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#### For thousands of years, nonhuman animals have been exploited in human wars. Horses were used as vehicles to carry colonial armies across continents, dogs were strapped with explosives and sent into enemy territory, and pigeons delivered messages between bases, often shot out of the sky by opposing forces. But the exploitation of nonhumans is not merely a thing of the past, nor is it limited to the battlefield. The military-animal-industrial complex is all around us. Millions of nonhuman animals are subjected to horrifying lab experiments at research universities like this one, tortured in the name of developing ever more lethal weapons. Dogs and dolphins are still used regularly in combat to detect and deliver bombs, and are often left to die among rotting corpses when armies retreat. Ecosystems are utterly destroyed by war—chemicals poison the water, bombs destroy forests and pollute the air, and humans displaced by conflict are forced to ravage what is left for survival. It should be clear that the exploitation of nonhumans is a central part of the militaristic mindset, past and present.

 (All examples are from the book “Animals and War: Confronting the Military-Animal Industrial Complex”)

#### And yet, current anti-war discourse, both in debate and the academy more broadly, largely ignores the impact that war has on non-humans. War is calculated purely in terms of human lives lost, human safety, and human interests. This human-centered approach has no hope of ending militarism—only the affirmative’s account of both human and non-human suffering can address the underlying causes of militarism and reign in the security state that threatens the extinction of all life on earth

Johns 98 [David M. Adjunct Assistant Professor of Political Science Portland State Univ. B.S. Political Science and Anthropology 1976, Portland State University; M.A. Political Science 1978, J.D. Law, 1980, Columbia University. The Relevance of Deep Ecology to the Third World (1990) Some Preliminary Comments in The great new wilderness debate By J. Baird Callicott, Michael P. Nelson] [ct] [Page/s 257]

MILITARIZATION As with overconsumption we should ask which system of values will constrain militarism more: the human- or the biosphere-centered? By recognizing the valuableness of nature and other species apart from their usefulness to humans, a significant constraint is imposed on human activity with regard to both the conduct of war and more importantly the economic activity that is essential to preparation for war. Indeed, more than war itself, it is the consumption of "resources" to create and maintain the industrial capacity geared to arms production -for whatever purpose--that is so destructive of the biosphere. All human centered value systems necessarily fall prey to the easy rationalization of militarism. If one is concerned only with humans, with the perpetuation and protection of particular social systems against internal or external threats, the constraints placed upon the consumption of nature are weak indeed. Even when limits on resources may temper overconsumption generally, there is a real tendency in this sphere of "national security" to literally let the future take care of itself and commit all to the current struggle. Certainly aesthetic regard for nature falls by the wayside. If the machine needs oil, then drill. The Soviet Union, as an example, has some of the strictest environmental legislation in the world. These laws also provide a giant loophole for any endeavor related to the security of the state, virtually negating restrictions!' Most countries start with weaker laws to begin with before embracing the exceptions. There are many human-centered value systems, religious and secular, critical of militarization—and all are largely ineffective. The failure comes in part from the wedding of values to structures of power—be they church or state—that depend upon force for their survival. Insofar as these pacifistic values arc taken up by those "outside" these structures they provide some check. But because they are human-centered—the point of opposing militarization is to end human waste and suffering—it is easy to neutralize them by appeal to other human values and other forms of suffering even worse than war or the costs of deterrence. The other great weakness is that much pacifistic thinking does not address adequately the roots of militarism, something I attempt to do below. If one values nature in and for itself, then human goals and needs are placed within the context of a larger community. The value placed on the integrity of that community militates heavily against any human-centered rationalization for exploitation. A biocentrism view quite simply limits the conversion of ecosystems and biomass to human use to any extensive degree. Although such a view may seem utopian, because it poses a threat to the survival of particular social systems or the system of historical social systems, it does not pose a threat to tic survival of the species as some would argue. Quite the opposite, the threat to both us and the planet comes from this system of systems. It is here that biocentrism provides understanding which human-centered approaches cannot, for the latter accept fundamental values which justify the very structures that give rise to the outcomes they criticize. Consider the roots of militarism. Because modern militarism is panicularly virulent, attempts to understand and criticize this blight are often limited to the modern period. Certainly the combination of enlightenment arrogance, science, and technology, embedded in the international political economy resulting from the European expansion, has produced a very dangerous world."' It is, however, necessary to look more deeply into human history to grasp the underlying dynamic of militarism. While it may have reached new proportions, it is not new, but rather an essential feature of something very old: civilization.'It is inseparable from social systems based upon hierarchy (class, gender, and ethnic), control of nature, the denial of self, and the emotions and bonds which constitute the self. It is an essential feature of those societies in which the state exists, the process by which the state attempts to substitute itself for authentic human community is well underway, and conflict between communities has been replaced by the institutionalized conflict of center and periphery and between competing centers." Civilization, and the process of its formation and emergence in the neolithichic, **is the story of the human attempt to adapt through** various **strategies of control**—control **of nature and of people** through technology and social organization. **It is this** attempt to control nature that separates us from it, that **constitutes the core of our** alienation from it, and that becomes the foundation for social development that includes patriarchy, class domination, statism, and militarism. While most, but by no means all human centered value systems eschew militarism, civilization is held as a crowning achievement. Some value systems praise the military spirit, while the majority that condemn it usually do so as a necessary evil, i.e.. they simultaneously justify it to one degree or another. The point to be made here is that civilization is based upon and is constituted by relationships of domination that invariably and necessarily produce the conflict and inequality which make militarism inevitable. Certainly some human-centered theory recognizes aspects of the roots of militarism. and it recognizes the terrible price humans have paid, even if ignoring the price nature has paid. Nevertheless, critics maintain a fervent faith in the human mission to manage, in the human ability to disentangle what is inextricably linked. They speak from within the perspective of civilization and cannot see that they must transcend the precarious ground on which they (we) teeter." Critical theory shares much in common with liberal theory in this area. Some Marxist analysis of the genesis of modern Militarism is sound. The notion that many human ills would be solved with due end of class society is also appealing. But the end of class is not the end of the state or of domination, and hence not the end of social systems which produce militarism. (Nor is the end of capitalism the end of class.) The control of nature and the human control of social and cultural evolution are values deeply embedded in most Marxism. Although it has developed useful models for understanding social transformation, the assumptions, perspective, and the content of the transformative vision arc very much within the human-centered tradition that is part of the problem.'" Some feminism gets much closer to the source of the problem in its cri- tique of hierarchy generally and in particular in its understanding of the central role of patriarchy to militarism and to producing humans amenable to domination. At times. however, feminist theory falls into a kind of intraspecific dualism, i.e., human males are the problem (while at the same time claiming credit for the fact that females created agriculture, which became the economic foundation for the emergence of hierarchy), ignoring that systems adapt to and alter the environment, and individuals adapt to (even while they resist) the roles created by the system's division of labor.' Even where this dualism is not at issue, most feminism, like Marxism, remains human-centered. Values such as community, spontaneity, and integration of emotion and intellect militate against the worst features of mainstream human-centered values, but still fail to take account a the re-lationship with nature as fundamental to all hierarchical systems. Or they remain anthropocentric and fail to address the separation front nature which not only makes possible the superexploitation of the biosphere for the maintenance of the military apparatus. but also underlies the social structures which produce militarism. While Marxism, feminism, and other critical social theory have contributed much to understanding the dynamic of our civilization, they tend to miss the point that if nonhuman life is not valued for itself, then life is not valued for itself. Any system of values that does not transcend nature-as-other cannot limit destruction of the biosphere as effectively as one that embraces nonhuman life as intrinsically valuable. Nor can such a value system help to heal the fundamental split in the human psyche which makes possible civilization and militarism. Biocentrism is not alone in grasping that the dynamic of human evolution over the last six or seven thousand years may be at a dead end. Certainly the huge growth in human numbers. the displacement of "simpler" societies by more "complex" ones, ones with greater capacity to exploit nature, capture and use energy, and so on suggests that the underlying dynamic is highly adaptive, at least at first glance. What is increasingly clear. however, is that if this dynamic continues we stand a very good chance of killing ourselves along with a good portion of the rest of the planet. The latter is well under way—it's business as usual. Biocentrism offers a direction for human society based upon a thoroughly fundamental transformation which stresses the centrality of finding our place in nature. Such a transformation is as fundamental as the neolithic or industrial revolutions. A life-centered or planet-centered value system requires that we move toward transcending the split with nature both within our own psyches and in our material relationships: how we consume and alter the biosphere. Far fewer humans, far lower levels of consumption for many. much improved levels for others, the recreation of authentic communitics that reintegrate the human into the natural, and the abandonment of the instrummentalities of control—these are a few of the implications of such an ethic. In contrast, a human-centered approach focuses on wiser if not greater human control. In its more progressive forms we hear words like stewardship rather than ownership; nevertheless, underlying both is the notion that we can replace nature with our intellect. that we can manage our way out of any problems, that We as a species are not only unique (as every species and ecosystem is), but that our uniqueness means we are godlike, better than the others. In short, it is the same arrogance. the same split that has brought us to the current crisis.

