# Round 2—Neg vs Vandy BM

## 1NC

### 1NC

#### First off is the Human Apocalypse Kritik

#### Their catastrophe rhetoric reaffirms an anthropocentric value system that is founded upon violence on the non-human

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(Rosemary-Claire, “Apocalypse Meow”, Capitalism Nature Socialism, 24:1, 35-41, dml)

It is an easy point to make, that apocalypse is defined in almost totally human terms. Although environmental apocalypticism is tied to statistics about species loss and habitat destruction, it is only really an apocalypse once human beings (and capitalist production for that matter) are under threat. Occasionally nonhuman species deemed extraordinary in some manner (usually in the degree to which either they are most ‘‘like us’’ or useful to us) may enter into the apocalyptic calculus\* dolphins that can recognize themselves in the mirror, chimpanzees that use tools. This is further evidence of apocalypticism’s anthropocentrism. Leftist critiques of apocalyptic narratives, while not necessarily incompatible with the previous point, have focused instead on these narratives’ depoliticizing tendencies. Swyngedouw (and obscures how the human hubris creates the conditions for these scenarios 2010a; 2011) locates apocalypse within a general trend toward environmental populism and ‘‘post-politics,’’ a political formation that forecloses the political, preventing the politicization of particulars (Swyngedouw 2010b). He argues that populism never assigns proper names to things, signifying (following Rancie`re) an erosion of politics and ‘‘genuine democracy . . .[which] is a space where the unnamed, the uncounted, and, consequently, un-symbolized become named and counted’’ (Swyngedouw 2011, 80). Whereas class struggle was about naming the proletariat, and feminist struggles were named through ‘‘woman’’ as a political category, a defining feature of post-politics is an ambiguous and unnamed enemy or target of concern. As Swyngedouw (2010b; 2011) contends, the postpolitical condition invokes a common predicament and the need for common humanity-wide action, with ‘‘human’’ and ‘‘humanity’’ vacant signifiers and homogenizing subjects in this politics. I return to this idea soon. Over a decade earlier, Katz (1995) also argues that ‘‘apocalypticism is politically ~~disabling’’~~ [debilitating] (277). She writes: ‘‘contemporary problems are so serious that rendering them apocalyptic obscures their political ecology\*their sources, their political, economic and social dimensions’’ (278). Loathe to implicate ‘‘human nature’’ as one of these sources, Katz instead targets global capitalism, which is ‘‘premised on a series of socially-constructed differences that, in apocalyptic visions, take a universal character: man/woman; culture/nature; first world/third world; bourgeoisie/working class’’ (279). Towards the end of her short chapter, she remarks that ‘‘human beings are simultaneously different from and of a piece with bees’’ (280), calling subsequently for ‘‘a usable environmental politics [that] takes seriously the political responsibility implied by the difference between people and bees’’ (280). There is so much to agree with here. But Katz misses a big binary in her list: human/animal. On the other hand, she clearly if implicitly recognizes not only the productiveness of this binary and its role in environmental politics (the humans and the bees), but also the attention it deserves. The question then remains: Although according to Katz, apocalyptic politics underplays if not entirely ignores the production process, is this inherent to apocalypticism, or is there potential to train apocalypticism onto production, particularly of the human and the human/animal binary? Neither a natural order, nor a pre-given subject position, nor a category that exists beyond politics, the human is rather an intensely political category whose ongoing production is rife with violence, contestation, and hierarchy. The central mode of this production is the human/animal binary that Haraway (2008, 18) says ‘‘flourishes, lethally, in the entrails of humanism.’’ This binary is continually re-made and re-authorized politically, legally, scientifically, religiously, and so on. It is the product of particular epistemologies, ontologies, and power relations, and it also produces these same structures. The spatial, material and discursive inclusion and exclusion of animals construct the human/animal binary. Materially, animals are included in the ‘‘human’’ project as laborers, food, clothing, and so on, but are excluded from life itself should their dead bodies be of economic value. Animals work for us, for free, and are largely ‘‘disposable workers’’ in a manner similar to and different from the ‘‘disposable women’’ Wright (2006) observes are fundamental to the workings of capital and labor in Mexican maquiladoras. The similarity lies in how both animal laborers and these women factory workers are devalued as laborers, and this devaluing of their labor actually contributes to the formation of value in the commodities and capital of the production network. They are different in that of course the women are still paid\*albeit marginally\*and their labor is recognized as labor. Animals do not just labor for free. They also die for profit and power. The most obvious example of industrial meat production aside, capitalism and the liberal state derive significant profits from the ability to kill\*often in mass numbers\*wild animals. Killing wolves, bears, cougars, and other animals has been a predominant colonial project, with bounty often the first laws passed in the colonies. Not only domesticated but also wild animals have played and continue to play a central role, materially and symbolically, in capitalism and the formation of the nation state, as symbols, commodities, and spectacle. Discursively animals found the human subject by virtue of their exclusion: the human is what is not animal. This is a juridicopolitical, ethical exclusion that is always at the same time an inclusion. The human thus appears to be a neurological or biophysiological product rather than a result of specific histories, geographies, and social relations, between humans and also humans and animals. Certainly particular socio-natural properties do become essential to a thing’s power and geopolitical centrality (think opposable thumbs, cerebral cortexes, bipedalism, and so on). But as Huber (2011, 34, emphasis added) argues in the context of oil, ‘‘biophysical capacities are only realizable through particular uneven social relations of culture, history, and power.’’ Specific conditions and relations produce the human, which is entirely different than saying that humans are the same as each other or as other animals. Their differences should not be disregarded for a host of reasons, not the least of which is the political struggle various groups have made to claim both difference and not being animals. It is not my aim to ignore, then, the particularities of the human species, although I would emphasize that these particularities are not universal and are increasingly being shown to be far less particular than we imagined.

#### And these representations numb action – expanding our scope of value to the nonhuman allows more effective solutions to attritional impacts which outweigh

**Estok 13**—Sungkyunkwan University (Simon, “Ecocriticism in an Age of Terror”, CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 15.1 (2013), dml)

Understanding the "constructions of terror and terrorist bodies" (Puar xxiv) is key to resisting participation, no less than twenty-five years ago unlearning sexism involved catching myself (still does) every time I participated — using the word "girl," for instance, to describe a woman. This unlearning is activism. Sucked into a patriotic vortex (even if we are not US-American) of nationalist, heterosexist, White, ableist, ageist, classist, ecophobic, US-American exceptionalism, we are complicit in the making of the terrorist assemblage — and it is a vast one, certainly not confined to descriptions of people who fly planes into buildings. Increasingly, humanity imagines itself under siege and vulnerable. Perhaps it is a sign of our maturity as a species that we see and try to understand the threats to our survival: colony collapse disorder, new and devastating diseases, global warming, 9/11 and terrorism, increasing food, water, and resource shortages, and so on. Perhaps it is a sign of our intelligence and wisdom that we narrativize our visions of apocalypse and that we entertain ourselves with stories of our own vulnerability before forces which we perceive as profoundly — indeed, lethally — violent toward our very existence. Perhaps our perceptions and almost fetishistic representations of ourselves as being under siege signals changes in our ethics toward other people and toward the natural environment. Yet, to borrow the words of political theorist Jane Bennett, "we continue to produce and consume in the same violently reckless ways" as if we do not take our own violence (or the violent reactions to it) at all seriously (113) — at least not on a level that would cause us to change our behaviors. Part of this violence has to do with the very basic issue of how we see the world.

For some time now we have seen the world in high resolution through images which travel with inconceivable speed and with incredible accessibility in many parts of the world. The sheer surfeit of information produces its own effects. For a long time now, it has been the case that the "kicks just keep getting harder to find" (to cite from the Paul Revere and the Raiders). We need more the more we get, but there is a numbing effect to all of this apocalyptic narrative — whether it is news, film, music, print, or other media — with which we increasingly entertain ourselves. Disastrous (as well as terrorist) events "have a visceral, eye-catching and page turning power," a power that materializes the present and dematerializes more longue durée emergencies (Nixon 3). Rob Nixon wonders "how can we convert into image and narrative the disasters that are slow moving and long in the making, disasters that are anonymous and star nobody, disasters that are attritional and of indifferent interest to the sensation-driven technologies of our image world" (3). Nixon's concern is with bringing those things which do not seem immediate into public consciousness, those things which are not Katrina or 9/11, those slow moving and more predictable things. Perhaps one of the reasons these are difficult to bring into public consciousness is the very fact that they are more predictable than the sudden surprises which kill thousands. One of the reasons terror has such purchase in the twenty-first century is that it remains one of the few things that still evokes our sense of tragedy and that can still stimulate us into action. Representations of disaster and environmental adversity, meanwhile, often take the same shape and effect of representations of terror, and we might just as easily use a description from Nichols of terrorism to designate a weather event such as Katrina as "an evil that lurks beyond the pale of diplomacy, international relations, or the rule of law" (136). The fact that sensational news does stimulate us into action, combined with the fact of overlaps in our thinking about terror and environment, on the one hand, and the fact that tragic narratives have extended their rather narrow focus from the fall of individuals to the fall of our entire species, on the other, puts ecocriticism in a good position. Ecocriticism in an age of terror is well situated to challenge how we see and represent the world and to do so specifically by unveiling the dishonesty and violence that populate our narratives and our imagination about the natural world.

Tragedy is no longer the sole domain of humanity: "Rather than limiting tragedy to an artistic genre — written by a playwright and performed on stage — it is helpful to loosen up these criteria, giving it much broader scope. For tragedy does not always hinge on human authors and human victims" (Dimock 68). The collapse and derogation of the natural environment is a tragedy in itself: our being dislodged and our troubled individuality are surely tragic too, but the fall of that bigger body of which we are a part — the fall of nature — is a tragic one. The question is not whether nature will survive: it will, but diminished. The question — if we may borrow a line from Robert Frost — "is what to make of a diminished thing" (118). Theorizing tragedy for the modern world is necessary. Theorizing tragedy to address the diminishing of nature (a diminishing that is itself a direct result of ecophobia) is more than an act of political engagement: it is activist in the sense that it changes how we see and behave. Along with the evolution of humanist notions of rights extending beyond the human, tragic theory too must evolve to address what it is that patterns the perception and representation of ecological disasters as both terrorism and tragedy: "The moments of crisis in a community's understanding of itself" (Poole 36) that tragedy stages are moments in the narrative of ecophobia.

Notwithstanding sometimes hostile responses to the theorizing of ecophobia (perhaps from people who think that humanity is motivated only by altruism and benevolence), it is necessary to continue theorizing this sometimes contentious topic. No point in preaching to the choir. Marc Bekoff, one of the 2011 ASLE plenary speakers, made precisely this point and argued that for him, it is important "to appeal to people who don't agree with me, rather than to preach to the converted, because this is where change occurs" (11). This is at least one place where activism is to be found. In times like ours relocating the limits of activist and academic coexistence means taking to heart the importance of the work that we do, the budging of the mindset that is unsustainable, the constant hammering away at the problems — not with a shot-in-the-dark ("it might hit something") or trickle-down ("it might grow") goal, but with trust in the fact that the arguments and connections we are making are right, and every single person we teach or reach is one more person behind us. In times like ours when the natural environment increasingly intrudes into the affairs of humanityin ways increasingly understood in terms of terror, expanding the definitional range of tragedy to accommodate nonhuman agency will allow us to see the world more accurately. In times like ours, however much we may rail against elitism and hierarchy and class disparities, it remains a fact that all of us professors and students here right now reading this work and study in an elite venue, not a park setting where admission is free to all and sundry or a public square where we are likely to rile revolutionary masses, but a university or college, an institution at which most of our neighbors do not work. In times like ours, however activist we may want to be, our practices are unsustainable. In times like ours, when bombs go off in Boston and men fly airplanes into buildings; when hurricanes wipe out cities and other severe weather events randomly and unpredictably erase things humanity has tried hard to establish; in times like these when it is hard not to hear ecocritics grasping, struggling, and committed to having an effect but terribly troubled about how theory distances us from intervening in real world problems, it is necessary to theorize about ecophobia, terror, and tragedy.

#### The alternative is an imagining of the global suicide of humanity – we must abandon our stranglehold over the domination of life in order to envision a more ethical future

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How might such a standpoint of dialectical, utopian anti-humanism reconfigure a notion of action which does not simply repeat in another way the modern humanist infliction of violence, as exemplified by the plan of Hawking, or fall prey to institutional and systemic complicity in speciesist violence? While this question goes beyond what it is possible to outline in this paper, **we contend that** **the thought experiment of global suicide helps to locate this question--the question of modern action itself--as residing at the heart of the** modern environmental **problem**. In a sense perhaps the only way to understand what is at stake in ethical action which responds to the natural environment is to come to terms with the logical consequences of ethical action itself. **The point operates then not as the end, but as the starting point of a standpoint which attempts to reconfigure our notions of action, life-value, and harm**.

For some, guided by the pressure of moral conscience or by a practice of harm minimisation, the appropriate response to historical and contemporary environmental destruction is that of action guided by abstention. For example, one way of reacting to mundane, everyday complicity is the attempt to abstain or opt-out of certain aspects of modern, industrial society: to not eat non-human animals, to invest ethically, to buy organic produce, to not use cars and buses, to live in an environmentally conscious commune. Ranging from small personal decisions to the establishment of parallel economies (think of organic and fair trade products as an attempt to set up a quasi-parallel economy), a typical modern form of action is that of a refusal to be complicit in human practices that are violent and destructive. Again, however, at a practical level, to what extent are such acts of nonparticipation rendered banal by their complicity in other actions? In a grand register of violence and harm the individual who abstains from eating non-human animals but still uses the bus or an airplane or electricity has only opted out of some harm causing practices and remains fully complicit with others. **One response, however, which bypasses** the problem of **complicity** and the banality **of action is to take the non-participation solution to its** most **extreme** level. In this instance, the only way to truly be non-complicit in the violence of the human heritage would be to opt-out altogether. Here, then, the modern discourse of reflection, responsibility and action runs to its logical conclusion--the **global suicide of humanity**--as a free-willed and 'final solution'.

