## 1NC

**OFF**

**A. Interpretation**

**“Resolved” expresses intent to implement the plan**

**Merriam-Webster Dictionary** 19**96** [http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=resolved, downloaded 07/20/03]

“6. **To change or convert by resolution or formal vote**; -- **used only reflexively; as, the house resolved itself into a committee of the whole**.”

**“Should” denotes an expectation of enacting a plan**

**American Heritage Dictionary 2K**

[www.dictionary.com]

3 **Used to express** probability or **expectation**

**B. Violation—affirming a owmanist ethic is not limited to a result of the plan**

**C. Vote negative**

**1. Limits—by arbitrarily choosing to not defend parts of the topic, they explode the possible number of affs—makes neg research prep impossible**

**A limited topic with equitable ground is necessary to foster decision-making and clash**

**Steinberg & Freeley 8** \*Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, AND \*\*David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U Miami, **Argumentation and** Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp 45-

**Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate:** the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, **it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four,"** because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (**Controversy is an essential prerequisite** of debate. **Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered.** For example**, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many** illegal immigrants **are in the United States?** What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? **Do they take jobs** from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? **Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration** by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? **Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do?** Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? **Should we build a wall on the Mexican border**, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? **Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy.** To be discussed and resolved effectively, **controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions,** frustration, and emotional distress, as **evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate** during the summer of 2007. **Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job!** They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." **Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations**, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, **but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed**—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—**then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step**. **One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies.** The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. **They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by** directing and **placing limits on the decision** to be made, **the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument**. For example, **the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation**. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. **Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad,** too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. **What sort of writing are we concerned with**—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? **What does "effectiveness" mean** in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" **The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition** such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. **This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation** of the controversy by advocates, **or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.**

**2. Topic education—they avoid the core question of the resolution, which is how authority can be limited—allows them to spike out of circumvention arguments which kills negative ground**

**Debating about policy details is key to influence the political process and create change**

**Nye 09** - Joseph Nye, professor at Harvard University and former dean of the Harvard Kennedy School, 4-13-2009, Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/12/AR2009041202260\_pf.html 4-13-09

President Obama has appointed some distinguished academic economists and lawyers to his administration, but few high-ranking political scientists have been named. In fact, the editors of a recent poll of more than 2,700 international relations experts declared that "**the walls surrounding the ivory tower have never seemed so high**." While important American scholars such as Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski took high-level foreign policy positions in the past, that path has tended to be a one-way street. **Not many top-ranked scholars** of international relations **are going into government**, and even fewer return to contribute to academic theory. The 2008 Teaching, Research and International Policy (TRIP) poll, by the Institute for Theory and Practice in International Relations, showed that of the 25 scholars rated as producing the most interesting scholarship during the past five years, only three had ever held policy positions (two in the U.S. government and one in the United Nations). **The fault** for this growing gap **lies** not with the government but **with** the **academics**. **Scholars** are **pay**ing **less attention to** questions about **how their work relates to the policy world**, and in many departments a focus on policy can hurt one's career. Advancement comes faster for those who develop mathematical models, new methodologies or theories expressed in jargon that is unintelligible to policymakers. A survey of articles published over the lifetime of the American Political Science Review found that about one in five dealt with policy prescription or criticism in the first half of the century, while only a handful did so after 1967. Editor Lee Sigelman observed in the journal's centennial issue that "if 'speaking truth to power' and contributing directly to public dialogue about the merits and demerits of various courses of action were still numbered among the functions of the profession, one would not have known it from leafing through its leading journal." As citizens, **academics might be considered to have an obligation to help improve on policy ideas when they can**. Moreover, **such engagement can enhance** and enrich **academic work, and** thus **the ability of academics to teach the next generation**. As former undersecretary of state David Newsom argued a decade ago, "**the** growing **withdrawal of** university **scholars behind curtains of theory** and modeling **would** not have wider significance if this trend did not raise questions regarding the preparation of new generations and the future influence of the academic community on public and official perceptions of international issues and events. Teachers plant seeds that shape the thinking of each new generation; this is probably the academic world's most lasting contribution." Yet too often scholars teach theory and methods that are relevant to other academics but not to the majority of the students sitting in the classroom before them. **Some** academics **say that while the** growing **gap between theory and policy may have costs for policy**, **it** has **produced better social science theory**, and that **this is more important than whether such scholarship is relevant**. Also, to some extent, the gap is an inevitable result of the growth and specialization of knowledge. Few people can keep up with their subfields, much less all of social science. But **the danger is** that **academic theorizing will say more and more about less and less**. Even when **academics** supplement their usual trickle-down approach to policy by writing in journals, newspapers or blogs, or by consulting for candidates or public officials, they **face** many **competitors for attention**. More than 1,200 **think tanks** in the United States **provide not only ideas but also experts ready to comment** or consult **at a moment's notice**. Some of these new transmission belts serve as translators and additional outlets for academic ideas, but **many add a bias** provided by their founders and funders. As a group, think tanks are heterogeneous in scope, funding, ideology and location, but universities generally offer a more neutral viewpoint. While pluralism of institutional pathways is good for democracy, **the policy process is diminished by the withdrawal of the academic community**. **The solutions must come via a reappraisal within the academy itself**. Departments should give greater weight to real-world relevance and impact in hiring and promoting young scholars. Journals could place greater weight on relevance in evaluating submissions. Studies of specific regions deserve more attention. Universities could facilitate interest in the world by giving junior faculty members greater incentives to participate in it. That should include greater toleration of unpopular policy positions. One could multiply such useful suggestions, but young people should not hold their breath waiting for them to be implemented. If anything, the trends in academic life seem to be headed in the opposite direction.

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#### the aff’s appeal to personal experience and portraying class as one of a laundry list of oppressions naturalizes inequality and precludes a universal starting point to challenge capitalism

Gimenez (Prof. Sociology at UC Boulder) 01 [Martha, “Marxism and Class; Gender and Race”, Race, Gender and Class, Vol. 8, p. online: http://www.colorado.edu/Sociology/gimenez/work/cgr.html]

There are many competing theories of race, gender, class, American society, political economy, power, etc. but no specific theory is invoked to define how the terms race, gender and class are used, or to identify how they are related to the rest of the social system. To some extent, race, gender and class and their intersections and interlockings have become a mantra to be invoked in any and all theoretical contexts, for a tacit agreement about their ubiquitousness and meaning seems to have developed among RGC studies advocates, so that all that remains to be dome is empirically to document their intersections everywhere, for everything that happens is, by definition, raced, classed, and gendered. This pragmatic acceptance of race, gender and class, as givens, results in the downplaying of theory, and the resort to experience as the source of knowledge. The emphasis on experience in the construction of knowledge is intended as a corrective to theories that, presumably, reflect only the experience of the powerful. RGC seems to offer a subjectivist understanding of theory as simply a reflection of the experience and consciousness of the individual theorist, rather than as a body of propositions which is collectively and systematically produced under historically specific conditions of possibility which grant them historical validity for as long as those conditions prevail. Instead, knowledge and theory are pragmatically conceived as the products or reflection of experience and, as such, unavoidably partial, so that greater accuracy and relative completeness can be approximated only through gathering the experiential accounts of all groups. Such is the importance given to the role of experience in the production of knowledge that in the eight page introduction to the first section of an RGC anthology, the word experience is repeated thirty six times (Andersen and Collins, 1995: 1-9).

I agree with the importance of learning from the experience of all groups, especially those who have been silenced by oppression and exclusion and by the effects of ideologies that mystify their actual conditions of existence. To learn how people describe their understanding of their lives is very illuminating, for "ideas are the conscious expression -- real or illusory -- of (our) actual relations and activities" (Marx, 1994: 111), because "social existence determines consciousness" (Marx, 1994: 211). Given that our existence is shaped by the capitalist mode of production, experience, to be fully understood in its broader social and political implications, has to be situated in the context of the capitalist forces and relations that produce it. Experience in itself, however, is suspect because, dialectically, it is a unity of opposites; it is, at the same time, unique, personal, insightful and revealing and, at the same time, thoroughly social, partial, mystifying, itself the product of historical forces about which individuals may know little or nothing about (for a critical assessment of experience as a source of knowledge see Sherry Gorelick, "Contradictions of feminist methodology," in Chow, Wilkinson, and Baca Zinn, 1996; applicable to the role of experience in contemporary RGC and feminist research is Jacoby's critique of the 1960s politics of subjectivity: Jacoby, 1973: 37- 49). Given the emancipatory goals of the RGC perspective, it is through the analytical tools of Marxist theory that it can move forward, beyond the impasse revealed by the constant reiteration of variations on the "interlocking" metaphor. This would require, however, a) a rethinking and modification of the postulated relationships between race, class and gender, and b) a reconsideration of the notion that, because everyone is located at the intersection of these structures, all social relations and interactions are "raced," "classed," and "gendered."

