# Round 5—Neg vs Vermont BB

## 1NC

### 1nc before the law

Before the law is a gatekeeper. To this gatekeeper comes a man from the country who asks to gain entry into the law. But the gatekeeper says that he cannot grant him entry at the moment. The man thinks about it and then asks if he will be allowed to come in later on. “It is possible,” says the gatekeeper, “but not now.” At the moment the gate to the law iss open, as always, and the gatekeeper walks to the side, so the man bends over in order to see through the gate into the inside. When the gatekeeper notices that, he laughs and says: “If it tempts you so much, try it in spite of my prohibition. But take note: I am powerful. And I am only the most lowly gatekeeper. But from room to room are gatekeepers, each more powerful than the other. I can’t endure even one glimpse of the third.” The man from the country has not expected such difficulties: the law should always be accessible for everyone, he thinks, but as he now looks more closely at the gatekeeper in his fur coat, at his large pointed nose and his long, thin, black Tartar’s beard, he decides that it would be better to wait until he gets permission to go inside. The gatekeeper gives him a stool and allows him to sit down at the side in front of the gate. There he sits for days and years. He makes many attempts to be let in, and he wears the gatekeeper out with his requests. The gatekeeper often interrogates him briefly, questioning him about his homeland and many other things, but they are indifferent questions, the kind great men put, and at the end he always tells him once more that he cannot let him inside yet. The man, who has equipped himself with many things for his journey, spends everything, no matter how valuable, to win over the gatekeeper. The latter takes it all but, as he does so, says, “I am taking this only so that you do not think you have failed to do anything.” During the many years the man observes the gatekeeper almost continuously. He forgets the other gatekeepers, and this one seems to him the only obstacle for entry into the law. He curses the unlucky circumstance, in the first years thoughtlessly and out loud, later, as he grows old, he still mumbles to himself. He becomes childish and, since in the long years studying the gatekeeper he has come to know the fleas in his fur collar, he even asks the fleas to help him persuade the gatekeeper. Finally his eyesight grows weak, and he does not know whether things are really darker around him or whether his eyes are merely deceiving him. But he recognizes now in the darkness an illumination which breaks inextinguishably out of the gateway to the law. Now he no longer has much time to live. Before his death he gathers in his head all his experiences of the entire time up into one question which he has not yet put to the gatekeeper. He waves to him, since he can no longer lift up his stiffening body.

The gatekeeper has to bend way down to him, for the great difference has changed things to the disadvantage of the man. “What do you still want to know, then?” asks the gatekeeper. “You are insatiable.” “Everyone strives after the law,” says the man, “so how is that in these many years no one except me has requested entry?” The gatekeeper sees that the man is already dying and, in order to reach his diminishing sense of hearing, he shouts at him, “Here no one else can gain entry, since this entrance was assigned only to you. I’m going now to close it.

Franz Kafka, the parable “Before the Law,” <http://www.kafka-online.info/before-the-law-page2.html>. **Gendered language read in context from Kafka’s original German—we don’t endorse it.**

#### “Before the Law” is Franz Kafka’s profound RUPTURE with transcendent ordering, which sees the law as *existing* but always *out there*, in the hands only of the gate keepers, who validate the existence of the objective Law via the act of punishment, an endless feedback loop of representations on top of representations of the law, ultimately concealing that there is just no *there* there. We are all before the law—it is merely a question of how we interpret it.

#### The law is an assemblage, a social machine, whose component parts constitute *only* our belief in the transcendent signifier of the Law.

#### We affirm the potentiality of minor literature to put the law, language, and reality themselves to flight: Kafka writes *escape routes* that use representations of the law themselves to dismantle the assemblage of the law, to focus in on such small parts of the so-called law that the assumed existence of such a system is called into question.

Deleuze and Guattari 86. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature*, “Immanence and Desire,” pg. 43-52

Negative theology (or the theology of absence), the transcendence of the law, the a prioriness of guilt are the dominant themes of so much Kafka interpreta- tion. The famous passages in The Trial (as well as in "The Penal Colony" and "The Great Wall of China") present the law as a pure and empty form without content, the object of which remains unknowable: thus, the law can be expressed only through a sentence, and the sentence can be learned only through a punishment. No one knows the law's interior. No one knows what the law is in the Colony; and the needles of the machine write the sentence on the body of the condemned, who doesn't know the law, at the same time as they inflict their tor- ture upon him. "He will learn [the sentence] on his body." In "The Great Wall of China": "[I]t is an extremely painful thing to be ruled by laws that one does not know. . . . [T]he essence of a secret code is that it should remain a mys- tery." Kant constructed a rational theory of the law's reversal from a Greek con- ception to the Judeo-Christian one. The law no longer depends on a preexistent Good that would give it a materiality; it is a pure form on which the good such as it is depends. The good is that which the law expresses when it expresses it- self. One might say that Kafka situates himself as part of this reversal. But the humor that he puts into it shows an entirely different intention. For him, it is less a question of presenting this image of a transcendental and unknowable law than of dissecting the mechanism of an entirely different sort of machine, which needs this image of the law only to align its gears and make them function to- gether with "a perfect synchronicity" (as soon as this image-photo disappears, the pieces of the machine disperse as in "The Penal Colony"). The Trial must be considered a scientific investigation, a report of the experiments on the functioning of a machine in which the law runs the strong risk of playing no more than the role of exterior armature. That's why the texts in The Trial should be used only with great care. The primary problem has involved misjudging the relative importance of these texts and making unwarranted assumptions about their placement in the novel, as is expecially evident in the ways that Max Brod arranged things to support his thesis of negative theology.

Two chapters are of particular concern: the brief final chapter, about K's execution, and the preceding chapter, "In the Cathedral," in which the priest represents the discourse of the law. Nothing tells us that the final chapter was written at the end of The Trial; it might have been written when Kafka had just begun to revise and was still under the influence of his breakup with Felice. It is a premature, delayed, aborted ending. One can't fix the place where Kafka would have put it. It might well be a dream that could fit anywhere in the course of the novel. Indeed, Kafka published, by itself and under the title "A Dream," another fragment originally envisioned for The Trial. Max Brod is thus better inspired when he notes the degree to which The Trial is an interminable novel, necessarily indefinite: "But as the trial, according to the author's own statement made by word of mouth, was never to get as far as the highest Court, in a certain sense the novel could never be terminated—that is to say, it could be prolonged into infinity" (postface toTrans. Willa and Edwin Muir. [New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956], 334). The idea of ending with K's execution is con- tradicted by the whole direction of the novel and by the quality of "unlimited postponement" that regulates The Trial. The imposition of K's execution as the final chapter seems to have an equivalent in the history of literature—the place- ment of the famous description of the plague at the end of Lucretius's book. In both cases, it is a question of showing that at the last moment, an epicurian can do no more than submit to agony, or that a Prague Jew can only assume the guilt that is operating within him. As for the other chapter, "In the Cathedral," the place of honor given to it, as though it indicated some sort of key to the novel, as though it constituted proof of the book's religious character, is also well con- tradicted by its own content. The story about the gatekeeper of the law remains highly ambiguous, and K learns that the priest who tells this story is a member of the judiciary apparatus, chaplain for the prisons, one element in a whole series of other elements, and that he has no privilege, since the series has no need to stop with him. We agree with Uyttersprot's proposal to remove this chapter and put it before that entitled "The Lawyer, the Industrialist, and the Painter."1

From the point of view of a supposed transcendence of the law, there must be a certain necessary connection of the law with guilt, with the unknowable, with the sentence or the utterance. Guilt must in fact be the a priori that corresponds to transcendence, for each person or for everyone, guilty or innocent. Having no object and being only pure form, the law cannot be a domain of knowledge but is exclusively the domain of an absolute practical necessity: the priest in the cathedral explains that "it is not necessary to accept everything as true, one must only accept it as necessary." Finally, because it has no object of knowledge, the law is operative only in being stated and is stated only in the act of punishment: a statement directly inscribed on the real, on the body and the flesh; a practical statement opposed to any sort of speculative proposition. All these themes are well presented in The Trial. But it is precisely these themes that will be the object of a dismantling (demontage), and even of a demolition, throughout Kafka's long experimentation. The first aspect of this dismantling consists in "eliminating any idea of guilt from the start," this being part of the accusation itself: culpability is never anything but the superficial movement whereby judges and even lawyers confine you in order to prevent you from en- gaging in a real movement—that is, from taking care of your own affairs.2 Sec- ond, K will realize that even if the law remains unrecognizable, this is not because it is hidden by its transcendence, but simply because it is always denuded of any interiority: it is always in the office next door, or behind the door, on to infinity (we can already see this quite well in the first chapter of The Trial where everything happens in the "room next door"). Finally, it is not the law that is stated because of the demands of a hidden transcendence; it is almost the exact opposite: it is the statement, the enunciation, that constructs the law in the name of an immanent power of the one who enounces it—the law is confused with that which the guardian utters, and the writings precede the law, rather than being the necessary and derived expression of it.

