### AT: Legitimacy Theory

#### Bernstein is wrong and predictions are good

Chernoff 2k9 (Fred, “Conventionalism as an Adequate Basis for Policy-Relevant IR Theory” European Journal of International Relations Vol. 15(1): 157–194)

Other reflexivist theorists reject prediction more by omission. For example, Walker and Wendt are less explicit but are still quite clear in their rejections of prediction in IR. While Walker (1993) offers a sustained critique of naturalism and the empiricist (though not empirical) approach to the social sciences, he focuses on the logic of explanation and the presuppositions of the dominant forms of theory rather than questions connected to ‘prediction’. He ignores the notion of ‘prediction’. Wendt is of course one of the principal figures in American constructivism and, like others in that group, emphasizes scientific-style explanation. But at no point does he endorse prediction. Wendt lays out his extensive metatheory in Social Theory of International Politics (1999) but barely even mentions ‘prediction’. Rationalist scholars rarely note the problem that prediction – scepticism creates for the empirical value that IR theory might have. John Mearsheimer is one of the exceptions. He observes that reflexivists hope to improve the world by making it more cooperative and peaceful, which they hold will be advanced by eliminating the ‘hegemonic discourse’ of realism. But, as Mearsheimer points out, if the reflexivists were to eliminate the hegemonic discourse, then, since they do not have any way to predict what would follow in its place, the change may be a shift from realism to fascism.12 There is a related but somewhat more radical implication, which Mearsheimer does not mention, namely that without any ability to predict in the social world, it is possible that reflexivists may succeed in creating a more institutionally oriented discourse, but that discourse might not produce any change whatever in real-world politics. If they reject causal (probabilistic) connections projected into the future between events, states of affairs, or event-types, then there is no reason to believe that any specific change will lead to any effect at all.13 While it is clear that prediction-scepticism creates severe problems for the claim that the work of IR scholars might contribute to the needs of policymaking, the question remains, ‘are the arguments against predictiveness of social science theory well founded?’ On what are these rejections based? The trend in IR toward rejecting or downgrading ‘prediction’ is based on and reinforced by various developments in current philosophy of social science. IR scholars draw on three different sources of prediction – scepticism in the philosophy of social science: the indeterminacy of social theory (Weber, 1949, 1974; Habermas, 1971, 1987; Bohman, 1993; and Bernstein et al., 2000); the lack of governing regularities in the social sciences (Cartwright, 1983; Little, 1991) and the effects of nonlinearities (Doran, 1991, 1999). I have argued elsewhere that all three sorts of anti-predictive arguments are defective and that the latter two presuppose an unjustifiably narrow notion of ‘prediction’.14 A determined prediction sceptic may continue to hold that there is too great a degree of complexity of social relationships (which comprise ‘open systems’) to allow any prediction whatsoever. Two very simple examples may circumscribe and help to refute a radical variety of scepticism. First, we all make reliable social predictions and do so with great frequency. We can predict with high probability that a spouse, child or parent will react to certain well-known stimuli that we might supply, based on extensive past experience. More to the point of IR prediction – scepticism, we can imagine a young child in the UK who (perhaps at the cinema) (1) picks up a bit of 19th-century British imperial lore thus gaining a sense of the power of the crown, without knowing anything of current balances of power, (2) hears some stories about the US–UK invasion of Iraq in the context of the aim of advancing democracy, and (3) hears a bit about communist China and democratic Taiwan. Although the specific term ‘preventative strike’ might not enter into her lexicon, it is possible to imagine the child, whose knowledge is thus limited, thinking that if democratic Taiwan were threatened by China, the UK would (possibly or probably) launch a strike on China to protect it, much as the UK had done to help democracy in Iraq. In contrast to the child, readers of this journal and scholars who study the world more thoroughly have factual information (e.g. about the relative military and economic capabilities of the UK and China) and hold some cause-and-effect principles (such as that states do not usually initiate actions that leaders understand will have an extremely high probability of undercutting their power with almost no chances of success). Anyone who has adequate knowledge of world politics would predict that the UK will not launch a preventive attack against China. In the real world, China knows that for the next decade and well beyond the UK will not intervene militarily in its affairs. While Chinese leaders have to plan for many likely — and even a few somewhat unlikely — future possibilities, they do not have to plan for various implausible contingencies: they do not have to structure forces geared to defend against specifically UK forces and do not have to conduct diplomacy with the UK in a way that would be required if such an attack were a real possibility. Any rational decision-maker in China may use some cause-and-effect (probabilistic) principles along with knowledge of specific facts relating to the Sino-British relationship to predict (P2) that the UK will not land its forces on Chinese territory — even in the event of a war over Taiwan (that is, the probability is very close to zero). The statement P2 qualifies as a prediction based on DEF above and counts as knowledge for Chinese political and military decision-makers. A Chinese diplomat or military planner who would deny that theory-based prediction would have no basis to rule out extremely implausible predictions like P2 and would thus have to prepare for such unlikely contingencies as UK action against China. A reflexivist theorist sceptical of ‘prediction’ in IR might argue that the China example distorts the notion by using a trivial prediction and treating it as a meaningful one. But the critic’s temptation to dismiss its value stems precisely from the fact that it is so obviously true. The value to China of knowing that the UK is not a military threat is significant. The fact that, under current conditions, any plausible cause-and-effect understanding of IR that one might adopt would yield P2, that the ‘UK will not attack China’, does not diminish the value to China of knowing the UK does not pose a military threat. A critic might also argue that DEF and the China example allow non-scientific claims to count as predictions. But we note that while physics and chemistry offer precise ‘point predictions’, other natural sciences, such as seismology, genetics or meteorology, produce predictions that are often much less specific; that is, they describe the predicted ‘events’ in broader time frame and typically in probabilistic terms. We often find predictions about the probability, for example, of a seismic event in the form ‘some time in the next three years’ rather than ‘two years from next Monday at 11:17 am’. DEF includes approximate and probabilistic propositions as predictions and is thus able to catagorize as a prediction the former sort of statement, which is of a type that is often of great value to policy-makers. With the help of these ‘non-point predictions’ coming from the natural and the social sciences, leaders are able to choose the courses of action (e.g. more stringent earthquake-safety building codes, or procuring an additional carrier battle group) that are most likely to accomplish the leaders’ desired ends. So while ‘point predictions’ are not what political leaders require in most decision-making situations, critics of IR predictiveness often attack the predictive capacity of IR theory for its inability to deliver them. The critics thus commit the straw man fallacy by requiring a sort of prediction in IR (1) that few, if any, theorists claim to be able to offer, (2) that are not required by policy-makers for theory-based predictions to be valuable, and (3) that are not possible even in some natural sciences.15 The range of theorists included in ‘reflexivists’ here is very wide and it is possible to dissent from some of the general descriptions. From the point of view of the central argument of this article, there are two important features that should be rendered accurately. One is that reflexivists reject explanation–prediction symmetry, which allows them to pursue causal (or constitutive) explanation without any commitment to prediction. The second is that almost all share clear opposition to predictive social science.16 The reflexivist commitment to both of these conclusions should be evident from the foregoing discussion. The preceding section raised the objection to reflexivism that it fails to meet the third challenge identified at the outset. A reflexivist might still object that the third challenge is misplaced, that is, that the founders of IR were simply wrong in believing that IR theories could support reliable predictions that provide a basis for changing the world. This section looks at two studies of the track record of IR prediction in order to provide empirical support for the claim that IR theory-based prediction can succeed, and thus that the founders of IR were not aiming for an unrealizable goal. The Prediction Track Record — Ray and Russett on the End of the Cold War When the Cold War came to an end, critics of prediction in IR bolstered their sceptical position by seizing on scholars’ failure to foresee that event — perhaps the most important international development of the second half of the 20th century. James Lee Ray and Bruce Russett responded by arguing that, despite the widespread perception of failure, there were three ‘streams of research’ that, especially when taken together, showed a grasp of the transition taking place and hold promise for predicting political phenomena (Ray and Russett, 1996). These are democratic peace studies, certain sorts of rational choice models, combined (since both of these require inputs or knowledge about domestic politics) with the work of experts in regional and domestic politics. Ray and Russett looked at work published (though considered also some classified material) prior to 1991 as their focus, noting that once predictions are published, it is difficult for authors to ‘fiddle’ with them.17 In assessing the record of, and prospects for, predictive success of IR and political science, we must remember that Ray and Russett are both well-known IR scholars who have argued for some theories as correct (such as those that include the dyadic democratic peace hypothesis) and against others as wrong (e.g. realist theories that reject the dyadic hypothesis relevance of regimetype). Thus like all theorists, they would expect that proponents of inferior theories would fail to produce accurate predictions. So from their point of view it is no surprise that many IR theories, especially realist theories, that pertained to superpower relations and were published prior to the end of the Cold War, should fail to yield correct predictions. With regard to predictions about the end of the Cold War, Ray and Russett cite several individuals whose insights appear to have been impressively on target. They quote a very prescient-looking comment of John Mueller, just 12 months into the Gorbachev era, according to which, ‘there is a great deal in the present situation to suggest that this condition could be on the verge of terminal improvement; the incentives for the Soviet Union to reduce its commitment to worldwide revolution are considerable. This could eventually result in the end of the cold war.’18 However, true to their methodological constraints, Ray and Russett resist the temptation to place a great deal of weight on it in their evaluation of theory-based prediction because Mueller did not make explicit use of theoretical principles. The authors also focus on the examination of democratic peace (DP) hypotheses published by Russett. Those who study the dyadic DP hypothesis generally agree that mature democracies are indeed quite peaceful toward one another. One of the predictions derived from the dyadic DP hypothesis is that, as more states become mature democracies, those states will be less likely to fight wars against one another; another is that, as states become less authoritarian and more democratic, they are less likely to fight wars against mature democracies. As DP studies were first receiving the serious attention of theorists, Russett himself, as early as 1981, offered the conditional prediction that if the USSR were to become more democratic, then a more cooperative relationship with the US would be likely.19 Ray and Russett acknowledge that those works did not study or identify the internal changes taking place inside the Soviet Union; hence the prediction remained conditional (though still satisfying the terms of DEF). However, they point out that scholars who were examining the level of democracy in the USSR after Gorbachev rose to power did indeed publish claims of dramatic changes. They note that the Polity database, which uses a 0–10 ‘institutionalized democracy index’, scored the USSR at a 0 in 1986 and at 5 in 1989 (Ray and Russett, 1996: 460, n. 80). The predictive accuracy of the dyadic DP hypothesis continues past the publication of Ray and Russett’s article. The historical record in the 20 years that followed Russett’s first DP predictions on the subject shows that peaceful relations among democracies continued. Between 1980 and 2001 there were 492 violent interstate disputes, none of which were between mature democracies.20 Ray and Russett go beyond DP studies and endorse the theoretical and methodological merits of other sorts of methods of analysis and theories of IR that are successful in terms of their ability to produce reliable predictions, especially the formal model of Bueno de Mesquita and his collaborators. They note that the model had been applied to many different problems over a period of years, producing over 2000 predictions. One source reports that the model ‘consistently outperformed’ predictions of the experts who were supplying the domestic political analysis with roughly a 90 percent success rate.21 Ray and Russett argue that many of the familiar and often-devastating criticisms of rational choice modelling in the social sciences do not apply to the model of Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., since the latter model is different from more familiar models in some key respects.22 One difference is that it does not rely exclusively on the nation-state as the principal actor. The model is used at all levels of analysis — interest groups, individuals, political parties, etc., as well as the state. The sort of actor modelled in each case depends upon the particular sort of question about the future that is being asked. A second difference is that the model is not static but rather allows information processing and updating of cognitively relevant factors. And a third difference is that the utility functions are not exogenously given but are based on psychological studies; knowledge about each actor’s attitudes towards risks, threats, etc. is specifically factored into the model. The use of computers allows the model to use multiple-iteration simulations to consider the alternate paths if the data turn out to be faulty. There are many ways in which these models make use of real-world politics and attitudes that are usually absent in simpler rational choice models. The coding of the data is done by those most familiar with the relevant real-world politics (regional, area or national specialists), rather than by modelling specialists.

