## \*\*2AC\*\*

### Heg: A2 “Sustainability”

**Hegemony is sustainable**

-econ/military dominance

-trade measures

-diffusion of tech

Michael Beckley, PhD, “The Unipolar Era: Why American Power Persists and China’s Rise Is Limited,” Dissertation, Columbia University, 2012, p. 4-6.

In the pages that follow, I argue that such **declinist beliefs are exaggerated** and that **the alternative perspective more accurately captures the dynamics of the current unipolar era**. First, I show that **the United States is not in decline. Across most indicators of national power, the United States has maintained, and** in some areas **increased, its lead** over other countries since 1991. **Declinists often characterize the expansion of globalization and U.S. hegemonic burdens as** sufficient **conditions for U.S.** relative **decline. Yet, over the last two decades American economic and military dominance endured while globalization and U.S. hegemony increased significantly.** Second, I find that **U.S. hegemony is profitable** in certain areas. **The U**nited **S**tates **delegates part of the burden of maintaining international security to others while channeling** its own **resources**, and some of its allies resources, **into** enhancing **its** own **military dominance. It imposes punitive trade measures against others while deterring such measures against its own industries. And it manipulates global technology flows** in ways that enhance the technological and military capabilities of itself and allies. Such a privileged position has not provoked significant opposition from other countries. In fact, **balancing against the United States has declined steadily since the end of the Cold War.** Third, I conclude that **globalization benefits the United States more than other countries. Globalization causes innovative activity to concentrate in areas where it is done most efficiently**. Because the United States is already wealthy and innovative, it sucks up capital, technology, and people from the rest of the world. Paradoxically, therefore, **the diffusion of technology around the globe helps sustain a concentration of technological and military capabilities in the U**nited **S**tates.Taken together, **these results suggest that unipolarity will be an enduring feature of international relations, not a passing moment in time, but a deeply embedded material condition that will persist for the foreseeable future**. The United States may decline because of some unforeseen disaster, bad policies, or from domestic decay. But the two chief features of the current international system – **American hegemony and globalization – both reinforce unipolarity.** For scholars, this conclusion implies that the study of unipolarity should become a major research agenda, at least on par with the study of power transitions and hegemonic decline. For policymakers, the results of this study suggest that the United States should not retrench from the world, but rather continue to integrate with the world economy and sustain a significant diplomatic and military presence abroad.

**Hegemony will remain strong—bandwagoning by other powerful states behind the U.S.**

-weakness in rising powers

-us led order favorable

William C. Wohlforth, Professor, Government, Dartmouth College, "US Decline? (No.2): William Wohlforth: The United States Lost Some Ground over the Past Decade," interviewed by Kourosh Ziabari, IRAN REVIEW, 12--13--12, www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/US-Decline-No-2-William-Wohlforth-The-United-States-Lost-Some-Ground-over-the-Past-Decade.htm, accessed 5-23-13.

There is little doubt that after increasing its economic, technological and military dominance in the 1990s, **the U**nited **S**tates **has lost some ground** over the past ten years. While this trend may well continue, **whether it** really **leads to a transformation depends on** two things primarily: **the speed and scale of U.S. decline, and the interests of other major players**. A lot of ink has been spilled on the first of these, the so called “rise of the rest.” So much, in fact, that **we’re now seeing something of backlash, as analysts are starting to notice weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the rising powers’ economies, societies and politics**. But the second issue is at least as important, if not more so. Note that **the attitude of the countries with most of the world’s largest and most advanced economies and militaries are generally favorable to the U.S.-led order**: the EU, Japan, Canada, Mexico and many other American countries, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, etc. **Given this huge preponderance of power lining up basically in favor of the status quo, even if the U.S. itself declines, there will still be very powerful support for the current arrangements**.

#### U.S. still maintains a massive lead—the margin may have decreased, but will be able to maintain pre-eminence for a long time

Robert J. **Lieber**, Professor, Government and International Affairs, Georgetown University, “Is American Decline Real?” SALON, 5—14—**12**, <http://www.salon.com/2012/05/14/is_american_decline_real/>,

Beyond material strengths, the society itself benefits from a durable political system, rule of law, vigorous free press and information media, and a competitive and adaptable economy, as well as strong traditions of entrepreneurship and innovation, leadership and critical mass in new technology, and a history of resilience and flexibility in overcoming adversity. The declinist proposition that America’s international primacy is collapsing as a result of the rise of other countries should also be regarded with caution. On the one hand, the United States does face a more competitive world, regional challenges, and some attrition of its relative degree of primacy. This process, or diffusion of power, is not exclusive to the post–Cold War era, but began at least four decades ago with the recovery of Europe and Japan from World War II, the rise of the Soviet Union to superpower status, and the emergence of regional powers in Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa. Still, in contrast to other great powers that have experienced decline, the United States has held a substantially more dominant position. For example, Britain at the start of the twentieth century was already falling behind Germany and the United States, although it did manage to continue for half a century as head of a vast empire and commonwealth. Because of the enormous margin of power the United States possessed after the end of the Cold War, it should be able to withstand erosion in its relative strength for some time to come without losing its predominant status. While it is true that the weight of important regional powers has increased, many of these are allied or friendly. Those that are not (Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Venezuela) do not by themselves constitute serious balancing against the United States and its allies. Russia occupies an intermediate position, at times acting as a spoiler, but not an outright adversary. China presents a potentially more formidable challenge, notably through its growing economic might and the rapid expansion of its military capacity, but it has not yet become a true peer competitor. In any case, and despite the burden of a decade of war in the Middle East, America continues to possess significant advantages in economic breadth and depth, science, technology, competitiveness, demography, force size, power projection, military technology, and even in learning how to carry out effective counterinsurgency, and thus retains the capacity to meet key objectives. In sum, although the United States predominates by lesser margins, it still remains a long way from being overtaken by peer competitors. However, given profound disagreements about policy, intense partisan rancor among political elites, growing social-class division, distrust of government, and deep disagreement about foreign commitments, nonmaterial factors could prove to be a greater impediment to staying power than more commonly cited indicators of economic problems and military overstretch. The United States retains the power and capacity to play a leading world role. The ultimate questions about America’s future are likely to be those of policy and will.

### Heg Good: Prolif—1NC

#### Leadership checks prolif and nuclear terrorism

Jim **Talent**, U.S. Senator, and Heath Hall, Heritage Foundation, Sowing the Wind: The Decay fo American Power and Its Consequences, American Freedom & Enterprise Foundation, 3--5--**10**, www.freedomsolutions.org/2010/03/sowing-the-wind-the-decay-of-american-power-and-its-consequences/.

There is a reason that regimes like Iran and North Korea go to the time and expense, and assume the risks of developing nuclear weapons programs; nuclear capability empowers them to achieve their ends, and thereby poses challenges to the United States, for several reasons. First, there is a danger that rogue regimes with nuclear material may assist terrorists in developing weapons of mass destruction.[36] Even the possibility that such regimes may do so gives them leverage internationally. Second, these regimes have ambitions in their regions and around the world.[37] Some of their leaders are fanatical enough to actually consider a first strike using nuclear weapons; for example, high-ranking officials of the Iranian government have openly discussed using a nuclear weapon against Israel.[38] Whether a first strike occurs or not, the possession of nuclear capability frees aggressive regimes to pursue their other goals violently with less fear of retaliation. For example, North Korea’s nuclear capability means that it could attack South Korea conventionally with a measure of impunity; even if the attack failed, the United States and its allies would be less likely to remove the North Korean regime in retaliation. In other words, nuclear capability lessens the penalties which could be exacted on North Korea if it engages in aggression, which makes the aggression more likely. The same logic applies to Iran, which is why the other nations in the Middle East are so concerned about Iran’s nuclear program. A nuclear attack by Iran is possible, but the real danger of Iranian nuclear capability is that it would make conventional aggression in the region more likely.[39] Finally, the more nations that get nuclear weapons, the greater the pressure on other nations to acquire them as a deterrent, and this is particularly true when a government acquiring the capability is seen as unstable or aggressive. North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons has tended, for obvious reasons, to make the South Koreans and Japanese uncomfortable about having no deterrent themselves. The possibility of uncontrolled proliferation—what experts call a “nuclear cascade”[40]—is tremendously dangerous; it increases the possibility that terrorists can get nuclear material from a national program, and it raises the prospect of a multilateral nuclear confrontation between nations.[41] Many of the smaller nuclear nations do not have well-established first strike doctrine or launch protocols; the chance of a nuclear exchange, accidental or intentional, increases geometrically when a confrontation is multilateral. The antidote to proliferation is American leadership and power. The reality and perception of American strength not only deters aggressive regimes from acquiring weapons of mass destruction; it reassures other countries that they can exist safely under the umbrella of American power without having to develop their own deterrent capability.[42]

