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**1AC: Blowback**

**Contention 1 is Blowback:**

**US legitimacy has been severely damaged by detention—plan is key to reverse negative perceptions**

**Randall 10** (Diane, executive secretary of the Friends Committee on National Legislation, 7-18-10, "America must be better than Guantanamo" Washington Post) www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/on-faith/wp/2013/07/18/america-must-be-better-than-guantanamo/

**If** President Barack **Obama and** the U.S. **Congress want to** act **immediately** to **bolster** the **flagging faith among the international community and** among much-needed **allies in the Arab World, there is one policy** lever **that could help: Guantanamo** Bay. Speaking as the head of a Quaker faith lobby in Washington DC, and as someone who just returned, this month, from the protested and politically active streets of Istanbul, I can attest to the urgency of this moment. From Istanbul to Sana’a, from Beirut to Baghdad, and from Cairo to Kabul, the protests are becoming more common, calls for reform more frequent, and disregard for America’s role in the region more apparent. **Whatever moral authority America once commanded continues to wither as we violate our country’s cherished values of human rights and the rule of law** with the continued operation of Guantanamo. There, at Guantanamo, 166 detainees live in captivity; over 80 of those men have been on a hunger strike, many being force-fed against their will. Over half of the total detainees have been cleared of charges and await release. **The world watches our government’s inaction to address this injustice.** Additionally, and in violation of international law prohibitions against “cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment,” several dozen inmates who remain on hunger strike are being force fed. After being physically immobilized, a two-foot long nasal tube is lodged into their bodies. The process ruptures the protective lining of their throats and stomachs and ruptures any sense of dignity, causing injury to body and soul. The harm to these detainees is awful in the very action, but **the fact that America** — which considers itself the standard bearer for freedom and justice — **is allowing this wound to fester harms our nation’s effectiveness** with nations **around the globe. This** Pentagon **malpractice is fueling**, quite **fast and furiously, anti-American sentiment abroad**. And while Sens. Diane Feinstein (D-CA) and Richard Durbin (D-IL) have called for the Pentagon to end force feedings and implement the same prisoner protections currently in place at federal prisons, the world isn’t seeing the nuance among America’s leadership. Beyond the absolute illegality and the severe human rights implications here, **the message America is sending** to leaders in Yemen, Sudan, Egypt, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Syria, and Libya **is one that encourages the contravening of** the **rule of law**, criminal justice, **and due process** in a court.

**Legitimacy is crucial to sustainable and effective US hegemony—judicial review is key**

**Knowles 9** [Spring, 2009, Robert Knowles is a Acting Assistant Professor, New York University School of Law, “American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Constitution”, ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL, 41 Ariz. St. L.J. 87]

**American unipolarity has created a challenge for realists. Unipolarity was thought to be inherently unstable because other nations, seeking to protect their own security**, form alliances to counter-balance the leading state. n322 **But no nation or group of nations has yet attempted to challenge America's military predominance**. n323 Although some realists predict that [\*140] counter-balancing will occur or is already in some ways occurring, n324 William Wohlforth has offered a compelling explanation for why true counter-balancing, in the traditional realist sense, will probably not happen for decades. n325 American unipolarity is unprecedented. n326 First, **the United States is geographically isolated from other potential rivals**, who are located near one another in Eurasia. n327 **This mutes the security threat that the U.S. seems to pose while increasing the threats that potential rivals seem to pose to one another**. n328 Second, **the U.S. far exceeds the capabilities of all other states in every aspect of power** - military, economic, technological, and in terms of what is known as "soft power." **This advantage "is larger now than any analogous gap in the history of the modern state system."** n329 Third, **unipolarity is entrenched as the status quo** for the first time since the seventeenth century, multiplying free rider problems for potential rivals and rendering less relevant all modern previous experience with balancing. n330 Finally, the potential rivals' possession of nuclear weapons makes the concentration of power in the United States appear less threatening. A war between great powers in today's world is very unlikely. n331 These factors make the current system much more stable, peaceful and durable than the past multi-polar and bipolar systems in which the United States operated for all of its history until 1991. **The lack of balancing means that the U**nited **S**tates, **and by extension the executive branch, faces** much **weaker external constraints on its exercise of power** than in the past. n332 Therefore, **the internal processes of the U.S. matter now more than any other nations' have in history**. n333 And **it is these internal processes**, as much as external developments, **that will determine the durability of American unipolarity. As one realist scholar has argued, the U.S. can best ensure the [\*141] stability of this unipolar order by ensuring that its predominance appears legitimate**. n334 **Hegemonic orders take on hierarchical characteristics**, with the preeminent power having denser political ties with other nations than in a unipolar order. n335 **Stability in hegemonic orders is maintained in part through security guarantees and trade relationships that result in economic specialization** among nations. n336 For example, if Nation X's security is supplied by Hegemon Y, Nation X can de-emphasize military power and focus on economic power. In a hegemonic system, **the preeminent state has "the power to shape the rules of international politics according to its own interests."** n337 **The hegemon**, in return, **provides public goods for the system as a whole**. n338 **The hegemon possesses** not only superior command of military and economic resources but "**soft" power, the ability to guide other states' preferences and interests.** n339 **The durability and stability of hegemonic orders depends on other states' acceptance of the hegemon's role. The hegemon's leadership must be seen as legitimate.** n340 [\*142] **The U**nited **S**tates **qualifies as a global hegemon**. In many ways, **the U.S. acts as a world government**. n341 **It provides public goods for the world**, such as security guarantees, the protection of sea lanes, and support for open markets. n342 After World War II, the U.S. forged a system of military alliances and transnational economic and political institutions - such as the United Nations, NATO, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank - that remain in place today. The U.S. provides security for allies such as Japan and Germany by maintaining a strong military presence in Asia and Europe. n343 Because of its overwhelming military might, the U.S. possesses what amounts to a "quasi-monopoly" on the use of force. n344 This prevents other nations from launching wars that would tend to be truly destabilizing. Similarly, **the United States provides a public good through its efforts to combat terrorism** and confront - even through regime change - rogue states. n345 **The U**nited **S**tates also **provides a public good through its promulgation and enforcement of international norms. It exercises a dominant influence on the definition of international law because it is the largest "consumer" of such law and the only nation capable of enforcing it on a global scale.** n346 The U.S. was the primary driver behind the establishment of the United Nations system and the development of contemporary treaties and institutional regimes to effectuate those treaties in both public and private international law. n347

Moreover, **controlling international norms are** [\*143] sometimes **embodied in the U.S. Constitution and domestic law rather than in treaties or customary international law.** For example, **whether terrorist threats will be countered effectively depends "in large part on U.S. law regarding armed conflict, from rules that define the circumstances under which the President can use force to those that define the proper treatment of enemy combatants.**" n348 **These public goods provided by the United States stabilize the system by legitimizing it and decreasing resistance to it.** **The transnational** political and economic **institutions created by the U**nited **S**tates **provide other countries with informal access to policymaking and tend to reduce resistance to American hegemony, encouraging others to "bandwagon"** with the U.S. rather than seek to create alternative centers of power. n349 American hegemony also coincided with the rise of globalization - the increasing integration and standardization of markets and cultures - which tends to stabilize the global system and reduce conflict. n350 **The legitimacy of American hegemony is strengthened and sustained by the democratic and accessible nature of the U.S. government. The American constitutional separation of powers is an international public good. The risk that it will hinder the ability of the U.S. to act swiftly, coherently or decisively** in foreign affairs **is counter-balanced by the benefits it provides in permitting foreigners multiple points of access to the government**. n351 Foreign nations and citizens lobby Congress and executive branch agencies in the State, Treasury, Defense, and Commerce Departments, where foreign policy is made. n352 They use the media to broadcast their point of view in an effort to influence the opinion of decision-makers. n353 Because the United States is a nation of immigrants, many American citizens have a specific interest in the fates of particular countries and form "ethnic lobbies" for the purpose of affecting foreign policy. n354 **The courts,** too, **are accessible to foreign nations and non-citizens. The Alien Tort Statute is emerging as an** [\*144] **important vehicle for adjudicating tort claims among non-citizens in U.S. courts.** n355 Empires are more complex than unipolar or hegemonic systems. Empires consist of a "rimless-hub-and-spoke structure," with an imperial core - the preeminent state - ruling the periphery through intermediaries. n356 The core institutionalizes its control through distinct, asymmetrical bargains (heterogeneous contracting) with each part of the periphery. n357 Ties among peripheries (the spokes) are thin, creating firewalls against the spread of resistance to imperial rule from one part of the empire to the other. n358 The success of imperial governance depends on the lack of a "rim." n359 Stability in imperial orders is maintained through "divide and rule," preventing the formation of countervailing alliances in the periphery by exploiting differences among potential challengers. n360 Divide-and-rule strategies include using resources from one part of the empire against challengers in another part and multi-vocal communication - legitimating imperial rule by signaling "different identities ... to different audiences." n361 Although the U.S. has often been labeled an empire, the term applies only in limited respects and in certain situations. Many foreign relations scholars question the comparison. n362 However, the U.S. does exercise informal imperial rule when it has routine and consistent influence over the foreign policies of other nations, who risk losing "crucial military, economic, or political support" if they refuse to comply. n363 The "Status of Force Agreements" ("SOFAs") that govern legal rights and responsibilities of U.S. military personnel and others on U.S. bases throughout the world are typically one-sided. n364 And the U.S. occupations in Iraq and Afghanistan had a strong imperial dynamic because those regimes depended on American support. n365 [\*145] But the management of empire is increasingly difficult in the era of globalization. Heterogeneous contracting and divide-and-rule strategies tend to fail when peripheries can communicate with one another. The U.S. is less able control "the flow of information ... about its bargains and activities around the world." n366 In late 2008, negotiations on the Status of Force Agreement between the U.S. and Iraq were the subject of intense media scrutiny and became an issue in the presidential campaign. n367 Another classic imperial tactic - the use of brutal, overwhelming force to eliminate resistance to imperial rule - is also unlikely to be effective today. The success of counterinsurgency operations depends on winning a battle of ideas, and collateral damage is used by violent extremists, through the Internet and satellite media, to "create widespread sympathy for their cause." n368 The abuses at Abu Ghraib, once public, harmed America's "brand" and diminished support for U.S. policy abroad. n369 Imperial rule, like hegemony, depends on maintaining legitimacy.B. Constructing a Hegemonic Model International relations scholars are still struggling to define the current era. The U.S.-led international order is unipolar, hegemonic, and, in some instances, imperial. In any event, this order diverges from traditional realist assumptions in important respects. It is unipolar, but stable. It is more hierarchical. The U.S. is not the same as other states; it performs unique functions in the world and has a government open and accessible to foreigners. And the stability and legitimacy of the system depends more on successful functioning of the U.S. government as a whole than it does on balancing alliances crafted by elite statesmen practicing realpolitik. "World power politics are shaped primarily not by the structure created by interstate anarchy but by the foreign policy developed in Washington." n370 These differences require a new model for assessing the institutional competences of the executive and judicial branches in foreign affairs. [\*146] One approach would be to adapt an institutional competence model using insights from a major alternative theory of international relations - liberalism. Liberal IR theory generally holds that internal characteristics of states - in particular, the form of government - dictate states' behavior, and that democracies do not go to war against one another. n371 Liberalists also regard economic interdependence and international institutions as important for maintaining peace and stability in the world. n372 Dean Anne-Marie Slaughter has proposed a binary model that distinguishes between liberal, democratic states and non-democratic states. n373 Because domestic and foreign issues are "most convergent" among liberal democracies, Slaughter reasons, the courts should decide issues concerning the scope of the political branches' powers. n374 With respect to non-liberal states, the position of the U.S. is more "realist," and courts should deploy a high level of deference. n375 One strength of this binary approach is that it would tend to reduce the uncertainty in foreign affairs adjudication. Professor Nzelibe has observed that it would put courts in the difficult position of determining which countries are liberal democracies. n376 But even if courts are capable of making these determinations, they would still face the same dilemmas adjudicating controversies regarding non-liberal states. Where is the appropriate boundary between foreign affairs and domestic matters? How much discretion should be afforded the executive when individual rights and accountability values are at stake? To resolve these dilemmas, an institutional competence model should be applicable to foreign affairs adjudication across the board. In constructing a new realist model, it is worth recalling that the functional justifications for special deference are aimed at addressing problems of a particular sort of role effectiveness - which allocation of power among the branches will best achieve general governmental effectiveness in foreign affairs. In the twenty-first century, **America's global role has changed, and the best means of achieving effectiveness in foreign affairs have changed as well. The international realm remains highly political** - if not as much as in the past - but **it is American politics that matters most.** If the U.S. is truly an empire - [\*147] and in some respects it is - the problems of imperial management will be far different from the problems of managing relations with one other great power or many great powers. Similarly, **the management of hegemony or unipolarity requires a different set of competences.** Although American predominance is recognized as a salient fact, there is no consensus among realists about the precise nature of the current international order. n377 The hegemonic model I offer here adopts common insights from the three IR frameworks - unipolar, hegemonic, and imperial - described above. First, the "hybrid" hegemonic model assumes that the goal of U.S. foreign affairs should be the preservation of American hegemony, which is more stable, more peaceful, and better for America's security and prosperity, than the alternatives. **If the United States were to withdraw from its global leadership role, no other nation would be capable of taking its place. n378 The result would be radical instability and a greater risk of major war**. n379 In addition, the United States would no longer benefit from the public goods it had formerly produced; as the largest consumer, it would suffer the most. Second, the hegemonic model assumes that **American hegemony is unusually stable and durable**. n380 As noted above, **other nations have many incentives to continue to tolerate the current order**. n381 And although other nations or groups of nations - China, the European Union, and India are often mentioned - may eventually overtake the United States in certain areas, such as manufacturing, **the U.S. will remain dominant in most measures of capability for decades.** According to 2007 estimates, the U.S. economy was projected to be twice the size of China's in 2025. n382 **The U.S. accounted for half of the world's military spending in 2007 and holds enormous advantages in defense technology that far outstrip would-be competitors. n383 Predictions of American decline are not new, and they have thus far proved premature.** n384 [\*148] Third, **the hegemonic model assumes that preservation of American hegemony depends not just on power, but legitimacy. n385 All three IR frameworks for describing predominant states - although unipolarity less than hegemony or empire - suggest that legitimacy is crucial to the stability and durability of the system.** **Although empires and predominant states in unipolar systems can conceivably maintain their position through the use of force, this is much more likely to exhaust the resources of the predominant state and to lead to counter-balancing or the loss of control. n386 Legitimacy as a method of maintaining predominance is far more efficient.** The hegemonic model generally values courts' institutional competences more than the anarchic realist model. **The courts' strengths in offering a stable interpretation of the law, relative insulation from political pressure, and power to bestow legitimacy are important for realizing the functional constitutional goal of effective U.S. foreign policy.** This means that courts' treatment of deference in foreign affairs will, in most respects, resemble its treatment of domestic affairs. Given the amorphous quality of foreign affairs deference, this "domestication" reduces uncertainty. **The increasing boundary problems caused by the proliferation of treaties and the infiltration of domestic law by foreign affairs issues are lessened by reducing the deference gap**. And **the dilemma caused by the need to weigh different functional considerations** - liberty, accountability, and effectiveness - **against one another is made less intractable because it becomes part of the same project that the courts constantly grapple with in adjudicating domestic disputes.**

**U.S. leadership is key to global stability and preventing great power wars**

Yuhan **Zhang**, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Lin Shi, Columbia University, “America’s Decline: A Harbinger of Conflcit and Rivalry,” EAST ASIA FORUM, 1—22—**11**, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/01/22/americas-decline-a-harbinger-of-conflict-and-rivalry/>

This does not necessarily mean that the US is in systemic decline, but it encompasses a trend that appears to be negative and perhaps alarming. Although the US still possesses incomparable military prowess and its economy remains the world’s largest, the once seemingly indomitable chasm that separated America from anyone else is narrowing. Thus, the global distribution of power is shifting, and the inevitable result will be a world that is less peaceful, liberal and prosperous, burdened by a dearth of effective conflict regulation. Over the past two decades, no other state has had the ability to seriously challenge the US military. Under these circumstances, motivated by both opportunity and fear, **many actors have bandwagoned with US hegemony** and accepted a subordinate role. Canada, most of Western Europe, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore and the Philippines have all joined the US, **creating a status quo that has tended to mute great power conflicts**. However, **as** the **hegemony** that drew these powers together **withers,** so will the pulling power behind the US alliance. **The result will be an** international **order where power is more diffuse,** American interests and influence can be more readily challenged, **and conflicts or wars may be harder to avoid. As history attests, power decline and redistribution result in military confrontation.** For example, in the late 19th century America’s emergence as a regional power saw it launch its first overseas war of conquest towards Spain. By the turn of the 20th century, accompanying the increase in US power and waning of British power, the American Navy had begun to challenge the notion that Britain ‘rules the waves.’ Such a notion would eventually see the US attain the status of sole guardians of the Western Hemisphere’s security to become the order-creating Leviathan shaping the international system with democracy and rule of law. Defining this US-centred system are three key characteristics: enforcement of property rights, constraints on the actions of powerful individuals and groups and some degree of equal opportunities for broad segments of society. As a result of such political stability, free markets, liberal trade and flexible financial mechanisms have appeared. And, with this, many countries have sought opportunities to enter this system, proliferating stable and cooperative relations. However, what will happen to these advances as America’s influence declines? Given that America’s authority, although sullied at times, has benefited people across much of Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, as well as parts of Africa and, quite extensively, Asia, the answer to this question could affect global society in a profoundly detrimental way. Public imagination and academia have anticipated that **a post-hegemonic world would return to** the problems of the 1930s: **regional blocs, trade conflicts and strategic rivalry.** Furthermore, multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank or the WTO might give way to regional organisations. For example, Europe and East Asia would each step forward to fill the vacuum left by Washington’s withering leadership to pursue their own visions of regional political and economic orders. **Free markets would become more politicised — and, well, less free — and major powers would compete for supremacy.** Additionally, such power plays have historically possessed a zero-sum element. In the late 1960s and 1970s, US economic power declined relative to the rise of the Japanese and Western European economies, with the US dollar also becoming less attractive. And, as American power eroded, so did international regimes (such as the Bretton Woods System in 1973). **A world without American hegemony is one where great power wars re-emerge,** the liberal international system is supplanted by an authoritarian one, and trade protectionism devolves into restrictive, anti-globalisation barriers. This, at least, is one possibility we can forecast in a future that will inevitably be devoid of unrivalled US primacy.

**Hegemony solves conflicts that cause extinction**

Thomas P.M. **Barnett,** chief analyst, Wikistrat, “The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S. and Globalization, at Crossroads,” WORLD POLITICS REVIEW, 3—7—**11**, www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-at-crossroads

Events in Libya are a further reminder for **Americans** that we **stand at a crossroads in our continuing evolution as the** world's sole full-service **superpower.** Unfortunately, we are increasingly seeking change without cost, and shirking from risk because we are tired of the responsibility. We don't know who we are anymore, and our president is a big part of that problem. Instead of leading us, he explains to us. Barack Obama would have us believe that he is practicing strategic patience. But many experts and ordinary citizens alike have concluded that he is actually beset by strategic incoherence -- in effect, a man overmatched by the job. It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack of mass violence. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II. Let me be more blunt: **As the guardian of globalization, the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known. Had America been removed from the global dynamics** that governed the 20th century, the mass murder never would have ended. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable **there would now be no** identifiable **human civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered the killing equation. But the world did not keep sliding down** that path of **perpetual war**. Instead**, America** stepped up and **changed everything by ushering in** our now-perpetual **great-power peace. We introduced** the international liberal trade order known as **globalization** and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. **What resulted was the collapse of empires, an explosion of** **democracy**, the **persistent spread of** **human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from state-based conflicts.** That is what American "hubris" actually delivgered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force. As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head. The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars. That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, these **calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a 99 percent relative drop in deaths due to war**. We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity, something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms, deeply embedded in the geometry to come. To continue the historical survey, after salvaging Western Europe from its half-century of civil war, the U.S. emerged as the progenitor of a new, far more just form of globalization -- one based on actual free trade rather than colonialism. America then successfully replicated globalization further in East Asia over the second half of the 20th century, setting the stage for the Pacific Century now unfolding.

**Indefinite detention increases terrorism—multiple mechanisms**

Martin **Scheinin**, Professor, International Law, “Should Human Rights Take a Back Seat in Wartime?” REAL CLEAR WORLD, interviewed by Casey L. Coombs, 1—11—**12**, www.realclearworld.com/articles/2012/01/11/national\_defense\_authorization\_act\_scheinin\_interview-full.html, accessed 8-21-13.

CLC: As a world leader and active promoter of universal human rights, **the practice of indefinite detention without charge would** seem to **clash with U.S. ideals**. Could you comment on this contradiction? MS: **One of the main lessons learned in the** international **fight against terrorism is that counter-terrorism professionals** have gradually **come to learn and admit that human rights violations are not an acceptable shortcut** in an effective fight against terrorism. **Such measures** tend to **backfire in multiple ways**. **They** result in legal problems by **hamper**ing **prosecution, trial and punishment**. **The use of torture is a clear example** here. **They** also tend to **alienate** the **communities with which authorities should be working** in order **to** detect and **prevent terrorism**. And **they add to causes of terrorism,** both **by perpetuating "root causes" that involve the alienation of communities and by providing "triggering causes" through which bitter individuals** make the morally inexcusable decision to **turn to** methods of **terrorism.** The NDAA is just one more step in the wrong direction, by aggravating the counterproductive effects of human rights violating measures put in place in the name of countering terrorism. CLC: Does the NDAA afford the U.S. a practical advantage in the fight against terrorism? Or might the law undermine its global credibility? MS: **It is hard to see any practical advantage gained through the NDAA**. It is just another form of what I call symbolic legislation, enacted because the legislators want to be seen as being "tough" or as "doing something." The law is written as just affirming existing powers and practices and hence not providing any meaningful new tools in the combat of terrorism. By constraining the choices by the executive, **it** nevertheless **hampers e**ffective counter-terrorism work, including criminal investigation and prosecution, as well as **international counter-terrorism cooperation**, markedly in the issue of closing the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. Hence, **it carries the risk of distancing** the **U**nited **S**tates **from its closest allies and the international community generally**. And of course **these kinds of** legal **provisions are** always **open for bad faith copying by repressive governments that will use them for their own political purposes**.

