argues that states seek to maximize their individual absolute gains and are indifferent to the gains achieved by others. Cheating, the new theory suggests, is the greatest impediment to cooperation among rationally egoistic states, but international institutions, the new theory also suggests, can help states overcome this barrier to joint action. Realists understand that states seek absolute gains and worry about compliance. However, realists¶ find that states are positional, not atomistic, in character, and therefore realists argue that, in addition to concerns about cheating, states in cooperative arrangements also worry that their partners might gain more from cooperation that they do. For realists, a state will focus both on its absolute and relative gains from cooperation, and a state that is satisfied with a partner's compliance in a joint arrangement might nevertheless exit from it because the partner is achieving relatively greater gains. Realism, then, finds that there are at least two major barriers to international cooperation: state concerns about cheating and state concerns about relative achievements of gains. Neoliberal institutionalism pays attention exclusively to the former and is unable to identify, analyze, or account for the latter.¶ Realism's identification of the relative gains problem for cooperation is based on its insight that states in anarchy fear for their survival as independent actors. According to realists, states worry that today's friend may be tomorrow's enemy in war, and fear that achievements of joint gains that advantage a friend in the present might produce a more dangerous potential foe in the future. As a result, states must give serious attention to the gains of partners. Neoliber-als fail to consider the threat of war arising from international anarchy, and this allows them to ignore the matter of relative gains and to assume that states only desire absolute gains. Yet in doing so, they fail to identify a major source of state inhibitions about international cooperation.¶ In sum, I suggest that realism, its emphasis on conflict and competition notwithstanding, offers a more complete understanding of the problem of international cooperation than does its latest liberal challenger. If that is true, then realism is still the most powerful theory of international politics.

#### Soft power won’t maintain hegemony or solve global problems – hard power key

Quinn 11 Adam Quinn, Lecturer in International Studies at the University of Birmingham, “The art of declining politely: Obama’s prudent presidency and the waning of American power”, 7/1/2011, International Affairs 87:4 (2011) 803–824, Wiley Online, CMR

Nevertheless, this qualification demands two further qualifications of its own. The first is that if we consider ‘soft power’ as a national attribute then it is difficult to separate it with confidence from the economic and military dimensions of power. Is it really likely that America’s ideological and cultural influence will endure undiminished in the absence of the platform of military and economic primacy upon which it has been constructed? It may be overstatement to suggest that, borrowing Marxist terminology, hard power represents the ‘base’ and soft power mere ‘superstructure’. But one could plausibly argue that even America’s non-coercive power and political appeal are inextricably entwined with the status conferred upon it by possession of a preponderance of material resources. While vestigial soft power may delay or mitigate the consequences of relative material decline, it is surely unrealistic to expect it to override them such as to allow the US to continue to exercise the same influence in a multipolar or non-polar world as it did in a unipolar one.¶ The second qualification is that the definition of power as control over behaviour or outcomes is not the only plausible one, or the only one that matters. In his seminal Theory of international politics, Kenneth Waltz criticized the relational definition of power, which in his words ‘equates power with control’ and ‘confuses process with outcome’.38 Defining power by reference to whether or not one can engineer one’s preferred outcomes, Waltz argued, logically collapses the space needed for consideration of how judicious strategy is required to translate raw power into results, because under the relational definition being powerful is simply the same thing as achieving one’s desired outcomes, and weakness equates with the failure to do so. Instead, Waltz commended the ¶ and simple notion that an agent is powerful to the extent that he affects others more than they affect him. The weak understand this; the strong may not. Prime Minister Trudeau once said that, for Canada, being America’s neighbour ‘is in some ways like sleeping with an elephant. No matter how friendly or even-tempered is the beast … one is affected by every twitch and grunt.’39¶ This definition makes eminent intuitive sense, and captures something important which the relational conception of power does not. In addressing the declinist argument, it is something of a detour to argue that the US may continue to exercise influence through other means even as its relative resource advantage diminishes. This may be true, but it remains the case that, simply put, the ‘size of the elephant’, which is to say the relative disproportionate effect of America’s actions upon others, will be decreasing. This in all likelihood has implications for the realization of those goals with which it identifies itself. But even if the United States should somehow play its hand so well that it continues to obtain many desired outcomes, such a change would remain significant in its own right.

#### No impact to credibility---allies won’t abandon us and adversaries can’t exploit it

Stephen M. Walt 11 the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, December 5, 2011, “Does the U.S. still need to reassure its allies?,” online: <http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/05/us_credibility_is_not_our_problem>

A perennial preoccupation of U.S. diplomacy has been the perceived need to reassure allies of our reliability. Throughout the Cold War, U.S. leaders worried that any loss of credibility might cause dominoes to fall, lead key allies to "bandwagon" with the Soviet Union, or result in some form of "Finlandization." Such concerns justified fighting so-called "credibility wars" (including Vietnam), where the main concern was not the direct stakes of the contest but rather the need to retain a reputation for resolve and capability. Similar fears also led the United States to deploy thousands of nuclear weapons in Europe, as a supposed counter to Soviet missiles targeted against our NATO allies.

The possibility that key allies would abandon us was almost always exaggerated, but U.S. leaders remain overly sensitive to the possibility. So Vice President Joe Biden has been out on the road this past week, telling various U.S. allies that "the United States isn't going anywhere." (He wasn't suggesting we're stuck in a rut, of course, but saying that the imminent withdrawal from Iraq doesn't mean a retreat to isolationism or anything like that.)

There's nothing really wrong with offering up this sort of comforting rhetoric, but I'venever really understood why U.S. leaders were so worried about the credibility of our commitments to others. For starters, given our remarkably secure geopolitical position, whether U.S. pledges are credible is first and foremost a problem for those who are dependent on U.S. help. We should therefore take our allies' occasional hints about realignment or neutrality with some skepticism; they have every incentive to try to make us worry about it, but in most cases little incentive to actually do it.

**Other nations will still cooperate with the U.S. even if it’s unpopular – empirically proven by Bush
Kagan, ‘6**

[Robert Kagan, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, writes a monthly column for The Post., “Still the Colossus,” The Washington Post, January 15, 2006, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=17894&prog=zgp&proj=zusr]

The striking thing about the present international situation is the degree to which America remains what Bill Clinton once called "the indispensable nation." Despite global opinion polls registering broad hostility to George W. Bush's **U**nited **S**tates, the behavior of governments and political leaders suggests America's position in the world is not all that different from what it was before Sept. 11 and the Iraq war.  The much-anticipated global effort to balance against American hegemony -- which the realists have been anticipating for more than 15 years now -- has simply not occurred. On the contrary, in Europe the idea has all but vanished. European Union defense budgets continue their steady decline, and even the project of creating a common foreign and defense policy has slowed if not stalled. Both trends are primarily the result of internal European politics. But if they really feared American power, Europeans would be taking more urgent steps to strengthen the European Union's hand to check it.  Nor are Europeans refusing to cooperate, even with an administration they allegedly despise. Western Europe will not be a strategic partner as it was during the Cold War, because Western Europeans no longer feel threatened and therefore do not seek American protection. Nevertheless, the current trend is toward closer cooperation. Germany's new government, while still dissenting from U.S. policy in Iraq, is working hard and ostentatiously to improve relations. It is bending over backward to show support for the mission in Afghanistan, most notably by continuing to supply a small but, in German terms, meaningful number of troops. It even trumpets its willingness to train Iraqi soldiers. Chancellor Angela Merkel promises to work closely with Washington on the question of the China arms embargo, indicating agreement with the American view that China is a potential strategic concern. For Eastern and Central Europe, the growing threat is Russia, not America, and the big question remains what it was in the 1990s: Who will be invited to join NATO?

**Anti-americanism does not translate into policy changes because other nations understand the advantages.
Mandelbaum, ‘6**

[Michael Mandelbaum, Christian A. Herter professor of American foreign policy at The Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, “David’s Friend Goliath,” January/February 2006, Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/users/login.php?story\_id=3331&URL=http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story\_id=3331&print=1]

Nor is the world likely to express much gratitude to the United States any time soon. Even if they privately value what the **U**nited **S**tates does for the world, other countries, especially democratic ones, will continue to express anti-American sentiments. That is neither surprising nor undesirable. Within democracies, spirited criticism of the government is normal, indeed vital for its effective performance. The practice is no different between and among democracies.  Anti-Americanism has many domestic political uses. In many parts of the world, the **U**nited **S**tates serves as a convenient scapegoat for governments, a kind of political lightning rod to draw away from themselves the popular discontent that their shortcomings have helped to produce. That is particularly the case in the Middle East, but not only there. Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder achieved an electoral victory in 2002 by denouncing the war in Iraq. Similarly, it is convenient, even comforting, to blame the United States for the inevitable dislocations caused by the great, impersonal forces of globalization.  But neither the failure to acknowledge America’s global role nor the barrage of criticism of it means that the officials of other countries are entirely unaware of the advantages that it brings them. If a global plebiscite concerning America’s role in the world were held by secret ballot, most foreign-policy officials in other countries would vote in favor of continuing it. Though the Chinese object to the U.S. military role as Taiwan’s protector, they value the effect that American military deployments in East Asia have in preventing Japan from pursuing more robust military policies. But others will not declare their support for America’s global role. Acknowledging it would risk raising the question of why those who take advantage of the services America provides do not pay more for them. It would risk, that is, other countries’ capacities to continue as free riders, which is an arrangement no government will lightly abandon.

#### Alliances don’t solve anything – Gulf War proves that countries will hate us no matter what.

Krauthammer, ‘3 (Charles, The National Interest, Winter 2002/2003)

A third critique comes from what might be called pragmatic realists, who see the new unilateralism I have outlined as hubristic, and whose objections are practical. They are prepared to engage in a pragmatic multilateralism. They value great power concert. They seek Security Council support not because it confers any moral authority, but because it spreads risk. In their view, a single hegemon risks far more violent resentment than would a power that consistently acts as primus inter pares, sharing rule-making functions with others.12 I have my doubts. The United States made an extraordinary effort in the Gulf War to get un support, share decision-making, assemble a coalition and, as we have seen, deny itself the fruits of victory in order to honor coalition goals. Did that diminish the anti-American feeling in the region? Did it garner support for subsequent Iraq policy dictated by the original acquiescence to the coalition? The attacks of September 11 were planned during the Clinton Administration, an administration that made a fetish of consultation and did its utmost to subordinate American hegemony and smother unipolarity. The resentments were hardly assuaged. Why? Because the extremist rage against the United States is engendered by the very structure of the international system, not by the details of our management of it.

**The impact is empirically false. The US has trampled on international law from the beginning**

Steven **Holloway**, professor of political science at St. Francis Xavier University, Global Governance, July-September **2000**, p. 363.

There are, after all, grounds for doubting the constancy of the U.S. commitment to multilateralism. In negotiations leading to the 1997 landmine treaty and the 1998 international criminal court treaty, the United States not only refused to lead the world community but--in a striking display of unilateralism--also refused to sign agreements supported by a majority of states and most of its Western allies. This behavior led the Economist, a British magazine not usually noted as a bastion of radicalism or anti-U.S. sentiment, to publish an editorial in December 1998 calling the United States "a two-faced, half-hearted friend" rather than a champion of international law. Important indicators of multilateralism are the negotiation and support of new international norms. However, as the editorial observed, "the United States has a sorry record of shilly-shallying, or plain obstruction, in the development of international law. Instead of leading, America has ratified many human-rights treaties only after most other countries have already done so." A litany followed. It took 40 years to ratify the Genocide Convention, 28 for the Convention Against Racial Discrimination, 26 for even the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the most important treaty of all. Over 160 countries have ratified the convention banning discrimination against women but not the United States. Only two in the world have not ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child. . . . And even when America has ratified treaties, it has often attached extensive reservations, making them inapplicable at home. It has also paid scant respect to monitoring mechanisms set up by the treaties, and to the International Court of Justice in The Hague. . . . Alone among its allies, it now opposes the permanent international criminal court endorsed by 120 nations at a UN conference last July primarily because it could not win an absolute exemption for its own soldiers. In assessing commitment to multinationalism, the UN also provides an important benchmark. But consider the unilateralist behavior of the United States at the UN in the selection of the last secretary-general and the ongoing financial crisis provoked by nonpayment of U.S. dues. [4] Any observer of the UN General Assembly in the 1980s would more likely be impressed with the obvious unilateral nature of U.S. voting behavior. In the last year of the Bush administration--after the end of the Cold War and the supposed creation of a new world order--the U.S. representative to the Forty-seventh General Assembly was moved to vote "nay" on 61 percent of final resolutions adopted by a majority of the membership. This record was unmatched even by Israel, the second most "nonaccommodating" member, which had a record of voting against the majority only 45 percent of the time.

**Too weak to accomplish anything**

**Stark 2002** – Visiting Professor of Law at Hofstra Law School (Barbara, Violations of Human Dignity' and Postmodern International Law, 27 Yale J. Int'l L. 315, Summer)

Unlike domestic law, international law remains fragmentary: there is no Supreme Court to reconcile warring districts, no legislature to fill in doctrinal gaps. Indeed, international "law -making" is often so contentious that no law is made at all; in many areas there are more gaps than law. International law is unapologetically "discontinuous"; the decisions of the International Court of Justice have no precedential value, and those of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) are similarly ad hoc. Treaty law applies only to the specific subject the particular treaty addresses and is binding only on the parties to the treaty. While customary international law ("CIL") applies more broadly, states may persistently dissent from CIL and exempt themselves from its coverage. Many of the broad general principals that comprise CIL, moreover, such as the duty to avoid harm to neighboring states, prove difficult to apply in specific cases.

#### Multilat fails

**Holmes 10**-VP, foreign policy and defense studies, Heritage. Frmr Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs. While at the State Department, Holmes was responsible for developing policy and coordinating U.S. engagement at the United Nations and 46 other international organizations. Member of the CFR. Frmr adjunct prof of history, Georgetown. PhD in history, Georgetown (Kim, Smart Multilateralism and the United Nations, 21 Sept. 2010, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/09/smart-multilateralism-when-and-when-not-to-rely-on-the-united-nations)

The need for multilateralism is obvious. Nations share concerns about many problems and issues for which coordinated efforts could be mutually beneficial. Yet only rarely do all governments agree on the nature of a problem and the means to address it. At times, negotiations result in a less-than-perfect, but still acceptable, course of action. Disagreements can also lead to no action or the use of force or other confrontational measures. One of the purposes of multilateralism is to minimize the number and intensity of such confrontations. The process itself, however, is fraught with political challenges that can undermine potential solutions and even lead to other problems. For the United States, multilateralism faces its greatest challenge at the United Nations, where U.S. diplomats seek cooperative action among member nations on serious international problems. Therein lies the tension. The United Nations is first and foremost a political body made up of 192 states that rarely agree on any one issue. Even fundamental issues, such as protecting and observing human rights, a key purpose of the U.N. that all member states pledge to uphold when they join it, have become matters of intense debate. A key reason for this difficulty is the fact that the voices and votes of totalitarian and authoritarian regimes have equal weight to those of free nations at the

U.N. The all-too-frequent clash of worldviews between liberty and authoritarian socialism has stymied multilateralism more than facilitated it, frequently leading to institutional paralysis when a unified response to grave threats to peace and security or human rights and fundamental freedoms was needed. U.S. secretary of state John Foster Dulles, who attended the San Francisco meetings that established the U.N., acknowledged this Achilles’ heel in 1954, when he told reporters: “The United Nations was not set up to be a reformatory. It was assumed that you would be good before you got in and not that being in would make you good.”[[1]](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/09/smart-multilateralism-when-and-when-not-to-rely-on-the-united-nations%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn1) Fifty-five years later, the ideological fray at the U.N. has turned the terms “democracy” and “freedom” on their heads. Autocracies that deny democratic liberties at home are all too keen to call the Security Council “undemocratic” because in their view not every region, country, or bloc is sufficiently represented. During my time at the State Department, I was told repeatedly by other diplomats at the U.N. that the very concept of “freedom” is taboo because the term is “too ideologically charged.” In this environment, how can the United States or any freedom-loving country advance the purposes set forth in the U.N. Charter, including “encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all,”[[2]](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/09/smart-multilateralism-when-and-when-not-to-rely-on-the-united-nations%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn2) when the word “freedom” itself is considered too controversial? More money will not do it. No other nation contributes more to the U.N.’s regular budget, its peacekeeping budget, or the budgets of its myriad affiliated organizations and activities than the United States. America has continued its generous support even though Americans increasingly view the U.N. as inefficient and ineffective at best and fraudulent, wasteful, anti-American, and beyond reform at worst.[[3]](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/09/smart-multilateralism-when-and-when-not-to-rely-on-the-united-nations%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn3) If the United States is to advance its many interests in the world, it needs to pursue multilateral diplomacy in a smarter, more pragmatic manner. This is especially true when Washington is considering actions taken through the United Nations. A decision to engage multilaterally should meet two criteria: First, it should be in America’s interests, and second, it will serve to advance liberty. Unless the United States can achieve both these ends acting within the U.N. system, it should find ways to work around it. Such “smart multilateralism” is not easy, particularly in multilateral settings. It requires politically savvy leaders who can overcome decades-old bureaucratic inertia at the State Department and in international organizations. It requires the political will and diplomatic skill of people who are dedicated to advancing U.S. interests in difficult environments, especially where progress will likely be slow and incremental. It requires a belief in the cause of liberty, gleaned from a thorough study of our nation’s history and the U.S. Constitution, and a deep appreciation for the values and principles that have made America great. Smart multilateralism requires a fundamental awareness of the strengths and weaknesses, capabilities and failings, of the U.N. and other multilateral negotiating forums, so that the United States does not overreach. Perhaps the most critical decision is whether or not to take a matter to the U.N. in the first place. It would be better to restrict U.S. engagement at the U.N. to situations in which success is possible or engagement will strengthen America’s influence and reputation. Selective engagement increases the potential for success, and success breeds success. When America is perceived to be a skillful and judicious multilateral player, it finds it easier to press its case. Smart multilateralism thus requires well-formulated and clear policy positions and a willingness to hold countries accountable when their votes do not align with our interests. Finally, smart multilateralism is not the same thing as “smart power,” a term that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has used. Suzanne Nossell, a former diplomat at the U.S. Mission to the U.N. in New York, coined that term in 2004 and described it in an article in *Foreign Affairs*.[[4]](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/09/smart-multilateralism-when-and-when-not-to-rely-on-the-united-nations%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn4) Smart power is seen as a takeoff of “soft power,” which suggests that America’s leaders downplay the nation’s military might as well as its historic role in establishing an international system based on the values of liberty and democracy, and de-emphasize its immense economic and military (“hard”) power. Smart power seeks to persuade other countries from a position of assumed equality among nations. This assumption has become the Achilles’ heel of the U.N. system and other Cold War–era organizations. Smart multilateralism does not make that same mistake. Challenges to Effective U.S. Multilateralism The United States belongs to dozens of multilateral organizations, from large and well-known organizations such as NATO, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the International Monetary Fund to relatively small niche organizations such as the Universal Postal Union and the International Bureau of Weights and Measures. The 2009 congressional budget justification[[5]](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/09/smart-multilateralism-when-and-when-not-to-rely-on-the-united-nations%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn5) for the U.S. Department of State included line items for U.S. contributions to some fifty distinct international organizations and budgets.[[6]](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/09/smart-multilateralism-when-and-when-not-to-rely-on-the-united-nations%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn6)The United Nations and its affiliated bodies receive the lion’s share of these contributions. While the World Bank and International Monetary Fund weight voting based on contributions, most of these organizations subscribe to the notion of the equality of nations’ votes. With a few exceptions such as Taiwan,[[7]](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/09/smart-multilateralism-when-and-when-not-to-rely-on-the-united-nations%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn7) all nations—no matter how small or large, free or repressed, rich or poor—have a seat at the U.N. table. Every nation’s vote is equal, despite great differences in geographic size, population, military or economic power, and financial contributions.

## 2NC

### T

#### Presumption--NDAA doesn’t apply to citizens, LPRs, or anyone captured in the US- also doesn’t affect the AUMF

NAME: Colby P. Horowitz 13 BIO: \* J.D. Candidate, 2014, Fordham University School of Law. Captain, U.S. Army, participating in the Funded Legal Education Program. April, 2013 Fordham Law Review 81 Fordham L. Rev. 2853 LENGTH: 27336 words SYMPOSIUM: THE GOALS OF ANTITRUST: NOTE: CREATING A MORE MEANINGFUL DETENTION STATUTE: LESSONS LEARNED FROM HEDGES V. OBAMA. Lexis

President Obama commented that, despite new language in the NDAA that is not included in the AUMF, section 1021 "breaks no new ground and is unnecessary." n97 The President's interpretation is supported by a subsection of section 1021 titled "Construction," which states that "nothing in this section is intended to limit or expand the authority of the President or the scope of the [AUMF]." n98 Another subsection, titled "Authorities," further limits section 1021 by declaring that "nothing in this section shall be construed to affect existing law or authorities relating to the detention of United States citizens, lawful resident aliens of the United States, or any other persons who are captured or arrested in the United States." n99

### AT: We Restrict Broad Presidential Interpretation

**Authority is delegated power to act**

**Kelly**, **2003** (judge for the State of Michigan, JOSEPH ELEZOVIC, Plaintiff, and LULA ELEZOVIC, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY and DANIEL P. BENNETT, Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants., No. 236749, COURT OF APPEALS OF MICHIGAN, 259 Mich. App. 187; 673 N.W.2d 776; 2003 Mich. App. LEXIS 2649; 93 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 244; 92 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1557, lexis)

Applying agency principles, a principal is responsible for the acts of its agents done within the scope of the agent's authority, "even though acting contrary to instructions." [Dick Loehr's, Inc v Secretary of State, 180 Mich. App. 165, 168; 446 N.W.2d 624 (1989)](https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=6cbcd97524abff5644c0987b135f7517&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b259%20Mich.%20App.%20187%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_origin=TOASHLX&_butNum=115&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b180%20Mich.%20App.%20165%2cat%20168%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=136&_startdoc=101&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkAk&_md5=708331d40466e4347936b73e103c82fb). This is because, in part, an agency relationship arises where the principal [\*\*\*36]  has the right to control the conduct of the agent. [St Clair Intermediate School Dist v Intermediate Ed Ass'n/Michigan Ed Ass'n, 458 Mich. 540, 558 n 18; 581 N.W.2d 707 (1998)](https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=6cbcd97524abff5644c0987b135f7517&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b259%20Mich.%20App.%20187%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_origin=TOASHLX&_butNum=116&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b458%20Mich.%20540%2cat%20558%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=136&_startdoc=101&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkAk&_md5=c0a63a81a484a6ce53be229bc2290a07) (citations omitted). The employer is also liable for the torts of his employee if "'the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation,'" [McCann v Michigan, 398 Mich. 65, 71; 247 N.W.2d 521 (1976)](https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=6cbcd97524abff5644c0987b135f7517&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b259%20Mich.%20App.%20187%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_origin=TOASHLX&_butNum=117&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b398%20Mich.%2065%2cat%2071%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=136&_startdoc=101&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkAk&_md5=5219d53b6a7119254f8041c911d87fd2), quoting [Restatement of Agency, 2d § 219(2)(d)](https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=6cbcd97524abff5644c0987b135f7517&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b259%20Mich.%20App.%20187%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=4&_butStat=0&_origin=TOASHLX&_butNum=118&_butInline=1&_butinfo=AGENCY%20SECOND%20219&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=136&_startdoc=101&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkAk&_md5=71c1bf8c001fe5ae1153be4268b8e9e9), p 481; see also [Champion v Nation Wide Security, Inc, 450 Mich. 702, 704, 712; 545 N.W.2d 596 (1996)](https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=6cbcd97524abff5644c0987b135f7517&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b259%20Mich.%20App.%20187%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_origin=TOASHLX&_butNum=119&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b450%20Mich.%20702%2cat%20704%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=136&_startdoc=101&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkAk&_md5=3d1841dc7f4fb90804d8adb6349a6fae), citing [Restatement of Agency, 2d § 219(2)(d)](https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=6cbcd97524abff5644c0987b135f7517&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b259%20Mich.%20App.%20187%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=4&_butStat=0&_origin=TOASHLX&_butNum=120&_butInline=1&_butinfo=AGENCY%20SECOND%20219&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=136&_startdoc=101&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkAk&_md5=c1927abf5bf3954a85d211c044ada141), p 481 ("the master is liable for the tort of his servant if the servant 'was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation'"). In [Backus v  [\*213]  Kauffman (On Rehearing), 238 Mich. App. 402, 409; 605 N.W.2d 690 (1999)](https://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=6cbcd97524abff5644c0987b135f7517&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b259%20Mich.%20App.%20187%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_origin=TOASHLX&_butNum=121&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b238%20Mich.%20App.%20402%2cat%20409%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=136&_startdoc=101&wchp=dGLbVtb-zSkAk&_md5=d9947545fee151274d489cbc14123160), this Court stated: **The term "authority" is defined by Black's Law Dictionary to include "the power delegated by a principal to an agent."** Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed), p [\*\*\*37]  127. **"Scope of authority" is defined** in the following manner: **"The reasonable power that an agent has been delegated** or might foreseeably be delegated in carrying out the principal's business." Id. at 1348.

#### Authority only comes from congress

JULES **LOBEL 8** Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh Law School “Conflicts Between the Commander in Chief and Congress: Concurrent Power  over the Conduct of War” OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:391 http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2012/04/69.3.lobel\_.pdf

 Some have argued that the historical record supports not only rejecting  any Presidential claim of preclusive Commander in Chief wartime authority, but also denying the President independent substantive constitutional power

to conduct warfare that is authorized by Congress.279 This reading of history  would not  find any  Presidential power to conduct war grounded  in an

independent  constitutional authority as  Commander in Chief, but  would  derive such presidential power exclusively from statutes authorizing warfare. The extent of presidential power to conduct warfare would, according to this  perspective, be determined solely by legislation authorizing warfare. The historical record contains  some support  for this perspective. The Framers’ intent in naming the President Commander in Chief was clearly to  provide for civilian control of the military and to ensure that one person,

and  not an unwieldy legislative body or someone appointed by Congress, would  direct, order, and supervise the military. That intent is not inconsistent with  viewing the President’s substantive power to conduct warfare as stemming

from, and not  independent  of, legislative enactment. The history of the Commander in Chief’s  powers  under British  law also  suggests  that  her powers came from the statute and not the Constitution itself. That all of our declarations of war provide the President with the authority to use the entire

army and navy to fight the enemy suggests that the declaration of war itself  might  not  have sufficed to invoke the  President’s  Commander in Chief power.280 Statements by various Republican Senators during the Civil War debate on the Confiscation Act  that  there is  “not  a syllable in the Constitution  conferring on the President war powers,” and that the President can conduct  war “only in the manner and in the  mode” prescribed by Congress, also  support  a position  that  the Commander in  Chief Clause accorded  the President  only a command  function, but  no independent substantive power.281 So too, Chief Justice Marshall’s statement in Talbot v. Seeman that

the whole powers of war are vested in Congress and that, therefore, “the acts of that  body can alone be resorted to as  our guides”

282

in determining  whether a capture was lawful also suggests that the extent of the President’s  power as  Commander in  Chief is  determined solely  by legislative

authorization. Furthermore, in Brown  v. United  States, Marshall suggested

that neither a declaration of war nor a broad authorization of force activate a Commander in Chief’s power to execute the laws of war.283 The Brown Court recognized that a declaration of war gave the United  States the rights which war confers, but argued that it did not automatically  empower the Executive to implement such war measures. Marshall held that

the congressional power to make rules concerning captures on land and water was  an  independent substantive power, not  included in  the  declaration of war. Therefore, the declaration did not authorize the President to seize enemy  property in the United States. Indeed, Marshall notes  that  Congress’s

independent authorization for the detention of enemy aliens, and for “the safe

keeping and accommodation of prisoners of war,” “authorizations that were

separate from its declaration of war, affords  a strong  implication that  [the  President]  did not  possess  those powers  by virtue of the declaration of war.”