**Heg: A2 “Heg Bad”**

**Heg solves nuclear indo-pak war**

**Brezezinski**(Former Sect. Of State) **04**

[Zbigniew, The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership, Perseus, New York // wyo-tjc]

For the time being. **the key US. interest is to prevent a nuclear war from erupting between Pakistan and India and to discourage any further regional proliferation**, especially since there can he little doubt that the once-imperial and nationally ambitious Iran looks with under­standable envy at its nuclear-armed neighbors. Of the two goals, the prevention of a nuclear war may be somewhat easier to pursue because the very possession of nuclear weaponry is forcing both the Indian and the Pakistani militaries to calculate more cautiously the potential con­sequences of their periodic border clashes. Nonetheless, **the unresolved issue of Kashmir is bound to pro­duce repeated collisions, each of which inflames the volatile and reli­giously conflicted Muslim and Hindu masses. Pakistan could then even become a fundamentalist Muslim state (**thus probably determin­ing Afghanistan’s fate as well), while India might be seized by fanatical Hindu passions**. Irrationality might then overwhelm the strategic restraint inherent in the nuclear calculus. Just as the West for years has been relatively indifferent to the unresolved Palestinian issue, so it has also neglected Kashmir**. India has been able to insist formally that there is no Kashmir issue, either between India and Pakistan or for the international community as a whole—that it is an internal matter. Pakistan in turn has relied on thinly camouflaged official support for guerrilla and terrorist actions against India’s control of the province as a way of keeping the issue alive—thereby also precipitating increasingly heavy-handed Indian repression of Kashmiris suspected of disloyalty. Once both countries acquired nuclear weapons, the Kashmir issue inevitably gained wider international significance. The question of Kashmir has now become part of the larger problem of instability in the Global Balkans**. Its peaceful resolution is likely to he at least as difficult as that of the Arab-Israeli conflict**. The conflict involves two major states that jointly have a population approaching 1.2 billion people—roughly one-fifth of the world—and much of that population is still pre-modern, semiliterate, and suscep­tible (even among the elites) to demagogic appeals. **Fostering a compromise in that setting will require sustained outside engagement, considerable international pressure, major political and financial inducements, and a great deal of patience. Here again, political solidarity between the United States and the European Union**, perhaps tangibly backed by Japan, **would make even­tual success more likely. Great Britain,** for historical reasons, **can play an important diplomatic role, especially in concert with the United States**. Both Russia and China may be supportive, since neither would benefit from a nuclear war in its immediate proximity, and each can subtly influence the major purchaser of its arms exports (India in the case of Russia, Pakistan in the case of China). The reality, however, is that a major collective international effort is likely only in the face of an imminent threat of war, with international concern rapidly fading once the threat recedes [P. 76-77]

**Extinction**

**Caldicott** (Founder of Physicians for Social Responsibility) **02**

[Helen, The New Nuclear Danger, 2002, p. xii // wyo-tjc]

**The use of Pakistani nuclear weapons could trigger a chain reaction. Nuclear-armed India**, an ancient enemy, **could respond in kind. China, India's hated foe, could react if India used her nuclear weapons, triggering a nuclear holocaust on the subcontinent. If any of either Russia or America's 2, 250 strategic weapons on hair-trigger alert were launched either accidentally or purposefully in response, nuclear winter would ensue, meaning the end of most life on earth**.

**US pursuit of hegemony inevitable**

**Kagan**, 1/24/20**11**, (Robert Kagan, [American](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States)historian, author and foreign policy commentator at the[Brookings Institution](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brookings_Institution)) ‘The Price of Power: The benefits of U.S. defense spending far outweigh the costs’, VOL. 16, NO. 18, <http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/price-power_533696.html?page=3>

In theory, the United States could refrain from intervening abroad. But, in practice, will it? Many assume today that the American public has had it with interventions, and Alice Rivlin certainly reflects a strong current of opinion when she says that “much of the public does not believe that we need to go in and take over other people’s countries.” That sentiment has often been heard after interventions, especially those with mixed or dubious results. It was heard after the four-year-long war in the Philippines, which cost 4,000 American lives and untold Filipino casualties. It was heard after Korea and after Vietnam. It was heard after Somalia. Yet **the reality has been that after each intervention, the sentiment against foreign involvement has faded, and the United States has intervened again. Depending on how one chooses to count, the United States has undertaken roughly 25 overseas interventions since 1898**:Cuba, 1898The Philippines, 1898-1902China, 1900Cuba, 1906Nicaragua, 1910 & 1912Mexico, 1914Haiti, 1915Dominican Republic, 1916Mexico, 1917World War I, 1917-1918Nicaragua, 1927World War II, 1941-1945Korea, 1950-1953Lebanon, 1958Vietnam, 1963-1973Dominican Republic, 1965Grenada, 1983Panama, 1989First Persian Gulf war, 1991Somalia, 1992Haiti, 1994Bosnia, 1995Kosovo, 1999Afghanistan, 2001-presentIraq, 2003-presentThat is one intervention every 4.5 years on average. Overall, **the United States has intervened or been engaged in combat somewhere in 52 out of the last 112 years, or roughly 47 percent of the time. Since the end of the Cold War**, it is true, **the rate of U.S. interventions has increased, with an intervention roughly once every 2.5 years and American troops intervening or engaged in combat in 16 out of 22 years, or over 70 percent of the time**, since the fall of the Berlin Wall.The argument for returning to “normal” begs the question: What is normal for the United States? The historical record of the last century suggests that it is not a policy of nonintervention. This record ought to raise doubts about the theory that American behavior these past two decades is the product of certain unique ideological or doctrinal movements, whether “liberal imperialism” or “neoconservatism.” **Allegedly “realist” presidents in this era have been just as likely to order interventions as their more idealistic colleagues**. George H.W. Bush was as profligate an intervener as Bill Clinton. He invaded Panama in 1989, intervened in Somalia in 1992—both on primarily idealistic and humanitarian grounds—which along with the first Persian Gulf war in 1991 made for three interventions in a single four-year term. Since 1898 the list of presidents who ordered armed interventions abroad has included William McKinley, Theodore Roose-velt, William Howard Taft, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush. **One would be hard-pressed to find a common ideological or doctrinal thread among them—unless it is the doctrine and ideology of a mainstream American foreign policy that leans more toward intervention than many imagine or would care to admit**.Many don’t want to admit it, and **the only thing as consistent as this pattern of American behavior has been the claim by contemporary critics that it is abnormal and a departure from American traditions.** The anti-imperialists of the late 1890s, the isolationists of the 1920s and 1930s, the critics of Korea and Vietnam, and the critics of the first Persian Gulf war, the interventions in the Balkans, and the more recent wars of the Bush years have all insisted that the nation had in those instances behaved unusually or irrationally. And yet the behavior has continued.To note this consistency is not the same as justifying it. The United States may have been wrong for much of the past 112 years. Some critics would endorse the sentiment expressed by the historian Howard K. Beale in the 1950s, that “the men of 1900” had steered the United States onto a disastrous course of world power which for the subsequent half-century had done the United States and the world no end of harm. But **whether one lauds or condemns this past century of American foreign policy—and one can find reasons to do both—the fact of this consistency remains.It would require not just a modest reshaping of American foreign policy priorities but a sharp departure from this tradition to bring about the kinds of changes that would allow the United States to make do with a substantially smaller force structure.**Is such a sharp departure in the offing? It is no doubt true that many Americans are unhappy with the on-going warfare in Afghanistan and to a lesser extent in Iraq, and that, if asked, a majority would say the United States should intervene less frequently in foreign nations, or perhaps not at **all. It may also be true that the effect of long military involvements in Iraq and Afghanistan may cause Americans and their leaders to shun further interventions at least for a few years—as they did for nine years after World War I, five years after World War II, and a decade after Vietnam. This may be further reinforced by the difficult economic times in which Americans are currently suffering. The longest period of nonintervention in the past century was during the 1930s, when unhappy memories of World War I combined with the economic catastrophe of the Great Depression to constrain American interventionism to an unusual degree and produce the first and perhaps only genuinely isolationist period in American history**.So are we back to the mentality of the 1930s? It wouldn’t appear so. There is no great wave of isolationism sweeping the country. There is not even the equivalent of a Patrick Buchanan, who received 3 million votes in the 1992 Republican primaries. Any isolationist tendencies that might exist are severely tempered by continuing fears of terrorist attacks that might be launched from overseas. Nor are the vast majority of Americans suffering from economic calamity to nearly the degree that they did in the Great Depression.Even if we were to repeat the policies of the 1930s, however, **it is worth recalling that the unusual restraint of those years was not sufficient to keep the United States out of war. On the contrary, the United States took actions which ultimately led to the greatest and most costly foreign intervention in its history. Even the most determined and in those years powerful isolationists could not prevent it**.Today there are a number of obvious possible contingencies that might lead the United States to substantial interventions overseas, notwithstanding the preference of the public and its political leaders to avoid them. **Few Americans want a war with Iran, for instance. But it is not implausible that a president—indeed, this president—might find himself in a situation where military conflict at some level is hard to avoid.** The continued success of the international sanctions regime that the Obama administration has so skillfully put into place, for instance, might eventually cause the Iranian government to lash out in some way—perhaps by attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz. Recall that Japan launched its attack on Pearl Harbor in no small part as a response to oil sanctions imposed by a Roosevelt administration that had not the slightest interest or intention of fighting a war against Japan but was merely expressing moral outrage at Japanese behavior on the Chinese mainland. Perhaps in an Iranian contingency, the military actions would stay limited. But perhaps, too, they would escalate. One could well imagine an American public, now so eager to avoid intervention, suddenly demanding that their president retaliate. Then there is the possibility that a military exchange between Israel and Iran, initiated by Israel, could drag the United States into conflict with Iran. Are such scenarios so farfetched that they can be ruled out by Pentagon planners?Other possible contingencies include a war on the Korean Peninsula, where the United States is bound by treaty to come to the aid of its South Korean ally; and possible interventions in Yemen or Somalia, should those states fail even more than they already have and become even more fertile ground for al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. And what about those “humanitarian” interventions that are first on everyone’s list to be avoided? Should another earthquake or some other natural or man-made catastrophe strike, say, Haiti and present the looming prospect of mass starvation and disease and political anarchy just a few hundred miles off U.S. shores, with the possibility of thousands if not hundreds of thousands of refugees, can anyone be confident that an American president will not feel compelled to send an intervention force to help?Some may hope that a smaller U.S. military, compelled by the necessity of budget constraints, would prevent a president from intervening. More likely, however, it would simply prevent a president from intervening effectively. This, after all, was the experience of the Bush administration in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both because of constraints and as a conscious strategic choice, the Bush administration sent too few troops to both countries. The results were lengthy, unsuccessful conflicts, burgeoning counterinsurgencies, and loss of confidence in American will and capacity, as well as large annual expenditures. Would it not have been better, and also cheaper, to have sent larger numbers of forces initially to both places and brought about a more rapid conclusion to the fighting? The point is, it may prove cheaper in the long run to have larger forces that can fight wars quickly and conclusively, as Colin Powell long ago suggested, than to have smaller forces that can’t. Would a defense planner trying to anticipate future American actions be wise to base planned force structure on the assumption that the United States is out of the intervention business? Or would that be the kind of penny-wise, pound-foolish calculation that, in matters of national security, can prove so unfortunate?The debates over whether and how the United States should respond to the world’s strategic challenges will and should continue. Armed interventions overseas should be weighed carefully, as always, with an eye to whether the risk of inaction is greater than the risks of action. And as always, these judgments will be merely that: judgments, made with inadequate information and intelligence and no certainty about the outcomes. No foreign policy doctrine can avoid errors of omission and commission. But **history has provided some lessons, and for the United States the lesson has been fairly clear: The world is better off, and the United States is better off, in the kind of international system that American power has built and defended.**