**Detention is a major terrorist recruitment tool**

**Postel 13** (Therese, policy associate in international affairs at The Century Foundation, 5-12-13, "How Guantanamo Bay's Existence Helps Al-Qaeda Recruit More Terrorists" The Atlantic) www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/04/how-guantanamo-bays-existence-helps-al-qaeda-recruit-more-terrorists/274956/

While these human rights issues are egregious in their own right, and a vigilant minority continues to pressure the Obama administration on the situation, in the bigger picture, **the continued existence of Guantanamo Bay is damaging our national security on a daily basis. Guantanamo Bay has often been the focus of jihadist media and propaganda. Just recently, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan--the mouthpiece of the Taliban-- put out a statement calling attention to the ongoing hunger strike at Guantanamo** Bay. The brief message claims that the hunger strike at the prison has been going on for forty days (as of March 24) and calls for international rights organizations to "spread awareness about the plight of the destitute inmates." **Guantanamo** Bay **has become a salient issue used in jihadist propaganda. In 2010**, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (**AQAP**) **released the first issue of Inspire** , their English language recruitment magazine. To date, AQAP has released 10 issues of Inspire, and **the plight of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay has been featured prominently in several issues.** In the 2010 inaugural issue of Inspire, an essay by Osama bin Laden mentions "the crimes at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo . . . which shook the conscience of humanity." Tellingly, bin Laden points out that "there has been no mentionable change" at Guantanamo and the prison is noted again later in the issue. Gitmo features even more prominently in Issue 2 of Inspire. The essays of Abu Sufyan al-Azdi and Uthman al-Gamidi, two former detainees who returned to AQAP upon their release, call new individuals to join the jihad, whether at home or abroad. In Issue 7, Yahya Ibrahim notes that Guantanamo Bay "exposed the West for what it really is" and "showed the world the American understanding of human rights." Most troubling, **in the latest issue of Inspire released early this month, AQAP mentions Guantanamo Bay several times.** In a prelude to the attention that the hunger strikers have been paid lately, Abu Musab al-Suri notes that Guantanamo is not only "filled with . . . mujahedeen" but also with "hundreds of innocent civilians." While it is quite rich to hear AQAP's concern for the plight of innocent civilians, given the high number of Yemenis cleared for release still at Guantanamo, this is a very salient message for AQAP's base in Yemen. **The constant refrain about Guantanamo Bay may be inspiring jihadist action. Anwar al-Awlaki issued a lecture discussing the plight of prisoners in Guantanamo Bay before his death by drone strike in 2011. Awlaki's lectures still play an important role in recruiting impressionable individuals to jihad.** As we know, Fort Hood shooter Nidal Hassan was impressed by Awlaki's message and was encouraged (although not directed) to carry out an attack on the states by the cleric himself. **The ramifications of the indefinite nature of Guantanamo have not been lost on American military and policy-makers, either. Air Force Officer Matthew Alexander, who was in charge of an interrogation team in Iraq, states that many of his subjects mentioned Guantanamo in their discussions and that it remains a strong recruitment tool**. Not only does it aid recruitment, but in Alexander's words, **"the longer it stays open the more cost it will have in U.S. lives."** John Brennan, now director of the Central Intelligence Agency, echoed Alexander's words just less than two years ago: "The prison at Guantánamo Bay undermines our national security, and our nation will be more secure the day when that prison is finally and responsibly closed." General Colin Powel underlined U.S. awareness of this perception in 2010. **Powell said unless Guantanamo is closed, it gives "radicals an opportunity to say, you see, this is what America is all about. They're all about torture and detention centers."** In Powell's words, the continuation of Guantanamo reinforces Al-Qaeda's "own positions." General David Petraeus' own words on Guantanamo Bay now seem prophetic. Just a year into Obama's first term Petraeus stated, I've been on the record on that for well over a year as well, saying that it [Guantanamo] should be closed. . . . And I think that whenever we have, perhaps, taken expedient measures, they have turned around and bitten us in the backside. . . . Abu Ghraib and other situations like that are nonbiodegradables. They don't go away. The enemy continues to beat you with them like a stick. **As the ongoing hunger strike intensifies at Guantanamo Bay, this issue and the facility itself continues to undermine our national security. Joe Biden called Guantanamo the "greatest propaganda tool that exists for recruiting of terrorists around the world" in 2005. Eight years later, if human rights and budgetary concerns are not enough to end this intractable problem, maybe national security will be.**

**Al Qaeda is still a major threat—predictions of decline are premature and false**

**Sinai 13** (Joshua, JINSA Fellow, Washington, DC-based consultant on national security studies, focusing primarily on terrorism, counterterrorism, and homeland security, 3-11-13, “Al Qaeda Threat to U.S. Not Diminished, Data Indicates” The Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs) http://www.jinsa.org/fellowship-program/joshua-sinai/al-qaeda-threat-us-not-diminished-data-indicates#.UbaiWvmsiSo

**Conventional wisdom holds that the threat** to America **posed by al Qaeda** and its affiliates **is greatly diminished** compared to 9/11. Today, it is claimed, al Qaeda is less well organized, with many of its top leaders eliminated, and is so broken into geographically disparate franchises that it is unable to recruit, train, and deploy a specialized cell to carry out a comparable catastrophic attack against America. The fact that no al Qaeda terrorist attacks have been carried out in America over the last two years, while some 20 individuals have plotted to carry out attacks but were arrested and convicted during the pre-incident phases, is seen as evidence that this terrorist threat is decreasing domestically. Therefore, according to this thesis, security authorities should prepare for more numerous and frequently occurring but low casualty attacks mounted by less well-trained and capable homegrown operatives, particularly by what are termed "lone wolves." **When a more complete compilation of all the components** involved in terrorism **are taken into account, however, the magnitude of the threat becomes much clearer and includes a higher likelihood of attempts to carry out catastrophic attacks as well as evidence that al Qaeda continues to recruit and prepare terrorist operatives in the United States.** Downplaying the terrorist threat posed by al Qaeda and its affiliates also has significant political implications due in part to the more than $70 billion that is spent annually on America's domestic counterterrorism programs (with larger amounts expended for overseas operations), all of which need to be continuously justified as cost effective by Administration planners and Congressional appropriators. Such **purported decline in al Qaeda attacks domestically**, however, **is** now **being seized upon by those who favor reduced government funding for counterterrorism programs, including weakening the USA PATRIOT Act**, to support their position that a reduced threat requires reduced funding and resources. **When the trajectory of attacks by al Qaeda and its associates over the years are carefully studied,** however, **certain patterns recur.** Specifically, **every time the threat is underplayed, it is invariably followed by a major attack. In the months leading up to the November 2012 elections, the media was filled with pronouncements that al Qaeda's threat had greatly diminished** as a result of the elimination of its leadership and the reduced operational role over attacks by what is termed "al Qaeda Central" in Pakistan's tribal areas. **While accurate on one level, this did not stop al Qaeda and its affiliates from continuing to launch major terrorist attacks, including** that by its Libyan affiliate against the U.S. consulate in **Benghazi** on September 11, 2012, which led to severe political repercussions for the Administration for its unpreparedness to anticipate such an attack. **This was followed by** the launching of **the devastating cross-border attack against the natural gas facility in eastern Algeria** in mid-January by another al Qaeda affiliate in Mali. **Thirty-six foreign workers were murdered in that attack, which, again, was unanticipated.** Moreover, **the fact that a catastrophic attack against America comparable to 9/11 has not occurred over the past 11 years should not suggest that a future one is not being planned. In summer 2006, al Qaeda-linked operatives in London plotted to detonate liquid explosives on board 10 transatlantic airliners flying from the UK to America and Canada. In** September **2009**, Najibullah **Zazi and his associates were arrested for plotting to conduct a suicide bombing attack against the New York City subway system. On Christmas Day, 2009,** Umar Farouk **Abdulmutallab failed to detonate plastic explosives while on board an airliner heading to Detroit.** Anwar al Awlaki, a former American extremist cleric, reportedly masterminded Abdulmutallab's operation. Awlaki was killed in a drone attack in Yemen on September 30, 2011. The killings of al Awlaki and Samir Khan, another American extremist who had made his way to Yemen in 2009, could well trigger a catastrophic attack by al Qaeda to avenge their deaths. **The recent capture of** Osama **Bin Laden's son-in-law**, Sulaiman abu Ghaith, and the decision to try him in New York City, **is also likely to trigger a major revenge attack against America.** Finally, **organizing catastrophic terrorist attacks requires** extensive **planning, funding and preparation. A terrorist group that feels** itself **strong will take its time to carefully plan a few but devastating attacks**, while a group that regards itself as weak may feel compelled to carry out frequent, but low-casualty attacks to demonstrate its continued relevancy. Some **incident databases, such as** a recent compilation of **data about American al Qaeda terrorists by the UK-based Henry Jackson Society, only account for completed attacks** and convictions of those arrested. **If such counting is expanded to include other factors**, however, then **the overall threat becomes much more severe. Other factors**, therefore, **should include** the **potential consequences of** the **thwarted attacks** had they not been prevented, **the number of radicalized Americans** who travel overseas to join al Qaeda-affiliated insurgencies, and the extent of radicalized activity by al Qaeda's American sympathizers in jihadi website forums and chatrooms. **A more complete accounting of the threat will** now **reveal that the supportive extremist infrastructure for al Qaeda in America is actually not diminishing and that the purported "lone wolf" actors have actual ties to al Qaeda operatives overseas. We should not,** therefore, also **be misled into complacency if catastrophic attacks by al Qaeda do not occur for lengthy periods. Nor so by the comforting but false sense of security that comes with believing that "lone wolf" attacks** in the United States **are not a product of al Qaeda** recruitment and support. It is also possible, nevertheless, that **al Qaeda's terrorist planners are considering both types of attacks, infrequent catastrophic and frequent low casualty. This may explain why al Qaeda's propaganda organs are calling on its radicalized followers in the West to take matters into their own hands and embark on any sort of attacks that may be feasible at the moment, but with further surprise attacks of a catastrophic nature still ahead.**

**Risk of nuclear terrorism is real and high now**

**Matthew, et al, 10/2/13** [ Bunn, Matthew, Valentin Kuznetsov, Martin B. Malin, Yuri Morozov, Simon Saradzhyan, William H. Tobey, Viktor I. Yesin, and Pavel S. Zolotarev. "Steps to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism." Paper, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, October 2, 2013, Matthew Bunn. Professor of the Practice of Public Policy at Harvard Kennedy School andCo-Principal Investigator of Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. • Vice Admiral Valentin Kuznetsov (retired Russian Navy). Senior research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Senior Military Representative of the Russian Ministry of Defense to NATO from 2002 to 2008. • Martin Malin. Executive Director of the Project on Managing the Atom at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. • Colonel Yuri Morozov (retired Russian Armed Forces). Professor of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences and senior research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, chief of department at the Center for Military-Strategic Studies at the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces from 1995 to 2000. • Simon Saradzhyan. Fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Moscow-based defense and security expert and writer from 1993 to 2008. • William Tobey. Senior fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and director of the U.S.-Russia Initiative to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, deputy administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation at the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration from 2006 to 2009. • Colonel General Viktor Yesin (retired Russian Armed Forces). Leading research fellow at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences and advisor to commander of the Strategic Missile Forces of Russia, chief of staff of the Strategic Missile Forces from 1994 to 1996. • Major General Pavel Zolotarev (retired Russian Armed Forces). Deputy director of the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, head of the Information and Analysis Center of the Russian Ministry of Defense from1993 to 1997, section head - deputy chief of staff of the Defense Council of Russia from 1997 to 1998.<http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/23430/steps_to_prevent_nuclear_terrorism.html>]

I. Introduction **In 2011, Harvard’s Belfer Center** for Science and International Affairs **and the Russian Academy** **of Sciences’** Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies **published “The U.S. – Russia Joint Threat** **Assessment** on Nuclear Terrorism.” **The assessment analyzed the means, motives, and access of would-be nuclear terrorists**, **and concluded that the threat of nuclear terrorism is urgent and real**. **The Washington and Seoul Nuclear Security Summits in 2010 and 2012 established and demonstrated** a **consensus** **among political leaders from around the world that nuclear terrorism poses** **a serious threat to the peace**, security, and prosperity **of our planet**. **For any country, a terrorist** **attack** **with a nuclear device would be an immediate and catastrophic disaster**, **and** the negative effects **would reverberate around the world far beyond the location and moment of the detonation. Preventing a** **nuclear terrorist attack requires** international **cooperation** to secure nuclear materials, especially among those states producing nuclear materials and weapons. As the world’s two greatest nuclear powers, the United States and Russia have the greatest//xperience and capabilities in securing nuclear materials and plants and, therefore, share a special responsibility to lead international efforts to prevent terrorists from seizing such materials and plants. The depth of convergence between U.S. and Russian vital national interests on the issue of nuclear security is best illustrated by the fact that bilateral cooperation on this issue has continued uninterrupted for more than two decades, even when relations between the two countries occasionally became frosty, as in the aftermath of the August 2008 war in Georgia. Russia and the United States have strong incentives to forge a close and trusting partnership to prevent nuclear terrorism and have made enormous progress in securing fissile material both at home and in partnership with other countries. However, to meet the evolving threat posed by those individuals intent upon using nuclear weapons for terrorist purposes, the United States and Russia need to deepen and broaden their cooperation. The 2011 “U.S. - Russia Joint Threat Assessment” offered both specific conclusions about the nature of the threat and general observations about how it might be addressed. This report builds on that foundation and analyzes the existing framework for action, cites gaps and deficiencies, and makes specific recommendations for improvement. “The U.S. – Russia Joint Threat Assessment on Nuclear Terrorism” (The 2011 report executive summary): • **Nuclear terrorism is a real and urgent threat**. Urgent actions are required to reduce the risk. **The risk is driven by the rise of terrorists who seek to inflict unlimited damage, many of whom have sought justification for their plans in radical interpretations of Islam**; **by the spread of information about the decades-old technology of nuclear weapons**; **by the increased availability of weapons-usable nuclear materials; and by globalization, which makes it easier to move people, technologies, and materials across the world.** • **Making a crude nuclear bomb** would not be easy, but **is potentially within the capabilities of a technically sophisticated terrorist group**, **as numerous government studies have confirmed**. Detonating a stolen nuclear weapon would likely be difficult for terrorists to accomplish, if the weapon was equipped with modern technical safeguards (such as the electronic locks known as Permissive Action Links, or PALs). **Terrorists could**, however, **cut open a stolen** **nuclear weapon and make use of its nuclear material for a bomb of their own**. • **The nuclear material for a bomb is small and difficult to detect, making it a major challenge to stop nuclear smuggling or to recover nuclear material after it has been stolen**. Hence, a primary focus in reducing the risk must be to keep nuclear material and nuclear weapons from being stolen by continually improving their security, as agreed at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington in April 2010. • **Al-Qaeda has sought nuclear weapons for almost two decades**. **The group has repeatedly attempted to purchase stolen nuclear material or nuclear weapons, and has repeatedly attempted to recruit nuclear expertise**. **Al-Qaeda reportedly conducted tests of conventional explosives for its nuclear program in the desert in Afghanistan**. The group’s nuclear ambitions continued after its dispersal following the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. **Recent writings from top al-Qaeda leadership are focused on justifying the mass slaughter of civilians, including the use of weapons of mass destruction, and are in all likelihood intended to provide a formal religious justification for nuclear use.** While there are significant gaps in coverage of the group’s activities, al-Qaeda appears to have been frustrated thus far in acquiring a nuclear capability; it is unclear whether the the group has acquired weapons-usable nuclear material or the expertise needed to make such material into a bomb. Furthermore, pressure from a broad range of counter-terrorist actions probably has reduced the group’s ability to manage large, complex projects, but has not eliminated the danger. However, **there is no sign the group has abandoned its nuclear ambitions.** On the contrary, **leadership statements as recently as 2008 indicate that the intention to acquire and use nuclear weapons is as strong as ever.**

**Nuke terror causes extinction—equals a full-scale nuclear war**

Owen B. **Toon 7**, chair of the Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences at CU-Boulder, et al., April 19, 2007, “Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism,” online: http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/acp-7-1973-2007.pdf

To an increasing extent, **people are congregating in the world’s great urban centers, creating megacities with populations exceeding 10 million individuals**. At the same time, **advanced technology has designed nuclear explosives of such small size they can be easily transported in a car**, small plane or boat **to the heart of a city**. We demonstrate here that **a single detonation in the 15 kiloton range can produce urban fatalities approaching one million** in some cases, **and casualties exceeding one million**. Thousands of small weapons still exist in the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia, and there are at least six other countries with substantial nuclear weapons inventories. In all, thirty-three countries control sufficient amounts of highly enriched uranium or plutonium to assemble nuclear explosives. A conflict between any of these countries involving 50-100 weapons with yields of 15 kt has the potential to create fatalities rivaling those of the Second World War. Moreover, **even a single surface nuclear explosion**, or an air burst in rainy conditions, **in a city center is likely to cause the entire metropolitan area to be abandoned at least for decades** owing to infrastructure damage and radioactive contamination. As the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in Louisiana suggests, **the economic consequences of even a localized nuclear catastrophe would most likely have severe national and international economic consequences**. Striking effects result even from relatively small nuclear attacks because low yield detonations are most effective against city centers where business and social activity as well as population are concentrated. Rogue nations and **terrorists would be most likely to strike there**. Accordingly, an organized **attack on the U.S. by a small nuclear state, or terrorists** supported by such a state, **could generate casualties comparable to those** once **predicted for a full-scale nuclear “counterforce” exchange in a superpower conflict**. Remarkably, the **estimated quantities of smoke generated by attacks totaling about one megaton of nuclear explosives could lead to significant global climate perturbations** (Robock et al., 2007). While we did not extend our casualty and damage predictions to include potential medical, social or economic impacts following the initial explosions, such analyses have been performed in the past for large-scale nuclear war scenarios (Harwell and Hutchinson, 1985). Such a study should be carried out as well for the present scenarios and physical outcomes.

**Russia’s rule of law deficit undermines cooperation and internal stability—plan is key to restoring our credibility to deal with this issue**

Sarah E. **Mendelson**, Director, Human Rights and Security Initiative, Center for Strategic and International Studies, “U.S.-Russian Relations and the Democracy and Rule of Law Deficit,” CENTURY FOUNDATION REPORT, 20**09**, p. 3-4.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, every U.S. administration has considered Russia’s political trajectory a national security concern. Based on campaign statements and President Barack Obama’s early personnel choices, this perspective likely will affect policy toward Russia in some way for the foreseeable future. **While** the **Obama** administration **plans to cooperate with Moscow** on a number of issues, **it will find that Russia’s** current **deficit in** the areas of **democracy and the rule of law complicate the relationship and** may, in some cases, **undermine** attempts at **engagement.** The organizers of the Century Foundation Russia Working Group have labeled this policy problem “coping with creeping authoritarianism.” Results from nearly a dozen large, random sample **surveys** in Russia since 2001 that examine the views and experiences of literally thousands of Russians, combined with other research and newspaper reporting, all s**uggest the current democracy and rule of law deficit is** rather **stark**. The deficit does not diminish the importance of Russia in international affairs, nor is it meant to suggest the situation is unique to Russia. The internal conditions of many states have negative international security implications. As Europeans repeatedly pointed out during the administration of George W. Bush, **U.S. departures from the rule of law made the** **U**nited **S**tates **increasingly problematic as a global partner**, whether through the use of force in Iraq or the manner in which the United States pursued and handled terrorist suspects. In fact, **coping with authoritarian trends in Russia** (and elsewhere) **will involve changes in U.S. policies** that have, on the surface, nothing to do with Russia. Bush administration **counterterrorism policies that authorized torture, indefinite detention** of terrorist suspects, and the rendering of detainees to secret prisons and Guantánamo **have had numerous negative unintended consequences** for U.S. national security, **including serving as a recruitment tool** for al Qaeda and insurgents in Iraq. Less often recognized, **these policies also have undercut** whatever **leverage the** **U**nited **S**tates **had, as well as limited the effectiveness of American decision-makers, to push back on authoritarian policies adopted by,** among others, the **Putin** administration. At its worst, **American departures from the rule of law** may **have enabled abuse inside Russia.** These departures certainly left human rights defenders isolated. **Repairing the damage to U.S. soft power and reversing the departure from human rights norms** that characterized the Bush administration’s counterterrorism policies **will provide the** Obama **administration strategic and moral authority and improve the ability of the United States to work with allies. It also can have positive consequences for Obama’s Russia policy.** The **changes** that **need to be made in U.S.** counterterrorism **policies**, however politically sensitive, **are** somewhat more **straightforward** than the adjustments that must be made to respond to the complex issues concerning Russia. The Obama administration must determine how best to engage Russian leaders and the population on issues of importance to the United States, given Russia’s poor governance structures, the stark drop in oil prices, Russia’s continued aspirations for great power status, and the rather serious resentment by Russians concerning American dominance and prior policies. The policy puzzle, therefore, is how to do all this without, at the same time, sacrificing our values and undercutting (yet again) U.S. soft power. This report assesses the political dynamics that have shaped Russia’s authoritarian drift, briefly addresses a few of the ways in which they matter for U.S. policy, and suggests several organizing principles to help the Obama administration manage this critical relationship. Possible approaches include working closely with Europe on a joint approach to Russia, accurately anticipating the unintended consequences of U.S. policy in one realm (such as Kosovo) for Russia policy, and embracing the rights of states to choose their own security alliances. A final important principle relates to U.S. engagement with Russians beyond the Kremlin. President Obama should speak directly to the Russian people, engaging in a manner that respects their interests and desires, but also reflects the core values of the Obama administration; that is, “reject[s] as false the choice between our safety and our ideals.”6 The Obama administration also should endorse a platform and a process for a renewed dialogue between U.S. and Russian civil society. the VIew from the KremlIn Two interactive dynamics over the past several years have shaped the dominant approach by the Russian government to the outside world: the United States declined as a world power, and at the same time, the Russian state accumulated massive wealth from high gas and oil prices. Following what many in the Russian elite view as the “humiliation” of the 1990s, by 2008, Russia was no longer a status quo power. Instead, revisionist in nature, Russian authorities focused on the restoration of great power status.7 Fueled by petrodollars, the government tackled this project in numerous ways, including military exercises around the globe, soft power projects such as a twenty-four-hour-a-day English language cable news station, “think tanks” in New York and Paris, and perhaps most important, gas and oil distribution systems meant to make Russia a central player in energy security for decades to come.8 This restoration project undoubtedly will be slowed by the current financial crisis and drop in oil revenues, but the building blocks remain in place. As the restoration project evolved, the Putin administration increasingly challenged aspects of the post–World War II and post–cold war legal, security, and economic architecture, and suggested the need for new arrangements. Many in the Russian elite seemed to view the changes that have occurred in Europe over the past twenty years, such as the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), as illegitimate, driven not by the choices of local governments or populations, but by the will of Washington. Nostalgia for the Soviet era, a related sentiment, is widely shared, and is an important source of former president and now Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s popularity.9 Some experts even suggest that many in Russia’s governing structures believe that Europe whole and free—that is, post–cold war Europe—is not in the security interest of Russia. The Carnegie Moscow Center’s Lilya Shevtsova has labeled this view “great power nationalism” and observes that the “Putin-Medvedev-Lavrov doctrine” derives from the premise that Russia seeks to contain the West—while the West is busy trying not to offend Russia.10 Some other studies suggest that Russian policymakers have attempted, in fact, to divide the United States from Europe, and generally have preferred bilateral to multilateral engagement.11 At the United Nations, Russia, together with China, repeatedly has challenged international responses to gross human rights violations in Burma, Darfur, and Zimbabwe, and it has engaged in systematic efforts to undermine the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s (OSCE) election monitoring efforts and the Council of Europe’s human rights monitoring.12 Meanwhile, Russian leaders seem to believe the current European security arrangements are soft commitments, ripe for renegotiation and restructuring. President Dmitri Medvedev has, in fact, called for a new “collective security arrangement,” at the same time reintroducing the concept of spheres of influence.13 All of these actions taken together, along with the decline in U.S. soft power, have looked at times as if some in the Russian government were trying to reset the table on human rights and international law, exporting its democracy and rule of law deficit abroad. How best can the United States, together with Europe, respond to this situation? Two additional dynamics are relevant: Russian internal weaknesses, both political and economic, but also the degree to which the Russian authorities’ assessment of the condition of the international system is correct. For example, in August 2008, Russian government officials fecklessly deployed human rights and international law rhetoric to justify the Russian use of force in South Ossetia—was that just a murky reflection of the current deeply inconsistent international order?14 Will that calculation be challenged by the Obama administration? How can it do so effectively? Will we see a new era of more robust international organizations, underpinned by respect for human rights and international law? If not, will we be in for a period of serious instability in Europe, along Russia’s borders? russIa’s democracy and rule oflaw defIcIt What makes these questions so pressing is the reality that American and European political strategy dating back to the early 1990s of integrating Russia into the Euro-Atlantic community and thus encouraging democratic development has largely failed. By 2009, Vladimir Putin’s policies have systematically closed off nearly all legitimate structures for voicing opposition. Many nongovernmental organizations are under daily pressure from the authorities.15 The parliament is dominated by a government-run party, United Russia, and outcomes of local and national elections are controlled by the authorities. The government controls national television. The few critically minded journalists that exist routinely are threatened or are under constant surveillance by the authorities, and twenty murders of journalists since 2000 have gone unsolved.16 One small newspaper known for its criticism of Kremlin policies has seen four of its journalists killed in recent years. At a minimum, the authorities have presided over an era of impunity, and at worst, some fear government authorities may have been directly involved in these deaths.17 Meanwhile, the democratic political opposition is extremely marginal and dysfunctional—irrespective of whatever government pressures are brought to bear on it. Russia has no leading liberal figures that might emerge as national leaders at present. In years past, the fighting among liberal parties was legendary, and led to multiple fratricidal losses in single-mandate districts, as liberal parties ran against one another—back when there were competitive elections for parliamentary seats.18 Today, it is unclear when or how the democratic opposition will repair itself. Yet, as political space has shrunk steadily in the past ten years, the majority of Russians do not appear to mind. In terms of the younger generation, the conventional wisdom that wealth would lead to a demand for democracy has not been borne out; only about 10 percent of survey respondents could be considered strongly supportive of democracy, while most are ambivalent. In the early 1990s, many in the West assumed that the older Soviet generation would be replaced eventually by a younger, pro-Western, pro-democratic generation. Experts and policymakers alike assumed this succession would be a natural course of events, like gravity. A similar conventional wisdom about the younger generation in Russia continues. It holds that iPods, lattes, skateboards, and other artifacts of Western consumer culture will translate into a desire for independent media, justice, and human rights. In 2005 and 2007, in an environment of steadily shrinking political space, a study based at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) explored how young Russians viewed Soviet history and Stalin. Our nationally representative surveys of 16-to- 29-year-old Russians suggested that, despite economic prosperity, most young people gravitated enthusiastically to Vladimir Putin’s ideological platform of revisionist history and nostalgia. The narrative advanced by the government concerning recent history quite simply resonated with this younger generation. In both surveys, a majority believed that Stalin did more good than bad and that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century. These findings undoubtedly reflected coordinated strategic communications efforts by government authorities, including support of a teacher’s guide rewriting Soviet history, downplaying the deaths of millions of citizens, and effacing historical memory. These actions facilitated Russia’s authoritarian trend.19 In sum, the Russian middle class and support for authoritarian governance coexist. The tacit bargain of the past decade, however, in which dissenters were punished but Russians’ pocketbooks grew, may now be threatened by the international economic crisis. Oil prices plunged from a high of $147 a barrel in July 2008 to about $40 a barrel in December 2008. If the price of oil stays low, the lubricating effect of oil and gas revenues may well dry up, laying bare Russia’s dysfunctional state institutions and challenging the authorities’ ability to govern. Economic hardship and poor governance seem, at least anecdotally, to correlate with an increase in public protest and nervousness on the part of the ruling authorities.20 Perhaps, in the long run, the mix of economic hard times and poor governance will stimulate a greater demand for democracy and the rule of law in Russia, as citizens grow unhappy with state institutions that do not function and link that dysfunction to poor governance. In the near term, we can expect growth in nationalism and xenophobia. 21 To be sure, the democracy and rule of law deficit and the growth in nationalism pose problems primarily for Russians. In the twenty-first century, independent investigative journalism and the legitimate use of courts for prosecution are necessary to fight corruption. Today, Russia is plagued by corruption, and the Russian authorities dominate both television and court decisions.22 Independent newspapers and Internet sites exist, but journalists who have engaged in investigative journalism have been killed or live under threat.23 In a state where the rule of man predominates, the population experiences the police as predatory rather than protective. Torture in police stations is said to be common and police officers who have been rotated through Chechnya are said to be especially abusive.24 In a 2004 CSIS survey of 2,400 Russians ages 16 to 65, 41 percent of respondents feared arbitrary arrest by the police.25 In a 2007 CSIS survey of 2,000 Russians ages 16 to 29, 62 percent of respondents fully or partially distrusted the police.26 While one cannot make direct comparisons for methodological reasons, it is worth bearing in mind a recent study of attitudes toward police in China, where only 25 percent reported distrust.27 Undoubtedly, the democracy and rule of law deficit varies regionally, but it is particularly worrisome in the southern regions of Russia. The government’s approach to what it perceives as widespread radical Islamic sentiment in the North Caucasus has increased violence rather than contained it. Between May 1 and August 31, 2008, there were at least 282 incidents, and between September 1 and December 31, 2008 there were at least 333.28 When the situation is at its most dire, the Russian government appears not to control this part of its territory. Many experts worry that there will be war in the North Caucasus in 2009, or possibly that, south of the border, a Russian-Georgia war will break out again.29 That prognosis may be overly gloomy, but violence is clearly on the rise and the socioeconomic conditions in the region are dire. why It matters What does any of this have to do with the Obama administration? The democracy and rule of law deficit in Russia has a range of security and human rights implications for the United States and our allies in Europe. For example, the Obama administration comes to office with a number of arms control goals. These plans may be complicated by the absence of Russian military reform that, in turn, correlates with abuse inside the army. (They are also complicated by continued government reliance on nonconventional forces: in September 2008, President Medvedev committed to modernizing the nuclear arsenal.30) Serious, joint counterterrorism efforts with the United States, Europe, and Russia are likely to remain illusive as long as the police and security services are corrupt and abusive, and the media, a potential source to expose that corruption, is largely controlled by the government. Even at the nongovernmental, track-two level, it is now difficult to have the sort of transatlantic policy dialogue on terrorism that has been common among other nations and societies since 2001.31 The most dire evidence suggests that security service personnel or contractors have been deployed abroad, in European cities, to eliminate Kremlin enemies. In the most famous example, British authorities have sought the extradition from Moscow of former KGB bodyguard and current Duma member Andrew Lugovoi for the murder by Polonium poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko in London in November 2006.32 Kremlin proxies, such as Chechnya’s Ramzan Kadyrov, may have agents doing the same on his behalf on the streets of Austria, also with apparent impunity.33 At a minimum, the Russian authorities seem to have drawn a red line at additional enlargement of Euro-Atlantic organizations. Instead of allowing states and societies to decide for themselves what alliances and security or economic arrangements they want, Russian officials speak of “zones of interest” and “neutral” spaces—presumably such as Ukraine. In the worst case scenario, the Kremlin might decide to probe the resolve of existing NATO and EU security commitments. Presumably, this realization led General James Craddock to request that NATO begin defense planning for the Baltic states.34 Some believe, although the evidence is not clear, that the May 2007 cyber attack on Estonian government agencies, banks, newspapers, and other organizations was a first probe by the Russian government.35 In the August 2008 war in Georgia, for which all sides deserve some blame, experts saw evidence of additional Russian government cyber attacks and a prime example of blatant disregard for international law as the Russian government sought to change an internationally recognized border by force.36 Meanwhile, existing Euro-Atlantic organizations are negatively and directly affected by Russia’s democracy and rule of law deficit. In recent years, the European Court of Human Rights has heard far more cases from Russia than any other country, effectively substituting for Russia’s domestic judiciary. Some European human rights lawyers argue that this situation is severely undermining the court’s efficacy and ability to handle cases from a broad range of countries. Moreover, the Russian government increasingly has failed to compensate victims or their families, apparently now risking its expulsion from the Council of Europe.37 According to numerous OSCE officials, the Kremlin has waged a systematic campaign to undercut the organization’s various monitoring efforts.38 The emergent norm of international election observation has been undermined by the Kremlin’s attempts to legitimize fraudulent elections at home and in neighboring states, supporting a wave of authoritarian governments in this region.39 an obama strategy The unprecedented economic crisis and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan dominate the initial agenda of the Obama administration. Worries over another Israeli Palestinian war, relations with Iran, nuclear proliferation, and the status of al Qaeda are somewhere next on the list of serious security challenges. Russia is, of course, on the list, as was made clear by Vice President Joseph Biden’s speech in Munich, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s meeting with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Geneva, the April London meeting and the July Moscow summit with President Obama and President Medvedev. The Obama administration appears keen not to let U.S.-Russia policy drift as it did in the Bush administration, and the Obama team is moving quickly to establish the organizing principles that would drive policy and guide how it copes with the political realities of Russia today, and seeking opportunities to change the relationship. As a guide to coping with creeping authoritarianism, and for planning purposes, **the Obama administration** reasonably **can** (1) assume that Russia will continue, in the near term, on an authoritarian trajectory while at the same time, try to **encourage** President **Medvedev toward more openness and engagement**; (2) consider that Russia’s political regime may grow more brittle and thus potentially more fragile, rather than more robust and invulnerable; (3) propose and prepare for joint cooperation with Moscow on a number of issues, but anticipate that these plans could be overwhelmed by internal dynamics in Russia; and (4) understand and prepare for that which is difficult to anticipate, such as the depth and length of the economic crisis, and the potential divisions within Russian leadership that might emerge over a range of issues such as whether and how to cooperate with the United States and how to address the effects of the crisis, including the use of force against civilians to stop public protest.40 The ability of any U.S. administration to shape what happens inside Russia has long been exaggerated and misunderstood. The impact of foreign assistance clearly matters to those individuals who receive funds and technical training, but recent evidence suggests that **how the U**nited **S**tates **conducts itself in the world has far more weight in terms of its ability to bolster or undermine democracy, human rights and the rule of law in other countries.**41 For example, **U.S. noncompliance with human rights norms and laws has enabled**, although not caused, **Russia’s authoritarian drift. Therefore, a robust and comprehensive effort to opt back in to international legal frameworks will have important knock-on effects for our relations with Russia, in addition to bolstering our ability to work with allies. The United States needs to shape the larger policy context in a positive, rather than a negative, way. 42 An array of** **new U.S. policies unrelated to Russia (such as** **closing Guantánamo, ending detention without charge**, and halting unlawful interrogation of terror suspects) **can help restore U.S. soft power, as well as repair the international architecture that Russia** (correctly) **views as weak and that it** (regrettably) **seeks to replace. If the United States once again is associated with justice** instead of injustice, **it will do much to shore up human rights activists inside Russia. It will also challenge core assumptions that have taken hold within the Russian elite about the hypocrisy and weakness of democracy and human rights norms within the international system.**