#### Two-thousand years of history prove

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Despite increasingly compelling findings concerning the importance of status seeking in human behavior, research on its connection to war waned some three decades ago.38 Yet empirical studies of the relationship between both systemic and dyadic capabilities distributions and war have continued to cumulate. If the relationships implied by the status theory run afoul of well-established patterns or general historical findings, then there is little reason to continue investigating them. **The clearest empirical implication** of the theory **is that** status **competition is unlikely to cause great power military conflict in unipolar systems**. If status competition is an important contributory cause of great power war, then, ceteris paribus, unipolar systems should be markedly less war-prone than bipolar or multipolar systems. And this appears to be the case. As Daniel Geller notes in a review of the empirical literature: "**The only polar structure that appears to influence conflict probability is unipolarity**."39 In addition, a larger number of studies at the dyadic level support the related expectation that narrow capabilities gaps and ambiguous or unstable capabilities hierarchies increase the probability of war.40 These studies are based entirely on post-sixteenth-century European history, and most are limited to the post-1815 period covered by the standard data sets. Though the systems coded as unipolar, near-unipolar, and hegemonic are all marked by a high concentration of capabilities in a single state, these studies operationalize unipolarity in a variety of ways, often very differently from the definition adopted here. An ongoing collaborative project looking at ancient interstate systems over the course of two thousand years suggests that historical systems that come closest to the definition of unipolarity used here exhibit precisely the behavioral properties implied by the theory. 41 As David C. Kang's research shows, the East Asian system between 1300 and 1900 was an unusually stratified unipolar structure, with an economic and militarily dominant China interacting with a small number of geographically proximate, clearly weaker East Asian states.42 Status politics existed, but actors were channeled by elaborate cultural understandings and interstate practices into clearly recognized ranks. Warfare was exceedingly rare, and the major outbreaks occurred precisely when the theory would predict: when China's capabilities waned, reducing the clarity of the underlying material hierarchy and increasing status dissonance for lesser powers. Much more research is needed, but initial exploration of other arguably unipolar systems-for example, Rome, Assyria, the Amarna system-appears consistent with the hypothesis.43 Status Competition and Causal Mechanisms Both theory and evidence demonstrate convincingly that competition for status is a driver of human behavior, and social identity theory and related literatures suggest the conditions under which it might come to the fore in great power relations. Both the systemic and dyadic findings presented in large-N studies are broadly consistent with the theory, but they are also consistent with power transition and other rationalist theories of hegemonic war.

#### Our advantage isn’t based on myopic security discourse- multiple independent fields support our hegemony advantage, prefer our advantage because it is interdisciplinary

William Wohlforth (professor of government at Dartmouth College) 2009 “ Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War”Project Muse

Mainstream theories generally posit that states come to blows over an international status quo only when it has implications for their security or material well-being. The guiding assumption is that a state’s satisfaction [End Page 34] with its place in the existing order is a function of the material costs and benefits implied by that status.24 By that assumption, once a state’s status in an international order ceases to affect its material wellbeing, its relative standing will have no bearing on decisions for war or peace. But the assumption is undermined by cumulative research in disciplines ranging from **neuroscience and evolutionary biology to economics, anthropology, sociology, and psychology** that human beings are powerfully motivated by the desire for favorable social status comparisons. This research suggests that the preference for status is a basic disposition rather than merely a strategy for attaining other goals.25 People often seek tangibles not so much because of the welfare or security they bring but because of the social status they confer. Under certain conditions, the search for status will cause people to behave in ways that directly contradict their material interest in security and/or prosperity.

#### Not a rubber stamp

Daskal, 13 [The Geography of the Battlefield: A Framework for Detention and Targeting Outside the 'Hot' Conflict Zone Jennifer Daskal American University Washington College of Law, April]

That said, there is a reasonable fear that any such court or review board will simply defer. In this vein, FISC’s high approval rate is cited as evidence that reviewing courts or review boards will do little more than rubber-stamp the Executive’s targeting decisions.180 But the high approval rates only tell part of the story. In many cases, the mere requirement of justifying an application before a court or other independent review board can serve as an internal check, creating endogenous incentives to comply with the statutory requirements and limit the breadth of executive action.181 Even if this system does little more than increase the attention paid to the stated requirements and expand the circle of persons reviewing the factual basis for the application, those features in and of themselves can lead to increased reflection and restraint.

### AT: Circumvention

#### The president perceives the plan will be effective

**Prakash and Ramsey, 12** ­– professor of law at the University of Virginia and professor of law at San Diego (Saikrishna and Michael, “The Goldilocks Executive” Feb, SSRN)

6. The Executive’s Perception of Legal Constraint.—A final feature of modern practice that is inconsistent with Posner and Vermeule’s description is that the Executive Branch feels constrained by law. In part this can be seen from the way it behaves. As discussed above, the Executive Branch asks Congress to enact legislation and make appropriations, rather than doing so independently. The Executive Branch brings alleged wrongdoers before courts for punishment, rather than punishing independently. The Executive Branch obeys court orders to act or refrain from acting, as implicitly required by the Constitution.

But also of significance is the Executive Branch’s internal recognition of legal constraints. The President employs an enormous and growing staff of lawyers spread among all executive offices and agencies. Anecdotal evidence suggests that legal determinations made within the Executive Branch have the effect of constraining Executive Branch action. In one particular episode in the Bush Administration, the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) reportedly refused to approve the legality of a surveillance program strongly favored by the White House, culminating in a showdown in the Attorney General’s hospital room.98 Apparently, when the Attorney General backed the OLC conclusions, the President acquiesced. More generally, Trevor Morrison argues that OLC legal conclusions are reached with a sense of independence from presidential policy preferences and have substantially influenced presidential decisionmaking.99 To be sure, Executive Branch lawyers often may seek to justify presidential actions under law. They may identify with the Executive and hope to expand its legal discretion. But that role in itself undermines Posner and Vermeule’s claims, for if the President is truly unbound by law, why expend resources dealing with the law’s nonexistent bounds?

We accept that the President’s lawyers search for legal arguments to justify presidential action, that they find the President’s policy preferences legal more often than they do not, and that the President sometimes disregards their conclusions. But the close attention the Executive pays to legal constraints suggests that the President (who, after all, is in a good position to know) believes himself constrained by law. Perhaps Posner and Vermeule believe that the President is mistaken. But we think, to the contrary, it represents the President’s recognition of the various constraints we have listed, and his appreciation that attempting to operate outside the bounds of law would trigger censure from Congress, courts, and the public.