While we are not interested in the discussion of the 'method' of the global suicide of humanity per se, one method that would be the least violent is that of humans choosing to no longer reproduce. [10] The case at point here is that the global suicide of humanity would be a moral act; it would take humanity out of the equation of life on this earth and remake the calculation for the benefit of everything nonhuman. While suicide in certain forms of religious thinking is normally condemned as something which is selfish and inflicts harm upon loved ones, the global suicide of humanity would be the highest act of altruism. That is, global suicide would involve the taking of responsibility for the destructive actions of the human species. By eradicating ourselves we end the long process of inflicting harm upon other species and offer a human-free world. If there is a form of divine intelligence then surely the human act of global suicide will be seen for what it is: a profound moral gesture aimed at redeeming humanity. Such an act is an offer of sacrifice to pay for past wrongs that would usher in a new future. Through the death of our species we will give the gift of life to others.

It should be noted nonetheless that our proposal for the global suicide of humanity is based upon the notion that such a radical action needs to be voluntary and not forced. In this sense, and given the likelihood of such an action not being agreed upon, it operates as a thought experiment which may help humans to radically rethink what it means to participate in modern, moral life within the natural world. In other words, whether or not the act of global suicide takes place might well be irrelevant. What is more important is the form of critical reflection that an individual needs to go through before coming to the conclusion that the global suicide of humanity is an action that would be worthwhile. The point then of a thought experiment that considers the argument for the global suicide of humanity is the attempt to outline an anti-humanist, or non-human-centric ethics. Such an ethics attempts to take into account both sides of the human heritage: the capacity to carry out violence and inflict harm and the capacity to use moral reflection and creative social organisation to minimise violence and harm. Through the idea of global suicide such an ethics reintroduces a central question to the heart of moral reflection: To what extent is the value of the continuation of human life worth the total harm inflicted upon the life of all others? Regardless of whether an individual finds the idea of global suicide abhorrent or ridiculous, this question remains valid and relevant and will not go away, no matter how hard we try to forget, suppress or repress it.

#### And individual complicity in the system is destructive

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In one sense, the human individual’s modern complicity in environmental violence represents something of a bizarre symmetry to Hannah Arendt’s notion of the ‘banality of evil’ (Arendt, 1994). For Arendt, the Nazi regime was an emblem of modernity, being a collection of official institutions (scientific, educational, military etc.) in which **citizens** and soldiers alike **served as clerks in a bureaucratic mechanism** run by the state. These individuals committed evil, but they did so in a very banal manner: fitting into the state mechanism, following orders, filling in paperwork, working in factories, driving trucks and generally respecting the rule of law. In this way perhaps all individuals within the modern industrial world carry out a banal evil against the environment simply by going to work, sitting in their offices and living in homes attached to a power grid. Conversely, those individuals who are driven by a moral intention to not do evil and act so as to save the environment, are drawn back into a banality of the good. By their ability to effect change in only very small aspects of their daily life, or in political-social life more generally, modern individuals are forced to participate in the active destruction of the environment even if they are the voices of contrary intention. What is ‘banal’ in this sense is not the lack of a definite moral intention but, rather, the way in which the individual’s or institution’s participation in everyday modern life, and the unintentional contribution to environmental destruction therein, contradicts and counteracts the smaller acts of good intention.

### 1NC

#### Next off is the Legitimate Violence kritik

#### The 1AC’s attempt to find the ‘legitimate’ use of violence is intrinsically linked to the creation of a hierarchy of life that has been used to justify nonhuman subjugation

**Kochi 9** - Sussex Law School, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK (Tarik, “Species War: Law, Violence and Animals,” SAGE Journals)

Although species war remains largely hidden because it is not seen as war or even violence at all it continues to affect the ways in which juridical mechanisms order the legitimacy of violence. While species war may not be a Western monopoly, in this account I will only examine a Western variant. This variant, however, is one that may well have been imposed upon the rest of the world through colonization and globalization. In what will follow I offer a sketch of species war and show how the juridical mechanisms for determining what constitutes legitimate violence fall back upon the hidden foundation of species war. I try to do this by showing that the various modern juridical mechanisms for determining what counts as legitimate violence are dependent upon a practice of judging the value of forms of life. I argue that contemporary claims about the legitimacy of war are based upon judgements about differential life-value and that these judgements are an extension of an original practice in which the legitimacy of killing is grounded upon the valuation of the human above the non-human. Further, by giving an overview of the ways in which our understanding of the legitimacy of war has changed, I attempt to show how the notion of species war has been continually excluded from the Law of war and of how contemporary historical movements might open a space for its possible re-inclusion. In this sense, the argument I develop here about species war offers a particular way of reflecting upon the nature of law more generally. In a Western juridical tradition, two functions of law are often thought to be: the establishment of order (in the context of the preservation of life, or survival); and, the realization of justice (a thick conception of the “good”). Reflecting upon these in light of the notion of species war helps us to consider that at the heart of both of these functions of law resides a practice of making judgements about the life-value of particular “objects.” These objects are, amongst other things: human individuals, groups of humans, non-human animals, plants, transcendent entities and ideas (the “state,” “community,” etc.). For the law, the practice of making judgements about the relative life- value of objects is intimately bound-up with the making of decisions about what objects can be killed. Within our Western conception of the law it is difficult to separate the moment of judgement over life-value from the decision over what constitutes “legitimate violence.” Species war sits within this blurred middle-ground between judgement and decision – it points to a moment at the heart of the law where distinctions of value and acts of violence operate as fundamental to the founding or positing of law. The primary violence of species war then takes place not as something after the establishment of a regime of law (i.e., after the establishment of the city, the state, or international law). Rather, the violence of species war occurs at the beginning of law, at its moment of foundation, as a generator, as a motor. 7

#### This distinction rests at the heart of the legal system—the hierarchal differential between the human and nonhuman not only ensures continued species war but is the foundation behind any form of violence against the Other.

**Kochi 9** - Sussex Law School, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK (Tarik “Species War: Law, Violence and Animals”)

The distinction between bare life and the good life is a legal-political distinction. It has, at least since Aristotle, resided at the foundation of Western legal and political theory. The law which holds together and  governs the political community is posited with the view of not merely sustaining the bare needs of life, but of establishing and realizing some form of the good life. However, the distinction between bare life and the good life already contains within it a prior distinction, one which arises when the survival of humans is distinguished from and affirmed against the survival of  non-human animals. At the basis of the distinction between bare life and the good life, and hence, at the basis of law, resides the human-animal distinction – a determination of value that the human form of life is good and that it is worth more or better than the lives of  non-human animals. There is a certain Nietzschean sense of the term “good” which can be drawn upon informatively here. My argument is that what occurs prior to the racial and aristocratic senses of the term “good” suggested by Nietzsche as residing genealogically with the concept of the “good life,” is more deeply, an elevated sense of life-worth that humans in the West have historically ascribed to themselves over and above the life-worth of non-human animals. Following this, when the meaning of the term “war” is explained by legal and political theorists with reference to either the concepts of survival or the good life, the linguistic and conceptual use of the term war already contains within it a value-laden human-animal distinction and the primary violence of species war. Survival   and  the  biological   imperative   (survive!)  maybe   seen  as components of a concept of “war” broadly defined. For non-human animals the killing and violence that takes place between them (and with respect to their eating of plant life) may be viewed not as species war but merely as action driven by the biological imperative. However, for humans the acts of killing and violence directed at non-human animals can be understood as species war. While such violence and killing may be thought to be driven, in part, by the biological imperative, these acts also take place within the context of normative judgments made with respect to a particular notion of the good often drawing upon a cosmic hierarchy of life-value established by religious theories of creation or scientific theories of evolution. This reflection need not be seen as carried out by every individual on a daily basis but rather as that which is drawn upon from time to time within public life as humans inter-subjectively coordinate their actions in accordance with particular enunciated ends and plan for the future. In this respect, the violence and killing of species war is not simply a question of survival or bare life, instead, it is bound up with a consideration of the good. For most modern humans in the West the “good life” involves the daily killing of animals for dietary need and for pleasure. At the heart of the question of species war, and all war for that matter, resides a question about the legitimacy of violence linked to a philosophy of value. The question of war-law sits within a wider history of decision making about the relative values of different forms of life. “Legitimate” violence is under-laid by cultural, religious, moral, political and philosophical conceptions about the relative values of forms of life. Playing out through history are distinctions and hierarchies of life-value that are extensions of the original human-animal distinction. Distinctions that can be thought to follow from the human-animal distinction are those, for  example, drawn between: Hellenes and barbarians; Europeans and Orientals; whites and blacks; the “civilized” and the “uncivilized”; Nazis and Jews; Israeli’s and Arabs; colonizers and the colonized. Historically these practices and regimes of violence have been culturally, politically and legally normalized in a manner that replicates the normalization of the violence carried out against non-human animals. Unpacking, criticizing and challenging the forms of violence, which in different historical moments appear as “normal,” is one of the ongoing tasks of any critic who is concerned with the question of what war does to law and of what law does to war? The critic of war is thus a critic of war’s normalization. Unpacking, criticizing and challenging the forms of violence, which in different historical moments appear as "normal," is one of the ongoing tasks of any critic who is concerned with the question of what war does to law and of what law does to war? The critic of war is thus a critic of war's norm-alization.

#### And anthropocentrism ensures unimaginable suffering and the unending slaughter of billions per year – this categorically outweighs

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Too manypeople with pretences to ethics, compassion, decency, justice, love, and other stellar values of humanity at its finestresist the profound analogies between animal and human slavery and animal and human holocausts, in order to devalue or trivialize animal suffering and avoid the responsibility of the weighty moral issues confronting them. The moral myopia of humanism is blatantly evident when people who have been victimized by violence and oppression decry the fact that they “were treated like animals” – as if it is acceptable to brutalize animal, but not humans. If there is a salient disanalogy or discontinuity between the tyrannical pogroms launched against animals and humans, it lies not in the fallacious assumption that animals do not suffer physical and mental pain similar to humans, but rather that animals suffer more than humans, both quantitatively (the intensity of their torture, such as they endure in fur farms, factory farms, and experimental laboratories) and qualitatively (the number of those who suffer and die). And while few oppressed human groups lack moral backing, sometimes on an international scale, one finds not mass solidarity with animals but rather mass consumption of them. As another Nobel Prize writer in Literature, South African novelist writer J. M. Coetzee, forcefully stated: “Let me say it openly: we are surrounded by an enterprise of degradation, cruelty, and killing which rivals anything the Third Reich was capable of, indeed dwarfs it, in that ours is an enterprise without end, self-regenerating, bringing rabbits, rats, poultry, livestock ceaselessly into the world for the purpose of killing them.”37 Every year, throughout the world, over 45 billion farmed animals currently are killed for food consumption.38 This staggering number is nearly eight times the present human population. In the US alone, over 10 billion animals are killed each year for food consumption – 27 million each day, nearly 19,000 per minute. Of the 10 billion land animals killed each year in the US, over 9 billion are chickens; every day in the US, 23 million chickens are killed for human consumption, 269 per second. In addition to the billions of land animals consumed, humans also kill and consume 85 billion marine animals (17 billion in the US).39 Billions more animals die in the name of science, entertainment, sport, or fashion (i.e., the leather, fur, and wool industries), or on highways as victims of cars and trucks. Moreover, ever more animal species vanish from the earth as we enter the sixth great extinction crisis in the planet’s history, this one caused by human not natural events, the last one occurring 65 million years ago with the demise of the dinosaurs and 90% of all species on the planet. It is thus appropriate to recall the saying by English clergyman and writer, William Ralph Inge, to the effect that: "We have enslaved the rest of the animal creation, and have treated our distant cousins in fur and feathers so badly that beyond doubt, if they were able to formulate a religion, they would depict the Devil in human form."

The construction of industrial stockyards, the total objectification of nonhuman animals, and the mechanized murder of innocent beings should have sounded a loud warning to humanity that such a process might one day be applied to them, as it was in Nazi Germany. If humans had not exploited animals, moreover, they might not have exploited humans, or, at the very least, they would not have had handy conceptual models and technologies for enforcing domination over others. “A better understanding of these connections,” Patterson states, “should help make our planet a more humane and livable place for all of us – people and animals alike, A new awareness is essential for the survival of our endangered planet.”40

#### The alternative is a refusal of sovereign power to draw lines between inside and outside – absolutism’s key

Edkins and Pin-Fat 05. Jenny Edkins, professor of international politics at Prifysgol Aberystwyth University (in Wales) and Veronique Pin-Fat, senior lecturer in politics at Manchester Universit, “Through the Wire: Relations of Power and Relations of Violence,” Millennium - Journal of International Studies 2005 34: pg. 14

One potential form of challenge to sovereign power consists of a refusal to draw any lines between zoe- and bios, inside and outside.59 As we have shown, sovereign power does not involve a power relation in Foucauldian terms. It is more appropriately considered to have become a form of governance or technique of administration through relationships of violence that reduce political subjects to mere bare or naked life. In asking for a refusal to draw lines as a possibility of challenge, then, we are not asking for the elimination of power relations and consequently, we are not asking for the erasure of the possibility of a mode of political being that is empowered and empowering, is free and that speaks: quite the opposite. Following Agamben, we are suggesting that it is only through a refusal to draw any lines at all between forms of life (and indeed, nothing less will do) that sovereign power as a form of violence can be contested and a properly political power relation (a life of power as potenza) reinstated. We could call this challenging the logic of sovereign power through refusal. Our argument is that we can evade sovereign power and reinstate a form of power relation by contesting sovereign power’s assumption of the right to draw lines, that is, by contesting the sovereign ban. Any other challenge always inevitably remains within this relationship of violence. To move outside it (and return to a power relation) we need not only to contest its right to draw lines in particular places, but also to resist the call to draw any lines of the sort sovereign power demands.