### AT: AUMF is a Restriction

**The AUMF is a grant of authority – expanding the AUMF expands the presidents war powers authority**

**Taeb and Levey 13**, Government Relations manager at the Arab American Institute, and Levey is Arab American Institute Legal Fellow on the AUMF

(6/13, Yasmine and Isaac, Time to fix the AUMF, thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/305349-time-to-fix-the-aumf-)

**During the past decade, the United States has taken extraordinary measures in fighting terrorism** all across the globe. Although the threats we face change continuously**, the legal authority and framework the executive branch has relied on has remained the same for nearly twelve years**. **The Authorization for the Use of Military Force** (AUMF), **passed** immediately **after** the **September 11**, 2001 attacks, **was a declaration of war** against the people who attacked us. **It gives the president immense power**, including over the lives and liberties of American citizens, **and doesn’t create much accountabilit**y. Since we now face a terror threat that is fundamentally different from the one we faced on 9/11, we must assess the AUMF’s continuing application and relevance, and whether it’s still necessary to fight terrorism. **The AUMF grants the president extraordinary power**. The last president used it to justify torture and illegal warrantless surveillance of Americans. This one uses it to justify lethal drone strikes all over the world, including at least one aimed at a U.S. citizen. The Supreme Court said in 2004 that the law authorized the President to detain an American citizen as an enemy combatant without any criminal charges. Last month, Pentagon lawyers said the AUMF might allow the U.S. to enter Syria, on the grounds that the extremist al-Nusra Front there is an “associated force” of al-Qaeda. That was too much for even Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), who said the authority “is no longer applicable to the conditions that prevailed” when Congress passed the AUMF in 2001. Sen. Angus King (I-Maine) added that the argument had “essentially rewritten the Constitution,” because it is Congress, not the president, that declares war.

### Violation 2NC

#### The groups expands authority to groups who aren’t currently authorized

Coronogue 12 – 1AC Author (Graham, JD at duke, “A NEW AUMF: DEFINING COMBATANTS IN THE WAR ON TERROR”, http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1294&context=djcil, zzx)

America's chief security threats used to come from the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The Taliban harbored the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks, al-Qaeda, and fell squarely under the AUMF's nexus requirement. Now, al-Qaeda has many allies and cobelligerents; these groups employ similar tactics, share comparable ideologies, and present significant threats to American lives. But does the AUMF authorize force against these groups? Are groups such as al-Shabaab,90 AQAP,91 and the Pakistani Taliban92 sufficiently tied to 9/11 or al-Qaeda? These groups are violent, dangerous, and opposed to the United States. In many ways, they are just as dangerous as al-Qaeda. However, many of these groups did not even exist on September 11, 2001, and the ones that did were not directly involved in the attacks. Thus, they could not possibly have a strong relationship to the attacks themselves, nor did they harbor those who did. Since the AUMF's text only authorizes force against those actors the President deems were involved in the 9/11 attacks, these groups are necessarily outside of Congress's authorization.

### 2NC Extra T

####

#### Here’s more evidence – AUMF applies to all war powers beyond the topic

Coronogue 12 – 1AC Author (Graham, JD at duke, “A NEW AUMF: DEFINING COMBATANTS IN THE WAR ON TERROR”, http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1294&context=djcil, zzx)

The AUMF’s broad “all necessary and appropriate force” language confers on the President complete Congressional authorization to wage war against the specified groups. First, the AUMF’s “all necessary and appropriate force” language mirrors that found in a declaration of war and, far from imposing any constraints, bolsters the President’s powers significantly.37 In Bas v. Tingy, the Court found that Congress could make narrow authorizations that are “limited in place, in objects, and in time.”38 Yet, the AUMF authorization is much broader than that typically found in a limited or quasi-war context where the President can only use certain armed forces against a specific type of target in a specified way.39 In the Quasi-War with France, for example, the President’s actions were limited to a specific place and type of enemy force.40 Indeed, the use of force was restricted to the high seas and armed French vessels.41 In these examples, the President was not authorized to use force in enemy ports or against many other members of the enemy’s military.42 In contrast, the AUMF does not explicitly limit where or what kind of force the President may use.43 Rather, it leaves this determination open to the President and merely names the class of targets.44 Second, the AUMF’s language illustrates congressional acquiescence or approval of broad presidential authority to use force. “[T]he enactment of legislation closely related to the question of the President’s authority in a particular case which evinces legislative intent to accord the President broad discretion may be considered to ‘invite’ ‘measures on independent presidential responsibility.’”45 The language in the AUMF is very similar to declarations of war and authorizations, in which presidents have exercised plenary power in determining the means and type of force.46 In these “perfect” wars, “all the members act[ed] under a general authority, and all the rights and consequences of war attach to their condition.”47 For instance, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution allowed the President to “take all necessary measures” and was used as broad authority to wage combat and detain enemies.48 Similarly, the AUMF allows for the use of “all necessary and appropriate force.” Presidents have commonly exercised broad authority under similar grants of power, and Congress’s failure to act in limiting these powers here suggests acquiescence to this interpretation.49 More convincingly than in Dames & Moore, where Congress failed to object to executive action, there are numerous comments from the legislature that the President should have broad authority under the AUMF.50 Given these statements and Congress’s ample opportunity to limit the scope or type of force, Congress must have acquiesced to past executive practice and interpretation. Furthermore, the plurality in Hamdi also treated the AUMF as a broad authorization to use force.51 In upholding the President’s power to detain enemy combatants, the Court leaned heavily on the similarities between the current authorization and that of broad authorizations characteristic of full wars.52 The Court found that the President had many of the same powers usually granted to the President by war declarations.53 Then, it looked to past exercises of presidential power to find what actions Congress would have implicitly authorized.54 Specifically, the Court found that detention was as “fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be an exercise of the ‘necessary and appropriate force’ Congress has authorized the President to use.”55 Given that the AUMF does not contain any specific limitation on the type of force and that the language describing this force is hashed in the extremely broad terms, the AUMF must grant the President significant authority to act. This authority is certainly still constrained by the laws of war and other independent constitutional checks on the Executive, but it appears that Congress delegated the President extremely broad powers. Finally, based on the plurality’s opinion in Hamdi, the exact scope of these powers will be interpreted in light of past actions by the Executive but still remains far from clear.56

### Flex UQ: PWP High 1NC

#### War powers authority high and rising- thumpers don’t affect global credibility

Roberts 10-5 (Kristin, master's degree in security studies from Georgetown University, News Editor @ National Journal¶ “The Do-It-Yourself Presidency”¶ .¶ By National Journal Staff¶ October 5, 2013 <http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/the-do-it-yourself-presidency-20131003?mrefid=LeadStoryTiles_normal>

If you’re judging President Obama based on what he’s failed to do, you’re missing the point. He’s one of the most powerful chief executives in U.S. history¶ After 20 children were gunned down at a Connecticut elementary school, President Obama pledged swift action to curtail mass shootings. And, after reportssurfaced that Bashar al-Assad had gassed his own people, the president vowed swift retaliation. And finally, after Republicans threatened to shutter the government over health care, Obama warned that "one faction of one party in one house of Congress in one branch of government doesn't get to shut down the entire government just to refight the results of an election."¶ There are as many AR-15s on the street today as there ever were, no Syrian targets have felt the brunt of an American missile, and the federal government has closed down for the first time in 17 years. So you would be forgiven for believing, as many do, that Barack Obama is a weak, ineffectual, even impotent leader. But move past the banner headlines and you'll see that Obama, by force of will and wielding of pen, is on track to be recorded as one of the most powerful presidents the country has known.¶ Full stop. No caveat is coming here. On the biggest, most significant issues affecting America and its place among global powers, this White House has aggressively forced its agenda from concept to implementation—ignoring congressional opposition—by assuming powers and authorities that previous administrations have only dreamt of invoking.¶ This aggressiveness is perhaps most clearly seen in national security, where Obama's embrace of government surveillance and a death-by-drone program ballooned beyond all known bounds despite a jaw-dropping lack of evidence against hundreds of the targets, Americans included. But he hasn't stopped there.

#### Obama power-played Syrian intervention – their thumper is wrong

Balkin 9/3/13 - law professor at Yale University (Jack, What Congressional Approval Won't Do: Trim Obama's Power or Make War Legal, [www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/09/what-congressional-approval-wont-do-trim-obamas-power-or-make-war-legal/279298/](http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/09/what-congressional-approval-wont-do-trim-obamas-power-or-make-war-legal/279298/))

One of the most misleading metaphors in the discussion of President Obama’s Syria policy is that the president has “boxed himself in” or has “painted himself into a corner.” These metaphors treat a president’s available actions as if they were physical spaces and limits on action as if they were physical walls. Such metaphors would make sense only if we also stipulated that Obama has the power to snap his fingers and create a door or window wherever he likes. The Syria crisis has not created a new precedent for limiting presidential power. To the contrary, it has offered multiple opportunities for increasing it. If Congress says no to Obama, it will not significantly restrain future presidents from using military force. At best, it will preserve current understandings about presidential power. If Congress says yes, it may bestow significant new powers on future presidents -- and it will also commit the United States to violating international law. For Obama plans to violate the United Nations Charter, and he wants Congress to give him its blessing. People who believe Obama has painted himself into a corner or boxed himself in might not remember that the president always has the option to ask Congress to authorize any military action he proposes, thus sharing the responsibility for decision if the enterprise goes sour. If Congress refuses, Obama can easily back away from any threats he has made against Syria, pointing to the fact that Congress would not go along. There is no corner. There is no box. Wouldn’t congressional refusal make the United States look weak, as critics including Senator John McCain warn loudly? Hardly. The next dictator who acts rashly will face a different situation and a different calculus. The UN Security Council or NATO may feel differently about the need to act. There may be a new threat to American interests that lets Obama or the next president offer a different justification for acting. It just won’t matter very much what Obama said about red lines in the past. World leaders say provocative things all the time and then ignore them. Their motto is: That was then, and this is now. If Congress turns him down, won’t Obama be undermined at home, as other critics claim? In what sense? It is hard to see how the Republicans could be less cooperative than they already are. And it’s not in the interest of Democrats to fault a president of their own party for acceding to what Congress wants instead of acting unilaterally. Some commentators argue (or hope) that whatever happens, Obama’s request for military authorization will be an important precedent that will begin to restore the constitutional balance between the president and Congress in the area of war powers. Don’t bet on it. By asking for congressional authorization in this case, Obama has not ceded any authority that he ­or any other president ­has previously asserted in war powers. Syria presents a case in which previous precedents did not apply. There is no direct threat to American security, American personnel, or American interests. There is no Security Council resolution to enforce. And there is no claim that America needs to shore up the credibility of NATO or another important security alliance. Nor does Obama have even the feeble justification that the Clinton Administration offered in Kosovo­: that congressional appropriations midway through the operation offered tacit and retroactive approval for the bombings. It is naive to think that the next time a president wants to send forces abroad without congressional approval, he or she will be deterred by the fact that Barack Obama once sought congressional permission to bomb Syria. If a president can plausibly assert that any of the previous justifications apply -- ­including those offered in the Libya intervention -- the case of Syria is easily distinguishable.

### Links

#### The plan collapses executive crisis response --- triggers terrorism, rogue state attacks, and wildfire prolif

John Yoo 8/30/13, Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law @ UC-Berkeley Law, visiting scholar @ the American Enterprise Institute, former Fulbright Distinguished Chair in Law @ the University of Trento, served as a deputy assistant attorney general in the Office of Legal Council at the U.S. Department of Justice between 2001 and 2003, received his J.D. from Yale and his undergraduate degree from Harvard, “Like it or not, Constitution allows Obama to strike Syria without Congressional approval,” Fox News, <http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2013/08/30/constitution-allows-obama-to-strike-syria-without-congressional-approval/>

The most important of the president’s powers are commander-in-chief and chief executive.¶ As Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist 74, “The direction of war implies the direction of the common strength, and the power of directing and employing the common strength forms a usual and essential part in the definition of the executive authority.”¶ Presidents should conduct war, he wrote, because they could act with “decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch.” In perhaps his most famous words, Hamilton wrote: “Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. . . It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks.”¶ The Framers realized the obvious. Foreign affairs are unpredictable and involve the highest of stakes, making them unsuitable to regulation by pre-existing legislation. Instead, they can demand swift, decisive action, sometimes under pressured or even emergency circumstances, that are best carried out by a branch of government that does not suffer from multiple vetoes or is delayed by disagreements. ¶ Congress is too large and unwieldy to take the swift and decisive action required in wartime. ¶ Our Framers replaced the Articles of Confederation, which had failed in the management of foreign relations because it had no single executive, with the Constitution’s single president for precisely this reason. Even when it has access to the same intelligence as the executive branch, Congress’s loose, decentralized structure would paralyze American policy while foreign threats grow. ¶ Congress

 has no political incentive to mount and see through its own wartime policy. Members of Congress, who are interested in keeping their seats at the next election, do not want to take stands on controversial issues where the future is uncertain. They will avoid like the plague any vote that will anger large segments of the electorate. They prefer that the president take the political risks and be held accountable for failure.¶ Congress's track record when it has opposed presidential leadership has not been a happy one.¶ Perhaps the most telling example was the Senate's rejection of the Treaty of Versailles at the end of World War I. Congress's isolationist urge kept the United States out of Europe at a time when democracies fell and fascism grew in their place. Even as Europe and Asia plunged into war, Congress passed Neutrality Acts designed to keep the United States out of the conflict.¶ President Franklin Roosevelt violated those laws to help the Allies and draw the nation into war against the Axis. While pro-Congress critics worry about a president's foreign adventurism, the real threat to our national security may come from inaction and isolationism.¶ Many point to the Vietnam War as an example of the faults of the “imperial presidency.” Vietnam, however, could not have continued without the consistent support of Congress in raising a large military and paying for hostilities. And Vietnam ushered in a period of congressional dominance that witnessed American setbacks in the Cold War, and the passage of the ineffectual War Powers Resolution. Congress passed the Resolution in 1973 over President Nixon's veto, and no president, Republican or Democrat, George W. Bush or Obama, has ever accepted the constitutionality of its 60-day limit on the use of troops abroad. No federal court has ever upheld the resolution. Even Congress has never enforced it.¶ Despite the record of practice and the Constitution’s institutional design, critics nevertheless argue for a radical remaking of the American way of war. They typically base their claim on Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution, which gives Congress the power to “declare War.” But these observers read the eighteenth-century constitutional text through a modern lens by interpreting “declare War” to mean “start war.” ¶ When the Constitution was written, however, a declaration of war served diplomatic notice about a change in legal relations between nations. It had little to do with launching hostilities. In the century before the Constitution, for example, Great Britain – where the Framers got the idea of the declare-war power – fought numerous major conflicts but declared war only once beforehand.¶ Our Constitution sets out specific procedures for passing laws, appointing officers, and making treaties. There are none for waging war, because the Framers expected the president and Congress to struggle over war through the national political process.¶ In fact, other parts of the Constitution, properly read, support this reading. Article I, Section 10, for example, declares that the states shall not “engage” in war “without the consent of Congress” unless “actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.” ¶ This provision creates exactly the limits desired by anti-war critics, complete with an exception for self-defense. If the Framers had wanted to require congressional permission before the president could wage war, they simply could have repeated this provision and applied it to the executive.¶ Presidents, of course, do not have complete freedom to take the nation to war. Congress has ample powers to control presidential policy, if it wants to. ¶ Only Congress can raise the military, which gives it the power to block, delay, or modify war plans.¶ Before 1945, for example, the United States had such a small peacetime military that presidents who started a war would have to go hat in hand to Congress to build an army to fight it. ¶ Since World War II, it has been Congress that has authorized and funded our large standing military, one primarily designed to conduct offensive, not defensive, operations (as we learned all too tragically on 9/11) and to swiftly project power worldwide. ¶ If Congress wanted to discourage presidential initiative in war, it could build a smaller, less offensive-minded military.¶ Congress’s check on the presidency lies not just in the long-term raising of the military. It can also block any immediate armed conflict through the power of the purse.¶ If Congress feels it has been misled in authorizing war, or it disagrees with the president's decisions, all it need do is cut off funds, either all at once or gradually.¶ It can reduce the size of the military, shrink or eliminate units, or freeze supplies. Using the power of the purse does not even require affirmative congressional action.¶ Congress can just sit on its hands and refuse to pass a law funding the latest presidential adventure, and the war will end quickly. ¶ Even the Kosovo war, which lasted little more than two months and involved no ground troops, required special funding legislation.¶ The Framers expected Congress's power of the purse to serve as the primary check on presidential war. During the 1788 Virginia ratifying convention, Patrick Henry attacked the Constitution for failing to limit executive militarism. James Madison responded: “The sword is in the hands of the British king; the purse is in the hands of the Parliament. It is so in America, as far as any analogy can exist.” Congress ended America’s involvement in Vietnam by cutting off all funds for the war.¶ Our Constitution has succeeded because it favors swift presidential action in war, later checked by Congress’s funding power. If a president continues to wage war without congressional authorization, as in Libya, Kosovo, or Korea, it is only because Congress has chosen not to exercise its easy check.¶ We should not confuse a desire to escape political responsibility for a defect in the Constitution. A radical change in the system for making war might appease critics of presidential power. But it could also seriously threaten American national security.¶ In order to forestall another 9/11 attack, or to take advantage of a window of opportunity to strike terrorists or rogue nations, the executive branch needs flexibility.¶ It is not hard to think of situations where congressional consent cannot be obtained in time to act. Time for congressional deliberation, which leads only to passivity and isolation and not smarter decisions, will come at the price of speed and secrecy.¶ The Constitution creates a presidency that can respond forcefully to prevent serious threats to our national security.¶ Presidents can take the initiative and Congress can use its funding power to check them. Instead of demanding a legalistic process to begin war, the Framers left war to politics.¶ As we confront the new challenges of terrorism, rogue nations and WMD proliferation, now is not the time to introduce sweeping, untested changes in the way we make war.

#### Congress is too slow to respond to 21st century threats --- executive deference is critical

Andrew Rudalevige 6, the Thomas Brackett Reed Professor of Government @ Bowdoin College, “The New Imperial Presidency,” UMich-Ann Arbor Press, Book, p. 264-67

That fragmentation is most obvious at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue. Despite common grammatical usage, including in this book, Congress is not an “it” but a “they.” That is, Congress is not singular but plural and a fractious plural at that. The geographic basis of House representation— the “territorial imperative”—means that no two House members share identical interests.6 The distinctive constituencies and terms of the House and Senate generate few overlapping sympathies across the chambers. Sequential majorities and supermajorities are required for action, but only a small minority for inaction. This became even more true after the application of reforms in the 1970s designed to apply the openness and decentralization aimed at the executive branch to Congress itself. The reforms enhanced the power of subcommittees and gave party rank-and-‹le more power to override seniority in selecting committee chairs. What nineteenth-century observers like Woodrow Wilson condemned as “committee government” often atomized further into “subcommittee government” instead. As a result, one scholar noted, members of Congress can make laws “only with sweat patience, and a remarkable skill in the handling of creaking machinery.” But stopping laws is a feat “they perform daily, with ease and infinite variety.”7¶ Thus even an alert and aggressive Congress has endemic weaknesses.8 Its large size and relative lack of hierarchy hamper quick decision making. The specialized jurisdictions inherent in the committee system, so necessary for dividing labor, also divide issues and make their comprehensive consideration across functional lines nearly impossible. (Nor do House members’ two-year terms give much incentive for long-term planning.) For similar reasons Congress has difficulty in planning and agenda setting. The ready acceptance of the idea of a presidential legislative program after World War II was partly a question of legislative convenience, a way to weed through innumerable proposals and provide a focus for limited floor time. Finally, with so many members, each seeking press attention, Congress also finds it hard to keep a secret. As President George H. W. Bush’s counsel, Boyden Gray, put it, “any time you notify Congress, it’s like putting an ad in the Washington Post. Notification is tantamount to declaration.”9¶ In short, Congress has the problems inherent to any body of individuals that must take collective action. The decisions that are rational for a single member—especially those aimed at gaining particular benefits for his or her district—are not always good decisions for the body as a whole.10 James Madison wrote as early as 1791 that whenever a question of “general. . . advantage to the Union was before the House . . . [members] commonly resorted to local views.” Then, as now, coalition building had to overcome decentralized inertia, with the result that governing often comes down to, in the words of LBJ budget official Charles Schultze, “a lot of boodle being handed out in large numbers of small boodle.”11¶ Worse, fragmentation is not limited to the legislative branch. After all, Congress created most of the executive branch as well—and in its own image. The “politics of bureaucratic structure” result in a bureaucracy far different than what organization theorists would draw up on a blank page, one rarely aligned along functional lines or with clear lines of executive authority. Legislative majorities hope to institutionalize their own interests in government agencies and to structurally insulate those preferences against future majorities seeking to meddle. They hope to gain access to the bureaucratic decision-making process and to influence it whenever desirable. They hope to gain points with constituents for fixing the errors agencies make, perhaps to the point of structuring agencies that cannot help but make errors. If nothing else, the historical pattern of executive branch development has spurred a particular array of legislative committees—and organized special interests linked to both.12¶ As the size and scope of the national government grew, its organizational inefficiencies became more obvious and more meaningful. This in turn focused increased attention on the need for direction and coordination— for a chief executive who could actually manage the executive branch. The areas of homeland security and intelligence analysis are only the most recent cases where failures of communication or analysis within the bureaucracy have magnified the need for those qualities.¶ Globalization in some ways highlights the continuing limits of the presidency’s authority: its incumbent is not, after all, president of the world. Yet the practical advantages of presidential leadership vis-à-vis the legislature, at least, are further magnified in an era where rapid transportation, instantaneous communication, and huge flows of trade have changed the context of governance in ways that play to presidential strengths. Both opportunities and threats arise quickly and demand immediate response. Their resolution requires a broad national view, not territorialism; resident expertise, not the give-and-take of log-rolling compromise. Further, if, as Richard Neustadt suggested, the cold war’s omnipresent fear of nuclear war made the president for a time the “final arbiter” in the balance of power, the rise of rogue states and nonstate actors with access to similar weaponry ups the ante again. In this one sense at least the “modern presidency” described earlier may have given way to a “postmodern” one.13 As the Bush administration argued to the Supreme Court on behalf of the president’s power to designate enemy combatants,¶ The court of appeals’ attempt to cabin the Commander-in-Chief authority to the conduct of combat operations on a traditional battlefield is particularly ill-considered in the context of the current conflict. . . . The September 11 attacks not only struck targets on United States soil; they also were launched from inside the Nation’s borders. The “full power to repel and defeat the enemy” thus necessarily embraces determining what measures to take against enemy combatants found within the United States. As the September 11 attacks make manifestly clear, moreover, al Qaeda eschews conventional battlefield combat, yet indiicts damage that, if anything, is more devastating.14

#### Telling Congress is like putting an ad in the newspaper --- leaks are inevitable

Andrew Rudalevige 6, the Thomas Brackett Reed Professor of Government @ Bowdoin College, “The New Imperial Presidency,” UMich-Ann Arbor Press, Book, p. 264-67

¶ Thus even an alert and aggressive Congress has endemic weaknesses.8 Its large size and relative lack of hierarchy hamper quick decision making. The specialized jurisdictions inherent in the committee system, so necessary for dividing labor, also divide issues and make their comprehensive consideration across functional lines nearly impossible. (Nor do House members’ two-year terms give much incentive for long-term planning.) For similar reasons Congress has difficulty in planning and agenda setting. The ready acceptance of the idea of a presidential legislative program after World War II was partly a question of legislative convenience, a way to weed through innumerable proposals and provide a focus for limited floor time. Finally, with so many members, each seeking press attention, Congress also finds it hard to keep a secret. As President George H. W. Bush’s counsel, Boyden Gray, put it, “any time you notify Congress, it’s like putting an ad in the Washington Post. Notification is tantamount to declaration.”9¶

### Solv: Circumv 2NC

#### lobel

#### the AUMF is a fig leaf—the government will continue to wage the war on terror

Greenwald 13—Glenn, Columnist on civil liberties and US national security issues for the Guardian [“Washington gets explicit: its 'war on terror' is permanent,” theguardian.com, May 17, 2013 http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/may/17/endless-war-on-terror-obama]

Nobody really even knows with whom the US is at war, or where. Everyone just knows that it is vital that it continue in unlimited form indefinitely. In response to that, **the only real movement in Congress is to think about how to enact a new law to expand the authorization** even further. **But it's a worthless and illusory debate, affecting nothing other than the pretexts and symbols used to justify** what will, in all cases, be a permanent and **limitless war. The Washington AUMF debate is about nothing other than whether more fig leafs are needed to make it all pretty and legal.** The **Obama** administration **already claims the power to wage endless and boundless war, in virtually total secrecy, and without a single meaningful check or constraint**. **No institution with any power disputes this**. **To the contrary**, the only ones which exert real influence - **Congress**, the courts, the establishment media, the plutocratic class - **clearly favor its continuation** and only think about how further to enable it. That will continue unless and until Americans begin to realize just what a mammoth price they're paying for this ongoing splurge of war spending and endless aggression.

#### Obama is already going after “close affiliates” of Al Qaeda. Proves the circumvention argument AND it means their aff is the status quo.