#### Refusal to consider the interests of nonhuman animals is a form of speciesism that has no place in a movement for social justice and relies on logic that justifies racism and sexism. The only ethical framework is to take into account the interests of all beings.

Regan 89 (Tom and Peter Singer, "Animal Rights and Human Obligations”, New Jersey, pp. 148-162) www.animal-rights-library.com/texts-m/singer02.htm

In recent years a number of oppressed groups have campaigned vigorously for equality. The classic instance is the Black Liberation movement, which demands an end to the prejudice and discrimination that has made blacks second-class citizens. The immediate appeal of the black liberation movement and its initial, if limited, success made it a model for other oppressed groups to follow. We became familiar with liberation movements for Spanish-Americans, gay people, and a variety of other minorities. When a majority group—women—began their campaign, some thought we had come to the end of the road. Discrimination on the basis of sex, it has been said, is the last universally accepted form of discrimination, practiced without secrecy or pretense even in those liberal circles that have long prided themselves on their freedom from prejudice against racial minorities. One should always be wary of talking of "the last remaining form of discrimination." If we have learnt anything from the liberation movements, we should have learnt how difficult it is to be aware of latent prejudice in our attitudes to particular groups until this prejudice is forcefully pointed out. A liberation movement demands an expansion of our moral horizons and an extension or reinterpretation of the basic moral principle of equality. Practices that were previously regarded as natural and inevitable come to be seen as the result of an unjustifiable prejudice. Who can say with confidence that all his or her attitudes and practices are beyond criticism? If we wish to avoid being numbered amongst the oppressors, we must be prepared to re-think even our most fundamental attitudes. We need to consider them from the point of view of those most disadvantaged by our attitudes, and the practices that follow from these attitudes. If we can make this unaccustomed mental switch we may discover a pattern in our attitudes and practices that consistently operates so as to benefit one group—usually the one to which we ourselves belong—at the expense of another. In this way we may come to see that there is a case for a new liberation movement. My aim is to advocate that we make this mental switch in respect of our attitudes and practices towards a very large group of beings: members of species other than our own—or, as we popularly though misleadingly call them, animals. In other words, I am urging that we extend to other spe cies the basic principle of equality that most of us recognize should be extended to all members of our own species. All this may sound a little far-fetched, more like a parody of other liberation movements than a serious objective. In fact, in the past the idea of "The Rights of Animals" really has been used to parody the case for women's rights. When Mary Wollstonecraft, a forerunner of later feminists, published her Vindication of the Rights of Women in 1792, her ideas were widely regarded as absurd, and they were satirized in an anonymous publication entitled A Vindication of the Rights of Brutes. The author of this satire (actually Thomas Taylor, a distinguished Cambridge philosopher) tried to refute Wollstonecraft's reasonings by showing that they could be carried one stage further. If sound when applied to women, why should the arguments not be applied to dogs, cats, and horses? They seemed to hold equally well for these "brutes"; yet to hold that brutes had rights was manifestly absurd; therefore the reasoning by which this conclusion had been reached must be unsound, and if unsound when applied to brutes, it must also be unsound when applied to women, since the very same arguments had been used in each case. One way in which we might reply to this argument is by saying that the case for equality between men and women cannot validly be extended to nonhuman animals. Women have a right to vote, for instance, because they are just as capable of making rational decisions as men are; dogs, on the other hand, are incapable of understanding the significance of voting, so they cannot have the right to vote. There are many other obvious ways in which men and women resemble each other closely, while humans and other animals differ greatly. So, it might be said, men and women are similar beings and should have equal rights, while humans and nonhumans are different and should not have equal rights. The thought behind this reply to Taylor's analogy is correct up to a point, but it does not go far enough. There are important differences between humans and other animals, and these differences must give rise to some differences in the rights that each have. Recognizing this obvious fact, however, is no barrier to the case for extending the basic principle of equality to nonhuman animals. The differences that exist between men and women are equally undeniable, and the supporters of Women's Liberation are aware that these differences may give rise to different rights. Many feminists hold that women have the right to an abortion on request. It does not follow that since these same people are campaigning for equality between men and women they must support the right of men to have abortions too. Since a man cannot have an abortion, it is meaningless to talk of his right to have one. Since a pig can't vote, it is meaningless to talk of its right to vote. There is no reason why either Women's Liberation or Animal Liberation should get involved in such nonsense. The extension of the basic principle of equality from one group to another does not imply that we must treat both groups in exactly the same way, or grant exactly the same rights to both groups. Whether we should do so will depend on the nature of the members of the two groups. The basic principle of equality, I shall argue, is equality of consideration; and equal consideration for different beings may lead to different treatment and different rights. So there is a different way of replying to Taylor's attempt to parody Wollstonecraft's arguments, a way which does not deny the differences between humans and nonhumans, but goes more deeply into the question of equality and concludes by finding nothing absurd in the idea that the basic principle of equality applies to so-called "brutes." I believe that we reach this conclusion if we examine the basis on which our opposition to discrimination on grounds of race or sex ultimately rests. We will then see that we would be on shaky ground if we were to demand equality for blacks, women, and other groups of oppressed humans while denying equal consideration to nonhumans. When we say that all human beings, whatever their race, creed, or sex, are equal, what is it that we are asserting? Those who wish to defend a hierarchical, inegalitarian society have often pointed out that by whatever test we choose, it simply is not true that all humans are equal. Like it or not, we must face the fact that humans come in different shapes and sizes; they come with differing moral capacities, differing intellectual abilities, differing amounts of benevolent feeling and sensitivity to the needs of others, differing abilities to communicate effectively, and differing capacities to experience pleasure and pain. In short, if the demand for equality were based on the actual equality of all human beings, we would have to stop demanding equality. It would be an unjustifiable demand. Still, one might cling to the view that the demand for equality among human beings is based on the actual equality of the different races and sexes. Although humans differ as individuals in various ways, there are no differences between the races and sexes as such. From the mere fact that a person is black, or a woman, we cannot infer anything else about that person. This, it may be said, is what is wrong with racism and sexism. The white racist claims that whites are superior to blacks, but this is false—although there are differences between individuals, some blacks are superior to some whites in all of the capacities and abilities that could conceivably be relevant. The opponent of sexism would say the same: a person's sex is no guide to his or her abilities, and this is why it is unjustifiable to discriminate on the basis of sex. This is a possible line of objection to racial and sexual discrimination. It is not, however, the way that someone really concerned about equality would choose, because taking this line could, in some circumstances, force one to