#### Best recent scholarship and examples prove that law can constrain the exec

Aziz Z. Huq 12, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School, "Binding the Executive (by Law or by Politics)", May 25, www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/400-ah-binding.pdf

There is some merit to this story. But in my view it again understates the observed effect of positive legal constraints on executive discretion. Recent scholarship, for example, has documented congressional influence on the shape of military policy via framework statutes . This work suggests Congress influences executive actions during military engagements through hearings and legislative proposals. 75 Consistent with this account, two legal scholars have recently offered a revisionist history of constitutional war powers in which “ Congress has been an active participant in setting the terms of battle, ” in part because “ congressional willingness to enact [ ] laws has only increased ” over time. 76 In the last decade, Congress has often taken the initiative on national security, such as enacting new statutes on military commissions in 2006 and 2009. 77 Other recent landmark security reforms, such as a 2004 statute restr ucturing the intelligence community, 78 also had only lukewarm Oval Office support. 79 Measured against a baseline of threshold executive preferences then , Congress has achieved nontrivial successes in shaping national security policy and institutions through both legislated and nonlegislated actions even in the teeth of White House opposition. 80¶ The same point emerges more forcefully from a review of our “ fiscal constitution. ” 81 Article I, § 8 of the Constitution vests Congress with power to “ lay and collect Tax es ” and to “ borrow Money on the credit of the United States, ” while Article I, § 9 bars federal funds from being spent except “ in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law. ” 82 Congress has enacted several framework statutes to effectuate the “ powerful limitations ” implicit in these clauses. 83 The resulting law prevents the President from repudiating past policy commitments (as Skowronek suggests) as well as imposing barriers to novel executive initiatives that want for statutory authorization . 84¶ Three statutes merit attention here. First, the Miscellaneous Receipts Act of 1849 85 requires that all funds “ received from customs, from the sales of public lands, and from all miscellaneous sources, for the use of the United States, shall be paid . . . into the treasur y of the United States. ” 86 It ensures that the executive cannot establish off - balance - sheet revenue streams as a basis for independent policy making. Second, the Anti - Deficiency Act, 87 which was first enacted in 1870 and then amended in 190 6 , 88 had the effect of cementing the principle of congressional appropriations control. 89 With civil and criminal sanctions, it prohibits “ unfunded monetary liabilities beyond the amounts Congress has appropriated, ” and bars “ the borrowing of funds by federal a gencies . . . in anticipation of future appropriations. ” 90 Finally, the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 91 (Impoundment Act) channels presidential authority to decline to expend appropriated funds. 92 It responded to President Nixon ’ s e xpansive use of impoundment. 93 Congress had no trouble rejecting Nixon ’ s claims despite a long history of such impoundments. 94 While the Miscellaneous Receipts Act and the Anti - Deficiency Act appear to have succeeded, the Impoundment Act has a more mixed rec ord. While the Supreme Court endorsed legislative constraints on presidential impoundment, 95 President Gerald Ford increased impoundments through creative interpretations of the law. 96 But two decades later, Congress concluded the executive had too little di scretionary spending authority and expanded it by statute. 97 ¶ Moreover, statutory regulation of the purse furnishes a tool for judicial influence over the executive. Judicial action in turn magnifies congressional influence. A recent study of taxation litiga tion finds evidence that the federal courts interpret fiscal laws in a more pro - government fashion during military engagements supported by both Congress and the White House than in the course of unilateral executive military entanglements. 98 Although the r esulting effect is hard to quantify, the basic finding of the study suggests that fiscal statutes trench on executive discretion not only directly, but also indirectly via judicially created incentives to act only with legislative endorsement. 99¶ To be sure, a persistent difficulty in debates about congressional efficacy, and with some of the claims advanced in The Executive Unbound , is that it is unclear what baseline should be used to evaluate the outcomes of executive - congressional struggles. What counts, that is, as a “win” and for whom? What, for example, is an appropriate level of legislative control over expenditures? In the examples developed in this Part , I have underscored instances in which a law has been passed that a President disagrees with in substantial part, and where there are divergent legislative preferences reflected in the ultimate enactment. I do not mean to suggest, however, that there are not alternative ways of delineating a baseline for analysis. 100¶ In sum, there is strong evidence that law and lawmaking institutions have played a more robust role in delimiting the bounds of executive discretion over the federal sword and the federal purse than The Executive Unbound intimates. Congress in fact impedes presidential agendas. The White House in practice cannot use presidential administration as a perfect substitute. Legislation implementing congressional control of the purse is also a significant, if imperfect, tool of legislative influence on the ground. This is true even when Presidents influence the budgetary agenda 101 and agencies jawbone their legislative masters into new funding. 102 If Congress and statutory frameworks seem to have such nontrivial effects on the executive ’ s choice set , this at minimum i mplies that the conditions in which law matters are more extensive than The Executive Unbound suggests and that an account of executive discretion that omits law and legal institutions will be incomplete .

#### Quality of life is skyrocketing worldwide by all measures

Ridley 10 – professor at Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory

(Matt, The Rational Optimist, pg. 13-15)//BB

If my fictional family is not to your taste, perhaps you prefer statistics. Since 1800, the population of the world has multiplied six times, yet average life expectancy has more than doubled and real income has risen more than nine times. Taking a shorter perspective, in 2005, compared with 1955, the average human being on Planet Earth earned nearly three times as much money (corrected for inflation), ate one-third more calories of food, buried one-third as many of her children and could expect to live one-third longer. She was less likely to die as a result of war, murder, childbirth, accidents, tornadoes, flooding, famine, whooping cough, tuberculosis, malaria, diphtheria, typhus, typhoid, measles, smallpox, scurvy or polio. She was less likely, at any given age, to get cancer, heart disease or stroke. She was more likely to be literate and to have finished school. She was more likely to own a telephone, a flush toilet, a refrigerator and a bicycle. All this during a half-century when the world population has more than doubled, so that far from being rationed by population pressure, the goods and services available to the people of the world have expanded. It is, by any standard, an astonishing human achievement. Averages conceal a lot. But even if you break down the world into bits, it is hard to find any region that was worse off in 2005 than it was in 1955. Over that half-century, real income per head ended a little lower in only six countries (Afghanistan, Haiti, Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia), life expectancy in three (Russia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe), and infant survival in none. In the rest they have rocketed upward. Africa’s rate of improvement has been distressingly slow and patchy compared with the rest of the world, and many southern African countries saw life expectancy plunge in the 1990s as the AIDS epidemic took hold (before recovering in recent years). There were also moments in the half-century when you could have caught countries in episodes of dreadful deterioration of living standards or life chances – China in the 1960s, Cambodia in the 1970s, Ethiopia in the 1980s, Rwanda in the 1990s, Congo in the 2000s, North Korea throughout. Argentina had a disappointingly stagnant twentieth century. But overall, after fifty years, the outcome for the world is remarkably, astonishingly, dramatically positive. The average South Korean lives twenty-six more years and earns fifteen times as much income each year as he did in 1955 (and earns fifteen times as much as his North Korean counter part). The average Mexican lives longer now than the average Briton did in 1955. The average Botswanan earns more than the average Finn did in 1955. Infant mortality is lower today in Nepal than it was in Italy in 1951. The proportion of Vietnamese living on less than $2 a day has dropped from 90 per cent to 30 per cent in twenty years. The rich have got richer, but the poor have done even better. The poor in the developing world grew their consumption twice as fast as the world as a whole between 1980 and 2000. The Chinese are ten times as rich, one-third as fecund and twenty-eight years longer-lived than they were fifty years ago. Even Nigerians are twice as rich, 25 per cent less fecund and nine years longer-lived than they were in 1955. Despite a doubling of the world population, even the raw number of people living in absolute poverty (defined as less than a 1985 dollar a day) has fallen since the 1950s. The percentage living in such absolute poverty has dropped by more than half – to less than 18 per cent. That number is, of course, still all too horribly high, but the trend is hardly a cause for despair: at the current rate of decline, it would hit zero around 2035 – though it probably won’t. The United Nations estimates that poverty was reduced more in the last fifty years than in the previous 500.

#### No impact uniqueness – inequality down now

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The U.S. Census Bureau recently released a study on the “Living Conditions in the United States, 2005” with detailed information on the “Percent of Households Reporting Consumer Durables,” and those percentages are displayed in the table below for: a) all U.S. households in 2005, b) households with income below the official poverty line in 2005, and c) all households in 1971.

Not surprisingly, the percentage of U.S. households owning basic home appliances increased between 1971 and 2005 for all appliances except traditional telephones, which have gradually been replaced by cell phones. Certain appliances such as air conditioning, clothes dryers, color TVs, and dishwashers that used to be luxury items owned by a minority of American households in 1971 became so affordable that by 2005 a large majority of households owned all of those appliances. And some household items such as microwave ovens, VCRs, computers, and cell phones that were virtually nonexistent in 1971 became so affordable by 2005 that more than two of every three American households owned those items.

But what is even more impressive is the comparison of the living standards of households living below the poverty line in 2005 to all U.S. households in 1971. By almost every measure of appliance ownership, poor American households in 2005 had much better living conditions than the average American household in 1971, since poor households in 2005 had much higher ownership rates for basic appliances like clothes dryers, dishwashers, color TVs, and air conditioners than all households did in 1971.

As economist Steve Horwitz commented recently about these improvements on the Austrian Economists blog, “Life for the average American is better today than 35 years ago, life for poor Americans is much better than it was 35 years ago, and poor Americans today largely live better than the average American did 35 years ago. Hard to square with a narrative of economic stagnation or decline.”

The reasons for the significant improvements in living standards over time for Americans at all income levels? Entrepreneurial innovation, technology improvements, supply-chain efficiencies, increases in productivity, and other market-based efficiencies that have continually driven prices lower and lower over time, measured in what is most important: our time and the amount of labor it takes to earn the money to purchase goods and services.

The chart below shows retail prices for 11 different household appliances in both 1973 (data here) and 2009 (data here), and the cost of purchasing those appliances measured by the number of “hours of work” at the average hourly wage in each year (BLS data here: $4.12 per hour in 1973 vs. $18.72 per hour in 2009). The chart shows the significant reductions in the real cost of basic household appliances between 1973 and today of from -50.7 percent for a basic kitchen stove (70.4 hours of work at the average wage in 1973 vs. 34.7 hours in 2009) to -83.5 percent for color TVs (97.1 hours in 1973 vs. 16 hours in 2009).