### Imperialism K: Heg Solves War 1AR

**Two-thousand years of history prove**

William **Wohlforth 8** Daniel Webster Professor of Government, Dartmouth. BA in IR, MA in IR and MPhil and PhD in pol sci, Yale, Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War, October 2008, World Politics Vol. 61, Iss. 1; pg. 28, 31 pgs, Proquest

Despite increasingly compelling findings concerning the importance of status seeking in human behavior, research on its connection to war waned some three decades ago.38 Yet **empirical studies of the relationship between** both systemic and dyadic **capabilities distributions and war have continued to cumulate. If the relationships implied by the status theory run afoul** of well-established patterns or general historical findings, **then there is little reason to continue investigating them. The clearest empirical implication** of the theory **is that** status **competition is unlikely to cause great power military conflict in unipolar systems. If status competition is an important contributory cause of great power war, then,** ceteris paribus, **unipolar systems should be markedly less war-prone** than bipolar or multipolar systems. And this appears to be the case. As Daniel Geller notes **in a review of the empirical literature: "The only polar structure that appears to influence conflict probability is unipolarity."**39 In addition, a larger number of studies at the dyadic level support the related expectation that narrow capabilities gaps and ambiguous or unstable capabilities hierarchies increase the probability of war.40 These studies are based entirely on post-sixteenth-century European history, and most are limited to the post-1815 period covered by the standard data sets. Though the systems coded as unipolar, near-unipolar, and hegemonic are all marked by a high concentration of capabilities in a single state, these studies operationalize unipolarity in a variety of ways, often very differently from the definition adopted here. **An ongoing collaborative project looking at ancient interstate systems over** the course of **two thousand years suggests** **that** **historical systems** **that come closest to** the definition of unipolarity used here **exhibit precisely the** **behavioral** **properties implied by the theory**. 41 As David C. Kang's research shows, the **East Asian system between 1300 and 1900 was** an unusually stratified **unipolar** structure, **with** an economic and militarily dominant **China interacting with** a small number of geographically proximate, clearly weaker East Asian **states**.42 Status politics existed, but actors were channeled by elaborate cultural understandings and interstate practices into clearly recognized ranks. **Warfare was exceedingly rare, and the major outbreaks occurred precisely when the theory would predict: when China's capabilities waned**, reducing the clarity of the underlying material hierarchy and increasing status dissonance for lesser powers. Much more research is needed, but initial exploration of other arguably unipolar systems-for example, Rome, Assyria, the Amarna system-appears consistent with the hypothesis.43 Status Competition and Causal Mechanisms **Both theory and evidence demonstrate convincingly that competition for status is a driver of human behavior, and social** identity **theory** and related literatures **suggest** the **conditions under which it might come to the fore in great power relations.** Both the systemic and dyadic findings presented in large-N studies are broadly consistent with the theory, but they are also consistent with power transition and other rationalist theories of hegemonic war.

### Defer Add-On: Chemical Soldiers 2AC

#### Military is developing chemical soldiers

Parasidis 12 (Efthimios, Assistant Professor of Law, Center for Health Law Studies, Saint Louis University School of Law, 2012, "Justice and Beneficence in Military Medicine and Research" Ohio State Law School, Lexis)

The United States military has a long and checkered history of experimental research involving human subjects. It has sponsored clandestine projects that examined if race influences one's susceptibility to mustard gas, n1 the extent to which radiation affects combat effectiveness, n2 and whether psychotropic drugs could be used to facilitate interrogations or develop chemical weapons. n3 In each of these experiments, the government deliberately violated legal requirements and ethical norms that govern human-subjects research and failed to provide adequate follow-up medical care or compensation for those who suffered adverse health effects. In defending its decisions, the government argued that the studies and research methods were necessary to further the strategic advantage of the United States. n4 The military's contemporary research program is motivated by the same rationale. As the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) explains, its goal is to "create strategic surprise for U.S. adversaries by maintaining the technological superiority of the U.S. military." n5 Current research sponsored by DARPA and the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) [\*725] aims to ensure that soldiers have "no physical, physiological, or cognitive limitations." n6 The research includes drugs that keep soldiers awake for seventy-two hours or more, a nutraceutical that fulfills a soldier's dietary needs for up to five days, a vaccine that eliminates intense pain within seconds, and sophisticated brain-to-computer interfaces. n7 The military's emphasis on neuroscience is particularly noteworthy, with recent annual appropriations of over $ 350 million for cognitive science research. n8 Projects include novel methods of scanning a soldier's brain to ascertain physical, intellectual, and emotional states, as well as the creation of electrodes that can be implanted into a soldier's brain for purposes of neuroanalysis and neurostimulation. n9 One of the goals of the research is to create a means by which a soldier's subjective experience can be relayed to a central command center, and, in turn, the command center can respond to the soldier's experience by stimulating brain function for both therapeutic and enhancement purposes. n10 For example, the electrodes can be used to activate brain function that can help heal an injury or keep a soldier alert during difficult moments. n11 Another goal is to create a "connected consciousness" whereby a soldier can interact with machines, access information from the Internet, or communicate with other humans via thought alone. n12