Gettinger, 5/18

[Dan, Bard College, “News Analysis: The Forever War Evermore”, Center for the Study of the Drone, <http://dronecenter.bard.edu/news-analysis-the-forever-war-evermore/>, BJM]

There is a **storm** brewing in Washington over the power to wage war. In a hearing on Capitol Hill last Thursday, the Senate Armed Services Committee heard arguments about the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), the 2001 legislation that gave President Bush the authority to wage war against al-Qaeda. However, the international terrorist organization has today evolved from the centrally-led hierarchy of the last decade to a number of far more disparate and diverse groups. **At stake is the Obama administration’s ability**, as the LA Times reported last March, **to intervene** using drones in conflicts such as Syria **and**, broadly, **the authority that Congress has to declare war**. The SASC hearing was upsetting for many of those present. Even experienced national security lawyers like Jack Goldsmith, a Harvard Law Professor and author of Power and Constraint, admitted about the hearing, “I thought I knew what the application [of the AUMF] meant, but I’m less confident now.” The hearing revealed the full spectrum of groups that the Administration and DOD lawyers consider targetable under the current provisions of the AUMF. The following is an exchange between Senator Donnelly, an Indiana Democrat, and several DOD lawyers concerning the powerful Syrian al-Nusra Front: Donnelly: Would you call the al Nusra front in Syria an AQ affiliated terrorist group? Sheehan: Yes sir, I would. Donnelly: Would you say that the AUMF applies to the al Nusra front? . . . Taylor: As with many things with Syria, we’re looking very hard and very carefully and I don’t have a definitive answer for you at the moment. Donnelly: . . . Would we have the ability to act against al Nusra today under the AUMF? Sheehan: Yes sir, we’d have that ability to act against al Nusra if we felt they were threatening our security. We would have the authority to do that today. Donnelly: Do we feel today that al Nusra is threatening our security? Sheehan: I don’t want to get in in this setting for how we target different groups and organizations around the world. Excerpt courtesy of Lawfare Blog Under the provisions of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, the President is permitted to: “use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons” To this end, the United States currently has multiple drone programs running, such as surveillance over Iran and Libya, combat missions in Afghanistan and targeted strikes in Yemen, Pakistan and Somalia. Some Senators, such as John McCain, seek to expand these provisions, arguing that the “dramatically changed landscape that we have in this war on Muslim extremism and Al Qaeda and others” requires a new set of rules. The military is in favor of keeping the Authorization as it stands. Michael Sheehan, the assistant secretary of defense for special operations, said in the recent hearing that “as of right now, it suits us very well,” and added that the war against al-Qaeda could last “at least 10 to 20 years.” The war in the next two decades is likely to take the form of covert operations and drone strikes run out of a constellation of forward operating bases strategically placed in countries like Djibouti. In October, 2012 the Washington Post concluded a three part series on the use of drones by the Obama administration with an article on the American base in Djibouti that is the hub for drone operations in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. At least sixteen times each day at Camp Lemonnier, a former outpost for the French Foreign Legion, drones take off for operations in East Africa or, more often, in Yemen. As the “busiest drone base outside the Afghan war zone,” Camp Lemonnier offers “a model for fighting a new generation of terrorist groups” and a glimpse into the secretive world of covert counter-terrorism operations. It is a world into which the public receive only fleeting glances but one that is at the center of the debate over the future of American military intervention and the status of our common enemy. What is an ‘associated force’? At the heart of the testimony on Thursday and of the debate over the AUMF is the ambiguous definition of which groups and persons constitute an ‘associated force,’ thereby making them targetable. In March of 2009, the Obama administration submitted a court brief in which they first use the term ‘associated force’ to describe their extension of the AUMF powers: The President also has the authority to detain persons who were part of, or substantially supported, Taliban or al-Qaida forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners, including any person who has committed a belligerent act, or has directly supported hostilities, in aid of such enemy armed forces. Confusingly, the term ‘associated force’ never appears in the actual AUMF legislation; it serves as an ambiguous shorthand to describe anyone who has aided those who perpetrated the 9/11 attacks. Many fear that retaining the **malleable standards** for target qualification **will result in a ‘forever war**.’ In Hamlily v Obama, a case that affirmed the administration’s use of ‘associated force’ as part of AUMF, Judge Bates qualified that, “‘associated forces’ do not include terrorist organizations who merely share an abstract philosophy or even a common purpose with al-Qaeda – there must be an actual association in the current conflict with al-Qaeda or the Taliban.’” The difficulty lies in the fact that the threats to the United States, as DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano noted, are “not limited to the al-Qaeda core group, or organizations that have close operational links to al-Qaeda. While al-Qaeda continues to threaten America directly, it also inspires its affiliates and other groups and individuals who share its violent ideology and seek to attack the United States…” The al-Qaeda emerging today is no longer the hierarchical organization based in Afghanistan and Pakistan but rather comprises of several tiers with varying degrees of affiliation with the official al-Qaeda group. The offshoot based in Yemen, al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP), has been the most targeted core-affiliated group, particularly after their several attempts to attack American soil. However, some third-tier terror groups are also supplanting second-tier groups like AQAP. A 2011 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies describes how, after ten years of ‘degrading’ the al-Qaeda core organization, “policymakers grew more concerned about cells and individuals that were not regularly associated with al-Qaeda or its affiliates but that drew clear inspiration and occasional guidance and support, from the groups.” The 2012 assassination of Christopher Stevens, the American Ambassador to Libya, offers a recent example of the expanding and elusive character of terrorist threats. Robert Chesney, a professor at the University of Texas School of Law, who was also present at last week’s SASC hearing, writes that “the general thrust of these changes [within al-Qaeda] has been to weaken the central organization relative to an emerging set of regional organizations that may share al-Qaeda’s brand but are not necessarily responsive to its direction and control.”Chesney goes on to explain how decentralization is central to the survival of al-Qaeda and that the growth of these localized groups that are based on the model of al-Shabab (Somalia) or Boko Haram (Nigeria) will continue. While terrorist groups differ in their individual goals and connection with core or affiliated al-Qaeda branches, the move toward decentralization is not without supporters among some “influential theorists of jihad- most notably Abu Musab al-Suri. Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, known as al-Suri, is a Syrian member of the al-Qaeda core and regarded as a key strategic thinker of the jihadist movement. Radicalized in the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, Setmariam served as a lecturer at al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan before the fall of the Taliban and is linked to the planning of the 2004 Madrid bombings. However, he his most known for the strategic concept of “‘individual terrorism’” that he intends to “replace the hierarchically orchestrated terrorism of Al Qaeda.” The authors of Abu Musab Al Suri: Architect of the New Al Qaeda, Paul Cruickshank and Mohannad Hage Ali, argue that Setmariam’s work has “made a very significant impact” in the face of the destruction of the centralized organization with its training camps and bureaucracy in Afghanistan and, more recently, Pakistan. This concept, familiar in the United States as “‘leaderless resistance,’” “maximizes operational security, as one cannot unravel a network after identifying one or more key nodes when there is no network.” The rise of Islamists in Mali, the attack on the American Embassy in Libya, and the infiltration of radical Islamists among the rebels in Syria, all appear to support the argument that the organization of al-Qaeda is becoming more diffuse, drawing inspiration and support from domestic events and causes rather than the unifying notion of ‘global jihad.’ Two More Decades of War “For you to come here and say we don’t need to change it or revise or update it, I think is, well, disturbing… I don’t blame you because basically you’ve got carte blanche as to what you are doing around the world.” Senator John McCain, Arizona It shouldn’t come as a surprise that the Obama administration **believes** it **has the power to wage war outside the ‘hot’ battlefields of Afghanistan**. In an April 2012 speech to the Wilson Center, John Brennan, who was then the national security adviser to President Obama and now serves as the chief of the CIA, said that the President has “always been clear that the end of bin Laden would neither mark the end of al-Qaeda, nor our resolve to destroy it.” The decimation of the central leadership of al-Qaeda has resulted in a shifted strategy that is in some ways **more dangerous** **than a centrally run core.** Nevertheless, last week’s hearing revealed, not only the expansive view the administration holds on targetable threats, but the very real prospect that this war could occupy the first three decades of this millennium. While it is unclear whether the Obama administration has a counter-terrorism strategy that envisions ten to twenty more years of war, the current ambiguity about the status of the war is untenable. A group of national security lawyers who testified last week, including Robert Chesney and Jack Goldsmith, argued that Congress must take a more active role in managing the designation of threats under the AUMF. While the legislation is undoubtedly out of date, it provides a useful limit on Executive branch speculation about the threat level of different groups.

#### This guarantees circumvention

Eric Lorber, “Executive Warmaking Authority and Offensive Cyber Operations: Can Existing Legislation Successfully Constrain Presidential Power?” 2013, University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 961, 2013

Stemming from similar tension noted in the constitutional division of war-making authority noted above, congressional oversight of covert actions beyond intelligence collection has often proved a point of contention between the executive and legislative branches. n195 Presidents have "inferred authority [to conduct covert actions] from such places as the Vesting Clause, the Commander-in-Chief Clause, the Treaty Clause, and from an implied executive privilege." n196¶ [\*993] Likewise, Congress attempted to rein in the President's ability to conduct covert operations without oversight by implementing a series of laws that required the President to get approval before undertaking such activities. n197 If the President did not provide such notification, Congress could decline to fund that particular covert activity. n198 Following the revelation that widespread, unreported covert actions were undertaken during the Vietnam War, Congress moved for stricter control of executive power, both by forcing the executive to account for the money it was spending as part of annual authorization bills n199 and by streamlining its own oversight capability by tasking two primary committees, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, with oversight. n200¶ While Congress designed this legislation to rein in the President's power to conduct covert activities without oversight, events in the 1980s clearly showed that its efforts had been ineffective. n201 In particular, the Iran-Contra affair illustrated that Congress needed to substantially reform oversight legislation to ensure that it could properly monitor executive covert action. n202 As a result, in 1990, Congress began drafting a new oversight bill, [\*994] the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991, which grants Congress oversight of covert activities. n203 Section 413b of the Intelligence Authorization Act provides,

### Terror

### AQAP: No Threat 2NC

#### No AQAP organization and attacks are localized

Robert Pape 8/22/13, professor of political science at the University of Chicago, and director of the Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism and David Schneyer is a research associate at the Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism, 8/22/13, "WHY WE SHOULDN’T BE AFRAID OF AL-QAEDA IN YEMEN," http://www.yementimes.com/en/1705/opinion/2782/Why-we-shouldn%E2%80%99t-be-afraid-of-Al-Qaeda-in-Yemen.htm

¶ Last week, the U.S. State Department closed and evacuated 19 of its embassies and issued a worldwide travel alert based on intelligence concerning a terrorist organization based in Yemen. Many Americans are asking what this means. Is an attack on U.S. soil imminent?¶ ¶ While nothing is certain, of course, it is unlikely that such an attack would take place in the United States, or even outside of Yemen.¶ ¶ The intelligence seems to be reliable. But individual data points can be exaggerated or ignored, depending on the domestic political environment of the time. In this case, the State Department acted due to “increased chatter” that it monitored among terrorist groups. Intelligence officials highlighted one communication in particular, in which Al-Qaeda leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri gave his blessing to an attack proposed by Nasser Al-Wuhayshi. Wuhayshi is the leader of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)—a sort of “franchise affiliate” based in Yemen, not to be confused with the central Al-Qaeda organization.¶ ¶ Such information certainly warrants our attention. But talk is cheap, and it is critical that we don’t give terrorist organizations more credit than they are worth. In order to understand what a terrorist organization is truly capable of, we must look at its past behavior. In this case, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is a deadly organization within its own borders, but it has not demonstrated that it possesses the means to successfully carry out an attack on U.S. soil. The one known attempt (carried out by the so-called “underwear bomber”) failed due to incompetence—the device did not properly detonate.¶ ¶ Let’s look at the data: AQAP has carried out 39 suicide attacks through 2012, with only one taking place outside of Yemen (just across the border in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia). Suicide attacks represent precisely the sort of attack we would fear—they are far more deadly than any other type. Now, AQAP has certainly proven itself capable of killing foreigners within its own borders, and so we should absolutely take the intercepted communication seriously with respect to our embassy in Yemen. But this is a far cry from being able to carry out an attack on foreign soil.¶ ¶ Consider 9/11, for instance, which obviously we failed to prevent. This failure was not a tactical one, or even a failure to “connect the dots.” Rather, it was a failure to properly assess the threat. In fact, a memo stating “Bin Laden determined to attack U.S.” made it to the White House by early August, 2001—the intelligence was there, but it was simply not given its due credibility or seriousness. ¶ ¶ Clearly, Al-Qaeda proved itself capable of attacking the United States across multiple borders long before 2001. But AQAP has not demonstrated this capability, and “increased chatter” among its leaders, no matter how heavy, is simply not enough evidence to be overly-concerned, unless the government has not revealed other critical details. Even if Al-Zawahiri were directing the attack—which U.S. intelligence officials confirmed he was not—the main Al-Qaeda group (now based in Pakistan) has not carried out a successful major attack on Western soil since the London bombings in 2005. Ayman Al-Zawahiri giving his blessing to AQAP leaders only proves how weak the main Al-Qaeda group really is.

## 1NR

### Debt: Overview 2NC

#### Failure to raise the debt ceiling collapses the economy – that outweighs case ---

#### A. Magnitude --- economic collapse causes extinction through global nuclear war --- 1NC Merlini. Magnitude first because you can only die once.

#### B. Timeframe ---- collapse by November if we don’t raise the debt ceiling

Sahadi 9/10 Jeanne, “Debt ceiling 'X date' could hit Oct. 18”, <http://money.cnn.com/2013/09/10/news/economy/debt-ceiling-bills-coming-due/index.html>, MCR

A new analysis by a think tank shows that Washington's drop-dead deadline for the debt ceiling could hit as soon as Oct. 18.¶ Estimating exactly when the Treasury Department will be unable to pay all the bills coming due if Congress fails to raise the nation's legal borrowing limit is notoriously difficult.¶ That's why, in an analysis released Tuesday, the Bipartisan Policy Center put the "X date" between Oct. 18 and Nov. 5.¶ Treasury Secretary Jack Lew has warned that by mid-October the agency will have only $50 billion in cash **on top of incoming revenue.**¶That may sound like a lot. But, as the Bipartisan Policy Center details, **it won't last very long**.¶ If the "X" date turns out to be Oct. 18, Treasury would run about $106 billion short of the money it owes between then and Nov.15. That means it wouldn't be able to pay the equivalent of a third of all the bills due during that period.¶ Here's why: Treasury handles about 80 million payments a month. Those payments are not evenly spaced out so on some days more is owed than on others. And the revenue flowing into federal coffers is unpredictable and varies from day to day.¶ Payments include IRS refunds, Social Security and veterans benefits, Medicare reimbursements for doctors and hospitals, bond interest owed investors, payments to contractors and paychecks for federal workers and military personnel.¶ If Congress fails to act in time, Treasury will have to make difficult -- and legally questionable -- decisions about who should get paid and who should be stiffed. It may decide to pay some bills in full and on time and not others.¶ Or it may decide to delay all payments due on a given day until it has sufficient revenue on hand to pay in full. in a Treasury Inspector General's report that this might be the most plausible and least harmful approach.¶ But under that scenario, delays would grow **over time** from a day or two to several weeks. For example, the payments due to seniors, veterans and active duty military personnel on Nov. 1 wouldn't go out until Nov. 13.¶ In any case, the expectation is that the agency will try to prioritize payments to bond investors over everyone else, lest the financial markets go haywire. Politically, of course, that carries risk, said Steve Bell, the senior director of the Bipartisan Policy Center's economic policy project.¶ "There's a political danger you'll be accused of paying bondholders over Social Security recipients," Bell said.¶ On both Oct. 23 and Nov. 14, $12 billion in Social Security benefits come due, while another $25 billion comes due on Nov. 1, according to the analysis.¶ Meanwhile, on Oct. 24, Treasury will have to roll over $57 billion in outstanding debt and another $115 billion on Oct. 31. Normally that's not a problem, because U.S. Treasury auctions attract a lot of buyers willing to purchase bonds at low rates.¶ But if those rollover dates come after the "X" date, and the **perception is that the United States is defaulting on some of its obligations,** Treasury could have trouble finding enough buyers **or investors could demand higher interest rates**.¶ The debt ceiling is currently set at $16.7 trillion. That ceiling was reached on May 19, and ever since Treasury has been using a host of special measures to keep the country's borrowing at or below that ceiling. But those measures will be exhausted by mid-October, according to Treasury.¶ If lawmakers want to raise the ceiling enough to get past the 2014 midterm elections in November, the Bipartisan Policy Center estimates they will have to raise it by $1.1 trillion to $17.8 trillion. To top of page

### Growth Good: Terrorism—2NC

#### Turns terror recuritment

Bremmer 09(Ian, - President of the Eurasia Group, sr. fellow @ World Policy Institute, , 3/4/09, Foreign Policy, http://eurasia.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/03/04/the\_global\_recession\_heightens\_terrorist\_risks)

But there's another reason why the financial crisis heightens the risk of global terrorism. Militants thrive in places where no one is fully in charge. The global recession threatens to create more such places. No matter how cohesive and determined a terrorist organization, it needs a supportive environment in which to flourish. That means a location that provides a steady stream of funds and recruits and the support (or at least acceptance) of the local population. Much of the counter-terrorist success we've seen in Iraq's al Anbar province over the past two years is a direct result of an increased willingness of local Iraqis to help the Iraqi army and US troops oust the militants operating there. In part, that's because the area's tribal leaders have their own incentives (including payment in cash and weaponry) for cooperating with occupation forces. But it's also because foreign militants have alienated the locals. The security deterioration of the past year in Pakistan and Afghanistan reflects exactly the opposite phenomenon. In the region along both sides of their shared border, local tribal leaders have yet to express much interest in helping Pakistani and NATO soldiers target local or foreign militants. For those with the power to either protect or betray the senior al-Qaeda leaders believed to be hiding in the region, NATO and Pakistani authorities have yet to find either sweet enough carrots or sharp enough sticks to shift allegiances. The slowdown threatens to slow the progress of a number of developing countries. Most states don't provide ground as fertile for militancy as places like Afghanistan, Somalia, and Yemen. But as more people lose their jobs, their homes, and opportunities for prosperity -- in emerging market countries or even within minority communities inside developed states -- it becomes easier for local militants to find volunteers. This is why the growing risk of attack from suicide bombers and well-trained gunmen in Pakistan creates risks that extend beyond South Asia. This is a country that is home to lawless regions where local and international militants thrive, nuclear weapons and material, a history of nuclear smuggling, a cash-starved government, and a deteriorating economy. Pakistan is far from the only country in which terrorism threatens to spill across borders.

#### Turns intel and coop

Warrick 08 (Joby, staff writer, *Washington Post*, 11/15/08)

Intelligence officials are warning that the deepening global financial crisis could weaken fragile governments in the world's most dangerous areas and undermine the ability of the United States and its allies to respond to a new wave of security threats. U.S. government officials and private analysts say the economic turmoil has heightened the short-term risk of a terrorist attack, as radical groups probe for weakening border protections and new gaps in defenses. A protracted financial crisis could threaten the survival of friendly regimes from Pakistan to the Middle East while forcing Western nations to cut spending on defense, intelligence and foreign aid, the sources said. The crisis could also accelerate the shift to a more Asia-centric globe, as rising powers such as China gain more leverage over international financial institutions and greater influence in world capitals. Some of the more troubling and immediate scenarios analysts are weighing involve nuclear-armed Pakistan, which already was being battered by inflation and unemployment before the global financial tsunami hit. Since September, Pakistan has seen its national currency devalued and its hard-currency reserves nearly wiped out. Analysts also worry about the impact of plummeting crude prices on oil-dependent nations such as Yemen, which has a large population of unemployed youths and a history of support for militant Islamic groups. The underlying problems and trends -- especially regional instability and the waning influence of the West -- were already well established, but they are now "being accelerated by the current global financial crisis," the nation's top intelligence official, Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell, said in a recent speech. McConnell is among several top U.S. intelligence officials warning that deep cuts in military and intelligence budgets could undermine the country's ability to anticipate and defend against new threats.

**SoPo/Cred: Econ Thumps SoPo 2NC**

#### Economic troubles kill soft power and US influence – outweighs the aff

**Neu 13** – senior economist at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation, B.S. in economics, California Institute of Technology; Ph.D. in economics, Harvard University; M.A. in economics, Harvard University (C. Richard, “U.S. 'Soft Power' Abroad Is Losing Its Punch”, <http://www.rand.org/blog/2013/02/us-soft-power-abroad-is-losing-its-punch.html>, CMR)

The way America flexes it economic muscle around the world is changing dramatically—and not necessarily for the better.¶ In 1997, facing a wave of sovereign debt defaults, the International Monetary Fund asked its member states to pledge lines of credit to support Fund rescue efforts. The United States and other nations did as asked. In 2009, the United States responded again to a call for expanded credit lines. When the Fund sought yet another expansion of these credit lines last April, 39 countries, including China, Russia, Brazil, Mexico, India, and Saudi Arabia, stepped up. Even cash-strapped Italy and Spain pledged support.¶ But the United States was conspicuously absent. A pledge from the United States requires congressional authorization. In the midst of last spring's contentious debate over U.S. government deficits and debts, support for an international body was a political nonstarter. Where the United States had previously demonstrated international leadership, other countries—some of them America's rivals for international influence—now make the running.¶ This is a small example of what may be a troubling trend: America's fiscal predicament and the seeming inability of its political system to resolve these matters may be taking a toll on the instruments of U.S. “soft power” and on the country's ability to shape international developments in ways that serve American interests.¶ The most potent instrument of U.S. soft power is probably the simple size of the U.S. economy. As the biggest economy in the world, America has a lot to say about how the world works. But the economics profession is beginning to understand that high levels of public debt can slow economic growth, especially when gross general government debt rises above 85 or 90 percent of GDP.¶ The United States crossed that threshold in 2009, and the negative effects are probably mostly out in the future. These will come at a bad time. The U.S. share of global economic output has been falling since 1999—by nearly 5 percentage points as of 2011. As America's GDP share declined, so did its share of world trade, which may reduce U.S. influence in setting the rules for international trade.¶ And it's not just the debt itself that may be slowing GDP growth. Economists at Stanford and the University of Chicago have demonstrated that uncertainty about economic policy—on the rise as a result of political squabbling over U.S. fiscal policy—typically foreshadows slower economic growth.¶ Investors may be growing skittish about U.S. government debt levels and the disordered state of U.S. fiscal policymaking.¶ From the beginning of 2002, when U.S. government debt was at its most recent minimum as a share of GDP, to the end of 2012, the dollar lost 25 percent of its value, in price-adjusted terms, against a basket of the currencies of major trading partners. This may have been because investors fear that the only way out of the current debt problems will be future inflation. The dollar has also given up a bit of its dominance as the preferred currency for international reserves among advanced economies. And the renminbi appears to have replaced the dollar as the “reference currency” for most of East Asia. (The good news is that in recent years U.S. banks have increased their share of deposits from foreigners, mostly at the expense of banks in London.)¶ More troubling for the future is that private domestic investment—the fuel for future economic growth—shows a strong negative correlation with government debt levels over several business cycles dating back to the late 1950s. Continuing high debt does not bode well in this regard.¶ But perhaps the worst consequences of U.S. debt are actions not taken.¶ U.S. international leadership has been based, in part, on contributions—political and financial—to major institutions and initiatives—International Monetary Fund, World Bank, General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (and later World Trade Organization), NATO, North America Free Trade Agreement, the Marshall Plan, and so on. These served U.S. interests and made the world better.¶ But what have we done lately? The Doha round of trade negotiations has stalled. Ditto efforts at coordinated international action on climate change. Countries of the Arab Spring need rebuilding. Little progress is apparent on the Transpacific Partnership, a proposed new free-trade area. And warnings from the U.S. treasury secretary to his European counterparts about the dangers of failing to resolve the fiscal crisis in the eurozone met with public rebukes: Get your own house in order before you lecture us. Have U.S. fiscal problems undermined America's self confidence and external credibility to the extent that it can no longer lead?¶ And what about unmet needs at home—healthcare costs, a foundering public education system, deteriorating infrastructure, and increasing inequality? A strained fiscal situation that limits resources for action and absorbs so much political energy cannot be helping with any of these matters. But without progress on such things, what becomes of the social cohesion necessary for unified action abroad or the moral authority to lead other nations by example?¶ America's fiscal predicament is serious. The problem has become obvious in the last few years, but it has been building for decades, largely the result of promises of extensive social benefits without a corresponding willingness to pay for them.¶ Putting U.S. government financing on a sustainable path will require painful adjustments over a number of years—increased government revenue and painful reductions in government outlays, almost certainly including outlays for defense and international affairs. During the necessary period of fiscal adjustment and constrained government resources, U.S. international influence may decline yet further.¶ But there is no alternative to getting on with the task. The world has not yet found an acceptable substitute for U.S. leadership

### Debt Uq: Will Pass—2NC

#### Strong Obama negotiating position allows him to force the GOP to raise the debt ceiling now—that’s Dovere

#### Will be raised now—strong Obama stance key

Brian Beutler, “Republicans Finally Confronting Reality: They’re Trapped!” SALON, 10—3—13,

<http://www.salon.com/2013/10/03/republicans_finally_confronting_reality_theyre_trapped/>

After struggling for weeks and weeks in stages one through four, Republicans are finally entering the final stage of grief over the death of their belief that President Obama would begin offering concessions in exchange for an increase in the debt limit.¶ The catalyzing event appears to have been an hour-plus-long meeting between Obama and congressional leaders at the White House on Wednesday. Senior administration officials say that if the meeting accomplished only one thing it was to convey to Republican leaders the extent of Obama’s determination not to negotiate with them over the budget until after they fund the government and increase the debt limit. These officials say his will here is stronger than at any time since he decided to press ahead with healthcare reform after Scott Brown ended the Democrats’ Senate supermajority in 2010.¶ There’s evidence that it sunk in.¶ First, there’s this hot mic moment in which Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell tells Sen. Rand Paul, R-Ky., that the president’s position is ironclad.¶ Then we learn that House Speaker John Boehner has told at least one House Republican privately what he and McConnell have hinted at publicly for months, which is that they won’t execute their debt limit hostage. Boehner specifically said, according to a New York Times report, and obliquely confirmed by a House GOP aide, that he would increase the debt limit before defaulting even if he lost more than half his conference on a vote.¶ None of this is to say that Republicans have “folded” exactly, but they’ve pulled the curtain back before the stage has been fully set for the final act, and revealed who’s being fitted with the red dye packet.

#### Obama is winning now—focus is shifting public opinion

Daniel Diermeier, “Professor, Kellog School of Management, Northwestern University, “How a Game Theorist Would Solve the Shutdown Showdown,” WASHINGTON POST, 10—4—13,

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/10/04/how-a-game-theorist-would-solve-the-shutdown-showdown/>

So looking at confrontations like the current one on the shutdown, and the coming one on the debt ceiling, one analogy I've heard people use is the game of chicken, where two cars are driving at each other and the first one to swerve away loses. Swerving is worse for you than not swerving, but if nobody swerves then you die. Similarly, John Boehner doesn't want to "swerve" (pass a clean continuing resolution or debt ceiling increase) and Obama doesn't want to "swerve" (sign a CR that defunds Obamacare, or sign a non-clean debt ceiling increase), but if neither swerves, then the shutdown continues and/or we default. Is that a fair analogy? That's the most basic way to think about it. When we think about the Cuban missile crisis, it kind of has that flavor. You could also call it a war of attrition, which is a more dynamic version of that. Those are appropriate analogies to a certain extent, but what they're missing is the specific nature of the U.S. political system and how public opinion plays a critical role in how damaging it is to be intransigent. It's not helpful for understanding the structural reasons why this is happening. The really critical question is whether the Republicans are going to stay together. There's a spectrum, of course, depending on your district and what your primaries will look like, from more extreme to more moderate, but they've been more able to maintain a level of party discipline that's unusual compared to the '60s, '70s and '80s. But at what point will the moderate Republicans peel off? Will they stay together, or will they feel so much backlash in their districts at this point, and hear from their constituencies, that the political calculus just doesn't work anymore? That, to me, is the big question. To a large extent that will depend on how effective the Obama administration is in shifting public opinion. It depends on (a) how catastrophic they think breaching the debt ceiling is and (b) who they're blaming for that. So I think this bargaining game will be determined by how successful the two sides are in shifting public opinion. Who do you think is doing better at managing that so far? So far it's going better for the Obama administration. You have these incidents of people being unable to get into national parks or Arlington National Cemetery, the Army/Navy games jeopardized. There are things where people say, "Ooh this is very bad," or "This is crazy." These are important because they give salience to the issue. The sequester didn't have anything like that. There wasn't anything symbolic that really caught people's attention and gave a sense of, "This is really wrong. We need to stop this." These small things, though they're economically not very significant, can shift public opinion because they reinforce how serious this is.

#### Republicans will cave now—Obama has them on the ropes

Easley 10-5 (Jason, 10-5-13, "House Republicans Are Deciding Whether They Should Totally Cave to Obama Now or Later" www.politicususa.com/2013/10/05/house-republicans-deciding-totally-cave-obama.html

A senior House Republican has let it leak that Republicans are so desperate to get out of the government shutdown/debt ceiling standoff that they are debating whether to cave to President Obama now or later. According to CNN: One idea being considered to end the immediate fiscal impasse is a bill to fund the government and extend the nation’s borrowing authority for six weeks, a senior Republican member of the House told CNN Chief Political Analyst Gloria Borger. The congressman agreed to speak with CNN on the condition of anonymity. The GOP lawmaker said a committee could then be set up to negotiate the fiscal issues dividing the two parties and negotiate a plan to keep the government funded for the rest of the year without the proverbial gun to their heads. This idea of an extension being floated among Republicans would give everyone a temporary political reprieve. It would give them a way to reopen the government but bypass the issue of tying it to a change in Obamacare, as well as avert a crisis over whether to raise the nation’s debt limit by Oct. 17 when the Treasury Department has said it will run out of money to pay its bills. House Republicans are pretending publicly that they won’t budge on their demand to delay Obamacare, but the truth is that they are flailing around and desperately searching for a way to get out of their promise to conservatives that they will get rid of the ACA. House Republicans have gone from demanding a one year delay of the ACA to looking for an escape hatch that will let them renew this fight later. It is doubtful that Democrats would accept a six week deal on opening the government and the debt ceiling, because there is no guarantee that anything would be resolved during the six week extension. If Democrats agreed to the short term deal, it’s likely that they would find themselves back in the same place that they are now. The only difference would be that the next showdown would take place during the holiday season. If you read between the lines, the real question that Republicans are debating is when they should totally cave. A six week extension would mean that they cave now, and hope that they can convince conservatives that they will continue to wage war against Obamacare later. Politically there is no reason for Democrats to accept a short term funding/debt ceiling deal that would allow House Republicans to live to fight another day. President Obama is leading a unified Democratic Party that is out to put an end to the tea party madness. The very intentional leaking of this short term proposal is a sign that President Obama and the Democrats have the House Republicans on the ropes. A six week short term deal that would reopen the government and raise the debt ceiling should be rejected by Democrats the very moment that it is offered.

#### Obama is winning—polling, GOP leaks prove

Jonathan Chait, “Yes, the White House is ‘Winning’,” NEW YORK MAGAZINE, 10—4—13,

<http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2013/10/yes-the-white-house-is-winning.html>

The shutdown news of the day so far is that a White House official boasted to The Wall Street Journal, “We are winning ... It doesn't really matter to us" how long the shutdown lasts "because what matters is the end result.” This is a sort of gaffe, partly true and partly false. The government shutdown has a non-zero-sum result, in that it hurts lots of Americans. It’s also a zero-sum contest between the parties. Now, one of the ways you win the zero-sum contest is by not declaring you’re winning the zero-sum contest and thus opening yourself to the charge of indifference to the negative-sum effects.

Still, it is true that the Obama administration is winning the zero-sum contest. One way to measure this is polling, which already shows movement toward the Democratic side. Another way to measure it is that Republicans, who have spent months refusing any budget deal, are suddenly desperate to make a budget deal. A flurry of Republican proposals have been leaked or floated by or to Politico, Jonathan Ward, and Republican adviser Yuval Levin.