The grammar of sovereign power cannot be resisted by challenging or fighting over where the lines are drawn. Whilst, of course, this is a strategy that can be deployed, it is not a challenge to sovereign power per se as it still tacitly or even explicitly accepts that lines must be drawn somewhere (and preferably more inclusively). Although such strategies contest the violence of sovereign power’s drawing of a particular line, they risk replicating such violence in demanding the line be drawn differently. This is because such forms of challenge fail to refuse sovereign power’s line-drawing ‘ethos’, an ethos which, as Agamben points out, renders us all now homines sacri or bare life.

#### An absolute refusal is critical to breaking down the underpinnings of humanist violence

**Pugliese 13** – Research Director at Macquarie University (Joseph, “State Violence and the Execution of Law: Biopolitical Caesurae of Torture, Black Sites, Drones,” p.95-97)

\*reject gendered language

Critically, the 'solution' to this regime of violence is not to shuffle the categories of life up or down the biopolitical hierarchy as this merely reproduces the system while leaving intact the governing power of the biopolitical cut andits attendant violent effects. Reflecting on the possibility of disrupting this biopolitical regime and its hierarchies of life, Agamben writes:

in our culture man has always been the result of a simultaneous division and articulation of the animal and thehuman, in which one of the two terms of the operation was what was at stake in it. To render inoperative the machine that governs our conception of man will therefore mean no longer to seek new - more effective or authentic- articulations, but rather to show the central emptiness, the hiatus that - within man - separates man and animal, and to risk ourselves in this emptiness: the suspension of the suspension. 21

Precisely because everything is always already at stake in the continued mobilization of biopolitical caesurae, the seeking of new articulations of life that will be valorized as more 'authentic' will merely reproduce the machine without having eliminated its capacity for violence as ensured by the re-articulation of the biopolitical cut. Looking back at the biopolitical infrastructure of the Nazi state, one can clearly see the imbrication of ecology, the regime of animal rights, and the racio-speciesist branding of Jews as collectively exemplifying the dangers of seeking more'authentic' articulations of animals and humans that are predicated on the biopolitical division and its capacity for inversions and recalibrations while leaving the violent order of the biopolitical regime intact. The Nazis effectively called for a more 'authentic' relation to nature ('blood and soil') that was buttressed by animal rights (Reich AnimalProtection laws) and the rights of nature (Reich Law on the Protection of Nature). 22 Animals and nature werethereby recalibrated up the speciesist scale at the expense of Jews. Deploying the violence of racio-speciesism, the Nazis animalized Jews as 'rats,' 'vermin' and other low life forms, situated them at the bottom of the biopolitical hierarchy, and then proceeded to enact the very cruelty and exterminatory violence (cattle car transport, herding incamps replicating stockyards and the industrialized killing procedures of animal slaughterhouses) that they hadoutlawed against animals. The Nazi state also exemplifies the manner in which the regime of (animal) rights can be perfectly accommodated within the most genocidal forms of state violence. This is so, precisely because the prior conceptof human rights is always-already founded on the human/animal biopolitical caesura and its asymmetry of power — otherwise the very categories of 'human' and 'animal' rights would fail to achieve cultural intelligibility. The paternal distribution of rights to non-human animals still pivots on this asymmetrical a priori. Even as it extends its seemingly benevolent regime of rights and protections to animals, rights discourse, by disavowing this violent a priori, merely reproduces the species war by other means

In order to short-circuit this machine, a deconstructive move is needed, a move that refuses to participate in the mereoverturning of the binarized hierarchy, for example: animal > human, and that effectively displaces the hierarchy bydisclosing the conceptual aporias that drive it. The challenge is to proceed to inhabit the hiatus, to run the risk of living the'emptiness' of an atopical locus that is neither animal nor human. This non-foundational locus is the space that Agamben designates as 'the open,' marked by the 'reciprocal suspension of the two terms [human/animal], something for which we perhaps have no name and which is neither animal nor [hujman [and that] settles in between nature and humanity.' Critically, the reciprocal suspension articulates 'the play between the two terms, their immediate constellation in a non-coincidence.' 2 \* In naming their constellation in a non-coincidence, Agamben enunciates the possibility of a Levinasian ethics that refuses the anthropocentric assimilation of the Other/animal/nature into the imperialism of the Same/human.The urgent necessity of instigating the move to render inoperative this anthropocentric regime is not incidental to the violent biopolitical operations of the state. On the contrary, state violence is virulently animated by the logic of the biopolitical caesura and its 'anthropological machine' - which 'produce [s] the human through the suspension and captureof the inhuman.' 21 The anthropocentrism that drives this biopolitical regime ensures that whatever is designated as non-human-animal life continues to be branded not only as expendable and as legitimately enslaveable but as the quintessential'unsavable figure of life.' 25 The aporetic force that drives this regime is exposed with perverse irony in one of the entries of the al-Qahtani interrogation log, which documents an interrogator reading to the detainee in the course of his torturesession two quotes from the book Wlmt Makes a Terrorist and Why?: 'The second quote pointed out that the terrorist mustdehumanize their victims and avoid thinking in terms of guilt or innocence.' In the context of the post-9/11 US gulags, this biopolitical regime of state terror is what guarantees the production of captive life that can be tortured with impunity andthat, moreover, enables its categorization as unsavable. Once captive life is thus designated, it can be liquidated withoutcompunction - without having to think 'in terms of guilt or innocence.

#### Its try or die for the neg – The standpoint of the animal epitomizes the failure with status quo politics. Democratic politics has only worked to further the dominant of the non-human. The only thing utopian is believing that the status quo will work.

**Calarco 8** – Ph.D, SUNY Binghamton, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Fullerton University (Matthew, “Zoographies: The Question of the Animal from Heidegger to Derrida” p.95-97)

The reader who takes up careful study of Agamben’s work from this angle, seeking answers to sub questions, will be well positioned to grasp its novelty. The overarching thesis of Agamben’s work over the past decade is that there is in fact an “inner solidarity” between democracy and totalitarianism, not at an empirical level, but at a historical and philosophical level. Despite the enormous empirical differences between these two political systems, they are nevertheless united in their investment in the politics of the anthropological machine and in seeking to separate bare (animal) life from properly political (human) life. Even if democratic regimes maintaining safeguards designed to prevent many of the totalitarian excesses perpetrated against bare life (and Agamben’s references to Karen Quinlan and others make it clear that democracies are actually far from successful in such matters), they continue unwittingly to create the conditions of possibility for such consequences. This hidden implication of democracy comes to the fore especially in those instances where the rule of law is suspended, for example, in the declarations of sovereign exception of the law or in the refugee crisis that accompanies the decline of nation-states. Such states of exception are, Agamben argues (following Walter Benjamin), becoming more and more the rule in contemporary political life – and the examples one might adduce in support of this thesis are indeed becoming increasingly and troublingly commonplace. It is considerations of this kind that lead Agamben to the conclusion that the genuine political task facing us today is not the reform, radicalization or expansion of humanism, democracy and sovereignty but creating an altogether different form of political life.

Agamben’s work faces two important challenges at this level. On the one hand, neohumanists will (justifiably) wonder whether Agamben’s “coming community” and rejection of the humanist tradition in favor of a nonsovereign and nonjuridical politics will be better able than current democracies to guard against the injustices he condemns. On the other hand, theorists of a more deconstructionist and Levinasian orientation will lkkley see Agamebn’s project as being constituted by a false dilemma between humanist democracy and a nonessentialist thought of community. Although such theorists would share Agamben;s concerns about the problematic virtual possibilities of democratic politics and its ontology, they would be less sanguine about completely rejecting the democratic heritage. For them, the chief political task would consist in filtering through our democratic inheritance to unlock its radical possibilities, in siting on democracy’s commitment to perfectibility so as to expand democracy’s scope and to open democratic politics to its Other. This would bring democracy and its humanist commitments into relation with another though of being with Others that is similar to Agamben’s coming community.

I should say that I find neither of these critical perspectives particularly persuasive and that I believe Agamben offers us overwhelmingly persuasive accounts of the limits of current forms of democracy and humanism. Furthermore, it should be noted that there are moments throughout his work where he gives instances of how his alternative thoughts of politics *can* be actualized in concrete circumstances. But even the most charitable reading of his work must acknowledge that in terms of the kinds of questions posed by neohumanists and deconstructionists, much remains to be worked out at the theoretical and concrete political level in Agamebn’s project. And if the scope of this discussion were limited to an anthropocentric politics, I would argue that the questions and criticisms raised by neohumanists and deconstructionists are very difficult to circumvent. Humanism, democracy and human rights are complicated and rich historical constructs with the intrinsic potential for extensive and remarkably progressive reforms.

And yet, if the question of the animal were taken seriously here and the political discussion were moved to that level as well, the stakes of the debate would change considerably. Who among those activists and theorists working in defense of animals seriously believes that humanism, democracy and human rights are the sine qua non of ethics and politics? Even those theorists who employ the logic of these discourses in extensionist manner so as to bring animals within the sphere of moral and political considerability do not seem to believe that an ethics and a politics **that genuinely respects animal life can be accomplished within the confines of the traditions they use.**

Of this political terrain, neohumanist arguments concerning the merits of the democratic tradition have little if any weight. Even if one were to inscribe animal rights within a democratic liberatory narrative of expansion and perfectibility (as is sometimes done), such gestured can only appear tragicomic in light of the massive institutionalized abuse of animals that contemporary democracies not only tolerate but encourage on a daily basis. And in many democracies the support of animal abuse goes much further. Currently, militant animal activists in the United States who engage in economic sabatoge and property destruction in the name of stopping the worst forms of animal abuse are not just criticized (and in many cases without sound justification) but are placed at the top of the list of “domestic terrorists” by the F.B.I. and subject to outrageously unjust penalties and prison sentences. In view of the magnitude of such problems, animal activists are currently embroiled in a stricter protracted debate over the merits of reformist (welfarist) versus a stricter and more radical rightist (incrementalist) approach to animal issues and over which approach is more effective in the contemporary political and legal contexts. However, the real question seems to me to lie elsewhere – precisely in the decision to be made between the project of radicalizing existing politics to accommodate nonhuman life (an expansion of neohumanism and deconstruction) and that of working toward the kind of coming politics advocated by Agamben that would allow for an entirely new economy of human-animal relations. While Agamben’s thought is sometimes pejoratively labeled by critics as utopian inasmuch as it seeks a complete change in our political thinking and practices without offering the concrete means of achieving such change, from the perspective of the question of the animal, the tables can easily be turned on the critics. Anyone who argues that existing forms of politics can be reformed or radicalized so as to do justice to the multiplicity of forms of nonhuman life is clearly the unrealistic and utopian thinker, for what sings or sources of hope do we have that humanism and democracy (both of which are grounded in an agent-centered conception of subjectivity) can be radicalized or reformed as to include and give direct consideration to beings beyond the human?

### 1NC Solvency

#### A national security court wrecks due process and compromises judicial independence by cementing executive control of adjudication

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Like any competent military commander, Sulmasy structures his proposal’s features to meet his objectives. First and foremost, his national security court system would adjudicate all habeas proceedings – rather than the federal district courts, as Boumediene envisioned – thus preventing the exodus Sulmasy fears.56 Otherwise, the most striking aspect of his proposed court system is its structural similarity to traditional military commissions; as Sulmasy envisions, the former represents “an outgrowth” of the latter, not a paradigm shift.57 Suspected terrorists would be detained in military brigs and trials conducted on military bases, as “has been the practice [] for generations.”58 Military judge advocates would supply both prosecution and defense counsel in habeas proceedings, although civilian prosecutors would supplement the former during full prosecution.59 Procedurally, the national security court system would “adopt virtually all [] aspects of the Military Commissions Act of 2006.”60 The merit of this structure, according to Sulmasy, consists in that it “includes the military’s input and can be seen as overt recognition that this is a war requiring military expertise.”61 Less euphemistically, the military would retain far greater control over logistics than in the alternative scenario of federal district court, mitigating the “pervasive elasticity in the rules governing [regular federal] judicial proceedings, over which [those] judges have a degree of supervisory authority.”62

Virtually the only significant departure from the military paradigm is the one forced by Boumediene: adjudication by civilian federal judges. Nevertheless, Sulmasy does everything possible to control the latter’s influence, borrowing heavily from earlier proposals by other conservative commentators.63 More precisely, the court’s constituting legislation “must be specific as to the . . . limited authority of the court.”64 Most critically, “[it] needs to limit the creativity of the court . . . mak[ing] clear to the judges that this is not an ordinary criminal court, and, as such, the judges should refrain from making analogies to the civilian system in deciding their cases.”65 Security court judges, in other words, would be “legislatively guide[d]” away from extending further constitutional rights to detainees.66 In addition, any departure from the legislated strictures of the court would be subject to immediate, as-of-right, interlocutory appeal by the prosecution (i.e., the military judge advocates), though not the defense; such interlocutory appeals would be reviewed on a standard of “error[] committed in applying the National Security Court legislation.”67 All these features quite obviously buttress the executive’s control over the adjudicatory process and the substantive findings available to the court.