**Continued human rights violations risk a Russian revolution**

Harlan **Ullman**, senior advisor, Atlantic Council, “The Third Russian Revolution,” UPI, 6—12—**13**, www.upi.com/Top\_News/Analysis/Outside-View/2013/06/12/Outside-View-The-third-Russian-Revolution/UPI-84461371009900/, accessed 8-7-13.

**Make no mistake: On the current trajectory, Russia won't be immune to** many of the **forces that provoked** the so-called colored **revolutions in** adjacent states and even **the** misnomered **Arab Awakening. A third Russian revolution is unfolding.** The only questions are when will that revolution reach a critical mass and, most importantly, will the forces of autocracy or pluralism carry the day? Russia, of course, experienced two revolutions in the 20th century. The Kaiser's Germany provoked the first by sending Lenin from Switzerland to Russia in the famous sealed train in 1917. That led to the undoing of the tsar and the Kerensky government as well as the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk that ended the war with Germany and allowed the Bolsheviks to sweep away the opposition. The second revolution came about in some seven decades later. The causes were a corrupt and fundamentally dishonest political system kept in place by a disciplined central leadership and dictatorship of the party. But that required able or at least competent leadership. Instead, the ruling Politburo became a genitocracy headed by sick, old men. Leonid Brezhnev took years to die and was replaced by two even less well general secretaries. In the mid-1970s, CIA Director William Colby repeatedly predicted Brezhnev's pending demise. It wasn't until 1982 that Colby's forecast came true. In the succession process, a few younger members were elevated to the Politburo. Because of the succession of antiquated leaders, Mikhail Gorbachev found himself moving from post to post from his appointment to the Politburo in 1979. In each post, he realized that the Soviet Union was an empty shell and each department was grossly mismanaged and underperforming. Six years later, when he became general secretary, Gorbachev was determined to save the Soviet Union and modernize the failing system. Gorbachev's tools were glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring). The floodgates of reform were fully opened and the old and unworkable system couldn't resist them. By 1991, the Soviet Union was no more. In the two decades since, Vladimir **Putin has emerged as the Ironman of Russia.** In the process, **Russia has been** described and **viewed by many as a kleptocracy ruled by the few who have pillaged national wealth** for their own benefits. Under what Republicans and Democrats alike in the United States see as a government of and by thugs, **human rights have been violated; dissidents and members of the media arrested; and opponents of the Kremlin subjected to purges and show trials leading to long prison sentences.** Russia's immediate neighbors are fearful of the return of the aggressive Russian bear anxious to spread its influence through manipulating its oil and natural gas reserves for political purposes and through military maneuvers designed to intimidate. Further, cyberattacks, principally against Estonia, reinforce this perception of a neo-Soviet Union under the leadership of former KGB Colonel Putin. And Putin's commitment to far greater military spending as well as unwillingness to accept NATO's missile defenses raises sinister possibilities. **Within Russia, discontent** on the part of many Russians **is waxing. Outright theft on the part of oligarchs has gone too far. Persecution** of political **opposition is particularly vexing**. And **the health and longevity of a declining population** reflects more than excesses of consumption of vodka and harsh winters. Indeed, as a buffer to Putin's intent to ramp up his military, the Kremlin faces a very limiting factor: 90 percent of all Russian youth are unfit for military service. Unfortunately, the West in general and the United States in particular have never been very good at Kremlinology (or indeed in understanding many foreign cultures). **Whether Putin is aware of the ticking time bomb over which he presides or not, Russia is still very important to Western interests**. Syria and Iran are two major crises where Russian support could be important.

**That causes miscalc and nuclear war**

**Pry 99** (Peter Vincent, Former US Intelligence Operative, War Scare: U.S.-Russia on the Nuclear Brink, netlibrary)

**Russian internal troubles**—such as a leadership crisis, coup, or civil war—**could aggravate Russia’s fears of foreign aggression and lead to a miscalculation of U.S. intentions and to nuclear overreaction**. While this may sound like a complicated and improbable chain of events, **Russia’s story** in the 1990s **is one long series of domestic crises that have all too often been the source of nuclear close calls.** The war scares of August 1991 and October 1993 arose out of coup attempts. The civil war in Chechnya caused a leadership crisis in Moscow, which contributed to the nuclear false alarm during Norway’s launch of a meteorological rocket in January 1995. Nuclear war arising from Russian domestic crises is a threat the West did not face, or at least faced to a much lesser extent, during the Cold War. **The** Russian **military’s continued fixation on surprise-attack scenarios into the 1990s, combined with Russia’s deepening internal problems, has created a situation in which the U**nited **S**tates **might find itself the victim of a preemptive strike for no other reason than a war scare born of Russian domestic troubles.** At least in nuclear confrontations of the 1950s–1970s—during the Berlin crisis, Cuban missile crisis, and 1973 Middle East war—both sides knew they were on the nuclear brink. There was opportunity to avoid conflict through negotiation or deescalation. The nuclear war scares of the 1980s and 1990s have been one-sided Russian affairs, with the West ignorant that it was in grave peril.

**Leaves earth uninhabitable**

**Starr 10**—Director of Clinical Laboratory Science Program @ University of Missouri [Steven Starr (Senior scientist @ Physicians for Social Responsibility.), “The climatic consequences of nuclear war,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 12 March 2010, Pg. http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/the-climatic-consequences-of-nuclear-war]

This isn't a question to be avoided. Recent **scientific studies have found that a war** fought **with** the deployed **U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals would leave Earth** virtually **uninhabitable**. In fact, **NASA computer models have shown that** **even a "successful" first strike** **by Washington or Moscow would inflict catastrophic environmental damage that would make agriculture impossible** and cause mass starvation. Similarly, in the January Scientific American, Alan Robock and Brian Toon, the foremost experts on the climatic impact of nuclear war, warn that the environmental consequences of a "regional" nuclear war would cause a global famine that could kill one billion people.

**1AC: Judiciary**

**Boumediene upheld the deference doctrine—by failing to specify a remedy, the courts have cemented executive power**

**Scheppele 12** (Kim, Professor of Sociology and Public Affairs in the Woodrow Wilson School, Director of the Program in Law and Public Affairs, Princeton University, January 2012, "The New Judicial Deference" Boston University Law Review, Lexis)

The majority in Boumediene had indeed found that the political branches had designed a system that violated the Constitution. **The majority in Boumediene hardly looked deferential**, at least when one examines the reasoning. **But the signature element of the new judicial deference is that the Court does not defer in principle; it defers in practice.** The petitioners won the right to have a regular court hear their habeas petitions. But what should such a court say about the Guantanamo detentions after this case? The majority frankly admitted that "our opinion does not address the content of the law that governs petitioners' detention. That is a matter yet to be determined." n294 So, **while the Court appeared to take seriously the years of delay in granting the petitioners any independent review of the bases for their detention, the Court would still not explain when and by what evidentiary standard detention would be permissible. That required more litigation. And that process would require more time, which would in turn allow the executive to detain the petitioners longer.**

**Problems in civil-military relations are likely to reach crisis proportions in 2014—now is key to reverse the trend**

**Munson 12** (Peter, Marine officer, author, and Middle East specialist, 11-12-12, "A Caution on Civil-Military Relations" Small Wars Journal) smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/a-caution-on-civil-military-relations

This brief post represents only a few quickly dashed thoughts in the hope of getting something on paper that might morph into a longer and more useful essay on civil-military relations. I believe that **civil-military relations in the U**nited **S**tates **are deeply troubled.** The issues are lurking mostly in the background right now. On the surface, our leadership—civilian and military—has been able to negotiate some relatively complex rapids without any of the major drama that has cropped up in the past. The falling out between Truman and MacArthur comes to mind. Nonetheless, there are serious background **issues that will only get worse in 2014** and beyond. There are several reasons for concern. The all-volunteer force has fought two brutal wars for over a decade while a (guilty or thankful) American population has stood by with very little involvement. There have been no war bonds, no victory gardens, no bandage wrapping drives, no air raid drills—nothing to make them feel a part of the conflict other than the human interest stories about killed and wounded veterans and the once-nightly footage of shattered HMMWVs and burning convoys. This has created an inequality in experience and sacrifice that the public has generally attempted to repay through extreme deference and ever-multiplying shows of thankfulness, the likes of which have never been seen in American society. Part of this is as a corrective to the disgraceful treatment of our Vietnam veterans, to be sure, but it has consequences nonetheless. In the face of such an inequality of experience and service and in such a deferential environment, **public criticism of the military is all too easily dismissed as unpatriotic.** Not only is this foil used to deflect criticism, but its threat deters many from bringing up much needed commentary and dissent. Likewise, **unquestioning support of the military** plays no small factor in **mak**ing **any discussion of rationalizing military budgets and targeting wasteful military spending difficult, if not impossible.** Late addition: This dynamic plays out in media coverage of the military, as well, leading to an insufficient criticality, or at least a lack of perspective, in much coverage. At worst, the media becomes a propaganda arm or engages in a cult of hero worship that perpetuates the dynamics above. As this coverage creates narratives that impact critical national security decisions, it likewise skews civil-military relations. The media is a central part of any civil-military dynamic in a democracy, providing the information that informs public discourse and shapes the decision-making space. If the media is incapable of being a relatively objective arbiter, this contributes to a flawed civil-military dynamic. The military, itself, has internalized much of this adulation. When ushered to the front of boarding lines at the airport, offered discounts at a myriad of establishments, proffered all sorts of swag at any number of appreciation venues, and even venerated daily on cable news with the incredibly self-centered practice of surprise homecomings, it is difficult for members **of the military not to fall victim to a culture of creeping narcissism.** Faced with lengthy, rapid fire deployments that placed some military members away from the stabilizing influences of family and normality for years of their lives, the military itself had to play up a narrative of sacrifice and exceptionalism to help keep the trains running. This narrative was drummed into the military and reinforced by its members who saw themselves deploying again and again as society stayed home and placed them on a pedestal. This is not to say that the sacrifice was insignificant, but to acknowledge that there were second order effects of the adulation. Even within the military, there was a significant inequality in hardships faced, from “FOBbits” with daily access to all the comforts of home to infantrymen living in squalor and under the constant threat of not only death, but horrific dismemberment. This additional dynamic, as an aside, has led to a significant insecurity on the part of some (but surely not most or all) of those servicemembers who operated in support roles. You can see it in those who make cryptic references to their “special operations” background or play up training that they never rightfully received. You see, even within the military there is a distinct hierarchy of who has truly “been there and done that” and those who feel they must insinuate that they did. I may be wrong, but I get the sense that the post-WWII culture just assumed that everyone had done their part and little need be said about it. In all, **this adds up to a military that** at least in part **feels it has earned entitlement, that it deserves the deferential treatment** it receives, and that America needs to sacrifice to provide for the military—whether that be benefits or budget outlays. **This is an incredibly dangerous cultural artifact**, especially in light of the coming period of adjustment. **As America’s involvement in Afghanistan winds down and as the nation is forced to adjust to new fiscal realities, the military will face a time of significant adjustment and** likely **austerity. A military with an entitled culture and** an **inability to countenance searing introspection will be unable to properly adjust** to these new realities and will fail to make the necessary reforms, corrections, and resets that the strategic situation demands. More critically, the prospects for **an unfavorable outcome in Afghanistan, coupled with significant budget cuts, will open the door for a “knife in the back” narrative that might argue that the civilian politicians and the American public “lost” the conflict** by giving up on the great sacrifice and heroic efforts of the American military there and, furthermore, the government then slashed the military budget (and perhaps restructured some entitlements) betraying a military charged with facing a plethora of threats around the world. **Such a narrative would be** dangerous—**poisonous—for civil-military relations**. In this it is important to recognize that our political institutions are undergoing a crisis of their own. Trust in government is at its lowest ebb in recent history. Political polarization is at its highest mark since the Great Depression. **Demographic and economic pressures will multiply in coming years** not only on the US, but more significantly on its key allies in Europe. The world will see a significant transformation of its power structure in the coming decades, all of **which will put great strain on the country’s civil-military relations. Thus, it is of critical importance that we** discuss, address, and **correct any flaws in this dynamic now before they reach crisis proportions in the years to come.**

**Judicial deference is responsible for the split—a less deferential role for the courts is necessary to restore balance in civil-military relations**

**Mazur 10** (Diane, Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law, "A More Perfect Military: How the Constitution Can Make Our Military Stronger" Oxford University Press, Print)

One of the ways the doctrine of **judicial deference has left a scar on civil-military relations** is **by changing how civilian government manages the military advice it receives**. I don't meant to suggest this is a new problem for civilian control of the military—President Harry Truman certainly struggled to manage the military advice offered by General Douglas MacArthur during the Korean War1—but **judicial deference has contributed to a more pervasive problem broadly affecting the way civilians engage with information from military sources.** Strictly speaking, judicial deference in military affairs applies only when constitutional or legal issues are in play. When the question is whether a particular military policy or plan of action is a wise or prudent thing to do, and not whether it is constitutional or lawful, courts have no role in answering the question and judicial deference is irrelevant. However, **because judicial deference has expanded beyond an abstract legal theory into a more general way of thinking** about military affairs, **it has come to have an** indirect **effect on all forms of military decision making by civilian officials. Deference in a strictly legal sense is only a part of the broad cultural deference on military issues we have adopted since the end of the Vietnam War. We** consistently **discourage civilians from serious engagement with military issues**. Wc assume most civilians arc incapable of understanding the military and have little to add to the conversation. We suspect they have not earned the right to speak about military affairs, even though at some level we must know civilian engagement is necessary in a system built on civilian control of the military. There is always a risk that asking too many questions will be interpreted as a lack of support for the military, and so the easier path is often to endorse whatever appears to be the consensus "military" position on an issue, whether or not the consensus position is actually helpful to the military. **Our inclination toward deference in matters involving the military is so strong that military advice can sometimes carry the power of a military veto when the advice becomes part of public debate. Few government officials want to be in the position of asking for the military's viewpoint on an issue and then choosing a policy direction inconsistent with that viewpoint.** As a result, civilians may package or present military advice in a way that mis-lcadingly removes any conflict with civilian policy preference, ensuring at least the appearance of a deferential attitude. The "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" debate offered a good example of this phenomenon. Congress put on what were essentially "show hearings" to create the appearance of unified military opposition to gay citizens in military service. I don't doubt that in 1993 military opposition outweighed military support, but the hearings were carefully scrubbed of any military expertise from the minority viewpoint. The military's increasing political partisanship also plays an important role in how we characterize and respond to military advice, and there may be no better example of why political partisanship is damaging to military professionalism. At the same time civilians have an incentive to package military opinion selectively for favorable effect, the military may also feel an obligation to shape the advice it gives (or to withhold contrary opinions) in an effort to be loyal to a particular political interest. Political partisanship within the military imposes great pressure on military professionals to produce advice supportive of its political allegiance. At the very least, there will always be an air of uncertainty as to whether military advice has been tainted by a desire to either support or undercut the commander in chief or the Congress. Even the general public responds to military advice differently depending on whether the advice matches expectations about the military's presumed political allegiance. When military officials were uncooperative to the point of being insubordinate and refused to seriously consider how to implement President Clinton's proposal to end sexual orientation discrimination in the military, most people believed they were simply following their professional obligation to give civilian leaders candid military advice. We are so comfortable with the idea of military testimony running counter to policy preferences of the Democratic Party that no one objected when General Colin Powell gave a speech at the Naval Academy encouraging midshipmen to resign if they believed they could not morally serve in a military that also permitted gay people to serve." That's not advice, that's insubordination. On the other hand, when military advice upsets the careful civil-military consensus we usually construct for public consumption and also runs counter to the military's expected political allegiances, people take notice and ask whether the military has violated its ethical obligation of subordination to civilian control. The recent example of note occurred when General Eric Shinseki, the Army chief of staff, responded to a question during a Senate hearing asking how large a force would be necessary to maintain public order in Iraq following an invasion. This was information Congress needed to know in order to carry out its constitutional responsibilities to declare war and fund military operations. Shinseki responded with a significantly higher number than the administration's party line, and it began a debate among civil-military experts that continues today. A scries of essays in the professional journal Armed Forces and Society examined the controversy,5 and one author seriously argued Shinseki had a professional obligation to answer in a way that would protect the president from the perception he might be acting against military advice, or at least without a consensus military opinion.'1 Our system of civilian control of the military included, according to this argument, an obligation on the part of military professionals to adjust their advice to shore up civilian policy preferences. I have a feeling, however, the same ethical argument would not have been made on behalf of a Democratic Party commander in chief. The solution is both simple to understand and difficult to achieve. **If we were more comfortable with open engagement and conversation about military advice—if we were more comfortable with robust, messy debate about military issues—it would not be so important to shape or distort military advice to match civilian preferences. If we were more comfortable with military viewpoints, and believed we could invite them, consider them, weigh their strengths and weaknesses, balance them against other nonmilitary concerns, and then, if necessary, make a decision inconsistent with those viewpoints, our civil-military relations would be much healthier.** This is the same dynamic that inhibits a healthy civil-military exchange in judicial settings. We believe the system cannot tolerate the complexity or the inconvenience of real information, and so we construct a system specifically designed to generate a false consensus—the doctrine of judicial deference—so we can all feel better about making military decisions.

**Civilian control key to military effectiveness—solves array of existential threats**

Dr. Mackubin Thomas **Owens**, Professor, National Security Affairs, “What Military Officers Need to Know About Civil-Military Relations,” NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW v. 65 n. 2, Spring 20**12**, p. 81-82.