#### Chemical soldiers cause extinction and destroy value to life

Deubel 13 (Paula, Professor Gabriel has held positions at the Brookings Institution, the Army Intelligence School, the Center for the Study of Intelligence at the CIA, and at the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, Department of Combat Psychiatry, in Washington. 3-25-13, "The Psychopath Wars: Soldiers of the Future?" Suite 101) suite101.com/article/the-psychopath-wars-soldiers-of-the-future-a366977 \*\*evidence is gender modified\*\*

According to Dr. Richard A. Gabriel in his fascinating book, No More Heroes, the sociopathic personality can keep his or her psyche intact even under extremely pathological conditions, while the sane will eventually break down under guilt, fear, or normal human repulsion. Chemical Soldiers Richard A. Gabriel (military historian, retired U.S. army officer and former professor at the U.S. Army War College) describes socio/psychopaths as people without conscience, intellectually aware of what harm they might do to another living being, but unable to experience corresponding emotions. This realization, Gabriel claims, has led the military establishments of the world to discover a drug banishing fear and emotion in the soldier by controlling ~~his~~ [their] brain chemistry. In order for soldiers to ideally function in modern war ~~he~~ [they] should first be reconstructed to become what could be defined as mentally ill. “We may be rushing headlong into a long, dark chemical night from which there will be no return,” warns Gabriel. If these efforts succeed (as it appears they can) a chemically induced zombie would be born, a psychopathic-type being who would function (at least temporarily) without any human compassion and whose moral conscience would not exist to take responsibility for his actions. “Man’s [Humankind’s] nature would be altered forever,” he adds, “and it would cost him his [us our] soul.” As incredible and futuristic as that sounds, the creation of such a drug is apparently already well underway in the world’s military research labs; Gabriel reports such research centers already exist in the United States, Russia, and Israel. Since all emotions are based in anxiety, it appears the eradication of it (perhaps through a variant of the anti-anxiety medication Busbirone) may create soldiers who become more efficient killing machines. Futuristic Warfare Gabriel writes further about the possible nightmarish future of modern warfare: “The standards of normal sane men will be eroded, and soldiers will no longer die for anything understandable or meaningful in human terms. They will simply die, and even their own comrades will be incapable of mourning their deaths […] The battlefields of the future will witness a clash of truly ignorant armies, armies ignorant of their own emotions and even of the reasons for which they fight.” (Operation Enduring Valor, Richard A. Gabriel) This would strip a person of his core identity and all of his humanity. Whether or not the soldier would knowingly take part in this experience is unknown, but during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, one could almost easily imagine that this conscience-killing pill had already been swallowed. Psychopathic Behavior During War During the 1991 Iraq war a pilot interviewed on European television callously remarked ambushing Iraqis was “like waiting for the cockroaches to come out so we could kill them." Other U.S. pilots compared killing human beings to “shooting turkey” or like “attacking a farm after someone had opened a sheep stall.” This same lack of empathy can be seen in Iraq’s Abu Graib prison scandal (2004) where U.S. soldiers were shown seemingly to enjoy torture, as well as more recent photos of military men posing with dead Afghans (first published in Germany's Der Spiegel magazine); more gruesome photos were later published in Rolling Stone before the U.S. Army censored all the remaining damning material from public view. No More Heroes warns that modern warfare will become increasingly difficult for sane men to endure. The combat punch of man’s weapons has increased over 600% since World War II. These weapons are highly technical. High Explosive Plastic Tracers (HEP-T) send fragments of metal through enemy tanks and into humans at speeds faster than the speed of sound. The Starlight Scope is able to differentiate between males and females by computing differences in body heat given off by pelvic areas. The Beehive artillery ammunition (filled with three-inch long nail-like steel needles) is capable of pinning victims to trees. The world has a nightmare arsenal of terrible weapons advanced beyond the evolution of our morality.

### Imperialism K: 2AC

**Focusing on international institutions is key to transition to a new democratic liberal order—the alt causes genocide and nuclear war**

**Shaw**, Professor of International Relations and Politics at the University of Sussex, **’99** (Martin, November 9, “The unfinished global revolution: Intellectuals and the new politics of international relations”

**The new politics of international relations require us**, therefore, **to go beyond** the **antiimperialism of the intellectual left as well as of the semi-anarchist traditions of the academic discipline**. We need to recognise three **fundamental** truths: First, in the twenty-first century **people struggling for democratic liberties across the non-Western world are likely to make constant demands on our solidarity**. Courageous academics, **students and** other **intellectuals will be in the forefront of these movements**. They deserve the unstinting support of intellectuals **in the West**. Second, the old international thinking in which democratic movements are seen as purely internal to states no longer carries conviction – despite the lingering nostalgia for it on both the American right and the anti-American left. **The idea that global principles can and should be enforced worldwide is firmly established in the minds of hundreds of millions of people**. This consciousness will a powerful force in the coming decades. Third, **global state-formation is a fact. International institutions are being extended, and they have a symbiotic relation with the major centre of state power**, the increasingly internationalised Western conglomerate. **The success of the global-democratic revolutionary wave depends** first on how well it is consolidated in each national context – but second, **on how thoroughly it is embedded in international networks of power, at the centre of which, inescapably, is the West**. From these political fundamentals, strategic propositions can be derived. First, **democratic movements cannot regard** non-governmental organisations and **civil society as ends in themselves. They must aim to civilise** local **states, rendering them open, accountable and pluralistic, and curtail the arbitrary and violent exercise of power**. Second, **democratising local states is not a separate task from integrating them into global** and often Western-centred **networks**. **Reproducing isolated local centres of power carries with it classic dangers of states as centres of war.** **Embedding global norms and integrating new state centres with global institutional frameworks are essential to the control of violence**. (To put this another way, the proliferation of purely national democracies is not a recipe for peace.) Third, while the global revolution cannot do without the West and the UN, neither can it rely on them unconditionally. **We need** these **power networks, but we need to tame them**, too, **to make their** messy **bureaucracies** enormously **more accountable and sensitive to** the needs of **society** worldwide. **This will involve** the kind of ‘**cosmopolitan democracy’** argued for by David Held80 and campaigned for by the new Charter 9981. **It will** also **require us to advance a global social-democratic agenda, to address** the literally catastrophic scale of **world social inequalities**. Fourth, **if we need the global-Western state, if we want to democratise it and make its institutions friendlier to global peace and justice, we cannot be indifferent to its strategic debates. It matters to develop robust peacekeeping as a strategic alternative to bombing our way through zones of crisis. It matters that international intervention supports pluralist structures, rather than ratifying Bosnia-style apartheid**. Likewise, **the internal politics of Western elites matter. It makes a difference to halt the regression to isolationist nationalism in American politics**. It matters that the European Union should develop into a democratic polity with a globally responsible direction. It matters that the British state, still a pivot of the Western system of power, stays in the hands of outward-looking new social democrats rather than inward-looking old conservatives. **As political intellectuals in the West**, we need to have our eyes on the ball at our feet, but we also need to raise them to the horizon. **We need to grasp the historic drama that is transforming worldwide relationships between people and state**, as well as between state and state. **We need to think about how the turbulence of the global revolution can be consolidated in democratic, pluralist, international networks of both social relations and state authority**. We cannot be simply optimistic about this prospect. Sadly, it will require repeated violent political crises to push Western governments towards the required restructuring of world institutions.82 What I have outlined tonight is a huge challenge; but **the alternative is to see the global revolution splutter into defeat, degenerate into new genocidal wars, perhaps even nuclear conflicts. The practical challenge for all concerned citizens**, and the theoretical and analytical challenges for **students of international relations and politics, are intertwined**.