The three worst themes in many interpretations of Kafka are the transcen- dence of the law, the interiority of guilt, the subjectivity of enunciation. They are connected to all the stupidities that have been written about allegory, meta- phor, and symbolism in Kafka. And also, the idea of the tragic, of the internal drama, of the intimate tribunal, and so on. No doubt, Kafka holds out the bait. He holds it out even, and especially, to Oedipus; not from complacency but be- cause he wants to make a very special use of Oedipus to serve his diabolical proj- ect. It is absolutely useless to look for a theme in a writer if one hasn't asked exactly what its importance is in the work-that is, how it functions (and not what its "sense" is). Law, guilt, interiority—Kafka has a great need for them as the superficial movement of his work. Superficial movement doesn't mean a mask underneath which something else would be hidden. The superficial movement indicates points of undoing, of dismantling, that must guide the experimentation to show the molecular movements and the machinic assemblages of which the superficial movement is a global result. We could say that law, guilt, interi- ority are everywhere. But all that is necessary is to consider a specific piece of the writing machine-for example, the three pricipal gears—letters, stories, novels —in order to see that these themes are really nowhere present and don't function at all. Each of these gears certainly has a primary affective tonality. But, in the letters, it is fear, not guilt: fear of the trap that is closing in on it, fear of a return of flux, the vampire's fear of being surprised in full daylight by the sun, by religion, by garlic, and by the stake through the heart (Kafka is greatly afraid, in his letters, of people and what can happen because of them; this is quite different from guilt or humiliation). And in the stories about a becoming-animal, it is escape that has an affective tonality apart from any con- nection to guilt and also distinct from fear; the becoming-animal lives a life of escape more than one of fear (the animal in "The Burrow" isn't really afraid, and the jackals aren't afraid—they liverather in a sort of "lunatic hope"; the musical dogs "that could dare achieve such thing had no need to fear such things"). In the novels, finally, it is strange to see the degree to which K doesn't feel any guilt and doesn't feel fear and doesn't flee; he is completely audacious and he offers a new tonality that is very strange, a sense of dismantling that is simultaneously that of a judge and that of an engineer, a veritable feeling, a Gemut. Fear, flight, dismantling—we should think of them as three passions, three in- tensities, correponding to the diabolical pact, to the becoming-animal, to the machinic and collective assemblages.

So, should we support realist and social interpretations of Kafka? Certainly, since they are infinitely closer to noninterpretation. And it is much more worthwhile to talk about the problems of minor literature, about the situation of a Jew in Prague, about America, about bureaucracies and about great trials, than to talk about an absent God. One could object that Kafka's America is unreal, that the New York strike remains intangible, that the most difficult working condi- tions receive no indignation in his work, that the election of the judge falls into the realm of pure nonsense. One might correctly note that there is never any criticism in Kafka. Even in "The Great Wall of China," the minority party can even believe that the law is only an arbitrary fact of the "nobility"; the party ex- presses no anger, and "that is the real reason why the parties who believe tht there is no law have remained so few—although their doctrine is in certain ways so attractive, for it unequivocally recognizes the nobility and its right to go on existing." InK doesn't attack the law and willingly aligns himself with the strong side and the executioners: he prods Franz who is being whipped; he terrorizes an accused person by seizing him by the arm; at the lawyer's, he makes fun of Block. In The Castle, K likes to menace and punish whenever he can. Can we conclude that, not being a "critic of his time," Kafka turned his criti- cism "against himself and had no other tribunal than an "internal tribunal"? This would be grotesque, since it would turn criticism into a dimension of representa- tion. If representation is not external, it can be only internal from here on. But it's really something else in Kafka: Kafka attempts to extract from social representations assemblages of enunciation and machinic assemblages and to dismantle these assemblages. Already in the animal stories, Kafka was drawing lines of escape; but he didn't "flee the world." Rather, it was the world and its representation that hend that he made follow these lines. It was a question of seeing and speaking like a beetle, like a dung beetle. Even more, in the novels, the dismantling of the assemblages makes the social representation take flight in a much more effective way than a critique would have done and brings about a deterritorialization of the world that is itself political and that has nothing to do with an activity of intimacy.3

#### Writing itself can have a radical character: translate everything into assemblages or machines of words, and then dismantle those assemblages. This is particularly poignant in terms of how Kafka, a Czech Jew, chose to situate himself *within* the German language of the majority in order to force it to take flight

Deleuze and Guattari 86. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature*, “Immanence and Desire,” pg. 43-52

Writing has a double function: to translate everything into assemblages and to dismantle the assemblages. The two are the same thing. This is why we have been distinguishing in Kafka's work instances that are in fact enmeshed in each other—first,achinlc indexes;abstract machines;e assem- blages of the machine. The machinic indexes are the signs of an assemblage that has not yet been established or dismantled because one knows only the individual pieces that go into making it up, but not how they go together. Most frequently, these pieces are living beings, animals, but they are only valuable as moving pieces or configurations of an assemblage that goes beyond them, and whose mystery remains because they are only the operators or executors of this assemblage. Thus, the musical dogs are actually pieces of the musical assemblage and produce a cacaphony by "the lifting and setting down of their feet, certain turns of the head, their running and their ising still, the position which they [take] up in relation to one another." But they function only as indexes, since they "[do] not speak, they [do] not sing, they remain generally silent, almost determinedly silent." These machinic indexes (which are not at all allegorical or symbolical) are particularly well developed in the acts of the becoming-animal and in the animalistic stories. "The Metamorphosis" forms a complex assemblage in which the index-elements are Gregor-animal and the musical sister; in which the index-objects are the food, the sound, the photo, and the apple; and in which the index configurations are the familial triangle and the bureaucratic triangle. The bent head that straightens up and the sound that latches onto the voice and derails it also function as indexes of this sort in the majority of the stories. There is thus a machinic index each time a machine is being built and is beginning to function, even though one doesn't know how the disparate parts that make it up and make it work actually function. But the reverse case also appears in the sto- ries: abstract machines surge into existence by themselves, without indexes. But in this case, they don't function, or no longer function. Such is the machine in the Penal Colony that answers to the Law of the old warden and doesn't survive its own dismantling; such is the creature named Odradek about whom "one is tempted to believe that the creature once had some sort of intelligible shape and is now only a broken-down remnant. Yet this does not seem to be the case . . . [T]he whole thing looks senseless enough but in its own way per- fectly finished"; such too are Blumfeld's ping-pong balls. Yet it seems also that the representation of the transcendental law, with its elements of guilt and unknowability, is an abstract machine of this sort. If the machine of the Penal Colony, as representative of the law, appears to be archaic and outmoded, this is not because, as people have often claimed, there is a new law that is much more modern but because the form of the law in general is inseparable from an abstract, self-destructive machine and cannot develop in a concrete way. This is why the stories seem to encounter two dangers that make them stop short or force them to remain incomplete or prevent them from developing into novels: either they are nothing more than machinic indexes of the assembly, no matter how lively they appear to be; or they put into operation abstract machines that are all assembled, but dead, and never succeed in concretely plugging intothings (we should note that Kafka willingly publishes his texts on transcendental law in short stories that he detaches from the whole).

Thus there remain machinic assemblages as objects of the novel. This time the machinic indexes stop being animal; they group, give birth to series, start proliferating, taking over all sorts of human figures or parts of figures. On the other hand, the abstract machine changes in a singular fashion. It stops being reified and isolated; it no longer exists outside the concrete, socio-political as- semblages that incarnate it. It diffuses into them and measures their machinic degree. Finally, the assemblage no longer works as a machine in the process of assembling itself, with a mysterious function, or as a fully assembled machine that doesn't function, or no longer functions. It works only through the dismantling that it brings about on the machine and on representation. And, actually functioning, it functions only through and because of its own dismantling. It is born from this dismantling (it is never the assembling of the ma- chine that interests Kafka). This method of active dismantling doesn't make use of criticism that is still part of representation. Rather, it consists in prolonging, in accelerating, a whole movement that already is traversing the social field. It operates in a virtuality that is already real without yet being actual (the diabolical powers of the future that for the moment are only brushing up against the door). The assemblage appears not in a still encoded and territorial criticism but in a decoding, in a deterritorialization, and in the novelistic acceleration of this decoding and this deterritorialization (as was the case with the German language—to always go farther in this movement that takes over the whole social field). This method is much more intense than any critique K says so himself. One's goal is to transform what is still only a method (precede) in the social field into a procedure as an infinite virtual movement that at the extreme invokes the machinic assemblage of the trial(proces)s a reality that is on its way and al- ready there.4 The whole of this operation is to be called a Process, one that is precisely interminable. Marthe Robert underlines the link between the trial and the procedure, and this is certainly not a mental, psychical, or interior procedure.