In the RGC perspective, race, gender and class are presented as equivalent systems of oppression with extremely negative consequences for the oppressed. It is also asserted that the theorization of the connections between these systems require "a working hypothesis of equivalency" (Collins, 1997:74). Whether or not it is possible to view class as just another system of oppression depends on the theoretical framework within class is defined. If defined within the traditional sociology of stratification perspective, in terms of a gradation perspective, class refers simply to strata or population aggregates ranked on the basis of standard SES indicators (income, occupation, and education) (for an excellent discussion of the difference between gradational and relational concepts of class, see Ossowski, 1963). Class in this non-relational, descriptive sense has no claims to being more fundamental than gender or racial oppression; it simply refers to the set of individual attributes that place individuals within an aggregate or strata arbitrarily defined by the researcher (i.e., depending on their data and research purposes, anywhere from three or four to twelve "classes" can be identified). From the standpoint of Marxist theory, however, class is qualitatively different **from gender and race** and cannot be considered just another system of oppression**. As Eagleton points out,** whereas racism and sexism are unremittingly bad, class is not entirely a "bad thing" **even** though socialists would like to abolish it. The bourgeoisie in its revolutionary stage was instrumental in ushering a new era in historical development, one which liberated the average person from the oppressions of feudalism and put forth the ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity. Today, however, it has an unquestionably negative role to play as it expands and deepens the rule of capital over the entire globe. The working class, on the other hand, is pivotally located to wage the final struggle against capital and, consequently, it is "an excellent thing" (Eagleton, 1996: 57). While racism and sexism have no redeeming feature, class relations are, dialectically, a unity of opposites; both a site of exploitation and, objectively, a site where the potential agents of social change are forged. To argue that the working class is the fundamental agent of change does not entail the notion that it is the only agent of change. The working class is of course composed of women and men who belong to different races, ethnicities, national origins, cultures, and so forth, so that gender and racial/ethnic struggles have the potential of fueling class struggles because, given the patterns of wealth ownership and income distribution in this and all capitalist countries, those who raise the banners of gender and racial struggles are overwhelmingly propertyless workers, technically members of the working class, people who need to work for economic survival whether it is for a wage or a salary, for whom racism, sexism and class exploitation matter. But this vision of a mobilized working class where gender and racial struggles are not subsumed but are nevertheless related requires a class conscious effort to link RGC studies to the Marxist analysis of historical change. In so far as the "class" in RGC remains a neutral concept, open to any and all theoretical meanings, just one oppression among others, intersectionality will not realize its revolutionary potential.

Nevertheless, I want to argue against the notion that class should be considered equivalent to gender and race. I find the grounds for my argument not only on the crucial role class struggles play in processes of epochal change but also in the very assumptions of RGC studies and the ethnomethodological insights put forth by West and Fenstermaker (1994). The assumption of the simultaneity of experience (i.e., all interactions are raced, classed, gendered) together with the ambiguity inherent in the interactions themselves, so that while one person might think he or she is "doing gender," another might interpret those "doings" in terms of "doing class," highlight the basic issue that Collins accurately identifies when she argues that ethnomethodology ignores power relations. Power relations underlie all processes of social interaction and this is why social facts are constraining upon people. But the pervasiveness of power ought not to obfuscate the fact that some power relations are more important and consequential than others. For example, the power that physical attractiveness might confer a woman in her interactions with her less attractive female supervisor or employer does not match the economic power of the latter over the former. In my view, the flattening or erasure of the qualitative difference between class, race and gender in the RGC perspective is the foundation for the recognition that it is important to deal with "basic relations of domination and subordination" which now appear disembodied, outside class relations. In the effort to reject "class reductionism," by postulating the equivalence between class and other forms of oppression, the RGC perspective both negates the fundamental importance of class but it is forced to acknowledge its importance by postulating some other "basic" structures of domination. Class relations -- whether we are referring to the relations between capitalist and wage workers, or to the relations between workers (salaried and waged) and their managers and supervisors, those who are placed in "contradictory class locations," (Wright, 1978) -- are of paramount importance, for most people's economic survival is determined by them. Those in dominant class positions do exert power over their employees and subordinates and a crucial way in which that power is used is through their choosing the identity they impute their workers. Whatever identity workers might claim or "do," employers can, in turn, disregard their claims and "read" their "doings" differently as "raced" or "gendered" or both, rather than as "classed," thus downplaying their class location and the class nature of their grievances. To argue, then, that class is fundamental is not to "reduce" gender or racial oppression to class, but to acknowledge that the underlying basic and "nameless" power at the root of what happens in social interactions grounded in "intersectionality" is class power.

#### their reliance on womanism as the site of political contestation is not an accidental instance of ignoring class. The demand arises out of the crisis of liberalism—such politics particularizes the oppressions of capitalism to the point that the universal system is naturalized. Attaining white, male bourgeoisse privilege becomes the bench-mark of success, re-entrenching the foundation of the system

Wendy Brown, Professor & genuis, “Wounded Attachments,” POLITICAL THEORY, August 1993, ASP.

Although this détente between universal and particular within liberalism is potted with volatile conceits, it is rather thoroughly unraveled by two features of late modernity, spurred by developments in what Marx and Foucault, respectively, reveal as liberalism's companion powers: capitalism and disciplinarity. On one side, the state loses even its guise of universality as it becomes ever more transparently invested in particular economic interests, political ends, and social formations. This occurs as it shifts from a relatively minimalist "night watchman" state to a heavily bureaucratized, managerial, fiscally complex, and highly interventionist welfare-warfare state, a transmogrification occasioned by the combined imperatives of capital and the autoproliferating characteristics of bureaucracy.6 On the other side, a range of economic and political forces increasingly disinter the liberal subject from substantive nation-state identification: deterritorializing demo- graphic flows; disintegration from within and invasion from without of family and community as (relatively) autonomous sites of social production and identification; consumer capitalism's marketing discourse in which individual (and subindividual) desires are produced, commodified, and mo- bilized as identities; and disciplinary productions of a fantastic array of behavior-based identities ranging from recovering alcoholic professionals to unrepentant crack mothers. These disciplinary productions work to conjure and regulate subjects through classificatory schemes, naming and normaliz- ing social behaviors as social positions. Operating through what Foucault calls "an anatomy of detail," "disciplinary power" produces social identifies (available for politicization because they are deployed for purposes of political regulation) that crosscut juridical identities based on abstract right. Thus, for example, the welfare state's production of welfare subjects-themselves subdi- vided through the socially regulated categories of motherhood, disability, race, age, and so forth-potentially produce political identity through these categories, produce identities as these categories. In this story, the always imminent but increasingly politically manifest failure of liberal universalism to be universal-the transparent fiction of state universality-combines with the increasing individuation of social subjects through capitalist disinternments and disciplinary productions. Together, they breed the emergence of politicized identity rooted in disciplinary pro- ductions but oriented by liberal discourse toward protest against exclusion from a discursive formation of universal justice. This production, however, is not linear or even but highly contradictory: although the terms of liberalism are part of the ground of production of a politicized identity that reiterates yet exceeds these terms, liberal discourse itself also continuously recolonizes political identity as political interest-a conversion that recasts politicized identity's substantive and often deconstructive cultural claims and critiques as generic claims of particularism endemic to universalist political culture. Similarly, disciplinary power manages liberalism's production of politicized subjectivity by neutralizing (re-depoliticizing) identity through normalizing practices. As liberal discourse converts political identity into essentialized private interest, disciplinary power converts interest into normativized social identity manageable by regulatory regimes. Thus disciplinary power politi- cally neutralizes entitlement claims generated by liberal individuation, whereas liberalism politically neutralizes rights claims generated by disciplinary identities. In addition to the formations of identity that may be the complex effects of disciplinary and liberal modalities of power, I want to suggest one other historical strand relevant to the production of politicized identity, this one hewn more specifically to recent developments in political culture. Although sanguine to varying degrees about the phenomenon they are describing, many on the European and North American Left have argued that identity politics emerges from the demise of class politics consequent to post-Fordism or pursuant to May 1968. Without adjudicating the precise relationship between the breakup of class politics and the proliferation of other sites of political identification, I want to refigure this claim by suggesting that what we have come to call identity politics is partly dependent on the demise of a critique of capitalism and of bourgeois cultural and economic values. In a reading that links the new identity claims to a certain relegitimation of capitalism, identity politics concerned with race, sexuality, and gender will appear not as a supplement to class politics, not as an expansion of Left categories of oppression and emancipation, not as an enriching complexification of pro- gressive formulations of power and persons-all of which they also are-but as tethered to a formulation of justice which, ironically, reinscribes a bour- geois ideal as its measure.

If it is this ideal that signifies educational and vocational opportunity, upward mobility, relative protection against arbitrary violence, and reward in proportion to effort, and if it is this ideal against which many of the exclusions and privations of people of color, gays and lesbians, and women are articulated, then the political purchase of contemporary American identity politics would seem to be achieved in part through a certain discursive renaturalization of capitalism that can be said to have marked progressive discourse since the 1970s. What this suggests is that identity politics may be partly configured by a peculiarly shaped and peculiarly disguised form of resentment-class resent- ment without class consciousness or class analysis. This resentment is displaced onto discourses of injustice other than class but, like all resent- ments, retains the real or imagined holdings of its reviled subject-in this case, bourgeois male privileges-as objects of desire. From this perspective, it would appear that the articulation of politicized identities through race, gender, and sexuality require, rather than incidentally produce, a relatively limited identification through class. They necessarily rather than incidentally abjure a critique of class power and class norms precisely because the injuries suffered by these identities are measured by bourgeois norms of social acceptance, legal protection, relative material comfort, and social indepen- dence. The problem is that when not only economic stratification but other injuries to body and psyche enacted by capitalism (alienation, cornmodifica- tion, exploitation, displacement, disintegration of sustaining, albeit contra- dictory, social forms such as families and neighborhoods) are discursively normalized and thus depoliticized, other markers of social difference may come to bear an inordinate weight. Absent an articulation of capitalism in the political discourse of identity, the marked identity bears all the weight of the sufferings produced by capitalism in addition to that bound to the explicitly politicized marking.

