## 1NC

**1**

**A. Interpretation: the affirmative must defend the hypothetical enactment of a topical plan by the United States federal government.**

**The United States federal government is the actor defined by the resolution, not individual debaters**

**US Gov** Official Website 20**09**

http://www.usa.gov/Agencies/federal.shtml

U.S. Federal Government **The three branches of U.S. government—legislative, judicial, and executive—carry out governmental power and functions.** View a complete diagram (.PDF) of the U.S. government's branches.

**“Resolved” expresses intent to implement the plan**

**Merriam-Webster Dictionary** 19**96** [http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=resolved, downloaded 07/20/03]

“6. **To change or convert by resolution or formal vote**; -- **used only reflexively; as, the house resolved itself into a committee of the whole**.”

**“Should” denotes an expectation of enacting a plan**

**American Heritage Dictionary 2K**

[www.dictionary.com]

3 **Used to express** probability or **expectation**

**B. Violation—the affirmative does not defend the implementation of a topical plan.**

**C. Vote negative**

**1. Limits—their interpretation kills limits because it creates a strategic incentive to disregard the resolution. If teams can get away with being non-topical, there’s no reason to defend the resolution. Limits are good:**

**A. Decision-making—having a limited topic with equitable ground is necessary to foster decision-making and clash**

**Steinberg & Freeley 8** \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, **Argumentation and** Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp 45-

**Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a** difference of opinion or a **conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement** on a tact or value or policy, **there is no need for debate:** the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, **it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four,"** because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (**Controversy is an essential prerequisite** of debate. **Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered.** For example**, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many** illegal immigrants **are in the United States?** What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? **Do they take jobs** from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? **Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration** by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? **Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do?** Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? **Should we build a wall on the Mexican border**, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? **Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy.** To be discussed and resolved effectively, **controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions,** frustration, and emotional distress, as **evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate** during the summer of 2007. **Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job!** They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." **Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations**, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, **but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed**—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—**then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step**. **One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies.** The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. **They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by** directing and **placing limits on the decision** to be made, **the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument**. For example, **the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation**. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. **Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad,** too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. **What sort of writing are we concerned with**—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? **What does "effectiveness" mean** in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" **The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition** such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. **This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation** of the controversy by advocates, **or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.**

**B. Creativity—thinking “inside the box” forces teams to be creative about their positions and come up with innovative solutions. Absent constraints, debate becomes boring and stale—we link turn all of their offense.**

**Intrator 10** (Intrator, David, President of The Creative Organization and musical composer, October 22, 2010, “Thinking Inside The Box: A Professional Creative Dispels A Popular Myth”, Training, http://www.trainingmag.com/article/thinking-inside-box) FS

**One of the most pernicious myths about creativity, one that seriously inhibits creative thinking and innovation, is the belief that one needs to “think outside the box.”** As someone who has worked for decades as a professional creative, **nothing could be further from the truth. This** a **is** view **shared by the vast majority of creatives, expressed** famously **by** the **modernist designer Charles Eames when he wrote, “Design depends largely upon constraints.” The myth of thinking outside the box stems from a fundamental misconception of what creativity is**, and what it’s not. In the popular imagination, creativity is **something weird and wacky.** The creative process is magical, or divinely inspired. But, in fact, **creativity is** not about divine inspiration or magic. It’s **about problem-solving, and by definition a problem is a constraint**, a limit, a box. One of the best illustrations of this is the work of **photographers**. They **create by excluding the great mass what’s before them**, choosing a small frame in which to work. **Within that tiny frame**, literally a box, **they uncover relationships and establish priorities**. **What makes creative problem-solving uniquely challenging is that you, as the creator, are the one defining the problem.** You’re the one choosing the frame. And **you alone determine what’s an effective solution**. **This can be quite demanding,** both intellectually and emotionally. **Intellectually, you are required to establish limits, set priorities**, and cull patterns and relationships from a great deal of material, much of it fragmentary. More often than not, this is the material you generated during brainstorming sessions. At the end of these sessions, you’re usually left with a big mess of ideas, half-ideas, vague notions, and the like. Now, chances are you’ve had a great time making your mess. You might have gone off-site, enjoyed a “brainstorming camp,” played a number of warm-up games. You feel artistic and empowered. **But to be truly creative, you have to clean up your mess, organizing those fragments into something real, something useful**, something **that actually works**. That’s the hard part. It takes a lot of energy, time, and willpower to make sense of the mess you’ve just generated. It also can be emotionally difficult. **You’ll need to throw out many ideas you originally thought were great, ideas you’ve become attached to, because they simply don’t fit into the rules you’re creating as you build your box.** You can always change the rules, but that also comes with an emotional price. Unlike many other kinds of problems, with creative problems there is no external authority to which you can appeal to determine whether you’re on the right track, whether one set of rules should have priority over another, or whether one box is better than another. There is no correct answer. Better said: There might be a number of correct answers. Or none at all. The responsibility of deciding the right path to take is entirely upon you. That’s a lot of responsibility, and it can be paralyzing. So it’s no wonder that the creative process often stalls after the brainstorming in many organizations. Whereas generating ideas is open-ended, and, in a sense, infinitely hopeful, having to pare those ideas down is restrictive, tedious, and, at times, scary. The good news, however, is that understanding the creative process as problem-solving is ultimately liberating. For one, all of **those** left-brainers **with well-honed rational skills will find themselves far more creative than they ever thought**. They’ll discover their talents for organization, abstraction, and clarity are very much what’s required to be a true creative thinker. **Viewing creativity as problem-solving also makes the whole process far less intimidating**, even though it might lose some of its glamour and mystery. Moreover, **since creative problems are open to rational analysis, they can be broken down into smaller components that are easier to address.** Best of all, **the very act of problem-solving, of organizing and trying making sense of things, helps generate new ideas.** Paradoxically, **thinking within a box may be one of the most effective brainstorming techniques there** is. That may be what Charles Eames meant when he added, “I welcome constraints.” **Without some sort of structure to your creative thinking, you’re just flailing about.** For a while you might feel like you’re making progress, generating a great mess of ideas that might hold some potential. But **to turn** those **ideas into something truly innovative, your best bet is to** build your box and **play by the rules** of your own creation.

**C. Livability—limits are key to prevent the debate workload from spiraling out of control. We need time to do things like spend time with our families and shower—it would be impossible to do those things and also cut substantive strategies against the field if everyone read a non-topical aff.**

**2. Switch-Side Debate—their interpretation allows teams to only debate one side of an issue. Switch-side debate is good:**

**A. Critical thinking—switching sides forces debaters to assess all possible outcomes of a policy and sharpens their analysis of complex situations**

**Harrigan 8** NDT champion, debate coach at UGA (Casey, thesis submitted to Wake Forest Graduate Faculty for Master of Arts in Communication, “A defense of switch side debate”, http://dspace.zsr.wfu.edu/jspui/bitstream/10339/207/1/harrigancd052008, p. 57-59)

**Along these lines, the greatest benefit of switching sides**, which goes to the heart of contemporary debate, **is its inducement of critical thinking.** Defined as “reasonable reflective thinking that is focused on deciding what to believe or do” (Ennis, 1987, p. 10), **critical thinking learned through debate teaches students not just how advocate and argue, but how to decide as well**. **Each and every student,** whether in debate or (more likely) at some later point in life, **will be placed in the position of the decision-maker**. Faced with competing options whose costs and benefits are initially unclear, **critical thinking is necessary to assess all the possible outcomes of each choice,** c**ompare their relative merits, and arrive at some final decision about which is preferable**. In some instances, such as choosing whether to eat Chinese or Indian food for dinner, the importance of making the correct decision is minor. For many other decisions, however, **the implications of choosing an imprudent course of action are potentially grave.** As Robert Crawford notes, **there are “issues of unsurpassed importance in the daily lives of millions upon millions of people…being decided to a considerable extent by the power of public speaking**” (2003). Although the days of the Cold War are over, and the risk that “the next Pearl Harbor could be ‘compounded by hydrogen’” (Ehninger and Brockriede, 1978, p. 3) is greatly reduced, **the manipulation of public support before the invasion of Iraq in 2003 points to the continuing necessity of training a well-informed and critically-aware public** (Zarefsky, 2007).**In the absence of debate-trained critical thinking, ignorant but ambitious politicians and persuasive but nefarious leaders would be much more likely to draw the country, and possibly the world, into conflicts with incalculable losses in terms of human well-being. Given the myriad threats of global proportions that will require incisive solutions, including global warming, the spread of pandemic diseases, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cultivating a robust and effective society of critical decision-makers is essential. A**s Louis Rene Beres writes, “with such learning, we Americans could prepare…not as immobilized objects of false contentment, but as authentic citizens of an endangered planet” (2003). Thus, **it is not surprising that critical thinking has been called “the highest educational goal of the activity**” (Parcher, 1998). W**hile arguing from conviction can foster limited critical thinking skills, the element of switching sides is necessary to sharpen debate’s critical edge and ensure that decisions are made in a reasoned manner instead of being driven by ideology**. Debaters trained in SSD are more likely to evaluate both sides of an argument before arriving at a conclusion and are less likely to dismiss potential arguments based on his or her prior beliefs (Muir 1993). **In addition, debating both sides teaches “conceptual flexibility,” where decision-makers are more likely to reflect upon the beliefs that are held before coming to a final opinion** (Muir, 1993, p. 290). **Exposed to many arguments on each side of an issue, debaters learn that public policy is characterized by extraordinary complexity that requires careful consideration before action.** Finally**, these arguments are confirmed by the preponderance of empirical research demonstrating a link between competitive SSD and critical thinking** (Allen, Berkowitz)