#### The law functions purely and only through desire: the law is written in a porno book, and we’re all fantasizing, calling its transcendent order into existence

Deleuze and Guattari 86. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature*, “Immanence and Desire,” pg. 43-52

Here, then, are the new characteristics of the novelistic machinic assemblage in opposition to the indexes and the abstract machines. These characteristics im-pose not an interpretation or a social representation of Kafka but an experimenta- tion, a socio-political investigation. Since the assemblage functions really in the real, the question becomes: how does it function? What function does it have? (Only later will we ask what it consists of and what its elements and its links are.) Thus, we must follow the movement oft several levels, taking account of objective uncertainty about the supposed last chapter and of the cer- tainty that the second-to-last chapter, "In the Cathedral" was more or less poorly placed by Max Brod. According to a first view, everything is false in The Trial: even the law, in contrast to Kantian law, erects the lie into a universal rule. The lawyers are false lawyers, the judges are false judges, "oafish inspectors," "cor- rupt warders," or at the very least are so much subalterns that they hide the real matters and "the proceedings of an inaccessible justice" that no longer lets itself be represented. Nonetheless, if this first view is not definitive, this is because there is a power in the false, and it is bad to weigh justice in terms of true or false. So the second view is much more important: where one believed there was the law, there is in fact desire and desire alone. Justice is desire and not law. Everyone in fact is a functionary of justice—not only the spectators, not only the priest and the painter, but also the equivocal young women and the perverse little girls who take up so much space in The Trial. K's book in the cathedral is not a prayerbook but an album of the town; the judge's book contains only obscene pictures. The law is written in a porno book. Here, it is no longer a question of suggesting an eventual falsity of justice but of suggesting its desiring quality: the accused are in principle the most handsome figures and are recog- nized for their strange beauty. The judges act and reason "like children." It hap- pens that a simple joke can derout repression. Justice is not Necessity but, quite the contrary, Chance; and Titorelli paints the allegory of it as a blind fortune, a winged desire. It is not a stable will but a moving desire. It is curious, K says, how justice must not move in order to not sway its scales. But the priest explains at another moment, 'The Court wants nothing from you. It receives you when you come and dismisses you when you go." The young women are not equivocal because they hide their nature as auxiliaries of justice; on the contrary, they show themselves to be auxiliaries because they simultaneously bring bliss to judges, lawyers, and accused, out of a single and unique polyvocal desire. The whole of *The Trial* is overrun by a polyvocality of desire that gives it its erotic force. Repression doesn't belong to justice unless it is also desire itself—desire in the one who is repressed as well as in the one who represses. And the authorities of justice are not those who look for offenses but those who are "attracted, propelled by offense." They nose around, they rummage about, they search everywhere. They are ~~blind~~ and accept no evidence but take into consideration only hallway events, the whispers of the courtroom, the secrets of the chambers, the noise heard behind doors, the murmurs from behind the scene, all those microevents that express desire and its arbitrary fortunes.

#### Hold their transcendence up to molecular, microscopic investigation: tiny affects, momentary perceptions, and quotidian interpretations contribute to a collective *desiring-law* which holds the whole system together. Situate the law immanent to your own body: how do you participate in it? Lose yourself, your essence, and your sense of personhood and study the fluxes and flows of desire which made those attributes realizable in the first place.

Deleuze and Guattari 86. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature*, “Immanence and Desire,” pg. 43-52

From this point on, it is even more important to renounce the idea of a transcendence of the law. If the ultimate instances are inaccessible and cannot be represented, this occurs not as a function of an infinite hierarchy belonging to a negative theology but as a function of a contiguity of desire that causes what- ever happens to happen always in the office next door. The contiguity of the offices, the segmentalization of power, replaces the hierarchy of instances and the eminence of the sovereign (already, the castle had revealed itself to be a seg- mental and contiguous rambling assemblage in the style of the Hapsburg bureaucracy or the mosaic of nations in the Austrian empire). If everything, everyone, is part of justice, if everyone is an auxiliary of justice, from the priest to the little girls, this is not because of the transcendence of the law but because of the immanence of desire. This is the discovery into which K's investigation and experimentation very quickly locks itself. While the Uncle pushes him to take his trial seriously, for example, to see a lawyer and pass through all the steps of transcendence, K realizes that he should not let himself be represented, that he has no need of a representative—that no one should come between him and his desire. He will find justice only by moving, by going from room to room, by following his desire. He will take control of the machine of expression: he will take over the investigation, he will write without stop, he will demand a leave of absence so he can totally devote himself to this "virtually interminable" work. It is in this sense that The Trial is an interminable novel. An unlimited field of immanence instead of an infinite transcendence. The transcendence of the law was an image, a photo of the highest places; but justice is more like a sound (the statement) that never stops taking flight. The transcendence of the law was an abstract machine, but the law exists only in the immanence of the machinic assemblage of justice. The Trial is the dismantling of all transcendental justifications. There is nothing to judge vis-a-vis desire; the judge himself is completely shaped by desire. Justice is no more than the immanent process of desire. The process is itself a continuum, but a continuum made up of contigui- ties. The contiguous is not opposed to the continuous—quite the contrary, it is a local and indefinitely prolongable version of the continuous. Thus, it is also the dismantling of the continuous-always an office next door, always the contiguous room. Barnabas "is admitted into certain rooms, but they're only a part of the whole, for there are barriers behind which there are more rooms. Not that he's actually forbidden to pass the barriers. . . . And you musn't imagine that these barriers are a definite dividing-line. . . . [T]here are barriers he can pass, and they're just the same as the ones he's never yet passed." Justice is the

continuum of desire, with shifting limits that are always displaced. It is this procedure, this continuum, this field of immanence that the painter, Titorelli, analyzes as unlimited postponement. A central part of The Trial that makes Titorelli into a special character of the novel. He distinguishes three theo- retical possibilities: definite acquittal, ostensible or superficial acquittal, and un- limited postponement. The first case never in fact comes about, since it would imply the death or abolition of a desire that would have reached a conclusion. On the other hand, the second case corresponds to the abstract machine of law. It is defined, in fact, by the opposition of fluxes, the alternation of poles, the succession of periods—a counterflux of the law in response to a flux of desire, a pole of escape in response to a pole of repression, a period of crisis for a period of compromise. We could say that the formal law sometimes retreats into a tran- scendence by leaving a field provisionally open to desire, or sometimes makes the transcendence emanate hierarchized hypostases that are capable of halting and repressing desire (in fact, there are many neo-Platonic readings of Kafka). In two different ways, this state, or rather this cycle of superficial acquittal, cor- responds to Kafka's situation in the letters or in the animalistic stories or in the becomings-animal. The trial at the hotel is the counterblow of the law reacting to the blow of the letters, a trial of the vampire who well knows that any acquittal can be only superficial. And succeeding the positive pole of the line of escape, the trial of the becoming-animal is the negative pole of the transcendental law that blocks the way out and that dispatches a familial hypostasis to retrap the guilty party—the re-Oedipalization of Gregor, the platonic apple that his father throws at him.

#### Kafka’s “Before the Law” is minor literature insofar as it is minoritarian, it resists majoritarian deciphering. Majorities have nothing to do with numbers, but presume a transcendent model, like common presuppositions about the existence of the law. A minority, in contrast, has no model, it is dismantling, destructive, and performs the very operation of Kafka’s parable: reading the law against itself.

Deleuze and Negri 95. Gilles Deleuze and Antonio Negri, “Control and Becoming,” *Negotiations,* Columbia University Press, pg. 173-6

Negri: How can minority-becoming be powerful? How can resistance become an insur­rection ? Reading you, I'm never sure how to answer such questions, even though I always find in your works an impetus that forces me to reformulate the questions theoretically and practically. And yet when I read what you 've written about the imagination, or on common notions in Spinoza, or when I follow your description in The Time-Image of the rise of revolutionary cine­ma in third-world countries, and with you grasp the passage from image into fabulation, into political praxis, I almost feel I've found an answer. . . Or am I mistaken ? Is there then, some way for the resistance of the oppressed to become effective, and for what's intolerable to be definitively removed? Is there some way for the mass of singularities and atoms that we all are to come forward as a constitutive power, or must we rather accept the juridical paradox that con­stitutive power can be defined only by constituted power?

Deleuze: The difference between minorities and majorities isn't their size. A minority may be bigger than a majority. What defines the majority is a model you have to conform to: the average European adult male city-dweller, for example ... A minority, on the other hand, has no model, it's a becoming, a process. One might say the majority is nobody. Everybody's caught, one way or another, in a minority becoming that would lead them info unknown paths if they opted to follow it through. When a 'minority creates models for itself, it's because it wants to become a majority, and probably has to, to survive or prosper (to have a state, be recognized, establish its rights, for example). But its power comes from what it's managed to create, which to some extent goes into the model, but doesn't depend on it. A people is always a creative minority, and remains one even when it acquires a majority^ it can be both at once because the two things aren't lived out on the same plane. It's the greatest artists (rather than populist artists) who invoke a people, and find they "lack a people": Mallarme, Rimbaud, Klee, Berg. The Straubs in cinema. Artists can only invoke a people, their need for one goes to the very heart of what they're doing, it's not their job to create one, and they can't. Art is resistance: it resists death, slavery, infamy, shame. But a people can't worry about art. How is a people created, through what terrible suf­fering? When a people's created, it's through its own resources, but in away that links up with something in art (Garrel says there's a mass of terrible suffering in the Louvre, too) or links up art to what it lacked. Utopia isn't the right concept: it's more a question of a "tabulation" in which a people and art both share. We ought to take up Bergson's notion of tabulation and give it a political meaning.

Negri: In your book on Foucault, and then again in your TV interview at INA,6 you suggest we should look in more detail at three kinds of power: sovereign power, disciplinary power, and above all the control of "communication " that's on the way to becoming hegemonic. On the one hand this third scenario relates to the most perfect form of domination, extending even to speech and imagination, but on the other hand any man, any minority, any singularity, is more than ever before potentially able to speak out and thereby recover a greater degree of freedom. In the Marxist Utopia of the Grundrisse, communism takes precise­ly the form of a transversal organization of free individuals built on a tech­nology that makes it possible. Is communism still a viable option? Maybe in a communication society it's less Utopian than it used to be?