Republicans are looking to make a budget deal now because they want to escape the political nightmare they’ve created for themselves. They blustered into a shutdown that corrodes their party brand and cracks the door to flip the House, which ought to be otherwise impregnable in a low-turnout midterm election. They can’t figure out how to back down without winning concessions the Democrats have no incentive to give them. Then they need to lift the debt ceiling, where they’ve raised even loftier expectations, and where the Democrats are even more determined not to be held hostage. Their only way out is to fold everything into a negotiation, give the Democrats something, and hold up whatever they win as a trophy that made it all worthwhile.

#### Compromise now—markets prove

Cordell Eddings, “Markets Suggest Debt-Ceiling Compromise, Pimco’s El-Eria Says,” BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, 10—4—13,

http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-10-04/markets-suggest-debt-ceiling-compromise-pimco-s-el-erian-says

Financial markets suggest that most investors anticipate that U.S. lawmakers will raise the limit on the nation’s debt and avoid a default on government securities, Pacific Investment Management Co.’s Mohamed El-Erian said.¶ “The alternative would be too awful to contemplate,” El-Erian, chief executive and co-chief investment officer at the world’s biggest manager of bond mutual funds, said on Bloomberg Television’s “In the Loop” with Betty Liu. “Most people in the market think we will avoid a debt-ceiling debacle.”¶ A partial U.S. government shutdown entered a fourth day amid wrangling by lawmakers over the budget and debt limit. The U.S. will run out of borrowing authority Oct. 17 and will have $30 billion in cash after that. The country would be unable to pay all of its bills sometime between Oct. 22 and Oct. 31, according to the Congressional Budget Office.¶ The Standard & Poor’s 500 Index (SPX) gained 0.6 percent to 1,689.36 at 12:29 p.m. in New York, while the Stoxx Europe 600 Index climbed 0.1 percent. The yield on 10-year Treasuries increased four basis points to 2.65 percent.¶ The Treasury Department yesterday released a report about the consequences of reaching the debt ceiling, saying it may have catastrophic results that last decades, such as higher interest rates and slower economic growth.¶ ‘Quite Catastrophic’¶ “If the debt ceiling gets taken hostage by politicians, you will see a much different reaction,” El-Erian said from Pimco’s headquarters in Newport Beach, California. “The market expects as we get closer to Oct. 17 some realism will start occurring on Capitol Hill and politicians will avoid what potentially could be quite catastrophic both for the U.S. and the global economy.”

#### Debt limit will be raised now—but political capital is key

VOA News 10-5-13 "Obama Expects Congress to Raise Debt Ceiling Before Deadline" VOA News) www.voanews.com/content/obama-expects-congress-to-raise-debt-ceiling-before-headline/1

U.S. President Barack Obama says he does not think Congress will breach a mid-October deadline to increase the country's borrowing limit so the United States does not default on its financial obligations. With the U.S. government in the fifth day of a partial shutdown, it also faces running out of money to pay its bills on October 17, including interest on government bonds held by China, Japan and other overseas investors. In a wide-ranging interview with the Associated Press released Saturday, Obama said he expects Congress will increase the country's $16.7 trillion debt ceiling so the United States can borrow more money. "America has never not paid its bills. And I've said repeatedly that that's not something anybody should be threatening," the president said. "The potential default of the United States, where we are essentially deadbeats, that's never happened." Obama, a Democrat in his fifth year as the American leader, is locked in a political stalemate with Republican opponents in Congress over government spending policies and implementation of his signature legislative achievement, wide-ranging health care changes that are now taking effect.

#### Stand firm is key to get Boehner to capitulate on the debt ceiling

Madhani 10-4-13 (Aamer, staff writer, "Obama hammers Boehner on shutdown, debt ceiling" www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/10/03/obama-boehner-shutdown-debt-limit/2918545/

President Obama continued to hammer House Speaker John Boehner on Thursday as no new signs of a resolution to a federal government shutdown emerged and the country teetered closer to the $16.7 trillion debt ceiling due to be reached in two weeks. In a speech at a construction company in the nearby Maryland suburbs, Obama placed the blame for the crisis squarely on Boehner, offering no shelter to the Republican leader with whom he has had a hot-and-cold relationship since the Ohio lawmaker won the speakership in 2010. "Speaker John Boehner won't even let the bill get a yes-or-no vote, because he doesn't want to anger the extremists in his party," Obama said. "That's all. That's what this whole thing is about." But as the government shutdown enters its fourth day, Obama and White House officials will have to weigh carefully just how hard they want to push Boehner, who is under intense pressure from the most conservative lawmakers in his party to not capitulate to a president who says he will not negotiate over either a short-term continuing resolution to keep the government open or the looming debt limit. In the end, political analysts say, it is in the interest of the White House to find a way for Boehner to emerge out of the crisis with some credibility with his rank-and-file, as the alternative to the Ohio lawmaker that could emerge from the Republican caucus may be far less tolerable. "There is an old Spanish saying, " said Steve Bell, a former Senate Republican aide and analyst at Bipartisan Policy Center in Washington. "When you go to dig a grave for your enemy dig two — one for him and one for you. " In perhaps a small sign of progress in the impasse, Boehner signaled on Thursday that he may be willing to hold a vote to raise the debt ceiling even if Obama refuses to agree to the Republican demand of delaying implementation of the president's signature health care law by a year. Jared Bernstein, who served as top economic adviser to Vice President Biden in the first term, said that by taking the debt ceiling debate off the table. Boehner could potentially gain some negotiating leverage in the budget fight, but he does it at the risk of the Republican base "throwing him under the bus." Bernstein said the best way forward for the White House is continuing to be "very explicit" with Boehner that it remains open on long term budget issues, while standing pat on the condition that a short-term budget and debt limit vote is passed without conditions. "You essentially tell him by putting clean votes on the floor right now buys a ticket to robust negotiations on the other side," Bernstein said. "At the point, it's perfectly legitimate for him to go into any negotiation with any asks that he wants." Even as Boehner showed signs of flexibility on a debt limit vote, House Republicans continued to pursue a piecemeal shutdown strategy to pass targeted funding bills for popular government services. House Majority Leader Eric Cantor, R-Va., wrote to rank-and-file Republicans in a memo Thursday that he was confident Obama and congressional Democrats would eventually bow to negotiations if Republicans hold the line. "While no one can predict with certainty how the current shutdown will be resolved, I am confident that if we keep advancing common-sense solutions to the problems created by the shutdown that Senate Democrats and President Obama will eventually agree to meaningful discussions that would allow us to ultimately resolve this impasse," Cantor wrote, "The American people have elected a divided government and they expect us to work together and they will not countenance one party simply refusing to negotiate." The House spent much of Thursday trying to develop smaller funding bills that would pay for popular government programs closed by the shutdown. House Republicans have scheduled a meeting for Friday morning to discuss their negotiating positions. Obama, meanwhile, made clear, at least for now, he is going to use the bully pulpit to keep the pressure on Boehner. "The longer this goes on, the worse it will be," Obama said. "And it makes no sense. The American people elected their representatives to make their lives easier, not harder."

#### Will happen now

Ezra Klein, “The House GOP’s Shutdown Plan is Great News,” WASHINGTON POST, 9—28—13,

http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/09/28/the-house-gops-shutdown-plan-is-great-news/

House Republicans plan to attach a one-year delay of Obamacare to the continuing resolution. That sharply increases the chances of a government shutdown beginning Monday night.¶ Good.¶ Speaker Boehner's original plan was to pass a clean bill to fund the government and then attach the one-year delay of Obamacare to the debt-ceiling bill. It was a strategy that would minimize the chances of a shutdown but maximize the chances of a default.¶ Boehner wanted that strategy because he thought Republicans had more leverage on the debt limit than they do on the shutdown. A shutdown, after all, is just bad for the economy. A default is catastrophic for it. You'd have to be insanely reckless to permit the federal government to default on its debts. And Boehner believes that House Republicans are insanely reckless and that President Obama isn't.¶ But that strategy failed. Boehner's members refused to wait for the debt ceiling. They want their showdown now. And that's all for the better.¶ Moving the one-year delay of Obamacare to the CR maximizes the chances of a shutdown but makes a default at least somewhat less likely. If a shutdown begins Monday night, Republicans and Democrats will have more than two weeks to resolve it before hitting the debt ceiling.¶ As Alec Phillips put it in a research note for Goldman Sachs, "If a shutdown is avoided, it is likely to be because congressional Republicans have opted to wait and push for policy concessions on the debt limit instead. By contrast, if a shutdown occurs, we would be surprised if congressional Republicans would want to risk another difficult situation only a couple of weeks later. The upshot is that while a shutdown would be unnecessarily disruptive, it might actually ease passage of a debt limit increase."¶ One way a shutdown makes the passage of a debt limit increase easier is that it can persuade outside actors to come off the sidelines and begin pressuring the Republican Party to cut a deal. One problem in the politics of the fiscal fight so far is that business leaders, Wall Street, voters and even many pundits have been assuming that Republicans and Democrats will argue and carp and complain but work all this out before the government closes down or defaults. A shutdown will prove that comforting notion wrong, and those groups will begin exerting real political pressure to force a resolution before a default happens.

### Ptx Lx: Congress 2NC

**Reducing Obama’s war powers causes republicans to sense blood in the water and put up a more concerted fight against him on domestic issues that makes it impossible for him to get any legislative successes – that’s Seeking Alpha**

#### President has to spend political capital defending war powers

Samples, 11 --- director of the Center for Representative Government at CATO

(10/27/2011, John, “Congress Surrenders the War Powers: Libya, the United Nations, and the Constitution,” <http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa687.pdf>))

But political representation has other fac-ets. It has given voice to public dissatisfaction about wars proper and limited wars. Con-gress “has historically been actively engaged in debates over the proper conduct of major military initiatives. It has proposed, publicly debated, and voted on various legislative initiatives to authorize or curtail the use of force.” Congress has also held hearings about the conduct of limited and proper wars. 215 Many believe that such legislative actions have little effect on the president. Yet such ac-tions can affect the cost-benefit calculations of the president in pursuing or failing to pur-sue a limited war. Congress can raise the costs of a policy by shaping and mobilizing public opinion against a war, thereby increasing the cost in political capital a president must pay to sustain a policy. Congressional actions also signal disunity (or unity) to foreign actors, who in turn act on their expectations, thereby raising the costs of a limited war. Congres-sional actions also affect presidential expec-tations about how the conduct of a war will be received in the legislature; Congress can thus influence presidential policies without directly overturning them. 216 Systematic evi-dence indicates that since 1945 Congress has been able to influence presidential policies through these means. 217 Although short of constitutional propriety, congressional voice can matter in war-making.

#### Perception of losing decks the president

Ornstein, 1 (Norman, American Enterprise Institute, September 10, Lexis)

The compromise accomplished two ends. First, it changed the agenda base of the issue. Patients' rights went from an issue where the only viable proposal was from Democrats (with GOP co-sponsors), which the President vowed to veto - to one where both Democrats and Bush are for patients' rights and merely differ on the details. Two, it gave the President a victory on the House floor when all the pundits predicted defeat - a major momentum builder. In a system where a President has limited formal power, perception matters. The reputation for success - the belief by other political actors that even when he looks down, a president will find a way to pull out a victory - is the most valuable resource a chief executive can have. Conversely, the widespread belief that the Oval Office occupant is on the defensive, on the wane or without the ability to win under adversity can lead to disaster, as individual lawmakers calculate who will be on the winning side and negotiate accordingly. In simple terms, winners win and losers lose more often than not.

**Plan results in fierce congressional opposition – empirics and bellicose congress members**

**Ackerman 5/23** Spencer Ackerman, Senior reporter for the Danger Room @ Wired, recently won the 2012 National Magazine Award for Reporting in Digital Media, “Exclusive: Congressman Preps Bill to End Terror War Authority”, Wired, May 23rd, 2013, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/05/schiff-aumf/

Rep. Adam Schiff (D-Calif.) is preparing a piece of legislation that would “sunset” the 2001 Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF), a foundational law passed in the days after the 9/11. “The current AUMF is outdated and straining at the edges to justify the use of force outside the war theater,” Schiff tells Danger Room.¶ Repealing the AUMF would be the boldest restriction of presidential war powers since 9/11. Both the Bush and Obama administrations have relied on the document to authorize everything from the warrantless electronic surveillance of American citizens to drone strikes against al-Qaida offshoots that did not exist on 9/11. Getting rid of it is certain to invite fierce opposition from more bellicose members of Congress, who have repeatedly demagogued efforts to roll back any post-9/11 wartime authority, let alone the most important one.¶ Rep. Barbara Lee (D-Calif.), the only legislator to vote against the authorization in 2001, has long fought unsuccessfully to repeal the AUMF. But Schiff is a moderate, not a firebreathing liberal, and while sunsetting the AUMF is sure to be a big legislative challenge, even conservative legislators like Rand Paul (R-Ky.) are raising fundamental questions about the merits of a never-ending war.

#### Modifying the AUMF solves partisanship but repealing it causes bipartisan opposition and fights from the DOD

Ackerman 5/23 Spencer Ackerman, Senior reporter for the Danger Room @ Wired, recently won the 2012 National Magazine Award for Reporting in Digital Media, “Exclusive: Congressman Preps Bill to End Terror War Authority”, Wired, May 23rd, 2013, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/05/schiff-aumf/

“I look forward to engaging Congress and the American people in efforts to refine, and ultimately repeal, the AUMF’s mandate,” Obama said. “And I will not sign laws designed to expand this mandate further. Our systematic effort to dismantle terrorist organizations must continue. But this war, like all wars, must end.”¶ That’s a position that may not sit well with the U.S. military. During a Senate hearing last week, generals from the Joint Staff and senior Pentagon civilians argued that the AUMF was a necessary law that should remain in place — unchanged. The position satisfied neither Democratic and Independent critics who saw it as a blank check for war nor Republican critics who considered it too restrictive to fight 2013-era terrorism.¶ One of them is McKeon, the first legislator who proposed reexamining the AUMF. Repealing it outright doesn’t sit well with him — and probably many other congressional Republicans and some Democrats.¶ “The chairman is far from convinced that’s the direction we need to go,” says an aide to McKeon’s committee. “We need to reaffirm our authority with respect to those [al-Qaida] affiliated groups.” What’s more, Obama’s willingness to “ultimately repeal” the AUMF runs right smack into his codification of a more limited counterterrorism war lasting for years. At the National Defense University, Obama simultaneously talked about a longer war and removing his own authorities for waging it.¶ Schiff sees all this tension — on the Hill and within the administration — as an opportunity. “There’s probably bipartisan support for the idea that the existing AUMF is ill-suited to the nature of the threats we face now,” he says. But there’s “probably bipartisan opposition to what would come after,” both from the left and right. Schiff thinks that disagreement means a congressional debate about the future of presidential authority against terrorism is overdue. He intends to kickstart one.

#### Modifying AUMF links to politics

Crowley 13 (Michael Crowley, Time, 4/1/13, “So, Who Can We Kill?”, http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,2139176,00.html, zzx)

Obama could also seek--or Congress could hand him--a renewed AUMF more clearly stating the mission, and enemy, in the antiterrorism war for the post-Afghanistan era. But that, too, could be fraught, involving an unpredictable process that, as someone familiar with the thinking of Administration officials puts it, "quickly becomes emotional and politicized. The extreme right and the extreme left have now converged on these issues, and they will team up." Others worry about just the opposite--that hawks like John McCain might seize control of the process and grant the President even broader new terrorist-hunting powers. "Proposing a new AUMF carries very significant risks," says Matthew Waxman, a former Bush Administration national-security official now at Columbia Law School, adding, "There would also be major risks to using force against other terrorist groups without a clear legislative basis."

### Debt Uq: A2 “Thumper—Syria”

#### Syria problems are a distant memory - strength in the current fight gives him a major political edge

Michael O’Brien, “Winners and Losers of the Government Shutdown,” NBC NEWS, 10—1—13,

<http://nbcpolitics.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/10/01/20763839-winners-and-losers-of-the-government-shutdown?lite>

Nonetheless, after two-and-a-half years of standoffs and gridlock, the fact that a shutdown has finally come to pass — 17 days before Congress must also raise the debt ceiling, no less — could upend politics with unforeseen consequences for many of this fight's key players. Here is a look at some of the shutdown's winners and losers. Winners: President Barack Obama At the end of the day, Obama's signature domestic achievement — the Affordable Care Act — survived this fight intact. What's more, the president didn't have to offer any concessions in exchange for leaving his namesake "Obamacare" law alone. Unlike the 2011 debt-ceiling fight, when the administration agreed to the automatic spending cuts that would eventually form the basis of the sequester, this time the administration held the line and didn't yield much ground to Republicans. The developments mark a somewhat stunning turnaround for Obama's political fortunes over the last month. Just a few week's ago, the administration was struggling badly to win congressional approval for intervention in Syria — an initiative which had no less than Obama's second-term relevance riding on it. Now, Obama has dispensed with the Syria issue (for now) through diplomacy, and scored a major win over Republicans -- a rare victory, given the waning prospects for immigration reform or major gun control legislation during his presidency.

#### Syria didn’t affect the debt ceiling debate

Paul Koring, “Obama Faces Fall Showdown with Congress,” GLOBE AND MAIL, 9—16—13,

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/obama-faces-fall-showdown-with-congress/article14329090/

**A**s hostile as relations are, some observers suggest the averted showdown over Syria – it’s now widely accepted that Congress would have rejected Mr. Obama’s call for an authorization of force had it gone to a vote – didn’t make things any worse. “We don’t know what September would have looked like in the absence of the Syria issue but my guess is that it would have looked an awful lot like it looks today**,”** said Sarah Binder, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution who watches Congress closely. “These divisions over spending and size of government have been with us all along and the [Republican] opposition to Obama has been quite strong all along. … Set aside the issue of Syria and really nothing has changed**.”**

#### Agreement bought time- can shift focus to the debt ceiling

BLOOMBERG, “Hezbollah, Iran Will Benefit from Syria Accord, Republican Says,” 9—15—13,

[www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-15/hezbollah-iran-will-benefit-from-syria-accord-republican-says.html](http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-15/hezbollah-iran-will-benefit-from-syria-accord-republican-says.html)

The agreement gives Obama a diplomatic achievement without a shot being fired by U.S. armed forces. While the deal still faces political and practical hurdles, it could also wind down a drama that has put the president at odds with most of the U.S. public and many of his supporters.¶ That would let the administration shift its focus to domestic priorities, including a budget agreement, an increase in the debt ceiling and the nomination of a Federal Reserve chairman.¶ “The most important political effect of the agreement is to knock the issue down a few pegs on the political agenda,” said John Pitney, a political science professor at Claremont McKenna College, in Claremont, California.

#### Won’t implicate the debt ceiling debate now that it’s been delayed

Caren Bohan, “Delay in Syria Vote Frees Obama to Shift to Hefty Domestic Agenda,” REUTERS, 9—11—13,

<http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/11/usa-obama-agenda-idUSL2N0H716N20130911>

WASHINGTON, Sept 11 (Reuters) - **Putting off** a decision on military strikes on **Syria** allows President Barack **Obama to shift his attention back to a weighty domestic agenda** for the fall **that includes budget fights**, immigration and selecting a new chairman of the Federal Reserve.¶ Obama and his aides have immersed themselves for a week and a half in an intensive effort to win support in Congress for U.S. military action in Syria after a suspected chemical weapons attack last month killed more than 1,400 people.¶ But the effort, which included meetings by Obama on Capitol Hill on Tuesday followed by his televised speech to Americans, seemed headed for an embarrassing defeat, with large numbers of both Democrats and Republicans expressing opposition.¶ **The push** for a vote **on Syria** - which has now been delayed - **had threatened to crowd out the busy legislative agenda for the final three months of 2013 and drain Obama's political clout, making it harder for him to press his priorities.**¶ But analysts said **a proposal floated by Russia**, which the Obama administration is now exploring, to place Syria's weapons under international control **may allow Obama to emerge from a difficult dilemma with minimal political damage.** **"He dodges a tough political situation this way," said** John **Pitney, professor of politics at Claremont** McKenna College in California.¶ Pitney said the delay in the Syria vote removes a big burden for Obama, given that Americans, who overwhelmingly opposed military intervention in Syria, will now be able to shift their attention to other matters.¶ He said Obama could suffer some weakening of his leverage with Congress. The administration's "full court press" to try to persuade lawmakers to approve military force on Syria was heavily criticized and did not yield much success.¶ "He probably has suffered some damage in Congress because there are probably many people on (Capitol Hill) who have increasing doubts about the basic competence of the administration and that's a disadvantage in any kind of negotiation," Pitney said.¶ BUDGET BATTLES¶ **Among Obama's most immediate challenges are two looming budget fights**. By Sept. 30, Congress and the president must agree on legislation to keep federal agencies funded or face a government shutdown.¶ Two weeks later, **Congress must raise the limit on the country's ability to borrow or risk a possible debt default that could cause chaos in financial markets.**¶ On the first budget showdown, Obama may be at a strategic advantage because of divisions among opposition Republicans about whether to use the spending bill to provoke a fight over Obama's signature health care law, known as Obamacare.¶ House Republican leaders are trying to rally the party around a temporary spending measure that would keep the government funded until Dec. 15 but are facing resistance within their own caucus from some conservatives who want to cut off funding for Obamacare, even if it means a government shutdown.¶ **The debt limit fight could end up going down to the wire and unnerving financial markets. Republicans want to use that standoff to extract concessions from the Democratic president, such as spending cuts and a delay in the health law. But Obama has said he has no intention of negotiating over the borrowing limit.**¶Another challenge for Obama will be reviving momentum for immigration reform. Sweeping legislation that would grant a path to citizenship for 11 million undocumented immigrants has passed the Democratic-led Senate but has been stalled in the Republican-controlled House of Representatives.¶ Over the past week and half, lobbyists and other supporters of immigration reform have become worried that the Syria issue could doom the legislation in the House by limiting the amount of time lawmakers have to consider it.¶ But lobbyists are not ready to give up and have continued meeting with lawmakers to press the issue.¶ Some activists believe Obama could create pressure on Republicans to act by making greater use of the bully pulpit. The White House has sought to strike a balance between calling for action and giving Congress space to consider the issue.¶ Another pressing domestic matter will be picking a candidate to succeed Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, whose term expires in January. Obama has been leaning toward Lawrence Summers, a former top White House aide and Treasury secretary, who is controversial within his own Democratic Party.¶ Any candidate for Fed chairman will require confirmation by the U.S. Senate.¶ **On issues like the budget battles in which Obama will go toe-to-toe with Republicans, the Syria push will have little fallout for Obama, predicted** Matt **Bennett, senior vice president at Third Way**, a center-left think tank.¶ Republicans showed a huge resistance to Obama's agenda well before the administration's effort to win congressional backing on Syria began to falter, Bennett noted. He said the time focused on Syria over the last week and half did nothing to change that dynamic.¶ "I certainly don't think the situation he's in today is markedly different from the one he faced a

few weeks ago," Bennett said.

#### Syria doesn’t thump – Dems still have Obama’s back

Lisa Lerer, analyst, 9-12-2013, “Obama Syria Reversal Sets Stage for Fights With Congress” Bloomberg, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-12/obama-syria-reversal-sets-stage-for-fights-with-congress.html

And it comes at a perilous time, as Obama and congressional Republicans need to come to an agreement to avoid a government shutdown after the 2013 budget year ends on Sept. 30. The House plans to be in session only six working days before the deadline, and already Boehner and Cantor have delayed a vote on a spending proposal amid opposition by fellow Republicans who want the party to take a tougher stand against funding Obama’s health-care law.¶ “He just cannot follow through,” Republican Senator Bob Corker, who is part of a group working with the administration on fiscal issues, said of Obama in an interview with CNN. “He’s a diminished figure here on Capitol Hill.”¶ Debt Limit¶ Along with grappling with the 2014 budget, within weeks both sides also will need to find a way to stave off a possible government default as the nation reaches its borrowing limit. Obama also needs to woo Republican support for Senate confirmation of his eventual pick to lead the Federal Reserve, a process that could begin as early as this month.¶ Republicans yesterday seized on Obama’s reversal on Syria as a sign that he is coming into the fall negotiations with a weakened hand politically, as the president decided to delay a strike against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime to explore a possible diplomatic solution proposed by Russian President Vladimir Putin.¶ “If this were a tennis match, it would be the umpire shouting, ‘Advantage Putin!’ He seems to be running circles around this administration,” Senator Rand Paul, a Republican from Kentucky who is opposed to military action in Syria, said on Glenn Beck’s radio show on TheBlaze.¶ No Effect¶ The White House and its allies argue that the debate over Syria won’t hurt Obama on other issues, simply because the fight didn’t break along traditional party lines and is unlikely to resonate in the 2014 congressional elections. A coalition of small-government Republicans wary of U.S. involvement overseas and Democrats who warned of the risk of entering another Middle Eastern war lined up against Obama’s Syria plan, likely killing its chances of passage if there had been a vote in the House.¶ Those Democrats, Obama supporters say, will stick with the president on economic issues, while many of those Republicans will always be lined up against him.

#### Syria doesn’t affect Obama’s agenda – GOP internal division and decision-calculus are the key internal links

Sargent 9-12 (Greg, Syria won’t make GOP’s immigration problem go “poof” and disappear, Washington Post, 12 September 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2013/09/12/syria-wont-make-gops-immigration-problem-go-poof-and-disappear/, da 9-13-13)

I noted this morning that the overarching factor that will shape this fall’s fiscal fights is the deep schism within the GOP over how aggressively to wage war on Obamacare. For all the talk about how Obama’s mishandling of Syria diminishes or weakens him for coming confrontations, all of that is largely irrelevant to the central question: Can Republicans resolve their own internal differences? It’s worth noting that a similar dynamic is present on immigration. Whatever Obama’s “standing” in relation to Congress, it won’t change the GOP’s predicament on immigration one iota.¶ Jorge Ramos, the widely influential Univision anchor who has been called the “Walter Cronkite of Hispanic media,” today published a column that illustrates this nicely. Republicans and neutral commentators say the Syria debate probably means immigration reform will be delayed indefinitely. This is, of course, a cop out, and Ramos says so rather bluntly. Here’s the translation, courtesy of America’s Voice:¶ Syria has turned into the biggest excuse to delay, and even eliminate, the chance for immigration reform this year. The enormous international consequences of an attack on Syria are giving the most conservative Republicans the pretext they were looking for not to give a path to citizenship to the undocumented.¶ I’m not trying to downplay the significance of Syria…but Hispanics and immigrants in the United States deserve better. The last time immigration reform happened was in 1986, and in 2007 a (weak) immigration bill died of starvation in Congress. How much longer do we have to wait? [...]¶ Delaying the debate over immigration reform because of the conflict in Syria is simply an unacceptable excuse. Truly important things should not be delayed. Syria and immigration can, and should, both be discussed and resolved before the year ends.¶ As Ramos has previously noted, if immigration reform dies, the Hispanic media — and Latinos generally — will hold House Republicans, and House Republicans alone, responsible for it. Ramos’ message above is that if Republicans try to use Syria as an excuse for inaction, Latinos will see right through that, too.¶ The debate in Washington right now is heavily focused on whether Obama’s handling of Syria — in particular, Congress’ apparent rejection of his request for authorization — has badly weakened his ability to realize the rest of his agenda. Immigration reform, of course, is a major item on that agenda.¶ But when it comes to immigration — as with this fall’s fiscal fights — that question is largely irrelevant. Obama’s “standing” or “strength” with regard to Congress won’t play any significant role in determining whether immigration reform happens. That, too, is a question that turns only on whether Republicans resolve their differences over it.¶ Immigration reform’s fate, at bottom, rests solely on whether Republicans decide it needs to pass for the long term good of the party. Either they will decide killing reform is too risky, because it will lock in anti-GOP hostility among Latinos for a generation or more. Or they will decide passing reform won’t do enough to win over Latinos, given their disagreement with the GOP on other issues, and that the downsides of alienating the base aren’t worth the potential upsides. Neither the fact that Congress is distracted by Syria, nor Obama’s short term dip in popularity or standing or whatever you want to call it, will have anything whatsoever to do with that decision. Nor will Latino reaction to the GOP’s eventual decision. Does anyone imagine that if Republicans kill reform, Latinos will somehow see the Syria debate — or, even more ludicrously, Beltway-generated ideas about Obama’s “standing” — as mitigating factors?¶ When looked at through the prism of specific issues — such as immigration reform or the budget arguments to come — the notion that the Syria mess somehow diminishes the chances for key items on Obama’s agenda, or somehow changes the calculus for Republicans with regard to how to approach them, is plainly absurd on its face.