#### This causes rubber-stamping of executive detention decisions

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The preceding developments would still not equate to the Shapiro/Stephen model of jurisdictional transfer if FISC was similarly independent to the federal courts that would otherwise review warrant applications. Importantly however, FISC has demonstrated an astounding lack of independence over its three-decade history: between 1978 and 2004, the court processed 18,742 warrant applications, modifying 181 and denying only four.169 "What emerges from this data,” observes Theodore Ruger, “is a government success rate unparalleled in any other American court.”170 A former National Security Agency intern and now law professor, Jonathan Turley, opines that FISC “would have signed anything that we put in front of [it].”171 As a result, several commentators regard FISC as “little more than a rubberstamp” for the executive.172 The court’s appellate branch, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court of Review, is publicly known to have convened only twice: in 2002, overturning restrictions FISC had placed on a warrant,173 and in 2008, upholding controversial amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.174 Prior to these two anomalous decisions, one of the appellate branch’s former judges reportedly stated that his position was “an empty title as far as I am concerned.”175 Based on its track record, one can reasonably suspect that FISC operates as a non-independent forum to which the government has transferred warrant review, precisely reflecting the dynamic of Shapiro and Stephen’s theoretical model.

FISC’s dubious record would perhaps be unsurprising were the court comprised of Article I adjudicators, in accordance with Meltzer’s vision for how Shapiro and Stephen’s process would unfold in the United States.176 Interestingly however, FISC is composed of eleven Article III judges drawn from among the federal district courts, selected by the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court.177 These judges maintain regular district court caseloads and serve on FISC part-time, for seven-year, nonrenewable terms.178 Despite the court’s track record, therefore, one is at pains to detect any apparent source of dependence among its judges. Ruger attempts to solve this puzzle empirically by examining Chief Justice Rehnquist’s appointments to FISC in 1992, 1997, and 2002.179 What Ruger uncovers is strikingly reminiscent of the manner by which Spain’s Tribunal de Orden Público achieved its remarkable lack of independence despite being composed of apparently independent judges. More specifically, Ruger hypothesizes that would-be FISC judges “self-promoted” themselves to the Chief Justice – known for his conservative, pro-government ideology – by submitting more progovernment Fourth Amendment decisions for publication than their colleagues.180 This signaling practice enabled the Chief Justice to more easily select pro-government FISC judges.181 This careerism produced, as in Spain, a nominally independent court that in practice operates to implement the executive’s will, as its record attests.

The preceding analysis of FISC holds significant implications for Sulmasy’s proposed national security court system. Starkly phrased, the mere presence of Article III judges is no magic bullet. Moreover, the criteria of judicial selection operating in both Spain’s Tribunal de Orden Público and FISC appear analogous to Sulmasy’s proposal, in that his court would be comprised of judges “versed in this unique area of law” – which, as reviewed earlier, Sulmasy employs as a euphemism for judges sympathetic to the executive and therefore willing to limit their “creativity” while interpreting constitutional rights.182 Meltzer recognizes this problem in the abstract, arguing that specialized courts are more vulnerable to political influence than generalist courts – a prediction that FISC radically bears out – and thus liberal scholars should not presume that specialized Article III courts would by themselves solve the independence problems of Article I tribunals.183 Whether Sulmasy’s bench consists of Article I or Article III adjudicators therefore appears less determinative of its independence that one would intuitively suspect.184

As Judith Resnik argues, “Article III looks thin . . . [it] misses the institutional needs of a judiciary . . . for its ability to work, let alone to be a player in governance.”185 Extending Reznik’s insight, one might hypothesize that structural bias in a court system will prejudice independence even where Article III judges are present. Neither FISC nor Sulmasy’s proposal fare well in this respect: both systems exhibit built-in pro-government bias, which can only exacerbate their anterior judicial independence deficits. For instance, as Ruger observes, an important reason why FISC’s appellate branch virtually never convenes is that only government can appeal,186 which in turn likely promotes stronger pro-government bias at first instance due to a lack of oversight.187 Similarly, only the prosecution (i.e., the military) may bring as-of-right interlocutory appeals in Sulmasy’s proposal,188 which one would expect to instill bias into its procedural jurisprudence. The accretion of further sources of bias – for example, both prosecution and representation of suspected terrorists by military judge advocates,189 executive control over facilities and logistics,190 and executive-biased presumptions about the proper balance between constitutional rights and military objectives191 – can only worsen this problem. The military’s pervasive institutional integration within Sulmasy’s national security court system clearly fails to satisfy the institutional needs of independence to which Resnik refers. Sulmasy’s proposal therefore, if implemented, would risk repeating the FISC debacle.192

### 1NC Credibility

#### The plan identifies the non-Western world as a space devoid of the rule of law---that sets the stage for aggressive intervention and colonial plunder, which locks in neoliberal structural violence

Ugo Mattei 9, Professor at Hastings College of the Law & University of Turin; and Marco de Morpurgo, M.Sc. Candidate, International University College of Turin, LL.M. Candidate, Harvard Law School, 2009, “GLOBAL LAW & PLUNDER: THE DARK SIDE OF THE RULE OF LAW,” online: <http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=bocconi_legal_papers>

Within this framework, Western law has constantly enjoyed a dominant position during the past centuries and today, thus being in the position to shape and bend the evolution of other legal systems worldwide. During the colonial era, continental-European powers have systematically exported their own legal systems to the colonized lands. During the past decades and today, the United States have been dominating the international arena as the most powerful economic power, exporting their own legal system to the ‘periphery’, both by itself and through a set of international institutions, behaving as a neo-colonialist within the ideology known as neoliberalism.

Western countries identify themselves as law-abiding and civilized no matter what their actual history reveals. Such identification is acquired by false knowledge and false comparison with other peoples, those who were said to ‘lack’ the rule of law, such as China, Japan, India, and the Islamic world more generally. In a similar fashion today, according to some leading economists, Third World developing countries ‘lack’ the minimal institutional systems necessary for the unfolding of a market economy.

The theory of ‘lack’ and the rhetoric of the rule of law have justified aggressive interventions from Western countries into non-Western ones. The policy of corporatization and open markets, supported today globally by the so-called Washington consensus3, was used by Western bankers and the business community in Latin America as the main vehicle to ‘open the veins’ of the continent—to borrow Eduardo Galeano’s metaphor4—with no solution of continuity between colonial and post-colonial times. Similar policy was used in Africa to facilitate the forced transfer of slaves to America, and today to facilitate the extraction of agricultural products, oil, minerals, ideas and cultural artefacts in the same countries. The policy of opening markets for free trade, used today in Afghanistan and Iraq, was used in China during the nineteenth century Opium War, in which free trade was interpreted as an obligation to buy drugs from British dealers. The policy of forcing local industries to compete on open markets was used by the British empire in Bengal, as it is today by the WTO in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Foreign-imposed privatization laws that facilitate unconscionable bargains at the expense of the people have been vehicles of plunder, not of legality. In all these settings the tragic human suffering produced by such plunder is simply ignored. In this context law played a major role in legalizing such practices of powerful actors against the powerless.5 Yet, this use of power is scarcely explored in the study of Western law.

The exportation of Western legal institutions from the West to the ‘rest’ has systematically been justified through the ideological use of the extremely politically strong and technically weak concept of ‘rule of law’. The notion of ‘rule of law’ is an extremely ambiguous one. Notwithstanding, within any public discussion its positive connotations have always been taken for granted. The dominant image of the rule of law is false both historically and in the present, because it does not fully acknowledge its dark side. The false representation starts from the idea that good law (which others ‘lack’) is autonomous, separate from society and its institutions, technical, non-political, non-distributive and reactive rather than proactive: more succinctly, a technological framework for an ‘efficient’ market.

The rule of law has a bright and a dark side, with the latter progressively conquering new ground whenever the former is not empowered by a political soul. In the absence of such political life, the rule of law becomes a cold technology. Moreover, when large corporate actors dominate states (affected by a declining regulatory role), law becomes a product of the economy, and economy governs the law rather than being governed by it.

#### The 1AC’s quick-fix solution to warming glosses over the ontological questioning of the human subject. The drive to prevent our inevitable extinction is an example of the same human hubris which has caused the 1AC’s scenarios in the first place.

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The challenge the Anthropocene poses is a challenge not just to national security, to food and energy markets, or to our “way of life” — though these challenges are all real, profound, and inescapable. The greatest challenge the Anthropocene poses may be to our sense of what it means to be human. Within 100 years — within three to five generations — we will face average temperatures 7 degrees Fahrenheit higher than today, rising seas at least three to 10 feet higher, and worldwide shifts in crop belts, growing seasons and population centers. Within a thousand years, unless we stop emitting greenhouse gases wholesale right now, humans will be living in a climate the Earth hasn’t seen since the Pliocene, three million years ago, when oceans were 75 feet higher than they are today. We face the imminent collapse of the agricultural, shipping and energy networks upon which the global economy depends, a large-scale die-off in the biosphere that’s already well on its way, and our own possible extinction. If homo sapiens (or some genetically modified variant) survives the next millenniums, it will be survival in a world unrecognizably different from the one we have inhabited.

Geological time scales, civilizational collapse and species extinction give rise to profound problems that humanities scholars and academic philosophers, with their taste for fine-grained analysis, esoteric debates and archival marginalia, might seem remarkably ill suited to address. After all, how will thinking about Kant help us trap carbon dioxide? Can arguments between object-oriented ontology and historical materialism protect honeybees from colony collapse disorder? Are ancient Greek philosophers, medieval theologians, and contemporary metaphysicians going to keep Bangladesh from being inundated by rising oceans?

Of course not. But the biggest problems the Anthropocene poses are precisely those that have always been at the root of humanistic and philosophical questioning: “What does it mean to be human?” and “What does it mean to live?” In the epoch of the Anthropocene, the question of individual mortality — “What does my life mean in the face of death?” — is universalized and framed in scales that boggle the imagination. What does human existence mean against 100,000 years of climate change? What does one life mean in the face of species death or the collapse of global civilization? How do we make meaningful choices in the shadow of our inevitable end?

These questions have no logical or empirical answers. They are philosophical problems par excellence. Many thinkers, including Cicero, Montaigne, Karl Jaspers, and The Stone’s own Simon Critchley, have argued that studying philosophy is learning how to die. If that’s true, then we have entered humanity’s most philosophical age — for this is precisely the problem of the Anthropocene. The rub is that now we have to learn how to die not as individuals, but as a civilization.

III.

Learning how to die isn’t easy. In Iraq, at the beginning, I was terrified by the idea. Baghdad seemed incredibly dangerous, even though statistically I was pretty safe. We got shot at and mortared, and I.E.D.’s laced every highway, but I had good armor, we had a great medic, and we were part of the most powerful military the world had ever seen. The odds were good I would come home. Maybe wounded, but probably alive. Every day I went out on mission, though, I looked down the barrel of the future and saw a dark, empty hole.

“For the soldier death is the future, the future his profession assigns him,” wrote Simone Weil in her remarkable meditation on war, “The Iliad or the Poem of Force.” “Yet the idea of man’s having death for a future is abhorrent to nature. Once the experience of war makes visible the possibility of death that lies locked up in each moment, our thoughts cannot travel from one day to the next without meeting death’s face.” That was the face I saw in the mirror, and its gaze nearly paralyzed me.

I found my way forward through an 18th-century Samurai manual, Yamamoto Tsunetomo’s “Hagakure,” which commanded: “Meditation on inevitable death should be performed daily.” Instead of fearing my end, I owned it. Every morning, after doing maintenance on my Humvee, I’d imagine getting blown up by an I.E.D., shot by a sniper, burned to death, run over by a tank, torn apart by dogs, captured and beheaded, and succumbing to dysentery. Then, before we rolled out through the gate, I’d tell myself that I didn’t need to worry, because I was already dead. The only thing that mattered was that I did my best to make sure everyone else came back alive. “If by setting one’s heart right every morning and evening, one is able to live as though his body were already dead,” wrote Tsunetomo, “he gains freedom in the Way.”

I got through my tour in Iraq one day at a time, meditating each morning on my inevitable end. When I left Iraq and came back stateside, I thought I’d left that future behind. Then I saw it come home in the chaos that was unleashed after Katrina hit New Orleans. And then I saw it again when Sandy battered New York and New Jersey: Government agencies failed to move quickly enough, and volunteer groups like Team Rubicon had to step in to manage disaster relief.

Now, when I look into our future — into the Anthropocene — I see water rising up to wash out lower Manhattan. I see food riots, hurricanes, and climate refugees. I see 82nd Airborne soldiers shooting looters. I see grid failure, wrecked harbors, Fukushima waste, and plagues. I see Baghdad. I see the Rockaways. I see a strange, precarious world.

Our new home.

The human psyche naturally rebels against the idea of its end. Likewise, civilizations have throughout history marched blindly toward disaster, because humans are wired to believe that tomorrow will be much like today — it is unnatural for us to think that this way of life, this present moment, this order of things is not stable and permanent. Across the world today, our actions testify to our belief that we can go on like this forever, burning oil, poisoning the seas, killing off other species, pumping carbon into the air, ignoring the ominous silence of our coal mine canaries in favor of the unending robotic tweets of our new digital imaginarium. Yet the reality of global climate change is going to keep intruding on our fantasies of perpetual growth, permanent innovation and endless energy, just as the reality of mortality shocks our casual faith in permanence.