**B. Tolerance—switching sides makes debaters more tolerant of arguments and ideas that are the opposite of their own—their one-sided approach promotes dogmatism**

**Muir 93** (Star, Professor of Communication – George Mason U., “A Defense of the Ethics of Contemporary Debate”, **Philosophy & Rhetoric**, Vol. 26, No. 4, p. 288-289)

The role of **switch-side debate is especially important in the** oral **defense of arguments that foster tolerance** without accruing the moral complications of acting on such beliefs. **The forum is** therefore **unique in providing debaters with** attitudes of **tolerance** without committing them to active moral irresponsibility. As Freeley notes, **debaters are** indeed **exposed to a multivalued world**, both within and between the sides of a given topic. Yet this exposure hardly commits them to such "mistaken" values. In this view, **the divorce of the game from the "real world" can be** seen as **a means of gaining perspective** without obligating students to validate their hypothetical value structure through immoral actions.'s Values clarification, Stewart is correct in pointing out, does not mean that no values are developed. Two very important values— **tolerance and fairness—inhere to a significant degree in the ethics of switch-side debate**. A second point about the charge of relativism is that tolerance is related to the development of reasoned moral viewpoints. **The willingness to recognize** the existence of **other views, and to grant alternative positions** a degree of **credibility, is** a value **fostered by switch-side debate**: Alternately **debating both sides** of the same question . . . **inculcates a deep-seated** attitude of **tolerance** toward differing points of view. **To** be forced to **debate only one side leads to an ego-identification with that side**. , . . The other side in contrast is seen only as something to be discredited. Arguing as persuasively as one can for completely opposing views is one way of giving recognition to the idea that a strong case can generally be made for the views of earnest and intelligent men, however such views may clash with one's own. . . .**Promoting** this kind of **tolerance is** perhaps **one of the greatest benefits debating both sides has to offer**. 5' The activity should encourage debating both sides of a topic, reasons Thompson, because **debaters are "more likely to realize that propositions are bilateral. It is those who fail to recognize this** fact who **become intolerant, dogmatic, and bigoted**.""\* While Theodore Roosevelt can hardly be said to be advocating bigotry, his efforts to turn out advocates convinced of their rightness is not a position imbued with tolerance.

**C. Activism—only switching sides teaches students to anticipate counter-arguments and build coalitions effectively, which is necessary for sustained activism**

**Harrigan 8** - Casey Harrigan, Associate Director of Debate at UGA, Master’s in Communications, Wake Forest U., 2008, “A Defense of Switch Side Debate”, Master’s thesis at Wake Forest, Department of Communication, May, pp.49-50

Third, there is an important question of means. Even the best activist intentions have little practical utility as long as they remain purely cordoned off in the realm of theoretical abstractions. **Creating programs of action that seek to produce material changes in the quality of life for** suffering **people**, **not mere wishful thinking** in the ivory towers of academia, **should be the goal of any revolutionary project**. Frequently, for strategies for change, the devil lies in the details. It is not possible to simply click one’s ruby red slippers together and wish for alternatives to come into being. Lacking a plausible mechanism to enact reforms, many have criticized critical theory as being a “fatally flawed enterprise” (Jones 1999). For activists, **learning the skills to successfully negotiate hazardous political terrain is crucial**. They must know when to and when not to compromise, negotiate, and strike political alliances in order to be successful. The pure number of failed movements in the past several decades demonstrates the severity of the risk assumed by groups who do not focus on refining their preferred means of change. Given the importance of strategies for change, SSD is even more crucial. Debaters trained by debating both sides are substantially more likely to be effective advocates than those experienced only in arguing on behalf of their own convictions. For several reasons, **SSD instills** a series of **practices that are essential for a successful activist agenda**. First, **SSD creates** more **knowledgeable advocates for public policy issues**. As part of the process of learning to argue both sides, debaters are forced to understand the intricacies of multiple sides of the argument considered. Debaters must not only know how to research and speak on behalf of their own personal convictions, but also for the opposite side in order to defend against attacks of that position. Thus, **when placed in the position of being required to** publicly **defend an argument**, **students trained via SSD are more likely to be able to** present and **persuasively defend their positions**. Second, **learning the nuances of all sides of a position** greatly **strengthens the** resulting **convictions of debaters**, **their ability to anticipate opposing arguments**, **and the effectiveness of their attempts to locate the crux**, nexus and loci **of arguments**. As is noted earlier, conviction is a result, not a prerequisite of debate. **Switching sides** and experimenting with possible arguments for and against controversial issues, **in the end**, **makes students more likely to ground their beliefs in a reasoned form of critical thinking that is durable and unsusceptible to knee-jerk criticisms**. As a result, even though it may appear to be inconsistent with advocacy, **SSD “actually created stronger advocates” that are more likely to be successful in achieving their goals** (Dybvig and Iverson 2000). Proponents of abandoning SSD and returning to debating from conviction should take note. Undoubtedly, many of their ideas would be beneficial if enacted and deserve the support of activist energies. However, anti-SSD critics seem to have given little thought to the important question of how to translate good ideas into practice. By **teaching students to privilege** their own **personal beliefs prior to a thorough engagement with all sides of an issue**, **debating from conviction produces activists that are more likely to be politically impotent**. By **positing that debaters should bring prior beliefs to the table** in a rigid manner **and assuming** that **compromising is tantamount to** giving in to **cooptation**, **the case of debating from conviction undercuts the tactics necessary for forging effective coalitional politics**. **Without such broad-based alliances, sustainable political changes will** likely **be impossible** (Best & Kellner 2001).

**3. Topic Education—their interpretation diverts focus away from the topic. Topic education is good:**

**A. Policy relevance—learning about how theory relates to policy and discussing implementation is crucial to influence real policymakers—without tying advocacy to policy, debate becomes irrelevant**

**Nye 09** - Joseph Nye, professor at Harvard University and former dean of the Harvard Kennedy School, 4-13-2009, Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/12/AR2009041202260\_pf.html 4-13-09

President Obama has appointed some distinguished academic economists and lawyers to his administration, but few high-ranking political scientists have been named. In fact, the editors of a recent poll of more than 2,700 international relations experts declared that "**the walls surrounding the ivory tower have never seemed so high**." While important American scholars such as Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski took high-level foreign policy positions in the past, that path has tended to be a one-way street. **Not many top-ranked scholars** of international relations **are going into government**, and even fewer return to contribute to academic theory. The 2008 Teaching, Research and International Policy (TRIP) poll, by the Institute for Theory and Practice in International Relations, showed that of the 25 scholars rated as producing the most interesting scholarship during the past five years, only three had ever held policy positions (two in the U.S. government and one in the United Nations). **The fault** for this growing gap **lies** not with the government but **with** the **academics**. **Scholars** are **pay**ing **less attention to** questions about **how their work relates to the policy world**, and in many departments a focus on policy can hurt one's career. Advancement comes faster for those who develop mathematical models, new methodologies or theories expressed in jargon that is unintelligible to policymakers. A survey of articles published over the lifetime of the American Political Science Review found that about one in five dealt with policy prescription or criticism in the first half of the century, while only a handful did so after 1967. Editor Lee Sigelman observed in the journal's centennial issue that "if 'speaking truth to power' and contributing directly to public dialogue about the merits and demerits of various courses of action were still numbered among the functions of the profession, one would not have known it from leafing through its leading journal." As citizens, **academics might be considered to have an obligation to help improve on policy ideas when they can**. Moreover, **such engagement can enhance** and enrich **academic work, and** thus **the ability of academics to teach the next generation**. As former undersecretary of state David Newsom argued a decade ago, "**the** growing **withdrawal of** university **scholars behind curtains of theory** and modeling **would** not have wider significance if this trend did not **raise questions regarding the preparation of new generations and the future influence of the academic community on public and official perceptions of international issues** and events. **Teachers plant seeds that shape the thinking of each new generation**; **this is** probably **the academic world's most lasting contribution**." Yet too often scholars teach theory and methods that are relevant to other academics but not to the majority of the students sitting in the classroom before them. **Some** academics **say that while the** growing **gap between theory and policy may have costs for policy**, **it** has **produced better social science theory**, and that **this is more important than whether such scholarship is relevant**. Also, to some extent, the gap is an inevitable result of the growth and specialization of knowledge. Few people can keep up with their subfields, much less all of social science. But **the danger is** that **academic theorizing will say more and more about less and less**. Even when **academics** supplement their usual trickle-down approach to policy by writing in journals, newspapers or blogs, or by consulting for candidates or public officials, they **face** many **competitors for attention**. More than 1,200 **think tanks** in the United States **provide not only ideas but also experts ready to comment** or consult **at a moment's notice**. Some of these new transmission belts serve as translators and additional outlets for academic ideas, but **many add a bias** provided by their founders and funders. As a group, think tanks are heterogeneous in scope, funding, ideology and location, but **universities generally offer a more neutral viewpoint.** While pluralism of institutional pathways is good for democracy, **the policy process is diminished by the withdrawal of the academic community**. **The solutions must come via a reappraisal within the academy itself**. Departments should give greater weight to real-world relevance and impact in hiring and promoting young scholars. Journals could place greater weight on relevance in evaluating submissions. Studies of specific regions deserve more attention. Universities could facilitate interest in the world by giving junior faculty members greater incentives to participate in it. That should include greater toleration of unpopular policy positions. One could multiply such useful suggestions, but young people should not hold their breath waiting for them to be implemented. If anything, the trends in academic life seem to be headed in the opposite direction.