**We control uniqueness—violence is decreasing due to the unipolar system**

**Drezner 05** (Daniel, 5-25-05, "GREGG EASTERBROOK, WAR, AND THE DANGERS OF EXTRAPOLATION" www.danieldrezner.com/archives/002087.html

Via Oxblog's Patrick Belton, I see that Gregg Easterbrook has a cover story in The New Republic entitled "The End of War?" It has a killer opening: Daily explosions in Iraq, massacres in Sudan, the Koreas staring at each other through artillery barrels, a Hobbesian war of all against all in eastern Congo--combat plagues human society as it has, perhaps, since our distant forebears realized that a tree limb could be used as a club. But here is something you would never guess from watching the news: **War has entered a cycle of decline. Combat in Iraq** and in a few other places **is an exception to a significant global trend** that has gone nearly unnoticed--namely that, **for about 15 years, there have been steadily fewer armed conflicts worldwide**. In fact, it is possible that **a person's chance of dying because of war has**, in the last decade or more, **become the lowest in human history.** Is Easterbrook right? He has a few more paragraphs on the numbers: The University of Maryland studies find the number of wars and armed conflicts worldwide peaked in 1991 at 51, which may represent the most wars happening simultaneously at any point in history. Since 1991, the number has fallen steadily. There were 26 armed conflicts in 2000 and 25 in 2002, even after the Al Qaeda attack on the United States and the U.S. counterattack against Afghanistan. By 2004, Marshall and Gurr's latest study shows, the number of armed conflicts in the world had declined to 20, even after the invasion of Iraq. All told, there were less than half as many wars in 2004 as there were in 1991. Marshall and Gurr also have a second ranking, gauging the magnitude of fighting. This section of the report is more subjective. Everyone agrees that the worst moment for human conflict was World War II; but how to rank, say, the current separatist fighting in Indonesia versus, say, the Algerian war of independence is more speculative. Nevertheless, the Peace and Conflict studies name 1991 as the peak post-World War II year for totality of global fighting, giving that year a ranking of 179 on a scale that rates the extent and destructiveness of combat. By 2000, in spite of war in the Balkans and genocide in Rwanda, the number had fallen to 97; by 2002 to 81; and, at the end of 2004, it stood at 65. This suggests the extent and intensity of global combat is now less than half what it was 15 years ago. Easterbrook spends the rest of the essay postulating the causes of this -- the decline in great power war, the spread of democracies, the growth of economic interdependence, and even the peacekeeping capabilities of the United Nations. Easterbrook makes a lot of good points -- most people are genuinely shocked when they are told that **even in a post-9/11 climate, there has been a steady and persistent decline in wars and deaths from wars.** That said, what bothers me in the piece is what Easterbrook leaves out. First, he neglects to mention **the biggest reason for why war is on the decline -- there's a global hegemon called the U**nited **S**tates right now. Easterbrook acknowledges that "the most powerful factor must be the end of the cold war" but he doesn't understand why it's the most powerful factor. Elsewhere in the piece he talks about the growing comity among the great powers, without discussing the elephant in the room: **the reason the "great powers" get along is that the U**nited **S**tates **is much, much more powerful than anyone else.** If you quantify power only by relative military capabilities, the U.S. is a great power, there are maybe ten or so middle powers, and then there are a lot of mosquitoes. [If the U.S. is so powerful, why can't it subdue the Iraqi insurgency?--ed. Power is a relative measure -- the U.S. might be having difficulties, but no other country in the world would have fewer problems.] Joshua Goldstein, who knows a thing or two about this phenomenon, made this clear in a Christian Science Monitor op-ed three years ago: We probably owe this lull to the end of the cold war, and to a unipolar world order with a single superpower to impose its will in places like Kuwait, Serbia, and Afghanistan**. The emerging world order is not exactly benign – Sept. 11 comes to mind** – and Pax Americana delivers neither justice nor harmony to the corners of the earth. **But a unipolar world is inherently more peaceful than the bipolar one where two superpowers fueled rival armies around the world.** The long-delayed "peace dividend" has arrived, like a tax refund check long lost in the mail. The difference in language between Goldstein and Easterbrook highlights my second problem with "The End of War?" Goldstein rightly refers to the past fifteen years as a "lull" -- a temporary reduction in war and war-related death. **The flip side of U.S. hegemony being responsible for the reduction of armed conflict is what would happen if U.S. hegemony were to ever fade away.** Easterbrook focuses on the trends that suggest an ever-decreasing amount of armed conflict -- and I hope he's right. But I'm enough of a realist to know that **if the U.S. should find its primacy challenged** by, say, a really populous non-democratic country on the other side of the Pacific Ocean, all best about the utility of **economic interdependence, U.N. peacekeeping, and** the spread of **democracy are right out the window.**

**Heg decreases structural violence---any alt dooms humanity to deprivation**

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First the absurdity: A few of the most **over-the-top Bush-Cheney neocons did** indeed **promote a vision of U.S. primacy by which America shouldn't be afraid to wage war to keep other rising powers at bay. It was a nutty concept then, and it remains a nutty concept today.** But since it feeds a lot of major military weapons system purchases, especially for the China-centric Air Force and Navy, don't expect it to disappear so long as the Pentagon's internal budget fights are growing in intensity. ¶ **Meanwhile**, the Chinese do their stupid best to fuel this outdated logic by building a force designed to keep America out of East Asia just as their nation's dependency on resources flowing from unstable developing regions skyrockets. **With America's fiscal constraints now abundantly clear, the world's primary policing force is pulling back, while that force's implied successor is nowhere close to being able to field a similar power-projection capacity -- and never will be.** So with NATO clearly stretched to its limits by the combination of Afghanistan and Libya, **a lot of future fires in developing regions will likely be left to burn on their own**. We'll just have to wait and see how much foreign commentators delight in that G-Zero dynamic in the years ahead. ¶ That gets us to the original "insult": **the U.S. did not lord it over the world in the 1990s. Yes, it did argue for and promote the most rapid spread of globalization possible. But the "evil" of the Washington Consensus only yielded the most rapid growth of a truly global middle class that the world has ever seen**. Yes, we can, in our current economic funk, somehow cast that development as the "loss of U.S. hegemony," in that the American consumer is no longer the demand-center of globalization's universe. But this is without a doubt the most amazing achievement of U.S. foreign policy, surpassing even our role in World War II. ¶ **Numerous world powers served as global or regional hegemons before we came along, and their record on economic development was painfully transparent: Elites got richer, and the masses got poorer. Then America showed up after World War II and engineered an international liberal trade order**, one that was at first admittedly limited to the West. But **within four decades it went virally global, and now for the first time in history, more than half of our planet's population lives in conditions of modest-to-mounting abundance -- § Marked 02:57 § after millennia of mere sustenance**. ¶ You may choose to interpret this as some sort of cosmic coincidence, but **the historical sequence is undeniable: With its unrivaled power, America made the world a far better place**. ¶ That spreading wave of global abundance has reformatted all sorts of traditional societies that lay in its path. Some, like the Chinese, have adapted to it magnificently in an economic and social sense, with the political adaptation sure to follow eventually. Others, being already democracies, have done far better across the board, like Turkey, Indonesia and India. But there are also numerous traditional societies where that reformatting impulse from below has been met by both harsh repression from above and violent attempts by religious extremists to effect a "counterreformation" that firewalls the "faithful" from an "evil" outside world.¶ Does this violent blowback constitute the great threat of our age? Not really. As I've long argued, this "friction" from globalization's tectonic advance is merely what's left over now that great-power war has gone dormant for 66 years and counting, with interstate wars now so infrequent and so less lethal as to be dwarfed by the civil strife that plagues those developing regions still suffering weak connectivity to the global economy. ¶ **Let's remember what the U.S. actually did across the 1990s** after the Soviet threat disappeared. **It went out of its way to police the world's poorly governed spaces, battling rogue regimes and answering the 9-1-1 call repeatedly when disaster and/or civil strife struck vulnerable societies. Yes, playing globalization's bodyguard made America public enemy No. 1 in the eyes of its most violent rejectionist movements**, including al-Qaida, **but we made the effort because**, in our heart of hearts, **we knew that this is what blessed powers are supposed to do**. ¶ Some, like the Bush-Cheney neocons, were driven by more than that sense of moral responsibility. They saw a chance to remake the world so as to assure U.S. primacy deep into the future. The timing of their dream was cruelly ironic, for it blossomed just as America's decades-in-the-making grand strategy reached its apogee in the peaceful rise of so many great powers at once. Had Sept. 11 not intervened, the neocons would likely have eventually targeted rising China for strategic demonization. Instead, they locked in on Osama bin Laden. The rest, as they say, is history. ¶ The follow-on irony of **the War on Terror** is that its operational requirements **actually revolutionized a major portion of the U.S. military -- specifically the Army, Marines and Special Forces -- in such a way as to redirect their strategic ethos from big wars to small ones**. It also forged a new operational bond between the military's irregular elements and that portion of the Central Intelligence Agency that pursues direct action against transnational bad actors. The up-front costs of this transformation were far too high, largely because the Bush White House stubbornly refused to embrace counterinsurgency tactics until after the popular repudiation signaled by the 2006 midterm election. But **the end result is clear: We now have the force we actually need to manage this global era.¶ But,** of course, **that can all be tossed into the dumpster if we convince ourselves that our "loss" of hegemony was somehow the result of our own misdeed, instead of being our most profound gift to world history. Again, we grabbed the reins of global leadership and patiently engineered not only the greatest redistribution -- and expansion -- of global wealth ever seen, but also the greatest consolidation of global peace ever seen. ¶ Now, if we can sensibly realign our strategic relationship with the one rising great power, China,** whose growing strength upsets us so much, **then in combination with the rest of the world's rising great powers we can collectively wield enough global policing power to manage what's yet to come.** ¶ As always, **the choice is ours.**