accept a most inegalitarian society. The fact that humans differ as individuals, rather than as races or sexes, is a valid reply to someone who defends a hierarchical society like, say, South Africa, in which all whites are superior in status to all blacks. The existence of individual variations that cut across the lines of race or sex, however, provides us with no defense at all against a more sophisticated opponent of equality, one who proposes that, say, the interests of those with I.Q. ratings above 100 be preferred to the interests of those with I.Q.s below 100. Would a hierarchical society of this sort really be so much better than one based on race or sex? I think not. But if we tie the moral principle of equality to the factual equality of the different races or sexes, taken as a whole, our opposition to racism and sexism does not provide us with any basis for objecting to this kind of inegalitarianism. There is a second important reason why we ought not to base our opposition to racism and sexism on any kind of factual equality, even the limited kind which asserts that variations in capacities and abilities are spread evenly between the different races and sexes: we can have no absolute guarantee that these abilities and capacities really are distributed evenly, without regard to race or sex, among human beings. So far as actual abilities are concerned, there do seem to be certain measurable differences between both races and sexes. These differences do not, of course, appear in each case, but only when averages are taken. More important still, we do not yet know how much of these differences is really due to the different genetic endowments of the various races and sexes, and how much is due to environmental differences that are the result of past and continuing discrimination. Perhaps all of the important differences will eventually prove to be environmental rather than genetic. Anyone opposed to racism and sexism will certainly hope that this will be so, for it will make the task of ending discrimination a lot easier; nevertheless it would be dangerous to rest the case against racism and sexism on the belief that all significant differences are environmental in origin. The opponent of, say, racism who takes this line will be unable to avoid conceding that if differences in ability did after all prove to have some genetic connection with race, racism would in some way be defensible. It would be folly for the opponent of racism to stake his whole case on a dogmatic commitment to one particular outcome of a difficult scientific issue which is still a long way from being settled. While attempts to prove that differences in certain selected abilities between races and sexes are primarily genetic in origin have certainly not been conclusive, the same must be said of attempts to prove that these differences are largely the result of environment. At this stage of the investigation we cannot be certain which view is correct, however much we may hope it is the latter. Fortunately, there is no need to pin the case for equality to one particular outcome of this scientific investigation. The appropriate response to those who claim to have found evidence of genetically-based differences in ability between the races or sexes is not to stick to the belief that the genetic explanation must be wrong, whatever evidence to the contrary may turn up: instead we should make it quite clear that the claim to equality does not depend on intelligence, moral capacity, physical strength, or similar matters of fact. Equality is a moral ideal, not a simple assertion of fact. There is no logically compelling reason for assuming that a factual difference in ability between two people justifies any difference in the amount of consideration we give to satisfying their needs and interests. The principle of the equality of human beings is not a description of an alleged actual equality among humans: it is a prescription of how we should treat humans. Jeremy Bentham incorporated the essential basis of moral equality into his utilitarian system of ethics in the formula: "Each to count for one and none for more than one." In other words, the interests of every being affected by an action are to be taken into account and given the same weight as the like interests of any other being. A later utilitarian, Henry Sidgwick, put the point in this way: "The good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view (if I may say so) of the Universe, than the good of any other.''[1] More recently, the leading figures in contemporary moral philosophy have shown a great deal of agreement in specifying as a fundamental presupposition of their moral theories some similar requirement which operates so as to give everyone's interests equal consideration—although they cannot agree on how this requirement is best formulated.[2] It is an implication of this principle of equality that our concern for others ought not to depend on what they are like, or what abilities they possess—although precisely what this concern requires us to do may vary according to the characteristics of those affected by what we do. It is on this basis that the case against racism and the case against sexism must both ultimately rest; and it is in accordance with this principle that speciesism is also to be condemned. If possessing a higher degree of intelligence does not entitle one human to use another for his [or her] own ends, how can it entitle humans to exploit nonhumans? Many philosophers have proposed the principle of equal consideration of interests, in some form or other, as a basic moral principle; but, as we shall see in more detail shortly, not many of them have recognized that this principle applies to members of other species as well as to our own. Bentham was one of the few who did realize this. In a forward-looking passage, written at a time when black slaves in the British dominions were still being treated much as we now treat nonhuman animals, Bentham wrote: The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been witholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may one day come to be recognized that the number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum, are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or perhaps the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. But suppose they were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?[3] In this passage Bentham points to the capacity for suffering as the vital characteristic that gives a being the right to equal consideration. The capacity for suffering—or more strictly, for suffering and/or enjoyment or happiness—is not just another characteristic like the capacity for language, or for higher mathematics. Bentham is not saying that those who try to mark "the insuperable line" that determines whether the interests of a being should be considered happen to have selected the wrong characteristic. The capacity for suffering and enjoying things is a prerequisite for having interests at all, a condition that must be satisfied before we can speak of interests in any meaningful way. It would be nonsense to say that it was not in the interests of a stone to be kicked along the road by a schoolboy. A stone does not have interests because it cannot suffer. Nothing that we can do to it could possibly make any difference to its welfare. A mouse, on the other hand, does have an interest in not being tormented, because it will suffer if it is. If a being suffers, there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration. No matter what the nature of the being, the principle of equality requires that its suffering be counted equally with the like suffering—in so far as rough comparisons can be made—of any other being. If a being is not capable of suffering, or of experiencing enjoyment or happiness, there is nothing to be taken into account. This is why the limit of sentience (using the term as a convenient, if not strictly accurate, shorthand for the capacity to suffer or experience enjoyment or happiness) is the only defensible boundary of concern for the interests of others. To mark this boundary by some characteristic like intelligence or rationality would be to mark it in an arbitrary way. Why not choose some other characteristic, like skin color? The racist violates the principle of equality by giving greater weight to the interests of members of his [or her] own race, when there is a clash between their interests and the interests of those of another race. Similarly the speciesist allows the interests of his [or her] own species to override the greater interests of members of other species.[4] The pattern is the same in each case. Most human beings are speciesists. l shall now very briefly describe some of the practices that show this.