### 2

#### Materialism explains reality…focus on the discursive/symbolic obfuscates that relation and makes oppression inevitable

The affirmatives focus on the discursive/symbolic reveals the extent to which they have given up on actually challenging the structures of oppression. But far from being a post-capitalist age in which all social experience is textually or discursively produced, it is a material world. Only a materialist method can account for the ways in which certain classes create and deploy rhetoric to legitimize a capitalist mode of social relations

Cloud (Prof of Comm at Texas) 01

[Dana, “The Affirmative Masquerade”, p. online: http://www.acjournal.org/holdings/vol4/iss3/special/cloud.htm]

At the very least, however, it is clear that poststructuralist discourse theories have left behind some of historical materialism’s most valuable conceptual tools for any theoretical and critical practice that aims at informing practical, oppositional political activity on behalf of historically exploited and oppressed groups. As Nancy Hartsock (1983, 1999) and many others have argued (see Ebert 1996; Stabile, 1997; Triece, 2000; Wood, 1999), we need to retain concepts such as standpoint epistemology (wherein truth standards are not absolute or universal but arise from the scholar’s alignment with the perspectives of particular classes and groups) and fundamental, class-based interests (as opposed to understanding class as just another discursively-produced identity). We need extra-discursive reality checks on ideological mystification and economic contextualization of discursive phenomena. Most importantly, critical scholars bear the obligation to explain the origins and causes of exploitation and oppression in order better to inform the fight against them. In poststructuralist discourse theory, the "retreat from class" (Wood, 1999) expresses an unwarranted pessimism about what can be accomplished in late capitalism with regard to understanding and transforming system and structure at the level of the economy and the state. It substitutes meager cultural freedoms for macro-level social transformation even as millions of people around the world feel the global reach of capitalism more deeply than ever before. At the core of the issue is a debate across the humanities and social sciences with regard to whether we live in a "new economy," an allegedly postmodern, information-driven historical moment in which, it is argued, organized mass movements are no longer effective in making material demands of system and structure (Melucci, 1996). In suggesting that global capitalism has so innovated its strategies that there is no alternative to its discipline, arguments proclaiming "a new economy" risk inaccuracy, pessimism, and conservatism (see Cloud, in press). While a thoroughgoing summary is beyond the scope of this essay, there is a great deal of evidence against claims that capitalism has entered a new phase of extraordinary innovation, reach, and scope (see Hirst and Thompson, 1999). Furthermore, both class polarization (see Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt, 2001) and the ideological and management strategies that contain class antagonism (see Cloud, 1998; Parker and Slaughter, 1994) still resemble their pre-postmodern counterparts. A recent report of the Economic Policy Institute concludes that in the 1990s, inequality between rich and poor in the U.S. (as well as around the world) continued to grow, in a context of rising worker productivity, a longer work week for most ordinary Americans, and continued high poverty rates. Even as the real wage of the median CEO rose nearly 63 percent from 1989, to 1999, more than one in four U.S. workers lives at or below the poverty level. Among these workers, women are disproportionately represented, as are Black and Latino workers. (Notably, unionized workers earn nearly thirty percent more, on average, than non-unionized workers.) Meanwhile, Disney workers sewing t-shirts and other merchandise in Haiti earn 28 cents an hour. Disney CEO Michael Eisner made nearly six hundred million dollars in 1999--451,000 times the wage of the workers under his employ (Roesch, 1999). According to United Nations and World Bank sources, several trans-national corporations have assets larger than several countries combined. Sub-Saharan Africa and the Russian Federation have seen sharp economic decline, while assets of the world’s top three billionaires exceed the GNP of all of the least-developed countries and their combined population of 600 million people (Shawki and D’Amato, 2000, pp. 7-8). In this context of a real (and clearly bipolar) class divide in late capitalist society, the postmodern party is a masquerade ball, in which theories claiming to offer ways toward emancipation and progressive critical practice in fact encourage scholars and/as activists to abandon any commitment to crafting oppositional political blocs with instrumental and perhaps revolutionary potential. Instead, on their arguments, we must recognize agency as an illusion of humanism and settle for playing with our identities in a mood of irony, excess, and profound skepticism. Marx and Engels’ critique of the Young Hegelians applies equally well to the postmodern discursive turn: "They are only fighting against ‘phrases.’ They forget, however, that to these phrases they themselves are only opposing other phrases, and that they are in no way combating the real existing world when they are merely combating the phrases of this world" (1976/1932, p. 41). Of course, the study of "phrases" is important to the project of materialist critique in the field of rhetoric. The point, though, is to explain the connections between phrases on the one hand and economic interests and systems of oppression and exploitation on the other. Marxist ideology critique, understands that classes, motivated by class interest, produce rhetorics wittingly and unwittingly, successfully and unsuccessfully. Those rhetorics are strategically adapted to context and audience. [cont’d] [cont;d] Yet Marxist theory is not naïve in its understanding of intention or individual agency. Challenging individualist humanism, Marxist ideology critics regard people as "products of circumstances" (and changed people as products of changed circumstances; Marx, 1972b/1888, p. 144). Within this understanding, Marxist ideology critics can describe and evaluate cultural discourses such as that of racism or sexism as strategic and complex expressions of both their moment in history and of their class basis. Further, this mode of critique seeks to explain both why and how social reality is fundamentally, systematically oppressive and exploitative, exploring not only the surface of discourses but also their often-complex and multi-vocal motivations and consequences. As Burke (1969/1950) notes, Marxism is both a method of rhetorical criticism and a rhetorical formation itself (pp. 109-110). There is no pretense of neutrality or assumption of transcendent position for the critic. Teresa Ebert (1996) summarizes the purpose of materialist ideology critique: Materialist critique is a mode of knowing that inquires into what is not said, into the silences and the suppressed or missing, in order to uncover the concealed operations of power and the socio-economic relations connecting the myriad details and representations of our lives. It shows that apparently disconnected zones of culture are in fact materially linked through the highly differentiated, mediated, and dispersed operation of a systematic logic of exploitation. In sum, materialist critique disrupts ‘what is’ to explain how social differences--specifically gender, race, sexuality, and class--have been systematically produced and continue to operate within regimes of exploitation, so that we can change them. It is the means for producing transformative knowledges. (p. 7)

#### The material determinism of capital is responsible for the instrumentalization of all life—makes all oppression inevitable.

**Dyer-Witherford** (professor of Library and Info. Sciences @ the Univ. of Western Ontarion) **‘99** [Nick. Cyber Marx: Cycles and Circuits of Struggle in High Technology Capitalism.]

**For capitalism, the use of machines as organs of “will over nature” is an imperative**. The great insight of the Frankfurt School—an insight subsequently improved and amplified by feminists and ecologists—was that capital’s dual project of dominating both humanity and nature was intimately tied to the cultivation of “instrumental reason” that systematically objectifies, reduces, quantifies and fragments the world for the purposes of technological control. Business’s systemic need to cheapen labor, cut the costs of raw materials, and expand consumer markets gives it an inherent bias toward the piling-up of technological power. This priority—enshrined in phrases such as “progress,” “efficiency,” “productivity,” “modernization,” and “growth”—assumes an automatism that is used to override any objection or alternative, regardless of the environmental and social consequences. Today, we witness global vistas of toxification, deforestation, desertification, dying oceans, disappearing ozone layers, and disintegrating immune systems, all interacting in ways that perhaps threaten the very existence of humanity and are undeniably inflicting social collapse, disease, and immiseration across the planet. The degree to which this project of mastery has backfired is all too obvious.

#### Vote Negative to validate and adopt the method of structural/historical criticism that is the 1NC.

#### one must understand the existing social totality before one can act on it—grounding the sites of political contestation or knowledge outside of labor and surplus value merely serve to humynize capital and prevent a transition to a society beyond oppression

**Tumino** (Prof. English @ Pitt) **01**

[Stephen, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critiqu]

Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. I will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions and are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory.

### 3

#### Embracing the positive potential in technology is critical to our survival

Nick **Bostrom**, Faculty of Philosophy, Oxford University, THE TRANSHUMANIST FAQ – A GENERAL INTRODUCTION Version 2.1, 20**03**, p. 4-5.

Through the accelerating pace of technological development and scientific understanding, we are entering a whole new stage in the history of the human species. In the relatively near future, we may face the prospect of real artificial intelligence. New kinds of cognitive tools will be built that combine artificial intelligence with interface technology. Molecular nanotechnology has the potential to manufacture abundant resources for everybody and to give us control over the biochemical processes in our bodies, enabling us to eliminate disease and unwanted aging. Technologies such as brain-computer interfaces and neuropharmacology could amplify human intelligence, increase emotional well-being, improve our capacity for steady commitment to life projects or a loved one, and even multiply the range and richness of possible emotions. On the dark side of the spectrum, transhumanists recognize that some of these coming technologies could potentially cause great harm to human life; even the survival of our species could be at risk. Seeking to understand the dangers and working to prevent disasters is an essential part of the transhumanist agenda.