#### Syria won’t affect the domestic agenda – it wasn’t along party lines, and domestic issues will dominate the midterm elections

Lerer 9-12 (Lisa, Obama Syria Reversal Sets Stage for Fights With Congress, Bloomberg, 12 September 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-12/obama-syria-reversal-sets-stage-for-fights-with-congress.html, da 9-13-13) PC

The White House and its allies argue that the debate over Syria won’t hurt Obama on other issues, simply because the fight didn’t break along traditional party lines and is unlikely to resonate in the 2014 congressional elections. A coalition of small-government Republicans wary of U.S. involvement overseas and Democrats who warned of the risk of entering another Middle Eastern war lined up against Obama’s Syria plan, likely killing its chances of passage if there had been a vote in the House.¶ Those Democrats, Obama supporters say, will stick with the president on economic issues, while many of those Republicans will always be lined up against him.¶ Representative Steve Israel of New York, head of Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, said the ability of the party’s candidates to sell the benefits of the health-care law and outline their economic proposals will be far more important in their races than talking about Syria.¶ “2014 is not going to be a referendum on Syria,” Israel told reporters on Sept. 10 at a Christian Science Monitor breakfast. “I cannot imagine voters waking up in one year and two months saying they are going to cast their vote on Syria.”¶ The White House declined to comment on notifying Boehner and Cantor about Obama’s decision to hold off on congressional votes on Syria.

#### Russia deal provides cover – no loss of PC

Bohan 9/11

Caren, Reuters, Delay in Syria vote frees Obama to shift to hefty domestic agenda, 9/11/13, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/11/us-usa-obama-agenda-idUSBRE98A0Z920130911

Putting off a decision on military strikes on Syria allows President Barack Obama to shift his attention back to a weighty domestic agenda for the fall that includes budget fights, immigration and selecting a new chairman of the Federal Reserve.¶ Obama and his aides have immersed themselves for a week and a half in an intensive effort to win support in Congress for U.S. military action in Syria after a suspected chemical weapons attack last month killed more than 1,400 people.¶ But the effort, which included meetings by Obama on Capitol Hill on Tuesday followed by his televised speech to Americans, seemed headed for an embarrassing defeat, with large numbers of both Democrats and Republicans expressing opposition.¶ The push for a vote on Syria - which has now been delayed - had threatened to crowd out the busy legislative agenda for the final three months of 2013 and drain Obama's political clout, making it harder for him to press his priorities.¶ But analysts said a proposal floated by Russia, which the Obama administration is now exploring, to place Syria's weapons under international control may allow Obama to emerge from a difficult dilemma with minimal political damage.¶ "He dodges a tough political situation this way," said John Pitney, professor of politics at Claremont McKenna College in California.¶ Pitney said the delay in the Syria vote removes a big burden for Obama, given that Americans, who overwhelmingly opposed military intervention in Syria, will now be able to shift their attention to other matters.

#### Capital key – overcomes GOP Obamacare holdout

Sargent 9/13

Greg, Washington, Post, The Morning Plum: Delusions and lies about Obamacare come back to haunt GOP leaders, 9/13/13, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2013/09/13/the-morning-plum-delusions-and-lies-about-obamacare-come-back-to-haunt-gop-leaders/

The new NBC/WSJ poll contains bad news for Dems. But the poll is even worse news for the whole country, because it may make Republicans more likely to think they have the leverage they need to use this fall’s confrontations to somehow undermine Obamacare.¶ The key findings are that 44 percent of Americans say they oppose a debt ceiling increase, versus only 22 percent who favor one. In a reversal, Republicans are now more favored on the economy by by four points, and on the deficit by 13 points.¶ Of course, public opinion always tilts against the debt limit — that didn’t stop Republicans from caving on it earlier this year — and as the NBC write-up notes, Obama has the bully-pulpit, which ultimately flipped opinion on it last time. But for conservatives looking for ways to rally the shock troops for the coming confrontation, this poll could boost their case that the GOP must hold firm in its demand to block or delay Obamacare, probably in the debt ceiling fight, where GOP leaders say they will make their stand against the law. Some are already pointing to it as proof of leverage.¶ But the poll also finds that an astonishingly low 23 percent favor the GOP as the party that is looking out for the middle class. As the GOP pollster who helped conduct the poll put it: “The Republican Party is not on the playing field in terms of who’s being considered as representing the values of the middle class. That is fundamental positioning problem.” Indeed, it’s a terrible place to be, heading into a war in which Republicans will be armed with little more than an austerity message as justification for unleashing more economic havoc.

### Dem Unity High: F/L

Dem Unity High – Shutdown Proves

Helderman and Rucker 10/1 Staff writers for Washington post “In battles over budget and Obamacare, rare unity among Democrats” http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/in-battles-over-budget-and-obamacare-rare-unity-among-democrats/2013/10/01/d2d85bca-2ab0-11e3-8ade-a1f23cda135e\_story.html[EDymit]

Shortly before the government shut down, House Republicans crafted their final spending offer, including two health-care provisions designed to scare red-state Senate Democrats facing reelection battles: one to delay Obamacare’s unpopular individual mandate and another removing subsidies for lawmakers and their staffs.¶ But the Democrats didn’t budge, killing the proposal without a single defection. Their unity was so assured that Majority Leader Harry M. Reid (D-Nev.) didn’t bother to convene a private caucus meeting to discuss the measure before the vote.¶Scott Clement from The Washington Post’s polling team explains the one number you need to know from the new Washington Post-ABC News Poll on the budget negotiations.¶ After a difficult summer for the party — with President Obama and lawmakers deeply divided over Syria, surveillance policies and a looming Federal Reserve nomination — the budget battle that resulted in the shutdown early Tuesday has brought rare unity to the Democrats.¶“We’re joined with the president now,” said Sen. Richard J. Durbin (Ill.). “This is totally irresponsible on [House Republicans’] part. It threatens the economy. It threatens jobs across America. We’ve got to make a stand, to make it clear once and for all that we are not going to be held hostage.”¶While Republicans have been openly disagreeing with one another over their budget strategy, Democrats from the White House to the Capitol have been largely singing the same tune.¶“It’s pretty unusual,” said Steve Elmendorf, a longtime Democratic operative and former House leadership aide. “Usually in situations like this, in private conversations with members and chiefs of staff, you have people saying, ‘I’m not sure if the leadership and the White House is getting this right.’ And I hear none of that — none.”

### Ptx Theory: A2 “Intrinsicness”

#### Link proves the DA is intrinsic – passing the plan makes Obama look weak and undermines his capital

#### We should evaluate the politics DA as an intrinsic cost of the plan

#### Willpower is a finite resource both in Congress and our personal lives – debating the politics DA lets us practice being realistic about our ability to make and stick to tough choices.

#### Intrinsicness is a voting issue –1) Moving target - affs should have to defend the plan to the death2) Kills ground - we would have no DAs since the USFG has unlimited agential ambit.

#### Politics DAs are good they force current events research on a topic that stays the same and we gain education about the political effects of the plan

#### Politics tests a key opportunity cost

Steve **Saideman**, Associate Professor, Political Science, McGill University, “Key Constraint of Policy Relevance,” 7—25—**11**, http://duckofminerva.blogspot.com/2011/07/key-constraint-on-policy-relevance.html, accessed 10-2-11.

Dan Drezner has a great post today about how the foreign policy smart set (his phrase) gets so frustrated by domestic politics that they tend to recommend domestic political changes that are never going to happen. I would go one step further and suggest that one of the key problems for scholars who want to be relevant for policy debates is that we tend to make recommendations that are "incentive incompatible." I love that phrase. What is best for policy may not be what is best for politics, and so we may think we have a good idea about what to recommend but get frustrated when our ideas do not get that far. Lots of folks talking about early warning about genocide, intervention into civil wars and the like blame "political will." That countries lack, for whatever reason, the compulsion to act. Well, that is another way of saying that domestic politics matters, but we don't want to think about it. Dan's piece contains an implication which is often false--that IR folks have little grasp of domestic politics. Many IR folks do tend to ignore or simplify the domestic side too much, but there is plenty of scholarship on the domestic determinants of foreign policy/grand strategy/war/trade/etc. Plenty of folks look at how domestic institutions and dynamics can cause countries to engage in sub-optimal foreign policies (hence the tradeoff implied in my second book--For Kin or Country). The challenge, then, is to figure out what would be a cool policy and how that cool policy could resonate with those who are relevant domestically. That is not easy, but it is what is necessary. To be policy relevant requires both parts--articulating a policy alternative that would improve things and some thought about how the alternative could be politically appealing. Otherwise, we can just dream about the right policy and gnash our teeth when it never happens.

### Debt IL: PC Key—2NC

#### Obama pushing now—capital key to success

Pace 9/12 Julie, AP White House correspondent, Syria debate on hold, Obama refocuses on agenda, The Fresno Bee, 9/12/13, http://www.fresnobee.com/2013/09/12/3493538/obama-seeks-to-focus-on-domestic.html

With a military strike against Syria on hold, President Barack Obama tried Thursday to reignite momentum for his second-term domestic agenda. But his progress could hinge on the strength of his standing on Capitol Hill after what even allies acknowledge were missteps in the latest foreign crisis.¶ "It is still important to recognize that we have a lot of things left to do here in this government," Obama told his Cabinet, starting a sustained White House push to refocus the nation on matters at home as key benchmarks on the budget and health care rapidly approach.¶ "The American people are still interested in making sure that our kids are getting the kind of education they deserve, that we are putting people back to work," Obama said.¶ The White House plans to use next week's five-year anniversary of the 2008 financial collapse to warn Republicans that shutting down the government or failing to raise the debt limit could drag down the still-fragile economy. With Hispanic Heritage Month to begin Monday, Obama is also expected to press for a stalled immigration overhaul and urge minorities to sign up for health care exchanges beginning Oct. 1.¶ Among the events planned for next week is a White House ceremony highlighting Americans working on immigrant and citizenship issues. Administration officials will also promote overhaul efforts at naturalization ceremonies across the country. On Sept. 21, Obama will speak at the Congressional Black Caucus Gala, where he'll trumpet what the administration says are benefits of the president's health care law for African-Americans and other minorities.¶ Two major factors are driving Obama's push to get back on track with domestic issues after three weeks of Syria dominating the political debate. Polls show the economy, jobs and health care remain Americans' top concerns. And Obama has a limited window to make progress on those matters in a second term, when lame-duck status can quickly creep up on presidents, particularly if they start losing public support.¶ Obama already is grappling with some of the lowest approval ratings of his presidency. A Pew Research Center/USA Today poll out this week put his approval at 44 percent. That's down from 55 percent at the end of 2012.¶ Potential military intervention in Syria also is deeply unpopular with many Americans, with a Pew survey finding that 63 percent opposing the idea. And the president's publicly shifting positions on how to respond to a deadly chemical weapons attack in Syria also have confused many Americans and congressional lawmakers.¶ "In times of crisis, the more clarity the better," said Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., a strong supporter of U.S. intervention in Syria. "This has been confusing. For those who are inclined to support the president, it's been pretty hard to nail down what the purpose of a military strike is."¶ For a time, the Obama administration appeared to be barreling toward an imminent strike in retaliation for the Aug. 21 chemical weapons attack. But Obama made a sudden reversal and instead decided to seek congressional approval for military action.¶ Even after administration officials briefed hundreds of lawmakers on classified intelligence, there appeared to be limited backing for a use-of-force resolution on Capitol Hill. Rather than face defeat, Obama asked lawmakers this week to postpone any votes while the U.S. explores the viability of a deal to secure Syria's chemical weapons stockpiles.¶ That pause comes as a relief to Obama and many Democrats eager to return to issues more in line with the public's concerns. The most pressing matters are a Sept. 30 deadline to approve funding to keep the government open — the new fiscal year begins Oct. 1 — and the start of sign-ups for health care exchanges, a crucial element of the health care overhaul.¶ On Wednesday, a revolt by tea party conservatives forced House Republican leaders to delay a vote on a temporary spending bill written to head off a government shutdown. Several dozen staunch conservatives are seeking to couple the spending bill with a provision to derail implementation of the health care law.¶ The White House also may face a fight with Republicans over raising the nation's debt ceiling this fall. While Obama has insisted he won't negotiate over the debt limit, House Speaker John Boehner on Thursday said the GOP will insist on curbing spending.

#### Capital key to solving standoff that guts the eocnomy

Richard McGregor, FINANCIAL TIMES, 6—24—13,

[www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3a66c240-dc0f-11e2-8853-00144feab7de.html#axzz2Z7YPAEJQ](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3a66c240-dc0f-11e2-8853-00144feab7de.html#axzz2Z7YPAEJQ)

The debt ceiling debate will take place in a very different context this time, with the economy recovering and the US budget deficit falling rapidly after earlier deals on tax rises and spending cuts. “There is also a certain crisis fatigue,” said Stan Collender, a former congressional staffer, at Qorvis Communication, a Washington consultancy. The debt ceiling will probably be increased eventually, even if a prolonged stand-off has the potential to damage confidence in the economy. “This isn’t 2011: if Republicans provoke a debt ceiling confrontation over demands for massive, offsetting spending cuts, the business community is going to come unglued,” said John Lawrence, former chief of staff to Nancy Pelosi, the Democratic minority leader in the House. But the political capital needed to get the statutory debt ceiling raised has the potential to drain the energy and spirit of compromise that both sides will need to forge a majority coalition for immigration.

### Debt IL: PC Key—Ext

#### Obama’s capital is key --- it’s his sole focus now

Jonathan Allen, “GOP Battles Boost President Obama,” POLITICO, 9—19—13,

dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=17961849-5BE5-43CA-B1BC-ED8A12A534EB

There’s a simple reason President Barack Obama is using his bully pulpit to focus the nation’s attention on the battle over the budget: In this fight, he’s watching Republicans take swings at each other. And that GOP fight is a lifeline for an administration that had been scrambling to gain control its message after battling congressional Democrats on the potential use of military force in Syria and the possible nomination of Larry Summers to run the Federal Reserve. If House Republicans and Obama can’t cut even a short-term deal for a continuing resolution, the government’s authority to spend money will run out on Oct. 1. Within weeks, the nation will default on its debt if an agreement isn’t reached to raise the federal debt limit. For some Republicans, those deadlines represent a leverage point that can be used to force Obama to slash his health care law. For others, they’re a zero hour at which the party will implode if it doesn’t cut a deal. Meanwhile, “on the looming fiscal issues, Democrats — both liberal and conservative, executive and congressional — are virtually 100 percent united,” said Sen. Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.). Just a few days ago, all that Obama and his aides could talk about were Syria and Summers. Now, they’re bringing their party together and shining a white hot light on Republican disunity over whether to shut down the government and plunge the nation into default in a vain effort to stop Obamacare from going into effect. The squabbling among Republicans has gotten so vicious that a Twitter hashtag — #GOPvsGOPugliness — has become a thick virtual data file for tracking the intraparty insults. Moderates, and even some conservatives, are slamming Texas Sen. Ted Cruz, a tea party favorite, for ramping up grassroots expectations that the GOP will shut down the government if it can’t win concessions from the president to “defund” his signature health care law. “I didn’t go to Harvard or Princeton, but I can count,” Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) tweeted, subtly mocking Cruz’s Ivy League education. “The defunding box canyon is a tactic that will fail and weaken our position.” While it is well-timed for the White House to interrupt a bad slide, Obama’s singular focus on the budget battle is hardly a last-minute shift. Instead, it is a return to the narrative arc that the White House was working to build before the Syria crisis intervened. And it’s so important to the president’s strategy that White House officials didn’t consider postponing Monday’s rollout of the most partisan and high-stakes phase even when a shooter murdered a dozen people at Washington’s Navy Yard that morning. The basic storyline, well under way over the summer, was to have the president point to parts of his agenda, including reducing the costs of college and housing, designed to strengthen the middle class; use them to make the case that he not only saved the country from economic disaster but is fighting to bolster the nation’s finances on both the macro and household level; and then argue that Republicans’ desire to lock in the sequester and leverage a debt-ceiling increase for Obamacare cuts would reverse progress made. The president is on firm ground, White House officials say, because he stands with the public in believing that the government shouldn’t shut down and that the country should pay its bills.

#### Calling in a favor on the plan burns up Obama’s limited leverage with House Republicans—PC is finite

Heidi Moore, “Syria: the Great Distraction,” GUARDIAN, 9—10—13,

<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/10/obama-syria-what-about-sequester>

Before President Obama speaks to the nation about Syria tonight, take a look at what this fall will look like inside America.

There are 49 million people in the country who suffered inadequate access to food in 2012, leaving the percentage of "food-insecure" Americans at about one-sixth of the US population. At the same time, Congress refused to pass food-stamp legislation this summer, pushing it off again and threatening draconian cuts. The country will crash into the debt ceiling in mid-October, which would be an economic disaster, especially with a government shutdown looming at the same time. These are deadlines that Congress already learned two years ago not to toy with, but memories appear to be preciously short. The Federal Reserve needs a new chief in three months, someone who will help the country confront its raging unemployment crisis that has left 12 million people without jobs. The president has promised to choose a warm body within the next three weeks, despite the fact that his top pick, Larry Summers, would likely spark an ugly confirmation battle – the "fight of the century," according to some – with a Congress already unwilling to do the President's bidding. Congress was supposed to pass a farm bill this summer, but declined to do so even though the task is already two years late. As a result, the country has no farm bill, leaving agricultural subsidies up in the air, farmers uncertain about what their financial picture looks like, and a potential food crisis on the horizon. The two main housing agencies, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, have been in limbo for four years and are desperately in need of reform that should start this fall, but there is scant attention to the problem. These are the problems going unattended by the Obama administration while his aides and cabinet members have been wasting the nation's time making the rounds on television and Capitol Hill stumping for a profoundly unpopular war. The fact that all this chest-beating was for naught, and an easy solution seems on the horizon, belies the single-minded intensity that the Obama White House brought to its insistence on bombing Syria. More than one wag has suggested, with the utmost reason, that if Obama had brought this kind of passion to domestic initiatives, the country would be in better condition right now. As it is, public policy is embarrassingly in shambles at home while the administration throws all of its resources and political capital behind a widely hated plan to get involved in a civil war overseas. The upshot for the president may be that it's easier to wage war with a foreign power than go head-to-head with the US Congress, even as America suffers from neglect. This is the paradox that President Obama is facing this fall, as he appears to turn his back on a number of crucial and urgent domestic initiatives in order to spend all of his meager political capital on striking Syria. Syria does present a significant humanitarian crisis, which has been true for the past two years that the Obama administration has completely ignored the atrocities of Bashar al-Assad. Two years is also roughly the same amount of time that key domestic initiatives have also gone ignored as Obama and Congress engage in petty battles for dominance and leave the country to run itself on a starvation diet imposed by sequestration cuts. Leon Panetta tells the story of how he tried to lobby against sequestration only to be told: Leon, you don't understand. The Congress is resigned to failure. Similarly, those on Wall Street, the Federal Reserve, those working at government agencies, and voters themselves have become all too practiced at ignoring the determined incompetence of those in Washington. Political capital – the ability to horse-trade and win political favors from a receptive audience – is a finite resource in Washington. Pursuing misguided policies takes up time, but it also eats up credibility in asking for the next favor. It's fair to say that congressional Republicans, particularly in the House, have no love for Obama and are likely to oppose anything he supports. That's exactly the reason the White House should stop proposing policies as if it is scattering buckshot and focus with intensity on the domestic tasks it wants to accomplish, one at a time.The president is scheduled to speak six times this week, mostly about Syria. That includes evening news interviews, an address to the nation, and numerous other speeches. Behind the scenes, he is calling members of Congress to get them to fall into line. Secretary of State John Kerry is omnipresent, so ubiquitous on TV that it may be easier just to get him his own talk show called Syria Today. It would be a treat to see White House aides lobbying as aggressively – and on as many talk shows – for a better food stamp bill, an end to the debt-ceiling drama, or a solution to the senseless sequestration cuts, as it is on what is clearly a useless boondoggle in Syria. There's no reason to believe that Congress can have an all-consuming debate about Syria and then, somehow refreshed, return to a domestic agenda that has been as chaotic and urgent as any in recent memory. The President should have judged his options better. As it is, he should now judge his actions better.

#### Entertaining GOP negotiating demands will drag the process out and trigger economic collapse

Carmel Lobello, “How the Looming Debt Ceiling Fight Could Screw up the U.S. Economy; Yup, This is Happening,” THE WEEK, 8—27—13, <http://theweek.com/article/index/248775/how-the-looming-debt-ceiling-fight-could-screw-up-the-us-economy>

Ready for more debt-ceiling drama?

The Treasury Department said Monday it would hit its borrowing limit in mid-October, which means that Congress will need to raise its $16.7 trillion debt ceiling to pay the nation's bills. The sooner-than-expected deadline comes at an inconvenient moment, because Congress is already facing a budget deadline for the stopgap "continuing resolution" that finances the federal government, which is set to run out September 30. Failure to come to an agreement would trigger a government shutdown. Having two big deadlines fall two weeks apart could be a recipe for disaster. Republicans, led by Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio), have been musing about the possibility of using the debt ceiling, instead of a government shutdown, as leverage to delay the implementation of ObamaCare. But as Ezra Klein put it in The Washington Post, "Trading a government shutdown for a debt-ceiling breach is like trading the flu for septic shock": Anything Republicans might fear about a government shutdown is far more terrifying amidst a debt-ceiling breach. The former is an inconvenience. The latter is a global financial crisis. It’s the difference between what happened in 1995, when the government did shutdown, and what happened in 2008, when global markets realized a bedrock investment they thought was safe (housing in that case, U.S. treasuries in this one) was full of risk. [The Washington Post] Indeed, a debt ceiling debate in 2011 that went on to the last possible minute had real economic consequences, leading Standard & Poor's to downgrade the United States' credit rating. The move "left a clear and deep dent in US economic and market data," said Matt Phillips at Quartz. Investors pulled huge amounts of cash from the stock market, and consumer confidence was hurt as well. When the same problem cropped up again in May 2012, because Congress failed to reach a long-term deal, Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers in Bloomberg explained how confidence plummeted the first time around: [Confidence] went into freefall as the political stalemate worsened through July. Over the entire episode, confidence declined more than it did following the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. in 2008. After July 31, when the deal to break the impasse was announced, consumer confidence stabilized and began a long, slow climb that brought it back to its starting point almost a year later. [Bloomberg] This morning, Wolfers had this to say: Treasury Secretary Jack Lew visited CNBC Tuesday morning to reiterate President Obama's promise not to go down he same road. "The president has made it clear: We're not going to negotiate over the debt limit," Lew said. He also explained why in a letter to Boehner Monday morning. "Protecting the full faith and credit of the United States is the responsibility of Congress, because only Congress can extend the nation's borrowing authority," he wrote. "Failure to meet that responsibility would cause irreparable harm to the American economy."

#### Obama strength ensures passage

Anatole Kaletsky, “Game theory and America’s budget battle”, Reuters, 10/3, <http://blogs.reuters.com/anatole-kaletsky/2013/10/03/game-theory-and-americas-budget-battle/>, TB gender edties

Until recently, the Republicans believed October 17 would be their moment of maximum leverage, since President Obama would have no choice but to make concessions or face an economic meltdown. But now it is becoming clear that Republicans will be the ones facing maximum pressure as the debt limit draws near. Game theory teaches that in such confrontations we must assess the costs to the players of fighting and also of backing down. Republican Congress[people]men, if they continue fighting right up to the debt limit, will have to answer to voters for the economic mayhem that a Treasury default could cause. Obama, on the other hand, has nothing to fear from elections since he will never run again. The costs of retreat also favor the White House. For the president to back down and gut Obamacare would destroy what he sees as his greatest achievement and would confirm his lame duck status. For the Republicans, by contrast, allowing the budget and debt ceiling to pass would leave them exactly where they were a few weeks ago. In logic, such calculations should force the Republicans to back down quickly, extracting whatever small face-saving concessions the White House might offer them to avert any further political embarrassment and economic harm. Such concessions might include agreement to go ahead with the Keystone oil pipeline, or to reduce the unpopular excise tax on medical equipment, or to launch a formal process of discussions on revenue-neutral tax reforms. Many Republicans seem to be making such calculations. Within 48 hours of the government shutdown, the Washington Post had identified 18 Republican Congressmen who had publicly expressed willingness to vote with the Democrats on a “clean” budget resolution, plus four leaning that way — and the numbers were growing every hour. Since only 17 Republican defectors would be needed to pass the budget, the deadlock seemed almost over — and this whole manufactured crisis may indeed be resolved by the weekend.

#### Obama will have to spend capital on debt ceiling

**Bull & Younglai, 9/5** (Alister Bull and Rachelle Younglai, 9/5/2013, “Analysis: Battle over Fed - Summers' opponents seek to sway Obama,” [http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/05/us-usa-fed-summers-analysis-idUSBRE98414R20130905)](http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/05/us-usa-fed-summers-analysis-idUSBRE98414R20130905%29))

Still, some Washington veterans are perplexed that Obama is apparently willing to bypass Yellen, who is also viewed as well qualified, and are concerned that Obama risks an unnecessary congressional fight at a time when he could spend his political capital more wisely. As well as battling for authorization to punish the use of chemical weapons by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, **the White House must** currently also **persuade lawmakers to raise the U.S. debt ceiling and forge an agreement to fund the federal government for the fiscal year beginning in October.**

**"Does** Barack **Obama want to play political football with the Congress on everything all fall?" asked** David **Rothkopf, a former Clinton administration official** who is now president of Garten Rothkopf, an international advisory firm.

#### ( ) Syria proves our link --- a fight on another issue like it would have sucked capital away from debt ceiling

**Frenzel, 9/6** --- Guest Scholar in Economic Studies at the Brookings Institution (9/6/2013, Bill, “By Dropping Syria In Congress' Lap, Obama Creates The Worst Of The Bad Old Days,” [http://www.forbes.com/sites/billfrenzel/2013/09/06/by-dropping-syria-in-congress-lap-obama-creates-the-worst-of-the-bad-old-days/)](http://www.forbes.com/sites/billfrenzel/2013/09/06/by-dropping-syria-in-congress-lap-obama-creates-the-worst-of-the-bad-old-days/%29))

Unfortunately, there is much more to this vote than a President forcing the Congress to ratify his decision. **The Syria question is** also **consuming the President’s political capital at a time when he may be running a bit short anyway**. He’s not a lame duck yet, but in a year he will be. **Capital spent on Syria is capital not available for looming domestic problems.** Worse, the decision comes at a time when Congressional energies ought to be focused on the FY14 CR, the sequester repair, and the Debt Ceiling extension. Congress is already a polarized battleground. **Syria**, because it is different, may relieve tensions. More **likely**, it **will crank up animosities and resentments between parties, branches and houses. Surely, it will burn valuable negotiating time.** Syria is an important foreign policy/national security issue. But it’s a mouse compared to the elephantine domestic fiscal problem. It now seems probable that **the Syria vote may delay and confuse settlement of the budget question, and exacerbate existing budget tensions.** If those conditions lead to a smaller budget agreement, and another year or two of kicking that same old can down the road, those unintended consequences would dwarf whatever happens in Syria as a result of well-intentioned U.S. anti-poison-gas efforts.

#### PC key to debt ceiling negotiations

Jonathan Weisman, 9-12-13 <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/13/us/politics/at-meeting-with-treasury-secretary-boehner-pressed-for-debt-ceiling-deal.html?_r=0>

WASHINGTON — With the Syrian crisis receding on Capitol Hill, Congress on Thursday plunged back into its bitter fiscal standoff as Speaker John A. Boehner appealed to the Obama administration and Democratic leaders to help him resolve divisions in the Republican ranks that could lead to a government shutdown. In meetings with Democratic and Republican Congressional leaders on Thursday after a session with Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew on Wednesday, Mr. Boehner pleaded for a resumption of negotiations that could keep the government running and yield a deficit-reduction deal that would convince recalcitrant conservatives to raise the government’s borrowing limit. Much of the federal government will shut down Oct. 1 unless Congress approves new spending bills to replace expiring ones, and by mid-October, the Treasury Department will lose the borrowing authority to finance the government and pay its debts.