Deleuze: We're definitely moving toward "control" societies that are no longer exactly disciplinary. Foucault's often taken as the theorist of discipli­nary societies and of their principal technology, confinement (not just in hospitals and prisons, but in schools, factories, and barracks). But he was actually one of the first to say that we're moving away from dis­ciplinary societies, we've already left them behind. We're moving toward control societies that no longer operate by confining people but through continuous control and instant communication. Bur­roughs was the first to address this. People are of course constantly talking about prisons, schools, hospitals: the institutions are breaking down. But they're breaking down because they're fighting a losing battle. New kinds of punishment, education, health care are being stealth­ily introduced. Open hospitals and teams providing home care have been around for some time. One can envisage education becoming less and less a closed site differentiated from the workspace as anoth­er closed site, but both disappearing and giving way to frightful con­tinual training, to continual monitoring7 of worker-schoolkids or bureaucrat-students. They try to present this as a reform of the school system, but it's really its dismantling. In a control-based system noth­ing's left alone for long. You yourself long ago suggested how work in Italy was being transformed by forms of part-time work done at home, which have spread since you wrote (and by new forms of circulation and distribution of products). One can of course see how each kind of society corresponds to a particular kind of machine—with simple mechanical machines corresponding to sovereign societies, thermo-dynamic machines to disciplinary societies, cybernetic machines and computers to control societies. But the machines don't explain any­thing, you have to analyze the collective arrangements of which the machines are just one component. Compared with the approaching forms of ceaseless control in open sites, we may come to see the harsh­est confinement as part of a wonderful happy past. The quest for "uni-versals of communication" ought to make us shudder. It's true that, even before control societies are fully in place, forms of delinquency or resistance (two different things) are also appearing. Computer pira­cy and viruses, for example, will replace strikes and what the nine­teenth century called "sabotage" ("clogging" the machinery) .8 You ask whether control or communication societies will lead to forms of resis­tance that might reopen the way for a communism understood as the "transversal organization of free individuals." Maybe, I don't know. But it would be nothing to do with minorities speaking out. Maybe speech and communication have been corrupted. They're thoroughly per­meated by money—and not by accident but by their very nature. We've got to hijack speech. Creating has always been something dif­ferent from communicating. The key thing may be to create vacuoles of noncommunication, circuit breakers, so we can elude control.

#### Like Kafka’s milieu, that of Czech Jewish exiled authors immediately before the holocaust, minority literature must emerge from *within* the cramped spaces of majoritarian language and spaces, effecting a dismantling, even if only momentary, of the perceived coherence of that majority.

Deleuze and Guattari 86. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature*, “What is Minor Literature?” pg. 17-18

So far we have dealt with little more than contents and their forms: bent head-straightened head, triangles-lines of escape. And it is true that in the realm of expression, the bent head connects to the photo, and the erect head to sound. But as long as the form and the deformation or expression are not considered for themselves, there can be no real way out, even at the level of contents. Only expression gives us the method. The problem of expression is staked out by Kafka not in an abstract and universal fashion but in relation to those literatures that are considered minor, for example, the Jewish literature of Warsaw and Prague. A minor literature doesn't come from a minor language; it is rather that which a minority constructs within a major language. But the first characteristic of minor literature in any case is that in it language is affected with a high coefficient of deterritorialization. In this sense, Kafka marks the impasse that bars access to writing for the Jews of Prague and turns their literature into something impossible—the impossibility of not writing, the impossibility of writing in German, the impossibility of writing otherwise.1 The impossibility of not writing because national consciousness, uncertain or oppressed, necessarily exists by means of literature ("The literary struggle has its real justification at the highest possible levels"). The impossibility of writing other than in German is for the Prague Jews the feeling of an irreducible distance from their primitive Czech territoriality. And the impossibility of writing in German is the deterritoralization of the German population itself, an oppressive minority that speaks a language cut off from the masses, like a "paper language" or an artificial language; this is all the more true for the Jews who are simultaneously a part of this minority and excluded from it, like "gypsies who have stolen a German child from its crib." In short, Prague German is a deterritoriali/ed language, appropriate for strange and minor uses. (This can be compared in another context to what blacks in America today are able to do with the English language.)

The second characteristic of minor literatures is that everything in them is political. In major literatures, in contrast, the individual concern (familial, marital, and so on) joins with other no less individual concerns, the social milieu serving as a mere environment or a background; this is so much the case that none of these Oedipal intrigues are specifically indispensable or absolutely necessary but all become as one in a large space. Minor literature is completely different; its cramped space forces each individual intrigue to connect immediately to politics. The individual concern thus becomes all the more necessary, indispensable, magnified, because a whole other story is vibrating within it. In this way, the family triangle connects to other triangles—commercial, economic, bureaucratic, juridical-that determine its values. When Kafka indicates that one of the goals of a minor literature is the "purification of the conflict that opposes father and son and the possibility of discussing that conflict," it isn't a question of an Oedipal phantasm but of a political program. "Even though something is often thought through calmly, one still does not reach the boundary where it connects up with similar things, one reaches the boundary soonest in politics, indeed, one even strives to see it before it is there, and often sees this limiting boundary everywhere. . . . What in great literature goes on down below, constituting a not indispensable cellar of the structure, here takes place in the full light of day, what is there a matter of passing interest for a few, here absorbs everyone no less than as a matter of life and death."2

The third characteristic of minor literature is that in it everything takes on a collective value. Indeed, precisely because talent isn't abundant in a minor literature, there are no possibilities for an individuated enunciation that would belong to this or that "master" and that could be separated from a collective enunciation. Indeed, scarcity of talent is in fact beneficial and allows the conception of something other than a literature of masters; what each author says individu- ally already constitutes a common action, and what he or she says or does is necessarily political, even if others aren't in agreement. The political domain has contaminated every statement. But above all else, because collective or national consciousness is "often inactive in external life and always in the process of break-down," literature finds itself positively charged with the role and function of collective, and even revolutionary, enunciation. It is literature that produces an active solidarity in spite of skepticism; and if the writer is in the margins or completely outside his or her fragile community, this situation allows the writer all the more the possibility to express another possible community and to forge the means for another consciousness and another sensibility; just as the dog of "Investigations" calls out in his solitude to another science. The literary machine thus becomes the relay for a revolutionary machine-to-come, not at all for ideological reasons but because the literary machine alone is determined to fill the conditions of a collective enunciation that is lacking elsewhere in this milieu: literature is the people's concern.3 It is certainly in these terms that Kafka sees the problem. The message doesn't refer back to an enunciating sub- ject who would be its cause, no more than to a subject of the statement (sujet d'enonce) who would be its effect. Undoubtedly, for a while, Kafka thought ac- cording to these traditional categories of the two subjects, the author and the hero, the narrator and the character, the dreamer and the one dreamed of.4 But he will quickly reject the role of the narrator, just as he will refuse an author's or master's literature, despite his admiration for Goethe. Josephine the mouse renounces the individual act of singing in order to melt into the collective enunci- ation of "the immense crowd of the heros of [her] people." A movement from the individuated animal to the pack or to a collective multiplicity —seven canine musicians. In "The Investigations of a Dog," the expressions of the solitary researcher tend toward the assemblagof a collective enunciation of the canine species even if this collectivity is no longer or not yet given. There isn't a subject; there are only collective assemblages of enunciation, and literature expresses these acts insofar as they're not imposed from without and insofar as they exist only as diabolical powers to come or revolutionary forces to be constructed. Kafka's solitude opens him up to everything going on in history today. The letter K no longer designates a narrator or a character but an assemblage that becomes all the more machine-like, an agent that becomes all the more collective because an individual is locked into it in his or her solitude (it is only in connection to a subject that something individual would be separable from the collective and would lead its own life).

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**Abandon the conjugation machine**

**Deleuze and Guattari ’80.** Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 1933: MICROPOLITICS AND SEGMENTARITY 208-231

In homage to Gabriel Tarde (1843-1904): his long-forgotton work has assumed new relevance with the influence of American sociology, in par- ticular microsociology. It had been quashed by Durkheim and his school (in polemics similar to and as harsh as Cuvier's against Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire). Durkheim's preferred objects of study were the great collective representations, which are generally binary, resonant, and overcoded. Tarde countered that collective representations presuppose exactly what needs explaining, namely, "the similarity of millions of people." That is why Tarde was interested instead in the world of detail, or of the infini-tesimal: the little imitations, oppositions, and inventions constituting an entire realm of subrepresentative matter. Tarde's best work was his analy- ses of a minuscule bureaucratic innovation, or a linguistic innovation, etc. The Durkheimians answered that what Tarde did was psychology or inter-psychology, not sociology. But that is true only in appearance, as a first approximation: a microimitation does seem to occur between two individuals. But at the same time, and at a deeper level, it has to do not with an individual but with a flow or a wave. Imitation is the propagation of a flow; opposition is binarization, the making binary of flows; invention is a conjugation or connection of different flows. What, according to Tarde, is a flow? It is belief or desire (the two aspects of every assemblage); a flow is always of belief and of desire. Beliefs and desires are the basis of every society, because they are flows and as such are "quantifiable"; they are veritable social Quantities, whereas sensations are qualitative and representations are simple resultants.18 Infinitesimal imitation, opposition, and invention are therefore like flow quanta marking a propagation, binarization, or conjugation of beliefs and desires. Hence the importance of statistics, providing it concerns itself with the cutting edges and not only with the "stationary" zone of representations. For in the end, the difference is not at all between the social and the individual (or interindividual), but between the molar realm of representations, individual or collective, and the molecular realm of beliefs and desires in which the distinction between the social and the individual loses all meaning since flows are neither attributable to individuals nor overcodable by collective signifiers. Representations already define large-scale aggregates, or determine segments on a line; beliefs and desires, on the other hand, are flows marked by quanta, flows that are created, exhausted, or transformed, added to one another, subtracted or combined. Tarde invented microsociology and took it to its full breadth and scope, denouncing in advance the misinterpretations to which it would later fall victim.