#### race and gender oppression along with relegation of reproduction to the private sphere are not ahistorical products of sexism or patriarchy, but historical productions of the emergence of a classed society founded on the logic of surplus accumulation. This shift from necessity to surplus solidified the pre-existing division of labor based on need and then sexed it to justify inequality

**Cloud** (Prof. Comm at UT) **03**

[Dana, “Marxism and Oppression”, Talk for Regional Socialist Conference, April 19, 2003, p. online]

In order to challenge oppression, it is important to know where it comes from. Historians, archaeologists, and anthropologists tell us that in pre-class societies such as hunter-gatherer societies, racism and sexism were unheard of. Because homosexuality was not an identifiable category of such societies, discrimination on that basis did not occur either. In fact, it is clear that racism, sexism, and homophobia have arisen in particular kinds of societies, namely class societies. Women’s oppression originated in the first class societies, while racism came into prominence in the early periods of capitalism when colonialism and slavery drove the economic system. The prohibition against gays and lesbians is a relatively modern phenomenon. But what all forms of oppression have in common is that they did not always exist and are not endemic to human nature. They were created in the interest of ruling classes in society and continue to benefit the people at the top of society, while dividing and conquering the rest of us so as to weaken the common fight against the oppressors. The work of Marx’s collaborator Friederich Engels onThe Origins of the Family, Private Property, and the State in some respects reflects the Victorian times in which in was written. Engels moralizes about women’s sexuality and doesn’t even include gay and lesbian liberation in his discussion of the oppressive family. However, anthropologists like the feminist Rayna Reiter have confirmed his most important and central argument that it was in the first settled agricultural societies that women became an oppressed class. In societies where for the first time people could accumulate a surplus of food and other resources, it was possible for some people to hoard wealth and control its distribution. The first governments or state structures formed to legitimate an emerging ruling class. As settled communities grew in size and became more complex social organizations, and, most importantly, as the surplus grew, the distribution of wealth became unequal—and a small number of men rose above the rest of the population in wealth and power. In the previous hunter-gatherer societies, there had been a sexual division of labor, but one without a hierarchy of value. There was no strict demarcation between the reproductive and productive spheres. All of that changed with the development of private property in more settled communities. The earlier division of labor in which men did the heavier work, hunting, and animal agriculture, became a system of differential control over resource distribution. The new system required more field workers and sought to maximize women’s reproductive potential. Production shifted away from the household over time and women became associated with the reproductive role, losing control over the production and distribution of the necessities of life. It was not a matter of male sexism, but of economic priorities of a developing class system. This is why Engels identifies women’s oppression as the first form of systematic class oppression in the world. Marxists since Engels have not dismissed the oppression of women as secondary to other kinds of oppression and exploitation. To the contrary, women’s oppression has a primary place in Marxist analysis and is a key issue that socialists organize around today. From this history we know that sexism did not always exist, and that men do not have an inherent interest in oppressing women as domestic servants or sexual slaves. Instead, women’s oppression always has served a class hierarchy in society. In our society divided by sexism, ideas about women’s nature as domestic caretakers or irrational sexual beings justify paying women lower wages compared to men, so that employers can pit workers against one another in competition for the same work. Most women have always had to work outside the home to support their families. Today, women around the world are exploited in sweatshops where their status as women allows bosses to pay them very little, driving down the wages of both men and women. At the same time, capitalist society relies on ideas about women to justify not providing very much in the way of social services that would help provide health care, family leave, unemployment insurance, access to primary and higher education, and so forth—all because these things are supposed to happen in the private family, where women are responsible. This lack of social support results in a lower quality of life for many men as well as women. Finally, contemporary ideologies that pit men against women encourage us to fight each other rather than organizing together.

#### he material determinism of capital is responsible for the instrumentalization of all life—makes all oppression inevitable and causes extinction

Dyer-Witherford (professor of Library and Info. Sciences @ the Univ. of Western Ontarion) **‘**99 [Nick. Cyber Marx: Cycles and Circuits of Struggle in High Technology Capitalism.]

**For capitalism, the use of machines as organs of “will over nature” is an imperative**. The great insight of the Frankfurt School—an insight subsequently improved and amplified by feminists and ecologists—was that capital’s dual project of dominating both humanity and nature was intimately tied to the cultivation of “instrumental reason” that systematically objectifies, reduces, quantifies and fragments the world for the purposes of technological control. Business’s systemic need to cheapen labor, cut the costs of raw materials, and expand consumer markets gives it an inherent bias toward the piling-up of technological power. This priority—enshrined in phrases such as “progress,” “efficiency,” “productivity,” “modernization,” and “growth”—assumes an automatism that is used to override any objection or alternative, regardless of the environmental and social consequences. Today, we witness global vistas of toxification, deforestation, desertification, dying oceans, disappearing ozone layers, and disintegrating immune systems, all interacting in ways that perhaps threaten the very existence of humanity and are undeniably inflicting social collapse, disease, and immiseration across the planet. The degree to which this project of mastery has backfired is all too obvious.

#### Vote Negative to validate and adopt the method of structural/historical criticism that is the 1NC.

#### one must understand the existing social totality before one can act on it—grounding the sites of political contestation or knowledge outside of labor and surplus value merely serve to humynize capital and prevent a transition to a society beyond oppression

**Tumino** (Prof. English @ Pitt) **01**

[Stephen, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critique]

Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. I will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions and are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory.

**Capitalism is able to absorb various social antagonisms and mediate difference – you have an ethical obligation to reject it**

**Zizek and Daly ‘4** (Slavoj and Glyn, Conversations with Zizek page 14-16)

For Zizek it is imperative that we cut through this Gordian knot of postmodern protocol and recognize that**our ethico-political responsibility is to confront the constitutive violence of today’s global capitalism and its obscene naturalization / anonymization of the millions who are subjugated by it throughout the world***.* Against the standardized positions of postmodern culture – with all its pieties concerning ‘multiculturalist’ etiquette *–* **Zizek is arguing for a politics tha*t***might be called ‘radically incorrect’ in the sense that it break with these types of positions 7 and**focuses**instead**on the very organizing principles of today’s social reality***:* the principles of global liberal capitalism. This requires some care and subtlety. For far too long, Marxism has been bedeviled by an almost isticeconomism that has tended towards political morbidity. With the likes of Hilferding and Gramsci, and more recently Laclau and Mouffee, crucial theoretical advances have been made that enable the transcendence of all forms of economism. In this new context, however, Zizek argues that the problem that now presents itself is almost that of the opposite. That is to say, the prohibitive anxieties surrounding the taboo of economism can function as a way of not engaging with economic reality and as a way of implicitly accepting the latter as a basic horizon of existence. In an ironic Freudian-Lacanian twist, the fear of economism can end up reinforcing a de facto economic necessity in respect of contemporary capitalism (i.e. the initial prohibition conjures up the very thing it fears). This is not to endorse any kind of retrograde return to economism. Zizek’s point is rather that in rejecting economism we should not lose sight of the systemic power of capital in shaping the lives and destinies of humanity and our very sense of the possible. In particular we should not overlook Marx’s central insight that**in order to create a universal global system the forces of capitalism seek to conceal the politico-discursive violence of its construction through a kind of gentrification of that system***.* What is persistently denied by neo-liberals such as Rorty (1989) and Fukuyama (1992) is that**thegentrification of global liberal capitalism**is one whose ‘universalism’ fundamentally**reproduces and depends upon a disavowed violence that excludes vast sectors of the world’s populations**. In this way,**neo-liberal ideology attempts to naturalize capitalism by presenting its outcomes of winning and losing as if they were simply a matter of chance and sound judgment in a neutral market place*.***Capitalism does indeed create a space for a certain diversity, at least for the central capitalist regions, but it is neither neutral nor ideal and its price in terms of social exclusion is exorbitant. That is to say,**the human cost in terms of inherent global poverty and degraded ‘life-chances’ cannot be calculated within the existing economic rationale and, in consequence, social exclusion remains mystified and nameless**(viz. the patronizing reference to the ‘developing world’). And Zizek’s point is that**this mystification is magnified through capitalism’s profound capacity to ingest its own excesses and negativity: to redirect**(or misdirect)**social antagonisms and to absorb them within a culture of differential affirmation*.***Instead of Bolshevism, the tendency today is towards a kind of political boutiquism that is readily sustained by postmodern forms of consumerism and lifestyle. Against this**Žižek argues for a new universalism whose primary ethical directive is to confront the fact that our forms of social existence are founded on exclusion on a global scale**. While it is perfectly true that universalism can never become Universal (it will always require a hegemonic-particular embodiment in order to have any meaning),**what is novel about Zizek’s universalism is that it would not attempt to conceal this fact or reduce the status of the abject Other to that of a ‘glitch’ in an otherwise sound matrix.**

#### rejection solves- the judges orientation as an individual against capitalism disrputs the system

Joel **Kovel**, Alger Hiss Professor, Social Studies, Bard College, THE ENEMY OF NATURE: THE END OF CAPITALISM OR THE END OF THE WORLD, 20**02**, p. 224.

Relentless criticism can delegitimate the system and release people into struggle. And as struggle develops, victories that are no more than in­cremental by their own terms — stopping a meeting of the IMF, the hopes stirred forth by a campaign such as Ralph Nader’s in 2000 — can have a symbolic effect far greater than their external result, and constitute points of rupture with capital. This rupture is not a set of facts added to our knowledge of the world, but a change in our relation to the world. Its effects are dynamic, not incremental, and like all genuine insights it changes the balance of forces and can propagate very swiftly Thus the release from inertia can trigger a rapid cascade of changes, so that it could be said that the forces pressing towards radical change need not be linear and incre­mental, but can be exponential in character. In this way, conscientious and radical criticism of the given, even in advance of having blueprints for an alternative, can be a material force, because it can seize the mind of the masses of people. There is no greater responsibility for intellectuals.