**The impact to US imperialism is minimal—and other powers are worse, which turns the alt**

Victor Davis **Hanson 2**, Ph. D. in Classics, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, a Professor Emeritus at California University, Fresno, “A Funny Sort of Empire: Are Americans really so imperial?” National Review Online, November 27, 2002, http://www.victorhanson.com/articles/hanson112702.html,

It is popular now to talk of the American "empire." In Europe particularly there are comparisons of Mr. Bush to Caesar — and worse — and invocations all sorts of pretentious poli-sci jargon like "hegemon," "imperium," and "subject states," along with neologisms like "hyperpower" and "overdogs." But **if we really are imperial, we rule over a very funny sort of empire.** We do not send out proconsuls to reside over client states, which in turn impose taxes on coerced subjects to pay for the legions. Instead, American bases are predicated on contractual obligations — costly to us and profitable to their hosts. We do not see any profits in Korea, but instead accept the risk of losing almost 40,000 of our youth to ensure that Kias can flood our shores and that shaggy students can protest outside our embassy in Seoul. **Athenians, Romans, Ottomans, and the British wanted land and treasure and grabbed all they could ge**t when they could. **The United States hasn't annexed anyone's soil since the Spanish-American War** — a checkered period in American history that still makes us, not them, out as villains in our own history books. Most Americans are far more interested in carving up the Nevada desert for monster homes than in getting their hands on Karachi or the Amazon basin. **Puerto Ricans are free to vote themselves independence anytime they wish. Imperial powers order and subjects obey. But in our case, we offer the Turks strategic guarantees, political support** — and money — for their allegiance. France and Russia go along in the U.N. — but only after we ensure them the traffic of oil and security for outstanding accounts. **Pakistan gets debt relief that ruined dot-coms could only dream of; Jordan reels in more aid than our own bankrupt municipalities. If acrimony and invective arise, it's usually one-way: the Europeans, the Arabs, and the South Americans all say worse things about us than we do about them, not privately and in hurt, but publicly and proudly**. § Marked 02:58 § Boasting that you hate Americans — or calling our supposed imperator "moron" or "Hitler" — won't get you censured by our Senate or earn a tongue-lashing from our president, but is more likely to get you ten minutes on CNN. We are considered haughty by Berlin not because we send a Germanicus with four legions across the Rhine, but because Mr. Bush snubs Mr. Schroeder by not phoning him as frequently as the German press would like. **Empires usually have contenders that check their power and through rivalry drive their ambitions.** Athens worried about Sparta and Persia. Rome found its limits when it butted up against Germany and Parthia. The Ottomans never could bully too well the Venetians or the Spanish. Britain worried about France and Spain at sea and the Germanic peoples by land. In contrast, **the restraint on American power is not China, Russia, or the European Union, but rather the American electorate itself — whose reluctant worries are chronicled weekly by polls that are eyed with fear by our politicians. We**, not them, **stop us from becoming what we could.** The Athenian ekklesia, the Roman senate, and the British Parliament alike were eager for empire and reflected the energy of their people. In contrast, America went to war late and reluctantly in World Wars I and II, and never finished the job in either Korea or Vietnam. We were likely to sigh in relief when we were kicked out of the Philippines, and really have no desire to return. Should the Greeks tell us to leave Crete — promises, promises — we would be more likely to count the money saved than the influence lost. Take away all our troops from Germany and polls would show relief, not anger, among Americans. **Isolationism, parochialism, and self-absorption are far stronger in the American character than desire for overseas adventurism. Our critics may slur us for "overreaching," but our elites in the military and government worry that they have to coax a reluctant populace, not constrain a blood-drunk rabble.**

**Even if we can’t 100% prove our knowledge claims, we should act based on the best possible information**

Friedrich **Kratochwil**, 200**7**, Political Sciences @ European University Inst., “Of False Promises and Good Bets: a Plea for a Pragmatic Approach to Theory Building”, Journal of International Relations and Development

Here **pragmatism seems to hold some promise for several reasons. First, as its most basic level it does not begin with ‘things’ or with ‘reason’ or thought, but with ‘acting’** (prattein), **thereby preventing some false starts. Even if the most rigorous and secure system of thought turns out not to be contradiction free, this revolutionary realization does not prevent mathematicians from going on to solve problems and most of us have to act most of the time without having the privilege of basing our decisions on secure universally valid knowledge.** § Marked 02:58 § Thus, **the cure of the anxiety induced by radical doubt consists not of the discovery of absolute certainty, which is a phantasmagorical undertaking that is engendered by its equally fantastic starting point, since nobody begins with universal doubt** (e.g. Pierce 1868/1997)! **Rather, the remedy for this anxiety consists of the recognition of the unproductive nature of universal doubt. Letting go of unrealizable plans and notions that lead us down the road to delusional projects and acquiring instead the ability to ‘go on’ in spite of uncertainties and the unknown is probably the most valuable lesson to learn. Second, by giving up on the idea that warranted knowledge is generated through either logical demonstration or the representation of the world ‘out there’, a pragmatic starting point not only takes the always preliminary character of scientific knowledge seriously but it also accounts for cumulative knowledge in a more coherent fashion. If the world ‘out there’ were ready made only to be discovered, then scientific knowledge would have to be a simple accumulation of more and more true facts, leading us virtually automatically closer and closer to ‘the Truth’ conceived as the totality of all true statements.** Here Popper’s (1972) ‘Third World’ comes to mind and his first interpretation of scientific progress as the self-correcting process of conjectures and refutations. But as the history of science has suggested, scientific progress was characterized by conceptual revolutions and not only ‘normal’ science, quite aside from the embarrassing problem of what to do with all those parts of the ‘third world’ that turned out to be false after all, such as the indivisibility of atoms, ether, phlogiston, or what have you. Similarly misleading is the imagery of scientific progress as an ever closer approximation to ‘the Truth’ without, however, ever reaching it, thereby foxing the problem of revision. Obviously the image of approximation in Popper’s (1963: Chapter 10) verisimilitude argument draws its persuasiveness from the successive approximation of polygons in approaching the perimeter of a circle, when determining the enclosed area. But **if we have learned anything from the studies of various disciplines, then it is the fact that progress consists of being able to formulate new questions that could not even be asked previously**. Thus, whatever we think of Kuhn’s argument about ‘paradigms’, we have to recognize that in times of revolutionary change the bounds of sense are being revolutionized and we donot simply now know some more of the encircled area!9 **Third, pragmatism recognizes that science as a process of knowledge production is a social practice determined by rules in which scientists are not only constitutive for the definitions of problems (rather than simply lifting a veil over nature), they also debate questions that seem ‘undecidable’ and they have to ‘weigh’ the evidence, instead of being able to rely on the bi-valence principle of logic as an automatic truth finder** (Kratochwil 2007). To that extent, the critical element of the epistemological project is retained, only that the ‘court’ which Kant believed to be reason itself, consists of the practitioners themselves. Instead of applying the standards as suggested by the epistemological project and the unity of science position, each science provides its own court and judges the appropriateness of its own methods and practices

### Iran UQ

#### talks fail – prolif inevitable

Prosor 10/21 (Ron, “Rouhani proclaims Iran’s innocence on nukes -- don't buy his false charm offensive,” 10/21/13, http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2013/10/21/rouhani-proclaims-irans-innocence-no-should-buy-his-false-charm-offensive/)

Since fighting broke out in Syria over two years ago, Iran has provided financial, political and logistical support to Assad, while sending Iranian Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah militia to assist Syrian government forces. Before a PR team set to work refashioning his image, Rouhani declared that Iran’s support for Assad is unbreakable and, “will not be shaken by any force in the world.” If Rouhani meant it when he declared to the General Assembly, “Say yes to peace,” he’d be saying yes to ceasing all nuclear enrichment. And if he meant it when he declared, “Say no to war,” he’d be ending Iran’s support for the brutal regime in Syria. Tired slogans without meaningful action should not be enough to gain the international community’s trust. Rouhani is intent on selling the world on Iran’s innocence; don’t buy the charm offensive.