#### Comparative evidence—embracing and directing the extension of our capabilities is more likely to ensure our survival

Mark **Walker**, “Ship of Fools: Why Transhumanism is the Best Bet to Prevent the Extintion of Civilization,” GLOBAL SPIRAL, Metanexus Institute, 2—5—**09**, [www.metanexus.net/magazine/tabid/68/id/10682/Default.aspx](http://www.metanexus.net/magazine/tabid/68/id/10682/Default.aspx)

Option: transhumanism future. The transhumanist future is one where both world-engineering and person-engineering are permitted. Specifically, as noted, the transhumanist view is that we should create persons who are smarter and more virtuous than we are. The application to our problem is obvious: our fears about the misuse of 21st century technology reduce down to fears about stupidity or viciousness. Like the Australian research scientists, the worry is that we may be the authors of an accident, but this time one of apocalyptic proportions: the end of civilization. Likewise, our moral natures may also cause our demise. Or, to put a more positive spin on it, the best candidates amongst us to lead civilization through such perilous times are the brightest and most virtuous: posthumans.17 It is worth pointing out that there is no need to deny what Fukuyama claims: there are real dangers in creating posthumans. The problem with the transhumanist project, says Fukuyama, comes when we think seriously about what characteristics to change: Our good characteristics are intimately connected to our bad ones: If we weren’t violent and aggressive, we wouldn’t be able to defend ourselves; if we didn’t have feelings of exclusivity, we wouldn’t be loyal to those close to us; if we never felt jealousy, we would never feel love. Even morality plays a critical function in allowing our species as a whole to survive and adapt…. Modifying any one of our key characteristics inevitably entails modifying a complex, interlinked package of traits, and we will never be able to anticipate the ultimate outcome.18 So, although Fukuyama sees the pull of transhumanism, how it might look “downright reasonable”, the fact that traits we might hope to modify are interconnected means that “we will never be able to anticipate the ultimate outcome.” What Fukuyama fails to address in any systematic way is the fact that there are even greater dangers associated with not creating posthumans. So, a prudential and moral reason for creating posthumans is not that this is without risk, rather, it is less risky than the alternative here: steady-as-she-goes. If forced to put some hard numbers to these scenarios, I would venture to suggest there is a 90% chance of civilization surviving the next two centuries if we follow the transhumanist path, while I would put the chances of civilization surviving a steady-as-she-goes policy at less than 20%. But then, I am an optimist.

#### The alternative is to recognize that there is no gaze, and embrace the positive technological potential of drones

#### This solves the aff, democratizes technological development

James **Hughes**, PhD, Public Policy Studies, DEMOCRATIC TRANSHUMANISM 2.0, last modified 1—26—**06**, [www.changesurfer.com/Acad/DemocraticTranshumanism.htm](http://www.changesurfer.com/Acad/DemocraticTranshumanism.htm),

Luddism is a political dead-end for progressive politics. Progressives must revive the techno-optimist tradition if they want to achieve the goals of furthering liberty, equality and solidarity. First, left Luddism inappropriately equates technologies with the power relations around those technologies. Technologies do not determine power relations, they merely create new terrains for organizing and struggle. Most new technologies open up new possibilities for both expanded liberty and equality, just as they open new opportunities for oppression and exploitation. Since the technologies will most likely not be stopped, democrats need to engage with them, articulate policies that maximize social benefits from the technologies, and find liberatory uses for the technologies. If biotechnology is to be rejected simply because it is a product of capitalism, adopted in class society, then every technology must be rejected. The mission of the Left is to assert democratic control and priorities over the development and implementation of technology. But establishing democratic control over technological innovation is not the same as Luddism. In fact, to the extent that advocates for the democratic control of technology do not guarantee benefits from technology, and attempt to suppress technology altogether, they will lose public support. Second, technology can help us transcend some of the fundamental causes of inequalities of power. Although we will never eliminate inequalities of intelligence and knowledge, the day is not far off when all humans can be guaranteed sufficient intelligence to function as active citizens. One of the most important progressive demands will be to ensure universal access to genetic choice technologies which permit parents to guarantee their children biological capacities equal to those of other children. Technologically assisted birth, eventually involving artificial wombs, will free women from being necessary, vulnerable vessels for the next generation. Morphological freedom, the ability to change one’s body, including one’s abilities, weight, gender and racial characteristics, will reduce body-based oppressions (disability, fat, gender and race) to aesthetic prejudices. Third, Left Luddism is boring and depressing; it has no energy to inspire movements to create a new and better society. The Left was built by people inspired by millenial visions, not by people who saw a hopeless future of futile existential protest. Most people do not want to live in a future without telecommunications, labor-saving devices, air travel and medicine. The Next Left needs to rediscover its utopian imagination if it is to renew itself, reconnect with the popular imagination, and remain relevant. The Next Left needs visionary projects worthy of a united transhuman world, such as guaranteeing health and longevity for all, eliminating work, and colonizing the Solar System.

### Case

**Drones good – U.S. military action *inevitable* but drones are *superior to alternatives* and *minimize civilian casualties* – solves *humanitarian intervention***

**Singh & Wittes 12** (Ritika Singh – Research Assistant, Governance Studies, AND Benjamin Wittes – Senior Fellow, Governance Studies, “Drones Are a Challenge — and an Opportunity”, Jan 11, The Cato Institute, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/01/11-drones-wittes>, CMR)

Indeed, Cortright may argue that “terrorism is more a political and law enforcement challenge than a threat that can be addressed by military means,” but it is worth remembering that the opposite of targeted killing is not usually law enforcement. It is often less-targeted—that is, more indiscriminate—killing. The important flip side to Cortright’s anxiety that drones will lower our inhibition to go to war is that drones can also limit the scope and scale of military action. The United States is not going to take a hands-off approach to states like Pakistan and Yemen, where law enforcement is not a feasible option. Drone warfare permits a highly calibrated military response to situations in which the alternative may involve not lesser but far greater uses of military violence. This is a good trade. Conversely, drones also allow militaries to contemplate certain humanitarian interventions where they might never contemplate risking actual forces; consider whether the recent NATO Libyan intervention—which probably saved a considerable number of lives—would have been politically possible had U.S. forces been seriously at risk.¶ In other words, while the rise of drone warfare has changed the face of American counterterrorism efforts and promises far greater change in years to come, this does not present the simple and terrible moral equation that Cortright describes. What began as a surveillance tool that could, on occasion, deliver lethal force, has evolved in a short space of time into a principal means of following enemy forces onto territory in which the United States is reluctant to put large numbers of boots on the ground—and striking at them there in a limited fashion that protects innocent civilians to an unprecedented level.¶ The logic of these weapons is so overpowering, both as a means of conducting surveillance and as a means of striking at enemy targets, that their growth as an element of U.S. force will resist moral hand-wringing of a sort that, if taken at face value, would lead to greater uses of force, civilian death, and risk to U.S. forces.

#### Their argument is backwards – drones enhance the reality of warfare and increase attentiveness to human suffering

**Brooks 12** – law professor at Georgetown University and a Schwartz senior fellow at the New America Foundation (Rosa, “What's Not Wrong With Drones?”, Sept 5, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/05/whats_not_wrong_with_drones?page=full>, CMR)

3. Drones Turn Killing into a Video Game.¶ Writing in the Guardian, Phillip Allston (the United Nations special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions) and Hina Shamsi of the ACLU decry "the PlayStation mentality" created by drone technologies. "Young military personnel raised on a diet of video games now kill real people remotely using joysticks. Far removed from the human consequences of their actions, how will this generation of fighters value the right to life?"¶ But are drones more "video game-like" than, say, having cameras in the noses of cruise missiles? Those old enough to remember the first Gulf War will recall the shocking novelty of images taken by cameras inside U.S. Tomahawk missiles, the jolting, grainy images in the crosshairs before everything went ominously black.¶ Regardless, there's little evidence that drone technologies "reduce" their operators' awareness of human suffering. If anything, drone operators may be far more keenly aware of the suffering they help inflict than any distant sniper or bomber pilot could be.¶ Journalist Daniel Klaidman reports the words of one CIA drone operator, a former Air Force pilot: "I used to fly my own air missions.... I dropped bombs, hit my target load, but had no idea who I hit. [With drones], I can look at their faces... see these guys playing with their kids and wives.... After the strike, I see the bodies being carried out of the house. I see the women weeping and in positions of mourning. That's not PlayStation; that's real."¶ Increasingly, there's evidence that drone pilots, just like combat troops, can suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder: watching a man play with his children, then seeing his mangled body takes a psychological toll. A recent Air Force study found that 29 percent of drone pilots suffered from "burnout," with 17 percent "clinically distressed."