**OFF**

**Capture over drones now**

David **Corn**, “Obama's Counterterrorism Speech: A Pivot Point on Drones and More?,” MOTHER JONES, 5—23—**13**,

http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2013/05/obama-speech-drones-civil-liberties

So **Obama's speech Thursday on counterterrorism policies**—which follows his administration's acknowledgment yesterday that it had killed four Americans (including Anwar al-Awlaki, an Al Qaeda leader in Yemen)—**is a big deal, for** with this address, **Obama is self-restricting his use of drones and shifting control of them** from the CIA to the military. And the president has approved making public the rules governing drone strikes.¶ The New York Times received the customary pre-speech leak and reported:¶ **A new classified policy guidance** signed by Mr. Obama **will sharply curtail the instances when unmanned aircraft can be used to attack in places that are not overt war zones,** countries like Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. The rules will impose the same standard for strikes on foreign enemies now used only for American citizens deemed to be terrorists.¶ Lethal force will be used only against targets who pose "a continuing, imminent threat to Americans" and cannot feasibly be captured, Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. said in a letter to Congress, suggesting that threats to a partner like Afghanistan or Yemen alone would not be enough to justify being targeted.¶ These moves may not satisfy civil-liberties-minded critics on sthe right and the left**. Obama is not declaring an end to indefinite detention or announcing the closing of Gitmo—though** he is echoing his State of the Union vow to revive efforts to shut down that prison. Still, these moves would be unimaginable in the Bush years. Bush and Cheney essentially believed the commander in chief had unchallenged power during wartime, and the United States, as they saw it, remained at war against terrorism. Yet here **is Obama subjecting the drone program to a more restrictive set of rules—and doing so publicly.** This is very un-Cheney-like. (How soon before the ex-veep arises from his undisclosed location to accuse Obama of placing the nation at risk yet again?)¶ Despite Obama's embrace of certain Bush-Cheney practices and his robust use of drones, the president has tried since taking office to shift US foreign policy from a fixation on terrorism. During his first days in office, he shied away from using the "war on terrorism" phrase. And his national security advisers have long talked of Obama's desire to reorient US foreign policy toward challenges in the Pacific region. By handing responsibility for drone strikes to the military, Obama is helping CIA chief John Brennan, who would like to see his agency move out of the paramilitary business and devote more resources to its traditional tasks of intelligence gathering and analysis.¶ With this speech, Obama is not renouncing his administration's claim that it possesses the authority to kill an American overseas without full due process. The target, as Holder noted in that letter to Congress, must be a senior operational leader of Al Qaeda or an associated group who poses an "imminent threat of violent attack against the United States" and who cannot be captured, and **Holder stated that foreign suspects now can only be targeted if they pose "a continuing, imminent threat to Americans."** (Certainly, **there will be debates over the meaning of "imminent,"** especially given that the Obama administration has previously used an elastic definition of imminence.) And **Obama is not declaring an end to the dicey practice of indefinite detention or a conclusion to the fight against terrorism.**

**Plan spurs shift towards drones**

Robert **Chesney**, Professor, Law, University of Texas, “Who May Be Held? Military Detention through the Habeas Lens,” BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW v. 52, 20**11**, LN.

The convergence thesis describes one manner in which **law might respond to** the **cross-cutting pressures associated with** the **asymmetric warfare** phenomenon—i.e., **the pressure to** reduce false positives (targeting, capture, or detention of the wrong individual) while also **ensur**ing an **adequate capacity to neutralize the non-state actors in question**. One must bear in mind, however, that **detention** itself **is not the only system of government action that can satisfy that latter interest. Other options exist, including the use of lethal force**; the use of rendition to place individuals in detention at the hands of some other state; the use of persuasion to induce some other state to take custody of an individual through its own means; and perhaps also the use of various forms of surveillance to establish a sort of constructive, loose control over a person (though for persons located outside the United States it is unlikely that surveillance could be much more than episodic, and thus any resulting element of “control” may be quite weak).210¶ From the point of view of the individual involved, all but the last of **these options are likely to be far worse experiences than** U.S.-administered **detention**. In addition, **all** but the last **are** also likely to be far **less useful for** purposes of **intelligence-gathering** from the point of view of the U.S. government.211 Nonetheless, these **alternatives may** **grow attractive to the government in circumstances where the detention alternative becomes unduly restricted, yet the pressure for intervention remains. The situation is** rather **like squeezing a balloon: the result is not to shrink the balloon, but instead to displace the pressure from one side to another, causing the balloon to distend along the unconstrained side**. So too here: when one of these coercive powers becomes constrained in new, more restrictive ways, the displaced pressure to incapacitate may simply find expression through one of the alternative mechanisms. On this view it is no surprise that lethal drone strikes have increased dramatically over the past two years, that the Obama administration has refused to foreswear rendition, that in Iraq we have largely (though not entirely) outsourced our detention operations to the Iraqis, and that we now are progressing along the same path in Afghanistan.212¶ Decisions regarding the calibration of a detention system—the¶ management of the convergence process, if you will—thus take place in the shadow of this balloon-squeezing phenomenon A thorough policy review would take this into account, as should any formal lawmaking process. For the moment, however, our formal law-making process is not directed at the detention-scope question. Instead, clarification and development with respect to the substantive grounds for detention takes place through the lens of habeas corpus litigation.

**Drone strikes cause thousands of civilian deaths and psychological violence**

**Stanford Human Rights Clinic**, “Living under Drones: death, Injury and Trauma to Civilians from US Drone Practices in Pakistan,” Stanford International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic (IHRCRC) and Global Justice Clinic (GJC) at NYU School of 9—**12**, http://livingunderdrones.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Stanford-NYU-LIVING-UNDER-DRONES.pdf

First, while civilian casualties are rarely acknowledged by the US government, there is significant evidence that US **drone strikes have injured and killed civilians**. In public statements, the US states that there have been “no” or “single digit” civilian casualties.”2 **It is difficult to obtain data on strike casualties because of US efforts to shield the drone program from democratic accountability**, compounded by the obstacles to independent investigation of strikes in North Waziristan. The best currently available public aggregate data on drone strikes are provided by The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ), an independent journalist organization. TBIJ reports that **from June 2004 through midSeptember 2012, available data indicate that drone strikes killed 2,562-3,325 people in Pakistan**, of whom 474-881 were civilians, including 176 children.3 TBIJ reports that these **strikes also injured an additional 1,228-1,362 individuals**. **Where media accounts do report civilian casualties, rarely is any information provided about the victims or the communities they leave behind**. This report includes the harrowing narratives of many survivors, witnesses, and family members who provided evidence of civilian injuries and deaths in drone strikes to our research team. It also presents detailed accounts of three separate strikes, for which there is evidence of civilian deaths and injuries, including a March 2011 strike on a meeting of tribal elders that killed some 40 individuals. Second, **US drone strike policies cause considerable and under-accounted for harm to the daily lives of ordinary civilians, beyond death and physical injury**. **Drones hover twenty-four hours a day over communities in northwest Pakistan, striking homes, vehicles, and public spaces without warning**. **Their presence terrorizes men, women, and children, giving rise to anxiety and psychological trauma among civilian communities**. **Those living under drones have to face the constant worry that a deadly strike may be fired at any moment, and the knowledge that they are powerless to protect themselves. These fears have affected behavior. The US practice of striking one area multiple times, and evidence that it has killed rescuers, makes both community members and humanitarian workers afraid or unwilling to assist injured victims**. **Some community members shy away from gathering in groups, including important tribal dispute-resolution bodies, out of fear that they may attract the attention of drone operators. Some parents choose to keep their children home, and children injured or traumatized by strikes have dropped out of school.** Waziris told our researchers that the **strikes have undermined cultural and religious practices related to burial, and made family members afraid to attend funerals. In addition, families who lost loved ones or their homes in drone strikes now struggle to support themselves**.

### Case

**Womanist scholarship has been commodified by the market—saps it of revolutionary potential**

**Coleman 06** (Monica, "Roundtable Discussion: Must I Be Womanist?" Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion) monicaacoleman.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Must-I-Be-Womanist-Entire.pdf

Must Be Womanist: The Branding of "Womanist" **I'm a black female religious scholar. On the** academic **job market, that means I'm** also **a womanist.** As I approached lioth the job market and the writing of my dissertation, I found that my colleagues and superiors had an often-stated assumption not onlv that I was familiar with womanist theology but also that I was committed to writing womanist theology. **The assumption is that all black women in the academic study of religion are womanists.** Sadly enough, **it is almost a marketable necessity. Whatever my academic proficiencies, interviewing committees always ask, "Can you teach black and womanist theology?"** Tills fact became clear: **if I wanted to get a job, I had better identify as a womanist; and do it quickly**. The theme continues as I prepare to publish revisions of my dissertation. The word tvomanist should appear in the title, I am told. That way, editors say, people can find the lx>ok when thev do a word search and the publishers know how to identify the liook. **I give these personal sketches as examples of the commodification and commercialization of the term womanist** within the academic study of religion. I cannot imagine that the first womanists ever dreamed that this would happen. After all, as Camion says, **so many of them had to fight just to prove that black women were a legitimate subject/object of study in the field of religion.33 As womanist religious scholars grewr from the initial triumvirate** (Cannon, Grant, and Weems) to a second and third generation of black female religious scholars, the term womanist was inserted and generally accepted as a significant field of studv. One dare not study liberation theologies or feminist theologies without mention of womanist theology. For this, there is cause celebre. **But has this progress forced all black female religious scholars into the rubric of "womanist"?** The academy's religion market does not liear sole responsibility' for the branding of "womanist." Black female religions scholars use the word womanist to identify a support network, Listserv, and programmatic section at local and national meetings of the American Academy of Religion. The term womanist was originally created to engender freedom: Walker chose the word because it was "more reflective of black women's culture, especially Southern culture."36 She liked "the feel, the fit, the sound" of the word.37 1 don't always feel or fit into "womanist." As 1 choose a name for myself, 1 commit treason against someone— either the womanists who mentored me into religion or the black feminists who raised my consciousness, employed me, and encouraged my writing.\*' Just as the field of womanist religious scholarship has grown in convergence with and departure from Walker's life and definition, so **the term womanist may now be larger than the women who initially claimed it.** Can womanists reclaim the term? Do thev1 even want to? Is this commercialization a sign of advancement? Or have **hierarchical (often white** ami **male) entities co-opted it, as vet another way to brand and classify black women and our thoughts**? If this is the case, **womanism has not had the revolutionary effect of its black feminist roots**. Perhaps **the realistic need for job security tempers the fire of the revolution.**