In total, to purchase all of those 11 basic household appliances in 1973, it would have taken 551.1 hours of work (13.8 weeks or 3.4 months) at the average hourly wage. To purchase those same 11 appliances in 2009, it would have only taken 171 hours of work (4.3 weeks or 1.1 month), a whopping 69 percent reduction in the number of hours worked. Or the typical worker in 1973 would have had to work from January 1 until the second week of April to earn enough income to purchase those 11 appliances (ignoring taxes), whereas a worker today would only have to work from January 1 until the first few days of February to earn enough income for those same appliances.

Bottom Line: As much as we hear reports about the decline in median income, economic stagnation, the disappearance of the middle class, and falling real wages, the data tell a much different story that can be summarized as follows: The rich in America are getting richer and the poor are getting richer.

#### The k has ZERO explanatory power – the plan tactical deployment is effective and alters the essence of the law – no risk of escalating violence

Ross, 12 [“Agamben’s Political Paradigm of the Camp: Its Features and Reasons” Alison Ross is Lecturer in Critical Theory in the Centre for Comparative Literature and Cultural Studies, Monash University, Australia, Constellations Volume 19, No 3, 2012, p. Blackwell Publications]

The difficulty here is that Agamben, given the ahistoricity of his theory, is unable to provide an account of **why the state of exception has become a problem at this particular point in time.** Similarly, he claims that the law is more likely to bring violence into play now, in the present historical juncture, than ever before, a claim that pertains to questions of fact. Agamben, however, cannot draw a link between the thesis concerning law’s “constitutive violence” and current circumstances because he pays no attention to issues such as **historical relationships** between political **institutions and policing** mechanisms, which disciplines like political sociology deal with. Agamben’s ontological theses regarding the “essence” of the law do not help in attending to the historical problem his theory needs to be able to address: namely, to **show the process by which “the state of exception has become the norm**.” More generally, it is difficult to see how his commitment to such theses sheds any light on the workings of the law. Agamben sees the purported “legitimacy of law” as a ruse of the liberal state, which in the social contract narrative claims legitimacy for law on account of its protection of otherwise vulnerable life. This position may usefully be compared with Foucault’s comments on the same topic. Foucault addresses the topic of law’s legitimacy from two different angles. First, he sees in political philosophy’s interest in the question of the features that qualifysovereign power as legitimate a tendency to avoid the crucial question of how “legitimate” power actually operates. In this sense, the account he provides in his work on prisons of how law’s violence manifests in penal institutions is a critique of the adequacy of the theory of sovereignty to form an accurate picture of the complex forces and instruments involved in social organization.32 Second, in his 1978–9 lectures on biopolitics, Foucault argues that liberalism is a government of life rather than the exercise of sovereignty over life and death. His analysis of the policy direction of post-war German intellectuals is premised on the assumption that their activities were strategically meaningful. Their social integration and state building initiatives were based on the goal of economic success. Even their “power politics” were staked on rapid economic growth.33 Foucault’s analysis of liberalism follows an injunction comparable to his focus on reformist manuals and prison plans in Discipline and Punish. Institutional practices do not function independently of what people think about them. They are intelligible precisely because they embody strategically considered ends (even if these ends are not realized or contained by those strategies).34 C \_ 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 428 Constellations, Volume 19, Issue 3, 2012 The premise of Agamben’s analysis, in contrast, renders power senseless. **What possible** intelligible **motives might Agamben’s sovereign have for wanting perpetual** and **unlimited disposition** over the physical existence of its subjects in the manner of a Nazi camp warden? This question cannot be raised in Agamben’s scheme. Moreover, it is precisely because the law is not – as Agamben’s analysis assumes – an objective mechanism that could function independently of what people think about it that he obscures how the different ways in which the law is experienced as legitimate (e.g., in its strategic deployment to realize specific ends) can affect its “essential nature.” This renders Agamben’s thesis of the “constitutive violence” of the law, if not unintelligible, at least inscrutable. Is it the way political institutions are shaped or the way human individuals are conceptualized in legal doctrine that produces this state of affairs? The deficiencies of this perspective **can** partly **be found in the ontological nature of his framework,** which thus has very **little to do with** an inquiry into institutional features and practices. It aims to pose questions regarding legal institutions and practices at the “fundamental” level of the forces or elements that drive history. His fascination with the terminology of the “exception” as the incisive political vocabulary for our times is a case in point. His use of this terminology marks out extreme situations not as anomalous, but as if they had general significance. This **mode of argumentation** necessarily looks past the task of analyzing institutional functioning because it imports the grammar of such functioning from the “exceptional” situation. iii. Agamben treats those subject to law **as** totallypassive **“bodies.”** His focus on the camp situation is telling because this is the only situation **where his doctrine seems to work**: in the extermination camp, action does not meet other actions, but bodies. Foucault insisted that this type of situation was not a relation of power, but one of submission to force.35 Similarly, sociological models of social interaction differentiate the study of social organization defined as actions influencing other actions from situations of crude force. Since he is so often contemptuous of the assumptions of liberalism, it is worth comparing Agamben’s position on this question of force with that of liberalism. Classical liberal theory acknowledges the ultimate dependence of order on relations of force; it holds the unification of the aggregate force of society under a single coercive law to be the virtue of the state. The purpose of such force is the protection of the members of its aggregate body. However, there are limits on the capacity of force to decide conflicts internal to this aggregate body. These limits are a central topic in liberal political philosophy, which sees reliance on force to manage social conflicts as a sign of the system’s weakness: such reliance places inflationary pressure on force, thus devaluing it. “Force” as it is understood and used in liberal political theory is a differential quantity that has to present itself and be received as a “quality,” as authority, on the pain of dissipation. In The State and the Rule of Law, Blandine Kriegel reads the history of theories of the state in these terms, emphasizing the perils of naked reliance on force pointed out in such theories. She notes, for instance, that theorists of the state since Bodin have found the state that restrains itself in its use of force and its extension of powers **more powerful than one with unlimited powers**.36 The question of force can also be approached from the perspective of other mechanisms that are important for social organization and that presuppose the existence of distinct currencies that pertain to the different media of the social system. Liberal theory acknowledges the findings of political sociology that describes how social order is constituted through, for instance, symbolic integration and economic instruments. Social integration and organization take place in multiple dimensions or media: symbolic (cultural, ideological, etc.), C \_ 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Agamben’s Political Paradigm of the Camp: Alison Ross 429 economic, and political (participation in collective decisions at various levels).37 Talcott Parsons attempted to define the problem of social interaction in terms of “systems of action” that use different “symbolically generalized media of communication” where action influences action. As part of this approach, he maintained the importance of patterns of interaction in establishing and reinforcing expectations for the functioning of such media. When a cultural system changes, this marks the introduction of a new pattern whose meaning is intelligible to and expected by social actors.38 In particular, Parsons was interested to account for the interaction between social, cultural, and personality systems. These relationships are all bidirectional according to him; that is, these symbolic systems are intelligible to agents whose action is susceptible to the “actions” of social and cultural systems of meaning.39 This approach is important not just because of the elements it deploys to explain social organization, but because of the image it produces of such organization. I will return to this point in my concluding remarks to this paper. The economic system is based on interactions in which actors select actions that will optimize their ends. They want to act “in the most profitable way [to achieve] the highest benefits when costs are substantial.” In this system, the symbolic medium of money is ordered according to a specific set of norms for its use and acquisition. Within the system, money is not replaceable by force. For instance, as a legitimate means for acquiring property, the use of money as a symbolic mechanism of exchange forbids as illegitimate “the use of force” for property acquisition.40 Similarly, in the political system, force is understood as an abortive way of managing conflicting goals since it is susceptible to counter-action by the force of others. It thus fails to make decisions that could bind everyone in a social system. The political system uses forms of collective decision-making to maximize the realization of actors’ specific goals. Legitimate political power is a general medium that can make collectively binding and effective decisions in a way that force cannot.41 **Insofar as such mechanisms are** effective**,** they are real**; and they need to be understood and analyzed in terms of their actual mechanics and dynamics,** not dismissed as masks**.**42 With these comments I do not intend to mount a defence of liberal political philosophy. Rather, I want to ask whether Agamben’s style of analysis allows things to be seen more clearly than they are in sociologically influenced liberal theory. Agamben’s criticisms of law are directed to the potential he sees realized in the camps to hold life in a relation of exposure to pure force. Of course, the critical stand he takes on law is explicable in terms of the ontological perspective he adopts, but we need to ask whether adopting this stance helps us illuminate current political circumstances. Why, for instance, does he choose to explain what happens in the camp as a potential of liberal law, rather than as a degradation of liberal protections?43 Additionally, how useful are categories crafted in the field of jurisprudence, which have their proper register of application within this field, for the purpose of describing what occurs in extreme situations like the camp? What makes the camp analogy especially unsuitable as a paradigm for understanding the organization of a society is that the “camp population,” unlike society, is not meant to have a future (and here one needs think of all those things that are required for a society to have a future: from material production to symbolic identity, etc.). The murderous contempt **shown the camp inmate is simply** not a viable option **for a state.**

### Hunting Politics

#### Death outweighs –ontologically destroys the subject and prevents any alternative way of knowing the world

**Paterson, 03** – Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island (Craig, “A Life Not Worth Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics, <http://sce.sagepub.com>)

Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that it is death per se that is really the objective evil for us, not because it deprives us of a prospective future of overall good judged better than the alter- native of non-being. It cannot be about harm to a former person who has ceased to exist, for no person actually suffers from the sub-sequent non-participation. Rather, death in itself is an evil to us because it ontologically destroys the current existent subject — it is the ultimate in metaphysical lightening strikes.80 The evil of death is truly an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists, independently of calculations about better or worse possible lives. Such an evil need not be consciously experienced in order to be an evil for the kind of being a human person is. Death is an evil because of the change in kind it brings about, a change that is destructive of the type of entity that we essentially are. Anything, whether caused naturally or caused by human intervention (intentional or unintentional) that drastically interferes in the process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil for the person. What is crucially at stake here, and is dialectically supportive of the self-evidency of the basic good of human life, is that death is a radical interference with the current life process of the kind of being that we are. In consequence, death itself can be credibly thought of as a ‘primitive evil’ for all persons, regardless of the extent to which they are currently or prospectively capable of participating in a full array of the goods of life.81 In conclusion, concerning willed human actions, it is justifiable to state that any intentional rejection of human life itself cannot therefore be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue for the subject, namely, the destruction of the present person; a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to weigh objectively against the travails of life in a rational manner. To deal with the sources of disvalue (pain, suffering, etc.) we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility.82

#### Ethical obligations are tautological—the only coherent rubric is to maximize number of lives saved

**Greene 2010** – Associate Professor of the Social Sciences Department of Psychology Harvard University (Joshua, Moral Psychology: Historical and Contemporary Readings, “The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul”, [www.fed.cuhk.edu.hk/~lchang/material/Evolutionary/Developmental/Greene-KantSoul.pdf](http://www.fed.cuhk.edu.hk/~lchang/material/Evolutionary/Developmental/Greene-KantSoul.pdf), WEA)

What turn-of-the-millennium science is telling us is that human moral judgment is not a pristine rational enterprise, that our moral judgments are driven by a hodgepodge of emotional dispositions, which themselves were shaped by a hodgepodge of evolutionary forces, both biological and cultural. Because of this, it is exceedingly unlikely that there is anyrationallycoherentnormativemoral theory that can accommodateourmoral intuitions. Moreover, anyone who claims to have such a theory, or even part of one, almost certainly doesn't. Instead, what that person probably has is a moral rationalization.

It seems then, that we have somehow crossed the infamous "is"-"ought" divide.  How did this happen? Didn't Hume (Hume, 1978) and Moore (Moore, 1966) warn us against trying to derive an "ought" from and "is?" How did we go from descriptive scientific theories concerning moral psychology to skepticism about a whole class of normative moral theories? The answer is that we did not, as Hume and Moore anticipated, attempt to derive an "ought" from and "is." That is, our method has been inductive rather than deductive. We have inferred on the basis of the available evidence that the phenomenon of rationalist deontological philosophy is best explained as a rationalization of evolved emotional intuition (Harman, 1977).

Missing the Deontological Point
I suspect that rationalist deontologists will remain unmoved by the arguments presented here. Instead, I suspect, they will insist that I have simply misunderstoodwhatKant and like-minded deontologistsare all about. Deontology, they will say, isn't about this intuition or that intuition. It's not defined by its normative differences with consequentialism. Rather, deontology is about taking humanity seriously. Above all else, it's about respect for persons. It's about treating others as fellow rational creatures rather than as mere objects, about acting for reasons rational beings can share. And so on (Korsgaard, 1996a; Korsgaard, 1996b).This is, no doubt, how many deontologists see deontology. But this insider's view, as I've suggested, may be misleading. The problem, more specifically, is that it defines deontology in terms of values that are notdistinctivelydeontological, though they may appear to be from the inside. Consider the following analogy with religion. When one asks a religious person to explain the essence of his religion, one often gets an answer like this: "It's about love, really. It's about looking out for other people, looking beyond oneself. It's about community, being part of something larger than oneself." This sort of answer accurately captures the phenomenology of many people's religion, but it's nevertheless inadequate for distinguishing religion from other things. This is because many, if not most, non-religious people aspire to love deeply, look out for other people, avoid self-absorption, have a sense of a community, and be connected to things larger than themselves. In other words, secular humanists and atheists can assent to most of what many religious people think religion is all about. From a secular humanist's point of view, in contrast, what's distinctive about religion is its commitment to the existence of supernatural entities as well as formal religious institutions and doctrines. And they're right. These things really do distinguish religious from non-religious practices, though they may appear to be secondary to many people operating from within a religious point of view.
In the same way, I believe that most of the standard deontological/Kantian self-characterizatons fail to distinguish deontology from other approaches to ethics. (See also Kagan (Kagan, 1997, pp. 70-78.) on the difficulty of defining deontology.) It seems to me that consequentialists, as much as anyone else, have respect for persons, are against treating people asmereobjects, wish to act for reasons that rational creatures can share, etc. A consequentialist respects other persons, and refrains from treating them as mere objects, by counting every person's well-beingin the decision-making process. Likewise, a consequentialist attempts to act according to reasons that rational creatures can share by acting according to principles that give equal weight to everyone's interests, i.e. that are impartial. This is not to say that consequentialists and deontologists don't differ. They do. It's just that the real differences may not be what deontologists often take them to be.
What, then, distinguishes deontology from other kinds of moral thought? A good strategy for answering this question is to start with concrete disagreements between deontologists and others (such as consequentialists) and then work backward in search of deeper principles. This is what I've attempted to do with the trolley and footbridge cases, and other instances in which deontologists and consequentialists disagree. If you ask a deontologically-minded person why it's wrong to push someone in front of speeding trolley in order to save five others, you will getcharacteristically deontological answers. Some will betautological: "Because it's murder!"Others will be more sophisticated: "The ends don't justify the means." "You have to respect people's rights." But, as we know, these answers don't really explain anything, because if you give the same people (on different occasions) the trolley case or the loop case (See above), they'll make the opposite judgment, even though their initial explanation concerning the footbridge case applies equally well to one or both of these cases. Talk about rights, respect for persons, and reasons we can share are natural attempts to explain, in "cognitive" terms, what we feel when we find ourselves having emotionally driven intuitions that are odds with the cold calculus of consequentialism. Although these explanations are inevitably incomplete, there seems to be "something deeply right" about thembecause they give voice to powerful moral emotions. But, as with many religious people's accounts of what's essential to religion, they don't really explain what's distinctive about the philosophy in question.

### AT: Structural Violence

#### War turns structural violence

**Bulloch 8** Millennium - Journal of International Studies May 2008 *vol. 36 no. 3 575-595*

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 But the idea that poverty and peace are directly related presupposes that wealth inequalities are – in and of themselves – unjust, and that the solution to the problem of war is to alleviate the injustice that inspires conflict, namely poverty. However, it also suggests that poverty is a legitimate inspiration for violence, otherwise there would be no reason to alleviate it in the interests of peace. It has become such a commonplace to suggest that poverty and conflict are linked that it rarely suffers any examination. To suggest that war causes poverty is to utter an obvious truth, but to suggest the opposite is – on reflection – quite hard to believe. War is an expensive business in the twenty-first century, even asymmetrically. And just to examine Bangladesh for a moment is enough at least to raise the question concerning the actual connection between peace and poverty. The government of Bangladesh is a threat only to itself, and despite 30 years of the Grameen Bank, Bangladesh remains in a state of incipient civil strife. So although Muhammad Yunus should be applauded for his work in demonstrating the efficacy of micro-credit strategies in a context of development, it is not at all clear that this has anything to do with resolving the social and political crisis in Bangladesh, nor is it clear that this has anything to do with resolving the problem of peace and war in our times. It does speak to the Western liberal mindset – as Geir Lundestad acknowledges – but then perhaps this exposes the extent to which the Peace Prize itself has simply become an award that reflects a degree of Western liberal wish-fulfilment. It is perhaps comforting to believe that poverty causes violence, as it serves to endorse a particular kind of concern for the developing world that in turn regards all problems as fundamentally economic rather than deeply – and potentially radically – political.

### disarm bad

#### Disarm bad—gotta have strategic primacy—the alternative requires bloodier and more frequent conflicts

Lieber and Press 10 – Keir A. Lieber, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, and Daryl G. Press, Associate Professor of Political Science at Dartmouth College, March/April 2010, “Second Strike: Is the U.S. Nuclear Arsenal Outmoded?,” Foreign Affairs