This is how you tell the difference between the segmented line and the quantum flow. A mutant flow always implies something tending to elude or escape the codes; quanta are precisely signs or degrees of deterrito-rialization in the decoded flow. The rigid line, on the other hand, implies an overcoding that substitutes itself for the faltering codes; its segments are like reterritorializations on the overcoding or overcoded line. Let us return to the case of original sin: it is the very act of a flow marking a decoding in relation to creation (with just one last island preserved for the Virgin), and a deterritorialization in relation to the land of Adam; but it simultaneously performs an overcoding by binary organizations and resonance (Powers, Church, empires, rich-poor, men-women, etc.) and complementary reterritorializations (on the land of Cain, on work, on reproduction, on money.. .)• Now the two systems of reference are in inverse relation to each other, in the sense that the first eludes the second, or the second arrests the first, prevents it from flowing further; but at the same time, they are strictly complementary and coexistent, because one exists only as a func- tion of the other; yet they are different and in direct relation to each other, although corresponding term by term, because the second only effectively arrests the first on a "plane" that is not the plane specific to the first, while the momentum of the first continues on its own plane.

￼A social field is always animated by all kinds of movements of decoding and deterritorialization affecting "masses" and operating at different speeds and paces. These are not contradictions but escapes. At this level, everything is a question of mass. For example, from the tenth to the four- teenth centuries we see an acceleration of factors of decoding and deterri- torialization: the masses of the last invaders swooping down from north, east, and south; military masses turned into pillaging bands; ecclesiastical masses confronted with infidels and heretics, and adopting increasingly deterritorialized objectives; peasant masses leaving the seigneurial do- mains; seigneurial masses forced to find means of exploitation less terri- torial than serfdom; urban masses breaking away from the backcountry and finding increasingly less territorialized social arrangements in the cit- ies; women's masses detaching themselves from the old passional and con- jugal code; monetary masses that cease to be a hoard object and inject themselves into great commercial circuits.19 We may cite the Crusades as effecting a connection of flows, each boosting and accelerating the others (even the flow of femininity in the "faraway Princess," even the flow of chil- dren in the Crusades of the thirteenth century). But at the same time, and inseparably, there occur overcodings and reterritorializations. The Cru- sades were overcoded by the pope and assigned territorial objectives. The Holy Land, the Peace of God, a new type of abbey, new figures of money, new modes of exploitation of the peasant through leasehold and the wage system (or revivals of slavery), urban reterritorializations, etc., form a complex system. At this point, we must introduce a distinction between the two notions of connection and conjugation of flows. "Connection" indi- cates the way in which decoded and deterritorialized flows boost one another, accelerate their shared escape, and augment or stoke their quanta; the "conjugation" of these same flows, on the other hand, indicates their relative stoppage, like a point of accumulation that plugs or seals the lines of flight, performs a general reterritorialization, and brings the flows under the dominance of a single flow capable of overcoding them. But it is pre- cisely the most deterritorialized flow, under the first aspect, that always brings about the accumulation or conjunction of the processes, determines the overcoding, and serves as the basis for reterritorialization under the second aspect (we have already encountered a theorem according to which it is always on the most deterritorialized element that reterritorialization takes place). For example, the merchant bourgeoisie of the cities conju- gated or capitalized a domain of knowledge, a technology, assemblages and circuits into whose dependency the nobility, Church, artisans, and even peasants would enter. It is precisely because the bourgeoisie was a cutting edge of deterritorialization, a veritable particle accelerator, that it also per- formed an overall reterritorialization.

**still organized by the regime of faciality**

**Deleuze and Guattari ’80.** Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 587 B.C.-A.D. 70: ON SEVERAL REGIMES OF SIGNS p. 124

When a prophet declines the burden God entrusts to him (Moses, Jeremiah, Isaiah, etc.), it is not because the burden would have been too heavy, as with an imperial oracle or seer who refuses a dangerous mission. It is instead a case like Jonah's, who by hiding and fleeing and betraying anticipates the will of God more effectively than if he had obeyed. The prophet is always being forced by God, literally violated by him, much more than inspired by him. The prophet is not a priest. The prophet does not know how to talk, God puts the words in his mouth: word-ingestion, a new form of semiophagy. Unlike the seer, the prophet interprets nothing: his delusion is active rather than ideational or imaginative, his relation to God is passional and authoritative rather than despotic and signifying; he anticipates and detects the powers {puissances) of the future rather than applying past and present powers (pouvoirs).Faciality traits no longer func- tion to prevent the formation of a line of flight, or to form a body of signifiance controlling that line and sending only a faceless goat down it. *Rather, it is faciality itself that organizes the line of flight, in the face-off between two countenances that become gaunt and turn away in profile. Betrayal has become an idee fixe, the main obsession, replacing the deceit of the paranoiac and the hysteric. The "persecutor-persecuted" relation has no relevance whatsoever: its meaning is altogether different in the authoritarian passional regime than in the despotic paranoid regime.*

**Rational calculation is enforced by the structure of lines**

**Deleuze and Guattari ’80.** Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 587 B.C.-A.D. 70: ON SEVERAL REGIMES OF SIGNS p. 126-7

How many betrayals accompanied the great discoveries of Christen- dom, the discovery of new lands and continents! Lines of deterrito-rialization on which small groups betray everything, their companions, the king, the indigenous peoples, the neighboring explorer, in the mad hope of founding, with a woman of their family, a race that would finally be pure and represent a new beginning. Herzog's film, Aguirre, is very Shakespearean. Aguirre asks, How can one be a traitor everywhere and in everything? I'm the only traitor here. No more deception, it's time for betrayal. What a grandiose dream! I will be the last traitor, the total traitor, and therefore the last man.

Then there was the Reformation: the extraordinary figure of Luther, as traitor to all things and all people; his personal relation with the Devil resulting in betrayal, through good deeds as well as bad.

These new figures of betrayal always return to the Old Testament: I am the wrath of God. But betrayal has become humanist, it does not fall between God and his own men; it relies on God, but falls between the men of God and the others, denounced as deceivers. In the end, there is only one man of God or of the wrath of God, a single betrayer against all deceivers. But every deceiver is mixed, and which does not take him- or herself to be the one? And what betrayer does not say to him- or herself at some point that he or she was nothing but a deceiver after all? (See the strange case of Maurice Sachs.)

It is clear that the book, or what takes its place, has a different meaning in the signifying paranoid regime than in the postsignifying passional regime. In the first case, there is an emission of the despotic signifier, and its interpretation by scribes and priests, which fixes the signified and reimparts signifier; but there is also, from sign to sign, a movement from one territory to another, a circulation assuring a certain speed of deterritorialization (for example, the circulation of an epic, or the rivalry between several cities for the birth of a hero, or, once again, the role of scribe-priests in exchanges of territorialities and genealogies).22 What takes the place of the book always has an external model, a referent, face, family, or territory that preserves the book's oral character. On the con- trary, in the passional regime the book seems to be internalized, and to internalize everything: it becomes the sacred written Book. It takes the place of the face and God, who hides his face and gives Moses the inscribed stone tablets. God manifests himself through trumpets and the Voice, but what is heard in sound is the nonface, just as what is seen in the book are words. The book has become the body of passion, just as the face was the body of the signifier. It is now the book, the most deterritorialized of things, that fixes territories and genealogies. The latter are what the book says, and the former the place at which the book is said. The function of interpretation has totally changed. Or it disappears entirely in favor of a pure and literal recitation forbidding the slightest change, addition, or commentary (the famous "stultify yourself of the Christians belongs to this passional line; the Koran goes the furthest in this direction). Or else interpretation survives but becomes internal to the book itself, which loses its circulatory function for outside elements: for example, the different types of coded interpretation are fixed according to axes internal to the book; interpretation is organized according to correspondences between two books, such as the Old and New Testaments, and may even induce a third book suffused by the same element of interiority.23 Finally, interpre- tation may reject all intermediaries or specialists and become direct, since the book is written both in itself and in the heart, once as a point of subjectification and again in the subject (the Reformation conception of the book). In any case, this is the point of departure for the delusional pas- sion of the book as origin and finality of the world. The unique book, the total work, all possible combinations inside the book, the tree-book, the cosmos-book: all of these platitudes so dear to the avant-gardes, which cut the book off from its relations with the outside, are even worse than the chant of the signifier. Of course, they are entirely bound up with a mixed semiotic. But in truth they have a particularly pious origin. Wagner, Mallarme, and Joyce, Marx and Freud: still Bibles. If passional delusion is profoundly monomaniacal, monomania for its part found a fundamental element of its assemblage in monotheism and the Book. The strangest cult. This is how things are in the passional regime, or the regime of subjectification. There is no longer a center of signifiance connected to expanding circles or an expanding spiral, but a point of subjectification constituting the point of departure of the line. There is no longer a signifier-signified relation, but a subject of enunciation issuing from the point of subjectification and a subject of the statement in a determinable relation to the first subject. There is no longer sign-to-sign circularity, but a linear proceeding into which the sign is swept via subjects. We may con- sider these three diverse realms.