**Judicial review is key to exercising prez power—prevents more intrusive crackdowns**

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**WE COME, then, to the question of what judicial review ought to look like in the war on terror** if one accepts that it should exist more robustly than the administration prefers but should not be of an unbridled or general nature, as human rights advocates wish to see. The answer is conceptually simple, though devilishly complicated in operation: **Judicial review should** be designed for the relatively narrow purpose of **hold**ing **the executive to clearly articulated legislative** **rules**, not to the often vague standards of international legal instruments that have not been implemented through American law. **Judges should have an expanded role in the powers of presidential preemption in the antiterrorism arena, for the judiciary is essential to legitimizing the use of those powers**. **Without them, the powers themselves come under a barrage of criticism which they cannot easily withstand**. And **eventually the effort to shield them from judicial review fails,** **and the review that results from the effort is more intrusive, more suspicious, and less accommodating of the executive's legitimate need for operational flexibility.** Judges, in other words, should be a part of the larger rules the legislature will need to write to govern the global fight against terrorism. Their role within these legal regimes will vary-from virtually no involvement in cases of covert actions and overseas surveillance to extensive involvement in cases of long-term detentions. The key is that the place of judges within those systems is not itself a matter for the judges to decide. The judiciary must not serve as the designer of the rules.

**Syria destroyed resolve**

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Instead, **the Administration** first **rushed into the kind of rhetoric you only use if you actually intend to act regardless of domestic and international support.** It tied its entire effort to Syrian use of chemical weapons and the precedent for using such weapons forever. **And only then did it suddenly spun around and talked about then need for delay, measured action, and Congressional approval.** While Beckett might not appreciate my efforts to define Godot as the Syrian Civil war, the Administration followed the script of Beckett’s play to the extent it never defined the reasons for what the actors were doing, why they were waiting, or what would happen after Godot came. Chemical weapons are a very real issue, but they are only a subset of the real issue: the overall level of suffering and growing regional instability coming out of the Syrian civil war. **We now face the inevitable reaction. The President’s decisions have reinforced all of the doubts about American strength, and our willingness to act, of both our friends and foes.** We now have ten days of confusion and uncertainty to deal with, and then **Congress will be evidently be asked to act only on a strike tailored to deter** the future use of **chemical weapons. It will still lack a meaningful plan for dealing with the Syrian civil war and its impact on the region. Israel is threatening to return to hawk mode over Iran. Russia and China are in the “we told you so” mode.** Assad has already launched new conventional artillery barrages against Syrian civilian areas and now has time enough to disperse a significant number of key physical assets from fixed target sites. **France is left hanging – as is Britain** for very different reasons. **Our Arab allies and Turkey have no clear lead to follow. Our whole strategy in the Middle East remains unclear, as is our entire national security posture in an era of Sequestration and funding crises. If the Congress does support the President, it will only be after we have openly faltered, and after having rushed forward before deciding on a course of delay. The President will have set a uniquely dangerous precedent by turning to Congress only after he appeared weak, rather than doing from the start**, and will have then committed himself to wait at least ten days for the congress to return for its holiday. **The message to the world is obvious.**

**Credibility is irrelevant and focusing on it makes bad policy—aff approach is best**

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Even if Assad were so simpleminded, the administration’s **critics are wrong to suggest that the president should have acted sooner to protect U.S. credibility**. **After the red line was first crossed, Obama could have taken the** **U**nited **S**tates **to war to prevent Assad from concluding that an irresolute Obama would not respond to any further attacks** -- a perception on Syria’s part that seems to have now made a U.S. military response all but certain. **But going to war to prevent a possible misperception that might later cause a war is**, to paraphrase Bismarck, **like committing suicide out of fear that others might later wrongly think one is dead**. It is also possible that **the U**nited **S**tates **did not factor into Assad’s calculations.** A few **months before the** **U**nited **S**tates **invaded Iraq**, Saddam **Hussein’s primary concerns were avoiding a Shia rebellion and deterring Iran.** Shortsighted, yes, but also a good reminder that **although the** **U**nited **S**tates **is at the center of the universe for Americans, it is not for everyone else.** **Assad has a regime to protect and he will commit any crime to win the war.** Finally, **it is possible that Assad never doubted Obama’s resolve** -- **he just expects that he can survive** any American response. **After all, if overthrowing Assad were easy, it would** **already have been done**. **Instead of worrying about U.S. credibility or the president’s reputation**, **the administration should focus on what can be done to reinforce the** longstanding **norm against the use of w**eapons of **m**ass **d**estruction.

**The “Obama power” thesis is totally wrong---nothing about a President’s relative resolve matters**

James **Kitfield 11**, Senior Correspondent for The National Journal, three-time winner of the Gerald R. Ford Award for Distinguished Reporting on National Defense, November 18, 2011, “Power Down,” The National Journal, online: http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/an-indispensible-nation-no-more--20111117

**For generations reared on** the mother’s milk of “**American exceptionalism,” each day brings a new affront**. **China**, on the rise, stubbornly **refuses to end its currency manipulation**, distorting Beijing’s advantage in an international system of our making. Close **allies in Europe and Japan slash defense budgets**, further burdening Washington with the role of global police officer. In the face of repeated threats and sanctions, **Iran still dares to build nuclear weapons** and plot terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. **Syria’s** despotic **president lingers in power.** **Israelis and Palestinians blithely ignore presidential exhortations** to make concessions for peace. A costly war in **Afghanistan drags on** toward … what, exactly? **Republicans lay the blame** **for** those **international woes on** President **Obama’s doorstep**. **They object to his squishy multilateralism**, **his willingness to engage** odious **adversaries** in diplomacy, and **his apologies for** past **American mistakes**. **They see** insufficient fealty to Israel, indecision in Afghanistan, and **a refusal to lead—out front**, the way they’re accustomed to seeing—**on Libya**. They doubt Obama’s conviction that America is a “shining city upon a hill” and a beacon to all free peoples. “As president of the United States, I will devote myself to an American Century, and I will never, ever apologize for America,” Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney said during a recent foreign-policy speech. In it, he advanced the notion of America’s singularity, its role as a bulwark against tyranny, and its leadership of the free (and, by extension, the entire) world. “America’s strength rises from a strong economy, a strong defense, and the enduring strength of our values,” he said. “Unfortunately, under this president, all three of those elements have been weakened.” Wait just a minute. **Only three years ago, Obama** and the Democrats **blamed** President **Bush** and his administration **for** **failing to check China and deter Iran**. **They objected to Bush’s** swashbuckling **unilateralism**, **his decision to ignore diplomacy with disagreeable countries,** and his with-us-or-against-us triumphalism **that alienated even close allies.** They questioned his one-sided fealty to Israel and blamed him for a war in Iraq that was dragging toward … what, exactly? **They charged that he tarnished the American beacon** by endorsing torture and conflating the spread of democracy with regime change at the point of a gun. **Why did two presidents with** **such different foreign-policy instincts** **run up against**—**and**, in many cases, **get foiled by—the same international challenges?** In “George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and the Future of U.S. Global Leadership,” a recent article in International Affairs, James Lindsay wrote that **presidents today**, **no matter their styles**, **must manage friends and foes who feel** **increasingly empowered to ignore or contest American dominance**. “**Americans have this ingrained notion that U.S. leadership and predominance is the natural state of world affairs, with** Democrats thus concluding that gentle engagement will automatically cause countries to rally to our banner, and **Republicans believing that firmness and consistency** **will have the same effect**,” Lindsay said in an interview. “**They are** both **fundamentally misreading the geostrategic environment**.” The § Marked 03:00 § post-Cold War period was an era of victory that left the United States standing atop the global order—a superpower with unmatched military, economic, social, and diplomatic might. No wonder expectations are so high. But things have changed. **Brazil, India, Indonesia, Turkey, and** especially **China are clawing their way to the top of the international system**, **“insisting on all the privileges that come with their newly elevated status**,” as Lindsay puts it. **Revolution is sweeping the Middle East**, the world’s energy basket. **Revisionist powers** (Russia) **and perennial outliers** (Iran, North Korea) **sense opportunity and new room to maneuver**. “If a unipolar moment ever really existed, it’s not just passed, it’s gone permanently,” says Richard Haass, the former senior official in the first Bush White House who now runs the Council on Foreign Relations. Partly, that follows from two costly wars, a recession, and political dysfunction that blocks a long-term debt solution or a bipartisan foreign-policy consensus. More than that, though, it flows from globalization. “Power is simply too diffuse now, and the challenges we confront are complex, transnational, and they defy the efforts of any one nation,” Haass says.