**Their decision to use traditional gender categories to ground their movement is self-defeating and recreates systems of oppression**

**Rudy 01** (Kathy, professor of women's studies at Duke University, Spring 2001, “Radical Feminism, Lesbian Separatism, and Queer Theory” Feminist Studies, JSTOR)

A complete review of the works of Butler, Fuss, Sedgwick and others is both impossible and unnecessary here. Instead, I want to summarize a few points primarily as they relate to radical feminist ideology. These antiessentialist queer theorists argued in short that **biological sex and gender are socially constructed.** They noted that **the system of gender construction** that inhabited us **wrongly presumed that everyone has either an obvious penis or vagina, that every person has an uncomplicated relationship to that biological entity, and that owning that piece of equipment necessarily correlated to certain ontological characteristics. The concept of gender,** they suggested **instead, exists on an unstable background of tacit assumptions and fantasies about both "women" and "men." We can no longer appeal to the transhistorical concepts of "woman"** or "woman's essential nature" **as a grounding for contemporary feminism, for to do so is to assume the validity of the very idea that creates the oppression in the first place.** As Butler articulated it, **'an uncritical appeal to the system which constructs gender for the emancipation of 'women' will clearly be self-defeating**."18

**The gender binary constructed by the aff results in continued oppression—vote neg instead to recognize that there are a multiplicity of genders**

**Rudy 01** (Kathy, professor of women's studies at Duke University, Spring 2001, “Radical Feminism, Lesbian Separatism, and Queer Theory” Feminist Studies, JSTOR)

These queer theorists reminded us that **there are no fool-proof scientific tests for gender; there is no hormonal, chromosomal, or anatomical test that can be administered which in every case guarantees that the subject being tested is either a woman or a man.** If **gender** does not equate or reduce to chromosomes, genes, genitals, or hormones, it **can only be "produced,"** they suggest, **by a wide variety of social events, strategies, and fantasies**: who makes more money, who wears a dress, and so forth, all work to help us organize all people into these two tracks. **Being a "woman" or being a "man**" are unfortunately the only options available to us; these identifications **are constructed not by biological or natural "facts," but by a culture that constantly and consistently places us in one category rather than the other. Gender** (and particularly the idea that there can only be two of them), then, **is a matter of social construction; whether one acts as female or male is a matter of performance**-that is, doing the things a woman or man does and thereby coding ourselves as such-**not ontological certainty.** The more we do the things that-say, as in my case-a woman does, the more we feel ourselves to "be" a woman at our core. Our **gender**, then, is not a function of an ontological or even biological certainty. Rather, it **is established through a widely accepted social grid that teaches even young children to identify themselves and behave as either a girl or boy. It is something we** (as part of culture) **"do," not something we "are."** Again, as Butler expresses it, "there is no gender identity behind the expressions of gender; that identity is performatively constituted by the very 'expression' that are said to be its results."19 Gender isn't some- thing we're born with, it is something that we are born into; it consists of a catalog of performances which organize experiences based on the binary man/woman. These feminist theorists prodded us to question our attachment to radical ferninism's stable category of woman**. To think of worn- en's liberation as an event involving "women only,"** they said, **was not only to miss the complexities of oppression, but it was also to assume and posit the very category that itself perpetuates injustice.** The lines should not be drawn between women and men, they said but, rather between those who espouse progressive politics, especially around the issues of sexuality, and those who don't. They defend **a reconstruction of a multiplicity of genders** as a way of **disrupt**ing **the binary** which keeps us locked into the hierarchical man/woman system. They point to concrete social locations where bifurcated notions of gender are currently prob-lematized-such as in the activities and **self-presentations of trans-gendered people**-and suggest that such practices **subvert the dominant paradigm precisely because they remind us that genders are performances rather than a biological facts. Without a binary system of gender, we could experience neither sexism** (how could we know what a woman is?) **nor homophobia** (how could we imagine partners of the "same sex" if there were an unlimited number of options?).

**Womanist scholarship leaves out heterosexist oppression—cannot account for queer difference and re-entrenches oppression**

**Coleman 06** (Monica, "Roundtable Discussion: Must I Be Womanist?" Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion) monicaacoleman.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Must-I-Be-Womanist-Entire.pdf

**Womanist** religious **scholars have done very little to address the** theological.

spiritual, and religious **experiences of black lesbians (and gays). More than ten years ago, womanist theologian** Renee **Hill critiqued her colleagues for their failure to address the issue of lesbianism: "Christian women have failed to recognize heterosexism and homophobia as points of oppression that need to be resisted**

 **li nil Black women** (straight, lesbian and bisexual) **are to have liU'ration and a sense of their own power**.™1 On the one hand, womanist theologians have long been willing to add heterosexism to the matrix of oppressive forces that affect the lives of black women (in addition to racism, sexism, and classlsm}.\* In fact, Kellv Brown Douglas does this as early as The Black Christ (1994) and gives it greater attention in her later book Sexuality anil the Black Church (1999) \*Tb her credit, Douglas writes about the entire purview of black sexuality ami the black church, and other womanists actively teach about heterosexism and homophobia.' I'm not sure which is more disappointing though—that no womanist wrote more than a few paragraphs about homosexuality until the twenty-first century', or that Douglas connects the church's need to address homosexuality with the HIV/AIDS crisis in the black community.

**Generally**, however, **womanist** **religious scholarship is typified by a silence about homosexuality. At times the silence is obvious and deafening. Womanists reference** Andre **Lorde's discussion of the erotic as power without discussing Lorde's personal expression of the erotic**. Womanists discuss Baby Suggs's sermon in Toni Morrison's Beloved's Clearing without including the perhaps-sexual relationship in Morrison's Sula? Womanists frequently cite Celie and Sliug's conversation about God in Walkers The Color Puqrfe, while omitting the pas-

sionate love Celie finds in Sling's anus.**10 Without giving detailed attention to the issue of sexual orientation, womanists paint a picture of black women as sisters, other-mothers, girlfriends, and loving church mothers, when there is much more to the picture**. Douglas asserts that this silence is part of the overall taboo of discussing sexuality within the black community." Karen Baker-Fletcher is more direct: "1 suspect that **for many [womanists, our silence about homosexuality] is for the same reason that many gays and lesbians hesitate to come out of the closet**: fear of losing a job, of being thrown out of church, ostracized in the community." **The silence is understandable, but it quickly becomes complicity.**

**This silence is particularly disturbing given the fact that black lesbians were so active and vocal in the development of black feminism.** In the Combahee River Collective"s black feminist statement of 1977, the authors repeatedly refer to the collaboration among "black feminists and lesbians."13 In "The Failure to Transform: Homophobia in the Black Community" (I9S3), Cheryl Clarke harshly criticizes black female scholars for their homophobic silence: "Like her black male counterpart, the black woman intellectual is afraid to relinquish heterosexual privilege." Clarke insists that the black community address homophobia, not because of HIV/AIDS or to fight oppression, but because "ain't lesbians women too?"1\* **Self-identified black feminists spoke out alxiut the issue of heterosexism more than twenty years I»efore womanist** religious **scholars did.**

**Womanism is Christan-centered—fails to include individuals from other religions**

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Black female ethicist Cheryl Sanders readily, ami appropriately, I believe, divorces herself from the laliel "womanist," because she refuses to "affirm and/ or advocate homosexual practices."11 For this reason, she argues, no Christian should embrace the label "womanist." In many ways, I agree. If one is not willing to openly, forthrightlv, and consistently critique heterosexism and homophobia with the same fervor as the critique of sexism, racism, and classism, then perhaps one should not be a "womanist." As noted earlier, I also feel that **womanist** religious **scholarship has not done well in reflecting the religious pluralism of black women's faith associations.** When Walker writes that a womanist "loves the Spirit," **womanist religious scholars seem to have read, "loves the Christian Spirit**." 1 cannot fault womanists for being true to their own faith declarations, which often are Christian. In fact, womanist religious scholars have done a wonderful job at transforming the church from within. Marcia Riggs analyzes sexism within black churches in Plenty Good Room (2003). Cheryl Townsend Gilkes reminds the black church of its historical and contemporary dependence on black women in "If It Wasn't for the Women" (2001). In Time for Honor, Delores Carpenter writes extensively on the often-inequitable experiences of black female clergy in comparison with their male counterparts."' Many womanists maintain a commitment to write for lx)th the church and the academv: Renita Weems, Chervl Kirk-Duggan, and Karen Baker-Fletcher immediately come to mind. Where others may have, and some have, given up on the church's ability to include and value the voices and leadership of women. Christian womanists cling to their faith and the ground of this faith with a tenacity' that is second to none. In this process, however, **womanists have often assumed that black women's religious experiences are Christian. Sanders's earlier comment reveals both the assertion of a particular kind of Christianity and the assumption**

**that womanist religious scholars always reference Christianity'**. Baker-Fletcher notes that womanists have often followed the pattern of "black Christian women" who tend to "conflate Cod (Creator), Jesus, and Holy Spirit during the ordinary, everyday eloquent prayers in homes, churches, and gatherings."1' **Without clarifying the theological difference between God and Jesus, womanists are incapable of speaking to the many black women who do not identify as Christian** (or Christians with low Christologies). Intentionally or not, **womanists have created a Christian hegemonic discourse within the field.** This christocentric discourse leaves womanist religious scholarship without a language for many black women's religious experiences. **How**, for example, **might a womanist interpret the strength Tina Turner finds in Buddhism ami the role her faith played in helping her to leave a violent relationship?** More importantly**, how would a womanist describe** Walker's "horn-again **pagan" spirituality**?1\* Few womanist scholars have dared to describe black women's spirituality' when a womanist is one who "loves nature" or "lows the universe, ' fi,K' m's aspect of womanist religious scholarship particularly painful, because the Christian assumption does not speak to the multifaith nature of my own spirituality and scholarship.