The biggest problem climate change poses isn’t how the Department of Defense should plan for resource wars, or how we should put up sea walls to protect Alphabet City, or when we should evacuate Hoboken. It won’t be addressed by buying a Prius, signing a treaty, or turning off the air-conditioning. The biggest problem we face is a philosophical one: understanding that this civilization is already dead. The sooner we confront this problem, and the sooner we realize there’s nothing we can do to save ourselves, the sooner we can get down to the hard work of adapting, with mortal humility, to our new reality.

The choice is a clear one. We can continue acting as if tomorrow will be just like yesterday, growing less and less prepared for each new disaster as it comes, and more and more desperately invested in a life we can’t sustain. Or we can learn to see each day as the death of what came before, freeing ourselves to deal with whatever problems the present offers without attachment or fear.

#### And their anthropocentric lens ignores how anthropocentric behavior is what causes pandemics in the first place – only the alternative solves

**Benatar 7** – Ph.D, written in the American Journal of Public Health (David, “The Chickens Come Home to Roost” [US National Library of Medicine](http://www.nlm.nih.gov/) [National Institutes of Health](http://www.nih.gov/), <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1963309/>)

As the number of human deaths from avian influenza grows and as the disease spreads geographically, fears of a 21st century influenza epidemic or pandemic mount. Even if the disease does not reach epidemic proportions imminently, the fears are nonetheless well-founded. Inductive reasoning leads to the conclusion that an influenza epidemic will arise, as such epidemics have arisen many times before, including 3 times during the 20th century. The relevant questions, therefore, are when the next one will emerge and how bad it will be.[1](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1963309/#r1)

Avian influenza is just one of dozens of zoonotic diseases that have caused and will cause considerable human fear, suffering, and death. (Indeed, some have suggested that “[a]ll human viral infections were initially zoonotic in origin,”[2](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1963309/#r2)(p6) although the precise animal source and route of transmission to humans is often a matter of some dispute.) I cannot mention all of these diseases; thus, only some well-known examples are provided, along with the probable source. There is at least some evidence that, similar to avian influenza, severe acute respiratory syndrome arose in the live-animal (i.e., “wet”) markets of China.[3](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1963309/#r3) Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease probably arose from bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE).[4](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1963309/#r4),[5](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1963309/#r5) And the source of HIV, which causes AIDS, is widely thought to be the simian immunodeficiency virus that is found in nonhuman primates.[6](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1963309/#r6),[7](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1963309/#r7)

Although some zoonoses are probably unavoidable, much human suffering resulting from zoonotic diseases could probably have been avoided had humans treated animals better. Consider, for example, the wet markets from which an influenza or severe acute respiratory syndrome epidemic may be launched. In these markets, live animals of diverse kinds are kept in large numbers and in cruelly close quarters ready for sale and fresh slaughter. The concentration of animals, their overlapping sojourns in the markets (allowing disease to spread through vast numbers of animals), and their interactions with humans (facilitating human infection) make these markets ripe for zoonoses.[8](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1963309/#r8) Once an epidemic starts among animals, it can spread to animals reared in less cruel conditions.

If humans did not eat wet market animals, there would be fewer of them (because fewer would be bred), the animals would not suffer from being housed in close quarters, and they would not be slaughtered. Consequently, the risk of zoonoses would be greatly diminished. In the case of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, humans would not have become infected had some humans not killed or eaten cows infected with BSE. Moreover, BSE would not spread among cattle if humans did not process offal, including neural matter from BSE-infected cattle, to produce feed for other cattle, a practice prompted by the volume of cattle humans eat. If the plausible hypothesis that HIV resulted from simian immunodeficiency virus is indeed true, then the most likely causal route of transmission was through infected simian blood during the butchering of these animals. The butchering itself was most likely for the purposes of providing nonhuman primate meat (“bushmeat”) for human consumption, a practice that continues today.

It is unlikely, of course, that those who make use of animals in the above ways will recognize their treatment of animals as maltreatment. However, there is good reason for characterizing it as such. There is now an ample body of philosophical literature that compellingly demonstrates that the ways in which most humans treat animals is wrong.[9](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1963309/#r9)–[12](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1963309/#r12) Almost all humans can now not only survive but also thrive without consuming animal flesh or using animal skins and furs. Thus those who persist in these practices treat the most important animal interests—interests in continued life and the avoidance of suffering—as less important than very trivial human interests, including carnivorous gastronomic experiences.[13](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1963309/#r13) Even those who deny that there is anything wrong with treating animals in this way should now recognize that thwarting important animal interests sometimes causes considerable harm to humans, even if some minor human interests are satisfied along the way.

It is curious, therefore, that changing the way humans treat animals—most basically, ceasing to eat them or, at the very least, radically limiting the quantity of them that are eaten—is largely off the radar as a significant preventive measure. Such a change, if sufficiently adopted or imposed, could still reduce the chances of the much-feared influenza epidemic. It would be even more likely to prevent unknown future diseases that, in the absence of this change, may result from farming animals intensively and from killing them for food. Yet humanity does not consider this option. Insofar as the focus is not on cures for the resultant diseases, attention is only given to lesser preventive measures. Some of these, such as slaughtering animals before they are brought to markets, may bring modest improvements to the treatment of animals. However, other preventive measures, such as developing a vaccine, do not require humans to improve their treatment of animals at all.

### 1NC Brazil

#### The 1AC’s proliferation discourse relies on an otherization of the ‘irrational, non americans’ and legitimizes a hierarchy that justifies the existence of nuclear weapons for those at the top

Gusterson 09. Hugh Gusterson, professor of anthropology at George Mason, American Anthropological Association, MIT; "Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination": Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 14, No. 1, February 1999, pg. 111-143, muse

Thus in Western discourse nuclear weapons are represented so that "theirs" are a problem whereas "ours" are not. During the Cold War the Western discourse on the dangers of "nuclear proliferation" defined the term in such a way as to sever the two senses of the word proliferation. This usage split off the "vertical" proliferation of the superpower arsenals (the development of new and im- proved weapons designs and the numerical expansion of the stockpiles) from the "horizontal" proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries, presenting only the latter as the "proliferation problem." Following the end of the Cold War, the American and Russian arsenals are being cut to a few thousand weapons on each side. However, the United States and Russia have turned back appeals from various nonaligned nations, especially India, for the nuclear powers to open discussions on a global convention abolishing nuclear weapons. Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty notwithstanding, the Clinton administration has declared that nuclear weapons will play a role in the defense of the United States for the indefinite future. Meanwhile, in a controversial move, the Clinton administration has broken with the policy of previous administrations in basically formalizing a policy of using nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states to deter chemical and biological weapons (Panofsky 1998; Sloyan 1998). The dominant discourse that stabilizes this system of nuclear apartheid in Western ideology is a specialized variant within a broader system of colonial and postcolonial discourse that takes as its essentialist premise a profound Otherness separating Third World from Western countries.6 This inscription of Third World (especially Asian and Middle Eastern) nations as ineradicably different from our own has, in a different context, been labeled "Orientalism" by Edward Said (1978). Said argues that orientalist discourse constructs the world in terms of a series of binary oppositions that produce the Orient as the mirror image of the West: where "we" are rational and disciplined, "they" are impulsive and emotional; where "we" are modern and flexible, "they" are slaves to ancient passions and routines; where "we" are honest and compassionate, "they" are treacherous and uncultivated. While the blatantly racist orientalism of the high colonial period has softened, more subtle orientalist ideologies endure in contemporary politics. They can be found, as Akhil Gupta (1998) has argued, in discourses of economic development that represent Third World nations as child nations lagging behind Western nations in a uniform cycle of development or, as Lutz and Collins (1993) suggest, in the imagery of popular magazines, such as National Geographic. I want to suggest here that another variant of contemporary orientalist ideology is also to be found in U.S. national security discourse. Following Anthony Giddens (1979), I define ideology as a way of constructing political ideas, institutions, and behavior which (1) makes the political structures and institutions created by dominant social groups, classes, and nations appear to be naturally given and inescapable rather than socially constructed; (2) presents the interests of elites as if they were universally shared; (3) obscures the connections between different social and political antagonisms so as to inhibit massive, binary confrontations (i.e., revolutionary situations); and (4) legitimates domination. The Western discourse on nuclear proliferation is ideological in all four of these senses: (1) it makes the simultaneous ownership of nuclear weapons by the major powers and the absence of nuclear weapons in Third World countries seem natural and reasonable while problematizing attempts by such countries as India, Pakistan, and Iraq to acquire these weapons; (2) it presents the security needs of the established nuclear powers as if they were everybody's; (3) it effaces the continuity between Third World countries' nuclear deprivation and other systematic patterns of deprivation in the underdeveloped world in order to inhibit a massive north-south confrontation; and (4) it legitimates the nuclear monopoly of the recognized nuclear powers.

#### Each year, billions of non-human animals are doomed to a life full of suffering and torture – nonexistence is the only ethical alternative

**Southan 11** – a pro-choice former vegan who lives in London (Rhys, July 30th “Why the Top Priority of Vegans Should be Human Extinction, Not Veganism” <http://letthemeatmeat.com/post/8241330449/why-the-top-priority-of-vegans-should-be-human>)

When vegans talk about humanely raised animal products, they may admit that it is at least slightly better than factory farming, but they tend to be like Benatar and focus on the harms. Even if the animals get to wander around, play and eat a natural diet, and are eventually killed painlessly, such a life is worse than never coming into being. While humane farm life may be relatively pleasant overall, the incidents of suffering farm animals often face — branding, dehorning, the separation of the calf from the mother, castration, artificial insemination, and early death — hopelessly taint the life beyond justifiability. As HumaneMyth.org says in “[Happy Cows: Behind the Myth](http://www.humanemyth.org/happycows.htm)”:

The truth of the matter is that each purchase of dairy products or veal directly contributes to more individuals brought into existence who will endure confinement, social deprivation, mutilation, reproductive manipulation, indignity and premature death. (41)

The sufferings can be minimized and some can be eliminated, but even if these animals are going to suffer only a little then be killed before their natural lifespan is up, they just shouldn’t have been born.

Fair enough, but when vegans use any amount of suffering to disqualify the legitimacy of bringing a life into existence, this creates some unintended philosophical consequences. If they are going to be so strict about any amount of suffering ruling out the desirability of starting a life, their priority shouldn’t be merely the end of animal farming — their priority should be ending humans.

There are a few reasons for this. One is that even the self-proclaimed ethical humans cause more suffering than even the most unrepentant carnivore species. As Benatar says:

Although the arguments I have advanced have not been misanthropic, there is a superb misanthropic argument against having children and in favour of human extinction. This argument rests on the indisputable premiss that humans cause colossal amounts of suffering—both for humans and for non-human animals. In Chapter 3, I provided a brief sketch of the kind of suffering humans inflict on one another. In addition to this, they are the cause of untold suffering to other species. Each year, humans inflict suffering on billions of animals that are reared and killed for food and other commodities or used in scientific research. Then there is the suffering inflicted on those animals whose habitat is destroyed by encroaching humans, the suffering caused to animals by pollution and other environmental degradation, and the gratuitous suffering inflicted out of pure malice.

Although there are many non-human species—especially carnivores—that also cause a lot of suffering, humans have the unfortunate distinction of being the most destructive and harmful species on earth. The amount of suffering in the world could be radically reduced if there were no more humans. (223 – 224)

#### And death cannot be bad – the lack of experience is only neutral

**Smuts 12** – Department of Philosophy, Rhode Island College (Aaron, “LESS GOOD BUT NOT BAD: IN DEFENSE OF EPICUREANISM ABOUT DEATH”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly Volume 93, Issue 2, pages 197–227, June 2012, dml)

In a cryptic passage in his ‘Letter to Menoeceus,’ Epicurus presents what may at first seem to be an absurd argument for the claim that it is irrational to fear death:

Foolish, therefore, is the man who says that he fears death, not because it will pain when it comes, but because it pains in the prospect. Whatever causes no annoyance when it is present, causes only a groundless pain in the expectation. Death, therefore, the most awful of evils, is nothing to us, seeing that, when we are, death is not come, and, when death is come, we are not. It is nothing, then, either to the living or to the dead, for with the living it is not and the dead exist no longer.1

Epicurus’ principal conclusion is that death is nothing to us. Death is nothing to us, because it does not lead to any bad experiences – it is the end of experience. And only experiences are good or bad for a person. Hence, death is not bad for the one who dies. Further, he assumes that it is irrational to fear what does no harm. So, he concludes that if it is irrational to fear what does no harm, then it is irrational to fear death.

Epicurus’ letter raises two distinct questions: (1) Is it rational to fear death? And, (2) Is death bad for the one who dies? In this article, I will say fairly little about the first question concerning the fear of death. My principal goal is to provide support for his answer to the second question – that death is not bad for the one who dies. His position on the badness of death has significant implications for a range of important topics, such as: the rational fear of death, the morality of killing animals for meat and hide, the badness of murder, and the morality of euthanasia. But I will not be exploring the implications here. I have a more limited goal: to defend Epicurus's position on the badness of death and his reasons, or at least an argument in much the same spirit.

Many call the position that death is not bad for the one who dies Epicureanism about the badness of death. Since this label is easily confused with Epicurus's related, but distinct, position on whether it is rational to fear death, I adopt the label innocuousism for the claim that death is not bad for the one who dies.2 This position holds that death is prudentially innocuous because it does no injury to the departing.