#### Miranda and I advocate that the war powers authority of the President should be restricted.

#### It is important to establish that what we mean by “war” is not simply casualties on the battlefield. War is more than a clash of armies—it is the structures and ideologies that make violence possible, in all its forms. We must strive for positive, not simply negative, peace. Recognizing the interests of nonhuman animals is crucial to this process—absent a rejection of speciesism, positive peace is impossible.

Salter 14 (Colin Salter, Assistant Professor, Centre for Peace Studies, McMaster University, Board member, Institute/or Critical Animal Studies, “Introducing the Military-Animal-Industrial Complex” Animals and War: Confronting the Military-Animal Industrial Complex, Lexington Books, p. 1-3, Print)

In seeking to highlight the exploitation of nonhuman animals as tools of war for human ends, on human terms and at the whim of anthropocentric, speciesist and human chauvinist notions, this volume forms an interjection into the discourse of war. What is provided is another layer of critical intervention, another set of voices that are more than antiwar. The chapters included here expand on the critique of the military-industrial complex in relation to the broader animal industrial complex—a concept first introduced by Barbara Noske in 1989, suggesting a military-animal industrial complex. Use and extension-refinement of Noske's concept—which identifies permeable and dynamic boundaries in the ways and means through which nonhuman animals 2 Introducing the Military-Animal Industrial Complex Colin Salter 3 are exploited for profit—in this volume seeks to move beyond monolithic and "almost rhetorical" reference in critical discourse, identifying specific aspects of "the myriad complexity of the multiple relations, actors, technologies and identities that may be said to comprise the complex" (Twine, 2012, p. 15). In seeking to increase engagement with Noske's concept, Richard Twine (2012) has offered "an initial basic and succinct definition" of the animal industrial complex (with the agriculture placed in brackets to express his specific interests) as: a partly opaque and multiple set of networks and relationships between the corporate (agricultural) sector, governments, and public and private science. With economic, cultural, social and affective dimensions it encompasses an extensive range of practices, technologies, images, identities and markets (p. 23). In challenging the intersection of the military-industrial and animal industrial complexes, the arguments presented here are critical of pro-war and negative peace narratives, alongside those that may be considered as promoting a form of positive peace, albeit without addressing the nonhuman animal question. u In many ways, this volume provides a number of tools for strategic peacebuilding, exposing questions central to self- and societal-transformation toward a more just society. Nonhuman animals have had a forced role in human warfare, as with most human-centered activities, for millennia. With a focus on the nonhuman animal question, this book diverges from many critical works on war: the causes of war are not explicitly engaged with here. What are highlighted are some of the horrors in our collective histories, and a possible future seeking to build negative peace as a foundation from which a positive peace can emerge. A central premise of this book is that a vision of a peaceful world is just on one in which there is total liberation: a world where one's gender, ability, sexuality, body, intellect and species are not used to dictate how they are considered. The ontological dualism in the distinction between human and animal is exposed and rejected as a falsehood. This is a world free of structural violence, which is exploitation and violence embedded in the very fabric of a society, where systems, institutions, policies or cultural beliefs can and do meet the needs and rights of some at the expense of others (Schirch, 2004)3 Animals and War: Dismantling the Military-Animal Industrial Complex explicitly draws attention to the species boundary, to the ongoing implications of ideologies of dominionism (speciesism and human chauvinism) which enable systematic (structural and direct) violence to be perpetrated against nonhuman animals, to the benefit of the human at the expense of all others. Benefit here is a little dubious a term, as in war there is often little or limited benefit (beyond that to the military-industrial complex). A fundamental aspect of war is dehumanization, the relational construction of someone as other. Othering has a long history that extends beyond traditional conceptions of warfare, being central to colonial imperialism, imperialism more generally, some religious doctrines, capitalist economic frameworks and the social world shaped biopolitically in various ways by some and all of these (Foucault, 1988). We use the term biopolitics here to refer to the politics of the body and the politics of the social: the social construction of the biophysical self and its implications. To be positioned as the other is to be marginalized as less-than-human, an absent referent, be it based on the color of one's skin, their class, culture, religious persuasion, moral values or more simply their geographic circumstance.4 This is often akin to positioning the other as closer to nature, as we have seen in the history of colonialism and, albeit at times differently, patriarchy (Plumwood, 1993). In being closer to nature, one is positioned as animal-like in a derogatory sense. Such dualistic positioning enables different treatment, a different moral relationship that is counter to a mutually beneficial relationship, a positive peace. In embracing difference, there is an implicit and explicit rejection of implied negative connotations—rooted in and emerging from species hierarchy constructed on (selective) self-validating human characteristics—as false. Contributors to Animals and War embrace that we are all animals, that humans are part of the natural world: one part and not separate from ecosystems however we act counter to ecological integrity. In envisioning positive peace and a means to work toward this, rejection of such constructed hierarchies with an embrace of diversity and connectedness is a foundation from which total liberation can emerge. This is an essential cornerstone for a positive peace-based existence. In extending the critique of the military-industrial complex, we delineate and position a framework for engaging with and challenging past, present and potential future exploitation of nonhuman animals in warfare. The implications are substantively more far-reaching, and challenge the very fabric of entrenched structural violence in society today. The use of nonhuman animals for human ends is speciesist, and rooted in human chauvinism. Widespread exploitation of the nonhuman animal is a central feature of the animal industrial complex.