#### Hitting the debt ceiling kills the economy

Bloomberg 10-6 "Five Reasons to Fear the Debt Ceiling" www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-06/five-reasons-to-fear-the-debt-ceiling.html

The global economy is facing a bizarre man-made threat: Radical legislators in the U.S., issuer of the world’s most trusted currency, think forcing the government to renege on its obligations would be a good way to shock it into recognizing the error of its fiscally imprudent ways. Lest anyone take this notion seriously, here’s what would happen if that threat were carried out. To keep spending, the government needs Congress to pass a spending law. Republicans have already blocked this, resulting in a partial government shutdown. Now they are threatening the separate and much more disruptive step of refusing to raise the federal debt ceiling, currently set at $16.7 trillion. Spending exceeds revenue, so without permission to borrow more, the government can’t pay its bills even if a law to allow spending goes through. If the debt ceiling stays in place, the Treasury will run short of cash soon after Oct. 17. At that point: 1. Global markets will see the U.S. government as grossly and dangerously incompetent. Refusing to raise the debt ceiling is fundamentally different from cutting the government’s funding. It’s as if Congress were sending the Treasury two contradictory and legally binding orders -- one that requires it to make hundreds of billions of dollars a month in payments, another that prevents it from borrowing the money it needs to do so. Which order is the Treasury supposed to obey? This is the stuff of absurdist theater. Confidence matters, and this event would destroy confidence. 2. Forced spending cuts will kill the economic recovery. Over the course of a year, the Treasury borrows roughly $1 out of every $5 it spends, so hitting the debt ceiling would require it to cut outlays by about a fifth -- and by much more in the short term, because flows into and out of the Treasury are lumpy. Such a severe fiscal squeeze would crush a still-tentative recovery at a time when widespread unemployment is threatening to do permanent damage to the country’s productive capacity. 3. The U.S. government might actually default on its debts. Some in Congress apparently think that hitting the debt ceiling needn’t mean missing a payment on the $12 trillion in government bonds outstanding -- an event that markets would call a default, which could trigger a financial catastrophe (see No. 4). The House of Representatives has passed legislation to authorize the Treasury to prioritize such payments. Even if the Senate passed that measure, which it has refused to do so far, it might not be enough. The Treasury processes more than 80 million separate payments a month, using an elderly system that wasn’t designed for debt-ceiling damage control. Money to bondholders goes through a separate channel called Fedwire, so some segregation might be possible -- but accidents are all too probable, and a payment could easily go missing. Markets are aware of the risk: Yields of Treasury bills maturing in the second part of October are abnormally high, suggesting that investors are demanding compensation. The cost of insuring against a U.S. default has almost doubled. 4. A default could trigger a global crash. Treasury bonds are the foundation of the U.S. and global financial systems. Their yields serve as benchmarks for interest rates on mortgages and corporate bonds. Securities dealers in the U.S. hold some $1.9 trillion in Treasuries as collateral on loans to hedge funds, banks and other financial companies. Mutual funds, pension plans and corporations rely on interest payments from Treasuries to meet their obligations to investors, retirees and workers. The slightest concern about the U.S. government’s ability or willingness to pay could prompt investors to demand a higher return on the bonds and dealers to toughen the terms on which they accept Treasuries as collateral. That would abruptly raise the cost of credit for everyone -- or else freeze financial markets altogether. Economists have estimated that a few missed Treasury-bond payments in 1979, the result of a brief technical glitch, pushed up interest rates by 0.6 percentage point and boosted the U.S. government’s borrowing costs by $12 billion a year. It’s hard to overstate the danger. Picture a crisis in which markets froze and the U.S. government was unable to act because its own creditworthiness was the cause of the panic.

U

### Hurts Econ

#### Hitting the debt ceiling kills the economy

Bloomberg 10-6 "Five Reasons to Fear the Debt Ceiling" www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-06/five-reasons-to-fear-the-debt-ceiling.html

The global economy is facing a bizarre man-made threat: Radical legislators in the U.S., issuer of the world’s most trusted currency, think forcing the government to renege on its obligations would be a good way to shock it into recognizing the error of its fiscally imprudent ways. Lest anyone take this notion seriously, here’s what would happen if that threat were carried out. To keep spending, the government needs Congress to pass a spending law. Republicans have already blocked this, resulting in a partial government shutdown. Now they are threatening the separate and much more disruptive step of refusing to raise the federal debt ceiling, currently set at $16.7 trillion. Spending exceeds revenue, so without permission to borrow more, the government can’t pay its bills even if a law to allow spending goes through. If the debt ceiling stays in place, the Treasury will run short of cash soon after Oct. 17. At that point: 1. Global markets will see the U.S. government as grossly and dangerously incompetent. Refusing to raise the debt ceiling is fundamentally different from cutting the government’s funding. It’s as if Congress were sending the Treasury two contradictory and legally binding orders -- one that requires it to make hundreds of billions of dollars a month in payments, another that prevents it from borrowing the money it needs to do so. Which order is the Treasury supposed to obey? This is the stuff of absurdist theater. Confidence matters, and this event would destroy confidence. 2. Forced spending cuts will kill the economic recovery. Over the course of a year, the Treasury borrows roughly $1 out of every $5 it spends, so hitting the debt ceiling would require it to cut outlays by about a fifth -- and by much more in the short term, because flows into and out of the Treasury are lumpy. Such a severe fiscal squeeze would crush a still-tentative recovery at a time when widespread unemployment is threatening to do permanent damage to the country’s productive capacity. 3. The U.S. government might actually default on its debts. Some in Congress apparently think that hitting the debt ceiling needn’t mean missing a payment on the $12 trillion in government bonds outstanding -- an event that markets would call a default, which could trigger a financial catastrophe (see No. 4). The House of Representatives has passed legislation to authorize the Treasury to prioritize such payments. Even if the Senate passed that measure, which it has refused to do so far, it might not be enough. The Treasury processes more than 80 million separate payments a month, using an elderly system that wasn’t designed for debt-ceiling damage control. Money to bondholders goes through a separate channel called Fedwire, so some segregation might be possible -- but accidents are all too probable, and a payment could easily go missing. Markets are aware of the risk: Yields of Treasury bills maturing in the second part of October are abnormally high, suggesting that investors are demanding compensation. The cost of insuring against a U.S. default has almost doubled. 4. A default could trigger a global crash. Treasury bonds are the foundation of the U.S. and global financial systems. Their yields serve as benchmarks for interest rates on mortgages and corporate bonds. Securities dealers in the U.S. hold some $1.9 trillion in Treasuries as collateral on loans to hedge funds, banks and other financial companies. Mutual funds, pension plans and corporations rely on interest payments from Treasuries to meet their obligations to investors, retirees and workers. The slightest concern about the U.S. government’s ability or willingness to pay could prompt investors to demand a higher return on the bonds and dealers to toughen the terms on which they accept Treasuries as collateral. That would abruptly raise the cost of credit for everyone -- or else freeze financial markets altogether. Economists have estimated that a few missed Treasury-bond payments in 1979, the result of a brief technical glitch, pushed up interest rates by 0.6 percentage point and boosted the U.S. government’s borrowing costs by $12 billion a year. It’s hard to overstate the danger. Picture a crisis in which markets froze and the U.S. government was unable to act because its own creditworthiness was the cause of the panic.

### Debt Econ Ix: Internals—2NC

#### Failure to raise the debt ceiling collapses the global economy – it causes the US to default on its debt which would be unprecedented – that triggers a collapse in market investment – banks would be unable to lend and interest rates would skyrocket – US treasury bonds are the bedrock of global financial stability – that’s Popper

#### Failure to lift limit crashes economy—happens now

James M. Lindsay, “The World Next Week: The Debt Ceiling Looms, Obama Attends APEC and ASEAN Summits (Maybe),” Council on Foreign Relations, 10—3—13, <http://blogs.cfr.org/lindsay/2013/10/03/the-world-next-week-the-debt-ceiling-looms-obama-attends-apec-and-asean-summits-maybe/>

Congress continues to bicker over legislation that would end the U.S. government shutdown that began on Tuesday. Those negotiations are now being complicated by the need also to craft agreement on raising the national debt ceiling. If Congress fails to reach an agreementby October 17 **to** raise the debt ceiling, the U.S. government willbe at risk of defaul**t**ing on the national debt. That would be disastrous for the U.S. economy and the international financial system, potentially surpassing the damage done by the financial crash of 2008-2009. So far the financial markets have taken the political wrangling over the debt ceiling in stride. The markets seem to be calculating that past debt ceiling stand-offs were resolved at the last moment and that this one will be as well. But if the conventional wisdom turns out to be wrong—and sometimes it does—the market correction will bequick and severe. And no one will like the result.

#### Debt ceiling collapses the global economy

Adam Davidson 9/10/13, economy columnist for The New York Times, co-founder of Planet Money, NPR’s team of economics reporters, “Our Debt to Society,” NYT, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/magazine/our-debt-to-society.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>

If the debt ceiling isn’t lifted again this fall, some serious financial decisions will have to be made. Perhaps the government can skimp on its foreign aid or furlough all of NASA, but eventually the big-ticket items, like Social Security and Medicare, will have to be cut. At some point, the government won’t be able to pay interest on its bonds and will enter what’s known as sovereign default, the ultimate national financial disaster achieved by countries like Zimbabwe, Ecuador and Argentina (and now Greece). In the case of the United States, though, it won’t be an isolated national crisis. If the American government can’t stand behind the dollar, the world’s benchmark currency, then the global financial system will very likely enter a new era in which there is much less trade and much less economic growth. It would be, by most accounts, the largest self-imposed financial disaster in history.¶ Nearly everyone involved predicts that someone will blink before this disaster occurs. Yet a small number of House Republicans (one political analyst told me it’s no more than 20) appear willing to see what happens if the debt ceiling isn’t raised — at least for a bit. This could be used as leverage to force Democrats to drastically cut government spending and eliminate President Obama’s signature health-care-reform plan. In fact, Representative Tom Price, a Georgia Republican, told me that the whole problem could be avoided if the president agreed to drastically cut spending and lower taxes. Still, it is hard to put this act of game theory into historic context. Plenty of countries — and some cities, like Detroit — have defaulted on their financial obligations, but only because their governments ran out of money to pay their bills. No wealthy country has ever voluntarily decided — in the middle of an economic recovery, no less — to default. And there’s certainly no record of that happening to the country that controls the global reserve currency.¶ Like many, I assumed a self-imposed U.S. debt crisis might unfold like most involuntary ones. If the debt ceiling isn’t raised by X-Day, I figured, the world’s investors would begin to see America as an unstable investment and rush to sell their Treasury bonds. The U.S. government, desperate to hold on to investment, would then raise interest rates far higher, hurtling up rates on credit cards, student loans, mortgages and corporate borrowing — which would effectively put a clamp on all trade and spending. The U.S. economy would collapse far worse than anything we’ve seen in the past several years.¶ Instead, Robert Auwaerter, head of bond investing for Vanguard, the world’s largest mutual-fund company, told me that the collapse might be more insidious. “You know what happens when the market gets upset?” he said. “There’s a flight to quality. Investors buy Treasury bonds. It’s a bit perverse.” In other words, if the U.S. comes within shouting distance of a default (which Auwaerter is confident won’t happen), the world’s investors — absent a safer alternative, given the recent fates of the euro and the yen — might actually buy even more Treasury bonds. Indeed, interest rates would fall and the bond markets would soar.¶ While this possibility might not sound so bad, it’s really far more damaging than the apocalyptic one I imagined. Rather than resulting in a sudden crisis, failure to raise the debt ceiling would lead to a slow bleed. Scott Mather, head of the global portfolio at Pimco, the world’s largest private bond fund, explained that while governments and institutions might go on a U.S.-bond buying frenzy in the wake of a debt-ceiling panic, they would eventually recognize that the U.S. government was not going through an odd, temporary bit of insanity. They would eventually conclude that it had become permanently less reliable. Mather imagines institutional investors and governments turning to a basket of currencies, putting their savings in a mix of U.S., European, Canadian, Australian and Japanese bonds. Over the course of decades, the U.S. would lose its unique role in the global economy.¶ The U.S. benefits enormously from its status as global reserve currency and safe haven. Our interest and mortgage rates are lower; companies are able to borrow money to finance their new products more cheaply. As a result, there is much more economic activity and more wealth in America than there would be otherwise. If that status erodes, the U.S. economy’s peaks will be lower and recessions deeper; future generations will have fewer job opportunities and suffer more when the economy falters. And, Mather points out, no other country would benefit from America’s diminished status. When you make the base risk-free asset more risky, the entire global economy becomes riskier and costlier.

#### Thrashes the economy

Paul Krugman, Nobel Prize winning economist, “Rebels without a Clue,” NEW YORK TIMES, 9—29—13,

<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/30/opinion/krugman-rebels-without-a-clue.html>

Still, a government shutdown looks benign compared with the possibility that Congress might refuse to raise the debt ceiling.

First of all, hitting the ceiling would force a huge, immediate spending cut, almost surely pushing America back into recession. Beyond that, failure to raise the ceiling would mean missed payments on existing U.S. government debt. And that might have terrifying consequences.

Why? Financial markets have long treated U.S. bonds as the ultimate safe asset; the assumption that America will always honor its debts is the bedrock on which the world financial system rests. In particular, Treasury bills — short-term U.S. bonds — are what investors demand when they want absolutely solid collateral against loans. Treasury bills are so essential for this role that in times of severe stress they sometimes pay slightly negative interest rates — that is, they’re treated as being better than cash.

Now suppose it became clear that U.S. bonds weren’t safe, that America couldn’t be counted on to honor its debts after all. Suddenly, the whole system would be disrupted. Maybe, if we were lucky, financial institutions would quickly cobble together alternative arrangements. But it looks quite possible that default would create a huge financial crisis, dwarfing the crisis set off by the failure of Lehman Brothers five years ago.

#### It would wreck all forms of business confidence

Susan Davis, “Clock Ticking on Shutdown, with ‘Obamacare’ Center Stage,” USA TODAY, 9—23—13, www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/09/22/shutdown-budget-drama-obamacare/2844981/

However the stopgap spending bill is resolved, soon after it lurks a fiscal fight that holds greater consequences to the U.S. and global economies. "Shutting down the government is one bad thing, but you shut it down, you open it up again," said Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi, D-Calif., "Not lifting the debt limit is unleashing a torrent, a river of no return. It is beyond cataclysmic." The nation has never defaulted. Though the exact impacts are unclear, there is broad consensus among economists, financial markets and most lawmakers that it would upend the markets. "If you don't raise the debt limit in time, you will be opening an economic Pandora's Box. It will be devastating to the economy," Moody's economist Mark Zandi testified before a congressional panel last week. He explained the consequences: "Consumer confidence will sharply decline, investor confidence, business confidence. Businesses will stop hiring, consumers will stop spending, the stock market will fall significantly in value, borrowing costs for businesses and households will rise."

#### Key to economy

Peter Goldmark, NEWSDAY, 9—22—13, LN.

Apparently our closest ally couldn't quite figure out what they wanted to do either, and voted against supporting the president in his proposed military strike on Syria. The lifetime of the proposal for a military strike was briefer than expected - though long enough both to ask Congress to approve it and to allow the Syrians to move their chemical weapons. But before Congress could get around to debating the question, the Russians came up with a plan under which the Syrians would hand over their chemical weapons to an international force supervised, in part, by the Russians. After having said that you can't trust the Russians on Syria, the U.S. government leaped into their arms - even though their plan was dependent for both approval and enforcement on a UN Security Council where both Russia and China have a veto. And in the middle of all this, a group of influential senators from the president's own party attacked Obama's putative nominee to head the Federal Reserve before the choice was even announced. Yes, indeed, many of the weaknesses of the Obama administration have been on display over the past few months. They include not thinking clearly through the consequences of decisions and not communicating with the American people or world leaders in terms compelling and coherent enough to command support. And this is the government we are counting on to lead us through a difficult confrontation over approving a spending plan and raising the debt ceiling next month - a crisis with enormous potential to disrupt the economy and harm American families. What's at stake here? The financial system depends on confidence - confidence that debts will be paid, that governments will support their currencies, that large financial institutions will not fail, and that all the millions of retail financial payments and transactions on which families and businesses depend will continue. A failure or even a significant delay in agreeing on a financing and spending plan for the U.S. government could cause that web of trust and transactions to unravel in several places. And the very prospect of damage to that web could itself trigger a cascade of breaks in the system. The financial markets are skittish cats, as we have had painful reason to be reminded over the past several years. Consider, for example, the consequences of the inability of the U.S. government to assure an orderly market in the face of low or no demand for U.S. Treasury notes. Consider the impact on the U.S. economy and global confidence if the government were unable to fully meet its obligations under Social Security or Medicare and Medicaid in October or November, or had to stretch out payments to its contractors and vendors. What have the Republicans in the House said about this prospect? At least some have said they don't care. And this summer has taught us that under great pressure and against tough deadlines, this administration is not at its best. It would be a cruel outcome for Americans struggling to find work and make ends meet in a fragile recovery if a divided and incompetent government threw us back into a deeper recession. Fasten your seat belts, please. We are about to experience some turbulence.

#### Grinds the entire economy to a halt

Michael McAuliff, “Debt Limit Showdown Could Be Catastrophic for Economy: Analysts,” HUFFINGTON POST, 9—18—13,

<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/18/debt-limit-showdown_n_3950890.html>)

"You can only put the gun to your head so many times before someone's going to make a mistake and pull the trigger, and it's to everyone's detriment," Zandi told Duffy.

He gave a crushing summary of the potential impacts of a default.

"If you don't raise the debt limit in time, you will be opening an economic Pandora's box. It will be devastating to the economy," he predicted. "If you don't do it in time, confidence will evaporate, consumer confidence will sharply decline, [as well as] investor confidence, business confidence. Businesses will stop hiring, consumers will stop spending, the stock market will fall significantly in value, borrowing costs for businesses and households will rise."

#### Destroys the global economy

Adam Davidson, “Our Debt to Society,” NEW YORK TIMES, 9—15—13,

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/magazine/our-debt-to-society.html

The Daily Treasury Statement, a public accounting of what the U.S. government spends and receives each day, shows how money really works in Washington. On Aug. 27, the government took in $29 million in repaid agricultural loans; $75 million in customs and duties; $38 million in the repayment of TARP loans; some $310 million in taxes; and so forth. That same day, the government also had bills to pay: $247 million in veterans-affairs programs; $2.5 billion to Medicare and Medicaid; $1.5 billion each to the departments of Education and Defense. By the close of that Tuesday, when all the spending and the taxing had been completed, the government paid out nearly $6 billion more than it took in. This is the definition of a deficit, and it illustrates why the government needs to borrow money almost every day to pay its bills. Of course, all that daily borrowing adds up, and we are rapidly approaching what is called the X-Date — the day, somewhere in the next six weeks, when the government, by law, cannot borrow another penny. Congress has imposed a strict limit on how much debt the federal government can accumulate, but for nearly 90 years, it has raised the ceiling well before it was reached. But since a large number of Tea Party-aligned Republicans entered the House of Representatives, in 2011, raising that debt ceiling has become a matter of fierce debate. This summer, House Republicans have promised, in Speaker John Boehner’s words, “a whale of a fight” before they raise the debt ceiling — if they even raise it at all. If the debt ceiling isn’t lifted again this fall, some serious financial decisions will have to be made. Perhaps the government can skimp on its foreign aid or furlough all of NASA, but eventually the big-ticket items, like Social Security and Medicare, will have to be cut. At some point, the government won’t be able to pay interest on its bonds and will enter what’s known as sovereign default, the ultimate national financial disaster achieved by countries like Zimbabwe, Ecuador and Argentina (and now Greece). In the case of the United States, though, it won’t be an isolated national crisis. If the American government can’t stand behind the dollar, the world’s benchmark currency, then the global financial system will very likely enter a new era in which there is much less trade and much less economic growth. It would be, by most accounts, the largest self-imposed financial disaster in history. Nearly everyone involved predicts that someone will blink before this disaster occurs. Yet a small number of House Republicans (one political analyst told me it’s no more than 20) appear willing to see what happens if the debt ceiling isn’t raised — at least for a bit. This could be used as leverage to force Democrats to drastically cut government spending and eliminate President Obama’s signature health-care-reform plan. In fact, Representative Tom Price, a Georgia Republican, told me that the whole problem could be avoided if the president agreed to drastically cut spending and lower taxes. Still, it is hard to put this act of game theory into historic context. Plenty of countries — and some cities, like Detroit — have defaulted on their financial obligations, but only because their governments ran out of money to pay their bills. No wealthy country has ever voluntarily decided — in the middle of an economic recovery, no less — to default. And there’s certainly no record of that happening to the country that controls the global reserve currency. Like many, I assumed a self-imposed U.S. debt crisis might unfold like most involuntary ones. If the debt ceiling isn’t raised by X-Day, I figured, the world’s investors would begin to see America as an unstable investment and rush to sell their Treasury bonds. The U.S. government, desperate to hold on to investment, would then raise interest rates far higher, hurtling up rates on credit cards, student loans, mortgages and corporate borrowing — which would effectively put a clamp on all trade and spending. The U.S. economy would collapse far worse than anything we’ve seen in the past several years. Instead, Robert Auwaerter, head of bond investing for Vanguard, the world’s largest mutual-fund company, told me that the collapse might be more insidious. “You know what happens when the market gets upset?” he said. “There’s a flight to quality. Investors buy Treasury bonds. It’s a bit perverse.” In other words, if the U.S. comes within shouting distance of a default (which Auwaerter is confident won’t happen), the world’s investors — absent a safer alternative, given the recent fates of the euro and the yen — might actually buy even more Treasury bonds. Indeed, interest rates would fall and the bond markets would soar. While this possibility might not sound so bad, it’s really far more damaging than the apocalyptic one I imagined. Rather than resulting in a sudden crisis, failure to raise the debt ceiling would lead to a slow bleed. Scott Mather, head of the global portfolio at Pimco, the world’s largest private bond fund, explained that while governments and institutions might go on a U.S.-bond buying frenzy in the wake of a debt-ceiling panic, they would eventually recognize that the U.S. government was not going through an odd, temporary bit of insanity. They would eventually conclude that it had become permanently less reliable. Mather imagines institutional investors and governments turning to a basket of currencies, putting their savings in a mix of U.S., European, Canadian, Australian and Japanese bonds. Over the course of decades, the U.S. would lose its unique role in the global economy. The U.S. benefits enormously from its status as global reserve currency and safe haven. Our interest and mortgage rates are lower; companies are able to borrow money to finance their new products more cheaply. As a result, there is much more economic activity and more wealth in America than there would be otherwise. If that status erodes, the U.S. economy’s peaks will be lower and recessions deeper; future generations will have fewer job opportunities and suffer more when the economy falters. And, Mather points out, no other country would benefit from America’s diminished status. When you make the base risk-free asset more risky, the entire global economy becomes riskier and costlier.

### Debt Econ Ix: A2 “XO Solves”

#### Obama won’t use executive action --- the debate’s over --- even if he did it still collapses the economy

Dan Roberts, “US Shutdown: Republicans Threaten to Take Debt Limit Fight to the Brink,” GUARDIAN, 10—4—13,

<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/03/republicans-debt-limit-treasury-economy>

The White House has ruled out using a legal veto to force Congress to extend the US debt limit as conservative Republicans threaten to take what the Treasury described as a potentially catastrophic economic standoff to the brink of a 17 October deadline.¶ President Obama had been encouraged by senior Democrats to call the bluff of hardline Republicans who want to add a debt limit refusal to an existing spending impasse that has already shut down much of the federal government.¶ Some Democrats argue that powers granted under the 14th amendment to the constitution, which was introduced to control southern states after the civil war, would allow the president to unilaterally borrow money if there was such a threat to the credit-worthiness of the US.¶ "Using the 14th would show the Republicans he means business," one former aide to Bill Clinton told the Guardian last week.¶ But the White House ruled out the option on Thursday, ending days of Washington debate about whether this obscure legal authority might provide a way out for Obama – at least from one half of Republicans' fiscal pincer movement. "The administration does not believe the 14th amendment gives power to the president to ignore the debt ceiling," said spokesman Jay Carney.¶ "The fact that there is significant controversy around the president's authority to act unilaterally means that it would not be a credible alternative to Congress raising the debt ceiling and would not be taken seriously by the market."

#### Even if he did, it wouldn’t solve --- nobody would buy the bonds

Adam Liptak, “Experts See Potential Ways Out for Obama in Debt Ceiling Maze,” NEW YORK TIMES, 10—3—13,

<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/04/us/politics/experts-see-potential-ways-out-for-obama-in-debt-ceiling-maze.html>

However one interprets the Constitution, there remains the practical question of whether the nation’s creditors would continue to lend to the United States if the president did take unilateral action.¶ “I don’t think anyone in their right minds would buy those bonds,” Michael W. McConnell, a law professor at Stanford, said of debt issued without Congressional authorization.

#### Obama’s consistently rejected this option

Margaret Talev, “White House Rejects 14th Amendment to Raise Debt Ceiling,” BLOOMBERG, 10—1—13,

<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-01/white-house-rejects-14th-amendment-to-raise-debt-ceiling.html>

President Barack Obama has neither the legal authority nor the practical ability to bypass Congress and extend the nation’s borrowing limit, and attempting such a step might trigger turmoil in the markets, two top White House advisers said.¶ National Economic Council Director Gene Sperling and Obama adviser Dan Pfeiffer were responding to some congressional Democrats who urged Obama to extend the federal debt ceiling without congressional authorization under the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.¶ Hours into a partial government shutdown resulting from a fiscal stalemate with House Republicans, administration officials and lawmakers are looking ahead to an Oct. 17 deadline for Congress to raise the $16.7 trillion federal debt limit.¶ Senate Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus, a Montana Democrat, told reporters at the Capitol today that invoking the president’s powers under the 14th Amendment to raise the limit is “an option that should seriously be considered.”¶ House minority leader Nancy Pelosi said last week that she disagrees with Obama’s decision not to act unilaterally during a 2011 standoff over increasing the debt limit. “I would never have taken it off the table,” the California Democrat said.¶ White House lawyers don’t see that as an option, Sperling and Pfeiffer said today at a Bloomberg Government luncheon.¶ “Our folks have never found that there was such extraordinary authority,” Sperling said.¶ Not Practical¶ Pfeiffer said employing such a tactic is impractical.¶ “Would people buy bonds that are legally questionable?” he said. “If you were buying a car, would you ever buy a car when the title was in doubt? The answer to that question is no.”¶ “I don’t know why we would assume that investors would buy bonds that are legally in question, that could at any day be invalidated by a court,” he said. “So it is an impractical solution to the problem.”¶ Proponents cite the language of the 14th amendment, which says that the “validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payments of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned.”¶ Obama and his advisers have consistently rejected using the amendment to justify raising the debt ceiling without Congressional support.

#### Obama won’t use 14th Amendment—doesn’t think he can.

Adam Liptak, 10/4 NY Times “Experts See Potential Ways Out for Obama in Debt Ceiling Maze” http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/04/us/politics/experts-see-potential-ways-out-for-obama-in-debt-ceiling-maze.html

That is the broadest option for Mr. Obama. The second is based on the actual text of the Constitution, though there is a dispute about what the words in question mean. Section 4 of the 14th Amendment says: “The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned.” The provision, adopted in 1868, was meant to ensure the payment of Union debts after the Civil War. But it was written in more general terms, as the Supreme Court once noted in passing. “While this provision was undoubtedly inspired by the desire to put beyond question the obligations of the government issued during the Civil War,” Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes wrote in 1935, “its language indicates a broader connotation.” On Thursday, Mr. Carney dismissed the argument, popular in some legal circles, that the amendment authorized the president to raise the debt ceiling. “We do not believe that the 14th Amendment provides that authority to the president,” he said. He added that the meaning of the provision had divided constitutional scholars. That alone, Mr. Carney said, “means that it would not be a credible alternative.”

#### Wont’ do it

New York Times, 10/3, (Jackie Calmes, “Obama Will Not Unilaterally Raise Debt Limit”, 10/3/2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/news/fiscal-crisis/2013/10/03/obama-will-not-unilaterally-raise-debt-limit/>)

President Obama will not invoke a constitutional amendment to unilaterally increase the nation’s debt limit if an impasse with House Republicans causes that ceiling to be breached Oct. 17, his spokesman said. “We do not believe that the 14th amendment provides that authority to the president,” the White House press secretary, Jay Carney, said on Thursday. The president, he added, “completely” agrees with his advisers’ legal reasoning. The administration, and Mr. Obama himself, have said in past confrontations with Republicans that the president does not have the constitutional power to act without Congress. But the issue has surfaced yet again, as another and seemingly more intractable impasse between the White House and Republicans threatens a debt crisis. After Oct. 17, the Treasury Department has said, it will no longer be able to borrow money to cover the nation’s obligations, including to creditors, precipitating a potential financial and economic crisis with global ramifications. “Look,” Mr. Carney said, sounding slightly exasperated to reporters, “our view is, the Constitution gives Congress, not the president, the authority to borrow money, and only Congress can increase the debt ceiling. Which is why it’s time that they do their job and raise the debt ceiling – you know, authorize the Treasury to pay the bills that Congress racked up.” The fact that the question of the president’s 14th amendment authority is controversial, with constitutional scholars in disagreement, “means that it would not be a credible alternative,” Mr. Carney said. Treasury officials have described a potential situation in which if the president unilaterally raised the borrowing limit, and Treasury then held an auction for new bonds to raise money, few if any buyers would participate for fear that the bonds ultimately would be deemed illegal.