Nuclear weapons are a boon for vulnerable states. During the Cold War, the United States deployed them in Europe to defend NATO because Soviet conventional forces seemed overwhelming. Now, the tables are turned: the United States' potential adversaries see nuclear weapons as a vital tool to counter U.S. conventional military superiority. Facing defeat on the battlefield, adversaries would have powerful incentives to use nuclear forces coercively, just as NATO planned to do during the Cold War. The fates of Manuel Noriega, Slobodan Milosevic, Radovan Karadzic, and Saddam Hussein have taught a grim lesson: use every weapon at your disposal to prevent defeat. When Jan Lodal and James Acton call for the elimination or devaluation of nuclear weapons, they assume that U.S. adversaries can be convinced to accept perpetual vulnerability. The Soviet Union could not talk NATO into surrendering its nuclear arsenal during the Cold War, nor can the United States dupe its adversaries into disarming today. The challenge is to grapple with the problem of deterring nuclear escalation during conventional wars, when U.S. adversaries will have every incentive to use their nuclear arsenals to compel a cease-fire. Toward this end, Washington must retain a range of counterforce capabilities, including conventional and low-casualty nuclear weapons. Hans Kristensen, Matthew McKinzie, and Ivan Oelrich raise several technical objections concerning the United States' ability to launch a successful counterforce strike. They dispute whether 3,000 pounds per square inch (PSI) of overpressure produced by low-yield airbursts would be enough to wreck Chinese silos. The use of 3,000 PSI in our model, however, is conservative. Many analysts believe that U.S. Cold War estimates exaggerated the hardness of enemy silos, and analysts with considerable technical expertise on this matter believe that our estimated requirement of 3,000 PSI probably overstates the hardness of China's silos. Most important, our results are not sensitive to moderate changes in assumptions about silo hardness. The United States could conduct a low-casualty nuclear strike--producing fewer than 1,000 fatalities--against all 20 Chinese silos even if they were built to withstand 5,000 PSI. Kristensen, McKinzie, and Oelrich also contend that airbursts alone cannot destroy missile silos. This is incorrect. Airbursts can produce sufficient overpressure to crush the caps that protect missiles in the ground. In fact, the Pentagon assigns "vulnerability numbers" to silos on the basis of their resistance to overpressure. And McKinzie co-authored a 2001 Natural Resources Defense Council report that contradicts the claims that he, Kristensen, and Oelrich make here. The report listed the overpressures required to destroy various Russian missile silos, and it argued that even Russia's silos--which are probably much more robust than China's--are highly vulnerable to a U.S. airburst attack. Our critics further suggest that the existence of mobile missiles obviates our analysis. If the launchers can be located, the argument goes, conventional weapons are sufficient to destroy them; if the launchers cannot be found, even nuclear weapons are useless. But the greatest challenge of targeting mobile missiles is not locating them momentarily; it is continuously tracking them and identifying where they have stopped. Hitting mobile launchers with conventional weapons requires near-perfect real-time intelligence--locating them within a few dozen yards. Even low-yield nuclear warheads would significantly reduce the targeting problem; locating the launchers within about half a mile would suffice if a five-kiloton warhead were used. Kristensen, McKinzie, and Oelrich also note that the U.S. military's current delivery systems are not optimized for a counterforce mission: the most accurate systems (bombs and cruise missiles) are not prompt, and the most prompt systems (ballistic missiles) are not the most accurate. This is true. But current U.S. delivery systems are adequate given the weakness of the adversaries the United States now faces. If Washington wishes to retain effective low-casualty counterforce options, the next generation of nuclear delivery systems should further combine prompt delivery with high accuracy. Lodal tries to link our discussion of counterforce options with the views held by senior officials in the George W. Bush administration. The fact of the matter is that nuclear counterforce options have been a core element of U.S. deterrence doctrine during every administration since Harry Truman's. U.S. strategic planners have understood that for deterrence to be credible, the president needs retaliatory options that he might actually use. Especially today, low-yield nuclear counterforce strikes are a better retaliatory option than high-yield nuclear strikes that, regardless of their target, would kill millions of civilians. The latter would be a disproportionate response to many possible enemy uses of nuclear weapons. Critics of our policy prescriptions must confront two core issues. First, nuclear weapons have fundamentally changed since the Cold War. They once produced stalemate, and nuclear war once meant mass slaughter. For good or ill, that has changed. The revolution in accuracy means that enemy arsenals can be destroyed, and in ways that produce few civilian casualties. Theories of deterrence and beliefs about strategic stability and nuclear force requirements must be reevaluated accordingly.

### Alt Fails—Reformism Good

#### Alt fails—only reformism sticks

Wright, 07 [Erik Olin, Vilas Distinguished Professor of Sociology at the University of Wisconsin, “Guidelines for Envisioning Real Utopias”, Soundings, April, [www.ssc.wisc.edu/~wright/Published%20writing/Guidelines-soundings.pdf](http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~wright/Published%20writing/Guidelines-soundings.pdf)]

5. Waystations The final guideline for discussions of envisioning real utopias concerns the importance of waystations. The central problem of envisioning real utopias concerns the viability of institutional alternatives that embody emancipatory values**,** but the practical achievability of such institutional designs often **depends upon the existence of smaller steps**, intermediate institutional innovations that move us in the right direction but only partially embody these values**.** Institutional proposals which have an **all-or-nothing quality** to them are both **less likely to be adopted in the first place, and may pose more difficult transition-cost problems** if implemented**.** The catastrophic experience of Russia in the “shock therapy” approach to market reform is historical testimony to this problem. Waystations are a difficult theoretical and practical problem because there are many instances in which partial reforms may have very different consequences than full- bodied changes. Consider the example of unconditional basic income. Suppose that a very limited, below-subsistence basic income was instituted: not enough to survive on, but a grant of income unconditionally given to everyone. One possibility is that this kind of basic income would act mainly as a subsidy to employers who pay very low wages, since now they could attract more workers even if they offered below poverty level earnings. There may be good reasons to institute such wage subsidies, but they would not generate the positive effects of a UBI, and therefore might not function as a stepping stone. What we ideally want**, therefore,** are intermediate reforms that have two main properties: **first,** they concretely demonstrate the virtues of the fuller program of transformation, so they contribute to the ideological battle of **convincing people that the alternative is credible and desirable; and second,** they **enhance the capacity for action of people**, increasing their ability to push further in the future. Waystations that increase popular participation and **bring people together in problem-solving deliberations** for collective purposes are particularly salient in this regard**.** This is what in the 1970s was called “nonreformist reforms”**:** reforms that are **possible within existing institutions** and that **pragmatically solve real problems** while at the same time empowering people in ways which **enlarge their scope of action in the future.**

### Action Good (may)

#### Change and survival are key to avoid passivity and ressentiment

May 5 (Todd, Professor of Philosophy at Clemson University, September 2005, “To change the world, to celebrate life,” Philosophy & Social Criticism, Vol. 31, No. 5-6)

For those among us who seek in philosophy a way to grapple with our lives rather than to solve logical puzzles; for those whose reading and whose writing are not merely appropriate steps toward academic advancement but a struggle to see ourselves and our world in a fresher, clearer light; for those who find nourishment among impassioned ideas and go hungry among empty truths: there is a struggle that is often waged within us. It is a struggle that will be familiar to anyone who has heard in Foucault’s sentences the stammering of a fellow human being struggling to speak in words worth hearing. Why else would we read Foucault? We seek to conceive what is wrong in the world, to grasp it in a way that offers us the possibility for change. We know that there is much that is, to use Foucault’s word, ‘intolerable’. There is much that binds us to social and political arrangements that are oppressive, domineering, patronizing, and exploitative. We would like to understand why this is and how it happens, in order that we may prevent its continuance. In short, we want our theories to be tools for changing the world, for offering it a new face, or at least a new expression. There is struggle in this, struggle against ideas and ways of thinking that present themselves to us as inescapable. We know this struggle from Foucault’s writings. It is not clear that he ever wrote about anything else. But this is not the struggle I want to address here. For there is, on the other hand, another search and another goal. They lie not so much in the revisioning of this world as in the embrace of it. There is much to be celebrated in the lives we lead, or in those led by others, or in the unfolding of the world as it is, a world resonant with the rhythms of our voices and our movements. We would like to understand this, too, to grasp in thought the elusive beauty of our world. There is, after all, no other world, except, as Nietzsche taught, for those who would have created another one with which to denigrate our own. In short, we would like our thought to celebrate our lives. To change the world and to celebrate life. This, as the theologian Harvey Cox saw, is the struggle within us.1 It is a struggle in which one cannot choose sides; or better, a struggle in which one must choose both sides. The abandonment of one for the sake of the other can lead only to disaster or callousness. Forsaking the celebration of life for the sake of changing the world is the path of the sad revolutionary. In his preface to Anti-Oedipus, Foucault writes that one does not have to be sad in order to be revolutionary. The matter is more urgent than that, however. One cannot be both sad and revolutionary. Lacking a sense of the wondrous that is already here, among us, one who is bent upon changing the world can only become solemn or bitter. He or she is focused only on the future; the present is what is to be overcome. The vision of what is not but must come to be overwhelms all else, and the point of change itself becomes lost. The history of the left in the 20th century offers numerous examples of this, and the disaster that attends to it should be evident to all of us by now. The alternative is surely not to shift one’s allegiance to the pure celebration of life, although there are many who have chosen this path. It is at best blindness not to see the misery that envelops so many of our fellow humans, to say nothing of what happens to sentient nonhuman creatures. The attempt to jettison world-changing for an uncritical assent to the world as it is requires a self-deception that I assume would be anathema for those of us who have studied Foucault. Indeed, it is anathema for all of us who awaken each day to an America whose expansive boldness is matched only by an equally expansive disregard for those we place in harm’s way. This is the struggle, then. The one between the desire for life-celebration and the desire for world-changing. The struggle between reveling in the contingent and fragile joys that constitute our world and wresting it from its intolerability. I am sure it is a struggle that is not foreign to anyone who is reading this. I am sure as well that the stakes for choosing one side over another that I have recalled here are obvious to everyone. The question then becomes one of how to choose both sides at once.

#### Also, stability-instability paradox means over-reliance on that perceived costs destabilizes MAD

**Winner and Yoshihara** in '0**2** (Andrew and Toshi, Senior Staff and Research Fellow at the Intstitute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Survival, “India and Pakistan at the Edge”, Autumn, Proquest, p. 70)

More generally, the advent of open nuclear deterrence between the two sides may also have set up a dangerous dynamic, described under the term **'stability-instability paradox**'. Long a staple of strategic theory, the Kargil crisis of 1999 may have provided some evidence for this phenomenon's actual operation. In essence, the theory posits that the establishment of nuclear deterrence between two rivals opens up the possibility of conventional war. In the case of Pakistan and India, open nuclear deterrence between the two has allowed Pakistan to neutralise India's conventional military advantage through the threat of nuclear response and escalate its own low-intensity conflict in Kashmir.