## 2NC

#### Their perm ignores their original framing of the issue… which is crucial to ground because it underlies the value of all utterances… to shift the frame of the enunciation destabilizes all meaning.

Horst Ruthrof, Professor of English and Comparative Literature at Murdoch University in Perth, Australia, Pandora and Occam: On the Limits of Language and Literature; Indiana Univ. Press, 1992.

To complement analytical approaches to the description of meaning in socially saturated and literary discourse I am proposing a procedure 'in reverse.' Instead of building the inquiry up from the clarity of formal logic and trying by degrees to account for the increasing murkiness of socially more and more highly saturated speech forms, the present strategy takes as its starting point what I regard as the richest discourse of all, the literary text and concomitant forms of reading. The broad assumption is that I should be able to account for a significant number of salient features of complex languages if I describe the habitual acts of conventional performance. But there is also an assumption of an epistemological kind, namely that language is not graspable as an empirical object but is what it is only by virtue of the acts which we must perform when we do it. Language in this view is wholly dependent on instantiations, i. e., particular acts of uttering, a position which favors the specificity of parole over langue as abstractable system. But I am not arguing the wholesale dismissal of langue as much as the foregrounding of instantiation as a dynamic system at a lower level. Langues can always be abstracted from discursive events, but we need to determine whether such formalizations are useful or misleading in a specific theory. Instantiations on this view are both paroles and a kind of grammar at a low level of abstraction. Instantiation is seen as a necessary part of all discourses, from logico-mathematical language to the socially fully saturated speech of everyday life. And even if it is not possible to alter the propositional sense of mathematical expressions by a variant intonation, they too have to be performed to constitute mathematics as a sign system. Less controversially, in everyday speech the prosodic contour which we impose on words and expressions can modify dramatically what is 'meant*.*' In this view, language does not exist outside instantiations nor independently of social semiosis at large. Therefore I have on the whole collapsed the concepts of 'language' and 'speech' into discourse. Another obstacle to regarding the meanings of words, expressions, and sentences as stable entities is the observation that expressions do not only have to be instantiated, but that they can be instantiated only within certain conventions. No matter whether we read a literary text in a literary manner or as if it were a pragmatic text, such as an instruction sheet, in either case we have consciously, unconsciously, or nonconsciously 'opted' for a certain kind of reading convention. Such conventions or, more generally, frames or horizons, govern all utterances from formal logic to the speech of commerce and fiction.

#### 4th, praxis DA: This is why you can’t perm a method…They strip all of the conceptual theory that allows us to understand the world—worse than the aff or the alt alone. Perm will become like occupy wall street—it’s also a rejection of capitalism but doesn’t have a praxis because the movement is fractured, no one knows what they are fighting for—this is why it will never catch on.

Tumino (Prof. English @ Pitt) 01

[Stephen, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critiqu]

Orthodox Marxism has become a test-case of the "radical" today. Yet, what passes for orthodoxy on the left—whether like Smith and Zizek they claim to support it, or, like Butler and Rorty they want to "achieve our country" by excluding it from "U.S. Intellectual life" ("On Left Conservatism"), is a parody of orthodoxy which hybridizes its central concepts and renders them into flexodox simulations. Yet, even in its very textuality, however, the orthodox is a resistance to the flexodox. Contrary to the common-sensical view of "orthodox" as "traditional" or "conformist" "opinions," is its other meaning: ortho-doxy not as flexodox "hybridity," but as "original" "ideas." "Original," not in the sense of epistemic "event," "authorial" originality and so forth, but, as in chemistry, in its opposition to "para," "meta," "post" and other ludic hybridities: thus "ortho" as resistance to the annotations that mystify the original ideas of Marxism and hybridize it for the "special interests" of various groups. The "original" ideas of Marxism are inseparable from their effect as "demystification" of ideology—for example the deployment of "class" that allows a demystification of daily life from the haze of consumption. Class is thus an "original idea" of Marxism in the sense that it cuts through the hype of cultural agency under capitalism and reveals how culture and consumption are tied to labor, the everyday determined by the workday: how the amount of time workers spend engaging in surplus-labor determines the amount of time they get for reproducing and cultivating their needs. Without changing this division of labor social change is impossible. Orthodoxy is a rejection of the ideological annotations: hence, on the one hand, the resistance to orthodoxy as "rigid" and "dogmatic" "determinism," and, on the other, its hybridization by the flexodox as the result of which it has become almost impossible today to read the original ideas of Marxism, such as "exploitation"; "surplus-value"; "class"; "class antagonism"; "class struggle"; "revolution"; "science" (i.e., objective knowledge); "ideology" (as "false consciousness"). Yet, it is these ideas alone that clarify the elemental truths through which theory ceases to be a gray activism of tropes, desire and affect, and becomes, instead, a red, revolutionary guide to praxis for a new society freed from exploitation and injustice. Marx's original scientific discovery was his labor theory of value. Marx's labor theory of value is an elemental truth of Orthodox Marxism that is rejected by the flexodox left as the central dogmatism of a "totalitarian" Marxism. It is only Marx's labor theory of value, however, that exposes the mystification of the wages system that disguises exploitation as a "fair exchange" between capital and labor and reveals the truth about this relation as one of exploitation. Only Orthodox Marxism explains how what the workers sell to the capitalist is not labor, a commodity like any other whose price is determined by fluctuations in supply and demand, but their labor-power—their ability to labor in a system which has systematically "freed" them from the means of production so they are forced to work or starve—whose value is determined by the amount of time socially necessary to reproduce it daily. The value of labor-power is equivalent to the value of wages workers consume daily in the form of commodities that keep them alive to be exploited tomorrow. Given the technical composition of production today this amount of time is a slight fraction of the workday the majority of which workers spend producing surplus-value over and above their needs. The surplus-value is what is pocketed by the capitalists in the form of profit when the commodities are sold. Class is the antagonistic division thus established between the exploited and their exploiters. Without Marx's labor theory of value one could only contest the after effects of this outright theft of social labor-power rather than its cause lying in the private ownership of production. The flexodox rejection of the labor theory of value as the "dogmatic" core of a totalitarian Marxism therefore is a not so subtle rejection of the principled defense of the (scientific) knowledge workers need for their emancipation from exploitation because only the labor theory of value exposes the opportunism of knowledges (ideology) that occult this exploitation. Without the labor theory of value socialism would only be a moral dogma that appeals to the sentiments of "fairness" and "equality" for a "just" distribution of the social wealth that does the work of capital by naturalizing the exploitation of labor under capitalism giving it an acceptable "human face."

#### Only class as a starting point allows us to understand the intersection between different manifestations of oppression

McLaren & D'Anniable 4 - (Peter, Valerie Scatamburlo, Educational Philosophy and Theory, Vol. 36, No. 2, 2004, © 2004 Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia April 2004, Class Dismissed? Historical materialism and the politics of ‘difference)