#### Autonomous war is inevitable- plan cant solve UAVs, nanotech

Mike Treder is the Managing Director of the IEET, and former Executive Director of the non-profit Center for Responsible Nanotechnology, March 26, 2009 “Robotic War Appears Inevitable”, http://ieet.org/index.php/IEET/print/2977

Military robots already have been deployed by the United States in the occupation of Iraq, and in growing numbers; not only are the quantities of robots increasing, but the varieties of their usage and capabilities are also expanding. Although the concept of full-scale robotic war still strikes some people as unrealistically futuristic or even science fictional, it’s clear that in fact the future is now. About a month ago I wrote an article entitled “The Ethics of Killer Robots” for the Responsible Nanotechology blog. In that article, I said: Military robots already have been deployed by the United States in the occupation of Iraq, and in growing numbers, as this recent article in The New Atlantis makes clear: When U.S. forces went into Iraq, the original invasion had no robotic systems on the ground. By the end of 2004, there were 150 robots on the ground in Iraq; a year later there were 2,400; by the end of 2008, there were about 12,000 robots of nearly two dozen varieties operating on the ground in Iraq. As one retired Army officer put it, the “Army of the Grand Robotic” is taking shape. Not only are the quantities of robots increasing, but the varieties of their usage and capabilities are also expanding: It isn’t just on the ground: military robots have been taking to the skies—and the seas and space, too. And the field is rapidly advancing. The robotic systems now rolling out in prototype stage are far more capable, intelligent, and autonomous than ones already in service in Iraq and Afghanistan. But even they are just the start. Although the concept of full-scale robotic war still strikes some people as unrealistically futuristic or even science fictional, it’s clear that in fact the future is now. A report this week from the McClatchy Newspapers says: The unmanned bombers that frequently cause unintended civilian casualties in Pakistan are a step toward an even more lethal generation of robotic hunters-killers that operate with limited, if any, human control. The Defense Department is financing studies of autonomous, or self-governing, armed robots that could find and destroy targets on their own. On-board computer programs, not flesh-and-blood people, would decide whether to fire their weapons. “The trend is clear: Warfare will continue and autonomous robots will ultimately be deployed in its conduct,” Ronald Arkin, a robotics expert at the Georgia Institute of Technology in Atlanta, wrote in a study commissioned by the Army. “The pressure of an increasing battlefield tempo is forcing autonomy further and further toward the point of robots making that final, lethal decision,” he predicted. “The time available to make the decision to shoot or not to shoot is becoming too short for remote humans to make intelligent informed decisions.” Belatedly, perhaps, ethical issues surrounding this development are attracting some attention. A recent opinion piece in NewScientist by A. C. Grayling, a philosopher at the University of London, decries the full-speed-ahead mentality that seems to dominate the robot-military-industrial complex: In the next decades, completely autonomous robots might be involved in many military, policing, transport and even caring roles. What if they malfunction? What if a programming glitch makes them kill, electrocute, demolish, drown and explode, or fail at the crucial moment? Whose insurance will pay for damage to furniture, other traffic or the baby, when things go wrong? The software company, the manufacturer, the owner? The civil liberties implications of robot devices capable of surveillance involving listening and photographing, conducting searches, entering premises through chimneys or pipes, and overpowering suspects are obvious. Such devices are already on the way. Even more frighteningly obvious is the threat posed by military or police-type robots in the hands of criminals and terrorists. There needs to be a considered debate about the rules and requirements governing all forms of robot devices, not a panic reaction when matters have gone too far. That is how bad law is made—and on this issue time is running out. We agree with Grayling’s call for urgent considered debate, now before it’s too late. And when you factor in the possibility—or probability—of increased power and functionality of killer robots based on advanced nanotechnology, then the concerns he and others have expressed gain added severity. It bears repeating: The future is now. Mike Treder is the Managing Director of the IEET, and former Executive Director of the non-profit Center for Responsible Nanotechnology.

**Their claim to listen or open space ignores their position in the western academy and reproduces the colonial gaze that they criticize**

John **Beverley**, Professor of Spanish and Latin American Literature and Cultural Studies, University of Pittsburgh SUBALTERNITY AND REPRESENTATION: ARGUMENTS IN CRITICAL THEORY, 19**99**, p. 69-70

Despite all the misunderstandings her essay has provoked, this was surely Spivak's point in answering the question "Can the Subaltern Speak?" in the negative. She was trying to show that **behind the good faith of the liberal academic or the committed ethnographer or solidarity activist in allowing or enabling the subaltern to speak lies the trace of the colonial construction of an other—an other who is conveniently available to speak to us** (with whom we can speak or feel comfortable speaking with). **This neutralizes the force of the reality of difference and antagonism our own relatively privileged position in the global system might give rise to.** Elzbieta Sklodowska has in mind something similar when she argues that, **despite its appeal to the authority of an actual subaltern voice, testimonio is in fact a staging of the subaltern by someone who is not subaltern,** as in Lyotard's notion of the differend (where a dispute is carried out according to the terms and language of one of the parties to the dispute). In particular, testimonio is not, in Sklodowska's words, "a genuine and spontaneous reaction of a 'multiform-popular subject' in conditions of postcoloniality, but rather continues to be a discourse of elites committed to the cause of democratization."" **The appeal to authenticity** and victimization in the critical validation of testimonio **stops the semiotic play of the text**, Sklodowska implies, **fixing the subject in a unidirectional gaze that deprives it of its reality. Fixes the testimonial narrator as a subject**, that is, **but also fixes us as subjects in** what Althusser would have called **a relation of double specularity created by the idealization or sublimation of subaltern otherness, which in the end also isolates us from our reality.**

**And, they invent subaltern voices to be heard, masking the process of dispossession behind the myth of listening**

John **Beverley**, Professor of Spanish and Latin American Literature and Cultural Studies, University of Pittsburgh SUBALTERNITY AND REPRESENTATION: ARGUMENTS IN CRITICAL THEORY, 19**99**, p. 38-40.

**In whose interests**, finally, **is the** immense labor of "**information retrieval" and narrativization** Peasont and Nation must have involved being performed? Mallon would agree with Chakrabarty that subaltern studies is a project within the university. It is not a narodnik project, in other words (the narodniki were the Russian populists who in the 1908s said, "We have to go to the people, to the narod," and then abandoned whatever their backgrounds were—the university, professions, middle-class family life— and went out to peasant communities and tried to organize there). It is not a way of saying, "Give up what you're doing and go work with communal groups in India or refugees in Guatemala or ACT-UP." But **don't we have to admit at some point that there is a limit to what we can or should do in relation to the subaltern**, a limit that is not only epistemological but also ethical? a limit constituted by the place of the historian like Mallon or a literary critic like myself in a position that is not the position of the subaltern? **The subaltern is something that is on the other side of that position. The assumption that the project of representing the subaltern from the academy and the subaltern's project of representing itself are commensurable is** simply that: **an assumption**. **I**

**n truth, it would be more accurate to say that these are** different, even **antagonistic** projects. I believe that the university should "serve the people." To that end, I support making it more accessible, democratizing it, making more financial aid available, moving back in the direction of open admissions, socializing the great private universities. But those things in themselves will not close the gap between our position in the academy and the world of the subaltern. They will not even close the gap between the relatively privileged, powerful (and often private) universities that, on the whole, have become the home of subaltern studies in the United States, and low-ranked, poorly funded urban public universities and community colleges. That is why **it is the "negative" or critical side of the subaltern studies project that I prefer to emphasize** here: its concern to register where the power of the university and the disciplines to understand and represent the subaltern breaks down. I sometimes think of subaltern studies as a secular version of the "preferential option for the poor" of liberation theology, one which shares with liberation theology the essential methodology of what Gustavo Gutierrez calls "listening to the poor. "" Like liberation theology, subaltern studies entails not only a new way of looking at or speaking about the subaltern, but also the possibility of building relationships of solidarity between ourselves and the people and social practices we posit as Qur objects of study. In a justly famous passage, Richard Rorty distinguishes between what he calls the "desire for solidarity" and the "desire for objectivity": There are two principal ways in which reflective human beings try, by placing their lives in a larger context, to give sense to those lives. The first is by telling the story of their contribution to a community. This community may be the actual historical one in which they live, or another actual one, distant in time or place, or a quite imaginary one, consisting perhaps of a dozen heroes and heroines selected from history or fiction or both. The second way is to describe themselves as standing in an immediate relation to a non-human reality. This relation is immediate in the sense that it does not derive from a relation between such a reality and their tribe, or their nation, or their imagined band of comrades. I shall say that stories of the former kind exemplify the desire for solidarity, and that stories of the latter kind exemplify the desire for objectivity." What is best about subaltern studies, I believe, is driven by something like what Rorty calls "the desire for solidarity"; Mallon's project in Peasant and Nation, on the other hand, seems to be driven by "the desire for objectivity." **The desire for solidarity** must begin, however, with a relation of what Gutierrez calls "concrete friendship with the poor": it **cannot be simply a matter of taking thought or "conversation," or** for that matter of **romanticizing** or idealizing **the subaltern**. In that sense, Mallon may have a point about the limits of textuality" and the virtues of fieldwork. Moreover, in making the shift from "objectivity" to "solidarity," we cannot simply disavow representation **under the pretext that we are allowing the subaltern to "speak for itself"** (that is Spivak's main point in "Can the Subaltern Speak?"). And there is a way in which **the** (necessarily?) liberal **political slant** Rorty gives the idea of solidarity may also be, as the 1960s slogan has it, part of the problem rather than part of the solution, because it **assumes that "conversation" is possible across power/exploitation divides that radically differentiate the participants."** Solidarity based on an assumption of equality and reciprocity does not "lean that contradictions are suppressed in the name of a heuristic notion of merger or identification with the subaltern: Foucault's point about the embarrassment of "speaking for others" is pertinent here. As the "little story” from Lacan with which I began this chapter illustrates, the act of the subaltern "talking back" necessarily disturbs—sometimes unpleasantly so our own high-minded discourse of ethical benevolence and epistemological privilege, especially at those moments when that discourse claims to speak for the other. Gutierrez concludes that the consequences of a preferential option for the poor for the intellectual are symbolized by the structure of an asymptotic curve: we can approximate in our work, personal relations, and political practice closer and closer the world of the subaltern, but we can never actually merge with it, even if, in the fashion of the narodniki, we were to "go to the people." **Those of us** who are **involved in** the project of **subaltern studies are often asked how we**, who are, in the main, middle- or upper-middle-class academics at major research universities in the United States, **can claim to represent the subaltern. But we do not claim to represent ("cognitively map," "let speak," "speak for," "excavate") the subaltern. Subaltern studies registers rather how the knowledge we construct and impart as academics is structured by the absence, difficulty, or impossibility of representation of the subaltern.** This is to recognize, however, the fundamental inadequacy of that knowledge and of the institutions that contain it, and therefore the need for a radical change in the direction of a more democratic and non-hierarchical social order.