**Renders the actions of the affirmative as goods of exchange value**

**James ‘3** Joy, Professor of Africana Studies @ Brown “Academia, activism, and imprisoned intellectuals.” http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Academia,+activism,+and+imprisoned+intellectuals.-a0133368005

Activism is as multidimensional in its appearances as the academy; as academia's alter ego, or problematic twin, it also reflects the best and worst tendencies of the marketplace. When structured by the market, activism is not inherently infused with responsible behavior or compassion. In its push for productivity--more rallies, demos, conferences, meetings--it can lose sight of effective strategies, community, and the importance of young activists exercising decision-making power. To value one's presence, i.e., just showing up for work, class, or demonstrations, over one's preparedness to fully participate in transformational acts is a feature of the crass market (where volume or quantity of a product register more than quality or utility). Likewise, **expectations for unquestioning obedience to managerial elites--whether radical instructor or organizer--are also features of the market found in activism and academia. Thus, beyond confronting the social crises and military and ideological wars enacted by the state, we are disturbed, destabilized, and therefore challenged by the commodification of our own educational sites and political movements. The marketplace--as the dominant metaphor and construct--influences our consciousness and regulates our lives to shape both academia and activism. Conformity and compliance, rebellion and resistance, are often channeled through and structured by markets that turn intellect and action into objects for trade and barter in competition for status and acquisition, while making our ideals (freedom and justice) and their representatives (prisoners of resistance) into commodities.** Through books, videos, and CDs, political representations are purchased and circulated with the intent of creating greater demand not only for the "product," but also for social justice, release campaigns, opposition to expanding police and military powers, and executions and state violence. For the imprisoned, the possibility of release, or at least remembrance, mitigates their social death in prison (or physical death, as in the cases of MOVE's [Merle](http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/merle) Africa and former Black Panther Albert Nuh Washington). Academics and activists use the market to highlight the human rights abuses and conditions of the imprisoned, the 2.5 million people locked in U.S. penal institutions, and the perpetuation of torture and slavery through the Thirteenth Amendment. **The irony is that commodification is another form of containment. Although Harlow advocates the "activist counterapproach" to consumption, not all activism provides an alternative. Some of it re-inscribes the competition, opportunism, disciplinary mechanisms, and demands for institutional loyalty that characterize the marketplace**. Activism or activists, like academia and academics, have their own forms of commerce. **At their weakest and most problematic points, they share, in their respective sites,** [careerism](http://www.thefreedictionary.com/careerism)**, appropriation, and the assertion of "authoritative" voices. For instance, the "political prisoner-as-icon" can be deployed to minimize or silence external and internal critiques. Editors, translators, and advocates can wield iconic power as surrogates (and in surreal fashion use that proxy against the incarcerated themselves). The structural position that the non-incarcerated possess, a quite valuable commodity, permits the appropriation of voice and new forms of dependencies.** Perhaps, the imprisoned use self-censorship not only as a shield against their guards (as Marilyn Buck describes in On Self-Censorship), but also as armor against their allies. Political prisoners have strategies to counter "free" progressives, given that in the social death of the prisoner rebel, the state is not the only entity that has the ability to capitalize on or [cannibalize](http://www.thefreedictionary.com/cannibalize) captive bodies. If indeed the political prisoner or imprisoned intellectual can be either "freed" or frozen in academic and/or activist discourse and productivity, then it is essential that academics-activists, students-scholars, directly communicate with political prisoners, as openly as possible given the structural disparities.

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#### It’s not just a question of what do words mean, it’s the subjects and subjectivities behind them—form and substance are indeed intertwined but that means that you can’t separate out form from content