The combination of **c**ivil-**m**ilitary **r**elations patterns and service doctrines **affect military effectiveness**. In essence, the ultimate test of a civil-military relations pattern is how well it contributes to the effectiveness of a state's military, especially at the level of strategic assessment and strategy making. (50) However, Richard **Kohn** has explicitly called into question the effectiveness of the American military in this realm, especially with regard to the planning and conduct of operations other than those associated with large-scale conventional war. "Nearly twenty years after the end of the Cold War, the American military, financed by more money than the entire rest of the world spends on its armed forces, failed to defeat insurgencies or fully suppress sectarian civil wars in two crucial countries, each with less than a tenth of the U.S. population, after overthrowing those nations' governments in a matter of weeks." (51) He **attributes** this **lack of effectiveness to** a **decline in** the **military**'s professional **competence** with regard to strategic planning. "In effect, in the most important area of professional expertise--the connecting of war to policy, of operations to achieving the objectives of the nation--the American military has been found wanting. The excellence of the American military in operations, logistics tactics, , weaponry, and battle has been manifest for a generation or more. Not so with strategy." (52) This phenomenon manifests itself, he argues, **in** recent **failure to adapt to a** changing **security environment in which** the **challenges to global stability are** "less from massed armies than from **terrorism; economic** and particularly financial **instability; failed states; resource scarcity** (particularly **oil and** potable **water**); pandemic **disease; climate change**; and international crime in the form of piracy, smuggling, narcotics trafficking, and other forms of organized lawlessness." He observes that this decline in strategic competence has occurred during a time in which the U.S. military exercises enormous influence in the making of foreign and national security policies. He echoes the claim of Colin Gray: "All too often, **there is a black hole where** American **strategy ought to reside**." (53) Is there something inherent in **current U.S. civil-military affairs** that **accounts for this failure** of strategy? The failure of American civil-military relations to generate strategy can be attributed to the confluence of three factors. The first of these is the continued dominance within the American system of what Eliot Cohen has called the "normal" theory of civil-military relations, the belief that there is **a clear line of demarcation** between civilians who determine the goals of the war and the uniformed military who then conduct the actual fighting. Until President George W. Bush abandoned it when he overruled his commanders and embraced the "surge" in Iraq, the normal theory has been the default position of most presidents since the Vietnam War. Its longevity is based on the idea that the failure of Lyndon Johnson and Robert McNamara to defer to an autonomous military realm was the cause of American defeat in Vietnam. The normal theory can be traced to Samuel Huntington's The Soldier and the State, in which he sought a solution to the dilemma that lies at **the heart of civil-military relations**--**how to guarantee civilian control** of the military while still ensuring the ability of the uniformed military to provide security. His solution was a mechanism for creating and maintaining a professional, apolitical military establishment, which he called "objective control." Such a professional military would focus on defending the United States but avoid threatening civilian control. (54) But as Cohen has pointed out, the normal theory of civil-military relations often has not held in practice. Indeed, such storied democratic war leaders as Winston Churchill and Abraham Lincoln "trespassed" on the military's turf as a matter of course, influencing not only strategy and operations but also tactics. The **reason that civilian leaders cannot simply leave the military to its own devices** during war **is that war is an iterative process** involving the interplay of active wills. What appears to be the case at the outset of the war may change as the war continues, modifying the relationship between political goals and military means. The fact remains that wars are not fought for their own purposes but to achieve policy goals set by the political leadership of the state. The second factor, strongly reinforced by the normal theory of civil-military relations, is the influence of the uniformed services' organizational cultures. Each military service is built around a "strategic concept" that, according to Samuel Huntington, constitutes "the fundamental element of a military service," the basic "statement of [its] role ... or purpose in implementing national policy." (55) A clear strategic concept is critical to the ability of a service to organize and employ the resources that Congress allocates to it. It also largely determines a service's organizational culture. Some years ago, the late Carl Builder of the RAND Corporation wrote The Masks of War, in which he demonstrated the importance of the organizational cultures of the various military services in creating their differing "personalities," identities, and behaviors. His point was that each service possesses a preferred way of fighting and that "the unique service identities ... are likely to persist for a very long time." (56)

**Judicial deference justifies military medical and bioweapons research**

**Parasidis 12** (Efthimios, Assistant Professor of Law, Center for Health Law Studies, Saint Louis University School of Law, 2012, "Justice and Beneficence in Military Medicine and Research" Ohio State Law School, Lexis)

The military has long nurtured a culture and identity that is fundamentally distinct from civil society, n522 and **the U.S.** **government has a history of bending** [\*792] **and breaking the law during times of war.** n523 **While the military has traditionally enjoyed great deference from civilian courts** in the United States, n524 military discipline and **national security interests should not grant government officials carte blanche to violate fundamental human rights.** n525 To the contrary, Congress and the courts should work to ensure that military and intelligence agencies remain subordinate to the democratic rule of law. n526 The motto of the American military physician is "to conserve the fighting force," yet **the last decade has seen a notable shift in emphasis to enhancing the fighting force through novel applications of biomedical enhancements.** n527 The nefarious **conduct of military officials during** the course of the **mustard gas, radiation, biological warfare, and psychotropic drug experiments provides ample evidence of the "lies** and half-truths" that **the DoD has utilized in the name of national security.** n528 Indeed, the Army Inspector General has acknowledged the "inadequacy of the Army's institutional memory" regarding experimental research. n529 **When one considers socio-economic dimensions of the armed forces, this history of neglect has served to further societal inequalities.** n530 As a judge on the Sixth Circuit, and former Commander in Chief [\*793] of the Ohio National Guard explains, "in a democracy **we have far more to fear from the lack of military accountability than from the lack of military** discipline **or aggressiveness**." n531

**That risks bioweapons use—theft, arms racing, tradeoff**

H. Patricia **Hynes**, retired Professor, Environmental Health, Boston University, “Biological Weapons: Bargaining with the Devil,” TRUTHOUT, 8—18—**11**, http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/2693:biological-weapons-bargaining-with-the-devil

The bullish climate of the "war on terrorism" set off a massive flow of federal funding for research on live, virulent bioweapons' organisms (also referred to as biodefense, bioterrorism and biosafety organisms) to federal, university and private laboratories in rural, suburban and urban areas. Among the federal agencies building or expanding biodefense laboratories are the Departments of Defense (DoD), Homeland Security, State and Agriculture; the Environmental Protection Agency; and the National Institutes of Health (NIH). A new network, comprised of two large national biowarfare laboratories at BU and University of Texas, Galveston medical centers, more than a dozen small regional laboratories and ten Regional Centers of Excellence for Biodefense and Emerging Infectious Diseases Research, was designed for funding by the National Institute for Allergy and Infectious Diseases, a division of NIH. The validation offered by the federal health research agency for ramped-up biological warfare research is the dual use of the research results: "better vaccines, diagnostics and therapeutics against bioterrorist agents but also for coping with naturally occurring disease." Today, in dozens of newly sprung laboratories, **research on the most lethal** bacteria and **viruses** with no known cure **is being conducted in an atmosphere of secrecy**, with hand-picked internal review boards and little, if any, public oversight or accountability. Fort Detrick, Maryland, a longstanding military base and major government research facility, is the site of the largest biodefense lab being built in the United States. Here, **biowarfare pathogens will be created**, including new genetically engineered viruses and bacteria, in order **to simulate** potential **bioweapons attacks** by terrorist groups. Novel, lethal organisms and methods of delivery in biowarfare will be tested, all rationalized by the national security need to study them and develop a figurative bioshield against them. In fact, Fort Detrick's research agenda - modifying and dispersing lethal and genetically modified organisms - has "unmistakable hallmarks of an offensive weapons program" ... "in essence **creating new threats that we're going to have to defend ourselves against" - threats from accidents, theft of organisms and stimulus of a bioarms race**.(3) Between 2002 and 2009, approximately 400 facilities and 15,000 people were handling biological weapons agents in sites throughout the country, in many cases unbeknownst to the local community. The marathon to spend nearly $60 billion since 2002 on biological weapons research has raised serious concerns for numerous scientists and informed public critics. Among these are: runaway biodefense research without an assessment of biowarfare threat and the need for this research; (See the Sunshine Project web site for the most comprehensive map of biodefense research sites through 2008 in the United States ) militarization of biological research and the risk of provoking a biological arms race; neglect of vital public health research as a tradeoff for enhanced biodefense research; lack of standardized safety and security procedures for high-risk laboratories; increased risk of accident and intentional release of lethal organisms with the proliferation of facilities and researchers in residential communities; lack of transparency and citizen participation in the decision-making process; and vulnerability of environmental justice (i.e., low income and minority) communities to being selected for the location of these high-risk facilities. Is this federal research agenda "the biological equivalent of our misadventure in Iraq?" An expert on biological weapons at the University of California Davis, Mark Wheelis, contends that a "mass-casualty bioterrorist attack" is unlikely and that "**plastering the country" with bioweapons laboratories leaves the country with a weakened public health research infrastructure and,** thus, **less secure. The** Government Accounting Office (GAO) and many others have drawn the same conclusion. In May 2009, a study of security in DoD biodefense laboratories determined that the **security systems of high biocontainment laboratories cannot protect against theft of bioweapons agents**. Soon after, a Washington Post story revealed that an inventory of potentially deadly pathogens at the government's premier bioweapons research laboratory at Fort Detrick, Maryland, uncovered that more than 9,000 vials were missing. In testimony to a House Committee hearing on the proliferation of bioweapons laboratories, Nancy Kingsbury of the GAO revealed that expansion of bioweapons laboratories has been "so uncoordinated that no federal agency knows how many exist"; nor, she added, is there any sense among federal agencies of how many are needed, of their operational safety and of the cumulative risks they pose to the public. Keith Rhodes, the GAO's chief technologist, testified in the same October 2007 Congressional hearing "'we are at greater risk today' of an infectious disease epidemic because of the great increase in biolaboratories and the absence of oversight they receive." As many have gravely observed, the biodefense build-up means a huge number of people has access to extremely lethal material.

**Bioweapons cause extinction**

Anders **Sandberg** et al., James Martin Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford University, "How Can We Reduce the Risk of Human Extinction?" BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, 9-9-**08**, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/how-can-we-reduce-the-risk-of-human-extinction, accessed 5-2-10.

The risks from anthropogenic hazards appear at present larger than those from natural ones. Although great progress has been made in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world, humanity is still threatened by the possibility of a global thermonuclear war and a resulting nuclear winter. We may face even greater risks from emerging technologies. **Advances in synthetic biology might make it possible to engineer pathogens capable of extinction-level pandemics**. **The knowledge, equipment, and materials needed to engineer pathogens are more accessible than those needed to build nuclear weapons. And unlike other weapons, pathogens are self-replicating, allowing a small arsenal to become exponentially destructive. Pathogens have been implicated in the extinctions of many wild species**. Although most pandemics "fade out" by reducing the density of susceptible populations, pathogens with wide host ranges in multiple species can reach even isolated individuals**. The intentional or unintentional release of engineered pathogens with high transmissibility, latency, and lethality might be capable of causing human extinction**. While such an event seems unlikely today, the likelihood may increase as biotechnologies continue to improve at a rate rivaling Moore's Law.

**Court involvement key to setting precedent that checks abuses**

**Pearlstein 03** [Deborah N., Deputy Director of the U.S. Law and Security Program at the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, and a Visiting Fellow at the Stanford University Center for Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, “The Role of the Courts in Protecting Civil Liberties and Human Rights for the Post-9/11 United States”, 2nd Pugwash Workshop on Terrorism: External and Domestic Consequences of the War on Terrorism, http://www.pugwash.org/reports/nw/terrorism2003-pearlstein.htm]

**In each** of the **historical examples** just given, **the judiciary** **ultimately played a critical role in evaluating the legality of executive action**. In the Civil War case, Lambdin Milligan, who had led armed uprisings against Union forces in Indiana, appealed his military tribunal prosecution to the U.S. Supreme Court. In Ex Parte Milligan (1865), the U.S. Supreme Court held Milligan's military prosecution unconstitutional, holding that as long as the civilian "courts are open and their process unobstructed, . . . they can never be applied to civilians in states which have upheld the authority of the government." In Ex Parte Quirin (1942), the Supreme Court reviewed the military prosecution of the German army spies for violations of the laws of war and concluded that it was within the executive's power**.** Unlike the civilian subject to military justice in Ex Parte Milligan, the Quirin defendants were members of the army of a nation with which the United States was in declared war. And critically, Congress had expressly authorized military commission trials for the offenses for which they were accused. The Supreme Court likewise upheld the exclusion of Japanese-Americans from their homes in Korematsu v. United States (1944), explaining: "Korematsu was not excluded from the military area because of hostility to him or his race. He was excluded because we are at war with the Japanese Empire, because the properly constituted military authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast and felt constrained to take proper security measures, and finally, because Congress, reposing its confidence in this time of war in our military leaders - as inevitably it must - determined that they should have the power to do just this." As these examples demonstrate, the U.S. Supreme Court has not always acted to enforce positive legal protections in favor of the individual against the government's exercise of 'wartime' power. Nonetheless**, the Court's structural involvement conveyed a critical political message that executive power remained subject to the rule of law.** In addition**, the Court's** published majority **opinions clarified the nature of the executive action** taken in response to perceived wartime threats, **providing a basis for comparative analysis of subsequent executive conduct**. In vigorous and public dissenting opinions accompanying each decision, minority justices gave expression to the strong opposing arguments on the resolution of the legal questions presented. Perhaps most important, the judicial decisions provided Congress, legal scholars, and the American public a means for understanding and, in the relative calm of post-war decision-making, for reevaluating the political wisdom of the challenged actions. Thus, for example, a federal court eventually granted a writ of coram nobis in Mr. Korematsu's case as a result of executive misrepresentations. (Korematsu v. United States (N.D. Cal. 1984)). In 1971, to rein in what was by then broadly recognized as executive excesses, Congress passed 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a), providing: "No citizen shall be . . . detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress." And in 1988, Congress awarded reparations to the remaining survivors and descendants of those interned during World War II as a result of the military exclusion order.

**Ignore their turns—deference relies on outdated Cold War thinking**

**Knowles 09** (Robert, Assistant Professor, New York University School of Law, Spring 2009, "American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Constitution" Arizona State Law Journal, Lexis)

American courts treat foreign affairs issues as unique and requiring very strong, sometimes absolute, deference to the Executive. n1 These "special deference" doctrines are a swamp of under-justification and inconsistent application. n2 But **when courts** and scholars do **seek to justify special deference in foreign affairs, they** usually **resort to received wisdom about superior executive branch competence - attributes such as speed, flexibility, secrecy, and uniformity - contrasted with judicial incompetence.** n3 In the [\*90] years since 9/11, in particular, these pragmatic arguments have been the weapon of choice for defenders of special deference. n4 The courts are, apparently, bringing a knife to a gunfight. n5 **Why do foreign affairs demand that the executive branch enjoy vast discretion?** The courts' view of their own competence has been shaped by America's role in the world. **There is a deep**, if usually unarticulated, **connection between the assumed need for special deference and** a popular theory of international relations known as **realism. Realism depicts an anarchic international realm**, populated only by nation-states, and dominated by roughly co-equal great powers carefully balancing one another. n6 **Executive competences are required to handle this dangerous and unstable external environment**. n7 **This** classic realist **model** of comparative institutional competence **seemed appropriate when America was one of several**, or even two, **great powers. But even then, importing** international relations ("IR") **realism into constitutional foreign affairs doctrine was a recipe for chaos. Realpolitik teaches that the state must do whatever is necessary to protect itself.** n8 But **how can courts successfully balance this** overriding principle **against other constitutional values** such as the protection of liberty? Moreover, **the post-Cold War world has provoked a crisis in realism.** n9 **The U**nited **S**tates **is a global hegemon. It is unrivaled** in its ability to deploy force throughout the globe, and it provides "public goods" for the world - such as the protection of sea lanes - in exchange for broad acceptance of [\*91] U.S. leadership. n10 Although realism predicts counter-balancing, **no great power or coalition has yet emerged to challenge America's predominance.** And **despite** a new round of **predictions about American decline, the U.S. is still projected to have by far the largest economy and the largest military for decades.** n11 Political scientists have struggled to define this American-led system, but courts and scholars of constitutional law have largely ignored it. n12 Instead, **most debates about** special **deference have simply accepted outmoded classic realist assumptions** that became conventional wisdom in the 1930s and 40s. This Article offers a new model for assessing appropriate judicial deference in foreign affairs that takes account of American-led order. **By maintaining consistent interpretation of U.S. and international law over time** and providing virtual representation for other nations and non-citizens, **U.S. courts bestow legitimacy on the acts of the political branches, provide public goods for the world, and increase America's soft power - all of which assist in maintaining the stability and legitimacy of the American-led hegemonic order.**

**Court action on detention is key to challenge the deference doctrine**

**Masur 05** (Jonathan, Law clerk for Posner, JD from Harvard, "A Hard Look or a Blind Eye: Administrative Law and Military Deference" Hastings Law Journal, Lexis)

In evidence is a court that instinctively views military action as judicially incomprehensible and legally untouchable. To the Fourth Circuit, law cannot bend the exigent realities of war to its constraining will because it cannot extract necessary factual clarity from amidst the "murkiness and chaos"; courts would thus be well-advised to remain outside the fray. n320 It is this judicial predilection that necessitates firm proof of dissimilitude between military and criminal detention. **When military operations assume the form and function of typical law enforcement acts, courts become hard-pressed to justify their abstention** from the rule-of-law constitutional questions that form the core of their juridical task. Despitea body of Supreme Court administrative law doctrine counseling judicial intervention into areas of executive expertise, and despite the principle that courts must act to vindicate the rule of law even [\*519] in fields of overwhelming executive or legislative authority, **Article III courts have come to view military questions as a taxonomic grouping they are simply incapable of navigating. Yet in this legal area** (as in most others), **doctrinal facts ought to drive psychological attitudes. Military cases do not always hold the threat of substantially greater national peril, nor offer more pressing exigencies, nor present more intractable** fact or policy **questions** than do typical administrative law adjudications. **Courts that remain unafraid to pass on the factual rationality of highway safety regulations** that may affect tens of thousands of lives each year **should hold no** particular impressionistic **aversion towards inquiring into the legality of detentions** or secretive hearings. There, the danger of a judicial misstep remains speculative precisely because courts have refused to put the Administration to its proofs. Moreover, **courts** themselves **possess responsibility for enforcing the legal limitations that exist to bind administrative actors. To leave wartime cases exclusively in the hands of the Executive Branch in the name of** "comity" or "**deference" would be to reduce fundamental constitutional guarantees to mere precatory language,** slaves to the vicissitudes of the executive expediency they were meant to curb. Lower courts need not shrink from validating the rule of law in cases that bear such resemblance to the administrative law doctrines with which they are familiar. If they continue to do so, **the Supreme Court must act to reconstitute wartime doctrine** along existing precedential lines, **lest the U**nited **S**tates **reap the consequences of this** unfortunate, self-conscious **judicial hand-washing.** Conclusion **Over the past three years, the "War on Terror" has become as much a legal strategy as a military operation.** Incursions abroad have been matched by informational blackouts at home. International manhunts for suspected terrorists are coupled with detention of American citizens. Constitutional rights have been eroded by a torrent of ostensibly security-enhancing measures, and aggrieved individuals have turned to the courts for redress, just as they did six decades ago when the Japanese population of the West Coast was interned in the name of national defense. Yet **courts have behaved solicitously** not towards claims of constitutional deprivations, but rather **towards governmental declarations of necessity and authority** over the lives and rights of the citizenry in wartime. In particular, **courts have overwhelmingly deferred to the executive branch** regarding the assertions of fact that form the factual predicates for governmental actions. Deference has come according to two rationales: first, the President's unique constitutional role as guarantor of national security, and second, the Executive's [\*520] superior institutional expertise in wartime matters. **In awarding deference** on these grounds, **the judiciary has ignored the operation of the Constitution** and laws as contemporaneous structural constraints on executive military action. The President and the military hold only the authority vested in them by the Constitution or by law. Action outside of those legal boundaries is by definition unconstitutional and unauthorized. Similarly, the Bill of Rights enshrines individual freedoms that executive action, even if otherwise lawful, cannot infringe. Moreover, **many cases implicating national security turn on issues of individual statutory and constitutional rights - such as the lawfulness of detention** or free speech rights such as access to information - that form the archetypal bailiwick of civilian tribunals. Thus, **even in wartime circumstances there is often constitutional and statutory law to apply, law to which courts must hold the Executive** and the legislature. As courts have nearly unanimously recognized, **it is emphatically the province of the judiciary to vindicate the rule of law by demanding that government bodies remain within circumscribed boundaries.** It is in this respect that administrative law can usefully inform the adjudication of wartime cases. Administrative law jurisprudence developed to address the particular problems presented by executive branch agencies possessing tremendous institutional expertise and resources and specially empowered by Congress to manage technically difficult subject matter. So-called "military" cases come to Article III courts within precisely the same jurisprudential framework as civilian administrative ones: courts must determine the degree to which they should defer to the legal or factual allegations of an expert, empowered executive branch organization. Despite the obvious considerations favoring substantial administrative deference, the Supreme Court's modern administrative law jurisprudence stands for the principle that adherence to the rule of law demands that courts meaningfully scrutinize administrative determinations of fact. The Court has recognized that enforcement of a legal stricture is toothless without a concomitant inquiry into that stricture's factual predicate. It has therefore insisted upon "substantial evidence" in support of agency judgments before affirming them and required courts to perform "rationality review" of agency policy decisions to ensure that agencies have considered all available alternatives and reached logical conclusions from available information. The rule-of-law principles that motivate judicial scrutiny of administrative determinations compel similar treatment for the claims of fact proffered by the military in the interest of surmounting constitutional restraints. The reasons that courts advance in defense of their acquiescence in wartime circumstances are logically unconvincing. [\*521] **The military matters that have come before the judiciary are neither more judicially inscrutable nor more legally intractable than the administrative issues upon which hard look and substantial evidence review were founded. If military cases present greater national dangers - a question that can hardly be answered accurately without judicial review in the first instance - than their civilian counterparts, they also threaten more dramatic erosions of civil and constitutional rights**. Courts cannot continue to invoke "national security" as a shibboleth absolving them from their responsibility, exemplified within the principles of administrative law, to examine especially those actions taken by broadly empowered, highly experienced executive bodies. On September 22, 2004, almost three years after Yaser Esam Hamdi was taken into custody by American forces in Afghanistan, and nearly three months after the Supreme Court had ruled that he could not be held indefinitely without some nature of adjudicative process, the United States Department of Justice decided that Hamdi's "intelligence value had been exhausted" and agreed to release him, provided he never again set foot in the United States. n321 Nineteen days later, Hamdi was placed on a flight bound for Saudi Arabia. n322 What justification the United States military believed it possessed for holding Hamdi may never be known; one can only presume that it would not have withstood even the limited scrutiny the Supreme Court had prescribed. Hamdi's release completed the military's circular narrative: it was the executive branch that chose to incarcerate Hamdi; it was the executive branch that unilaterally chose to release him; and it appears that the executive branch never ceased believing that it alone held the authority to make these decisions. Yaser **Hamdi**, Jose **Padilla, and** all American **citizens** bearing constitutional rights **are entitled to a government that operates by law and logic, not by executive fiat. Courts must act to vindicate the rule of law if such a government is to persevere.**

**Plan is key to domestic and international rule of law—modeling**

Michael P. **Scharf** et al., Counsel of Record, Brief of the Public International Law & Policy Group as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioners, Jamal Kiyemba, et. Al., v. Barack H. Obama, et al., SCOTUS, No. 08-1234, 12—**09**, p. 3-8.