#### The affirmative’s exposure of the military-animal-industrial complex is necessary to eliminate “strategic ignorance” surrounding non-human animals. We are all complicit in various ways with the military-animal-industrial complex—being aware of and accounting for the suffering of non-humans is a necessary first step to establish positive peace. This is in no way mutually exclusive with other anti-war movements—rather, it is a component that should be included within a broader critique of war.

Salter 14 (Colin Salter, Assistant Professor, Centre for Peace Studies, McMaster University, Board member, Institute/or Critical Animal Studies, “Introducing the Military-Animal-Industrial Complex” Animals and War: Confronting the Military-Animal Industrial Complex, Lexington Books, p. 6-7, Print)

Systematically, the majority of people in the West continue to remain strategically ignorant of the horrendous experiments that approximately 10 billion nonhuman animals suffer through every year. To make this figure more comprehensible, this equates to more than 19,000 nonhuman animals per minute.9 In using the term strategic ignorance, we draw from critical race theory and the valuable work of many scholars on epistemologies of ignorance (Sullivan & Tuana, 2007). As the combination of terms suggest, the vast majority of us are strategically and willfully ignorant of the pain, suffering and murder of these billions of individual nonhuman animals. This has clear benefits for the human, and these benefits are at the root of such ignorance. Being aware of the sheer scale of this exploitation, even for those who embrace human chauvinism, would require some level of reflection as to what level of suffering and murder can be attempted to be justified—and on what terms, if any. Noam Chomsky has referred to such epistemological ignorance as Orwell's problem: "the problem of explaining how we can know so little, given that we have so much evidence" (1987, p. xxv). Billions of nonhuman animals painfully experimented on every year suffer and die to fuel the coffers of corporate-capitalist interests invested in the military-animal industrial complex. This expanding profit-and-pain-generating industry has a very long history. Unfortunately, it appears to have an ever-increasing present and future. A just and consistent resistance to the exploitative, violent and social destructiveness that is war requires equally tenacious, creative and unrelenting action against the use of all animals—in all forms. Animals and War's focus on the nonhuman animal in no way takes away from the exploitative physical, psychological and social implications of war on the human animal and society more broadly. The engagements presented here add another layer to the expanding and solidly founded critique of all war—a pillar upon which positive peace can and must be founded. As many before us have identified, until we cease the exploitation of nonhuman animals, violence within our own species will continue apace: all species will continue to suffer.

#### We must have an intersectional approach to oppression, and that includes violence against nonhuman animals—any other approach will fail to create a truly just society

Scott 14 (Alyssa, former PETA intern, 2-18-14, "Animal Rights: An Intersectional Issue" Peta Asia Pacific) blog.petaasiapacific.com/activism/animal-rights-an-intersectional-issue \*\*edited for anthropocentric language

Sometimes the animal rights movement is unfairly branded as being irrelevant to other pursuits of justice or, worse, in opposition to other social-justice causes. I’ve always viewed animal rights as an extension of justice and as a cause which is inherently enmeshed with other positive enterprises. Not only does the exploitation of animals resemble other oppressive practices, but many animal rights concerns have an impact on humans and the environment, too. In 1989, Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw theorized about something that she called “intersectionality.” I think this framework is a useful way to understand how the exploitation of [nonhuman] animals relates to other injustices. Intersectionality means many things. Chief among them is the way that different forms of oppression, such as racism, homophobia and sexism, can create subjective experiences for the people who encounter such oppression. Additionally, intersectionality can be understood as a theory that indicates how forms of oppression are not unrelated. Social systems create an interlocking matrix that is responsible for injustice. When we apply this concept to animal rights issues, it’s easy to see how injustice to [nonhuman] animals is connected to other forms of oppression. For example, the cruelty inherent in the dairy industry parallels issues in the women’s rights movement. The dairy industry controls cow’s bodies in much the same way that patriarchal power structures attempt to regulate women’s bodies. Cows are artificially inseminated so that they will become pregnant and produce milk. Not only are they subjected to exploitation in factory farms because of their species, they are also controlled in unique ways because they are female. The other sense of intersectionality also clarifies how animal rights relate to other social-justice issues, for it is the same unfair system that is responsible for all forms of oppression. For example, global meat production is based on the exploitation of animals, people, and the environment. Factory farms were created because profit was prioritized above the welfare of animals. This same greed is responsible for other types of cruelty. Factory farming has spread across the globe, swallowing up small farms and concentrating wealth in the hands of the owners of a few large companies, which is especially destructive in countries where much of the population experiences extreme poverty. Not only are animals treated horrendously, factory-farm workers are also often exploited in the process. Ultimately, though, while intersectionality gives us a useful framework to connect the realities of injustice, you don’t need an academic theory to understand that cruelty begets cruelty. Put most simply, harmful attitudes, such as racism and speciesism, result from irrational hatred, xenophobia and exploitation in the name of profit. A lack of empathy allows these attitudes to persist. As a society, we are cruel to [nonhuman] animals because we refuse to recognize their needs, instead seeing them merely in terms of our own desires. This lack of concern for what happens to others characterizes all forms of oppression, and it is the reason why any type of injustice is a threat to the kind and equitable society that we have been fighting to create for so long. A truly just world would be one in which exploitation is eradicated and empathy is encouraged. This world can only exist once we have extended the circle of our empathy to include [nonhuman] animals.