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For Deleuze, language does not represent or signify ideas or things, but expresses them. Expression works by creating ever-new lines and new divisions through the use of medial terms (like sense or event) that split up already existing connections (like that between language and things). Since these mediators are "indifferent to all opposites" (LS 35), they serve to liberate the movement that was arrested in-between a given binary. Mediators enable Deleuze not only to break up his terms, but also to fold one into another or to cross any one of them with any (or all) of the others. This process literally enlivens the space of the extended middle: it yields two (or three, as DeLanda argues) ontological dimensions of Being traversed by three different lines of flight (primary, molecular, and molar line); it produces three orders of language (the primary order of "affections of the body," the secondary order of "the event of sense," and, finally, "the tertiary order of the proposition," the third of which—the proposition—again subdivides into "three distinct relations" (denotation, manifestation, and signification) to which Deleuze then adds a fourth relation (sense); there are, furthermore, two basic kinds of cinematic images (movement-image and time-image), the former of which sub-divides into three distinct varieties (perception-image, action-image, affection-image), etc.[13](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v013/13.4.strathausen.html" \l "f13) This quasi-infinite addition and division of medial terms is most obvious in Deleuze's concept of "double articulation," which denotes the two-fold process that constitutes the different strata of the actual (that is, the existing world of qualified and extended individuals). Deleuze famously argues that each stratum or assemblage is defined by its "substance" (i.e., that which occupies space or is extended in space) and by the "form" or "structure" of this substance (i.e., that which endows substance with specific qualities). So, the substance of a given stratum is some actualized and formed matter as opposed to the pure matter-energy that constitutes the plane of consistency (that is, the virtual). But Deleuze then introduces yet another distinction between two more terms—content and expression—and argues that each of them comprises a full set of the previous two (form and substance). In other words, "each articulation is already… double" (ATP 44). This means that expression comprises not only form, but also substance, and that content comprises not only substance, but also form. The duplication of content and expression allows Deleuze to distinguish between the "form of expression" and the "substance of expression"; conversely, he refers to the "substance of content" and to the "form of content." As Deleuze himself points out, this process of differentiation is infinite. It gives rise to an endless nexus of interrelating substances and forms, contents and expressions at numerous intermediate levels within and in between strata. "Content and expression," Deleuze writes, "not only vary from one stratum to another, but intermingle, and within the same stratum multiply and divide ad infinitum" (ATP 44). This leads to a "multiplicity of double articulations affecting both expression and content" (ATP 45), because "each stratum serves as a substratum for another stratum" (ATP 72), and because "forms of expression and regimes of signs are still *strata* (even considered in themselves, after abstracting forms of content)" (ATP 134). Every articulation, in other words, unfolds and multiplies across, above, and below the stratum. It is by means of this infinite movement of augmentation and differentiation—by means of this "*extra-Being*" that *is*univocal Being itself (LS 180)—that Deleuze thinks through and beyond the dualisms inherent in language. Faced with the perennial critique that his philosophy merely replaces traditional binaries (organic/non-organic; mind/body; signifier/signified) with new binaries (virtual/actual; smooth/striated; minor/major, etc), and that his entire ontology juxtaposes "good" processes of deterritorialization with "bad" processes of re-territorialization,[14](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v013/13.4.strathausen.html" \l "f14) Deleuze responds: "We must speak like everyone else, we must pass through dualisms, 1-2, or even 1-2-3…. We must pass through [passer par] dualisms because they are in language, it's not a question of getting rid of them, but we must fight against them, invent stammering…." (D 34).[15](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v013/13.4.strathausen.html" \l "f15) To stammer is to interrupt the flow of words; it is to add and insert new elements (words, syllables, sounds) in between the "right" ones. Stammering delays the construction of meaning, and one might well say that Deleuze's entire philosophy stutters: it stretches each line of thought by inserting new terms and adding new lines *ad infinitum*. As he thinks along these lines of infinite relations and twisting singularities, Deleuze does more than just map the world. He actualizes it. His thought creates the assemblages through which it thinks. By contrast, signification—and, above all, linguistic signification—falsely assumes that some points and lines are only meant to "signify" others. The lines that form words, or the airwaves that carry sound, are said to "represent" a certain content and "symbolize" a certain referent—as if their sole purpose were to dissolve themselves within and through this signifying function, as if lines and points themselves did not matter *as such*—namely *precisely as* the lines and points they actually are. This view, Deleuze argues, not only disregards the numerous folds and multiplicities that intervene betweencontent and expression, but also overlooks the double articulation that inheres *within* them. As demonstrated above, linguistic expression, like all other things, has its own unique substance—"fundamentally vocal substance, which brings into play various organic elements: not only the larynx, but the mouth and lips, and the overall motoricity of the face" (ATP 61). Once we realize that the (assemblage of the) face is the substance of expression, the linguistic/semiotic model of signification ceases to function. For how could this substance—our mouth, lips, saliva, enzymes, nerves—ever "signify" or "represent" a particular form of content like "prison"?[16](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v013/13.4.strathausen.html" \l "f16) This becomes possible only if we confuse articulation with signification, which cuts off both "content" and "signification" from their constitutive multiplicities and reductively equates them with "signified" and "signifier" respectively. It is this inherent reductionism of (Saussurian) linguistics that Deleuze rejects as imperialist and "despotic" (ATP 68). This is not to deny that language "exists" and "functions" as a form of expression (i.e., as a regime of signs or a semiotic system) in a given stratum. Rather, the crucial question is how it functions and what effects it is able to achieve. In this sense, Deleuze's understanding and use of language could not be more different not only from traditional hermeneutics and analytical philosophy, but also from deconstruction. Deleuze's philosophy, unlike Derrida's, is really *not* about language or about signification. It is about what happens above and beneath language—outside of it, yet still related to it. Deleuze's highest praise is reserved for authors like Kafka or Artaud who invent a foreign language within their own. The goal of the writer, according to Deleuze, is to make language "stutter" and effect "a straining of one's whole language toward something outside it" (N 140). Likewise, Deleuze encourages all readers "to break open words and sentences… and find what's uttered in them" (N 96). For Deleuze, expression is ultimately a matter of pressure, for what "strains" language beyond its limits of stratification is the interplay of creative forces language must seek—and fail—to express. Deleuze thus removes language from its philosophical pedestal as the privileged "ground" or "horizon" or "medium" of both knowledge and being. At a time when the "linguistic turn" was in full swing throughout the humanities, Deleuze bluntly declared: "I don't personally think th[at] linguistics is fundamental" (N 28). He realized that philosophers' obsessive focus on language cuts short the infinite potentiality of non-linguistic forms of expression such as dance, gestures, rituals etc., all of which are *significant* even though they are not *signifying*.[17](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v013/13.4.strathausen.html" \l "f17) For Deleuze, the significance of language, like that of other things, resides in its function, which, in turn depends upon the interaction of words with the unrepresentable forces of the virtual and the innumerous strata it actualizes. While it would be misleading to say that Deleuze materializes language, because the sense of language remains immaterial, it is nonetheless true that Deleuze *ontologizes* language: he literally bloats the process of signification until it bursts and spills over to the outside. When that happens, language becomes different from itself: it changes from major to minor, begins to stutter or simply falls silent. It no longer signifies, but matters all the more. Deleuze's ontologization of language means that all statements, even meaningless ones, affect the state of affairs surrounding them. It also means that the meaning and function of sentences, propositions, and words necessarily changes with every new assemblage they encounter. To read Deleuze is to confront a plethora of interrelated and idiosyncractic concepts whose meaning shifts and slides depending on the (philosophical, scientific, aesthetic, socio-political…) context in which they are made to function. Put differently, Deleuze's ontology cannot and will not operate with a strictly defined nomenclatura comprised of stable, identifiable, scientific-analytical terms. Rather, Deleuzian concepts (percepts, affects) are themselves assemblages or multiplicities. "Concepts are events" (WIP 36); they are "the contour, the configuration, the constellation of an event to come" (WIP 32f.). The Deleuzian concept is a "*linking*" (WIP 91), and although this linking exists independently from the points it connects and the relations it actualizes, it nonetheless functions differently with respect to each and every link it establishes. Given Deleuze's ontologizing view of language, it is hardly surprising to find that all of his major texts create a specific terminology. As Deleuze thinks through another philosopher, he literally engenders a different being of the virtual—as substance (Spinoza), as fold (Leibniz), as élan vital (Bergson), as the will to power (Nietzsche)—and each of his books calls the virtual by a different name: the body without organs (AO), the plane of immanence, (WIP), the plane of consistency (ATP), a life (Immanence), etc. In DeLanda's view, however, all these terms are "near synonyms" ([DeLanda 2002, 203](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v013/13.4.strathausen.html#b29)), because what really matters to Deleuze are "the referents of these labels, not the labels themselves" ([DeLanda 1997, 330](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v013/13.4.strathausen.html#b28)), Hence, the "label itself is immaterial and insignificant," DeLanda claims ([1997, 260](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v013/13.4.strathausen.html" \l "b28)), because Deleuze's various concepts for the virtual all express the same Being, the same One-All. What *matters*, DeLanda argues, are not "Deleuze's words" but "Deleuze's world" ([2002, 5](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v013/13.4.strathausen.html" \l "b29)). Yet this strict separation of word and referent hardly coincides with Deleuze's own view of things. "Being is the same for everything about which it is said" precisely because "Being cannot be said without also occurring" (LS 179). Deleuzian concepts, in other words, are not just arbitrary labels that function referentially, as DeLanda suggests. For if this were so, language would fall back upon the traditional plane of linguistic signification and thus effectively reinstate the very Saussurian theory of referential meaning Deleuze so vehemently rejected. Rather than mere labels, Deleuzian concepts are real entities in their own right. They literally create the object of which they speak. The Deleuzian concept "poses itself in itself—it is a self-positing" (WIP 11).[18](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v013/13.4.strathausen.html" \l "f18) Nobody, I think, has expressed the self-positing power of Deleuzian cocepts more eloquently than Jean-Luc Nancy. Nancy refers to Deleuze's concepts neither as concepts nor as labels, but as the power of naming. Deleuze's philosophy, Nancy claims, "is a philosophy of naming and not of discourse" (111). Nancy's use of the gerund makes a crucial point: the concept is not just a name, but a process of naming; it is not just an index, but a device for *indexing* and for "effectuating [being] differently" (111): For him, to create a concept is not to draw the empirical under a category: but to construct a universe of its own, an autonomous universe, an *ordo et connexio* which does not imitate the other, which does not represent it or signify it, but which effectuates it in its own way. The Deleuzian concept is a grapping machine, a machine that directs your thoughts—as if they were hands—over the flow of the virtual so it can swoop down and pull out this or that thing into a newly formed assemblage. Concepts create this or that by actualizing new entities from the stream of the virtual into the extended world of stratification: "It is in this sense that thinking and being are said to be one and the same" (WIP 38). Language, for Deleuze, does not represent the world, but acts upon it.[19](http://muse.jhu.edu.floyd.lib.umn.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v013/13.4.strathausen.html" \l "f19) How exactly does this work? How can we think this relationship between language and things, word and world in Deleuze's cosmology? Deleuze explores a number of different possibilities throughout his oeuvre, all based on his categorical rejection of the linguistic/semiotic model of signification. His first model pertains to what he calls "order-words"—words that effect and shape the particular situation in which they happen to occur. Order-words function on the actual level of stratification, because they serve to limit, retrain, and arrest movement. Yet language, like all other forms of expression, is also able to connect to the virtual plane of consistency. Language gives rise to events, articulates new sense and develops new forms of expression—precisely by becoming minor, by stuttering, or by falling silent. Order-words alone cannot account for this potentiality of language.

#### Eroticism becomes striated—closed up—when it is tied to productivity—when the body is made to produce a ballot

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(Gregg, “The ‘Non-Human Sex’ in Sexuality: ‘What are Your Special Desiring-machines?’”, *Deleuze and Sex* pg 143-147, dml)

It may seem strange to refer to the phallus as the instrument of original reparation, as an instrument of pacification (in the strongest sense of the term). The image given above is that of a war waged by the drives which is followed by a general and indefinite term of peace; of course, the terms of this peace are made by the victor, and Oedipal peace here comes off looking a lot like the MacArthur plan in many respects. Here again, we come back to Deleuze and Guattari’s fundamental question: if it is true that Oedipus was originally open, in all directions, to a field of production directly invested by libido, then what causes it to close up? Here, we are given the answer: it is the image of the phallus projected across the genital zone that triangulates the reality of the desiring-machines onto the surface of the body determined by Oedipal sexuality. In other words, Oedipus causes the entire field of desiring-production to close up around the body that is determined by sexuality, as if desire from that point onward only concerned sexuality and its various avatars (or, as Freud would define this, the distinction between normal sexuality and its perversions, which occurs when the triangulation effected by the projection of the phallus fails to sew things up and the component instincts separate from the body and return to their earlier stages of dis-order and guerrilla warfare). But what is the meaning of the body that is projected across the surface of the erogenous zones, closed off by sexuality? It is a body closed off from the reality of its own desiring-machines. This is why the forms of human sexuality are so much about plugging up every orifice, by giving every partial object (desiring-machine) something to do, by turning all the desiring-machines into an orchestra that constantly play nothing but the sad and mournful riff of Oedipal sexuality. Here we might ask why so much popular music is about fucking, playing out a literal transcription of Oedipal music which fills the environment of the socius like ambient sound, so in the end no one can escape it. It’s really quite funny and horrifying at once: from every nook and cranny, every corner, in every elevator, café or bar, in the home or in the office, in the car next to you at the signal, when you go to bed at night and when you wake up, in hallways and on airplanes – Oedipal mood music! Baby, gotta get me some . . . huh, huh. Hot, Hot, nasty sex . . .

The body is closed off from the reality of the desiring-machines, which means that in a certain sense the body is neutralised, or worse, turned into a corpse from the very beginning. It becomes a dummy, a prop, or a tool; it becomes a sterile and lifeless double, a doll poked and pulled at as in a child’s game or in a porno, an object that belongs to a subject according to a legal or moral code, a fragment of language, a pure image. If there is something vulgar in pornography it is the literal representation of the function of sexual organs determined as partial objects; there is so much production, producing, machines everywhere and every part or aspect of the body becoming machinic. If there is the ‘now you see it and now you don’t’ that seems to determine the object from the scopic drive, then this is simply the machine nature of the image that is attached to the body of the spectator through the eye; however, this machine is immediately related to others that do not exist within the image and constitute what lies outside of its field, populated by machines that enlarge and explode, by detonations and sadness. Guattari certainly understood this best when he said that ‘the phallus is the symbol of the body cut off from its own machines . . . The phallus heralds the death of desire and its entrance into the sexual organ’ (Guattari 2006: 292). He writes:

‘You will be a body – corpse-body – a cadaver, not a machine’.