**The precedent of this Court has a significant impact on rule of law in foreign states**. **Foreign governments, in particular foreign judiciaries, notice and follow the example set by the U.S. in upholding the rule of law**. **As foreign** governments and **judiciaries grapple with** new and challenging issues associated with **upholding the rule of law during times of conflict, U.S. leadership on the primacy of law during the war on terror is particularly important**. **Recent decisions of this Court have reaffirmed the primacy of rule of law** in the U.S. during the war on terror. As relates to the present case, a number of this Court’s decisions, most notably **Boumediene** v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008**), have established clear precedent that** Guantanamo detainees **have a right to** petition for **habeas corpus relief. Despite a clear holding** from this Court in Boumediene, the **Court of Appeals sought** in Kiyemba v. Obama **to narrow Boumediene** **to such a degree as to render this Court’s ruling hollow**. 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2009). **The** present **case is** thus **a test of both the substance of the right granted in Boumediene and the role of this Court in ensuring faithful implementation of its prior decisions**. Although this Court’s rulings only have the force of law in the U.S., **foreign governments will take note of the decision** in the present case **and use the precedent set by this Court to guide their actions in times of conflic**t. PILPG has advised over two dozen foreign states on peace negotiations and post-conflict constitution drafting, as well as all of the international war crimes tribunals. Through providing pro bono legal assistance to foreign governments and judiciaries, **PILPG has observed the important role this Court and U.S. precedent serve in promoting rule of law in foreign states.** In Uganda, for example, the precedent established by this Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), and Boumediene, influenced judges and legislators to incorporate the principles of judicial review and enforceability in their domestic war crimes bill. In Nepal, this Court has served as a model for the nascent judiciary. In Somaliland, the government relied heavily on U.S. terrorism legislation when drafting terrorism legislation for the region. And in the South Sudan peace process, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), the leading political party in the Government of Southern Sudan, relied on U.S. precedent to argue for the primacy of law and the importance of enforceability of previous adjudicative decisions in the Abyei Arbitration, one of the most important and contentious issues in the ongoing implementation of the peace agreement**. Foreign judges also follow the work of this Court closely**. In a number of the judicial training programs PILPG has conducted, **foreign judges have asked PILPG detailed questions about the role of this Court in upholding rule of law during the war on terror**. **A review of foreign precedent confirms how closely foreign judges follow this Court**. **In numerous foreign states, and in the international war crimes tribunals, judges regularly cite the precedent of this Court to establish their own legitimacy, to shore up judicial authority against overreaching by powerful executives, and to develop a strong rule of law within their own legal systems.** **Given the significant influence of this Court on foreign governments and judiciaries**, a decision in Kiyemba **implementing Boumediene will reaffirm this Court’s leadership in upholding the rule of law and promote respect for rule of law in foreign states during times of conflict**. ARGUMENT I. KIYEMBA v. OBAMA IS A TEST OF SUPREME COURT LEADERSHIP IN UPHOLDING RULE OF LAW IN TIMES OF CONFLICT **The precedent set by the Supreme Court** in the present case **will have a significant impact on the development of rule of law in foreign states. Foreign judicial, executive, and parliamentary bodies closely follow the work of this Court, and this Court’s previous decisions related to the war on terror have shaped how foreign states uphold the rule of law** in times of conflict. **Foreign governments and judiciaries** will **review** this Court’s **decision** in the present case in light of those previous decisions. **A decision** in the present case **implementing previous decisions of this Court granting habeas rights to Guantanamo detainees is an opportunity for this Court to reaffirm to foreign governments that the U.S. is a leader and role model in upholding the rule of law during times of conflict**. **Recent Supreme Court precedent established a clear role for the primacy of law in the U.S. war on terror**. In particular, this Court’s landmark decision in **Boumediene highlighted the critical role of the judiciary in a system dedicated to the rule of law, as well as the “indispensable” role of habeas corpus as a “time tested” safeguard of liberty.** Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 2247, 2259 (2008). **Around the globe, courts and governments took note of this Court’s** stirring **words:** “**Security subsists, too**, in **fidelity to freedom’s first principles. Chief among these are freedom from arbitrary and unlawful restraint** and the personal liberty **that is secured by adherence to the separation of powers**. It is from these principles that the judicial authority to consider petitions for habeas corpus relief derives.” Id. at 2277. In contrast to the maxim silent enim leges inter arma (in times of conflict the law must be silent), this Court affirmed in Boumediene that “[t]**he laws and Constitution are designed to survive, and remain in force, in extraordinary times. Liberty and security can be reconciled**, and in our system they are reconciled within the framework of the law.” Id. Boumediene held that the detainees in the military prison at Guantanamo Bay are “entitled to the privilege of habeas corpus to challenge the legality of their detentions.” Id. at 2262. Inherent in that privilege is the right to a remedy if the detention is found to be unlawful. In the present case, the Petitioners, who had been found not to be enemy combatants, sought to exercise their privilege of habeas corpus. The Executive Branch conceded that there was no legal basis to continue to detain the Petitioners, that years of diligent effort to resettle them elsewhere had failed, and that there was no foreseeable path of release. The District Court implemented Boumediene, ordering that the Petitioners be brought to the courtroom to impose conditions of release. In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, 581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 42-43 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The Court of Appeals reversed, with the majority concluding that the judiciary had no “power to require anything more” than the Executive’s representations that it was continuing efforts to find a foreign country willing to admit Petitioners. Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2009). **The Court of Appeals’ decision effectively narrowed Boumediene to such a degree that it rendered the ruling hollow**. Circuit Judge Rogers recognized this in her dissent, opining that the majority’s analysis “was not faithful to Boumediene.” Id. at 1032 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Given the Court of Appeals’ attempt to narrow Boumediene, Kiyemba v. Obama is a test of this Court’s role in upholding the primacy of law in times of conflict. A decision in favor of the Petitioners in Kiyemba will reaffirm this Court’s leadership in upholding the rule of law and promote respect for rule of law in foreign states during times of conflict.

**Remedy mandate is key to overall judicial power**

Alex Young K. **Oh** et al., Counsel of Record, Brief for the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, the Brennan Center for Justice at the New York University School of Law, the Constitution Project, People for the American Way Foundation, the Rutherford Institute, and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioners, amal Kiyemba, et. Al., v. Barack H. Obama, et al., SCOTUS, No. 08-1234, 12—11—**09**, p. 11-12.

**The "judicial Power" granted by the Constitution includes the power to effectuate remedies** in those cases where a federal court properly exercises jurisdiction. As Justice Johnson explained, riding circuit in 1808, "[t]**he term 'judicial power' conveys the idea, both of exercising the faculty of judging and of applying physical force to give effect to a decision**. The term 'power' could with no propriety be applied, nor could the judiciary be denominated a department of government, without the means of enforcing its decrees." Gilchrist v. Collector of Charleston, 10 F. Cas. 355, 361 (C.C.D.S.C. 1808) (Johnson, J.) (emphasis added). Indeed, **if the power to effectuate remedies independently were not part of the "judicial Power**" granted to the courts by the Constitution, **the power of the courts to "say what the law is,"** Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803**), would be a functional nullity in the face of any contrary whim of the political branches and courts would be relegated to the issuance of hortatory advisory opinions**. See Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 66 (1924) (recognizing, in the context of a discussion of courts' inherent contempt power, that "the attributes which inhere in [judicial] power and are inseparable from it can neither be abrogated nor rendered practically inoperative"). **The "judicial Power**," of course, **embodies a far more substantial power. The heart of the "judicial Power" vested by Article III** in the several federal courts **is the power to speak authoritatively and finally on any matter of law over which they have jurisdiction, as this power sustains the judiciary's independence. "At the core of [the judicial] power is the federal courts' independent responsibility**—independent from its coequal branches in the Federal Government, and independent from the separate authority of the several States—**to interpret federal law**." SanchezLlamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 354 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 378-79 (2000)). **The Court maintains its independence because this power to declare the law is the power to do so through orders and judgments that are binding and enforceable**. That is, **the Court acts only when its judgment on the law is not merely advisory, but effective**.

**Rule of law solves war—multiple triggers**

**Feldman ‘8** [Noah Feldman, a contributing writer for the magazine, is a law professor at Harvard University and an adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, “When Judges Make Foreign Policy”, NEW YORK TIMES, 9—25—08, www.nytimes.com/2008/09/28/magazine/28law-t.html]

Looking at today’s problem through the lens of our great constitutional experiment, it emerges that there is no single, enduring answer to which way the Constitution should be oriented, inward or outward. The truth is that we have had an inward- and outward-looking Constitution by turns, depending on the needs of the country and of the world. Neither the text of the Constitution, nor the history of its interpretation, nor the deep values embedded in it justify one answer rather than the other. In the face of such ambiguity, the right question is not simply in what direction does our Constitution look, but where do we need the Constitution to look right now? Answering this requires the Supreme Court to think in terms not only of principle but also of policy: to weigh national and international interests; and to exercise fine judgment about how our Constitution functions and is perceived at home and abroad. The conservative and liberal approaches to legitimacy and the rule of law need to be supplemented with a healthy dose of real-world pragmatism. In effect, the fact that the Constitution affects our relations with the world requires the justices to have a foreign policy of their own. On the surface, it seems as if such inevitably political judgments are not the proper province of the court. If assessments of the state of the world are called for, shouldn’t the court defer to the decisions of the elected president and Congress? Aren’t judgments about the direction of our country the exclusive preserve of the political branches? Indeed, the **Supreme Court** does need to be limited to its proper role. But when it comes to our **engagement with the world,** that role **involves taking a stand, not stepping aside.** The reason for this is straightforward: the court is in charge of interpreting the Constitution, and the Constitution plays a major role in shaping our engagement with the rest of the world. The court therefore has no choice about whether to involve itself in the question of which direction the Constitution will face; it is now unavoidably involved. Even choosing to defer to the other branches of government amounts to a substantive stand on the question. That said, **when the court exercises its own independent political judgment, it** still **does so in a distinctively legal way.**For one thing, the court can act only through deciding the cases that happen to come before it, and the court is limited to using the facts and circumstances of those cases to shape a broader constitutional vision. The court also speaks in the idiom of law — which is to say, of regular rules that apply to everyone across the board. It cannot declare, for instance, that only this or that detainee has rights. It must hold that the same rights extend to every detainee who is similarly situated. **This**, too, **is an effective constraint on the way the court exercises** its policy **judgment.** Indeed, it is this very regularity that gives its decisions legitimacy as the product of judicial logic and reasoning. Why We Need More Law, More Than Ever So what do we need the Constitution to do for us now? The answer, I think, is that the Constitution must be read to help us remember that while the war on terror continues, we are also still in the midst of a period of rapid globalization. An enduring lesson of the Bush years is the extreme difficulty and cost of doing things by ourselves. **We need to build and rebuild alliances — and law has** historically **been** one of **our best tool**s for doing so. In our present precarious situation, **it would be a** terrible **mistake to abandon our** historic **position of leadership in the g**lobal **spread of** the **rule of law. Our leadership matters** for reasons both universal and national. Seen from the perspective of the world, **the fragmentation of power** after the cold war **creates new dangers** of disorder that need to be mitigated by the sense of regularity and predictability **that only the rule of law can provide. Terrorists need to be deterred. Failed states need to be brought under the umbrella of international organizations so they can govern themselves. And economic interdependence demands coordination, so that the collapse of one does not become the collapse of all**. From a national perspective, our interest is less in the inherent value of advancing individual rights than in claiming that our allies are obligated to help us by virtue of legal commitments they have made. The Bush administration’s lawyers often insisted that lawwas a tool of the weak, and that therefore as a strong nation we had no need to engage it. But this notion of “lawfare” as a threat to the United States is based on a misunderstanding of the very essence of how law operates. **Law** comes into being and is sustained not because the weak demand it but because it is a tool of the powerful — as it has been for the United States since World War II at least. The reason those with power prefer law to brute force is that it **regularizes and legitimates the exercise of authority. It is easier and cheaper to get the compliance of weaker** people or **states by promising them rules** and a fair hearing **than by threatening them constantly with force.** After all, if those wielding power really objected to the rule of law, they could abolish it, the way dictators and juntas have often done the world over.

**1AC: Plan**

**The United States federal judiciary should rule that habeas corpus hearings of persons detained under the War Powers Authority of the President of the United States be subject to due process guarantees and that such individuals who have won their habeas corpus hearing be released.**

**1AC: Solvency**

**Contention 3 is Solvency:**

**Boumediene failed provide detainees legal recourse—Court clarification is key**

**Reprieve 12** (Anti-detention advocacy group based in London, 7-10-12, "Why can't cleared prisoners leave Guantánamo Bay? Reprieve) www.reprieve.org.uk/publiceducation/2012\_07\_10\_Guantanamo\_public\_education/

**Guantánamo detainees can appeal to federal judges to compel the Department of Defense to release them; a federal court order would circumvent the NDAA restrictions. Under this method, detainees challenge their detention by seeking a court order of habeas corpus – essentially asking the court to declare their detention illegal.** In 2008, **the U**nited **S**tates **Supreme Court ruled in Boumediene v. Bush that US courts can make habeas corpus orders** for non-US citizens detained at Guantánamo. (The Court specifically ruled that a Congressional Act prohibiting such orders was unconstitutional.) Following Boumediene, **a number of Guantánamo detainees challenged their detention in court. Some of these habeas petitions were granted,** meaning that the detainee had indeed been held illegally. The release of some of these habeas winners was not contested by the government and such prisoners returned home or to a third country willing to take them. **However, since 2010, the D.C. Circuit Court has consistently decided against the detainee on appeal[1], meaning the US courts have become effectively worthless to Guantánamo prisoners. The problem was that the Supreme Court’s Boumediene opinion lacked clear guidance on the standards and procedures for Guantánamo habeas corpus review. This allowed lower** (and possibly more hostile) **courts to narrow and misinterpret the meaning of the Boumediene decision to a point where it became worthless. For example, the D.C. Circuit Court set the standard of evidence required of the government to oppose a release as a “preponderance of evidence”** - extremely low and vague. **The Court has also allowed hearsay evidence, and has even accepted the existence of simply “some evidence" as sufficient for continued detention**. Furthermore, th**e courts now side with the government whenever it presents a 'plausible' allegation about the prisoner.** In reality, **this shifts the burden of proof onto the prisoner**, as he must actively disprove the allegations about him, while the government may simply present them as fact. In sum, **while detainees can challenge their detention in court they now have no chance of winning.** **As the ultimate judicial decision-maker, the US Supreme Court could clarify its Boumediene opinion, overriding the D.C. Circuit Court’s apparent resolution to block Guantánamo releases**. However, **the Supreme Court has since refused to hear Guantánamo-related cases. This has effectively ended all hopes of judicially-ordered releases for detainees.** Eleven years after the island prison opened, the Supreme Court does not seem interested in delivering justice at Guantanamo Bay.

**Granting detainees immediate court access for prosecution solves**

Kenneth **Roth**, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch, "Why the Current Approach to Fighting Terrorism is Making Us Less Safe," CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW v. 41, 6--**08**, p. 592.

Let me conclude just by saying what concretely should the next President do, and along with him or her, what should the next Congress do. It's not going to be enough just to be a fresh face in the White House. **There are going to have to be real changes in practice.** **Among those changes will be the need to close Guantanamo**, **to close its equivalents** around the world: Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan, certainly the CIA secret detention facilities and the like. **People** there **should be prosecuted or released. It's that simple. There should not be a preventive detention option**. We should not just move Guantanamo onshore. The Army rules for interrogation should be extended to the CIA, initially by executive order and as quickly possible by legislation to make it harder for the next President to introduce another one of these exceptions. **Habeas corpus should be immediately restored** **so that anyone detained by the U.S. has immediate access to the courts to challenge the legality of their detention**. **We should abolish altogether the military commissions**. **We do not need a justice system designed to introduce into evidence coerced testimony. People can be brought before the civilian courts.** If they are captured in a battlefield, they can be brought before a regular court martial but none of these dumbed-down substandard military commissions. Apart from these concrete changes, **we also need a real repudiation. It is not enough to simply stop doing it**, I think **there is a need to disown the theories that led to this**, including I should say the concept of the global war against terrorism: The view that the Bush Administration or any administration on its own unilaterally can identify anybody any place in the world that is a combatant and therefore remove them from the criminal justice system and simply detain them as a combatant.

**Obama will comply—the Court has the final word**

Joe **Meacham,** executive editor, Random House, “Why Obama Shouldn’t Declare War on Supreme Court,” TIME, 4—2—**12**, http://ideas.time.com/2012/04/02/why-obama-shouldnt-declare-war-on-the-supreme-court/

With the Supreme Court weighing the constitutionality of a central element of President Obama’s comprehensive health care reform, there’s a lot of talk (in the places where people talk about such things, usually unburdened by responsibility or firsthand knowledge) of making the court an issue in the campaign if it were to rule against the White House. But here is a pretty good rule of thumb for Democratic Presidents: if it didn’t work for Franklin D. Roosevelt, who won four terms and a World War, it probably won’t work for you either. In one of the rare political debacles of his long life, FDR overreached after his landslide win against Alf Landon in 1936. (Roosevelt carried every state, save for Maine and Vermont.) A largely conservative Supreme Court had already struck down key parts of New Deal legislation, and there was the threat of more anti-Roosevelt decisions to come. And so FDR proposed a plan that would have enabled him to appoint additional justices in an attempt to shift the court’s political orientation. The effort failed, miserably. Justified or not, **the Supreme Court has** a kind of **sacred status in American life**. For whatever reason, **Presidents can safely run against Congress**, and vice versa, **but** I think **there is an inherent popular aversion to assaults on the court itself**. Perhaps **it has to do with an instinctive belief that life needs umpires**, even ones who blow calls now and then. Ironies abound. One of the great partisans of the early republic, John Marshall, created an ethos around the court that has largely protected it (even from itself) from successful partisan attack. **Even when it makes bad law (Bush v. Gore), it has the last word**. **Even when it makes decisions that enrage vast swaths of** politically, culturally and religiously motivated **citizens** (Roe v. Wade), **it** basically **has the last word**. (If you disagree with this example, ask yourself how successful pro-lifers have been in amending the Constitution over the past 40 years.) It has had the grimmest of hours (Dred Scott v. Sandford) and the finest (Brown v. Board of Education). The court is, of course, a political institution. In no way is it a clinically impartial tribunal, for virtually every decision requires an application of values and an assessment in light of experience. “Activist judges” tend to be judges who make decisions with which you disagree. Wise Presidents have learned that taking the court on directly rarely turns out well. Thomas Jefferson cordially hated his cousin Marshall, but even Jefferson trod carefully as he repealed John Adams’ extension of Federalist judicial power. “John Marshall has made his decision,” Andrew Jackson is alleged to have said after a Cherokee case. “Now let him enforce it.” The showdown between Marshall and Jackson over the fate of Native Americans, however, was much more subtle on both sides, with Marshall characteristically taking care not to force an existential crisis with the executive branch. Segregationist Southerners may have put up billboards urging the impeachment of Earl Warren in the 1950s, but the chief justice’s job — and his place in history — was never in actual jeopardy. On a human level, Presidents who have to fight and claw their way to shape public opinion, pass legislation and then try to implement their policies must be mightily tempted to make a hostile Supreme Court a target to energize the base. But history shows that Obama should resist the temptation. There are subtle ways to make the point about a given court’s seeming hostility to your agenda and still win over highly informed independents in swing states who tend to decide elections. The big thing experience shows is that you should not declare war on the court. More in sadness than in anger, just mention the issues on which you feel stymied by the justices. From health care to campaign finance, those independent voters will get the message without being frightened off by an unsettling rhetorical attack on the judiciary. That’s what FDR got wrong. Obama may well have a chance to get it right.

**Prosecution in federal courts solves best—multiple reasons, experts agree**

Oona **Hathaway**, Professor, International Law, Yale Law School, Samuel Adelsberg, Spencer Amdur, Philip Levitz, Freya Pitts and Sirine Shebaya, “The Power to Detain: Detention of Terrorism Suspects after 9/11,” YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW v. 38, Winter 20**13**, p. 161-167.

The United States is still actively engaged in hostilities with global terrorist organizations, but there are indications that "we're within reach of strategically defeating al-Qaeda." n227 This development, combined with the growing distance from the national trauma of September 11, has reinvigorated the debate surrounding the detention and prosecution of suspected terrorists both outside of and within the United States. Even though Congress has recently expanded military detention and prosecution, n228 **prosecution in federal court offers several key advantages over law-of-war detention, including predictability, legitimacy, greater cooperation** by defendants and international partners, **and flexibility**. n229 These advantages have led a diverse set of actors - from current Department of Defense and counterterrorism officials, n230 to [\*162] former Bush Administration officials, n231 to the Washington Post editorial board n232 - to support the prosecution and detention of individuals through the federal courts, despite Congress's recently expressed preference for law-of-war detention. **In some cases, prosecution in federal court is the only available option for prosecuting an accused terrorist. Federal antiterrorism statutes are extensive and provide statutory authority to prosecute individuals who are** part of or **supporting terrorist groups without direct ties to** forces associated with **al-Qaeda or the Taliban** (and therefore outside the scope of the 2001 AUMF or the NDAA), n233 **and independently operating terrorists** who are inspired by, but are not part of or associated with, al-Qaeda or the Taliban. **n234 These** **statutes also reach persons** or citizens **who, because they are apprehended in the U**nited **S**tates, **cannot be tried under the MCA**. The following sections discuss the contours and limitations of such criminal prosecution and detention in the terrorism context. Even where detention under the law of war is available, **the criminal justice system offers** some **key advantages** **for** the **detention and prosecution of suspected terrorists.** We thus aim here to offer a correction to the recent trend toward favoring law-of-war detention over criminal prosecution and detention. **In the vast majority of cases, criminal prosecution** and detention **is the most effective and legitimate way to address the terrorist threat.** A. The Advantages of Criminal Prosecution and Detention The least contested bases for detention authority in any context are post-conviction criminal detention and pre-verdict detention for those who pose a risk of flight. It is often assumed that such criminal detention is ill-suited to terrorists. However, with very little fanfare, **federal district court dockets have been flush with terrorism cases over the past decade. Strikingly, efforts to measure the conviction rate in these cases place it between 86 and 91 percent.** n235 Far from being ineffective, then, **trying suspected terrorists in criminal courts is remarkably effective. It also offers** the **advantages** of predictability, legitimacy, and strategic benefits in the fight against terrorism. **1. Predictability Post-conviction detention of terrorists after prosecution in federal court provides predictability that is currently absent in the military commission system. Federal** district **courts have years of experience trying complex cases and convicting dangerous criminals, including international terrorists, and the rules are well established and understood. The current military commission system**, on the other hand, **is** a **comparatively untested** adjudicatory regime. n236 As already noted, **conviction rates in terrorism trials have been close to ninety percent** since 2001, and those rates have remained steady in the face of large increases in the number of prosecutions. **The military commissions,** by contrast, **have** - as of this writing - **convicted seven people** since 2001, five of whom pled guilty. n237 Charges have been dropped against several defendants, n238 [\*164] and other defendants have been charged but not tried. n239 The commission procedures have been challenged at every stage, and it is unclear what final form they will ultimately take. Even their substantive jurisdiction remains unsettled. In October 2012, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit overturned Salim Hamdan's military commission conviction for providing material support to terrorism. n240 The Court held that the Military Commissions Act of 2006, which made material support for terrorism a war crime that could be prosecuted in the commissions, was not retroactively applicable to Hamdan's conduct prior to enactment of the statute. n241 Moreover, the Court explained that material support for terrorism was not a recognized war crime under international law. n242 As a result, his conviction for material support for terrorism in the commission could not stand. n243 It is uncertain how this will affect other trials of detainees, but this decision clearly illustrates the unsettled nature of the commissions. n244 **2. Legitimacy** **Federal courts are** also generally **considered more legitimate than military commissions. The stringent procedural protections reduce the risk of error and generate trust and legitimacy**. n245 **The federal courts**, for example, **provide** more **robust hearsay protections** than the commissions. n246 In addition, **jurors are** [\*165] **ordinary citizens, not U.S. military personnel**. Indeed, **some of the weakest procedural protections in the military commission system have been successfully challenged as unconstitutiona**l. n247 **Congress and the Executive have responded to these legal challenges - and to criticism of the commissions from around the globe - by significantly strengthening the commissions' procedural protections. Yet the remaining gaps - along with** what many regard as **a tainted history - continue to raise doubts about the fairness and legitimacy of the commissions.** The current commissions, moreover, have been active for only a short period - too brief a period for doubts to be confirmed or put to rest. n248 **Federal criminal procedure**, on the other hand, **is well-established and widely regarded as legitimate. Legitimacy of the trial process is important** not only to the individuals charged but also **to the fight against terrorism.** As several successful habeas corpus petitions have demonstrated, **insufficient procedural protections create a real danger of erroneous imprisonment** for extended periods. n249 **Such errors can generate resentment and distrust of the U**nited **S**tates **that undermine** the **effectiveness of counterterrorism efforts.** Indeed, evidence suggests that **populations are more likely to cooperate in policing when they believe they have been treated fairly.** n250 The understanding that a more legitimate detention regime will be a more effective one is reflected in recent statements from the Department of Defense and the White House. n251 **3. Strategic Advantages There is clear evidence that other countries recognize and respond to the difference in legitimacy between civilian and military courts and that they are**, indeed, **more willing to cooperate with U.S. counterterrorism efforts when terrorism suspects are tried in the criminal justice system. Increased international cooperation is** therefore **another advantage of criminal prosecution.** Many **key U.S. allies have been unwilling to cooperate in cases involving law-of-war detention** or prosecution **but have cooperated in criminal** [\*166] **prosecutions.** In fact, **many U.S. extradition treaties, including those with allies such as India and Germany, forbid extradition when the defendant will not be tried in a criminal court.** n252 This issue has played out in practice several times. An al-Shabaab operative was extradited from the Netherlands only after assurances from the United States that he would be prosecuted in criminal court. n253 Two similar cases arose in 2007. n254 In perhaps the most striking example, five terrorism suspects - including Abu Hamza al-Masr, who is accused of providing material support to al-Qaeda by trying to set up a training camp in Oregon and of organizing support for the Taliban in Afghanistan - were extradited to the United States by the United Kingdom in October 2012. n255 The extradition was made on the express condition that they would be tried in civilian federal criminal courts rather than in the military commissions. n256 And, indeed, both the European Court of Human Rights and the British courts allowed the extradition to proceed after assessing the protections offered by the U.S. federal criminal justice system and finding they fully met all relevant standards. n257 An insistence on using military commissions may thus hinder extradition and other kinds of international prosecutorial cooperation, such as the sharing of testimony and evidence. Finally, **the criminal justice system is simply a more agile and versatile prosecution forum. Federal jurisdiction offers an extensive variety of antiterrorism statutes that can be marshaled to prosecute terrorist activity committed outside the U**nited **S**tates, **and subsequently to detain those who are convicted.** n258 **This greater variety of offenses** - military commissions can only [\*167] punish an increasingly narrow set of traditional offenses against the laws of war n259 - **offers prosecutors important flexibility.** For instance, **it might be very difficult to prove al-Qaeda membership in an MCA prosecution or a law-of-war habeas proceeding; but if the defendant has received training at a terrorist camp** or participated in a specific terrorist act, **federal prosecutors may convict under various statutes tailored to more specific criminal behavior.** n260 In addition, military commissions can no longer hear prosecutions for material support committed before 2006. n261 Due in part to the established track record of the federal courts, **the federal criminal justice system also allows for more flexible interactions between prosecutors and defendants. Proffer and plea agreements are powerful incentives for defendants to cooperate, and often lead to valuable intelligence-gathering, producing more intelligence over the course of prosecution**. n262

## \*\*2AC\*\*

**T-Release: 2AC**

**Counter-interpretation: Restriction means a limit and includes conditions on action**

**CAA 8**,COURT OF APPEALS OF ARIZONA, DIVISION ONE, DEPARTMENT A, STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. JEREMY RAY WAGNER, Appellant., 2008 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 613

P10 The term "restriction" is not defined by the Legislature for the purposes of the DUI statutes. See generally A.R.S. § 28-1301 (2004) (providing the "[d]efinitions" section of the DUI statutes). In the absence of a statutory definition of a term, we look to ordinary dictionary definitions and do not construe the word as being a term of art. Lee v. State, 215 Ariz. 540, 544, ¶ 15, 161 P.3d 583, 587 (App. 2007) ("**When a statutory term is not explicitly defined, we assume**, unless otherwise stated, **that the Legislature intended to accord the word its natural and obvious meaning**, which may be discerned from its dictionary definition."). P11 **The dictionary definition of "restriction" is "[a] limitation or qualification**." Black's Law Dictionary 1341 (8th ed. 1999). In fact, "**limited" and "restricted" are considered synonyms.** See Webster's II New Collegiate Dictionary 946 (2001). **Under these** **commonly accepted definitions**, **Wagner's driving privileges were "restrict[ed]" when they were "limited" by the ignition interlock requirement.** **Wagner was not only** [\*7] **statutorily required** **to install an ignition** **interlock device on all of the vehicles he operated,** A.R.S. § 28-1461(A)(1)(b), **but he** was also **prohibited from driving any vehicle that was not equipped with such a device**, regardless whether he owned the vehicle or was under the influence of intoxicants, A.R.S. § 28-1464(H). **These limitations constituted a restriction** on Wagner's privilege to drive, **for he was unable to drive in circumstances which were otherwise available** to the general driving population. Thus, the rules of statutory construction dictate that the term "restriction" includes the ignition interlock device limitation.