The real problem is the internal or dialectical relation that exists between capital and labor within the capitalist production process itself—a social relation in which capitalism is intransigently rooted. This social relation—essential to the production of abstract labor—deals with how already existing value is preserved and new value (surplus value) is created (Allman, 2001). If, for example, the process of actual exploitation and the accumulation of surplus value is to be seen as a state of constant manipulation and as a realization process of concrete labor in actual labor time—within a given cost-production system and a labor market—we cannot underestimate the ways in which ‘difference’ (racial as well as gender difference) is encapsulated in the production/reproduction dialectic of capital. It is this relationship that is mainly responsible for the inequitable and unjust distribution of resources. A deepened understanding of this phenomenon is essential for understanding the emergence of an acutely polarized labor market and the fact that disproportionately high percentages of ‘people of color’ are trapped in the lower rungs of domestic and global labor markets (McLaren & Farahmandpur, 1999). ‘Difference’ in the era of global capitalism is crucial to the workings, movements and proﬁt levels of multinational corporations but those types of complex relations cannot be mapped out by using truncated post-Marxist, culturalist conceptualizations of ‘difference.’ To sever issues of ‘difference’ from class conveniently draws attention away from the crucially important ways in which ‘people of color’ (and, more speciﬁcally, ‘women of color’) provide capital with its superexploited labor pools—a phenomenon that is on the rise all over the world. Most social relations constitutive of racialized differences are considerably shaped by the relations of production and there is undoubtedly a racialized and gendered division of labor whose severity and function vary depending on where one is situated in the capitalist global economy (Meyerson, 2000).6 In stating this, we need to include an important caveat that differentiates our approach from those invoking the well-worn race/class/gender triplet which can sound, to the uninitiated, both radical and vaguely Marxian. It is not. Race, class and gender, while they invariably intersect and interact, are not co-primary. This ‘triplet’ approximates what the ‘philosophers might call a category mistake.’ On the surface the triplet may be convincing—some people are oppressed because of their race, others as a result of their gender, yet others because of their class—but this ‘is grossly misleading’ for it is not that ‘some individuals manifest certain characteristics known as “class” which then results in their oppression; on the contrary, to be a member of a social class just is to be oppressed’ and in this regard class is ‘a wholly social category’ (Eagleton, 1998, p. 289). Furthermore, even though ‘class’ is usually invoked as part of the aforementioned and much vaunted triptych, it is usually gutted of its practical, social dimension or treated solely as a cultural phenomenon—as just another form of ‘difference.’ In these instances, class is transformed from an economic and, indeed, social category to an exclusively cultural or discursive one or one in which class merely signiﬁes a ‘subject position.’ Class is therefore cut off from the political economy of capitalism and class power severed from exploitation and a power structure ‘in which those who control collectively produced resources only do so because of the value generated by those who do not’ (Hennessy & Ingraham, 1997, p. 2). Such theorizing has had the effect of replacing an historical materialist class analysis with a cultural analysis of class. As a result, many post-Marxists have also stripped the idea of class of precisely that element which, for Marx, made it radical—namely its status as a universal form of exploitation whose abolition required (and was also central to) the abolition of all manifestations of oppression (Marx, 1978, p. 60). With regard to this issue, Kovel (2002) is particularly insightful, for he explicitly addresses an issue which continues to vex the Left—namely the priority given to different categories of what he calls ‘dominative splitting’—those categories of ‘gender, class, race, ethnic and national exclusion,’ etc. Kovel argues that we need to ask the question of priority with respect to what? He notes that if we mean priority with respect to time, then the category of gender would have priority since there are traces of gender oppression in all other forms of oppression. If we were to prioritize in terms of existential signiﬁcance, Kovel suggests that we would have to depend upon the immediate historical forces that bear down on distinct groups of people—he offers examples of Jews in 1930s Germany who suffered from brutal forms of anti-Semitism and Palestinians today who experience anti-Arab racism under Israeli domination. The question of what has political priority, however, would depend upon which transformation of relations of oppression are practically more urgent and, while this would certainly depend upon the preceding categories, it would also depend upon the fashion in which all the forces acting in a concrete situation are deployed. As to the question of which split sets into motion all of the others, the priority would have to be given to class since class relations entail the state as an instrument of enforcement and control, and it is the state that shapes and organizes the splits that appear in human ecosystems. Thus class is both logically and historically distinct from other forms of exclusion (hence we should not talk of ‘classism’ to go along with ‘sexism’ and ‘racism,’ and ‘species-ism’). This is, ﬁrst of all, because class is an essentially (hu)man-made category, without root in even a mystiﬁed biology. We cannot imagine a human world without gender distinctions—although we can imagine a world without domination by gender. But a world without class is eminently imaginable—indeed, such was the human world for the great majority of our species’ time on earth, during all of which considerable fuss was made over gender. Historically, the difference arises because ‘class’ signiﬁes one side of a larger ﬁgure that includes a state apparatus whose conquests and regulations create races and shape gender relations. Thus there will be no true resolution of racism so long as class society stands, inasmuch as a racially oppressed society implies the activities of a class-defending state. Nor can gender inequality be enacted away so long as class society, with its state, demands the super-exploitation of women’s labor. (Kovel, 2002, pp. 123–124) Contrary to what many have claimed, Marxist theory does not relegate categories of ‘difference’ to the conceptual mausoleum; rather, it has sought to reanimate these categories by interrogating how they are refracted through material relations of power and privilege and linked to relations of production. Moreover, it has emphasized and insisted that the wider political and economic system in which they are embedded needs to be thoroughly understood in all its complexity. Indeed, Marx made clear how constructions of race and ethnicity ‘are implicated in the circulation process of variable capital.’ To the extent that ‘gender, race, and ethnicity are all understood as social constructions rather than as essentialist categories’ the effect of exploring their insertion into the ‘circulation of variable capital (including positioning within the internal heterogeneity of collective labor and hence, within the division of labor and the class system)’ must be interpreted as a ‘powerful force reconstructing them in distinctly capitalist ways’ (Harvey, 2000, p. 106). Unlike contemporary narratives which tend to focus on one or another form of oppression, the irrefragable power of historical materialism resides in its ability to reveal (1) how forms of oppression based on categories of difference do not possess relative autonomy from class relations but rather constitute the ways in which oppression is lived/experienced within a class-based system; and (2) how all forms of social oppression function within an overarching capitalist system. This framework must be further distinguished from those that invoke the terms ‘classism’ and/or ‘class elitism’ to (ostensibly) foreground the idea that ‘class matters’ (cf. hooks, 2000) since we agree with Gimenez (2001, p. 24) that ‘class is not simply another ideology legitimating oppression.’ Rather, class denotes ‘exploitative relations between people mediated by their relations to the means of production.’ To marginalize such a conceptualization of class is to conﬂate an individual’s objective location in the intersection of structures of inequality with people’s subjective understandings of who they really are based on their ‘experiences.’ Another caveat. In making such a claim, we are not renouncing the concept of experience. On the contrary, we believe it is imperative to retain the category of lived experience as a reference point in light of misguided post-Marxist critiques which imply that all forms of Marxian class analysis are dismissive of subjectivity. We are not, however, advocating the uncritical fetishization of ‘experience’ that tends to assume that experience somehow guarantees the authenticity of knowledge and which often treats experience as self-explanatory, transparent, and solely individual. Rather, we advance a framework that seeks to make connections between seemingly isolated situations and/or particular experiences by exploring how they are constituted in, and circumscribed by, broader historical and social circumstances. Experiential understandings, in and of themselves, are suspect because, dialectically, they constitute a unity of opposites—they are at once unique, speciﬁc, and personal, but also thoroughly partial, social, and the products of historical forces about which individuals may know little or nothing (Gimenez, 2001). In this sense, a rich description of immediate experience in terms of consciousness of a particular form of oppression (racial or otherwise) can be an appropriate and indispensable point of departure. Such an understanding, however, can easily become an isolated ‘difference’ prison unless it transcends the immediate perceived point of oppression, confronts the social system in which it is rooted, and expands into a complex and multifaceted analysis (of forms of social mediation) that is capable of mapping out the general organization of social relations. That, however, requires a broad class-based approach. Having a concept of class helps us to see the network of social relations constituting an overall social organization which both implicates and cuts through racialization/ethnicization and gender … [a] radical political economy [class] perspective emphasizing exploitation, dispossession and survival takes the issues of … diversity [and difference] beyond questions of conscious identity such as culture and ideology, or of a paradigm of homogeneity and heterogeneity … or of ethical imperatives with respect to the ‘other’. (Bannerji, 2000, pp. 7, 19) A radical political economy framework is crucial since various ‘culturalist’ perspectives seem to diminish the role of political economy and class forces in shaping the ediﬁce of ‘the social’—including the shifting constellations and meanings of ‘difference.’ Furthermore, none of the ‘differences’ valorized in culturalist narratives alone, and certainly not ‘race’ by itself can explain the massive transformation of the structure of capitalism in recent years. We agree with Meyerson (2000) that ‘race’ is not an adequate explanatory category on its own and that the use of ‘race’ as a descriptive or analytical category has serious consequences for the way in which social life is presumed to be constituted and organized. The category of ‘race’—the conceptual framework that the oppressed often employ to interpret their experiences of inequality ‘often clouds the concrete reality of class, and blurs the actual structure of power and privilege.’ In this regard, ‘race’ is all too often a ‘barrier to understanding the central role of class in shaping personal and collective outcomes within a capitalist society’ (Marable, 1995, pp. 8, 226). In many ways, the use of ‘race’ has become an analytical trap precisely when it has been employed in antiseptic isolation from the messy terrain of historical and material relations. This, of course, does not imply that we ignore racism and racial oppression; rather, an analytical shift from ‘race’ to a plural conceptualization of ‘racisms’ and their historical articulations is necessary (cf. McLaren & Torres, 1999). However, it is important to note that ‘race’ doesn’t explain racism and forms of racial oppression. Those relations are best understood within the context of class rule, as Bannerji, Kovel, Marable and Meyerson imply—but that compels us to forge a conceptual shift in theorizing, which entails (among other things) moving beyond the ideology of ‘difference’ and ‘race’ as the dominant prisms for understanding exploitation and oppression. We are aware of some potential implications for white Marxist criticalists to unwittingly support racist practices in their criticisms of ‘race-ﬁrst’ positions articulated in the social sciences. In those instances, white criticalists wrongly go on ‘high alert’ in placing theorists of color under special surveillance for downplaying an analysis of capitalism and class. These activities on the part of white criticalists must be condemned, as must be efforts to stress class analysis primarily as a means of creating a white vanguard position in the struggle against capitalism. Our position is one that attempts to link practices of racial oppression to the central, totalizing dynamics of capitalist society in order to resist white supremacist capitalist patriarchy more fully.7

## 1NR

### Overview

**Critical thinking skills are crucial to solve world problems—the training debate provides is uniquely key. It’s a pre-requisite to applying their aff in the real world**

**Lundberg 10** - Christian O. Lundberg 10 Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p311

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But **the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech**—as indicated earlier, **debate builds capacity for critical thinking**, analysis of public claims, **informed decision making, and better public judgment**. **If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid** scientific and technological **change** outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, **and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate**. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because **as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy** such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems **place such a high premium on education** (Dewey 1988,63, 154). **Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them**, to son rhroueh and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly infonnation-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them. The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediatcd information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources: To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144) Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that **debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity**. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials. There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, **the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice** in the classroom as a technology **for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life**. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, **and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life. Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including**: domestic and international **issues of class, gender, and racial justice**; **wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change**; emerging **threats to international stability** in § Marked 18:30 § the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; **and increasing challenges of rapid globalization** including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. **More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill** and sensitivity **provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with** the **existential challenges** to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.