I defend innocuousism in the face of a widely accepted style of refutation – the deprivation account of the badness of death.3 The deprivation account holds that death is bad for the one who dies when it deprives her of good experiences that she would have had otherwise. That is, death is bad because it deprives one of the goods of life. This account of the badness of death gives rise to a number of well-known puzzles that I will not explore.4 Instead, I attack the theory of extrinsic badness at the core of the most convincing formulations of the deprivation account. The central goal of this article is to provide reasons to think that the deprivation account is wrong.

Recent defenders of the deprivation account, such as Fred Feldman and Ben Bradley, hold that although death is not intrinsically bad, it is extrinsically bad.5 They argue that death is sometimes extrinsically bad, not because it leads to intrinsically bad states of affairs, but because it leads to states that are less intrinsically good. I argue that this account of extrinsic badness conflates things that are merely less good with those that are bad.6 I intend to show that if we respect the distinction between states of affairs that are bad and those that are merely less good, the deprivation account fails as an objection to innocuousism.

My argument proceeds in a few steps. I begin by developing a contemporary version of Epicurus' argument that I call the Dead End Argument for Innocuousism. I then explain the deprivation account of the badness of death. In response, I raise several objections to the theory of extrinsic badness at the heart of the deprivation account. In support of innocuousism, I defend a competing account of extrinsic badness that avoids these problems. Along the way, I also provide positive support for non-comparative accounts of extrinsic badness. Finally, I respond to several objections to the prima facie absurd suggestion that death is not bad for the one who dies.

2. The Dead End argument for innocuousism

The Dead End Argument for Innocuousism concludes that death is not bad for the one who dies. This is because death leads to nothing – death is an experiential dead end. Since death is the end of experience, it is not intrinsically bad for the one who dies. Neither is it extrinsically bad. To be extrinsically bad, something must lead to intrinsically bad states of affairs. But there are no intrinsically bad states of affairs after death. Only experiences are intrinsically bad or good for a person. Hence, death is neither intrinsically nor extrinsically bad for the one who dies. Death is prudentially innocuous.

Here is a formalization of the argument:

The Dead End Argument for Innocuousism

1The sole bearers of intrinsic prudential value are mental states. (mental statism)

2Death is an experiential blank.

3Hence, the state of being dead is not intrinsically prudentially bad.

4An event is extrinsically bad if and only if it leads to intrinsically bad states of affairs. (causal hypothesis7)

5Hence, death is not extrinsically prudentially bad.

6Therefore, death is not prudentially bad for the one who dies. (innocuousism)

## 2NC

### legitimate violence

#### Now there is no offense, the system is inoperative and trending towards its own destruction – The only question is to cling on as it collapses or let it die.

Prozorov 10. Sergei Prozorov, professor of political and economic studies at the University of Helsinki, “Why Giorgio Agamben is an optimist,” Philosophy Social Criticism 2010 36: pg. 1065

In a later work, Agamben generalizes this logic and transforms it into a basic ethical imperative of his work: ‘[There] is often nothing reprehensible about the individual behavior in itself, and it can, indeed, express a liberatory intent. What is disgraceful – both politically and morally – are the apparatuses which have diverted it from their possible use. We must always wrest from the apparatuses – from all apparatuses – the possibility of use that they have captured.’32 As we shall discuss in the following section, this is to be achieved by a subtraction of ourselves from these apparatuses, which leaves them in a jammed, inoperative state. What is crucial at this point is that the apparatuses of nihilism themselves prepare their demise by emptying out all positive content of the forms-of-life they govern and increasingly running on ‘empty’, capable only of (inflict- ing) Death or (doing) Nothing.

On the other hand, this degradation of the apparatuses illuminates the ‘inoperosity’ (worklessness) of the human condition, whose originary status Agamben has affirmed from his earliest works onwards.33 By rendering void all historical forms-of-life, nihi- lism brings to light the absence of work that characterizes human existence, which, as irreducibly potential, logically presupposes the lack of any destiny, vocation, or task that it must be subjected to: ‘Politics is that which corresponds to the essential inoperability of humankind, to the radical being-without-work of human communities. There is pol- itics because human beings are argos-beings that cannot be defined by any proper oper- ation, that is, beings of pure potentiality that no identity or vocation can possibly exhaust.’34

Having been concealed for centuries by religion or ideology, this originary inoperos- ity is fully unveiled in the contemporary crisis, in which it is manifest in the inoperative character of the biopolitical apparatuses themselves, which succeed only in capturing the sheer existence of their subjects without being capable of transforming it into a positive form-of-life:

[T]oday, it is clear for anyone who is not in absolutely bad faith that there are no longer historical tasks that can be taken on by, or even simply assigned to, men. It was evident start- ing with the end of the First World War that the European nation-states were no longer capa- ble of taking on historical tasks and that peoples themselves were bound to disappear.35

Agamben’s metaphor for this condition is bankruptcy: ‘One of the few things that can be

declared with certainty is that all the peoples of Europe (and, perhaps, all the peoples of the Earth) have gone bankrupt’.36 Thus, the destructive nihilistic drive of the biopolitical machine and the capitalist spectacle has itself done all the work of emptying out positive forms-of-life, identities and vocations, leaving humanity in the state of destitution that Agamben famously terms ‘bare life’. Yet, this bare life, whose essence is entirely con- tained in its existence, is precisely what conditions the emergence of the subject of the coming politics: ‘this biopolitical body that is bare life must itself be transformed into the site for the constitution and installation of a form-of-life that is wholly exhausted in bare life and a bios that is only its own zoe.’37

The ‘happy’ form-of-life, a ‘life that cannot be segregated from its form’, is nothing but bare life that has reappropriated itself as its own form and for this reason is no longer separated between the (degraded) bios of the apparatuses and the (endangered) zoe that functions as their foundation.38 Thus, what the nihilistic self-destruction of the appara- tuses of biopolitics leaves as its residue turns out to be the entire content of a new form-of-life. Bare life, which is, as we recall, ‘nothing reprehensible’ aside from its con- finement within the apparatuses, is reappropriated as a ‘whatever singularity’, a being that is only its manner of being, its own ‘thus’.39 It is the dwelling of humanity in this irreducibly potential ‘whatever being’ that makes possible the emergence of a generic non-exclusive community without presuppositions, in which Agamben finds the possi- bility of a happy life.

[If] instead of continuing to search for a proper identity in the already improper and sense- less form of individuality, humans were to succeed in belonging to this impropriety as such, in making of the proper being-thus not an identity and individual property but a singularity without identity, a common and absolutely exposed singularity, then they would for the first time enter into a community without presuppositions and without subjects.40

Thus, rather than seek to reform the apparatuses, we should simply leave them to their self-destruction and only try to reclaim the bare life that they feed on. This is to be achieved by the practice of subtraction that we address in the following section.

#### We have multiple internal links to that impact

#### a.) Legitimate violence – the sole focus on positive law glosses over the ethical conceptions behind law. However, the two are inseparable. Before we make policies over what ‘legitimate violence’ is, we make formulations over which lives are valuable and which lives are not. Their sole focus on policy makes it impossible to interrogate or understand the broader underpinnings of law

**Kochi 09** - Sussex Law School, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK (Tarik, “Species War: Law, Violence and Animals,” SAGE Journals)

In everyday speech, in the words of the media, politicians, protestors, soldiers and dissidents, the language of war is linked to and intimately bound up with the language of law. That a war might be said to be legal or illegal, just or unjust, or that an act might be called “war” rather than terror or crime, displays aspects of reference, connection, and constitution in which the social meaning of the concepts we use to talk about and understand war and law are organised in particular ways. The manner in which specific terms (i.e. war, terror, murder, slaughter, and genocide) are defined and their meanings ordered has powerful and bloody consequences for those who feel the force and brunt of these words in the realm of human action. In this paper I argue that the juridical language of war contains a hidden foundation – species war. That is, at the foundation of the Law of war resides a species war carried out by humans against non-human animals. At first glance such a claim may sound like it has little to do with law and war. In contemporary public debates the “laws of war” are typically understood as referring to the rules set out by the conventions and customs that define the legality of a state’s right to go to war under international law. However, such a perspective is only a narrow and limited view of what constitutes the Law of war and of the relationship between law and war more generally. Here the “Law” of the “Law of war” needs to be understood as involving something more than the limited sense of positive law. The Law of war denotes a broader category that includes differing historical senses of positive law as well as various ethical conceptions of justice, right and rights. This distinction is clearer in German than it is in English whereby the term Recht denotes a broader ethical and juristic category than that of Gesetz which refers more closely to positive or black letter laws.

1 To focus upon the broader category of the Law of war is to put specific (positive law) formulations of the laws of war into a historical, conceptual context. The Law of war contains at its heart arguments about and mechanisms for determining what constitutes legitimate violence. The question of what constitutes legitimate violence lies at the centre of the relationrship between war and law, and, the specific historical laws of war are merely different juridical ways of setting-out (positing) a particular answer to this question. In this respect the Law of war (and thus its particular laws of war) involves a practice of normative thinking and rule making concerned with determining answers to such questions as: what types of coercion, violence and killing may be included within the definition of “war,” who may legitimately use coercion, violence and killing, and for what reasons, under what circumstances and to what extent may particular actors use coercion, violence and killing understood as war? When we consider the relationship between war and law in this broader sense then it is not unreasonable to entertain the suggestion that at the foundation of the Law of war resides species war. At present, the Law of war is dominated by two cultural-conceptual formulations or discourses. The Westphalian system of interstate relations and the system of international human rights law are held to be modern foundations of the Law of war. In the West, most people’s conceptions of what constitutes “war” and of what constitutes a “legitimate” act of war are shaped by these two historical traditions. That is to say, these traditions have ordered how we understand the legitimate use of violence. 2

#### Agency – focusing on only macro level change obscures how we, as individuals, participate in violence everyday of our lives. Just like complicit citizens in Nazi Germany, failure to confront anthropocentrism guarantees violence. Their view represents a delusional belief based on the banality of individual violence within an inherently violent system

Kochi and Ordan 8 – Lecturer in Law and International Security at the U of Sussex, and \*Research in Translation Studies at Bar Ilan U, (Tarik and Noam, “An argument for the global suicide of humanity” borderlands”, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_6981/is\_3\_7/ai\_n31524968/

In one sense, the human individual’s modern complicity in environmental violence represents something of a bizarre symmetry to Hannah Arendt’s notion of the ‘banality of evil’ (Arendt, 1994). For Arendt, the Nazi regime was an emblem of modernity, being a collection of official institutions (scientific, educational, military etc.) in which citizens and soldiers alike served as clerks in a bureaucratic mechanism run by the state. These individuals committed evil, but they did so in a very banal manner: fitting into the state mechanism, following orders, filling in paperwork, working in factories, driving trucks and generally respecting the rule of law. In this way perhaps all individuals within the modern industrial world carry out a banal evil against the environment simply by going to work, sitting in their offices and living in homes attached to a power grid. Conversely, those individuals who are driven by a moral intention to not do evil and act so as to save the environment, are drawn back into a banality of the good. By their ability to effect change in only very small aspects of their daily life, or in political-social life more generally, modern individuals are forced to participate in the active destruction of the environment even if they are the voices of contrary intention. What is ‘banal’ in this sense is not the lack of a definite moral intention but, rather, the way in which the individual’s or institution’s participation in everyday modern life, and the unintentional contribution to environmental destruction therein, contradicts and counteracts the smaller acts of good intention.

#### Their sole focus on governmental action is flawed – the world only exists in terms of individual power relations, altering our own practices are a necessary prerequisite

Nayar 99 – Professor in the School of Law at the University of Warwick (Jayan, “Orders of Inhumanity,” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, Fall 1999)

The "world," as we perceive it today, did not exist in times past. It does not exist today. There is no such thing as the global "one world." The world can only exist in the locations and experiences revealed through and in human relationships. It is often that we think that to change the world it is necessary to change the way power is exercised in the world; so we go about the business of exposing and denouncing the many power configurations that dominate. Power indeed does lie at the core of human misery, yet we blind ourselves if we regard this power as the power out there. Power, when all the complex networks of its reach are untangled, is personal; power does not exist out there, [\*630] it only exists in relationship. To say the word, power, is to describe relationship, to acknowledge power, is to acknowledge our subservience in that relationship. There can exist no power if the subservient relationship is refused--then power can only achieve its ambitions through its naked form, as violence. Changing the world therefore is a misnomer for in truth it is relationships that are to be changed. And the only relationships that we can change for sure are our own. And the constant in our relationships is ourselves--the "I" of all of us. And so, to change our relationships, we must change the "I" that is each of us. Transformations of "structures" will soon follow. This is, perhaps, the beginning of all emancipations. This is, perhaps, the essential message of Mahatmas.