### 2AC

**Back and forth debate is good**

Jeremy **Waldron**, Professor, Law, UC-Berkeley, “The Dignity of Legislation,” MARYLAND LAW REVIEW v. 54 n. 2, 19**95**, LN.

No doubt, in the course of discussion, someone may feel that it would be wiser for the assembly to discuss a somewhat different proposition than the one specified, perhaps worded in a subtly or substantially different way. But if they want to press the point, the parliamentary rule is that they must move an amendment, changing the wording of the motion under discussion, once again in a specifically formulated way. Proceedings are then devoted to a discussion of the virtues of the amendment, qua amendment, and a vote is taken on that, before the substantive discussion is resumed. And again, we see the virtue of this way of doing things in a diverse assembly. **In conversation among friends, the topic may shift** in an open-ended way, and people familiar with one another have both the willingness and the ability to keep track. But **in an assembly** consisting of people who are largely strangers to one another, **deliberation would be hopeless if** there was a sense that **the topic might** or might not have **shift**ed **slightly after every contribution**. So, although amendment processes exist, their formulaic character and the rules governing their proposal and adoption provide a way of keeping track of where the discussion is, a way of keeping track which does not depend upon implicit understandings that some of the members may not share. When discussion is exhausted, a vote may be called for, and-if my experience of law faculty meetings is any indication-someone will immediately leap to their feet and say: "I'm confused. What exactly are we voting on?" In a well-run assembly, the clerk or secretary will be in a position at that stage to read out the proposition (as amended) which now is the focus of the final vote. Once again, the determinacy of that proposition, as formulated and as amended, is important to establish a sense that we are all orienting our actions in voting to the same object. It is important for me to know, for example, that what I take myself to be voting against is exactly what my opponent takes himself to be voting in favor of. Otherwise, the idea that our votes, on a given occasion, are to be aggregated and weighed against one another becomes a nonsense. What I have just described is rudimentary by comparison with the processes employed in actual legislative assemblies such as the Congress of the United States. Bills are longer and more complex than the sort of motions one hears at faculty meetings. They have usually been drafted-more or less competently-in advance, and there are many stages of deliberation (including committee stages, whose proceedings may be much less formal) that bills must go through before they are adopted. And, this is to say nothing of the vicissitudes of bicamerality, conference committees, and the rest. For the most part, however, **these complications enhance the need for a determinate text to focus and coordinate** the various stages of the legislative process. **Without a text to consider**, to mark up, to amend, to confer about, and to vote upon, the process of **law-making** in a large and unwieldy assembly **would have even** a greater **air of babel-like futility** than that which is currently associated with Congress. Thus, whether we are talking about a small-scale meeting or a large-scale legislative process, **the positing of a** formulated text as the **resolution under discussion provides a focus for** the ordering of **deliberation** at every stage. **The** existence of a verbalized bill, motion, or **resolution is key to** norms of **relevance, and** key to **the sense**, which procedural rules are supposed to provide, **that** participants' **contributions are relevant** to one another **and** that they **are not talking at cross purposes**. Maybe, a one-person deliberative body can do without this-though even there, many of us are familiar with the mnemonic virtues of a formulated proposition in our own solitary decision-making. And maybe, decision-making in a small group of oligarchs or in a junta of familiars can do without this as well, if they can move toward consensus on the basis of conversational informality. But the sense of a **determinate focus** for discussion-something whose existence is **distinct from the** will or **tacit understandings of particular members'- seems absolutely** indispensable for a large and diverse assembly of people whose knowledge and trust of one another is limited. VIII If there is anything to this hypothesis, then we might want to start thinking about the textual canonicity of legislation in a slightly different way. I said in Part I that one of the values most commonly associated in the modern world with legislation is democratic legitimacy: We should defer to statutes because they have been enacted by a democratically elected entity. Just as the idea of democracy is insufficient to explain why we prefer a large elected legislature to a single elected legislator, so the democratic principle is insufficient to explain the particular way in which authority is accorded to legislation in the mod- ern world, viz., by taking seriously the exact words that were used in the formulations that emerged from the legislative chamber. If I am right, we now have an explanation for the importance of the ipsissima verba which is oriented primarily to the legislators' dealings among themselves, rather than directly to the issue of their collective authority vis-a-vis the people. The final step, then, in pursuit of this hypothesis would be to show how this account of the importance of a text to the legislators is connected with the authority of the text for its intended audience. Here there are a couple of lines to pursue. First, as we have seen, the existence of orderly discussion is necessary **to secure** whatever Aristotelian **advantages accrue from deliberation** in a large and diverse group. **Unless** the diverse **experiences** and knowledge of the various legislators **can** connect and **be synthesized, it is unlikely that** their **interaction will produce standards** that are **superior to those that any individual** citizen **could work out** for herself. The conditions for orderly discussion, then, are indirectly conditions for the legislature's authority, in the Razian sense.8 9 In other words, authority requires superior expertise; superior **expertise comes from deliberation** among those who are different from one another; deliberation among those who are different from one another is possible **only on the basis of** formal rules of order; and crucial to rules of order is the postulation of **an agreed text as the focus** of discussion. Second, respect for statute law is partly a matter of respect for the legislature as a forum whose representativeness is an aspect of the fairness 90 of the way a community makes its decisions. To the extent that representativeness requires diversity in the assembly, respect for that **fairness is a matter of respecting the conditions under which diverse representatives can deliberate coherently**. Thus, fairness-based respect for the legislature as a body may require not only that we respect the standards which it posits, but also that we respect these more formal aspects of the way in which its posited standards are arrived at- and thus that we respect the standards in question under the auspices of text-based formality.9 '

**Viewing debate as a game solves all their impacts—it’s the most educational model and replaces hate with love**

**Carter 08** [Leif A, Professor, The Colorado College, “Law and Politics as play” CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW Vol 83:3, http://www.cklawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/vol83no3/Carter.pdf]