#### No video game mentality – pilots agree

Blackhurst 12

(ROB BLACKHURST, THE TELEGRAPH, “Drone Pilots Say Their Job Is Not Like A Video Game” SEP. 24, 2012, <http://www.businessinsider.com/drone-pilots-say-their-job-is-not-like-playing-a-video-game-2012-9>, KB)

These pilots talk up the similarities with manned aircraft. Although they don’t suffer the exhausting effects of g-force and can’t look out of the window, they admit to flinching when they see something coming towards the aircraft.¶ 'It’s irrelevant where you are physically sitting,’ Oz says. 'You’re attached to the airframe, you’re attached to the view that you see, and you’re attached to the laws of armed conflict.’¶ He reacts with cool anger to suggestions that this mode of war reduces victims to the status of players in a video game. 'It’s a bugbear of mine because I’ve had the accusation levelled that it’s a Star Wars game. It’s anything but. If we act like it’s Star Wars, there are people in the command centre watching us and listening to what we do. The taking of human life is not something to be considered lightly. OK, they are bad guys we are killing, but they are still human beings.’¶ He also bridles at the suggestion that UAVs leave moral judgments to machines. 'The plane cannot start, cannot fly and cannot release a weapon without us doing it. Human beings are in the cockpit – exactly the same as when I was flying a Tornado. We just happen to be 8,000 miles away from the plane.’

## 2NC

### Tranny: Impact—2NC

#### Human technological enhancement is to be embraced—best way to protect against its threats

Nick **Bostrom**, Oxford University, “In Defense of Posthuman Dignity,” GLOBAL SPIRAL, Metanexus Institute, 2—5—**09**, [www.metanexus.net/magazine/tabid/68/id/10687/Default.aspx](http://www.metanexus.net/magazine/tabid/68/id/10687/Default.aspx),

Transhumanists promote the view that human enhancement technologies should be made widely available, and that individuals should have broad discretion over which of these technologies to apply to themselves (morphological freedom)3 , and that parents should normally get to decide which reproductive technologies to use when having children (reproductive freedom).4 Transhumanists believe that, while there are hazards that need to be identified and avoided, human enhancement technologies will offer enormous potential for deeply valuable and humanly beneficial uses. Ultimately, it is possible that such enhancements may make us, or our descendants, “posthuman”, beings who may have indefinite health-spans, much greater intellectual faculties than any current human being—and perhaps entirely new sensibilities or modalities—as well as the ability to control their own emotions. The wisest approach vis-à-vis these prospects, argue transhumanists, is to embrace technological progress, while strongly defending human rights and individual choice, and taking action specifically against concrete threats, such as military or terrorist abuse of bioweapons, and against unwanted environmental or social side-effects.

### Alt 2NC

#### Cognitive science has tied our brains to machines… we are evolving together.

N. Katherine Hayle**s**, Prof. University of California, Los Angeles- Now at Hahvahd, “Flesh and Metal: Reconfiguring the Mindbody in Virtual Environments,” Configurations 10.2 (2002) 297-320, p. 300.

The development of smart environments makes even more persuasive the arguments of philosopher Andy Clark and anthropologist Edwin Hutchins that cognition should not be seen as taking place in the brain alone. Rather, cognition in their view is a systemic activity, distributed throughout the environments in which humans move and work. Indeed, Clark argues that the distinctive characteristic of humans has always been to enroll objects into their cognitive systems, creating a distributed functionality he calls "extended mind." 15 We are cyborgs, he wrote in a recent article, "not in the merely superficial sense of combining flesh and wires, but in the more profound sense of being human-technology symbiots: thinking and reasoning systems whose minds and selves are spread across biological brain and non-biological circuitry"; observing that the "extended mind" is a strategy almost as old as humans, he nevertheless points out that the joining of technology with biology has created a "cognitive machinery" that is "now intrinsically geared to transformation, technology-based expansion, and a snowballing and self-perpetuating process of computational and representational growth*."* 16 Although relatively small changes in human brains may have been sufficient to make us into the "symbolic species," as Terrence Deacon calls humans, 17 these incremental changes have now catapulted us "on the far side of a precipitous cliff in cognitive-architectural space." 18 Following a similar line of thought, Edwin Hutchins argues that cognitive scientists made a fundamental mistake when they located cognition in the brain and then tried to model that cognition in artificial [End Page 302] intelligences. 19 They rather should have recognized that cognition is a systemic activity distributed throughout the environment and actuated by a variety of actors, only some of which are human. In his view it is not merely a metaphor to call drawing a line on a navigational chart "remembering" and erasing a line "forgetting," for if these objects are part of our extended mind, drawing and erasing are indeed functionally equivalent to remembering and forgetting. The extended-mind model indicates how cultural perceptions change in relation to the development of information-rich environments: Instead of the Cartesian subject who begins by cutting himself off from his environment and visualizing his thinking presence as the one thing he cannot doubt, the human who inhabits the information-rich environments of contemporary technological societies knows that the dynamic and fluctuating boundaries of her embodied cognitions develop in relation to other cognizing agents embedded throughout the environment, among which the most powerful are intelligent machines. In these views the impact of information technologies on the mindbody is always understood as a two-way relation, a feedback loop between biologically evolved capabilities and a richly engineered technological environment. Such feedback loops may be reaching new levels of intensity as our environments become smarter and more information-rich, but the basic dynamic is as old as humans. Returning to The Symbolic Species, I take Deacon's point that while the evolution of language changed human brain structure, human brain structure affected the evolution of language. To emphasize the importance of this relationality, he proposes that we "imagine language as an independent life form that colonizes and parasitizes human brains, using them to reproduce." 20 The relationship is symbiotic: "modern humans need the language parasite in order to flourish and reproduce, just as much as it needs humans to reproduce. Consequently, each has evolved with respect to the other." 21 He draws an analogy with the evolution of computer interfaces: When interfaces were restricted to DOS commands, computers were seen as the special province of scientists, engineers, and other researchers. With the more intuitive interfaces pioneered at Xerox PARC and implemented by Apple, computers spread much more rapidly in the population, in part because they were better suited to [End Page 303] brain processing. 22 This is the other side of adaptations in the brain to better accommodate computer dynamics. Relationality implies a deep and dynamic connection between the evolutionary pathways of computers and humans, each influencing and helping to configure the other. My argument further implies that these coevolutionary dynamics are not only abstract propositions grasped by the conscious mind, but also emergent dynamic processes actualized through interactions with the environment. And here there is a problem. Especially in times of rapid technological innovation, there are many gaps and discontinuities between abstract concepts of the body, experiences of embodiment, and the dynamic interactions with the flux of which these are enculturated expressions. The environment changes and the flux shifts in correlated systemic and organized ways, but it takes time, thought, and experience for these changes to be registered in the mindbody.