**Release CP: 2AC**

**Doesn’t solve the aff—saying they can’t be sent anywhere is an excuse for the executive and Congress to circumvent**

**Ynet 13** (News agency, “Yemeni president's White House talks on Guantanamo release fail”) http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4413553,00.html

**Despite attempts by officials to accent the positive aspects of his Washington visit** last week, Yemeni President Abd Raabuh Mansur **Hadi's White House meeting with President Barack Obama failed to reach a breakthrough on one of his most pressing issues, the repatriation of prisoners being held at the Guantanamo Bay prison who are Yemeni nationals.** The fate of the Yemeni, who now make up more than half of the remaining 166 prisoners being held at Gitmo, was on top of Hadi's agenda for his meeting with the president. Hadi told the American administration that Yemen is now capable and eligible to receive its imprisoned nationals, but the meeting failed to produce an agreement. Nevertheless, Hadi did not leave the Oval Office empty handed. The United States agreed to honor a previous commitment to provide Yemen with a military aid package that includes 12 aircraft equipped with night vision capabilities and radioactive monitoring sensors; 100 military vehicles; and a high-tech integrated communication system to aid Yemeni border guards tasked with the prevention and interdiction of smuggling activities. President Obama praised Hadi's leadership, saying his efforts have helped drive al-Qaeda elements out of their territories and pledged to help address Yemen's "significant economic challenges." President Hadi succeeded Ali Abdullah Saleh, who was ousted after more than thirty years of rule. Since his tenure began, the US security echelon has partnered with the Yemeni military in trying to eradicate the terrorist group al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), considered by American officials to be arguably the most potent of the international terrorist organization’s global franchises. Several AQAP leaders have recently been killed by missiles fired from American-operated drones. Stressing the importance of the Hadi trip to the United States, Dr. Fares Al-Saqqaf, Hadi's advisor on strategic issues, told The Media Line that, “This visit comes at a critical time as Yemen goes through the final stages of its two-year transitional period, by the end of which an election will be held and a new constitution will be drafted. It came at a time when the country is facing economic challenges and the delegates at the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) are approaching the end of their discussions." The NDC is a body of 565 Yemeni citizens representing a cross-section of society who are tasked with drafting a new constitution and revised system of government. Among its issues are good governance and corruption. Its work is set to conclude in September. Political analyst and chairman of the Abaad Studies and Research Center, Abdusalam Mohammed, agreed with Al-Saqqaf, adding that, “The political and security challenges facing Yemen in addition to the fact that Yemen is scheduled to have a presidential election early next year -- something which may need to be postponed -- necessitated this visit and made it so important.” **The situation of those incarcerated at Guantanamo** Bay, however, **is the issue of greatest concern to the prisoners’ families and spurred on by human rights organizations**, is considered a major public issue. Families and activists who joined together to demonstrate outside Hadi’s Sana’a residence simultaneous to the president’s meeting at the White House were disappointed to learn that there was no specific time set for the prisoners to be released. Instead, Presidents Obama and Hadi agreed only to work together “to facilitate the repatriation of Yemeni detainees who have been designated for transfer” and continue consultations on the matter, according to a statement issued by the White House after the meeting. **Although many Guantanamo prisoners have already been turned-over to their respective country’s**, but **56 Yemeni nationals designated for transfer remain in the infamous facility due to a US-imposed moratorium** on the release of any Yemeni prisoners after a failed attempt to blow up a Detroit-bound passenger plane on Christmas, 2009, which was traced back to AQAP. In May, President Obama said he would allow the repatriation of the Yemeni prisoners, but his decision was blocked by the Republican-controlled House of Representatives, where many lawmakers say they fear those released would quickly join forces with AQAP in part because **Yemen, the poorest Arab state, does not have extremist rehabilitation centers.** Earlier this year, Yemen announced plans to establish such a center in a move to meet Congress’s conditions for releasing the prisoners. "**Washington is not serious about releasing Yemeni detainees," said** Abdulrahman **Baraman, a human rights activist and lawyer for some of the detainees' families. “It's only trying to make excuses in order not to repatriate the Yemeni detainees…Every time Obama pledges to hand them over, he reneges and finds new grounds for not making good on his pledge.** We are afraid that our fellow Yemenis imprisoned unfairly at Guantanamo are victimized by the partisan bickering between the Republicans and Democrats." Twice, the Republicans have prevented the ban from being lifted.

**We can send them other places—China would never agree to the counterplan**

**Miami Herald 13** (3-17-13, "In China’s shadow, Guantánamo’s former Uighur captives languish on Palau" www.miamiherald.com/2013/03/17/3291352/in-chinas-shadow-guantanamos-former.html

**China considers Uighurs held in Guantánamo to be terrorists and has demanded they be repatriated.** But **since they would almost certainly face imprisonment or even torture if sent back to China, other countries had to be found**. The U.S. refused to grant them asylum. **Nearly a dozen now live in Albania, Bermuda, El Salvador and Switzerland.** Three remain in custody at the U.S. Navy prison in Cuba.

**Bagram Addon: 2AC**

**Detentions at Bagram will prevent post-2014 Afghanistan troop presence**

**Sisk 13** (Richard, 1-4-13, "Afghan Jail a 'Tougher Problem Than Guantanamo'" Military.com) www.military.com/daily-news/2013/01/04/afghan-jail-a-tougher-problem-than-guantanamo.html

**With more than five times the** number of **prisoners than** the detention facility on **Guantanamo** Bay, **the U.S. jail next to Bagram Airfield is** just one of many factors **affecting the degree to which U.S. forces remain in Afghanistan after 2014.** President Obama and Afghan President Hamid Karzai will meet next week in the White House to discuss the fate of the prison, the pace of America’s withdrawal, and the size of the U.S. presence in Afghanistan after 2014. “The first thing is to establish how many will stay in Afghanistan” after 2014, said George Little, the chief Pentagon spokesman. Karzai has warned that he will not approve a troop agreement unless all Afghans in U.S. custody are turned over to his jurisdiction. A complicating factor is the U.S. custody of suspects who allegedly committed insider attacks against allied troops. These attackers, who often posed as Afghan police officers and soldiers, killed U.S. and allied troops at a record rate in 2012. The number of prisoners detained at the high-security, $60 million detention facility is a tightly protected figure. Afghan officials, prison administrators, International Security Assistance Force spokesmen, and senior Pentagon officials all have repeatedly declined comment in recent weeks on how many are held at the facility located next to Bagram Airfield. U.S. Combined Joint Interagency Task Force 435 is the unit assigned to run the detention facility. “As a matter of operational security, we do not discuss numbers of detainees transferred or currently held by CJIATF 435 or U.S. Forces,” said Col. Thomas Collins, an ISAF spokesman in Kabul. However, President Obama discussed the numbers in December. In one of his required periodic reports to Congress under the War Powers Act , Obama wrote on Dec. 14 that “United States Armed Forces are detaining in Afghanistan approximately 946 individuals under the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (Public Law 107-40) as informed by the law of war.” The vast majority of the 946 are detained by CJIATF 435. A small number of recently captured prisoners are kept at local commands until they can be transferred to the detention facility next to Bagram I n the Parawan province. Obama’s report did not state whether the prisoners were captured on the battlefield or were taken into custody for other reasons. “We do not talk about individual detainees and we do not discuss the provenance” of the prisoners’ presence in custody, said Lt. Col. Todd Brasseale, a Pentagon spokesman. Since 2005, Karzai has demanded that prisoners held by the U.S. and the NATO coalition be turned over to Afghan jurisdiction -- with the exception of foreign nationals who were captured in military operations. About one-third of the 946 in Parwan are thought to be foreign nationals, mostly Pakistani but also Yemenis and Saudis, Brasseale said. Karzai has said that he does not want custody of the foreign nationals. In November, Karzai called for "urgent actions” by the U.S. to release the prisoners in Parawan to his control. He said in a statement that the U.S. did not "have the right to run prisons and detain Afghan nationals in Afghanistan." **Karzai threatened to cancel the already difficult negotiations on a post-2014 presence for U.S. forces. A main sticking point to those negotiations involves “status of forces” -- whether U.S. troops in the residual force would be immune from Afghan law.** Iraq’s refusal to provide immunity forced the U.S. to remove military forces from Iraq. Karzai’s spokesman, Aimal Faizi, has said that **more than 70 detainees held by the U.S. under “administrative detention” have already been cleared of wrongdoing by Afghan courts. He said the U.S. had no justification for continuing to hold them since administrative detention was not recognized under Afghan law. "There are some prisoners found innocent by the court who are still in custody,” Faizi said.** “This act is a serious breach of a memorandum of understanding." The U.S. has not faced the same issue at Guantanamo, where the host nation of Cuba has not claimed jurisdiction of the alleged terrorists held on the naval base. Under U.S. court rulings and acts of Congress, many of the 166 prisoners at Naval Station Guantanamo Bay have been cleared to return to their own countries or to a third-party nation willing to take them pending agreements on their continued monitoring and detention. The rest of the prisoners at Gitmo, where the first 20 captives in the war on terror arrived in January 2002, can be tried before a military commission. There is no such prospect for the prisoners next to Bagram. “We have never held a military commission in Afghanistan and we don’t expect there will be one,” Brasseale said. A senior Pentagon official, speaking on background, said “our goal, eventually, is to turn all of the prisoners over” to the Afghans, but the official added that “there is not a mechanism currently in place” for achieving the goal. The Parwan prisoner impasse has left the U.S. in a legal and political bind under international law, the Geneva Conventions and the law of armed conflict, said Gary Solis, a former Marine Corps Judge Advocate General. “We are simply disregarding agreements with the Afghans,” said Solis, an adjunct professor at Georgetown University who also teaches the law of war at West Point. “There is no guidebook for this, no precedent for this situation.” For years, Parwan was a key factor in U.S. worldwide intelligence gathering operations, as interrogators grilled insurgents captured on the battlefield for information on Al Qaeda and the war on terror. In August 2009, Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal, then the coalition commander as head of the International Security Assistance Force, said Parwan was at risk of becoming a “strategic liability” for the U.S. McChrystal said the extrajudicial detentions at Bagram were eroding Afghan support for the allies. Under a Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. and the Afghan governments reached last March, the U.S. was to have turned over all of the prisoners in September. This led to an awkward change of command ceremony at Parwan on Sept. 9, which Army Lt. Gen. Keith Huber, commander of CJIATF 435, declined to attend. The U.S. transferred about 3,000 prisoners to the Afghans. The U.S. held back more than 50 who were captured before March along with hundreds of others captured by U.S. forces between March and September. The Memorandum of Understanding called for the U.S. to turn over the entire Parwan jail to the Afghans, but the U.S. retained a section closed off to the Afghans. In the dispute over control of the Parwan facility, the U.S. stance has been that the Afghans might not be ready to manage the jail and that the corrupt Afghan justice system might hold trials that would result in the release of dangerous prisoners. In its latest “Report on Progress and Security and Stability in Afghanistan” to Congress last month, the Defense Department said “the Afghan judicial system continues to face numerous challenges.” The system is riddled with “systemic corruption at all levels resulting in a lack of political will to pursue prosecutions against many politically connected individuals,” the Defense Department report said. U.S. and Afghan officials declined comment on whether suspects in insider attacks by Afghan soldiers and police on coalition forces that have killed at least 62 allied troops last year were being held back for fear they would be turned loose. Several field commands said perpetrators in the attacks had been sent to Parwan. One such suspect was a 15-year-old boy allegedly working for the Taliban. A Marine spokesman said the boy had been sent to Parwan after he killed three Marines in southwestern Helmand province in August. According to the Long War Journal, at least 22 suspects in insider attacks have been captured, but U.S. and Afghan officials declined comment on their status. “No one is ever charged with anything so it’s difficult to know what they’re being held for” at Parwan, where prisoners “are not afforded even the minimal protections that the people at Guantanamo have,” said Heather Barr, a researcher in Kabul for Human Rights Watch, an independent advocacy group. Barr said she had attended sessions of the Detention Review Boards set up by the U.S. to determine the status of the prisoners, but the boards have never led to specific charges against prisoners. “We know of only one case that has gone to trial,” Barr said, and that case involved a prisoner, Abdul Sabor, who was captured by the French and handed over to the Afghans. Sabor, who allegedly killed five French troops in an insider attack last January, has been sentenced to death and his case is now under appeals in the Afghan courts, Barr said. Barr said the U.S. was “trying to bully the Afghans into setting up an administrative detention system” for high value prisoners that would allow them to be held indefinitely without the risk of a trial that might set them free. “The Afghan government has said it’s not going to do administrative detention, it’s unconstitutional under Afghan law,” Barr said. British officials have argued against transferring prisoners to the Afghans. In a November letter to Parliament, British Defense Secretary Phillip Hammond wrote that he was canceling future transfer of insurgents captured by British forces to the Afghans on grounds that they might be tortured. “There are currently reasonable grounds for believing that UK-captured detainees who are transferred to Lashkar Gah would be at real risk of serious mistreatment," Hammond said in a reference to the Afghan-run jail in the southwestern Helmand province capital of Lashkar Gah. U.S. Congressional leaders have expressed concerns that Afghan prisoners who still pose a threat might be released. In an August statement, Rep. Howard McKeon (R-Calif.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, cited the release of a “high-value terrorist” by Iraq over U.S. objections. “We call upon the President and Secretary of Defense (Leon) Panetta to extend all efforts to ensure that this tragic mistake is not repeated with terrorists currently in U.S. custody in Afghanistan,” McKeon said. **The central question on the Afghan prisoner issue was whether “the U.S. courts are going to take notice of what’s going on in Afghanistan” as they did in setting minimal habeas corpus rights on the charges against prisoners in Guantanamo, said** Donald **Huber**, a former Navy judge advocate general and now dean of the South Texas College of Law.

**Withdrawal causes Afghan instability and terror**

**Curtis 13** (Lisa, senior research fellow, 7-10-13, "Afghanistan: Zero Troops Should Not Be an Option" Heritage Foundation) www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/07/afghanistan-zero-troops-should-not-be-an-option

The Obama Administration is considering **leaving no U.S. troops behind in Afghanistan after it ends its combat mission** there **in 2014**. This **would undermine U.S. security interests**, as it would **pave the way for the Taliban to regain influence in Afghanistan and ~~cripple~~ [badly hurt]** the U.S. ability to conduct **counterterrorism missions** in the region. President **Obama instead should commit the U.S. to maintaining a robust troop presence** (at least 15,000–20,000) in Afghanistan after 2014 in order to train and advise the Afghan troops and conduct counterterrorism missions as necessary. **The U.S. should** also **remain** diplomatically, politically, and financially **engaged** in Afghanistan in order to sustain the gains made over the past decade **and ensure that the country does not again serve as a sanctuary for international terrorists intent on attacking the U.S.** Flaring Tensions Fuel Poor Policy Decisions Tensions between the Obama and Karzai administrations have escalated in recent months. The U.S. Administration blundered in its handling of the opening of a Taliban political office in Doha in mid-June. In sending a U.S. delegation to Doha to meet with the Taliban leadership without the presence of the Afghan government, the Taliban appeared to be achieving its long-sought objective of cutting the Karzai administration out of the talks. The Taliban also scored a public relations coup by raising the flag associated with its five-year oppressive rule in front of the office. The episode angered Afghan President Hamid Karzai to the point that he pulled out of the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) talks with the U.S., thus fulfilling another Taliban goal of driving a wedge between the U.S. and Afghan governments. Karzai’s opposition to the U.S. talking unilaterally with the Taliban is understandable, but his decision to pull out of the BSA talks is misguided, since maintaining an international troop presence post-2014 is essential to the stability of the Afghan state and the ability of Afghan forces to protect against the use of its territory for international terrorism. The BSA talks are necessary to forge an agreement on a post-2014 U.S. troop presence. If the White House is publicizing its consideration of the zero-troop option to try to pressure the Karzai administration, it also is misguided in its negotiating tactics. The Afghans already believe the U.S. is likely to cut and run, similar to the way Washington turned its back on the Afghans over two decades ago when the Soviets conceded defeat and pulled out of the country. The Obama Administration’s failure to reach agreement with the Iraqi government on the terms for a residual U.S. force presence there highlights the White House’s poor track record in managing these kinds of negotiations. Taliban Talks a Masquerade The Taliban leadership has shown no sign that it is ready to compromise for peace in Afghanistan. The Taliban has refused to talk directly with the Karzai government, calling it a puppet of the U.S., and has shown little interest in participating in a normal political process. The Taliban appears to believe that it is winning the war in Afghanistan and simply needs to wait out U.S. and NATO forces. The insurgent leaders’ only motivation for engaging with U.S. officials appears to be to obtain prisoner releases and to encourage the U.S. to speed up its troop withdrawals. The Taliban has already scored tactical points through the dialogue process by playing the U.S. and Afghans off one another and establishing international legitimacy with other governments. Moreover, the Taliban has not tamped down violence in order to prepare an environment conducive to talks. In fact, in recent weeks Taliban insurgents have stepped up attacks. In early June, for instance, insurgents conducted a suicide attack near the international airport in Kabul, and two weeks later they attacked the Afghan presidential palace. Perseverance Required to Achieve U.S. Objectives As difficult as the job may be, it is essential that the U.S. remain engaged in Afghanistan. It would be shortsighted to ignore the likely perilous consequences of the U.S. turning its back on this pivotal country from where the 9/11 attacks originated. Moving forward, the U.S. should: Lay its cards down on the number of troops it plans to leave in Afghanistan post-2014. The White House should commit to keeping a fairly robust number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan over the next several years. Former U.S. Central Command chief General James Mattis made clear in recent remarks to Congress that he hoped the U.S. would leave behind around 13,500 troops and that other NATO nations would leave an additional 6,500 troops.[1] This would bring a total of around 20,000 international forces stationed in Afghanistan beyond 2014 to help with training and advising the Afghan forces. Encourage continued strengthening of the democratic process in the country rather than rely on the false hope of political reconciliation with the Taliban. The Taliban believe they will win the war in Afghanistan without compromising politically and through violent intimidation of the Afghan population, especially when U.S. and coalition troops are departing. Taliban leaders appear unmotivated to compromise for peace and indeed are stepping up attacks on the Afghan security forces and civilians. The White House should focus on promoting democratic processes and institutions that will directly counter extremist ideologies and practices. Integral to this strategy is supporting a free and fair electoral process next spring both through technical assistance and regular and consistent messaging on the importance of holding the elections on time. Further condition U.S. military aid to Pakistan on its willingness to crack down on Taliban and Haqqani network sanctuaries on its territory. There continues to be close ties between the Pakistani military and the Taliban leadership and its ally, the Haqqani network, which is responsible for some of the fiercest attacks against coalition and Afghan forces. In early June, the U.S. House of Representatives approved language in the fiscal year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act that conditions reimbursement of Coalition Support Funds (CSF) pending Pakistani actions against the Haqqani network. Hopefully, the language will be retained in the final bill. The U.S. provides CSF funds to reimburse Pakistan for the costs associated with stationing some 100,000 Pakistani troops along the border with Afghanistan. Pakistan has received over $10 billion in CSF funding over the past decade. Avoid Repeating History **The U.S. should not repeat the same mistake it made 20 years ago by disengaging abruptly from Afghanistan, especially when so much blood and treasure has been expended in the country over the past decade. There is a genuine risk of the Taliban reestablishing its power base and facilitating the revival of al-Qaeda in the region if the U.S. gives up the mission in Afghanistan.** While frustration with Karzai is high, U.S. officials should not allow a troop drawdown to turn into **a rush for the exits** that **would lead to greater instability in Afghanistan and** thus **leave the U.S. more vulnerable to the global terrorist threat.**

**Global nuclear war**

**Morgan 07** (Stephen J., Political Writer and Former Member of the British Labour Party Executive Committee, “Better another Taliban Afghanistan, than a Taliban NUCLEAR Pakistan!?”, 9-23, http://www.freearticlesarchive .com/article/\_Better\_another\_Taliban\_Afghanistan\_\_than\_a\_Taliban\_NUCLEAR\_Pakistan\_\_\_/99961/0/)

However events may prove him sorely wrong. Indeed, his policy could completely backfire upon him. **As the war intensifies,** he has no guarantees that **the current autonomy may** yet **burgeon into a separatist movement**. Appetite comes with eating, as they say. Moreover, should the Taliban fail to re-conquer al of Afghanistan, as looks likely, but captures at least half of the country, then **a Taliban Pashtun caliphate** could be established which **would act as a magnet to separatist Pashtuns in Pakistan**. Then, **the** likely **break up of Afghanistan** along ethnic lines, **could**, indeed, **lead** the way **to the break up of Pakistan, as well**. Strong centrifugal forces have always bedevilled the stability and unity of **Pakistan**, and, in the context of the new world situation, the country **could be faced with civil wars and** popular **fundamentalist uprisings**, probably **including a** military-fundamentalist **coup** d’état. Fundamentalism is deeply rooted in Pakistan society. The fact that in the year following 9/11, the most popular name given to male children born that year was “Osama” (not a Pakistani name) is a small indication of the mood. Given the weakening base of the traditional, secular opposition parties, conditions would be ripe for a coup d’état by the fundamentalist wing of the Army and ISI, leaning on the radicalised masses to take power. Some form of radical, military Islamic regime, where legal powers would shift to Islamic courts and forms of shira law would be likely. Although, even then, this might not take place outside of a protracted crisis of upheaval and civil war conditions, mixing fundamentalist movements with nationalist uprisings and sectarian violence between the Sunni and minority Shia populations. The nightmare that is now Iraq would take on gothic proportions across the continent. The prophesy of **an arc of civil war** over Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq **would spread to south Asia, stretching from Pakistan to Palestine, through Afghanistan into Iraq and up to the Mediterranean** coast. **Undoubtedly, this would** also **spill over into India** both with regards to the Muslim community and Kashmir. **Border clashes**, terrorist attacks, sectarian pogroms and insurgency **would break out. A** new war, and possibly **nuclear war**, between Pakistan and India **could no be ruled out**. Atomic Al Qaeda Should Pakistan break down completely, a Taliban-style government with strong Al Qaeda influence is a real possibility. **Such deep chaos would**, of course, **open a “Pandora's box” for** the region and **the world**. With the possibility of unstable clerical and military fundamentalist elements being in control of the Pakistan nuclear arsenal, not only their use against India, but Israel becomes a possibility, as well as the acquisition of nuclear and other deadly weapons secrets by Al Qaeda. Invading Pakistan would not be an option for America. Therefore **a nuclear war** would now again become a real strategic possibility. This would bring a shift in the tectonic plates of global relations. It **could usher in a new Cold War with China and Russia pitted against the US**.