#### Doesn’t solve, won’t happen

Mark Felsenthal, “Update 1—Raising U.S. Debt Cap Unilaterally Would Be Suspect—White House,” REUTERS, 9—30—13, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/30/usa-fiscal-debtceiling-idUSL1N0HQ1QC20130930

The White House on Monday sought to quash any possibility that President Barack Obama would raise the U.S. debt ceiling by himself should Congress fail to do so before a mid-October deadline, as some have suggested he should. The U.S. Treasury Department has said it will exhaust the nation's $16.7 trillion borrowing limit in less than three weeks. Unless Congress raises the cap, the government would go into default, which the administration and most analysts say would deal a disastrous blow to the U.S. and the global economy, where the value of U.S. government debt is sacrosanct. "Even if the president could ignore the debt ceiling, the fact that there is significant controversy around the president's authority to act unilaterally means that it would not be a credible alternative to Congress raising the debt ceiling and would not be taken seriously by the global economy and markets," White House spokesman Jay Carney told reporters. Congressional Republicans say they will not raise the debt limit unless Obama agrees to delay his signature healthcare program or cut spending deeply, both of which the president rejects. The stalemate has raised the specter of a default.¶ The government is on track to shut down at midnight Monday over a similar impasse over government spending. Former President Bill Clinton and others have said Obama should act on his own to avoid a default, citing the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which says the validity of the public debt "shall not be questioned." Obama in January said he would not use the 14th Amendment to unilaterally raise the debt ceiling, and White House spokesman Jay Carney repeated that reluctance on Monday, saying it is Congress's responsibility to act on the debt limit, not the president's.¶"The president can't raise it by himself," Carney said. "This administration does not believe that the 14th Amendment gives the power to ignore the debt ceiling."

### Terrorism: WMD TError Defense 2NC

#### No WMD terrorism—Al-Qaeda is weak and doesn’t have the *resources* or *expertise*– they’ve budgeted less than 2000 dollars to pursuing WMD and are too busy watching porn – that’s Mueller – even if it’s possible, our evidence says the probability of an attack is “*wildly unlikely*” – their authors empirically exaggerate

**--He also indicts their scenario(s)**

Bioweapons attacks are empirically ineffective—Aum Shrinkyo faced technical obstacles and killed less than 13 people

Nuclear terrorism is “breathtakingly unlikely”—they couldn’t get the materials, scientists, or transport it across borders

#### --And he’s most qualified

Harper 12 (Jim, director of information policy studies @ Cato, “Mueller Right; Terror Experts Wrong”, 1-11, <http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/mueller-right-terror-experts-wrong/>, CMR)

John Mueller was right and everyone else was wrong. (Well, not everyone else…)

That’s Cato senior fellow John Mueller. He noted on the National Interest blog last week that 79 per cent of top terrorism experts queried in 2006 thought it was likely or certain that there would be another major terrorist attack in the United States by the end of 2011. They got it wrong.

When the survey came out, it touted these experts as the “very people who have run America’s national-security apparatus over the past half century.” Mueller lampoons them thus:

 The Very People’s 79 percent error rate is especially impressive because, although there had been quite a bit of terrorist activity in Iraq and elsewhere during the four-and-a-half years between 9/11 and when the survey was conducted, none of these attacks even remotely approached the destruction of the one on September 11. Nor, for that matter, had any terrorist attack during the four-and-a-half millennia previous to that date. In addition, although terrorist plots have been rolled up within the United States, none of the plotters threatened to wreak destruction on anything like the scale of 9/11, except perhaps in a few moments of movieland-fantasy musings.

Mueller was one of few suggesting in 2006—and well before—that 9/11 might be more of an aberration than a harbinger. Mueller’s studied correctness so far is not proof of what the future holds, of course. If you want to, it is certainly possible to cling to the threat of terrorism and the metastasis of policies that purport to address your fears. Part of terrorism’s design is its operation on fear to produce cognitive errors like probability neglect, for example. But thanks to Mueller, terrorism is holding fewer and fewer people in thrall. It is a serious, but manageable security threat. Those still transfixed by terrorism may add another fear to their long list: They may be mocked by the man who knows the subject matter better.

**--Expert reports are wrong**

Mearsheimer 11 John J. is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, “Imperial By Design” Jan/Feb The National Interest http://nationalinterest.org/print/article/imperial-by-design-4576

Finally, the ability of terrorists to strike the American homeland has been blown out of all proportion. In the nine years since 9/11, government officials and terrorist experts have issued countless warnings that another major attack on American soil is probable—even imminent. But this is simply not the case.3 The only attempts we have seen are a few failed solo attacks by individuals with links to al-Qaeda like the “shoe bomber,” who attempted to blow up an American Airlines flight from Paris to Miami in December 2001, and the “underwear bomber,” who tried to blow up a Northwest Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit in December 2009. So, we do have a terrorism problem, but it is hardly an existential threat**.** In fact, it is a minor threat. Perhaps the scope of the challenge is best captured by Ohio State political scientist John Mueller’s telling comment that “the number of Americans killed by international terrorism since the late 1960s . . . is about the same as the number killed over the same period by lightning, or by accident-causing deer, or by severe allergic reactions to peanuts.”

#### AND, no nuclear terror

Francis Gavin, Tom Slick Professor of International Affairs, Univeristy of Texas at Austin, "Same As It Ever Was: Nuclear Alarmism, Proliferation, and the Cold War," INTERNATIONAL SECURITY v. 34 n. 3, Winter 2009/20**10**, p. 19-20.

Experts disagree on whether nonstate actors have the scientiªc, engineering, ªnancial, natural resource, security, and logistical capacities to build a nuclear bomb from scratch. According to terrorism expert Robin Frost, the danger of a “nuclear black market” and loose nukes from Russia may be overstated**. Even if a terrorist** group **did acquire a nuclear weapon, delivering and detonating it** against a U.S. target **would present tremendous** technical and logistical **difficulties.**51 Finally**,** the feared nexus between terrorists and rogue regimes may be exaggerated.As nuclear proliferation expert Joseph Cirincione argues, states such as Iran and North Korea are **“not** the most **likely sources for terrorists since their stockpiles, if any, are small** and exceedingly **precious, and hence well-guarded.”**52 Chubin states that there “is no reason to believe that Iran today, any more than Sadaam Hussein earlier, would transfer WMD [weapons of mass destruction] technology to terrorist groups like al-Qaida or Hezbollah.”53

#### AND, no bio-terror risk

John Mueller, Professor, Political Science, Ohio State University, OVERBLOWN: HOW POLITICIANS AND THE TERRORISM INDUSTRY INFLATE NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS, AND WHY WE BELIEVE THEM, 2009, p. 21-22.

For the most destructive results, biological weapons need to be dispersed in very low-altitude aerosol clouds. Because aerosols do not appreciably settle, pathogens like anthrax (which is not easy to spread or catch and is not contagious) would probably have to be sprayed near nose level. Moreover, 90 percent of the microorganisms are likely to die during the process of aerosolization, and their effectiveness could be reduced still further by sunlight, smog, humidity, and temperature changes. Explosive methods of dispersion may destroy the organisms, and, except for anthrax spores, long-term storage of lethal organisms in bombs or warheads is difficult: even if refrigerated, most of the organisms have a limited lifetime. The effects of such weapons can take days or weeks to have full effect, during which time they can be countered with medical and civil defense measures. And their impact is very difficult to predict; in combat situations they may spread back onto the attacker. In the judgment of two careful analysts, delivering microbes and toxins over a wide area in the form most suitable for inflicting mass casualties—as an aerosol that can be inhaled—requires a delivery system whose development "would outstrip the technical capabilities of all but the most sophisticated terrorist" Even then effective dispersal could easily be disrupted by unfavorable environmental and meteorological conditions." After assessing, and stressing, the difficulties a nonstate entity would find in obtaining, handling, growing, storing, processing, and dispersing lethal pathogens effectively, biological weapons expert Milton Leitenberg compares his conclusions with glib pronouncements in the press about how biological attacks can be pulled off by anyone with "a little training and a few glass jars," or how it would be "about as difficult as producing beer." He sardonically concludes, "The less the commentator seems to know about biological warfare the easier [they] he seems to think the task is.""

#### Their impact is irresponsible fearmongering – there is NO capacity for terrorists to acquire and execute a nuclear attack

**Mueller and Stewart 12**[John Mueller is Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science, both at Ohio State University, and Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute in Washington, D.C. Mark G. Stewart is Australian Research Council Professorial Fellow and Professor and Director at the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at the University of Newcastle in Australia, “The Terrorism Delusion”, International Security, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Summer 2012), pp. 81–110, Chetan]

It seems increasingly likely that the official and popular reaction to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, has been substantially deluded—massively disproportionate to the threat that al-Qaida has ever actually presented either as an international menace or as an inspiration or model to homegrown amateurs. Applying the extensive datasets on terrorism that have been generated over the last decades, we conclude that the chances of an American perishing at the hands of a terrorist at present rates is one in 3.5 million per year—well within the range of what risk analysts hold to be “acceptable risk.”40 Yet, despite the importance of responsibly communicating risk and despite the costs ofirresponsible fearmongering, just about the only official who has ever openly put the threat presented by terrorism in some sort of context is New York’s Mayor Michael Bloomberg, who in 2007 pointed out that people should “get a life” and that they have a greater chance of being hit by lightning than of being a victim of terrorism—an observation that may be a bit off the mark but is roughly accurate.41 (It might be noted that, despite this unorthodox outburst, Bloomberg still managed to be re-elected two years later.) Indeed, much of the reaction to the September 11 attacks calls to mind Hans Christian Andersen’s fable of delusion, “The Emperor’s New Clothes,” in which con artists convince the emperor’s court that they can weave stuffs of the most beautiful colors and elaborate patterns from the delicate silk and purest gold thread they are given. These stuffs, they further convincingly explain, have the property of remaining invisible to anyone who is unusually stupid or unfit for office. The emperor finds this quite appealing because not only will he have splendid new clothes, but he will be able to discover which of his officials are unfit for their posts—or in today’s terms, have lost their effectiveness. His courtiers, then, have great professional incentive to proclaim the stuffs on the loom to be absolutely magnificent even while mentally justifying this conclusion with the equivalent of “absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.” Unlike the emperor’s new clothes, terrorism does of course exist. Much of the reaction to the threat, however, has a distinctly delusionary quality. In Carle’s view, for example, the CIA has been “spinning in self-referential circles” in which “our premises were flawed, our facts used to fit our premises, our premises determined, and our fears justified our operational actions, in a self-contained process that arrived at a conclusion dramatically at odds with the facts.” The process “projected evil actions where there was, more often, muddled indirect and unavoidable complicity, or not much at all.” These “delusional ratiocinations,” he further observes, “were all sincerely, ardently held to have constituted a rigorous, rational process to identify terrorist threats” in which “the avalanche of reporting confirms its validity by its quantity,” in which there is a tendency to “reject incongruous or contradictory facts as erroneous, because they do not conform to accepted reality,” and in which potential dissenters are not-so-subtly reminded of career dangers: “Say what you want at meetings. It’s your decision. But you are doing yourself no favors.”42 Consider in this context the alarming and profoundly imaginary estimates of U.S. intelligence agencies in the year after the September 11 attacks that the number of trained al-Qaida operatives in the United States was between 2,000 and 5,000.43 Terrorist cells, they told reporters, were “embedded in most U.S. cities with sizable Islamic communities,” usually in the “run-down sections,” and were “up and active” because electronic intercepts had found some of them to be “talking to each other.”44 Another account relayed the view of “experts” that Osama bin Laden was ready to unleash an “11,000 strong terrorist army” operating in more than sixty countries “controlled by a Mr. Big who is based in Europe,” but that intelligence had “no idea where thousands of these men are.”45 Similarly, FBI Director Robert Mueller assured the Senate Intelligence Committee on February 11, 2003, that, although his agency had yet to identify even one al-Qaida cell in the United States, “I remain very concerned about what we are not seeing,” a sentence rendered in bold lettering in his prepared text. Moreover, he claimed that such unidentified entities presented “the greatest threat,” had “developed a support infrastructure” in the country, and had achieved both the “ability” and the “intent” to inflict “significant casualties in the US with little warning.”46 Over the course of time, such essentially delusionary thinking has been internalized and institutionalized in a great many ways. For example, an extrapolation of delusionary proportions is evident in the common observation that, because terrorists were able, mostly by thuggish means, to crash airplanes into buildings, they might therefore be able to construct a nuclear bomb. Brian Jenkins has run an internet search to discover how often variants of the term “al-Qaida” appeared within ten words of “nuclear.” There were only seven hits in 1999 and eleven in 2000, but the number soared to 1,742 in 2001 and to 2,931 in 2002.47 By 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates was assuring a congressional committee that what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is “the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear.”48 Few of the sleepless, it seems, found much solace in the fact that an al-Qaida computer seized in Afghanistan in 2001 indicated that the group’s budget for research on weapons of mass destruction (almost all of it focused on primitive chemical weapons work) was $2,000 to $4,000.49 In the wake of the killing of Osama bin Laden, officials now have many more al-Qaida computers, and nothing in their content appears to suggest that the group had the time or inclination, let alone the money, to set up and staff a uranium-seizing operation, as well as a fancy, super-high-technology facility to fabricate a bomb. This is a process that requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators and other criminals, obtaining and transporting highly guarded material, setting up a machine shop staffed with top scientists and technicians, and rolling the heavy, cumbersome, and untested finished product into position to be detonated by a skilled crew—all while attracting no attention from outsiders.50 If the miscreants in the American cases have been unable to create and set off even the simplest conventional bombs, it stands to reason that none of them were very close to creating, or having anything to do with, nuclear weapons—or for that matter biological, radiological, or chemical ones. In fact, with perhaps one exception, none seems to have even dreamed of the prospect; and the exception is José Padilla (case 2), who apparently mused at one point about creating a dirty bomb—a device that would disperse radiation—or even possibly an atomic one. His idea about isotope separation was to put uranium into a pail and then to make himself into a human centrifuge by swinging the pail around in great arcs.51Even if a weapon were made abroad and then brought into the United States, its detonation would require individuals in-country with the capacity to receive and handle the complicated weapons and then to set them off. Thus far, the talent pool appears, to put mildly, very thin.

#### AND, no nuke terror

Mockli 12 Daniel mockli is a Senior Researcher @ Center for Security Studies in International Relations and Security Network, "Terrorism as a Manageable Risk -- Yes it is," http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Special-Feature/Detail/?lng=en&id=152973&tabid=1453321093&contextid774=152973&contextid775=152971 9-21-13, DOA: 7-20-13, y2k

Eleven years after al-Qaida’s coor­dinated mass-casualty attacks on the US, many effects of 11 Septem­ber 2001 are still visible. Islamist extremist violence continues to be widely perceived as a major threat to global security. Recurring terrorism alerts and news about successful or foiled attacks serve as forceful remind­ers that this is a threat that could hit anyone anytime. Aviation security and infrastructure protection remain ma­jor public concerns. Counterterrorism capabilities in law enforcement, intel­ligence, and the military have all been enhanced. For all these repercussions, 9/11 has not brought about strategic change to the international system. It illustrated the globalization of security threats and the empowerment of non-state actors. It also had a tremendous im­pact on US foreign policy for several years. Yet, with the US gradually mod­ifying its counterterrorism approach, al-Qaida has not succeeded in pro­voking the West into a clash of civilizations. This is notwithstanding growing anti-Muslim and anti-Amer­ican sentiment in certain parts of the world. Nor has al-Qaida become a mass movement. The core organization of al-Qaida has been significant­ly weakened. Al-Qaida’s ideology has lost much support in Muslim coun­tries. The vast majority of Islamist extremist groups have not answered the call for global jihad and continue to pursue more local agendas. Seen from the perspective of West­ern security, Islamist extremist violence has not become an existential threat as was frequently predicted after 9/11. Rather, it should be perceived as an ongoing but manageable risk. Current counter-terrorism policies are effective to the extent that the likelihood of com­plex and catastrophic attacks against the homeland of Western countries has substantially decreased. The jihadist threat to Europe and the US no doubt remains real, with ‘home­grown’ radicals that have ties to al-Qaida-related terror organizations being a particular source of concern. However, potential terrorist attacks are likely to be limited in scale and conventional in nature over the com­ing years. Shifting from ‘managing’ to ‘resolving’ the problem of jihadist ter­rorism may be too ambitious an objective, as strategic counterterror­ism is beset with major challenges. The fight against terrorism is set to stay and will continue to require considerable resources. Yet, terrorism is a threat that should no longer be overemphasized at the expense of other security challenges. Issues relating to the transformation of the international system and regional developments in Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere will likely top the strategic agenda of Western countries in the coming years. An evolving threat The jihadist threat has evolved significantly in the past years. The capacity of al-Qaida Central to launch complex and catastrophic attacks has been dimin­ished. Al-Qaida’s ideology and brand have, however, been taken up by some other terror organizations. These regional al-Qaida affiliates embrace the call for global jihad to some extent. But their grievances and objectives – and in most cases, also their operative range – are tied to specific local contexts. The same holds true for most other Islamist extremist groups. Al-Qaida’s concept of global jihad is being marginalized in Islamic religious and political discourse. Most of the groups that operate on the premise of jihad continue to follow the classical interpretation of a defensive struggle against oppression in Muslim coun­tries. Going after the ‘near enemy’, they still may hit not just national regimes and security forces, but also local Western targets. But they do not subscribe to al-Qaida’s reinter­pretation of jihad in global and more offensive terms. Hitting the ‘far en­emy’, i.e. launching attacks against the US homeland and other Western countries, is not what they are after. In Europe, and increasingly in the US as well, there is the additional threat of homegrown radicalization. Evidence suggests that the damage homegrown jihadists can cause de­pends significantly on whether they are self-inspired and acting autono­mously or trained and guided by established terrorist organizations. The most likely current scenarios of homegrown terrorism concern attacks of limited scale with traditional terrorist methods such as armed assault and improvised explo­sives. Overall, the diversification of Islam­ist extremist violence in recent years has rendered the jihadist threat more diffuse. It has also meant that the threat for Western homelands, while still real, has been reduced. Muslim-majority countries, rather than the West, are the main target of terrorist attacks. A largely non-Western threat The decreasing appeal of global jihad and the limited operational capacity of jihadists willing to strike European or US targets suggest a reduced scale of threat emanating from Islamist ex­tremist violence to Western countries. A typical attack in the coming years will likely be of limited scale and sophistication, carried out with con­ventional weapons like assault rifles or small improvised explosive devices. In its methods, jihadist terrorism in­creasingly resembles traditional IRA-or ETA-type terrorism. It continues to differ, however, in that it is often aimed at indiscriminate mass casual­ties and may target any country, irre­spective of secessionist conflicts. It is due to this last reason that Islamist extremist violence will likely remain a major concern to Western publics and policy-makers. It works to the advantage of al-Qaida that even failed attacks arouse public atten­tion, emotion, and fear. It is impor­tant to note, however, that it is non- OECD countries, and predominantly Muslim-majority countries, that suffer the bulk of terrorism attacks and casu­alties. In 2010, the ‘top five’ countries in terms of both attacks and deaths were Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, India, and Somalia. Collectively, they accounted for 76 per cent of all attacks and 83 per cent of all deaths. Europe and the United States rank last on this global list of terror incidents. In Europe, there have been few attacks, and the figures for arrests have been decreasing since 2006. According to Europol data covering 26 European Union (EU) member states (excluding the UK), six mem­ber states reported 294 failed, foiled, or successfully perpetrated terrorist attacks in 2009. Only one of these attacks was categorized as Islamist, as opposed to 237 attacks related to ETA in Spain and France. In the fig­ures for 2010, the number of Islam­ist attacks may go up slightly [note: in 2011, no religiously-inspired attack was reported by EU member-states], but the major trend may well be a rise in attacks by anarchist (left-wing) groups in Greece, Italy, and Spain. In the UK, there were 173 terrorism arrests in 2009/10 [note: 62 in 2011], compared to an annual average of 216 since 2002. As for the US, few would have expected that there would ‘only’ be 14 homeland deaths caused by Islamist extremist violence in the decade post- 9/11 – a figure that contrasts with the 168 people killed in the right-wing Oklahoma bombing of 1995. The bottom line is that while jihad­ist terrorism hits hard some of the Muslim countries, it is a manageable risk in Western countries. There is of course a price tag attached to manag­ing this risk effectively. Also, new large-scale attacks on West­ern homelands can never be ruled out. Nevertheless, the likelihood of such an attack appears lower today than some counterterrorist bureaucracies and analysts continue to argue. This is also why two worst-case scenarios are unlikely today: for example, links between anti-Western Muslim re­gimes and global jihadists have not materialized in any substantial way. Iran does support Hezbollah and Hamas, but has been tough on Al Qaeda. Nor did Saddam Hussein cooperate with global jihadists. There are ties between the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and al-Qaida and Lashkar-e-Taiba in Pakistan. Yet, these are tactical alliances that are not geared against the West, but must be seen in the context of the ISI’s strate­gic calculations concerning Pakistan’s relations with India. Without state sponsorship of global jihadism, the scenario of terrorism based on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) appears unlikely too. Again, there are concerns about the safety of nuclear weapons, especially should Pakistan descend into political chaos. US President Barack Obama’s characterization of nuclear terrorism as ‘the most extreme threat to global security’ is cer­tainly justified, and there is no doubt that a WMD attack could be a game-changer in international relations. But it is doubtful that Obama is also right in calling this ‘the most immediate threat’. Getting the materials and the know-how to launch an effective WMD attack remains exceedingly difficult. As for the use of conventional explosives to disperse radioactive materials, such ‘dirty bombs’ are unlikely to cause mass casualties, though they may cause mass panic.

### Terrorism: Bioterror Defense 2NC

#### No bioterror—

#### No dispersal—technical capacity is beyond the means of terrorists—at best it takes weeks to spread and things like smog, humidity and temp changes make it impossible to deliver

#### IT IS Empirically denied—bioweapons have never killed more than 20 people and medical and civil defense solves.

#### AND, Empirically they don’t spread

Dove 12 [Alan Dove, PhD in Microbiology, science journalist and former Adjunct Professor at New York University, “Who’s Afraid of the Big, Bad Bioterrorist?” Jan 24 2012, http://alandove.com/content/2012/01/whos-afraid-of-the-big-bad-bioterrorist/]

The second problem is much more serious. Eliminating the toxins, we’re left with a list of infectious bacteria and viruses. With a single exception, these organisms are probably near-useless as weapons, and history proves it.¶ There have been at least three well-documented military-style deployments of infectious agents from the list, plus one deployment of an agent that’s not on the list. I’m focusing entirely on the modern era, by the way. There are historical reports of armies catapulting plague-ridden corpses over city walls and conquistadors trying to inoculate blankets with Variola (smallpox), but it’s not clear those “attacks” were effective. Those diseases tended to spread like, well, plagues, so there’s no telling whether the targets really caught the diseases from the bodies and blankets, or simply picked them up through casual contact with their enemies.¶ Of the four modern biowarfare incidents, two have been fatal. The first was the 1979 Sverdlovsk anthrax incident, which killed an estimated 100 people. In that case, a Soviet-built biological weapons lab accidentally released a large plume of weaponized Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) over a major city. Soviet authorities tried to blame the resulting fatalities on “bad meat,” but in the 1990s Western investigators were finally able to piece together the real story. The second fatal incident also involved anthrax from a government-run lab: the 2001 “Amerithrax” attacks. That time, a rogue employee (or perhaps employees) of the government’s main bioweapons lab sent weaponized, powdered anthrax through the US postal service. Five people died.¶ That gives us a grand total of around 105 deaths, entirely from agents that were grown and weaponized in officially-sanctioned and funded bioweapons research labs. Remember that.¶ Terrorist groups have also deployed biological weapons twice, and these cases are very instructive. The first was the 1984 Rajneeshee bioterror attack, in which members of a cult in Oregon inoculated restaurant salad bars with Salmonella bacteria (an agent that’s not on the “select” list). 751 people got sick, but nobody died. Public health authorities handled it as a conventional foodborne Salmonella outbreak, identified the sources and contained them. Nobody even would have known it was a deliberate attack if a member of the cult hadn’t come forward afterward with a confession. Lesson: our existing public health infrastructure was entirely adequate to respond to a major bioterrorist attack.¶ The second genuine bioterrorist attack took place in 1993. Members of the Aum Shinrikyo cult successfully isolated and grew a large stock of anthrax bacteria, then sprayed it as an aerosol from the roof of a building in downtown Tokyo. The cult was well-financed, and had many highly educated members, so this release over the world’s largest city really represented a worst-case scenario.¶ Nobody got sick or died. From the cult’s perspective, it was a complete and utter failure. Again, the only reason we even found out about it was a post-hoc confession. Aum members later demonstrated their lab skills by producing Sarin nerve gas, with far deadlier results. Lesson: one of the top “select agents” is extremely hard to grow and deploy even for relatively skilled non-state groups. It’s a really crappy bioterrorist weapon.¶ Taken together, these events point to an uncomfortable but inevitable conclusion: our biodefense industry is a far greater threat to us than any actual bioterrorists.

### Terror: Allied Coop Ans

#### Cooperation’s inevitable\*\*

Mueller 12 (John, Prof @ Ohio State, Terrorism and Security, in “Controversies in Globalization,” page 149-150, CMR)

Overall, with 9/11 and subsequent activity, bin Laden and his gang seem mainly to have succeeded in uniting the world, including its huge Muslim portion, against their violent global jihad. No matter how much they might disagree on other issues (most notably America’s war on Iraq), there is a compelling incentive for states – including Arab and Muslim ones – to cooperate to deal with any international terrorist problem emanating from groups and individuals connected to, or sympathetic with, al-Qaeda. Although these multilateral efforts, particularly by such Muslim States as Sudan, Syria, Libya, Pakistan, and even Iran, may not have received sufficient publicity, these countries have had a vital interest, because they felt directly threatened by the militant network, and their diligent and aggressive efforts have led to important breakthroughs against al-Qaeda. ¶ This post-9/11 willingness of governments around the world to take on terrorists has been reinforced and amplified as they reacted to subsequent, if sporadic, terrorist activity within their own countries. Thus a terrorist bombing in Balin in 2002 galvanized the Indonesia government into action and into extensive arrests and convictions. When terrorists attacked Saudis in Saudi Arabia in 2002, that country seems, very much for self-interested reasons, to have become considerably more serious about dealing with internal terrorism, including a clampdown on radical clerics and preachers. Some inept terrorist bombings in Casablanca in 2003 inspired a similar determined crackdown by Moroccan authorities. The main result of al-Qaeda-linked suicide terrorism in Jordan in 2003 was to outrage Jordanians and other Arabs against the perpetrators. Massive protests were held, and in polls, those expressing a lot of confidence in Osama Bin Laden to “do the right thing” plunged from 25 percent to less than 1 percent. In polls conducted in 35 predominately Muslim coutnries, more than 90 percent condemned bin Laden’s terrorism on religious grounds. [149-150]

#### Soft power not key to counter-terror cooperation

Boot, senior fellow at CFR, 4**—**CFR senior fellow in national security studies. Bachelor’s in history, Berkley. Master’s in history, Yale. (Max, 8/31, Foreign Policy Luncheon)

Lots of people who are not huge fans of the war in Iraq, for example, are nevertheless providing substantially more cooperation on intelligence, on busting up terrorist rings now than they ever did in the past. Now, why are they doing that? Pretty obvious, it's self- interest, because the al Qaeda threat has gotten so much bigger since 9/11. They've not only hit us, they've hit Spain, they've hit Saudi Arabia, they've hit all over the place. All these countries are now drawing in and cooperating with us. And look, at the end of the day, it doesn't matter that much what the level of U.S. popularity is, because this is a life-or-death issue. And countries like France, Germany, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, all these other countries, they know that to protect the lives of their own citizens, they have to work with the United States -- with our military, with our intelligence, with our various resources -- and that's exactly what they're doing.