You will be a man or a woman according to the binary symbol: phallus-non phallus. This has nothing to do with the supposed ‘entrance into the order of the symbolic’. It’s the opposite. The phallus heralds an entrance into the division of the sexes (third internal binary relation, limiting the addition of things and sign multiplicativity).

So what remains is the body [my emphasis]. You are a man-body or a woman-body, or maybe you are both in alternation. You have a common trunk. Production-reproduction man-woman unit. Your ego is: a body without a machine.

So the phallus opens up the entrance to the ego, to the massive social body; work unit and reproduction unit (male and female). . . . So, return to Freud: there is indeed a genital phase: the phallus doesn’t gloss over the series. It characterizes a specific suppressive operation, that of the division of the sexes. The phallus is the prototype of a dualistic break in the division of labor, and nothing more. (Guattari 2006: 291–2)

Consequently, when we speak of the body, in the manner that we usually do, in the manner we have been taught (and not simply by our parents, since they have been taught to speak that way as well), we are speaking of nothing effectively real, but of something that has no real effective unity because in fact it has only the reality of an image. This is its precise ontological status; body-image is the remainder, what is left over, from the separation effected by the phallic supplement, it is a fragmentary part that thereafter has the function of a whole. As Deleuze and Guattari write: ‘To withdraw a part from the whole, to detach, to “have something left over”, is to produce, and to carry out real operations of desire in the material world’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 41).

Therefore, to say that under this determination of the image the desiringmachines have been cut off, or the body-as-image is closed to the reality of the desiring-machines, is to say that the effective reality of desire and its production continues to operate through the partial objects that do not compose or have the image of the body as their unity. The body is not a whole of which the partial objects would be the parts, even though this is how the partial objects are usually represented according to the image of normative sexuality, but only in the manner of pieces that don’t quite fit and are violently jammed into place. This is why the body, as an object of representation, always fails to grasp the reality of all the partial objects that are constantly interrupting and disturbing this image fundamentally. It is this disturbance of the image that still speaks to the existence of the desiring-machines, and to the fact that they are not completely pacified. Of course, real sexual couples know that the Oedipal image of the sexualised body is completely false. Its perfect image is not unified and constantly breaking down. This is why there is so much talk in relationships ‘about sex’ that is really talk about re-assembling the pieces of a machine that is breaking down, that is, either on the verge of or in the process of breaking down, if not broken already. In other words, sooner or later, someone is always talking about fixing things, about getting things up and running again, or putting them into a new order that will work better next time.

The real question becomes why – if we grasp the true reality of sexuality as machinic, as simply a question of arranging one’s own special desiring-machines so that they work together – is this opposed to the image of sexuality as a pacified whole, as something that is fundamentally non-machinic? According to Guattari, this is because the phallus actually represents a form ‘machine-alterity’, it is ‘other than the machine’, an image that becomes equated with the Ego as ‘a body without a machine [. . . which] henceforth speaks in the name of the most deterritorialized machinic alterity’ (Guattari 2006: 293). Here, let me return to rephrase the definition of human sexuality I began with: in so-called human sexuality, the determination of the aim originates in the Ego in accordance with the satisfaction the death instinct, which demands nothing less than the suppression of the desiring-machines in the name of the most deterritorialised machinic alterity. In other words, the final goal of sexuality functions as the end of desire, as the final quelling or silencing of the machines that keep on stirring up the entire question of Desire again and again. Here we can see that the body produced by phallic order is made of a particular metal. It is the metal body of the Ego that is produced to enclose or encase the organs or partial objects; it is made to protect the Ego from its own desiring-machines, in order finally to put a stop to them, as if to encase them in solid lead, thereby causing them to stop working. In all this we must keep in mind that the desiring-machines do not belong to the body determined by the Ego, but are distributed across several bodies, from the very beginning. This is why the Ego’s projection of the body, or of the phallic project of the body as the image of the Ego (Körper-Ich), is essentially false and leads to constant suppression of the desiring-machines. In real sexuality, for example, to suppress the desiring-machine is nothing less than to suppress the part of the desiring-machine that exists in the other’s body to which my desiring-machine is connected and which it requires in order to function at all. This is why Deleuze posed the idea of jealousy that functions in Proust as crucial to determining the dialectic between the whole and the parts in sexuality, posed in terms of the subject of Marcel, and the partial objects that were scattered over and dwelled inside Albertine’s body. Jealousy was the form of Marcel’s recognition of the fugitive nature of partial objects that existed in the position of Albertine’s body, and holding her captive was his manner of maintaining possession of them.

Consequently, there is a specific kind of talk of alienation that directly addresses this machinic alterity. You have alienated me from my desiring-machines. You came into my universe with your sick phantasy and you re-organised all my desiring-machines and got them working according to your plan, and now they are all in pieces, scattered all over the floor like shards of glass. But this already follows the narrow channel opened by blaming the parents. Someone is always to blame – someone must take the blame, accept the blame. Guilty, guilty!! In some ways, this accusation is always true, which is why it is always dif- ficult to dismiss out of hand, or leads to constant qualification: yes, it is true, you are alienated, you are not to be blamed for the loss of desire, but I am not to be blamed either. Innocent, Innocent! The question is: who is really to blame? or even if it is a question of blaming someone, whether this constant cycle of guilt and innocence is actually produced by Oedipal sexuality as well? Why guilt, after all, if not to formulate the entire question of desire from the depressive position directly in relation to the Law and its social tribunal? Which is why sexual couples are always calling in the authorities to assist in the assigning of guilt, whether this amounts to actually calling the cops, or sending the accused to the doctor for evaluation, or in order to win their side of the argument, employing the language of psychoanalysis to diagnose the other’s madness or hysteria. In fact, it doesn’t matter whether the cops come or not, since they are always just outside the window monitoring the situation, or in the neighbours’ apartment with their ears pressed up against the wall, making certain that things don’t get out of hand, that everyone plays within the legal limits laid down by Oedipus. And all the while the couples themselves sit at a table inside the room, in their black robes, passing little death sentences on one another. Of course, its all quite ‘Kafkaesque’.

#### Their emphasis on aesthetic practices of the body and embodied experience forecloses the true potentiality within desire

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(Abigail and Claire, “The Haunted Flesh: Corporeal Feminism and the Politics of (Dis)Embodiment”, Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 1998, vol. 24, no. 1, dml)

The antirepresentationalism of Deleuze may also be questioned in this regard. If, as we have argued, the practice of anorexia and its disruption of normalized body practices can be seen as creative, it is because anorexia can be examined as a specific mode of being. The ascription of creativity, positivity, or activity to different bodily practices avoids the positing of any primary explanandum (such as representation) of which these practices would be effects. If the attribution of a creative positivity to anorexia implies a valorization of the practice as an aesthetic comportment, it may well be due to antirepresentationalism's opposition between the rigidity of the concept versus the fluidity of poesis. In this sense Deleuze's critique of representation implies a privileged difference. Deleuze not only celebrates certain writers whose work is seen as inherently disruptive of representational thought (such as Kafka, Joyce, Beckett, Woolf), he also posits poetry as an Idea that typifies the dynamic power of language: "Repetition is the power of language, and far from being explicable in negative fashion by some default on the part of nominal concepts, it implies an always excessive Idea of poetry" (1994, 291). The idea that art or literature provides an exemplary ethical liberation accepts representation's own definition of the concept.13 If concepts are ideal disembodied negations of the fluidity of sensibility and experience, then it makes sense to seek liberation in a domain such as poesis that defines itself against the reification of the rational concept. But, as Deleuze and Guattari's own work has argued, concepts are already creative acts (1994). The aesthetic, while it may foreground its active constitution, is also thoroughly located within forms of determination and regularity. The aesthetic is not pure active becoming. A concept is never absolutely ideal. To link the ethical as self-constituting and affirmative comportment with the aesthetic in general is, then, to valorize a particular exteriority (art as the general other) and a particular difference (representation vs. the affirmative). We would agree, then, with Dorothea Olkowski's careful reading of Deleuze that shows the clear link between the ethical and the aesthetic in Deleuze's Nietzscheanism (Olkowski 1995, 28). But we would suggest that this link ought to be questioned.

Clearly, certain forms of antinormalizing practices that are creative (such as anorexia) remain as problems. Only a celebration of the aesthetic as necessarily ethical or transgressive would make the creative character of bodily practices valuable as such. To argue that the problem of anorexia is answered by seeing the body as active force is to repeat the same foreclosure that lies in seeing the body as a repressed effect. If the body is a site of production of positive forces and creative differences then this opens a question of the body's ethics. How we evaluate these modes of creating difference cannot be resolved by appealing to a single opposition (ethical/ aesthetic vs. moral/representational). If we do accept that difference is positive, that there is no privileged exteriority and that ethics is a continual task, then the question of sexual difference need no longer be seen as primary. We would therefore disagree with Grosz's use of Deleuze to argue for the universality of binary sexual difference: "The bifurcation of sexed bodies ... is, in my opinion, an irreducible cultural universal" (1994b, 160). The analysis of particular problems, such as anorexia, beneath a general rubric of sexual difference might be opened up in two directions. First, such specific ethical problems ought not to be read as synecdoches for female subjectivity in general. The first part of our article has shown the debilitating consequences of arguments that pathologize femininity and that explain pathologies by referring to a general malaise of sexual difference. Second, practices like anorexia might be best analyzed according to the power relations within which they occur: not as further examples of representational violence but according to the practices of cure, definition, regulation, and contestation that surround them.