**China Relations DA**

**Relations are resilient, but the cooperation that their impacts assume is impossible**

Harry **Harding 11**, founding dean of the School of Leadership and Public Policy at the University of Virginia, “Are China and the U.S. on a collision course?”, June 14, http://thinkingaboutasia.blogspot.com/2011/06/are-china-and-us-on-collision-course.html

In my judgment, **it is highly unlikely for the relationship between the US and China to be primarily cooperative**, at least in the short to medium term. **The differences in values, political systems, interests, levels of development, and perceptions of the existing international order are simply too great for the two countries to find common ground on all issues, or even to find a mutually agreeable allocation of costs and benefits when they try to pursue common interests**. Only a common interest that was massively compelling – say a widespread pandemic, another financial crisis, a global outbreak of terrorist activity targeted at both countries, or increasingly severe consequences of climate change – might produce a predominantly cooperative relationship. **Fortunately, an essentially confrontational relationship is also unlikely**, especially **if one is primarily concerned with** the risks of **military conflict**. **The high degree of economic interdependence between the two countries has already created a relatively resilient relationship**. **The cost of military conflict**, especially given the fact that both China and the US are nuclear powers, **will be a significant deterrent** against military conflict. Equally important, **the probability of the most worrying of the trigger events** identified above– a unilateral declaration of independence by Taiwan – **is presently quite low**, as is the risk that China would try to compel unification through the use of force.

**China can’t solve North Korea—different priorities**

**Halpin 13** (Dennis, visiting scholar at the U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, 8-1-13, “Don't Abandon Taiwan” The National Interest) http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/dont-abandon-taiwan-8812?page=1

There was reportedly greater progress by the two sides on the issue of North Korea. On this, however, only time will tell. **The U**nited **S**tates **and its allies have been repeatedly led down the garden path by Beijing on the North Korean issue for the past two decades, starting with the Four-Party talks in** Geneva in **the late 1990s. In past instances, the illusion that Beijing will somehow produce the elixir that will heal the North Korean illness once and for all has only led to disappointment**. It is often forgotten that **Beijing's primary goal for the Korean peninsula is the maintenance of an ideologically compatible buffer state that will keep Washington and its allies at arm's length. Issues like denuclearization and reform remain secondary.**

**No impact to North Korea**

**Manning 13** (Robert, senior fellow of the Brent Scowcroft Center for International Security at the Atlantic Council, 4-12-13, "There's No North Korea Crisis" National Interest) nationalinterest.org/commentary/theres-no-north-korea-crisis-8341?page=1

**From the hysterical TV portrayals of goose-stepping North Korean troops, breathless news reports of North Korean warnings of war, and maps depicting the range of imminent missile launches** (complete with retired U.S. generals explaining the targets), **you might think there is a crisis on the Korean Peninsula. But there is no crisis**, only a farce. This time around, it is louder and more melodramatic. But **we have seen time and again North Korea throwing a political tantrum in response to annual U.S.-ROK military exercises** or the latest round of UN Security Council sanctions in response to Pyongyang testing a nuclear device or launching a missile. **The notion of a “crisis”—as in the 1962 Cuban Missile crisis—is nonsense. The world is not on the brink of an imminent nuclear confrontation. North Korean troops and artillery are not about to pour across the Demilitarized Zone. This is all nothing more than political theater. Kim may be dangerous, but he is not crazy: North Korea is not suicidal. Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile tests are not really “provocations.” They are part of a systematic military program that North Korea has been working on for more than forty years to obtain nuclear and missile capabilities.** Diplomatic concessions in the past have affected the timing and perhaps the amount of missile and nuclear tests. But they have gone and will continue to go forward because the North Koreans want to gain such weapons. In the past, North Korean actions have been designed to create tensions in order to extract concessions. But the Obama administration and that of the new ROK President Park Geun-hye have made it clear that they have both seen that movie before and are not buying it. So what is the point of it? The conventional wisdom to explain North Korea’s actions is that this is primarily about a new twenty-nine-year-old trying to consolidate his position by demonstrating how tough and courageous he is to the North Korean military and political elite. That may be part of the answer. But let me offer an explanation that has been noticeably absent in the sea of commentary on North Korea in recent weeks. It’s possible that **the core reason North Korea’s new leaders decided they needed to whip up a sense of crisis—**of a nation under siege and facing impending attack from outside enemies—**is because they are insecure and fear a fragile internal situation that is increasingly difficult to control. Since the end of the Cold War** (and Soviet aid) **North Korea’s economic system has steadily broken down.** Since the great famine in 1995, **there have been continual food shortages** facing by some estimates up to one-third of North Korea’s twenty-three million people. The breakdown of Pyongyang’s food-distribution system led the government to allow private markets and some private plots. **There has been a bottom-up second economy taking shape**. In recent years, markets have sprung up all over North Korea with a growing array of goods indulged by the regime as a coping mechanism. A fledgling merchant stratum has sprung up; it is occasionally harassed, but tolerated, and exists largely outside the government. At the same time, **despite efforts to keep the nation isolated, several factors—including economic trade and refugee flows to China, CDs and broadcasts from South Korea, and now some five million cellphones—have made its borders more porous and information flows more accessible. To the degree that North Koreans get a dose of reality about the outside world, the myths of a “socialist paradise” by which the regime misgoverns start to unravel. If the twenty-three million North Koreans realize the massive lies fed to them to sustain the world’s only hereditary Stalinist dictatorship, it could gradually undo the regime.** This is not to argue that the masses are poised to revolt. That is unlikely to happen anytime soon. Pyongyang still runs a terror state with some two hundred thousand in labor camps, and those caught trying to flee the country are frequently executed. But the current situation may be viewed by the regime as discomforting and fragile, with its efforts to seal off the country from reality increasingly more than fraying at the edges. At the onset of a new leader’s tenure, **how better to reassert tight control over its beleaguered citizens and whip up support for the regime than to instill fear and claim that the U.S. imperialists are on the verge of starting a nuclear war. This involved going to great lengths, including telling foreign embassies to evacuate Pyongyang and warning foreigners in South Korea to leave before the war starts. It’s great theater, and about as real as Orson Welles' 1938 radio broadcast of a Martian invasion.**

**ROL K: 2AC**

**Must vote aff to solve the K—the perm solves too**

Emir **Sader**, Professor, State University of Rio de Janiero, "The Weakest Link? Neoliberalism in Latin America," NEW LEFT REVIEW v. 52, July/August 20**08**, http://newleftreview.org/II/52/emir-sader-the-weakest-link-neoliberalism-in-latin-america, accessed 4-14-13.

At a time when neoliberalism was sharpening its assault on the state, in favour of the market; on politics, in favour of economics; and on political parties, in favour of corporations, a certain ambiguity crept into the distinction between movements that championed the ‘social’ dimension to the detriment of politics, parties and states, and those same neoliberal arguments. **A new tendency arose within the left** or the overall resistance to neoliberalism, embodied in social movements and NGOs, and **articulated around the dichotomy of ‘state versus civil society’**. The World Social Forum reinforced this tendency by welcoming social movements and NGOs but remaining closed to political parties, arguing that this space belonged to civil society. **There are two main problems with this position**. Firstly, **it blurs the boundaries** with neoliberal discourse, since as we pointed out above, the latter likewise regards the state and party politics as its great enemies. Secondly, given that **neoliberalism** is characterized by the wholesale expropriation of rights, it **can only be overcome in the political sphere: through the universalization of rights enacted by the governing authority of the state. Otherwise, the struggle** against neoliberalism **would remain perpetually on the defensive, having discarded the political instruments necessary for its own realization. Some movements have remained trapped in this paradox, ostensibly embodying hubs of resistance yet unable to move forward int**o challenging neoliberal hegemony, via a fresh articulation of the social with the political. **Their critique of the state is subordinated to the terms of the theoretical discourse of neoliberalism, structured around the polarization of state versus private. This polarity is designed to demonize the state**, take control of the private sphere (in which market relations are embedded) **and abolish the indispensable framework for the democratization and defeat of neoliberalism: the public sphere. The real polarization is between the public sphere and the market sphere**, in that the neoliberal project is committed to the infinite extension of market relations, whereas **the state is not so much a pole as a space of hegemonic dispute between the two spheres.** **The construction of an** anti-neoliberal **alternative must begin with the reorganization or recasting of the state in favour of the public sphere, universalizing citizens’ rights while divorcing the state** and general social relationships **from the market. To democratize means** to de-marketize, **to recuperate for the terrain of people’s rights** that which neoliberalism has delivered into the hands of the market. **Limiting the field of action to the ‘social’ as opposed to the ‘political’, proclaiming the autonomy of social movements as a principle, means condemning oneself to** impotence, and ultimately to **defeat.**

**Their impact is about the status quo—intervention happens now—only legitimacy can prevent a type of hegemony that relies purely on force—that’s Knowles**

**The impact to US imperialism is minimal—and other powers are worse, which turns the alt**

Victor Davis **Hanson 2**, Ph. D. in Classics, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, a Professor Emeritus at California University, Fresno, “A Funny Sort of Empire: Are Americans really so imperial?” National Review Online, November 27, 2002, http://www.victorhanson.com/articles/hanson112702.html,

It is popular now to talk of the American "empire." In Europe particularly there are comparisons of Mr. Bush to Caesar — and worse — and invocations all sorts of pretentious poli-sci jargon like "hegemon," "imperium," and "subject states," along with neologisms like "hyperpower" and "overdogs." But **if we really are imperial, we rule over a very funny sort of empire.** We do not send out proconsuls to reside over client states, which in turn impose taxes on coerced subjects to pay for the legions. Instead, American bases are predicated on contractual obligations — costly to us and profitable to their hosts. We do not see any profits in Korea, but instead accept the risk of losing almost 40,000 of our youth to ensure that Kias can flood our shores and that shaggy students can protest outside our embassy in Seoul. **Athenians, Romans, Ottomans, and the British wanted land and treasure and grabbed all they could ge**t when they could. **The United States hasn't annexed anyone's soil since the Spanish-American War** — a checkered period in American history that still makes us, not them, out as villains in our own history books. Most Americans are far more interested in carving up the Nevada desert for monster homes than in getting their hands on Karachi or the Amazon basin. **Puerto Ricans are free to vote themselves independence anytime they wish. Imperial powers order and subjects obey. But in our case, we offer the Turks strategic guarantees, political support** — and money — for their allegiance. France and Russia go along in the U.N. — but only after we ensure them the traffic of oil and security for outstanding accounts. **Pakistan gets debt relief that § Marked 23:26 § ruined dot-coms could only dream of; Jordan reels in more aid than our own bankrupt municipalities. If acrimony and invective arise, it's usually one-way: the Europeans, the Arabs, and the South Americans all say worse things about us than we do about them, not privately and in hurt, but publicly and proudly**. Boasting that you hate Americans — or calling our supposed imperator "moron" or "Hitler" — won't get you censured by our Senate or earn a tongue-lashing from our president, but is more likely to get you ten minutes on CNN. We are considered haughty by Berlin not because we send a Germanicus with four legions across the Rhine, but because Mr. Bush snubs Mr. Schroeder by not phoning him as frequently as the German press would like. **Empires usually have contenders that check their power and through rivalry drive their ambitions.** Athens worried about Sparta and Persia. Rome found its limits when it butted up against Germany and Parthia. The Ottomans never could bully too well the Venetians or the Spanish. Britain worried about France and Spain at sea and the Germanic peoples by land. In contrast, **the restraint on American power is not China, Russia, or the European Union, but rather the American electorate itself — whose reluctant worries are chronicled weekly by polls that are eyed with fear by our politicians. We**, not them, **stop us from becoming what we could.** The Athenian ekklesia, the Roman senate, and the British Parliament alike were eager for empire and reflected the energy of their people. In contrast, America went to war late and reluctantly in World Wars I and II, and never finished the job in either Korea or Vietnam. We were likely to sigh in relief when we were kicked out of the Philippines, and really have no desire to return. Should the Greeks tell us to leave Crete — promises, promises — we would be more likely to count the money saved than the influence lost. Take away all our troops from Germany and polls would show relief, not anger, among Americans. **Isolationism, parochialism, and self-absorption are far stronger in the American character than desire for overseas adventurism. Our critics may slur us for "overreaching," but our elites in the military and government worry that they have to coax a reluctant populace, not constrain a blood-drunk rabble.**

**Extinction outweighs—there is no recovering from it**

Anders **Sandberg** et al., James Martin Research Fellow, Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford University, "How Can We Reduce the Risk of Human Extinction?" BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, 9-9-**08**, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/how-can-we-reduce-the-risk-of-human-extinction, accessed 5-2-10.

**Such remote risks may seem academic in a world plagued by** immediate problems, such as global **poverty, HIV, and climate change. But as intimidating as these problems are, they do not threaten human existence**. In discussing the risk of nuclear winter, Carl Sagan emphasized the astronomical toll of human extinction: A nuclear war imperils all of our descendants, for as long as there will be humans. Even if the population remains static, with an average lifetime of the order of 100 years, over a typical time period for the biological evolution of a successful species (roughly ten million years), we are talking about some 500 trillion people yet to come. By this criterion, **the stakes are one million times greater for extinction** than for the more modest nuclear wars that kill "only" hundreds of millions of people.There are many other possible measures of the potential loss--including culture and science, **the evolutionary history of the planet, and the significance of the lives of all of our ancestors who contributed to the future of their descendants.** Extinction is the undoing of the human enterprise. **There is a discontinuity between risks that threaten 10 percent or even 99 percent of humanity and those that threaten 100 percent. For disasters killing less than all humanity, there is a good chance that the species could recover.** If we value future human generations, then reducing extinction risks should dominate our considerations**. Fortunately,** most measures to reduce these risks also improve global security against a range of lesser catastrophes, and thus deserve support regardless of how much one worries about extinction.

**We shouldn’t abandon rule of law--appeals for institutional restraint are a crucial supplement to political resistance to executive power**

David **COLE** Law @ Georgetown **’12** “The Politics of the Rule of Law: The Role of Civil Society in the Surprising Resilience of Human Rights in the Decade after 9/11” http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/Cole%201.12.12.pdf p. 51-53

As I have shown above, **while political forces played a significant role in checking** President **Bush**, what was significant was the particular substantive content of that politics; **it was not just any political pressure**, **but pressure to maintain** fidelity to **the rule of law**. **Politics standing alone is as likely to fuel as to deter executive abuse; consider the lynch mob, the Nazi Party** in Germany, or **xenophobia** more generally. **What we need if we are to check abuses of executive power is a politics that champions the rule of law.** Unlike the politics Posner and Vermeule imagine, **this** type of **politics cannot be segregated neatly from the law**. On the contrary, **it will often coalesce around a distinctly legal challenge, objecting to departures from distinctly legal norms**, heard in a court case, as we saw with Guantanamo. **Congress’s actions make clear that had Guantanamo been left to the political process, there would have been few if any advances**. **The litigation generated and concentrated political pressure on claims for a restoration of the values of legality,** and, as discussed above, **that pressure then played a critical role in the litigation’s outcome, which in turn affected the political pressure for reform. T**here is, to be sure, something paradoxical about this assessment. The rule of law, the separation of powers, and human rights are designed to discipline and constrain politics, out of a concern that pure majoritarian politics, focused on the short term, is likely to discount the long-term values of these principles. Yet without a critical mass of political support for these legal principles, they are unlikely to be effective checks on abuse, for many of the reasons Posner andVermeule identify. **The answer, however, is not to abandon the rule of law for politics, but to develop and nurture a political culture that values the rule of law itself.** **Civil society organizations devoted to such values**, **such as Human Rights Watch, the Center for Constitutional Rights, and the American Civil Liberties Union, play a central role in facilitating, informing, and generating that politics**. Indeed, **they have no alternative.** Unlike governmental institutions, civil society groups have no formal authority to impose the limits of law themselves. Their recourse to the law’s limits is necessarily indirect: they can file lawsuits seeking judicial enforcement, lobby Congress for statutory reform or other legislative responses, or seek to influence the executive branch. **But they necessarily and simultaneously pursue these goals through political avenues – by appealing to the public for support, educating the public, exposing abuses, and engaging in public advocacy around rule-of-law values**. Unlike ordinary politics, which tends to focus on the preferences of the moment, **the politics of the rule of law is committed to a set of long-term principles.** **Civil society organizations are uniquely situated to bring these long-term interests to bear on the public debate.** Much like a constitution itself, civil society groups are institutionally designed to emphasize and reinforce our long-term interests. When the ordinary political process is consumed by the heat of a crisis, organizations like the ACLU, Human Rights First, and the Center for Constitutional Rights, designed to protect the rule of law, are therefore especially important. While Congress and the courts were at best compromised and at worst complicit in the abuses of the post-9/11 period, civil society performed admirably. The Center for Constitutional Rights brought the first lawsuit seeking habeas review at Guantanamo, and went on to coordinate a nationwide network of volunteer attorneys who represented Guantanamo habeas petitioners. The ACLU filed important lawsuits challenging secrecy and government excesses, and succeeded in disclosing many details about the government’s illegal interrogation program. Both the ACLU and CCR filed lawsuits and engaged in public advocacy on behalf of torture and rendition victims, and challenging warrantless wiretapping. Human Rights Watch and Human Rights First wrote important reports on detention, torture, and Guantanamo, and Human Rights First organized former military generals and admirals to speak out in defense of humanitarian law and human rights. These efforts are but a small subset of the broader activities of civil society, at home and abroad, that helped to bring to public attention the Bush administration’s most questionable initiatives, and to portray the initiatives as contrary to the rule of law. At their best, civil society organizations help forge a politics of the rule of law, in which **there is a symbiotic relationship between politics and law**: **the appeal to law informs a particular politics, and that politics reinforces the law’s appeal, in a mutually reinforcing relation**. **Posner and Vermeule understand the importance of politics as a checking force in the modern world, but fail to see the critical qualification that the politics must be organized around a commitment to fundamental principles of liberty, equality, due process, and the separation of powers** – in short, the rule of law. Margulies and Metcalf recognize that politics as much as law determines the reality of rights protections, but fail to identify the unique role that civil society organizations play in that process**. It is not that the “rule of politics” has replaced the “rule of law,” but that, properly understood, a politics of law is a critical supplement to the rule of law.** We cannot survive as a constitutional democracy true to our principles without both. And our survival turns, not only on a vibrant constitution, but on a vibrant civil society dedicated to reinforcing and defending constitutional values.

**CIR**

**Boehner won’t break Hastert rule, won’t pass without it**

Bob Ray **Sanders**, BND, **10—22**, [www.bnd.com/2013/10/22/2862687/bob-ray-sanders-theres-no-better.html](http://www.bnd.com/2013/10/22/2862687/bob-ray-sanders-theres-no-better.html)

House Speaker John **Boehner**, who has refused to bring the Senate bill to a vote, has **said he won't bring** any **immigration** legislation **to the floor until a majority of his** Republican **caucus agrees. That, in effect, means never. Or, if there is a bill that the majority of his party would support, you can almost bet it will be terribly inadequate, one that would not pass the Senate and one that the president wouldn't sign** if it did.

**Won’t pass—too little time, lack of interest in the House**

**USA Today 10-20**-13 "Time running out for immigration reform" www.wusa9.com/(X(1)A(92EZlV22zAEkAAAAMzFkZWM3NzQtYjg3My00NzBiLTljZTgtZjk4NThmOTE0MmE4gDM05vFDPcmfgzctcqAxjFx6vJ81))/news/article/279759/158/Time-running-out-for-immigration-reform

But **given the narrowing window of opportunity and the complexity of the various immigration issues, other observers suggested the forecast for action on immigration reform this year may be bleaker than the die-hard supporters may suspect. There are other dynamics to consider. Boehner could rely on Democrats and a minority of Republicans to pass immigration legislation**, as some have urged him to do, **but would risk a conservative revolt that could cost him his speaker's job. The interests of national Republican leaders also remain at odds with many rank-and-file House GOP members when it comes to reaching out to Latino voters**, who backed Obama in droves over 2012 Republican nominee Mitt Romney. Many GOP House members represent conservative congressional districts and are not convinced that immigration reform represents good policy or good politics. "There's just not that much enthusiasm to deal with it up on the Hill," said Steven Camarota, director of research for the Center for Immigration Studies, a Washington, D.C.-based organization that supports more immigration enforcement and overall reductions in immigration. "**The Republicans don't have that much incentive to deal with it, there's a million other things to contend with it, and time constraints matter enormously. All of that makes it unlikely."**

**Farm Bill, Resentment, Budget Cuts thump**

Peter **Nicholas and** Carol E. **Lee**, “Obama’s Agenda Faces a Rocky Road,” Wall street Journal, **10-17**-13, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303680404579141472200495820

**By most measures**, President [**Barack Obama**](http://topics.wsj.com/person/O/Barack-Obama/4328) **came out on top in the showdown** with congressional Republicans. He beat back efforts to dismantle his health-care overhaul and hit upon a strategy that confounded Republicans: refusing to negotiate with lawmakers who wanted to roll back the 2010 law as the price for reopening the government. **Yet it is far from certain** Mr. **Obama can exploit these** tactical **gains** in coming months. In his remarks Thursday from the State Dining Room, **he said he wanted** to pass an **immigration** overhaul, a farm bill and reach a budget agreement that cuts the deficit and spurs economic growth. Not on the list were the more ambitious plans he laid out in his State of the Union speech in February: raising the minimum wage, expanding access to pre-school education and launching a sweeping program to upgrade the nation's roads and bridges.¶ **Those efforts** require bipartisan consensus that **may be even more elusive amid the ill will carried over from the budget fight**. **Even Republicans who voted with the president believe** Mr. **Obama struck a hard-line posture that makes future collaboration difficult.**¶ "**A lot of us are resentful that he didn't negotiate as hard as we think he could have or should have,"** said Sen. [John McCain](http://topics.wsj.com/person/M/John-McCain/6226) (R., Ariz.) in an interview. "Let me put it this way: He didn't do himself any good." Refusing to negotiate with GOP adversaries proved a winning strategy in this instance, and Republicans who saw Mr. Obama hold firm may have gotten the message that he won't cave when it is time to raise the debt ceiling again in February.¶ Rep. [Peter King](http://topics.wsj.com/person/K/Peter-King/6539) (R., N.Y.), who opposed GOP efforts to strip funding from the health law, said Republicans need to reduce their expectations of what can be achieved in a time of divided government. Shutting down the government and other "D-Day-type victories" shouldn't be the goal so much as revising the nation's tax code and reducing the debt, Mr. King said.¶ Some Democrats, meanwhile, believe Mr. Obama must be a more active player in looming fights. Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D., Calif.) said in an interview Mr. Obama "stepped back" in part because he felt "burned" by the grinding budget fights that have played out over the past three years.¶ "I hope that changes, because you do need presidential leadership on these" issues, she said. In "three or four months, we could be back in the same place, and we can't let ourselves be back in the same place," she said.¶ Mr. Obama suggested Thursday he was willing to negotiate on a range of issues, consistent with his message during the budget fight that he was prepared to bargain with lawmakers once the government was reopened and the debt ceiling raised.¶ Mr. Obama may find some consolation in the House vote Wednesday. In the end, 87 House Republicans voted the president's way on the debt bill. More than 17% of them hailed from districts Mr. Obama carried in 2012, suggesting a potential way forward for a president eager to assemble a centrist coalition.¶ Yet a**s much as he wants to shift the focus to immigration** and the farm bill, Mr. **Obama will have trouble pulling it off**. **His administration is under pressure to fix the operational problems that have bedeviled the new health-care exchanges**.¶ ¶ **The next set of fiscal deadlines,** and worries **about** the next round of the across-the-board **spending cuts**, scheduled to take effect in mid-January**, are likely to overshadow other efforts.** That § Marked 23:28 § leaves lawmakers with only a narrow window of time to tackle any remotely complex legislation before the 2014 midterm dynamics overtake Washington.¶ **Messy internal GOP politics over the farm bill could also complicate lawmakers' efforts to reconcile the different measures passed by the House and Senate**.¶ As for immigration, House **Republicans have said they plan to consider piecemeal immigration bills, but so far not one has reached the House floor**.

**Obama will make a push to close Gitmo in the coming months**

**Kummer 8-28** (Luke Jerod, congressional correspondent for The Washington Diplomat, 8-28-13, "Will Congress Put Obama’s Push To Shutter Gitmo on Lockdown?" Washington Diplomat) www.washdiplomat.com/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=9528:will-congress-put-obamas-push-to-shutter-gitmo-on-lockdown&catid=1506&Itemid=428

**Prasow** also said she has long **believed that Obama would make a strong push to close Guantanamo at this point in his second term because he retains** significant **political capital and the** 2014 **midterm elections are still more than a year away. How much force he can muster, and how much risk he can stand, remains to be seen.** But advocates like Prasow can take heart in knowing that **Obama's legacy is tightly bound to this issue** — something he seemed keenly aware of during his speech at the National Defense University. **"I know the politics are hard," Obama told the audience. "But history will cast a harsh judgment on this aspect of our fight against terrorism** and those of us who fail to end it."