B. The Psychology of Games **Good games neutralize turf and, by legitimizing losing, reduce or eliminate the irrational and often self-defeating effects of** Kahneman’s **loss aversion**, specifically the urge to double down and send good money after bad.127 Like legal education and legal practice, and like Vico’s **rhetorical debating games**, competitive games **over time construct for players and fans a continuing civic education.** **The desire to win a competition moti-vates players to become keenly curious about the rules of the game**, **the conditions on the field** of play, **the skills of the opponent, and so on**. In games people return to and practice the “thought of sense.”128 In games, **players must base their calculations on what is real, not on what they imag-ine or hope for.** Games thus rewire the remarkably plastic human brain in the direction of the classical rationality of “economic man” like no other social context. People come to belie Franklin’s belief that men only use reason to justify everything they have a mind to do. **Through the behavior of playing, people reconfigure their brains to be more conventionally ra-tional**. In play people create the sense that Faulkner thought they lacked.129 **Curiosity necessarily humanizes opponents instead of “despeciating” them, as so often happens in the brutality cycle**.130 Kahneman observes that **each opponent in a conventional conflict believes that the other side acts out of malice** and hostile motives,131 **but just the opposite happens in games**. **Competitors merge identities**. **Each** knows that the other **experi-ences the same world**, “thinks the way I think,” “wants what I want,” and “needs to know me as much as I need to know her**.” Opponents do not “take it personally**.”132 Competitive games, without any help from post-modern philosophers, convert believers into pragmatists. **In games people delight in the particulars of concrete situations**. **Good play helps realize** Whitman’s wise **urging to turn from curiosity about God to curiosity about each other**.133 **The curiosity that players must develop to play well dis-places ethnocentrism, xenophobia, moral superiority, and the other brutaliz-ing tendencies of the human mind** described by Hood, Milgram, Zimbardo, Pinker, Damasio, and Frith, and noted in Part I. **Curiosity overcomes, or very much reduces, the impulse to hate**.134 **Good play has the same effect on players as does the naming of a doll or an animal. It creates a kind of love.**

**Games are key to value to life and are intrinsically good**

**Hurka 6** – philosopher who serves as the Jackman Distinguished Chair in Philosophical Studies at the University of Toronto (Thomas, 2006, "Games and the Good," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 80, http://homes.chass.utoronto.ca/~thurka/docs/pass\_games.pdf)

I take this admiration to rest on the judgement that **excellence in games is good in itself**, apart from any pleasure it may give the player or other people but **just for the properties that make it excellent**. The admiration, in other words, rests on the perfectionist judgement that **skill in games is worth pursuing for its own sake and can add value to one’s life**. This skill is not the only thing we value in this way; we give similar honours to achievements in the arts, science, and business. But one thing we admire, and to a significant degree, is excellence in athletic and nonathletic games. Unless we dismiss this view, one **task for philosophy is to explain why such excellence is good**. But few philosophers have attempted this, for a well-known reason. A unified explanation of why excellence in games is good requires a unified account of what games are, and many doubt that this is possible. After all, Wittgenstein famously gave the concept of a game as his primary example of one for which necessary and sufficient conditions cannot be given but whose instances are linked only by looser “family resemblances.”2 If Wittgenstein was right about this, 2 there can be no single explanation of why skill in games is good, just a series of distinct explanations of the value of skill in hockey, skill in chess, and so on. But Wittgenstein was not right, as is shown in a little-known book that is nonetheless a classic of twentieth-century philosophy, Bernard Suits’s The Grasshopper: Games, Life and Utopia. **Suits gives a perfectly persuasive analysis of playing a game as**, to quote his summary statement, “**the voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles**.”3 And in this paper I will use his analysis to explain the value of playing games. More specifically, I will argue that the different elements of Suits’s analysis give game-playing two distinct but related grounds of value, so it instantiates two related intrinsic goods. I will also argue that **game-playing is an important intrinsic good**, which gives the clearest possible expression of what can be called a modern as against a classical, or more specifically Aristotelian, view of value. But first Suits’s analysis. It says that a game has three main elements, which he calls the prelusory goal, the constitutive rules, and the lusory attitude. To begin with the first, in playing a game one always aims at a goal that can be described independently of the game. In golf, this is that a ball enter a hole in the ground; in mountain-climbing, that one stand on top of a mountain; in Olympic sprinting, that one cross a line on the track before one’s competitors. Suits calls this goal “prelusory” because it can be understood and achieved apart from the game, and he argues that every game has such a goal. Of course, in playing a game one also aims at a goal internal to it, such as winning the race, climbing the mountain, or breaking par on the golf course. But on Suits’s view this “lusory” goal is derivative, since achieving it involves achieving the prior prelusory goal in a specified way. This way is identified by the second element, the game’s constitutive rules. According to 3 Suits, **the function of** these **rules is to forbid the most efficient means to the prelusory goal**. Thus, **in golf one may not carry the ball down the fairway and drop it in the hole by hand**; one must advance it using clubs, play it where it lies, and so on. In mountain-climbing one may not ride a gondola to the top of the mountain or charter a helicopter; in 200-metre sprinting, one may not cut across the infield. **Once these rules are in place, success in the game typically requires achieving the prelusory goal as efficiently as they allow**, such as getting the ball into the hole in the fewest possible strokes or choosing the best way up the mountain. But this is efficiency within **the rules**, whose **larger function is to forbid the easiest means to the game’s initial goal**. These first two elements involve pursuing a goal by less than the most efficient means, but they are not sufficient for playing a game. This is because someone can be forced to use these means by circumstances he regrets and wishes were different. If this is the case – if, for example, a farmer harvests his field by hand because he cannot afford the mechanical harvester he would much rather use – he is not playing a game. Hence the need for the third element in Suits’s analysis, **the lusory attitude**, which **involves a person’s willingly accepting the constitutive rules**, or **accepting them because they make the game possible**. Thus, a golfer accepts that he may not carry the ball by hand or improve his lie because he wants to play golf, and obeying those rules is necessary for him to do so; **the mountaineer accepts that he may not take a helicopter to the summit because he wants to climb**. The **restrictions the rules impose are adhered to not reluctantly but willingly, because they are essential to the game**. Adding this third element gives Suits’s full definition: “**To play a game is to attempt to achieve a specific state of affairs** [prelusory goal], **using only means permitted by the rules** ..., **where the rules prohibit the use of more efficient in favour of less efficient means** [constitutive rules], **and where the rules are** 4 **accepted just because they make possible such activity** [lusory attitude].” Or, in the summary statement quoted above, “**playing a game is the voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles**.”4 This analysis will doubtless meet with objections, in the form of attempted counterexamples. But Suits considers a whole series of these in his book, showing repeatedly that his analysis handles them correctly, and not by some ad hoc addition but once its elements are properly understood. Nor would it matter terribly if there were a few counterexamples. Some minor lack of fit between his analysis and the English use of “game” would not be important if the analysis picks out a phenomenon that is unified, close to what is meant by “game,” and philosophically interesting. But the analysis is interesting if, as I will now argue, it allows a persuasive explanation of the value of excellence in games. **Suits** himself addresses this issue of value. In fact, a **central aim of his book is to give a defence of the grasshopper** in Aesop’s fable, **who played all summer, against the ant, who worked**. But in doing so he argues for the strong thesis that **playing games is not just an intrinsic good but the supreme such good, since in the ideal conditions of utopia, where all instrumental goods are provided, it would be everyone’s primary pursuit**. The **grasshopper’s game-playing**, therefore, while it had the unfortunate effect of leaving him without food for the winter, **involved him in the intrinsically finest actvity**. Now, I do not accept Suits’s strong thesis that gameplaying is the supreme good – I think many other states and activities have comparable value – and I do not find his arguments for it persuasive. But I will connect the weaker thesis that **playing games is one intrinsic good** to the details of his analysis more explicitly than he ever does.