#### US constrains Israeli lashout

Mitchell G. Bard (Executive Director of American – Israeli Cooperative Enterprise AICE and one of the leading authorities on US Middle East Policy. He haw written 18 books. PhD.). “Will Israel Survive.” 2007. p 229

American Jews sometimes fear the United States could one day turn against Israel because of the bias of the media, the prevalence of anti-Israel professors on college campuses, or the changing demographics of the electorate. The truth, however, is that Americans and Israelis are closely inter-twined on so many levels that the special relationship should endure. For Israel, the strength of the alliance provides security. Israelis know their ally will maintain its commitment and be limited in its ability to apply pressure to force them into actions they oppose. Still, no prime minister wants strained relations with Israel's closest friend and the world's most powerful nation, so Israel inevitably bends to the will of the president.

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### Violence UQ

**The world is getting better now because heg is peaceful**

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**Is Unipolarity Peaceful?** As evidence, **Monteiro provides metrics of the number of years during which great powers have been at war.** For the unipolar era since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been at war 13 of those 22 years or 59% (see his Table 2 below). Now, **I've been following** some of **the discussion by** and about Steven **Pinker** and Joshua Goldstein's [work](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/opinion/sunday/war-really-is-going-out-of-style.html?pagewanted=all) **that suggests the world is becoming more peaceful** **with** interstate wars and intrastate **wars becoming more rare**. I was struck by the graphic that Pinker used in a Wall Street Journal [piece](http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904106704576583203589408180.html) back in September that drew on the Uppsala Conflict Data, which shows a steep decline in the number of deaths per 100,000 people. **How do we square this account by Monteiro of a unipolar world that is not peaceful** (**with the U.S. at war during this period in Iraq twice, Afghanistan, Kosovo**) **and** **Pinker's account which suggests declining violence in the contemporary period**? **Where Pinker is focused on systemic outcomes, Monteiro's measure merely reflect years during which the great powers are at war**. Under unipolarity, there is only one great power so the measure is partial and not systemic. However, Monteiro's theory aims to be systemic rather than partial. In critiquing Wohlforth's early work on unipolarity stability, Monteiro notes: Wohlforth’s argument does not exclude all kinds of war. Although power preponderance allows the unipole to manage conflicts globally, this argument is not meant to apply to relations between major and minor powers, or among the latter (17). So presumably, **a more adequate test of the peacefulness or not of unipolarity** (at least for Monteiro) **is not the number of years the great power has been at** **war but whether the system as a whole is becoming more peaceful under unipolarity compared** to previous eras, including wars between major and minor powers or wars between minor powers and whether the wars that do happen are as violent as the ones that came before. Now, as Ross Douthat pointed [out](http://douthat.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/17/steven-pinkers-history-of-violence/), Pinker's argument isn't based on a logic of benign hegemony. It could be that even if the present era is more peaceful, unipolarity has nothing to do with it. Moreover, **Pinker may be wrong**. Maybe the world isn't all that peaceful. I keep thinking about the places I don't want to go to anymore because they are violent (Mexico, Honduras, El Salvador, Nigeria, Pakistan, etc.) As Tyler Cowen [noted](http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2011/10/steven-pinker-on-violence.html), the measure Pinker uses to suggest violence is a per capita one, which doesn't get at the absolute level of violence perpetrated in an era of a greater world population. **But, if my read of other** [**reports**](http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/20092010/graphs-and-tables.aspx) **based on Uppsala data is right, war is becoming more rare and less deadly** (though later [data](http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/charts_and_graphs/) suggests lower level armed conflict may be increasing again since the mid-2000s). The apparent violence of the contemporary era may be something of a presentist bias and reflect our own lived experience and the ubiquity of news media **.Even if the U.S. has been at war for the better part of unipolarity, the deadliness is declining, even compared with Vietnam, let alone World War II.** Does Unipolarity Drive Conflict? So**, I** kind of took **issue with the Monteiro's premise that unipolarity is not peaceful**. What about his argument that unipolarity drives conflict? Monteiro suggests that the unipole has three available strategies - defensive dominance, offensive dominance and disengagement - though is less likely to use the third. Like Rosato and Schuessler, Monteiro suggests because other states cannot trust the intentions of other states, namely the unipole, that minor states won't merely bandwagon with the unipole. Some "recalcitrant" minor powers will attempt to see what they can get away with and try to build up their capabilities. As an aside, in Rosato and Schuessler world, unless these are located in strategically important areas (i.e. places where there is oil), then the unipole (the United States) should disengage. **In Monteiro's world**, **disengagement would inexorably lead to instability and draw in the U.S. again** (though I'm not sure this necessarily follows), but neither defensive or offensive dominance offer much possibility for peace either since it is U.S. power in and of itself that makes other states insecure, even though they can't balance against it.

### FW

**Engaging international institutions and evaluating consequences is necessary to realize the alternative**

Anthony **Burke,** Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations, University of New South Wales, "Security Cosmopolitanism," CRITICAL STUDIES IN SECURITY v. 1. n. 1, 20**13**, pp. 13-28.

It might be argued that having to peer long into an uncertain future through the prism of one's choices is an impossible burden. I disagree. Uncertainty is also potentiality; it opens up the potential for more just and secure paths, and the possible effects of particular technological, policy, and strategic choices can often be reasonably predicted through a combination of critical history, social science, public dialogue, and scenario-based planning. **A consistent aim must be to create legal and structural frameworks that work to build security and ward off disastrous outcomes in a systemic fashion. This process will be assisted by a third ethical principle: a principle that can responsibly guide security actions in the face of their future impacts, some of them potentially unknowable. This, in a modification of Kant, one could call a global categorical imperative.** Recall that Kant's categorical imperative of morality stated that one ‘must act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it be a universal law…act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature’ (Kant 2004, 31). The global categorical imperative refines Kant's categorical imperative in two ways. First, its address expands from the individual to collectivities and organizations – governments, NGOs, international organizations, militaries, defence ministries, diplomats, insurgents, and more – to any actor or agency whose activities will affect the security of others (a principle that modifies the criteria for institutional moral responsibility developed in Erskine 2003, 6–8). Second, its scope moves beyond the moral individual wrestling with their duties to take in the world as a whole: actors must consider the systemic context and impact of their actions, work to understand their potential collective consequences, and act collectively to manage those impacts and resolve global insecurities. The global categorical imperative would thus state: act as if both the principles and consequences of your action will become global, across space and through time, and act only in ways that will bring a more secure life for all human beings closer. **We must act as if**

**the principles and consequences of our actions will become global because they are likely to: because norms, ideas, and effects spread, or they lie dormant until they appear at other times** and in other places, and because the complex security processes that actions feed into reverberate widely through space and time; they take on momentum that is difficult to arrest. **The global categorical imperative tests norms and actions against their global consequences and the complex causal chains they feed into. What is the impact on global security if bad norms become commonplace-torture, the violation of human rights, military aggression, proxy warfare, targeted killings, terrorism, corruption, gender or racial discrimination, colonialism, and other great injustices?** Can the world really bear them, and judge itself secure? **The global categorical imperative demands that security actors look into a distant and open future, and take responsibility for it, in the face of the particularly challenging quality that Arendt attributed to action: ‘action has no end.** The process of a single deed can quite literally endure through time until mankind itself has come to an end’ (Arendt 1998, 233). The global categorical imperative asks us to consider what violence, conflict, and insecurity put into the world – grief, radicalization, impoverishment, resentment, pain, trauma, and fear – and then of the myriad ways that the insecurity that manifests them can multiply and mutate. The long-standing security concern with ‘proliferation’ here widens to take in its systemic potentials: proliferation of weapons, doctrines, tactics, norms, ideas, feelings, dilemmas, and consequences. The ethical principles of security cosmopolitanism, then, are not merely normative preferences: they are strategic necessities.