#### Culture and Technology shape our physical form- creating new evolutionary paths.

N. Katherine Hayles, professor in the the Program in Literature at Duke University, “Unfinished Work: From Cyborg to Cognisphere,” Theory Culture Society 2006; 23; 159, <http://tcs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/23/7-8/159>

One of the important insights that has emerged in science studies in the last 20 years is the realization that scientific models are underdetermined with respect to empirical evidence (or, to put it another way, that multiple models may be consistent with prevailing knowledge). Cultural beliefs, or more accurately cultural presuppositions, play important roles in determining which models will be proposed and which will succeed*.* In How We Became Posthuman (1999) I demonstrated this dynamic at work through my analysis of information-theoretic models. The Shannon–Weaver version of information theory triumphed over Donald MacKay’s conceptually richer embodied version for practical reasons (largely because it could be reliably quantified). However, the Shannon–Weaver model then rapidly traveled to other fields where quantification was impossible (such as semiotics and communication theory) because of its ‘scientific’ cachet, whereas MacKay’s model would have been more appropriate. The adaptation of a disembodied view of information spread so pervasively, I argued, because it fitted well with existing preconceptions about a separation between a material body and an immaterial essence, which of course was a subtext for a disembodied view of information in the first place. (For a full discussion of Shannon and Weaver’s information theory and the competing embodied theory of Donald MacKay, see Hayles, 1999: 50–112.) To sum up these complex interactions between means and metaphor, I offer in My Mother Was a Computer (2005) the following formulation, which has become central for me in understanding the contemporary situation as well as historical precedents: ‘What we make and what (we think) we are co-evolve together.’ If we leave aside for the moment the parenthetical ‘we think’, the statement would find enthusiastic agreement among anthropologists, who have long accepted, for example, that tool use and bipedalism co-evolved together. Bipedalism facilitated the use and especially the transport of tools; tool use in turn bestowed such decisive fitness advantage that it had the effect of accelerating bipedalism. This co-evolutionary spiral involved both cultural and biological changes, including for example the opposable thumb and the skeletal transformations that bipedalism brought about. Stanley Ambrose (2001), an anthropologist at the University of Illinois, has demonstrated a similar dynamic at work in the practice of fashioning compound tools (tools with more than one part that have to be assembled in sequential order, such as a stone ax with a handle, bindings and a stone insert). Evidence indicates that compound tools were contemporaneous with the accelerated development of Broca’s area in the frontal cortex, the part of the brain involved in language use. Ambrose speculates that the sequential and hierarchical ordering required in the fashioning of compound tools co-evolved with language because language, like compound tools, requires the sequential ordering of reproducible and discrete units. In this scenario, the trait often identified with the essence of the human – our ability to use complex languages – was bound up at the dawn of Homo sapiens with the emergence of a relatively sophisticated technology (i.e. compound versus simple tools), initiating a co-evolutionary spiral in which what we made and what we became co-evolved together. How does that formulation change if the parenthetical ‘we think’ is put back into the picture? Cultural beliefs and practices are part of this coevolutionary dynamic because they influence what tools are made and how those tools are used, which in turn affects who we are as biological organisms, which then feeds back into the co-evolutionary spiral. Haraway’s insistence that the world is ‘relationality all the way down’ applies as much to technology as to companion species. In the contemporary period, computation emerges as a crucial aspect of the entwined dynamical hierarchies that structure and energize relational dynamics. As inhabitants of globally interconnected networks, we are joined in a dynamic co-evolutionary spiral with intelligent machines as well as with the other biological species with whom we share the planet. That the cyborg is no longer the most compelling metaphor through which to understand our contemporary situation should not blind us to the fact that much urgent and pressing work remains to be done. The cognisphere takes up where the cyborg left off. No longer bound in a binary with the goddess but rather emblem and instantiation of dynamic cognitive flows between human, animal and machine, the cognisphere, like the world itself, is not binary but multiple, not a split creature but a co-evolving and densely interconnected complex system.

### 2—videogames

#### No video game mentality – pilots agree

Blackhurst 12

(ROB BLACKHURST, THE TELEGRAPH, “Drone Pilots Say Their Job Is Not Like A Video Game” SEP. 24, 2012, <http://www.businessinsider.com/drone-pilots-say-their-job-is-not-like-playing-a-video-game-2012-9>, KB)

These pilots talk up the similarities with manned aircraft. Although they don’t suffer the exhausting effects of g-force and can’t look out of the window, they admit to flinching when they see something coming towards the aircraft.¶ 'It’s irrelevant where you are physically sitting,’ Oz says. 'You’re attached to the airframe, you’re attached to the view that you see, and you’re attached to the laws of armed conflict.’¶ He reacts with cool anger to suggestions that this mode of war reduces victims to the status of players in a video game. 'It’s a bugbear of mine because I’ve had the accusation levelled that it’s a Star Wars game. It’s anything but. If we act like it’s Star Wars, there are people in the command centre watching us and listening to what we do. The taking of human life is not something to be considered lightly. OK, they are bad guys we are killing, but they are still human beings.’¶ He also bridles at the suggestion that UAVs leave moral judgments to machines. 'The plane cannot start, cannot fly and cannot release a weapon without us doing it. Human beings are in the cockpit – exactly the same as when I was flying a Tornado. We just happen to be 8,000 miles away from the plane.’

**Video game phenomenon is flawed - drones don’t desensitize operators – they work the same as staffed platforms, and operators make no firing decisions**

Anderson 13

(Kenneth, is professor of law at Washington College of Law, American University; a visiting fellow of the Hoover Institution and member of its Task Force on National Security and Law; and a non-resident senior fellow of the Brookings Institution. He writes on international law, the laws of war, and national security, ”The case for drones,” 05/24/13, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2013/05/24/the\_case\_for\_drones\_118548.html) RC

The most offensively foolish (though endlessly repeated) objection raised against drones was the one made by Jane Mayer in her influential 2009 New Yorker article, “The Predator War”: that drone pilots are so distant from their targets that they encourage a “push-button,” video-game mentality toward killing. The professional military find the claim bizarre, and it fails to take into account the other kinds of weapons and platforms in use. Note, the pilot of a manned craft is often thousands of feet away and a mile above a target looking at a tiny coordinates screen. And what of the sailor, deep in the below-decks of a ship, or a submarine, firing a cruise missile with no awareness of any kind about the target hundreds of miles away?¶ For that matter, the common perception of drones as a sci-fi combination of total surveillance and complete discretion in where and when to strike is simply wrong. The drone pilot might sit in Nevada, but the drone itself has a limited range, requires an airstrip, fuel, repairs, and 200 or so personnel to keep it in the air. All this physical infrastructure must be close to the theater of operations. Stress rates among drone pilots are at least as high as those of manned aircraft pilots; they are far from having a desensitized attitude toward killing. This appears to be partially because these are not mere combat operations but fundamentally and primarily intelligence operations. Drone pilots engaged in targeted killing operations watch their targets from a very personal distance via sensor technology, through which they track intimate, daily patterns of life to gather information and, perhaps, to determine precisely the best moment to strike, when collateral damage might be least.¶ As one drone operator told me, it is not as if one sees the terrible things the target is engaged in doing that made him a target in the first place; instead, it feels, after a few weeks of observation, as though you are killing your neighbor. ¶ In any case, the mentality of drone pilots in targeted-killing ops is irrelevant to firing decisions; they do not make decisions to fire weapons. The very existence of a remote platform, one with long loiter times and maximum tactical surveillance, enables decisions to fire by committee. And deliberately so, notes Gregory McNeal, a professor of law at Pepperdine University, who has put together the most complete study of the still largely secret decision-making process—the so-called disposition lists and kill matrix the New York Times has described in front page stories. It starts from the assessment of intelligence through meetings in which determinations, including layers of legal review, are made about whether a potential target has sufficient value and, finally, whether and when to fire the weapon in real time. The drone pilot is just a pilot.

#### Drones make us accept the harsh realities of war and conflict escalation – it makes us more cautious when using force

Carpenter and Shaikhouni 11

Charli Carpenter (associate professor of international relations at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst) and Lina Shaikhouni June 7, 2011 “Don't Fear the Reaper” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/07/dont\_fear\_the\_reaper?page=0,1

Misconception No. 2: Drones Make War Easy and Game-Like, and Therefore Likelier. **Remote-controlled violence even with a human in the loop also has people concerned:** Nearly 40 percent of the op-eds we studied say that remote-control killing makes war too much like a video game. **Many argue this increases the likelihood of armed conflict**. **It's a variation on an old argument: Other revolutions in military technology** -- the longbow, gunpowder, the airplane -- **have also progressively removed the weapons-bearer from hand-to-hand combat with his foe**. Many of these advances, too, were initially criticized for degrading the professional art of war or taking it away from military elites. For example, European aristocrats originally considered the longbow and firearms unchivalrous for a combination of these reasons. It's true that all killing requires emotional distancing, and militaries throughout time have worked hard to devise ways to ease the psychological impact on soldiers of killing for the state in the national interest. Yet it's not so clear whether the so-called Nintendo effect of drones increases social distance or makes killing easier. Some anecdotal evidence suggests the opposite: Drone pilots say they suffer mental stress precisely because they have detailed, real-time images of their targets, and because they go home to their families afterward rather than debriefing with their units in the field. Studies haven't yet confirmed which view is accurate or whether it's somehow both. Even if some variant of the Nintendo effect turns out to be real, there is little evidence that distancing soldiers from the battlefield or the act of killing makes war itself more likely rather than less. If that were true, the world would be awash in conflict. ¶ As former Lt. Col. Dave Grossman has documented, at no time in history has the combination of technology and military training strategies made killing so easy -- a trend that began after World War I. Yet as political scientist Joshua Goldstein demonstrates in a forthcoming book, the incidence of international war -- wars between two or more states -- has been declining for 70 years. The political debate over drones should move away from the fear that military advancements mean war is inevitable and instead focus on whether certain weapons and platforms are more or less useful for preventing conflict at a greater or lesser cost to innocent civilian lives. Activists should keep pressure on elected officials, military personnel, and other public institutions to make armed conflict, where it occurs, as bloodless as possible. For example, some human rights groups say the Nintendo effect itself could be harnessed to serve humanitarian outcomes -- by embedding war law programming into game designs.