**Court don’t link—gitmo-specific**

**Stimson 9**

[09/25/09, Cully Stimson is a senior legal fellow at the Heritage Foundation and an instructor at the Naval Justice School former American career appointee at the Pentagon. Stimson was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs., “Punting National Security To The Judiciary”, http://blog.heritage.org/2009/09/25/punting-national-security-to-the-judiciary/]

**So what is really going on here? To those of us who have either served in senior policy posts and dealt with these issues on a daily basis, or followed them closely from the outside, it is becoming increasingly clear that this administration is trying to create the appearance of a tough national-security policy regarding the detention of terrorists at Guantanamo, yet allow the courts to make the tough calls on releasing the bad guys. Letting the courts do the dirty work would give the administration plausible cover and distance from the decision-making process. The numbers speak for themselves. Of the 38 detainees whose cases have been adjudicated through the habeas process in federal court in Washington, 30 have been ordered released by civilian judges. That is close to an 80 percent loss rate for the government, which argued for continued detention. Yet, how many of these decisions has this administration appealed, knowing full well that many of those 30 detainees should not in good conscience be let go? The answer: one. Letting the courts do it for him gives the president distance from the unsavory release decisions.** It also allows him to state with a straight face, as he did at the Archives speech, “We are not going to release anyone if it would endanger our national security, nor will we release detainees within the United States who endanger the American people**.” No, the president won’t release detainees; he’ll sit back and let the courts to do it for him. And the president won’t seek congressional authorization for prolonged detention of the enemy, as he promised, because it will anger his political base on the Left.** The ultra-liberals aren’t about to relinquish their “try them or set them free” mantra, even though such a policy threatens to put terrorists back on the battlefield. Moreover, the president would have to spend political capital to win congressional authorization for a prolonged detention policy. Obviously, **he would rather spend that capital on other policy priorities.** Politically speaking, **it is easier to maintain the status quo and let the detainees seek release from federal judges. The passive approach also helps the administration close Gitmo without taking the heat for actually releasing detainees themselves.**

**Court legitimacy shields**

**Pacelle 02** Richard L. Pacelle, Associate Professor, Political Science, University of Missouri-St. Louis, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS, 2002, p. 102.

The limitations on the Court are not as significant as they once seemed. They constrain the Court, but the boundaries of those constraints are very broad. Justiciability is self-imposed and seems to be a function of the composition of the Court rarther than a philosophical position. **Checks and balances are seldom successfully invoked against the judiciary, in part because the Court has positive institutional resource to justify its decision. The Supreme Court has a relatively high level of diffuse support that comes, in part, from a general lack of knowledge by the public and that contributes to its legitimacy. The cloak of the Constitution and the symbolism attendant to the marble palace and the law contribute as well. As a result, presidents and the Congress should pause before striking at the Court or refusing to follow its directives. Indeed, presidents and members of Congress can often use unpopular Court decisions as political cover. They cite the need to enforce or support such decision even though they disagree with them. In the end, the institutional limitations do not mandate judicial restraint, but turn the focus to judicial capacity**, the subject of the next chapter.

**Blame-shifting solves the link**

**Whittington 05** (Keith E. Whittington, Professor of Politics - Princeton University, "Interpose Your Friendly Hand: Political Supports for the Exercise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court”, The American Political Science Review, Nov., (99)4, p. 583)

There are **some issues that politicians cannot easily handle**. For individual legislators, their **constituents may be sharply divided on a given issue** or overwhelmingly hostile to a policy that the legislator would nonetheless like to see adopted. Party leaders, including **presidents and legislative leaders**, must similarly sometimes manage deeply divided or cross-pressured coalitions. When faced with such issues, elected officials **may actively seek to turn over controversial political questions to the courts so as to circumvent a paralyzed legislature and avoid the political fallout that would come with taking direct action themselves.** As Mark Graber (1993) has detailed **in cases such as** slavery and **abortion, elected officials may prefer judicial resolution of disruptive political issues to direct legislative action,** especially when the courts are believed to be sympathetic to the politician's own substantive preferences **but even when the attitude of the courts is uncertain** or unfavorable (see also, Lovell 2003). Even when politicians do not invite judicial intervention, strategically minded courts will take into account not only the policy preferences of well-positioned policymakers but also the willingness of those potential policymakers to act if doing so means that they must assume responsibility for policy outcomes. For cross-pressured politicians and coalition leaders, **shifting blame for controversial decisions to the Court and obscuring their own relationship to those decisions may preserve electoral support and coalition unity without threatening active judicial review**(Arnold 1990; Fiorina 1986; Weaver 1986). The conditions for the exercise of judicial review may be relatively favorable when judicial invalidations of legislative policy can be managed to the electoral benefit of most legislators. In the cases considered previously, fractious coalitions produced legislation that presidents and party leaders deplored but were unwilling to block. Divisions within the governing coalition can also prevent legislative action that political leaders want taken, as illustrated in the following case.

**decline Doesn’t cause war**

**Miller 2k** – Professor of Management, Ottawa (Morris, Poverty As A Cause Of Wars?, http://www.pugwash.org/reports/pac/pac256/WG4draft1.htm, AG)

Thus, these armed conflicts can hardly be said to be caused by poverty as a principal factor when the greed and envy of leaders and their hegemonic ambitions provide sufficient cause. The poor would appear to be more the victims than the perpetrators of armed conflict. It might be alleged that some dramatic event or rapid sequence of those types of events that lead to the exacerbation of poverty might be the catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who might be tempted to seek a diversion by finding/fabricating an enemy and going to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of **the Carnegie Endowment** for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. **After studying 93 episodes of economic crisis in 22 countries** in Latin America and Asia in the years since World War II **they concluded that** Much of **the conventional** wisdom about **the** political **impact of economic crises may be wrong**... The **severity of economic crisis** - as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - **bore no relationship to** the **collapse** of regimes. A more direct role was played by political variables such as ideological polarization, labor radicalism, guerilla insurgencies **and** an anti-Communist military... (**In democratic states) such changes seldom lead to** an outbreak of **violence (while**) in the cases of **dictatorships** and semi-democracies, the ruling elites **responded** to crises **by** increasing repression (thereby **using one form of violence to abort another.**

**resilient**

**Globe and Mail 2010** (5/31/10, BRIAN MILNER, "While gloom says bear, TIGER points to bull", lexis, WEA)

**Even at the height of the remarkable rebound** of 2009 that brought stocks back from the dead zone, **the bears never retreated** to their lairs. **Negative sentiment** among investors **remained stubbornly high, no matter how promising the economic indicators** looked. And **then** along **came the Greeks and their** little sovereign **debt** problem, **the Chinese and** their public hand-wringing over **asset bubbles and the North Koreans** **and their** latest idiotic **sabre-ratting** to remind nervous markets just how fragile the nascent global recovery could turn out to be. The latest survey of American investors last week showed bearish sentiment hovering close to 30 per cent, with plenty of room for an uptick in the months ahead, as the optimists come to realize that a V-shaped recovery was never in the cards after the worst global financial and economic crisis since the Great Depression. The world's most overexposed permabear, Nouriel Roubini, is still grabbing headlines with his dire Greece-is-just-the-tip-of-the-iceberg warnings. (Well, he does have a new book to sell.) And such high-profile Canadian bruins as gold-loving money manager Eric Sprott and eminent strategist and data miner David Rosenberg have never veered from their sombre outlooks. The fact that May turned into a particularly brutal month for just about everything but U.S. Treasuries - even after last week's modest rebound, the Dow posted its worst performance for the month in 70 years - only added fuel to arguments that worse, much worse, is yet to come. I mention all this to Eswar Prasad, when I reach the Cornell University economics professor at his hotel in Beijing. Prof. Prasad is a noted China watcher who once headed the IMF's China division and still keeps in close touch with top government finance officials. But on this call, I'm more interested in one of his other hats as a shrewd analyst of global economic and market trends. "**My inclination also is to be a bear**," the affable academic says. "**But the data don't support my bearishness** § Marked 23:29 § as much as I would like. **One has to be a little cautious**, because these are based on a variety of **indicators**. Some of them certainly **show more strength than** I had **realized**." The data he's talking about come out of his work on a new composite index derived from a broad set of economic, market and confidence measures in the G20 countries and designed to provide a quarterly snapshot of the global recovery. "All signs are that the recovery has some momentum," says Prof. Prasad, who developed the index at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank where he is also a senior fellow. "But I wouldn't call it solid enough momentum that we can consider it 'in the bag.'" **The new index**, cutely named TIGER (Tracking Indices for the Global Economic Recovery), is a joint effort by Brookings and the Financial Times. And TIGER **shows that since the world began climbing out of the deep trough** about the middle of last year, **big emerging economies have roared ahead**, while the developed world has experienced much more uneven results. **Industrial production and trade have bounced back handsomely** - total exports from the big emerging countries now exceed pre-crisis levels - but the employment picture remains cloudy and consumption has yet to develop a new head of steam. "**It's much easier** at this stage **to list all the things that could derail the recovery**," Prof. Prasad says. "But all of those things are still conjectural. **The reality, and the data, is that things are looking better**."

## \*\*1AR\*\*

**Resilient**

**Relations are stable – their ev is media bias**

**Linfei 11** (Zhi Linfei and Ran Wei, Xinhua, “Yearender: China-U.S. relations witness gains, obstacles in 2011”, 12/13/2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2011-12/13/c\_131304574.htm)

Despite the setbacks in the second half of the year, **China-U.S. relations are more mature than before and were generally stable in 2011**, **with the two sides now accustomed to the pattern of periodic ups and downs** **in their ties in the past four decades**. Lieberthal said**, taking into consideration the frequent meetings and personal contacts by top leaders** of the two countries, **the relationship between Beijing and Washington was not as tense as it appeared**. **China and the United States had "developed a matter of conscious policy**," **including having very extensive personal contacts between high-level officials**, he said, adding **the two countries had also strengthened military ties**. "**In private conversations, I think there is less tension and more mutual understandings than as captured either in public announcements and media treatment**," Lieberthal said.

**Chen incident proves – it disproves massive political incentives on both sides**

**Drezner 12** (Daniel W. Drezner is professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, 5/4/2012, "The big dogs that have not barked in the Chen Guangcheng case ", drezner.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/05/04/thoughts\_on\_the\_chen\_guangcheng\_case)

Before I begin, given the rapid real-time developments in the Chen case, I'm operating on the assumption that China's last Foreign Ministry statement suggests the denouement: **Chen and his family will be able to go to the United States** to study, and he then may or may not be allowed back into the country. My Big Thought: **contrary to just about every headline** I've seen in the past three days, I think **Chen's case demonstrates the surprising resilience of the Sino-American relationship**. Recall what I wrote earlier in the week: **The fact that both Beijing and Washington have kept their mouths shut on Chen is a** pretty **surprising but positive sign about the overall stability/resilience of Sino-American relations**. Bear in mind that **according to the latest reports**, much of the **leadership in Beijing takes an increasingly conspiratorial view of the United States**. As for **the mood in Washington**, well, **let's just call it unfriendly towards China**. **Both sides are in the middle of big leadership decisions, making the incentive to cater to nationalist domestic interests even stronger than normal**. **With the rest of the Pacific Rim trying to latch themselves onto the U.S. security umbrella, this could have been the perfect match to set off a G-2 powderkeg**. **Despite all of these incentives for escalating the dispute**, however, **it hasn't happened**. Kurt Campbell was dispatched to Beijing, talks are ongoing, and **neither side appears to be interested in ramping up domestic audience costs**. **That escalation hasn't happened despite massive political incentives on both sides to let it happen suggests that, contrary to press fears about Chen blowing up the bilateral relationship, there are powerful pressures in Washington and Beijing to find a solution that saves as much face as humanly possible for both sides**. Now, in the three days since I wrote that post, **Chen has been released,** calling every Chinese dissident, U.S. congressman and international reporter with a phone/recording device/Twitter account and is loudly and frantically describing the intimidation he and his family have experienced. The man has asked to be flown out on Hillary Clinton's plane as she departs from the Strategic and Economic Dialogue. In other words, **everything that has transpired in the past three days has given a black eye to both the Chinese and American governments' handling of this case**. **Despite the near-overwhelming incentive to ramp up bilateral tensions, however, it really hasn't happened**. China's Foreign Mnistry has issued a couple of garden-variety press statements demanding a U.S. apology that won't be forthcoming. **There have been no leaks or anonymous criticisms of the United States otherwise, despite the fact that this entire case is a burr in China's saddle at veery awkward moment**. **None of the U.S. State Department statements or press leaks have been terribly critical of the Chinese side either**. Indeed, as the Washington Post observes: **Neither Clinton nor her Chinese counterparts mentioned Chen in their formal remarks at the end of their two-day meeting, saying instead that** **U.S.-Sino differences on human rights issues must not disrupt the broader relationship between the two world powers**.

**China Rels Bad**

**Relations allow China to learn US secrets to modernize its military and use bioweapons to end American unipolarity and kill millions- from China’s Minister of Defense**

**Haotian 5** Former Minister of Defense and vice-chairman of China’s Central Military Commission (Chi, 8/8/05 War is not far from US and is the midwife of the Chinese century; <http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/5-8-8/31055.html>)

**I sometimes think how cruel it is for China and the United States to be enemies that are bound to meet on a narrow road! Do you remember a movie about Liberation Army troops led by Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping? The title is something like “Decisive Battle on the Central Plains.” There is a famous remark in the movie that is full of power and grandeur: “The enemies are bound to meet on a narrow road, only the brave will win!” It is this kind of fighting to win or die spirit that enabled us to seize power in Mainland China.** **It is historical destiny that China and United States will come into unavoidable confrontation on a narrow path and fight each other! The United States**, **unlike Russia and Japan, has never occupied and hurt China, and also assisted China in its battle against the Japanese. But, it** **will certainly be an obstruction, and the biggest obstruction! In the long run, the relationship of China and the United States is one of a life-and-death struggle. One time, some Americans came to visit and tried to convince us that the relationship between China and United States is one of interdependence. Comrade Xiaoping replied in a polite manner: “Go tell your government, China and the United States do not have such a relationship that is interdependent and mutually reliant.” Actually, Comrade Xiaoping was being too polite, he could have been more frank, “The relationship between China and United States is one of a life-and-death still rely on their capital and technology, we still need America. Therefore, we must do everything we can to promote our relationship with America, learn from America in all aspects and use America as an example to reconstruct our country.** **How have we managed our foreign affairs in these years?** **Even if we had to put on a smiling face in order to please them, even if we had to give them the right cheek after they had hit our left cheek, we still must endure in order to further our relationship with the United States**. **Do you remember the character of Wuxun in the movie the “Story of Wuxun”? In order to accomplish his mission, he endured so much pain and suffered so much beating and kicking!** **The United States is the most successful country in the world today. Only after we have learned all of its useful experiences can we replace it in the future. Even though we are presently imitating the American tone “China and United States rely on each other and share honor and disgrace,” we must not forget that the history of our civilization repeatedly has taught us that one mountain does not allow two tigers to live together**. **We also must never forget what Comrade Xiaoping emphasized “refrain from revealing the ambitions and put others off the track.”** **The hidden message is: we must put up with America; we must conceal our ultimate goals, hide our capabilities and await the opportunity.** **In this way, our mind is clear. Why have we not updated our national anthem with something peaceful? Why did we not change the anthem’s theme of war? Instead, when revising the Constitution this time, for the first time we clearly specified “March of the Volunteers” is our national anthem. Thus we will understand why we constantly talk loudly about the “Taiwan issue” but not the “American issue.” We all know the principle of “doing one thing under the cover of another.” If ordinary people can only see the small island of Taiwan in their eyes, then you as the elite of our country should be able to see the whole picture of our cause. Over these years, according to Comrade Xiaoping’s arrangement, a large piece of our territory in the North has been given up to Russia; do you really think our Party Central Committee is a fool? To resolve the issue of America we must be able to transcend conventions and restrictions. In history, when a country defeated another country or occupied another country, it could not kill all the people in the conquered land, because back then you could not kill people effectively with sabers or long spears, or even with rifles or machine guns. Therefore, it was impossible to gain a stretch of land without keeping the people on that land. However, if we conquered America in this fashion, we would not be able to make many people migrate there. Only by using special means to “clean up” America will we be able to lead the Chinese people there. This is the only choice left for us.** **This is not a matter of whether we are willing to do it or not. What kind of special means is there available for us to “clean up” America? Conventional weapons such as fighters, canons, missiles and battleships won’t do; neither will highly destructive weapons such as nuclear weapons**. **We are not as foolish as to want to perish together with America by using nuclear weapons, despite the fact that we have been exclaiming that we will have the Taiwan issue resolved at whatever cost.** **Only by using non-destructive weapons that can kill many people will we be able to reserve America for ourselves. There has been rapid development of modern biological technology, and new bio weapons have been invented one after another.** **Of course we have not been idle; in the past years we have seized the opportunity to master weapons of this kind.** **We are capable of achieving our purpose of “cleaning up” America all of a sudden**. **When Comrade Xiaoping was still with us**, **the Party Central Committee had the perspicacity to make the right decision not to develop aircraft carrier groups and focus instead on developing lethal weapons that can eliminate mass populations of the enemy country**. **From a humanitarian perspective, we should issue a warning to the American people and persuade them to leave America and leave the land they have lived in to the Chinese people. Or at least they should leave half of the United States to be China’s colony, because America was first discovered by the Chinese. But would this work? If this strategy does not work, then there is only one choice left to us. That is, use decisive means to “clean up” America, and reserve America for our use in a moment. Our historical experience has proven that as long as we make it happen, nobody in the world can do anything about us. Furthermore, if the United States as the leader is gone, then other enemies have to surrender to us.** **Biological weapons are unprecedented in their ruthlessness, but if the Americans do not die then the Chinese have to die… It is indeed brutal to kill one or two hundred million Americans. But that is the only path that will secure a Chinese century, a century in which the CCP leads the world**. **We, as revolutionary humanitarians, do not want deaths. But if history confronts us with a choice between deaths of Chinese and those of Americans, we’d have to pick the latter, as, for us, it is more important to safeguard the lives of the Chinese people and the life of our Party**. **That is because, after all, we are Chinese and members of the CCP. Since the day we joined the CCP, the Party’s life has always been above all else! History will prove that we made the right choice.** **Now, when I am about to finish my speech, you probably understand why we conducted this online survey.** **Simply put, through conducting this online survey we wanted to know whether the people would rise against us if**

**one day we secretly adopt resolute means to “clean up” America. Would more people support us or oppose** us? **This is our basic judgment: if our people approve of shooting at prisoners of war, women and children, then they would approve our “cleaning up” America. For over twenty years, China has been enjoying peace, and a whole generation has not been tested by war. In particular, since the end of World War II, there have been many changes in the formats of war, the concept of war and the ethics of war. Especially since the collapse of the former Soviet Union and Eastern European Communist states, the ideology of the West has come to dominate the world as a whole, and the Western theory of human nature and Western view of human rights have increasingly disseminated among the young people in China. Therefore, we were not very sure about the people’s attitude. If our people are fundamentally opposed to “cleaning up” America, we will, of course, have to adopt corresponding measures. Why didn’t we conduct the survey through administrative means instead of through the web? We did what we did for a good reason. First of all, we did it to reduce artificial inference and to make sure that we got the true thoughts of the people. In addition, it is more confidential and won’t reveal the true purpose of our survey. But what is most important is the fact that** **most of the people who are able to respond to the questions online are from social groups that are relatively well-educated and intelligent. They are the hard-core and leading groups that play a decisive role among our people. If they support us, then the people as a whole will follow us**; **if they oppose us, they will play the dangerous role of inciting people and creating social disturbance.** **What turned out to be very comforting is they did not turn in a blank test paper. In fact, they turned in a test paper with a score of over 80. This is the excellent fruition of our Party’s work in propaganda and education over the past few decades**. **Of course, a few people under the Western influence have objected to shooting at prisoners of war and women and children. Some of them said, “It is shocking and scary to witness so many people approving of shooting at women and children. Is everybody crazy?” Some others said, “The Chinese love to label themselves as a peace-loving people, but actually they are the most ruthless people. The comments are resonant of killing and murdering, sending chills to my heart.” Although there are not too many people holding this kind of viewpoint and they will not affect the overall situation in any significant way**, but we still need to strengthen the propaganda to respond to this kind of argument. That is to vigorously propagate Comrade He Xin's latest article, which has already been reported to the central government. You may look it up on the website. If you get on the website using key words to search, you will find out that a while ago, comrade He Xin pointed out to the Hong Kong Business News during an interview that: "The US has a shocking conspiracy." According to what he had in hand, from September 27 to October 1, 1995, the Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachëv Foundation, funded by the United States, gathered 500 of the world’s most important statesmen, economic leaders and scientists, including George W. Bush (he was not the US president at the time), the Baroness Thatcher, Tony Blair, Zbigniew Brzezinski, as well as George Soros, Bill Gates, futurist John Naisbitt, etc., all of the world’s most popular characters, in the San Francisco Fairmont hotel for a high-level round table conference, discussing problems about globalization and how to guide humanity to move forward into the 21st century. According to what He Xin had in hand, the outstanding people of the world in attendance thought that in the 21st century a mere 20% of the world’s population will be sufficient to maintain the world’s economy and prosperity, the other 80% or 4/5 of the world’s population will be human garbage unable to produce new values. The people in attendance thought that this excess 80% population would be a trash population and "high-tech" means should be used to eliminate them gradually. Since the enemies are secretly planning to eliminate our population, we certainly cannot be infinitely merciful and compassionate to them. Comrade He Xin's article came out at the right time, it has proven the correctness of our tit for tat battle approach, has proven Comrade Deng Xiaoping’s great foresight to deploy against the United States military strategy. Certainly, in spreading Comrade He Xin’s views, we cannot publish the article in the party newspapers, in order to avoid raising the enemy’s vigilance. He Xin's conversation may remind the enemy that we have grasped the modern science and technology, including "clean" nuclear technology, gene weapons technology as well as biological weapons technology, and we can use powerful measures to eliminate their population on a large-scale. The last problem I want to talk about is of firmly seizing the preparations for military battle. …. **The central committee believes, as long as we resolve the United States problem at one blow, our domestic problems will all be readily solved. Therefore, our military battle preparation appears to aim at Taiwan, but in fact is aimed at the United States, and the preparation is far beyond the scope of attacking aircraft carriers or satellites. Marxism pointed out that violence is the midwife for the birth of the new society. Therefore war is the midwife for the birth of China’s century.** **As war approaches, I am full of hope for our next generation.**

**Can’t Solve Noko**

**Relying on China will fail—a belligerent North Korea is in their strategic interests**

**Becker 13** (Jeff, Principal Military Analyst working on a number of U.S. Defense and Security related projects in Virginia, 7-15-13, "Winning a Game of Nuclear Chicken in Asia" Real Clear Defense) www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2013/07/15/winning\_a\_game\_of\_nuclear\_chicken\_in\_asia\_106691.html

The U.S. is confronted by a North Korea intent on extracting concessions from the U.S. and its partners in the region by periodically engaging in direct nuclear threats. As a result, **the U.S and others continue to look to China to moderate the behavior of** its ally and implore **Pyongyang** to assist in constructing a more enduring framework for peace on the Korean Peninsula. **But** benign **assumptions about China’s motivations cannot be reconciled with the reality of its relationship with North Korea. China’s objectives in the Asia-Pacific are served by having a “bad boy” in the neighborhood. Constant, high-level tensions emanating from Pyongyang keep the U.S. and allied military and strategic focus on the anachronistic regime in the North, allowing China to place the balance of its strategic efforts elsewhere**. While not necessarily desiring war, **China may calculate that a damaging war on the peninsula – up to and including nuclear strikes on Seoul, Tokyo, Guam, Hawaii, or even the U**nited **S**tates itself – **could potentially change the relative balance of power in Beijing’s favor. We must be clear-sighted about Beijing’s potential motivations**, and not avoid “thinking the unthinkable” with respect to what an imminent North Korean nuclear breakout means for the Asia-Pacific region. At the core of our current strategy appears to be tacit acceptance of at least a rudimentary North Korean nuclear capability. We tolerate the North Koreans hoping the Chinese will finally bring the Hermit Kingdom to heel, restraining Pyongyang until the regime eventually collapses on its own accord. On the other hand, the unpredictable actions of North significantly raise the potential for miscalculation by the U.S., Japan, or South Korea. No leader in a democracy can remain completely impassive under vocal and increasingly credible threat of nuclear strikes. Barring a sudden radical shift in Pyongyang, the U.S. seems to have no choice short of war but to accept a future in which nuclear blackmail is an enduring feature of the foreign policy landscape in the region. Furthermore, **a strategy relying on partnership with the Chinese to restrain it is likely to be unsuccessful. China may act selectively to cool periodic spikes in tensions, but there is little reason to believe China will force its North Korean ally to accept a permanent solution that curbs its nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation.**