#### Absent an orientation away from exceptional politics, indefinite detention remains inevitable

Tagma 09. Halit Mustafa Tagma, Professor of Political Science and International Relations, Sabanci University, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Oct.-Dec. 2009), pg. 422

The right of sovereignty was the right to take life or let live. And then this new right is established: the right to "make" live and to "let" die.76 Excluded bodies, for Agamben, are made possible by sovereign power that produces bare life. For Foucault, sovereign power is asso- ciated with the taking of life, whereas biopower is associated with the reproduction of life. This puts Foucault in a difficult spot as the power to kill and make live in the age of modernity has seen its extremes: If the power of sovereignty is increasingly on the retreat and disci- plinary power is on the advance, how is it possible to kill? How can murder function in this technology of power, which takes life as both its object and its objective? Given that this power's objective is essentially to make live, how can it let die? How can the power of death, the function of death, be exercised in a political system cen- tered upon bio-power?77 Foucault' s response is that racism is the "precondition to the ex- ercise of such a power: the right to kill."78 State racism is introduced in order to separate livable life from life that can be killed. Wars of the early twentieth century have employed such reasoning, where a statist discourse externalizes and racializes the danger to society that ought to be defeated for the sake of the community. Foucault, in Society Must be Defended, had in mind the biological variant of racist discourse that was portrayed in Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. However, the theme is alive and well in today's racism, which can be loosely labeled here as "cultural" racism.79 Cultural racism understood in this sense is articu- lated today through a discourse of "civilizations": "our values," "our mode of living," and "proper" human governance. Cultural racism ex- hibits itself in Samuel Huntington 's binary framing of a civilized world (the West) facing an uncivilized world. Orientalist discourse fostered European imperialism in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe through the representation of Middle Eastern peoples as an inferior race. Similarly today, the contemporary representations of Iraqis and Afghanis as threatening subjects, unable to govern themselves, help le- gitimize external military interventions in those societies.80 In launch- ing a war against internal and external threats, one therefore not only betters the "inferior people's lives" but also ensures "the regeneration of one's race" through heroic rituals and nationalist ceremonies that parade the good Western nation and its values.81 None of this is a recent invention. As Timothy Mitchell has ar- gued, the European colonization of Egypt rested on the ability to pro- duce not just a neatly organized society modeled after the military barracks, but the ability of the European to imagine and disseminate a form of representation and identity that was colonizing by nature.82 The articulation of the Egyptian as the racially and culturally inferior other to the Western rational scientific man through an Orientalist discourse, both in Europe and Egypt, was at the core of Egyptian col- onization. The Orient was thought to lack technological and military superiority and was seen as a culture that lacked the ability to produce a rational, orderly society. The imperial encounter with Europe's other was not just to keep the "natives in their huts," but also to "win their hearts and minds." A French military officer after suppressing a rebellion in 1845-1846 in Egypt said: "When we have them in our hands, we will then be able to do many things which are quite im- possible for us today and which will perhaps allow us to capture their minds after we have captured their bodies."83 This logic echoes re- cent news when a US commander in Iraq who works with social sci- entists says, "We're looking at this from a human perspective, from a social scientist's perspective. We're not focused on the enemy. We're focused on bringing governance down to the people."84 The regime of truth of a given society, and the marks of differ- ence on a subject's body, has long informed sovereign power about what forms of life are to be excluded. The US Army's recruitment of social scientists in Afghanistan and Iraq under a program titled "Human Terrain System" (HTS) exemplifies the way in which localized sovereign decisions are informed by a scientific discourse. Under this program, teams of social scientists, most notably anthropologists, are embedded in combat brigades to help the commanders make better decisions with respect to the population in which they are operat- ing.85 The following statement of the overseer of this program serves as an excellent example of the relation between the production of knowledge in the human sciences and its utilization by a bureaucratic apparatus: "Cultural anthropologists are focused on understanding how societies make decisions and how attitudes are formed. They give us the best vision to see the problems through the eyes of the target population."86 David Price's comment on this relation serves my point on this power/knowledge nexus: In observing that "cultural understanding is an endless endeavor that must be overcome leveraging whatever assets are available," the military's choice of "leveraging" beautifully clarifies how the mili- tary conceptualizes anthropologists and others providing occupying troops in Iraq with cultural information: they are seen as priers of knowledge; tools to be used for the extraction and use of knowledge "assets" in ways that military commanders see fit.87 As Mitchell points out, the use of the scientific gaze to discipline, classify, and control the local population goes back to the colonial pe- riod. Today we see the use of scientific discourse in the the US Army's Professional Writing Collection. In an article detailing the HTS, the ad- ministrators of the system draw from the lessons of the French and British experience in colonizing the local population: "Conclusions logically demand that past experience guide our understanding of how best to meet, in a manner that supports our own military objec- tives, the expectations and desires of the people at the heart of such struggles."88 What this means is that the colonial lessons of the past are used today to bring "governance down to the population." Besides the manual Standard Operating Procedures that dictates the minute-to-minute details on disciplining prisoners and Human Ter- rain Systems to classify and discipline populations, there is also a mushrooming psychiatric discipline that has the prisoners as its ob- ject. Allison Howell argues that the psychiatric discourse, as a regime of truth, has pathologized the Guantánamo prisoners such that it "play[ed] a part in the conditions of possibility for indefinite deten- tion."89 Howell shows how the scientific discourse on the mental health of the prisoners has constructed them as "crazy, fanatical mad- men" who are dangerous to themselves and society.90 She argues that this regime of truth has legitimated the indefinite detention of the prisoners. This supports my central argument that the "regime of truth" of biopower supplements sovereign power. This means that tactics of power create the conditions of possibility for the justifica- tion of exceptional sovereign practices. In other words, techniques of power that attempt to individualize, divide, and discipline bodies feed back into and justify the conditions of possibility for the exceptional logic in the articulation of emergency powers - a logic of supplemen- tarity par excellence. All this is not to say that there is a simple chronol- ogy to this logic, and that such affairs occur in abstraction, external to chance, contingency, historicity, interpretation, and the regime of truth of a given society. Instead, the techniques of power go hand in hand with the regime of truth in a given space and time. Exclusion- ary practices and the production of bare life do not operate, as Agam- ben would have us believe, in a uniform and universal manner that gets replicated across time and space, be it in the Greek city-state Nazi Germany. Agamben declares that thanks to sovereign power Ve are all Homo Sacer" Historically and theoretically, however, the articu- lation of the Ve" is at the core of the problem. The prisoners of the war on terror are also subject to standards of classification, categorization, and profiling. In the case of John Phillip Walker Lindh, the son of a white suburban US family, who was captured in the opening of the war in Afghanistan, "justice" was meted out swiftly, and he was given a twenty-year sentence. On the other hand, Jose Padilla, "an American citizen of color," and in the case of thousands of other subjects put on indefinite detention, nor- mal law is put on hold.91 What accounts for this difference are the marks of difference on a subject's body (race, religion, national back- ground, and ideology) that all come in to play at the ground level when petty bureaucrats get to decide who is to be treated according to what standard of operation. The workings of racism can be identi- fied in the speeches of petty bureaucrats at the local level, as in this statement from one of the Tipton Three: I recall that one of them said "you killed my family in the towers and now it's time to get you back." They kept calling us mother fuckers and I think over the three or four hours that I was sitting there, I must have been punched, kicked, slapped or struck with a rifle butt at least 30 or 40 times. It came to a point that I was simply too numb from the cold and from exhaustion to respond to the pain.92 Although the Three were British citizens and had nothing to do with the 9/11 terrorist attacks, they were quickly associated with ter- rorism because of their racial background and apprehension in Af- ghanistan. Despite the fact that they had nothing to do with terrorism, as their release from Guantánamo Bay suggests, their treatment sands as an indication not of senseless sovereign vengeance but of a vengeance informed by a certain racist bias. Their capture, torture, and treatment was all made possible by a prior initial racial profiling that resulted in innocent men being held in captivity. Sovereign vio- lence does not operate in the absence of a regime of truth that iden- tifies those whose bodies could be subjected to violence. As developed in particular, there was an unmistakable racist disposition toward the "different" bodies of the prisoners. As Reid-Henry points out, the flesh of the Oriental, both as an exotic and an inferior sub- ject, probably had something to do with the stripping and beating of Middle Eastern prisoners.93 It may be argued that the decision not to apply the Geneva Con- vention and other standards of legal treatment to the prisoners cap- tured in Afghanistan is representative of an exceptional decision. However, in line with what I have been arguing, such a resolution is not a simple act of deciding on the part of the leading politicomili-tary cadres of a state. This is not to deny the importance of subjects in key positions; however, such decisions do not take place in a space external to interpretation, culture, and history. Furthermore, much of the sovereign decisions, such as "who is to be detained indefi- nitely," are made at the local level based on interpretation of petty bureaucrats. Sovereign decisions are always already informed by historical and cultural understandings as to who counts as a member of the "good species." The "good species," "the inside," and the body politic have been constructed by colonial discourse. As Roxanne Doty has pointed out, colonial discourse has had a vital role in the construction of Western nations. She further points out that race, religion, and other marks of difference have played an important role in national classi- fication.94 The treatment of faraway people as inferior and exotic has played an important role in nation building in its classic sense. There- fore, who counts as a citizen, a "legitimate" member of a "legitimate" nation, is the product and effect of centuries of interaction of the West with its others. Understood in this sense, sovereign decisions (whether made at the top or bottom level) are informed and shaped by a cultural and colonial history. This is neglected in Agamben's grand analysis of Western politics. Therefore, sovereign power needs the classification, hierarchization, and othering provided by a regime of truth in order to conduct its violent power. Only certain types of peo- ple could be rendered as bare life and thrown into a zone of indis- tinction. Understood this way, it is easier to comprehend the "smooth" production of homines sacri out of Middle Eastern subjects.

#### The plan is a red herring— including the plan only detracts from a systemic critique which is critical to challenging sovereign power

Saas 12. William O. Saas, PhD in communications from Penn State University, “Critique of Charismatic Violence,” symploke, Volume 20, Numbers 1-2, 2012, pg. 65

Hidden in plain sight: a sprawling bureaucracy designed to justify and deliver military violence—clothed in the new war lexicon—to the world. How might one critique this massive network of violence that has become so enmeshed in our contemporary geo-socio-political reality? Is there any hope for reversing the expansion of executive violence in the current politi- cal climate, in which the President enjoys minimal resistance to his most egregious uses of violence? How does exceptional violence become routine? Answers to these broad and difficult questions, derived as they are from the disorientingly vast and hyper-accelerated retrenchment of our current politi- cal situation, are best won through the broad strokes of what Slavoj Žižek calls “systemic” critique. For Žižek, looking squarely at interpersonal or subjec- tive violences (e.g., torture, drone strikes), drawn as we may be by their grue- some and immediate appeal, distorts the critic’s broader field of vision. For a fuller picture, one must pull one’s critical focus back several steps to reveal the deep, objective structures that undergird the spectacular manifestations of everyday, subjective violence (Žižek 2008, 1-2). Immediately, however, one confronts the limit question of Žižek’s mandate: how does one productively draw the boundaries of a system without too severely dampening the force of objective critique?

## 1NR

### cred

#### their exclusive focus on warming occludes focus on other forms of environmental destruction

Crist 7 [Eileen Crist, Associate Professor of Science and Technology in Society at Virginia Tech University, 2007, “Beyond the Climate Crisis: A Critique of Climate Change Discourse,” *Telos*, Volume 141, Winter, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Telos Press, p. 49-51]

If mainstream environmentalism is catching up with the solution promoted by Teller, and perhaps harbored all along by the Bush administration, it would certainly be ironic. But the irony is deeper than incidental politics. The projected rationality of a geoengineering solution, stoked by apocalyptic fears surrounding climate change, promises consequences (both physical and ideological) that will only quicken the real ending of wild nature: "here we encounter," notes Murray Bookchin, "the ironic perversity of a 'pragmatism' that is no different, in principle, from the problems it hopes to resolve."58 Even if they work exactly as hoped, geoengineering solutions are far more similar to anthropogenic climate change than they are a counterforce to it: their implementation constitutes an experiment with the biosphere underpinned by technological arrogance, unwillingness to question or limit consumer society, and a sense of entitlement to transmogrifying the planet that boggles the mind. It is indeed these elements of techno-arrogance, unwillingness to advocate radical change, and unlimited entitlement, together with the profound erosion of awe toward the planet that evolved life (and birthed us), that constitute the apocalypse underway—if that is the word of choice, though the words humanization, colonization, or occupation of the biosphere are far more descriptively accurate. Once we grasp the ecological crisis as the escalating conversion of the planet into "a shoddy way station,"59 it becomes evident that inducing "global dimming" in order to offset "global warming" is not a corrective action but another chapter in the project of colonizing the Earth, of what critical theorists called world domination.

Domination comes at a huge cost for the human spirit, a cost that may or may not include the scale of physical imperilment and suffering that apocalyptic fears conjure. Human beings pay for the domination of the biosphere—a domination they are either bent upon or resigned to—with alienation from the living Earth.60 This alienation manifests, first and [end page 50] foremost, in the invisibility of the biodiversity crisis: the steadfast denial and repression, in the public arena, of the epochal event of mass extinction and accelerating depletion of the Earth's biological treasures. It has taken the threat of climate change (to people and civilization) to allow the tip of the biodepletion iceberg to surface into public discourse, but even that has been woefully inadequate in failing to acknowledge two crucial facts: first, the biodiversity crisis has been occurring independently of climate change, and will hardly be stopped by windmills, nuclear power plants, and carbon sequestering, in any amount or combination thereof; and second, the devastation that species and ecosystems have already experienced is what largely will enable more climate-change-driven damage to occur.

Human alienation from the biosphere further manifests in the recalcitrance of instrumental rationality, which reduces all challenges and problems to variables that can be controlled, fixed, managed, or manipulated by technical means. Instrumental rationality is rarely questioned substantively, except in the flagging of potential "unintended consequences" (for example, of implementing geoengineering technologies). The idea that instrumental rationality (in the form of technological fixes for global warming) might save the day hovers between misrepresentation and delusion: firstly, because instrumental rationality has itself been the planet's nemesis by mediating the biosphere's constitution as resource and by condoning the transformation of Homo sapiens into a user species; and secondly, because instrumental rationality tends to invent, adjust, and tweak technical means to work within given contexts—when it is the given, i.e., human civilization as presently configured economically and culturally, that needs to be changed.

### brazil

#### None of their value to life arguments assume the standpoint of the animal, in fact, they only prove the existence of human privilege. We are vampires living in a world where we prosper at the expense of the majority of the world, of course we have value, but that doesn’t account for the victims who live in a world of fear and suffering.