### --Virtual war inev 2NC

#### Personal combat is extinct, dichotomy is inevitable—means tranny alt is the only way to solve

Jonathan Cook is The National’s correspondent in Nazareth. He is the author of Disappearing Palestine, July 26. 2010, “Do drone attacks make life and death worth less?”, http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100727/OPINION/707269925/1080

For a highly militarised society, such developments have proved incredibly lucrative. The growing demands of the global homeland security industry are being met by small specialist Israeli companies, usually run by former generals, whose business is devising hardware to keep suspect groups and populations under surveillance and control. It only takes a small additional step to customise these machines to eliminate the suspects. Drones seem to fascinate and appal us in equal measure. Most of us, however, instinctively recoil from the idea of killing by remote control. Why does it so offend our sensibilities? One suggestion is that it violates ancient codes of chivalry. Should the warrior not be forced to confront his opponent directly before dispatching him? In executing someone remotely, do we not strip them of the respect they deserve for fighting and dying in a different cause? Such reasoning is overly romantic. Mortal combat has not been the norm in warfare since long before joysticks were invented. In fact, remote-control killing is just the latest stage in the evolution of waging war from afar that probably began with the bow and arrow, and has progressed through the gun, tank and warplane. Remote killing does, however, justifiably arouse deep-seated fears about a future in which machines not only do the killing for us but decide who dies – or even turn against their makers. What limits should be placed on automation: should machines only carry out operators’ instructions, or should they be allowed a degree of independence? And in cases of mistakes, who is to be held accountable? While valid, these concerns are largely hypothetical. Unmanned machines are – for the time being at least – still operated by humans. Is there really a moral difference between a drone operator firing a missile using a joystick and a pilot doing the same seated in a cockpit? It is not clear that there is.

## 1NR

### FW: A2 “Perm”

#### 2. Perm is impossible—their model transforms debate into discussion

**Speice 03** (Speice, Patrick, Wake Forest ,and Lyle, Jim, debate coach at Clarion, 2003, “Traditional Policy Debate: Now More Than Ever”, Debaters Research Guide, http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/SpeiceLyle2003htm.htm) FS

The structure of intercollegiate and high school debate builds on to this competitive framework. Judges not only answer a yes/no question regarding the resolution/plan, their decision generates a winner and a loser for the event. Judges assign winners, determine who does the better debating, and give speaker points and ranks to determine which teams are excelling more than others in advancing particular claims that provide an answer to the question asked by the resolution. And, the competitiveness of the activity extends across rounds as tournaments promote the better teams to elimination rounds and crown a champion. Participants at tournaments such as the Tournament of Champions and the National Debate Tournament are determined by evaluating competitive success across the entirety of the debate season. Debate, neither in an ultra-generic form nor the specific form that we participate in can be classified merely as discussion or dialogue. If it were decided that the promotion of education is of greater importance than preserving debate as a game, then the activity would begin to fall apart. Imagine that if instead of having two teams argue over competing viewpoints about a particular resolution/plan that debate instead asked debaters to simply inform the other participants of a different viewpoint regarding the plan. What would the activity look like then? Instead of hearing why the plan was good and bad, or why one policy alternative was better than another, we instead would hear why the plan is good, and why the plan reminded us of a story about one’s childhood. How would the judge evaluate such claims? If the desirability of the plan loses its importance and debate ceases to answer a yes/no question, what criteria should be used to resolve the “debate” (Smith, 2002)? While promoting intellectual development and enterprise are important components of the activity, the promotion of these values at the expense of the value of clash can only lead to the transformation of debate into discussion. In fact, it is not only that such a development spurs the loss of competitiveness, such a turn for the activity risks the loss of debate itself. Teams can begin to argue however they wish, and the “2 + 2 = 4” strategy becomes viable. What comes to matter then is word choice or performance. The result is a loss of depth of the education provided by the activity. Learning loses direction and begins to wander into the realm of acquiring random trivia. The entire purpose of having a policy resolution is rendered moot. Certainly one of the things most debaters enjoy about debate is that it really has no rules, however, if we decide to completely throw away “rules,” even as guiding principles, then the activity becomes something other than debate as an activity premised on fairness and competitive equity. Does any of this mean that there is no room for experimentation in the activity? Does any of this mean that there is no room for critical argumentation in debate, in policy debate? The answer to both questions is “No.” What this does suggest, however, is that before we adopt, and use, these newer debate practices we need to consider how these tools fit into the overall scheme of the activity and its goals.

### FW: A2 “Objectivity Doesn’t Exist”

#### Even if there is no absolute truth, consensus can create common understanding

Yale **Ferguson**, professor of IR at Rutgers, and Richard Mansbach, professor of IR at Iowa State **02** “International Relations and the “Third Debate,” ed. Jarvis)

Although there may be no such thing as “absolute truth” (Hollis, 1994:240-247; Fernandez-Armesto, 1997:chap.6), there is often a sufficient amount of intersubjective consensus to make for a useful conversation. That conversation may not lead to proofs that satisfy the philosophical nit-pickers, but it can be educational and illuminating. We gain a degree of apparently useful “understanding” about the things we need (or prefer) to “know.”

### FW: Limits—Decision-Making 2NC

#### Effective deliberation is the lynchpin of solving all existential global problems

**Lundberg 10** - Christian O. Lundberg 10 Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p311

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, debate builds capacity for critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and better public judgment. If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63, 154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to son rhroueh and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly infonnation-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them. The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediatcd information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources: To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144) Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials. There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life. Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international issues of class, gender, and racial justice; wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing challenges of rapid globalization including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.

#### It’s the only portable skill

**Steinberg & Freeley 8** \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp9-10

After several days of intense debate, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military\* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition. Meanwhile, and perhaps equally difficult for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. Each of these\* situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions. Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making homes from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations. We all make many decisions even- day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car.what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate CO vote for. paper or plastic, all present lis with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration? Is the defendant guilty as accused? Tlie Daily Show or the ball game?And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIMI: magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs.online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople. academics, and publishers. We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs? The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates. Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized. Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others. Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

### FW: Games Good

#### Viewing debate as a game solves all their impacts—it’s the most educational model and replaces hate with love

**Carter 08** [Leif A, Professor, The Colorado College, “Law and Politics as play” CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW Vol 83:3, http://www.cklawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/vol83no3/Carter.pdf]

B. The Psychology of Games Good games neutralize turf and, by legitimizing losing, reduce or eliminate the irrational and often self-defeating effects of Kahneman’s loss aversion, specifically the urge to double down and send good money after bad.127 Like legal education and legal practice, and like Vico’s rhetorical debating games, competitive games over time construct for players and fans a continuing civic education. The desire to win a competition moti-vates players to become keenly curious about the rules of the game, the conditions on the field of play, the skills of the opponent, and so on. In games people return to and practice the “thought of sense.”128 In games, players must base their calculations on what is real, not on what they imag-ine or hope for. Games thus rewire the remarkably plastic human brain in the direction of the classical rationality of “economic man” like no other social context. People come to belie Franklin’s belief that men only use reason to justify everything they have a mind to do. Through the behavior of playing, people reconfigure their brains to be more conventionally ra-tional. In play people create the sense that Faulkner thought they lacked.129 Curiosity necessarily humanizes opponents instead of “despeciating” them, as so often happens in the brutality cycle.130 Kahneman observes that each opponent in a conventional conflict believes that the other side acts out of malice and hostile motives,131 but just the opposite happens in games. Competitors merge identities. Each knows that the other experi-ences the same world, “thinks the way I think,” “wants what I want,” and “needs to know me as much as I need to know her.” Opponents do not “take it personally.”132 Competitive games, without any help from post-modern philosophers, convert believers into pragmatists. In games people delight in the particulars of concrete situations. Good play helps realize Whitman’s wise urging to turn from curiosity about God to curiosity about each other.133 The curiosity that players must develop to play well dis-places ethnocentrism, xenophobia, moral superiority, and the other brutaliz-ing tendencies of the human mind described by Hood, Milgram, Zimbardo, Pinker, Damasio, and Frith, and noted in Part I. Curiosity overcomes, or very much reduces, the impulse to hate.134 Good play has the same effect on players as does the naming of a doll or an animal. It creates a kind of love.

### FW: Topic Good—Policy 2NC

**Student debate about the policy of war powers is critical to overall American Political Development**

**Dominguez and Thoren 10** Casey BK, Department of Political Science and IR at the University of San Diego and Kim, University of San Diego, Paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, San Francisco, California, April 1-3, 2010, “The Evolution of Presidential Authority in War Powers”, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=1580395

**Students of American institutions should** naturally **be interested in the relationships between the president and Congress**. However, **the evolution of war powers falls into a category of inquiry that is important not just to** studies of the presidency or to **students of history, but also to the field of American Political Development.** Among Orren and **Skowronek’s recommendations** for future work in American Political Development, they **argue that “shifts in governing authority,” including and especially shifts in the system of checks and balances, “are important in historical inquiry, because they are a constant object of political conflict and they set the conditions for subsequent politics, especially when shifts are durable**” (Orren and Skowronek 2004, 139). **How an essential constitutional power**, that of deploying military force, **changed hands from one institution to another over time, would** certainly seem to **qualify as a durable shift in governing authority. Cooper and Brady** (1981) also **recommend that researchers study change over time in Congress’ relations to the other branches of government.**