#### Negotiated stasis is necessary for debate—without a starting point, teams just talk past each other

**O’Donnell 4** – PhD, director of debate at Mary Washington (Tim, WFU Debaters Research Guide, “Blue helmet blues”, ed. Bauschard& Lacy, http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/DRGArtiarticlesIndex.htm)

The answer, I believe, resides deep in the rhetorical tradition in the often overlooked notion of stasis. Although the concept can be traced to Aristotle’s Rhetoric, it was later expanded by Hermagoras whose thinking has come down to us through the Roman rhetoricians Cicero and Quintillian. Stasis is a Greek word meaning to “stand still.” It has generally been considered by argumentation scholars to be the point of clash where two opposing sides meet in argument.Stasis recognizes the fact that interlocutors engaged in a conversation, discussion, or debate need to have some level of expectation regarding what the focus of their encounter ought to be. To reach stasis, participants need to arrive at a decision about what the issue is prior to the start of their conversation. Put another way, they need to mutually acknowledge the point about which they disagree. What happens when participants fail to reach agreement about what it is thatthey are arguing about? They talk past each other with little or no awareness of what the other is saying.The oft used cliché of two ships passing in the night, where both are in the dark about what the other is doing and neither stands still long enough to call out to the other, is the image most commonly used to describe what happens when participants in an argument fail to achieve stasis. In such situations, genuine engagement is not possible because participants have not reached agreement about what is in dispute. For example, when one advocate says that the United States should increase international involvement in the reconstruction of Iraq and their opponent replies that the United States should abandon its policy of preemptive military engagement, they are talking past each other. When such a situation prevails, it is hard to see how a productive conversation can ensue. I do not mean to suggest that dialogic engagement always unfolds along an ideal plain where participants always can or even ought to agree on a mutual starting point. The reality is that many do not. In fact, refusing to acknowledge an adversary’s starting point is itself a powerful strategic move. However, it must be acknowledged that when such situations arise, and participants cannot agree on the issue about which they disagree, the chances that their exchange will result in a productive outcome are diminished significantly. In an enterprise like academic debate, where the goals of the encounter are cast along both educational and competitive lines, the need to reach accommodation on the starting point is urgent. This is especially the case when time is limited and there is no possibility of extending the clock. The sooner such agreement is achieved, the better. Stasis helps us understand that we stand to lose a great deal when we refuse a genuine starting point.

The benefits of debate can only be achieved by focusing on a **stable resolution**---debate’s unique from a conversation among friends where tangential relevance to the topic at hand has no implication---given the multiplicity of perspectives about the resolution, formal rules are crucial

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No doubt, in the course of discussion, csomeone may feel that it would be wiser for the assembly to discuss a somewhat different proposition than the one specified, perhaps worded in a subtly or substantially different way. But if they want to press the point, the parliamentary rule is that they must move an amendment, changing the wording of the motion under discussion, once again in a specifically formulated way. Proceedings are then devoted to a discussion of the virtues of the amendment, qua amendment, and a vote is taken on that, before the substantive discussion is resumed. And again, we see the virtue of this way of doing things in a diverse assembly. In conversation among friends, the topic may shift in an open-ended way, and people familiar with one another have both the willingness and the ability to keep track. But in an assembly consisting of people who are largely strangers to one another, deliberation would be hopeless if there was a sense that the topic might or might not have shifted slightly after every contribution. So, although amendment processes exist, their formulaic character and the rules governing their proposal and adoption provide a way of keeping track of where thediscussion is, a way of keeping track which does not depend upon implicit understandings that some of the members may not share.¶When discussion is exhausted, a vote may be called for, and-if my experience of law faculty meetings is any indication-someone will immediately leap to their feet and say: "I'm confused. What exactly are we voting on?" In a well-run assembly, the clerk or secretary will be in a position at that stage to read out the proposition (as amended) which now is the focus of the final vote. Once again, the determinacy of that proposition, as formulated and as amended, is important to establish a sense that we are all orienting our actions in voting to the same object. It is important for me to know, for example, that what I take myself to be voting against is exactly what my opponent takes himself to be voting in favor of. Otherwise, the idea that our votes, on a given occasion, are to be aggregated and weighed against one another becomes a nonsense.¶ What I have just described is rudimentary by comparison with the processes employed in actual legislative assemblies such as the Congress of the United States. Bills are longer and more complex than the sort of motions one hears at faculty meetings. They have usually been drafted-more or less competently-in advance, and there are many stages of deliberation (including committee stages, whose proceedings may be much less formal) that bills must go through before they are adopted. And, this is to say nothing of the vicissitudes of bicamerality, conference committees, and the rest.¶ For the most part, however, these complications enhance the need for a determinate text to focus and coordinate the various stages of the legislative process. Without a text to consider, to mark up, to amend, to confer about, and to vote upon, the process of law-making in a large and unwieldy assembly would have even a greater air of babel-like futility than that which is currently associated with Congress.¶ Thus, whether we are talking about a small-scale meeting or a large-scale legislative process, the positing of a formulated text as the resolution under discussion provides a focus for the ordering of deliberation at every stage. The existence of a verbalized bill, motion, or resolution is key to norms of relevance, and key to the sense, which procedural rules are supposed to provide, that participants' contributions are relevant to one another and that they are not talking at cross purposes. Maybe, a one-person deliberative body can do without this-though even there, many of us are familiar with the mnemonic virtues of a formulated proposition in our own solitary decision-making. And maybe, decision-making in a small group of oligarchs or in a junta of familiars can do without this as well, if they can move toward consensus on the basis of conversational informality. But the sense of a determinate focus for discussion-something whose existence is distinct from the will or tacit understandings of particular members'- seems absolutely indispensable for a large and diverse assembly of people whose knowledge and trust of one another is limited.¶ VIII If there is anything to this hypothesis, then we might want to start thinking about the textual canonicity of legislation in a slightly different way. I said in Part I that one of the values most commonly associated in the modern world with legislation is democratic legitimacy: We should defer to statutes because they have been enacted by a democratically elected entity. Just as the idea of democracy is insufficient to explain why we prefer a large elected legislature to a single elected legislator, so the democratic principle is insufficient to explain the particular way in which authority is accorded to legislation in the mod- ern world, viz., by taking seriously the exact words that were used in the formulations that emerged from the legislative chamber. If I am right, we now have an explanation for the importance of the ipsissimaverba which is oriented primarily to the legislators' dealings among themselves, rather than directly to the issue of their collective authority vis-a-vis the people. The final step, then, in pursuit of this hypothesis would be to show how this account of the importance of a text to the legislators is connected with the authority of the text for its intended audience. Here there are a couple of lines to pursue. First, as we have seen, the existence of orderly discussion is necessary to secure whatever Aristotelian advantages accrue from deliberation in a large and diverse group. Unless the diverse experiences and knowledge of the various legislators can connect and be synthesized, it is unlikely that their interaction will produce standards that are superior to those that any individual citizen could work out for herself. The conditions for orderly discussion, then, are indirectly conditions for the legislature's authority, in the Razian sense.8 9 In other words, authority requires superior expertise; superior expertise comes from deliberation among those who aredifferent from one another; deliberation among those who are different from one another is possible only on the basis of formal rules of order; and crucial to rules of order is the postulation of an agreed text as the focus of discussion.*¶*Second, respect for statute law is partly a matter of respect for the legislature as a forumwhose representativeness is an aspect of the fairness90 of the way a community makes its decisions. To the extent that representativeness requires diversity in the assembly, respect for that fairness is a matter of respecting the conditions under which diverse representatives can deliberate coherently. Thus, fairness-based respect for thelegislature as a body may require not only that we respect the standards which it posits, but also that we respect these more formal aspects of the way in which its posited standards are arrived at- and thus that we respect the standards in question under the auspices of text-based formality.9 '

### A2 “Master’s Tools”

**Working from within the system can produce change – best method to break down ontological exclusion and master/slave binaries.**

Robin M. **James**, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, UNC-Charlotte, “Autonomy, Universality, and Playing the Guitar: On the Politics and Aesthetics of Contemporary Feminist Deployments of the ‘Master's Tools’, April 14, 20**09**.

Norma Coates expresses here an ethical and aesthetic quandary we might term a “feminist guilty pleasure”: liking something one knows one just shouldn't like, since one considers its politics problematic, if not disgusting. Why would an avowed feminist like this clearly misogynistic work? How can one have an aesthetic taste for something that is politically disgusting? This is not a new question by any means, but it is still a contested one. Indeed, Audre Lorde has famously argued that the “the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house,” just as Laura Mulvey has equally famously called for the necessity for feminists to abandon mainstream cinematic pleasure as coercive (Mulvey 1975; Lorde 1983). I contend, however, that **we should not be too quick to dismiss either the “master's tools”** or some of the “pleasures” we might experience from them. Indeed, **when appropriately hacked, the master's tools in certain situations and under certain criteria might even be very effective tools for feminist, anti-racist work.** Examining two cases—one political, one aesthetic—from the perspective of non-ideal theory, I will demonstrate concrete instances in which multiply-underprivileged individuals have utilized, for liberatory ends, the concepts, rhetoric, and methodologies characteristic of what bell hooks terms “the white supremacist capitalist patriarchy.”1 Judith Butler's recent appeals for “autonomy” and “universality,” and indie-electro artist Peaches's use of conventionally racist and sexist art forms are all instances in which “**the master's tools” have been productively reappropriated for progressive ends**. I argue that non-ideal theory also helps clarify two conditions that help to distinguish a successful resignification from a hegemonic rearticulation: first, **reappropriation is successful when**, as Butler argues, **the very process of an “outsider's” appropriation of “insider” privilege collapses the insider/outsider or master/marginalized distinction, so the procedure is itself transformative**; second, **success is achieved in instances where nothing else does quite what the master's tools “do,” when nothing is as accessible, effective, affective**—or, as in the case of Coates and the Stones, as “sexy”—**as mainstream/conventional discourse**.