**Dolan 2 –** Ph.D in writing of the marquis de Sade from Berkely, professor and essayist, (John, April 21st, “The Case for Nuclear Winter” <http://www.exile.ru/articles/detail.php?ARTICLE_ID=6495&IBLOCK_ID=35>)

There are no nihilists any more. That fact is the most damning evidence of a great betrayal which has happened in the last half century. In 1945, when the Bomb gave us the option of quitting this dirty, rigged game of Darwinian strip poker, we learned that not one of the anti-life artists meant what they said. In a few years, all the anti-life art of the early twentieth century vanished. The artists who had made their careers documenting the horrors of life on earth and denouncing the cycle of animal existence yelped away like scared puppies the moment a real chance to end the suffering appeared.

They saw that magnificent mushroom cloud and instead of falling down to worship it, they ran to the nearest church or Christian Science Reading Room or Socialist meeting hall. After convincing thousands of adolescents to kill themselves in the name of holy despair, these sleazy careerists ran to hug the knees of GAIA, the bloody mother. They Chose Life -- the swine!

Go ahead, pick a culture, any culture! Any culture you can name, during any historical period you choose, will furnish hundreds of examples of anti-life rhetoric which was taken very, very seriously -- up until the moment when it actually meant something. Take, say, Europe in the nineteenth century, that cheery and bustling period. OK; here's its greatest philosopher on the subject:

"If you imagine...the sum total of distress, pain and suffering which the sun shines upon, you will be forced to admit that it would have been better if the surface of the earth were still as crystalline as that of the moon....For the world is Hell, and men are on the one had the tormented souls and on the other the devils in it."

That was Schopenhauer, telling the Germans in their bristly abstract way what Darwin told the English in their fussier, more detailed language: there is no point but suffering. There is no hidden redemptive meaning in any of this. It's just an unfortunate industrial accident, organic life.

Both Schopenhauer and Darwin resorted to animal examples to convey the horror which summed up the world. They were trying to overcome the popular heresy that somehow, it all must "balance out" somehow. It doesn't, because it was never designed to do so: "compare the pleasure of an animal engaged in eating another animal with the pain of the animal being eaten."

By the beginning of the twentieth century, Schopenhauer and Darwin were in play in the higher European circles, mixing and strengthening each other. It was the bravest moment in the history of our species; something truly dangerous, a final anti-life epiphany, seemed ready to happen. This is what poor sweet Nietzsche meant with his heartbreaking faith in "the men who are coming."

Nihilism's one great weakness was that it had always been an elite cult, not considered transmissible to the masses. This was in fact why Buddhism was replaced by a mindless demotic cult like Hinduism in India: Nirvana was too cold a doctrine for peasants who equated fecundity with happiness.

But in the early twentieth century, a demographic anomaly appeared: the elite was big, and getting bigger. They brought their cult with them; art began serving as the propaganda wing of Nihilism. What we call "Modernism" was actually a multimedia offensive which was beginning to make Nihilism palatable to the masses. The fuzzy "Modern/Postmodern" distinction is best seen as a change in popular religion: from 1910-1945, art did an honorable job of preparing the masses to abandon their attachment to the biosphere; from 1945 to the present, art borrows Nihilist images, diction and narrative without the least intention of employing them to free us from attachment to organic life.

The echoes of that dangerous early twentieth-century art are still audible:

"I've always been surprised by everyone's going on living." Birth, and copulation and death. That's all the facts when you come to brass tacks: Birth, and copulation, and death. I've been born, and once is enough. You don't remember, but I remember, Once is enough. It's sad for the dog. He lives only because he was born, just like me.... So they sang. And many believed them. Maybe a few of them really meant it -- Schopenhauer especially. What would Schopenhauer have said about nuclear weapons? My guess is he'd be all for them; he was a serious man, an honorable man. But the rest -- they never meant it, and only talked so grandly against Life because they knew there was no alternative, no way to end the world. When the cat's away, the mice will ham it up.

But since 1945, they self-censored themselves, to the effect that no matter how many Nihilist images you may borrow, you will do nothing truly dangerous -- nothing that could make anyone press that nuclear trigger. You can wear all the black you want; you can worship suicide -- individual suicide, that is -- ; you can write songs about how life sucks; but you can't mean it.

Of course, not everybody's in on the double-talk scam. Those dangerous anti-lifers are still floating around, infecting those naive enough to listen to them. Cobain and Courtney are the classic example: both wore the rags, the scowls, the sulk; both screamed and ranted against life; but only one of them ever believed it. He, poor bastard, took it all seriously; she, a much more typical representative of the treacherous 20th-century avant garde, knew better.

When you think of poor Cobain now, it all seems inevitable, from the moment he chose that fatal name for his band. "Nirvana": a quaint Buddhist term, taken by most American bohemians to mean something like "nice peaceful feeling." But that's not what it means at all: "nirvana" means, literally, "the blowing out of a candle." Extinction, a return to stillness. Poor Cobain! He took it seriously, and made Nirvana for himself...and Courtney inherited, pouting all the way to the bank.

They're all Courtneys, the ones who still live. Lou Reed, who invented black, wrote hymns to heroin as the best available anti-life, and provided the soundtrack for God knows how many thousands of adolescent suicides, showed up recently at a memorial service for John "All You Need Is Love" Lennon. There he was, up on the stage with a dozen other rich old popstar vampires, singing treacly Beatles songs. They were praying, really -- praying to be granted another few years of life. "Choose life!" That's a vulture's favorite proverb, and these wrinkled undead were singin' it with feeling.

The ones who meant it, even a little -- they die. Sid died because he believed it; John Lydon said so, giggling at his dead comrade's stupidity in a recent interview. Sid, he explained, took all the punk stuff seriously, and died of it. Lydon knew better, he explained from poolside. He looked over at his pool frequently during the interview -- scanning his LA mansion, just overjoyed with his good sense and deriving an especially piquant satisfaction from the thought of poor old Sid. Johnny chose life.

It's not hard to see why a popstar chooses life; his life comes at the expense of everyone else's. A vampire universe feels great -- to a vampire. But what about the rest of us, the nobodies? The feeding cows? What do we have to lose?

There's always been a lot of preaching against suicide. In some way, any choice to choose non-life frightens the ruling vampires. Their favorite argument is, of course, guilt: "Think of the pain you leave behind you!" I remember a scraggly hippie mystic on Sproul denouncing suicide as "a slap in the face to everybody who loves you," and adding, "Even the worst bum on Skid Row has somebody who loves him." It impressed me at the time; I thought he must have had some special knowledge of the affectional backgrounds of bums which I didn't possess. It was several years before I knew for certain that he was simply preaching, another damn Christian-without-Christ babbling the ruling vampires' cliches.

Suicide is unpatriotic; that's why it offends them. It deprives the vampires of a jugular to sip. How can you not like this boneyard? This is the finest torture-chamber in the universe! How dare you opt out of it! But since 1945, the vampire lords have had another, much stronger reason to fear the idea of suicide: individual suicide is only Nuclear Winter writ small. Nuclear Winter is universal Nirvana.

And that makes it utterly different from individual suicide -- because there will be no survivors to mourn and grieve. There will be no mourning and grief at all, ever again.

Thus nuclear winter offers a true cure for suffering -- which the sermons against suicide do not. OK; you decide not to kill yourself because it will hurt your parents, friends, pit bull, roommates, chess club pals, whatever. So what? You're gonnna go anyway, and in some way much more agonizing than a bullet to the head: cancer, car wreck, genetic glitch, rafting accident, heart valve pop. And when you do, that suffering of the survivors will begin, the ten billionth wail of grief heard on Earth.

And the grieving die in their turn, and when they go another wail sets up....It's not just horrible -- it's silly. Just plain dumb. Squint at it -- draw your head back just a little and squint at it -- and it's truly "laughable, man": these creatures whose life consists of a ride down a conveyor belt towards a meat grinder, making a continual wail of surprise as another one goes over the edge. Every one a surprise. "Oh! He went in! How could this happen?" "Ah, she fell! My God!" Well Duh. What'd you expect?

That's what suffering is: going over the edge one at a time. The experience of individual death while the world grinds on. What would happen in the Nuclear Winter scenario is utterly different: all jump into the meatgrinder at once. No one is left to suffer or mourn. When some die and some live, there is suffering; when all die, blown out like a candle, there is no suffering. There is something else, something for which we have no name. But one thing is clear: it is not suffering. "We shall not suffer, for we shall not be."

It has been done on a small scale -- communal suicide, oblivion. The Old Believers; Jonestown; and some of the tribes hunted for sport by the Europeans. The Carib -- the last Carib jumped off a cliff rather than be taken. As did the last few bands of Tasmanians. They saw the suffering of their children ahead, and took the kids with them over the cliff. Are they were right. Imagine the prospects of a Tasmanian child in the hands of the British colonists who had killed its parents for sport. Life as a souvenir, mascot, bum-boy or -girl, stuffed exhibit in a museum… for what? So that in ten generations, one of its partial descendants might live to collect a guilt-dole from the Australian government? So that in another two generations, an even more attenuated descendant could pen a jargon-stuffed "indictment" of the crime, hoping for publication and a tenure-track affirmative-action job at a new regional polytech?

The cliff-edge has more dignity and sense.

We have given other species the gift of oblivion, sent them over the cliff: the Mammoth, the Moa Eagle, the Tasmanian Wolf...all the finest species, really, are going or gone. A hundred years from now, when all the big cats are gone, no one will understand how we thought the life of a hundred million Tamils worth that of even one Bengal Tiger.

Life on earth hit its peak during the Ice Ages, and we are now killing off the few species from that period who survived our first coup, ten thousand years ago. We have very little to lose, destroying the remaining fauna, now that the best is gone. The lives of all the horrible humans in Houston are not worth even one Columbia Mammoth.

So we have guides sent ahead of us into oblivion. When we pull the plug, press the button, drop the nuclear dime on ourselves, we will suffer no more than the Mammoth suffers. We owe them; let's join them. We can make our first act in the afterlife a formal apology to the Tasmanian Wolf, the Cave Bear, the Mammoth.

But at least their suffering is over now. The Mammoths' suffering ended when the last calf, watching its mother being hacked to death by ugly apes wearing caribou skins, trumpeted in shock and pain and tried to run -- and was hacked to death, screaming, then silent. And when its life went out -- the blowing out of a candle -- the suffering of all Mammoths ceased, gave way to something entirely different: Nirvana. The Nirvana of the Mammoths, where they wait for us now.

But we have to be sure of one thing: that it will be oblivion, death for all, rather than another partial slaughter. That would be worse even than the present. The thought of a post-nuke world of wretched survivors is the only real argument against detonation now. That's why the notion of Nuclear Winter is crucial. If, say, a nuclear war killed even five billion of us, it would leave a billion sobbing, burned survivors; and their offspring, mutant children limping across a boneyard; and hundreds of billions of mammals, birds, and reptiles mourning their kin. This is not Nirvana. Agreed.

But that argument has been specious since the early 1980s, when a team of physicists including that annoying geek Carl Sagan suggested that a major nuclear war would create a cloud of ash which would blot out the sun for decades, blocking 99% of solar energy for a period of three to 12 months, and thus extinguishing the photosynthetic engine which runs this big green torture chamber called Earth. Here's their scenario:

"Nuclear explosions will set off firestorms in the cities and surrounding forest areas. The small particles of soot are carried high into the atmosphere. The smoke will block the sun's light for weeks or months. The land temperatures would fall below freezing.

#### And, evaluate impacts using a lens of negative utilitarianism – you should act to minimize suffering rather than maximize pleasure

**Contestabile 12** – doctorate from the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (Bruno, “Negative Utilitarianism and Justice”, <http://www.socrethics.com/Folder2/Justice.htm#C3>, dml)

In the 20th century, the idea to formulate an ethical goal negatively is attributed to Karl Popper:

…there are no institutional means of making a man happy, but a claim not to be made unhappy, where it can be avoided. The piecemeal engineer will, accordingly, adopt the method of searching for, and fighting against, the greatest and most urgent evils of society, rather than searching for, and fighting for, its greatest ultimate good [Popper, 158]

At this point of chapter 9, Popper added his controversial note 2:

I believe that there is, from the ethical point of view, no symmetry between suffering and happiness, or between pain and pleasure. Both the greatest happiness principle of the Utilitarians and Kant’s principle “Promote other people’s happiness…” seem to me (at least in their formulations) wrong on this point which, however, is not completely decidable by rational argument (…). In my opinion human suffering makes a direct moral appeal, namely, the appeal for help, while there is no similar call to increase the happiness of [someone] **~~a man~~** who is doing well anyway.

A further criticism of the Utilitarian formula “Maximize pleasure” is that it assumes, in principle, a continuous pleasure-pain scale which allows us to treat degrees of pain as negative degrees of pleasure. But, from the moral point of view, pain cannot be outweighed by pleasure and especially not one man’s pain by another man’s pleasure. Instead of the greatest happiness for the greatest number, one should demand, more modestly, the least amount of avoidable suffering for all; and further, that unavoidable suffering – such as hunger in times of unavoidable shortage of food – should be distributed as equally as possible.

There is some analogy between this view of ethics and the view of scientific methodology which I have advocated in my The Logic of Scientific Discovery. It adds to clarity in the fields of ethics, if we formulate our demands negatively, i.e. if we demand the elimination of suffering rather than the promotion of happiness. Similarly, it is helpful to formulate the task of scientific method as the elimination of false theories (from the various theories tentatively preferred) rather than the attainment of established truths [Popper, 284].