**A2 GBTL/Imperialism**

Andrzejewski 14 (Julie, professor, activist scholar, and Co-Director of the Master’s degree program in Social Responsibility at St. Cloud State University, “Animals in the Aftermath”, Animals and War: Confronting the Military-Animal Industrial Complex, Lexington Books, p. 73, Print)

The invisibilization of animals is a major aspect of speciesism and empire. While stories of individual animal harm or triumph may receive sensationalistic attention, the systemic effects of human policies and projects on vast numbers of animals are rarely noticed, investigated, or reported in the media, even when animal bodies and lives are drastically impacted. The human activity of war, most often promulgated in the interests of empire and the theft of land, labor, and resources from animals and one another, is no exception. Even definitions of imperialism only identify the theft of resources from other groups of humans, ignoring the claim of animals to any of the resources upon which they have evolved and survived. Indeed, the idea that land is "owned" by the humans who have lived in that place the longest, ignores any recognition that animals have lived on all the earth's surfaces longer than any humans, and yet they are denied any claim to their living spaces while humans dominate the earth.

**Performance is not a mode of resistance - it gives too much power to the audience because the performer is structurally blocked from controlling the (re)presentation of their representations. Appealing to the ballot is a way of turning over one’s identity to the same reproductive economy that underwrites liberalism**

**Phelan 96**—chair of New York University's Department of Performance Studies (Peggy, Unmarked: the politics of performance, ed published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005, 146

**Performance’s only life is in the present. Performance cannot** be saved, recorded, documented, or otherwise **participate in the circulation of representations of representations**: once it does so, it becomes something other than performance. **To the degree that performance attempts to enter the economy of reproduction it betrays and lessens the promise of its own** ontology. Performance’s being, like the ontology of subjectivity proposed here, becomes itself through disappearance. **The pressures brought to bear on performance to succumb to the laws of the reproductive economy are enormous**. **For only rarely in this culture is the “now” to which performance addresses its deepest questions valued**. (This is why the now is supplemented and buttressed by the documenting camera, the video archive.) Performance occurs over a time which will not be repeated. It can be performed again, but this repetition itself marks it as “different.” **The document of a performance then is only a spur to memory, an encouragement of memory to become present**.

**The very act of articulating why performance ought be attached to the ballot casts performance within the terms of liberalism’s discursive economy – this reduces their performance to a form of aesthetic formalism, this subordinates the political potential of performance to the narrow disciplinary concerns of academic knowledge production**

**Phelan ‘96**—chair of New York University's Department of Performance Studies (Peggy, Unmarked: the politics of performance, ed published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005,

In his 1981 article Representation and the Limits of Interpretation, Eric E. Peterson delves into the problems of wedding post-structuralism and interpretation in terms of the limits of representation. He concedes that **for oral interpretation “representation is a powerful force in** the theoretical **understanding** of our **practice**. Not only does it allow us to distinguish oral interpretation from similar literary, theatrical, and speech arts; but it also provides a theoretical justification for the existence of oral interpretation as a discipline distinct from other disciplines” (24). Peterson formulated these arguments even before oral interpretation shifted to the broader term performance studies, but his predictions were insightful. Peterson maps out potential **disciplinary costs of** thinking representation in a certain way. He continues, saying that the cost of “**securing this place for oral interpretation is the increasing objectification of our practice and subjectification of our practitioners**. **By objectifying our practice, we mean that the conceptualization of art as representation precludes the examination of the very activity of representing**” (24). **This causes the field to continually wrap itself up in disciplinary techniques for the “accumulation of knowledge and the exercise of power**” (24) **through interpretation, instead of focusing on the eroticization of performance practice itself**. Peterson argues for reinvestigating the process of performance as art, not subject-object relations.

**The model for all forms of human oppression is anthro**

**Best 7** (Dr. Steven Best Associate Professor, Departments of Humanities and Philosophy University of Texas, El Paso, *Journal for Critical Animal Studies,* Volume V, Issue 2, 2007

It is little understood that the first form of oppression, domination, and hierarchy involves human *domination over animals*. Patterson’s thesis stands in bold contrast to the Marxist theory that the *domination over nature* is fundamental to the domination over other humans. It differs as well from the social ecology position of Murray Bookchin that *domination over humans* brings about alienation from the natural world, provokes hierarchical mindsets and institutions, and is the root of the long-standing western goal to “dominate” nature. In the case of Marxists, anarchists, and so many others, theorists typically don’t even mention human domination of animals, let alone assign it causal primacy or significance. In Patterson’s model, however, the human subjugation of animals is the first form of hierarchy and it paves the way for all other systems of domination such as include patriarchy, racism, colonialism, anti-Semitism, and the Holocaust. As he puts it, “the exploitation of animals was the model and inspiration for the atrocities people committed against each other, slavery and the Holocaust being but two of the more dramatic examples.” Hierarchy emerged with the rise of agricultural society some ten thousand years ago. In the shift from nomadic hunting and gathering bands to settled agricultural practices, humans began to establish their dominance over animals through “domestication.” In animal domestication (often a euphemism disguising coercion and cruelty), humans began to exploit animals for purposes such as obtaining food, milk, clothing, plowing, and transportation. As they gained increasing control over the lives and labor power of animals, humans bred them for desired traits and controlled them in various ways, such as castrating males to make them more docile. To conquer, enslave, and claim animals as their own property, humans developed numerous technologies, such as pens, cages, collars, ropes, chains, and branding irons.