#### Some drone use is key to legitimacy – counter terror is a public good

Knowles, 09 [Robert, Assistant Professor, NYU Law, “Article: American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs Constitution”, 41 Ariz. St. L.J. 87, p. lexis]

The United States qualifies as a global hegemon. In many ways, the U.S. acts as a world government. n341 It provides public goods for the world, such as security guarantees, the protection of sea lanes, and support for open markets. n342 After World War II, the U.S. forged a system of military alliances and transnational economic and political institutions - such as the United Nations, NATO, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank - that remain in place today. The U.S. provides security for allies such as Japan and Germany by maintaining a strong military presence in Asia and Europe. n343 Because of its overwhelming military might, the U.S. possesses what amounts to a "quasi-monopoly" on the use of force. n344 This prevents other nations from launching wars that would tend to be truly destabilizing. Similarly, the United States provides a public good through its efforts to combat terrorism and confront - even through regime change - rogue states. n345 The United States also provides a public good through its promulgation and enforcement of international norms. It exercises a dominant influence on the definition of international law because it is the largest "consumer" of such law and the only nation capable of enforcing it on a global scale. n346 The U.S. was the primary driver behind the establishment of the United Nations system and the development of contemporary treaties and institutional regimes to effectuate those treaties in both public and private international law. n347 Moreover, controlling international norms are [\*143] sometimes embodied in the U.S. Constitution and domestic law rather than in treaties or customary international law. For example, whether terrorist threats will be countered effectively depends "in large part on U.S. law regarding armed conflict, from rules that define the circumstances under which the President can use force to those that define the proper treatment of enemy combatants." n348 These public goods provided by the United States stabilize the system by legitimizing it and decreasing resistance to it. The transnational political and economic institutions created by the United States provide other countries with informal access to policymaking and tend to reduce resistance to American hegemony, encouraging others to "bandwagon" with the U.S. rather than seek to create alternative centers of power. n349 American hegemony also coincided with the rise of globalization - the increasing integration and standardization of markets and cultures - which tends to stabilize the global system and reduce conflict. n350The legitimacy of American hegemony is strengthened and sustained by the democratic and accessible nature of the U.S. government. The American constitutional separation of powers is an international public good. The risk that it will hinder the ability of the U.S. to act swiftly, coherently or decisively in foreign affairs is counter-balanced by the benefits it provides in permitting foreigners multiple points of access to the government. n351 Foreign nations and citizens lobby Congress and executive branch agencies in the State, Treasury, Defense, and Commerce Departments, where foreign policy is made. n352 They use the media to broadcast their point of view in an effort to influence the opinion of decision-makers. n353 Because the United States is a nation of immigrants, many American citizens have a specific interest in the fates of particular countries and form "ethnic lobbies" for the purpose of affecting foreign policy. n354 The courts, too, are accessible to foreign nations and non-citizens. The Alien Tort Statute is emerging as an [\*144] important vehicle for adjudicating tort claims among non-citizens in U.S. courts. n355

#### Executive deference fails – judicial oversight brings US policy in line with IHL protections

Wexler, 13 [The Role of the Judicial Branch during the Long War: Drone Courts, Damage Suits, and FOIA Requests, Lesley Wexler, Professor of Law and Thomas A. Mengler Faculty Scholar, 3rd Speaker and semifinalist 1998 National Debate Tournament, p. SSRN]

Introduction The current practice of using drones to engage in overseas killings raises difficult legal questions with incredibly high stakes. The fate of potential targets and collateral damage hangs in the balance along with grave concerns about national and foreign security. Over the past decade, expansive deference to the executive branch has allowed a substantial increase in the number and rate of drone strikes. The use of drones for targeted killing is becoming a regular tool of the U.S. government and perhaps will become so for other governments as well. What role, if any, do courts have to play in regulating this practice? Critics of the status quo would like greater transparency and accountability in regards to targeted killings. In addition to constitutional concerns, some worry the executive branch is violating International Humanitarian Law (IHL). They want the executive branch to reveal its legal under-standings of IHL. They also seek greater information regarding review processes for targeted kill-ings as to both prospective listings and retrospective assessments of compliance. These skeptics contend that the lack of judicial oversight and the opacity of the government’s legal position risks the deaths of innocent foreign civilians, violates democratic accountability norms, erodes our compliance reputation with allies, and helps recruit a new generation of anti-American insurgents. Even if the current approach is lawful, many worry about future administrations or other governments that may adopt drone strikes without sufficient IHL protections. As this chapter describes, some of these critics have proposed the use of courts to foster either transparency or accountability or both. In contrast, many, including the executive and judicial branches themselves, believe that the judicial role regarding drone strikes and targeted killings should be a minimal one. They suggest that an active court reviewing names of those to be targeted, providing damages to victims of un-lawful strikes, or demanding agencies declassify information on drone strikes would compromise an effective strategy in the war on terror. They fear judicial intervention would pose great danger to U.S. soldiers, foreign civilians, and in worst case scenarios, to U.S. citizens at home without en-hancing IHL compliance. In particular, executive branch officials have argued that greater transpar-ency may compromise intelligence efforts, provide targets with additional opportunities to act stra- 3 tegically, and sour relations with states currently willing to provide sub rosa permission for strikes. Meanwhile, these court opponents suggest that sufficient internal and congressional oversight can prevent unlawful activity. They also push back on the opacity charge by noting the information pro-vided through a series of high-level administration speeches and unacknowledged leaks. The U.S. judiciary itself is often reluctant to aggressively intervene in national security mat-ters and other legal issues arising out of armed conflicts. Federal courts frequently employ a variety of procedural postures and substantive doctrines to avoid deciding live IHL controversies. But the judicial branch sometimes surprises, as when the Supreme Court spoke to detention policy and its relationship to IHL in the trio of war on terror cases Hamdi,1 Hamdan,2 and Boumediene.3 U.S. courts might look to other countries, like Israel, whose courts have ruled on targeted killings and issued guidelines informed by IHL to govern future behavior.4 This chapter suggests the judiciary may play an important role in the debate over the executive branch’s decisions regarding IHL even if it declines to speak to the substance of such cases. First, advocates may use courts as a visible platform in which to make their arguments and spur conversations about alternative, non-judicially mandated transparency and accountability measures. As they did with the trio of detention cases, advocates can leverage underlying constitutional concerns about the treatment of citizens to stimulate interest in the larger IHL issues. Second, litigants may use courts to publicize and pursue Freedom of Information (FOIA) requests and thus enhance transparency. Even if courts decline to grant FOIA requests, the lawsuits can generate media attention about what remains undisclosed. Third, and most robustly, Congress may pass legislation that would facilitate either prospective review of kill lists through a so-called drone court or remove procedural barriers to retrospective damage suits for those unlawfully killed by a drone strike. **Even** the threat of such a judicial role may influence executive **branch** behavior.

### Getting Better

#### Violence declining now – heg is the reason

**Owen 11** [John M. Owen Professor of Politics at University of Virginia PhD from Harvard "DON’T DISCOUNT HEGEMONY" Feb 11 [www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/](http://www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/)]

Andrew Mack and his colleagues at the Human Security Report Project are to be congratulated. Not only do they present a study with a striking conclusion, driven by data, free of theoretical or ideological bias, but they also do something quite unfashionable: they bear good news. Social scientists really are not supposed to do that. Our job is, if not to be Malthusians, then at least to point out disturbing trends, looming catastrophes, and the imbecility and mendacity of policy makers. And then it is to say why, if people listen to us, things will get better. We do this as if our careers depended upon it, and perhaps they do; for if all is going to be well, what need then for us?

Our colleagues at Simon Fraser University are brave indeed. That may sound like a setup, but it is not. I shall challenge neither the data nor the general conclusion that **violent conflict around the world has been decreasing** in fits and starts since the Second World War. When it comes to violent conflict among and within countries, things have been getting better. (The trends have not been linear—Figure 1.1 actually shows that the frequency of interstate wars peaked in the 1980s—but the 65-year movement is clear.) Instead I shall accept that Mack et al. are correct on the macro-trends, and focus on their explanations they advance for these remarkable trends. With apologies to any readers of this forum who recoil from academic debates, this might get mildly theoretical and even more mildly methodological.

Concerning international wars, one version of the “nuclear-peace” theory is not in fact laid to rest by the data. It is certainly true that nuclear-armed states have been involved in many wars. They have even been attacked (think of Israel), which falsifies the simple claim of “assured destruction”—that any nuclear country A will deter any kind of attack by any country B because B fears a retaliatory nuclear strike from A.

But the most important “nuclear-peace” claim has been about *mutually* assured destruction, which obtains between two robustly nuclear-armed states. The claim is that (1) rational states having second-strike capabilities—enough deliverable nuclear weaponry to survive a nuclear first strike by an enemy—will have an overwhelming incentive not to attack one another; and (2) we can safely assume that nuclear-armed states are rational. It follows that states with a second-strike capability will not fight one another.

Their colossal atomic arsenals neither kept the United States at peace with North Vietnam during the Cold War nor the Soviet Union at peace with Afghanistan. But the argument remains strong that those arsenals did help keep the United States and Soviet Union at peace with each other. Why non-nuclear states are not deterred from fighting nuclear states is an important and open question. But in a time when calls to ban the Bomb are being heard from more and more quarters, we must be clear about precisely what the broad trends toward peace can and cannot tell us. They may tell us nothing about why we have had no World War III, and little about the wisdom of banning the Bomb now.