#### We will cooperate over terrorism regardless of relations

**Coessens 4** Page 1 V OL. III, N O. 1 , M ARCH 04 15 At Least in Fighting Terrorism, Transatlantic Cooperation Is Working By Philippe Coessens Philippe Coessens is the Head of Political, Academic, Justice, and Home Affairs at the Delegation of the European Commission in Washington, D.C. From 1998 to 2003, he was Head of Unit “European Correspondent” in the External Relations Directorate General. Before joining the Commission in 1991, he served in the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This article first appeared in the Fall 2003 issue of European Affairs, a publication of the European Institute.

While disagreements between the United States and the European Union on a range of global issues have recently attracted attention, cooperation between the two sides of the Atlantic on counter-terrorism has been relatively successful. There can be no doubt that this is an area in which the European Union and the United States share common goals. It is clear that terrorism and associated problems such as drug traffick- ing, money laundering, illegal immigration, and organized crime are very much global issues. So the European Union’s anti-terrorism efforts can be said to have had a positive impact on the world in general, and on the United States in par- ticular. This applies not only to the Union’s internal achievements but also to its efforts to strengthen cooperation with other countries and its participation in multilateral forums such as the United Nations and the Group of Eight leading industrial nations. The European Union set to work on a new anti-terrorism initiative immediately after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, convening a spe- cial meeting of the European Council barely a week later and coming up with a comprehensive action plan to support the United States in the face of the terror- ist attacks. The plan contained a series of actions aimed at enhancing police and judicial cooperation, developing international legal instruments, stepping up efforts to cut off terrorist financing worldwide (by immediately freezing assets of a substantial number of terrorist organizations), strengthening air security, and contributing to the systematic evaluation of relations with third countries in the light of their position on terrorism. Since then, the European Union and the United States have concluded a series of important bilateral agreements on police and judicial cooperation (notably agreements between Europol and the United States reinforcing the capability of law enforcement authorities to exchange data), as well as on mutu- al legal assistance and extradition. These, once fully in force, will make it eas- ier to bring to justice terrorists and other serious criminals in the jurisdictions where they are wanted. Inside the European Union, the focus has been on judicial cooperation between member states, increased cooperation between police and intelligence services, border control, and measures to counter the financing of terrorism. Key achievements in these areas include agreement on a common European arrest warrant and an EU framework decision on combating terrorism, which includes a definition of terrorist offenses; a more closely coordinated scale of penalties; a common EU list of worldwide terrorist organizations; and mutual recognition of orders freezing the property of terrorists or securing evidence against them. Plans are also under way to develop more secure visas and travel documents. None of these agreements was easy to achieve. They are, however, already having real operational effects by improving the legal framework for fighting crime and terrorism throughout the European Union. The combination of these new instruments is effectively denying safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts. In addition, the European Union has approved revised recommendations by the Financial Action Task Force aimed at stemming the flow of funds to terrorists and further cracking down on money laundering. The Union has also been developing a multi-faceted and more coordi- nated approach aimed at incorporating the fight against terrorism into all aspects of its foreign policy. For example, it is conducting threat analyses of various countries and regions (Central and Latin America, South and Southeast Asia) that are leading to concrete policy recommendations. In line with these recommendations, the European Union is launching pilot projects to help three priority countries (Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Philippines) curb terrorist financing, strengthen law enforcement, and develop more effective judicial systems. These countries and actions were chosen in consultation with the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee so as to assist their governments to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1373 of September 2001, which called for wide-ranging measures to fight terrorism. A second important step has been the introduction of anti-crime and anti-terrorism clauses in EU trade and cooperation agreements. Such clauses require the parties to exchange information on terrorist groups and their support organizations, with a view to preventing or punishing acts of terrorism. These provisions are being gradually included in agreements with Chile, Algeria, Egypt, and Lebanon, and currently figure in difficult negotiations for agree- ments with Syria, Iran, and the Gulf Cooperation Council. The Group of Eight (G8), which includes four EU member states (Britain, France, Germany, and Italy), along with representatives of the EU institutions, has also been quick to work toward implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1373. The G8 immediately recognized the need to provide technical assistance to other countries to help them to build the necessary capa- bilities to fulfill their obligations under the resolution. At its latest summit meeting, in Evian in June 2003, the G8 adopted an action plan that also concentrates on outreach activities and capacity building. The plan focuses on fighting terrorism in particular regions, such as South East and Central Asia, and in certain specific fields, such as reinforcing border secu- rity and equipping institutions to tackle money laundering and the financing of terrorist organizations. More generally, the U.S.-EU political dialogue on the entire issue of terrorism has deepened. Justice, home affairs, and counter-terrorism officials now meet regularly, and cooperation has substantially improved since 9/11. A great deal of work is also being done on both sides of the Atlantic on measures to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their acquisition by terrorist groups, and on how to deal with so-called rogue states. The European Union also adopted an important policy document that lays out guiding principles and a concrete plan for further counter-terrorist action at a summit meeting in Thessaloniki in June. This plan sets the course for future action so that momentum in the fight against terror will not be lost. The verdict on all these efforts to improve transatlantic cooperation in the fight against terrorism must at this point be “so far, so good.” Since 9/11, cooperation has substantially improved. Intelligence has been flowing across the Atlantic in unprecedented volumes, a number of terrorist cells have been disrupted, and many suspected terrorists are being prosecuted in different European countries. The European Union and the United States share the same values and objectives. We are now also sharing some of the same tools available to curb terrorist activity. After all the discussions we have had about different approach- es to multilateralism on either side of the Atlantic, it is striking that in this field both sides are stressing the importance of the work of the United Nations and the Counter-Terrorism Committee. That shows that – on terrorism, at least – the European Union and the United States see eye-to-eye as actors in the internastional community.

### Terrorism: Bab Al Mandab Ext 2NC

#### Extend the Saul in 11 evidence: AQAP has tried to disrupt The strait beforewithout success. AND, terrorists won’t cooperate with terrorists, so the risk can’t get worse.

#### Saul evidnce also proves that naval and surveillance superiority prevent an attack on the Strait

#### Empirically disproven twice

Komiss, William, and LaVar Huntzinger. "The Economic Implications of Disruptions to Maritime Oil Chokepoints." Center for Naval Analysis (2011).

The attack of the USS Coleon 12 October 2000 was a significant act of terrorism in the Gulf of Aden [20]. Since that time, terror organizations have planned several attacks against oil tankers in the Arabian Gulf and in the Horn of Africa. For example, in October 2002, alQaeda attacked a French supertanker off Yemen. As a result of the attack, the insurance premiums charged to tankers passing through Yemeni waters tripled [21].¶ Just as the USS *Cole* brought attention to terrorism in the Gulf of Aden, the hijacking of the oil tanker, Sirius Star, on 17 November 2008, brought worldwide attention to piracy as a threat to maritime security. Acts of piracy have become more frequent as pirates have regularly used “mother ships” to increase their range. As a result, the old warning to stay at least 50 nautical miles from the coast has been replaced by warnings to stay at least 200 nautical miles away [22].

#### AND, Bab Al Mandab oil impact is false—pipeline solves.

Charles Emmerson is a Senior Research Fellow in Energy,¶ Environment and Resource Governance at Chatham¶ House, working on the emerging global political economy¶ of natural resources. and Paul Stevens is a Senior Research Fellow in Energy,¶ Environment and Resource Governance at Chatham¶ House, Emeritus Professor of Petroleum Policy and¶ Economics at the University of Dundee and Visiting¶ Professor at University College London (Australia). Maritime Choke Points and the Global Energy System Charting a Way Forward Energy, Environment and Resource Governance | January 2012

Whereas there are no alternative maritime routes to the¶ Strait of Hormuz for oil exports from the Persian Gulf,¶ shipments through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore¶ could be re-routed, though at additional cost, through¶ other waterways such as the Lombok Strait. Similarly,¶ most oil shipments through Bab Al-Mandab subsequently¶ transit the Suez Canal. Thus disruption to the¶ Suez Canal would have a significant impact on shipments¶ through Bab Al-Mandab. Were Bab Al-Mandab itself¶ to be disrupted, some oil shipments could still be made through the Suez Canal from Saudi Arabian facilities on ¶ the eastern coast of the Red Sea, north of Yemen. The ¶ availability of oil here would depend on an East–West ¶ pipeline through Saudi Arabia.

#### AND, their Mountain evidence is literally just propaganda

Aaron Berhane, one of the first graduates of the University of Asmara's Journalism and Mass Communication program, he was co-founder and editor in chief of Setit, the largest independent newspaper in Eritrea, until the paper was closed down by the government in September 2001 during a sweep when many journalists were imprisoned without charge. Aaron lived in hiding for more than three months before escaping to Sudan. Through the UNHCR, International PEN helped him to find political asylum in Canada. Since finding refuge in Canada he has been awarded a Human Rights Watch Hellman / Hammett grant. In October 2003 he was selected for a prestigious Donner / CJFE Journalist at Risk Fellowship at Massey College. Berhane was awarded the PEN-Lecturer-in-Residence position at George Brown College in Toronto in 2005. *Shame on Thomas C. Mountain* Wednesday, 14 April 2010 http://www.asmarino.com/articles/637-shame-on-thomas-c-mountain

I didn’t think I would respond to Thomas C. Mr. Mountain’s article entitled, “Sweden’s Cause Celebre Dawit Issack: Hero or Zero?” published in Eritreacompass.com, a sister website of shabait.com(a website of the Ministry of Information).¶ Mr. Mountain is an unofficial spokesperson of the Eritrean government and he was actually hired by the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) to misinform the international community. I didn’t intend to raise this issue because most people know the truth anyway, but I decided to do so just in case Mr. Mountain’s article influences 0.00001% members of the international community. Those people deserve to know the truth if they are not aware of it yet.¶ Thomas C. Mountain, the so called “independent journalist,” acts as an expert on Eritrea. He has tried to discredit Eritrean journalists and organizations that advocate press freedom. Mr. Mountain criticised the World Association of Newspapers (WAN) and Reporters Without Borders (RSF) for placing Dawit Issack’s name on the list of arrested journalists in the fall of 2000.¶ He said, “The Eritrean government claimed that Dawit Issak, along with a number of others listed in the RSF press release, were detained for going absent without leave (AWOL) from their military units and were not in prison but had been returned to their military commands.”¶ There is no truth in his statement at all. First of all, neither RSF nor WAN listed Dawit Issack’s name with the eight journalists who were arrested on October 14, 2000. As a matter of fact, Dawit Issack was not in Eritrea; he was in Sweden from May 2000 to April 2001. I was one of the editors who passed the name of the arrested journalists to the international community. I remember back then that what Thomas C. Mountain wrote about the arrested journalists was not true.¶ I was so anxious to meet this so called “independent journalist” and challenge him in person. I wanted to know his motive for lying so blatantly. And so I contacted one of my sources who used to work in one of the biggest hotels in Asmara. She told me that she knew him and she confirmed that he was not in Asmara but was actually living in the USA.¶ That shocked me. He denied that the journalists had been arrested and he had pretended that he was in Asmara while the incident of arrest took place.¶ It is then that I learned that he had been hired by the PFDJ not only to gather historical information about the border conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia, but also to become involved in the propaganda’s activities of PFDJ. And gradually, he became an unofficial spokesperson of the Eritrean government. He has given several interviews. And of course, he has been trained to lie.¶

#### Ethiopian collapse make their impact inevitable

**Mountain 12** [Thomas, independent western journalist based in the Horn of Africa , Kavaz Center, “Could AQAP and al-Shabaab cause the death of the U.S.?”. News Fact Analysis, http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/11/19/choke-point-bab-el-mandeb-understanding-the-strategically-critical-horn-of-africa/, BJM]

The Horn of Africa is one of the most strategically critical regions in the world with the narrow passage where the Red Sea joins the Indian Ocean, the Bab el-Mandeb, being a potential choke point for much of the worlds commerce, wrote in his article Thomas Mountain. Almost all of the trade between the European Union and China, Japan, India and the rest of Asia passes through the Bab el-Mandeb everyday. Up to 30% of the worlds oil, including all of the oil and natural gas from the Persian Gulf heading west passes through the Horn of Africa daily. Who controls the Horn of Africa controls a major chunk of the worlds economies. Mr. Mountain indicates that the CIA, MI6 and all the western intelligence agencies know all to well just how critical the Horn of Africa is. The journalist suggests the following scenario: Somalia (or Yemen) became a strong, united, independent, and well armed Islamic country, and seeing the NATO attack on Libya, declares that no EU or USA bound shipments of goods, oil or natural gas would be allowed to pass through the Bab el-Mandeb as long as NATO bombardments of Libya continue. How long would the EU economies be able to hold out without the energy supplies from the Persian Gulf or the vital Asian imports?, asks Mr. Mountain. Is it even conceivable that the USA and its NATO allies would allow a scenario such as this to develop? Understanding this is crucial to understanding why the western powers conduct such a criminal policy in the Horn of Africa, writes Mr. Mountain. The USA, still the worlds lone superpower, has a policy of using local enforcers, policemen on the beat, to do its dirty work in areas of the world of critical importance to its interests. In South America the USA uses Columbia as its local gendarme or strongman to try and keep the region in line. In West Africa the USA uses Nigeria, in the Middle East, "Israel" and in East Africa the main USA mafioso enforcer is Ethiopia. Every year the USA and its western underlings pour some $ 7 billion into keeping the Ethiopian regime headed by the former Marxist-Leninist guerilla leader Meles Zenawi afloat making Ethiopia one of the most aid dependent countries in the world and a rival to "Israel" as the largest recipients of western aid on the planet. For this the USA can order Meles Zenawi to send his army to invade Somalia in the name of the "War on Terror" in 2006. Earlier, in 2000, Ethiopia invaded Eritrea (see map), again at the urging of the USA. Today, the USA is paying the salaries of some 10,000 Ethiopian Army "peacekeepers" deployed around Abeye (see map), the oil producing region on the border between north and South Sudan. For these and other crimes in the service of Pax Americana Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi has a permanent "get out of jail free" card, or blanket immunity. He has at least a billion dollars stashed in his mainly London bank accounts for the not so distant day when he boards his final flight out of Addis Ababa, writes Mr. Mountain. Whether it was former Brit PM Tony Blair anointing Meles Zenawi as chair of the short lived Africa Commission to the Obama White house arranging for Meles to stride the stage of the latest G-20 meeting of world leaders. With the largest, best equipped army in Africa, Ethiopia has a job to do and first and foremost it is to make sure that the region surrounding the Bab el-Mandeb choke point remains firmly under western control. For he who controls Bab el-Mandeb has his fingers around the throats of both the EU and Asia's economies. Today the USA's grip on the region is increasingly in doubt, for the Ethiopian regime is ever closer to the day of its demise and what comes after Meles Zenawi's departure could shake the world as we know it. Choke Point Bab el-Mandeb is **strategically critical** in today's world and just how important can be judged by how careful the western media is in covering the region. Almost nothing is allowed in the news that might hasten the day of Meles Zenawi's departure. Meles must stride the G-20 stage once again for all the world to see that he remains the anointed defender of western control of the Bab el-Mandeb, writes Mr. Mountain. **The day the USA loses control of the Bab el-Mandeb may** very well **mark the end of the USA's days as the worlds lone superpower and it's control of the world** as we know it.

### Oil Shocks--General—2NC

#### Econ is insulated, speculation means inventories increase, shock causes dollar depreciation which spurs job growth which offsets high prices—that’s whitehouse

#### No impact- market adaptation

**Gholz and Press,** associate professor Public Affairs at the U of Texas Austin and associate professor government Dartmouth, **10** (Summer, Eugene and Daryl, “Protecting “The Prize”: Oil and the U.S. National Interest,” Security Studies, 19:453–485 vol 3) atw

Each day, twenty-four million barrels of crude are pumped from the Persian Gulf region, most of which are loaded onto supertankers to feed refineries around the world.8 The immediate effect of a major supply disruption in the Gulf would leave one or more consumers wondering where their next expected oil delivery will come from. But the oil market, like most others, adjusts to shocks via a variety of mechanisms. These adaptations do not require careful coordination, unusually wise stewardship, or benign motives. Individuals’ drive for profit triggers most of them. The details of each oil shock are unique, so each crisis triggers a different mix of adaptations. Some adjustments would begin within hours of a disruption; others would take weeks or longer to implement. Similarly, some could only supply the market for short periods of time, and others could be sustained indefinitely. But the net result of the adaptations softens the disruptions’ effects on consumers.

#### No short-term oil impact-Major oil producers are resilient to social upheaval AND alternative sources solve long term supplies

**Krauss,** former Edward R. Murrow fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations**, 10-11**

(Clifford, NYT contributor, “In the Middle East, the Crisis That Wasn't,” <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/12/business/energy-environment/in-the-middle-east-the-crisis-that-wasnt.html?pagewanted=1>, DA: 10-11-11, atw)

When revolts broke out from Tunisia to Bahrain last winter and spring, alarm bells rang out across global oil markets. Prices of various benchmark crude oils soared as traders, policy makers and industry analysts feared a repeat of the kind of oil price upheavals that had shaken the global economy several times in the 1970s. JPMorgan Chase, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley all predicted sharply higher oil prices, with Goldman saying the price of crude could rise as high as $135 a barrel by the end of 2012. The initial pop in oil and gasoline prices drained consumers and businesses, but the oil markets have calmed and remain well below levels predicted by many experts. The slowing global economy has certainly curbed demand, and a coordinated effort by industrialized countries to release strategic oil reserves on the market bolstered supplies. But most important, crude shipments from the Gulf were never interrupted in a meaningful way. Simply put, there has been no lasting oil shock from the Arab Spring. “Libya had an impact on the market, but the disruption was on the order of Hurricanes Rita and Katrina and was nothing like the 1973 OPEC boycott or 1979 Iranian revolution,” said Daniel Yergin, an oil historian, referring to the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and the two storms that interrupted production in the Gulf of Mexico for much of autumn 2008. “When you talk to refiners no one has said there is a shortage of supply, though there was a temporary psychological effect on the market.” Potential revolts in Algeria, Oman, Saudi Arabia and other important oil producers have not occurred, as many had predicted. Egypt has gone through a revolution without the Suez Canal’s being closed to oil tankers for even a day. Unrest in Yemen has interrupted some exports, but it has not jeopardized the adjacent shipping lane between the Horn of Africa and the Middle East through which nearly four million barrels of oil pass daily. To be sure, there have been sporadic demonstrations in Saudi Arabia and in Kuwait, where labor strife appears on the upswing. But so far, Libya has been the only major oil producer to suffer a market-shifting interruption of exports, and the emergence of a new government, indebted to some extent to NATO countries for their military support, could eventually turn its production into a long-term oil supply gain. Yemeni oil exports have been partially interrupted, but Yemen is too minuscule a producer to tilt markets. A Western boycott of Syrian oil could merely shift its exports from Europe to Asia, meaning little, if any, net difference in world supplies. And Iraq, despite sporadic attacks in recent months on its oil infrastructure, is beginning to recover its position as a major exporter. Perhaps the most worrying development to come out of the Arab Spring, in terms of future oil supplies, may be the sharpening tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the two most influential members of OPEC. But regional production is little changed from that day in December when a Tunisian fruit cart seller set himself on fire and started the uprising, even with the loss of Libyan exports. Meanwhile, the Libyan rebels showed no interest in sabotaging oil fields; indeed, they protected them for the day — apparently coming soon — when they will tap them to rebuild their country. Of course, there is no way to be sure that stable oil supplies are guaranteed from a region where Iranian nuclear ambitions, Israeli-Palestinian tensions and enduring terrorist threats in several countries make political stability uncertain. But the fact of the matter is that the major oil producing countries have generally proved to be the most resilient or least susceptible to serious conflict. “Is there the potential for instability and further oil supply disruptions in Saudi Arabia or any of these countries?” asked Jamie Webster, a Middle East expert at PFC Energy, a consulting company. “At least in the short term, no. Citizens have seen that an overthrow of a government can be messy and painful and governments are taking a much more proactive stance to provide their citizens with more opportunities like low fuel costs, increased housing and increased job opportunities.” Saudi Arabia and other oil producers have the resources to tamp down discontent with generous social programs, putting off major changes. To be sure, it is a strategy that may not work in the long run. And in the short term, it means Saudi Arabia and the other producers will need to guard against a steep drop in oil prices as the global economy slows, lest their ability to be so generous should wane. The producers will need all the oil revenues they can get their hands on to spend on the social and energy subsidies and payments to their religious establishments. Shortly after the outbreak of protests around the region, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia increased spending on housing, social welfare and education by $10 billion, and gave government workers a 15 percent cost-of-living allowance. Likewise, Algeria has accelerated a five-year, nearly $300 billion plan to building housing and roads. Kuwait has a $125 billion four-year investment plan to build public utilities and various other infrastructure projects. “Producing countries are the ones that have the money to buy off their citizens,” said Michael Levi, an energy expert at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. “Saudi Arabia has the ability to spend upward of $100 billion on social spending, where Egypt and Syria don’t have the same kind of options.” But Mr. Levi noted a downside to Saudi largesse. “If Saudi Arabia equates high oil prices with stability in its society, it will target high oil prices,” he said. “And that is not a good thing for the United States and global consumers.” Still, the Saudis and other producers have demonstrated repeatedly that they do not want oil prices so high that they smother global economic growth or encourage the development of renewable and unconventional fuels. Saudi Arabia is the biggest OPEC producer and holder of most of the cartel’s spare production capacity. The Arab Spring has pushed the Saudis into an aggressive posture to block what they perceive to be as Iranian efforts to spread its influence by fanning unrest in Bahrain and flexing its muscles in OPEC to raise oil prices. Saudi Arabia sent troops into Bahrain to help quell unrest, to assure that Shiite protests in Bahrain would not spread to a nearby Saudi Shiite region. And after the Iranians stymied Saudi efforts at OPEC’s June meeting to raise official production quotas, Saudi Arabia raised its oil production from 9.3 million barrels a day to 10 million barrels a day anyway. Smaller allied producers followed suit, acknowledging that Saudi Arabia remained OPEC’s pivotal power. Over the next decade, there is a good chance that the Middle East and North Africa region will produce as much if not more oil than it does today. If the shaky Baghdad government can hold once U.S. troops withdraw, Iraq alone could produce a million barrels a day or more than it does now. Some analysts say Libya, which produced 1.3 million barrels a day for international markets last year, could easily produce several hundred thousand barrels more a day in a few years than under Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi if the new government can consolidate control and get foreign oil companies back. The latter seem eager. Over the longer term, there is a good chance that the world will become less dependent on Middle East oil anyway, whatever the eventual ramifications of the Arab Spring. That is already the case for the United States, which over the past few years has begun to import less oil from the Middle East, replacing those imports with synthetic crude made from Canadian oil sands and increased domestic production. “As people who invest in oil and gas and look over the next 10 or 15 years, they are looking primarily at deep-water prospects in West Africa and South America, the Arctic, global shale fields, heavy oil in Canada,” said David L. Goldwyn, a former U.S. State Department coordinator for energy affairs. “And, if Chávez moves on, you could see a boom in Venezuela, too,” he said, referring to President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela.

#### Even large shocks don’t cause major crises- 2010 proves

**Shapiro** 2-9-**11** [Robert, chairman and co-founder of Sonecon, LLC, a private firm that provides advice and analysis to senior executives and officials of U.S. and foreign businesses, governments, and non-profit organizations and former Under Secretary of Commerce for Economic Affairs from 1997 to 2001, “The Real Economic Implications of the Uprising in Egypt,” <http://ndn.org/blog/2011/02/real-economic-implications-uprising-egypt>]

But in order to threaten the U.S. and global recoveries, an oil price spike would have to be both very large and persistent -- for at least four-to-six months. Before this year’s unrest gripped Tunisia and Egypt, oil prices in 2010 had risen by about 27 percent. That cost the United States an additional $72 billion for oil imports, an extra $70 billion for the EU’s oil imports, and $27 billion more for Japan. That’s not peanuts, but it was still just ripples for economies of their size. Saudi Arabia is the only country with the capacity to engineer and maintain a price spike sufficient to wreck real economic havoc – as it has the capacity to prevent any other oil-producing country from trying to do the same.

#### Multiple checks to the impact of oil shocks:

**Economist, 2011 (**March 3, 2011, “The 2011 oil shock,” <http://www.economist.com/node/18281774>)

So far, the shocks to supply have been tiny. Libya’s turmoil has reduced global oil output by a mere 1%. In 1973 the figure was around 7.5%. Today’s oil market also has plenty of buffers. Governments have stockpiles, which they didn’t in 1973. Commercial oil stocks are more ample than they were when prices peaked in 2008. Saudi Arabia, the central bank of the oil market, technically has enough spare capacity to replace Libya, Algeria and a clutch of other small producers. And the Saudis have made clear that they are willing to pump.

### Oil Shocks--Economy—1NC

#### No economic impact to oil shocks – IMF study proves

**Rasmussen and Roitman**, IMF Economists, 20**11**

[Tobias N. Rasmussen, Senior Economist, Middle East and Central Asia Department, IMF and Agustín Roitman, Economist for the IMF, 9/3, Oil shocks in a global perspective: are they really that bad? AD 9/9/2011]jap

Using a comprehensive global dataset, we outline stylized facts characterizing relationships between crude oil prices and macroeconomic developments across the world. Approaching the data from several angles, we find that the impact of higher oil prices on oil-importing economies is generally small: a 25 percent increase in oil prices typically causes GDP to fall by about half of one percent or less. While cross-country differences in impact are found to depend mainly on the relative size of oil imports, we also show that oil price shocks are not always costly for oil-importing countries: although higher oil prices increase the import bill, there are partly offsetting increases in external receipts. We provide a small open economy model illustrating the main transmission channels of oil shocks, and show how the recycling of petrodollars may mitigate the impact.

#### No impact- market adaptation

**Gholz and Press,** associate professor Public Affairs at the U of Texas Austin and associate professor government Dartmouth, **10** (Summer, Eugene and Daryl, “Protecting “The Prize”: Oil and the U.S. National Interest,” Security Studies, 19:453–485 vol 3) atw

Each day, twenty-four million barrels of crude are pumped from the Persian Gulf region, most of which are loaded onto supertankers to feed refineries around the world.8 The immediate effect of a major supply disruption in the Gulf would leave one or more consumers wondering where their next expected oil delivery will come from. But the oil market, like most others, adjusts to shocks via a variety of mechanisms. These adaptations do not require careful coordination, unusually wise stewardship, or benign motives. Individuals’ drive for profit triggers most of them. The details of each oil shock are unique, so each crisis triggers a different mix of adaptations. Some adjustments would begin within hours of a disruption; others would take weeks or longer to implement. Similarly, some could only supply the market for short periods of time, and others could be sustained indefinitely. But the net result of the adaptations softens the disruptions’ effects on consumers.

#### No wars from econ collapse.

Morris **Miller**, Winter **2000**, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, “Poverty as a cause of wars?” V. 25, Iss. 4, p pq

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis - as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semidemocracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).

#### Multiple checks to the impact of oil shocks:

**Economist, 2011 (**March 3, 2011, “The 2011 oil shock,” <http://www.economist.com/node/18281774>)

So far, the shocks to supply have been tiny. Libya’s turmoil has reduced global oil output by a mere 1%. In 1973 the figure was around 7.5%. Today’s oil market also has plenty of buffers. Governments have stockpiles, which they didn’t in 1973. Commercial oil stocks are more ample than they were when prices peaked in 2008. Saudi Arabia, the central bank of the oil market, technically has enough spare capacity to replace Libya, Algeria and a clutch of other small producers. And the Saudis have made clear that they are willing to pump.

#### Instability doesn’t increase oil prices – their evidence is speculation

Rob **Heidrick**, writer for the Texas Enterprise, 3-10-**2011**, “Oil Disruptions No Longer Very Disruptive, Study Show,” Texas Enterprise, <http://texasenterprise.org/article/oil-disruptions-no-longer-very-disruptive-study-shows>

Protests in the Middle East in recent weeks have sparked not only regime change but also concerns about the rising price of oil. Political unrest in the region has caused oil supply disruption and price hikes before; many Americans recall – and do not want to repeat – the gas shortages in 1973 spurred by U.S. support for Israel during the Yom Kippur War. But is the cause for alarm justified? New research by Eugene Gholz, a distinguished scholar at The Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law at The University of Texas at Austin, suggests that it is not. By analyzing every major oil disruption since 1973, Gholz and his colleague Daryl Press show that the related price increases have been short-lived and with little enduring economic impact. When oil supplies run short, it turns out, oil purchasers scramble but market forces kick in to fill the gap. If the market is able to adapt, and the chances of another major oil shock are slim, what does that mean for American foreign policy toward the oil-rich nations of the Middle East?