Regarding the downward trend in *international* war, Professor Mack is friendlier to more palatable theories such as the “democratic peace” (democracies do not fight one another, and the proportion of democracies has increased, hence less war); the interdependence or “commercial peace” (states with extensive economic ties find it irrational to fight one another, and interdependence has increased, hence less war); and the notion that people around the world are more anti-war than their forebears were. Concerning the downward trend in *civil* wars, he favors theories of economic growth (where commerce is enriching enough people, violence is less appealing—a logic similar to that of the “commercial peace” thesis that applies among nations) and the end of the Cold War (which end reduced superpower support for rival rebel factions in so many Third-World countries).

These are all **plausible mechanisms** for peace. What is more, none of them excludes any other; all could be working toward the same end. That would be somewhat puzzling, however. Is the world just lucky these days? How is it that an array of peace-inducing factors happens to be working coincidentally in our time, when such a magical array was absent in the past? The answer may be that one or more of these mechanisms reinforces some of the others, or perhaps some of them are mutually reinforcing. Some scholars, for example, have been focusing on whether economic growth might support democracy and vice versa, and whether both might support international cooperation, including to end civil wars.

We would still need to explain how this charmed circle of causes got started, however. And here let me raise another factor, perhaps even less appealing than the “nuclear peace” thesis, at least outside of the United States. That factor is what international relations scholars call hegemony—specifically American hegemony.

A theory that many regard as discredited, but that refuses to go away, is called hegemonic stability theory. The theory emerged in the 1970s in the realm of international political economy. It asserts that for the global economy to remain open—for countries to keep barriers to trade and investment low—one powerful country must take the lead. Depending on the theorist we consult, “taking the lead” entails paying for global public goods (keeping the sea lanes open, providing liquidity to the international economy), coercion (threatening to raise trade barriers or withdraw military protection from countries that cheat on the rules), or both. The theory is skeptical that international cooperation in economic matters can emerge or endure absent a hegemon. The distastefulness of such claims is self-evident: they imply that it is good for everyone the world over if one country has more wealth and power than others. More precisely, they imply that it has been good for the world that the United States has been so predominant.

There is no obvious reason why hegemonic stability theory could not apply to other areas of international cooperation, including in security affairs, human rights, international law, peacekeeping (UN or otherwise), and so on. What I want to suggest here—suggest, not test—is that American hegemony might just be a deep cause of the steady decline of political deaths in the world.

How could that be? After all, the report states that United States is the third most war-prone country since 1945. Many of the deaths depicted in Figure 10.4 were in wars that involved the United States (the Vietnam War being the leading one). Notwithstanding politicians’ claims to the contrary, a candid look at U.S. foreign policy reveals that the country is as ruthlessly self-interested as any other great power in history.

The answer is that U.S. hegemony might just be a **deeper cause of the proximate causes outlined by** Professor Mack. Consider economic growth and openness to foreign trade and investment, which (so say some theories) **render violence irrational**. American power and policies may be responsible for these in two related ways. First, at least since the 1940s Washington has prodded other countries to embrace the market capitalism that entails economic openness and produces **sustainable** economic growth. The United States promotes capitalism for selfish reasons, of course: its own domestic system depends upon growth, which in turn depends upon the efficiency gains from economic interaction with foreign countries, and the more the better. During the Cold War most of its allies accepted some degree of market-driven growth.

Second, the U.S.-led western victory in the Cold War damaged the credibility of alternative paths to development—communism and import-substituting industrialization being the two leading ones—and left market capitalism the best model. The end of the Cold War also involved an end to the billions of rubles in Soviet material support for regimes that tried to make these alternative models work. (It also, as Professor Mack notes, eliminated the superpowers’ incentives to feed civil violence in the Third World.) What we call globalization is caused in part by the emergence of the United States as the global hegemon.

The same case can be made, with somewhat more difficulty, concerning the spread of democracy. Washington has supported democracy only under certain conditions—the chief one being the absence of a popular anti-American movement in the target state—but those conditions have become much more widespread following the collapse of communism. Thus in the 1980s the Reagan administration—the most anti-communist government America ever had—began to dump America’s old dictator friends, starting in the Philippines. Today Islamists tend to be anti-American, and so the Obama administration is skittish about democracy in Egypt and other authoritarian Muslim countries. But general U.S. material and moral support for liberal democracy remains strong.

The trouble with hegemonic stability theory is that it is difficult to test. The difficulty lies in the unobservable qualities of hegemony: it is about not simply material power—guns and money—but “soft power,” persuasion, ideas, things difficult to quantify and measure. Still, many scholars of international relations continue to think that there is much to the theory. The implications are large. If American hegemony does indeed underpin, at least indirectly, the virtuous macro-trends outlined in Professor Mack’s essay—the overall downward trend in wars and political deaths—then the decline in American hegemony many analysts are now seeing is about much more than the humbling of a superpower.

#### Empiricism is useful, despite complexity

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The differences among the ontologies of various positivists at one end, and the different degrees of subjectivism among various interpretive theorists at the other end, both suggest that moving a little further away from each extreme might get us closer to a "middle ground" on the issue of an objective/subjective ontology of social reality. This "middle ground" may be best exemplified in Max Weber's position on the problem of subjectivity. Although there are contending perspectives on where the "real" Weber came down on this question, 13 Weber is clear that his empirical analysis is not intended to support analytic laws or even provide exhaustive causal explanations of all aspects of a social phenomenon. In his famous essay, "'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy," in addition to placing quotation marks around the word ''objectivity," he states that "as far back as we may go into the gray mist of the far-off past, the reality to which the laws apply always remains equally individual, equally undeducible from laws." Weber goes on to note that his method of classification through "ideal-types" are designed not to objectively capture general laws, but only to generate a better understanding of an "infinitely complex" reality through the "analytic accentuation" of certain aspects on the basis of the investigator's own interests.14 In another essay on "Basic Sociological Terms," Weber argues that subjectivity does not rule out the possibility of a systematic investigation into certain aspects of a phenomena because " 'recapturing an experience' is . . . not an absolute precondition for its interpretation."15 It is easy to interpret these statements as indicative that Weber was ambivalent in addressing the problem of subjectivity, and yet the ambivalence itself might be indicative of a pragmatic intermediate position that is no less compelling than the more definitive positions staked out by positivists and relativists. Clearly, Weber is hardly being a radical subjectivist or relativist when he argues that interpretation does not presuppose "recapturing" an experience or when he constructs "ideal types" to categorize social phenomena; at the same time, he is cautious about inferring too much from social patterns or regularities given that these regularities are abstracted from a complex reality by individual social scientists primarily on the basis of what is of interest to them. Taking the lead from this interpretation of Weber's ontology, we can identify an approximate "center" on the problem of objective/subjective reality in social analysis reflected in the following proposition: While social reality is subjectively experienced and socially constructed, it is sufficiently "intersubjective" to permit the investigator opportunities to extract a generalizable "interpretive understanding" of the meanings that individuals attach to actions and subjective experiences in different historical and cultural contexts. Such an "intersubjective" ontology, while hardly unique to Weberians, leaves the door open to a wider variety of social analysis and enables all but the most extreme objectivists and subjectivists to communicate with one another in attempting to better grasp aspects of social reality.

### AT: Virilio/numbibng

#### Their tech numbing arguments are the status quo—we create rules to reduce that—it’s also ultimately a shitty Virillio K…

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Recently, this general hum of activity has been powered up by information technology. True, the speed and interconnectedness of information and communications technology may have produced new vulnerabilities but, generally speaking, information and communications technology has probably made cities more robust by adding more degrees of redundancy. Simple things like risk analysis and other institutionalised forms of diligence, booking systems, etc. have made the business of maintenance and repair easier to carry out and, indeed, is beginning to automate at least some of this activity (as in, for example, the instance of machines that send messages that they are breaking down). More to the point, in situations of breakdown, whether epic or mundane, the humble mobile phone has extended the city’s interactivity and adaptability in all kinds of ways and may well have been the most significant device to add to a city’s overall resilience by adding an extra thread to the urban knot. In addition, all kinds of knowledges of maintenance and repair which are heavily dependent upon information and communications technologies are coming to the fore, all the way from logistics to disaster planning itself (which, in certain senses, is a branch of logistics).

I want to argue that this activity constitutes an urban technological unconscious which helps to keep cities as predictable objects in which things turn up as they are meant to, regularly and predictably (THRIFT, 2004a). Modern Western cities are in many ways mass engineerings of time and space and this engineering increasingly involves working with very small spaces (of the order of millimetres) and times (of the order of milliseconds). At this scale, this means working on the structure of anticipation, producing a comforting sense of regularity and a corresponding (and probably amplified historically) sense of annoyance when things do not play out exactly as it is intended that they should. In a sense, speed has produced a new landscape of anticipation. Some commentators see this landscape as a threat, likely to institute a new «dromocracy». I am more ambivalent. It seems to me that it offers possibilities too, and not least in providing rapid reaction to problems large and small. Indeed, as information technology systems come in which are based on continuous updating of information, some degree of capacity to track and trace and the ability to forecast forward in a very limited way (for example, through profiling systems), so it seems to me that cities will add another landscape to their repertoire, one which works a few seconds or minutes or, in extreme cases, hours ahead of the present and which will add markedly to their resilience. Of course, there is a new repertoire of risk associated with this landscape of foresight but whether it is that much larger than many other developments remains to be seen. Computer systems are vulnerable to attack just like any other system but it is also important to remember the continuous amount of repair and maintenance which goes into these systems anyway and reactions to attacks by worms or viruses are rapidly being incorporated into this burgeoning structure.