# Round 4—Neg vs Indiana MP

## 1NC

### 1nc long

#### Plan’s restrictions are a paper tiger that reinforces the Trumanite bureaucracy, the vast network of officials who carry out national security policy—obfuscates underlying ideologies that jack solvency

**Glennon 14**—Professor of International Law, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University [Trumanites=“the network of several hundred high-level military, intelligence, diplomatic, and law enforcement officials within the Executive Branch who are responsible for national security policymaking”]

(Michael, “National Security and Double Government”, Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 5, pg 1-114, dml)

The first set of potential remedies aspires to tone up Madisonian muscles one by one **with ad hoc** legislative **and** judicial **reforms**, by, say, narrowing the scope of the state secrets privilege; permitting the recipients of national security letters at least to make their receipt public; broadening standing requirements; improving **congressional oversight of** covert operations, including drone killings **and** cyber operations; **or strengthening** statutory constraints **like** FISA545 and **the War Powers Resolution**.546 Law reviews brim with such proposals. But **their stopgap approach has been tried repeatedly** since the Trumanite network’s emergence. Its futility is now glaring. Why such efforts would be any more fruitful in the future **is hard to understand**. The Trumanites **are committed to the rule of** **law** and their sincerity is not in doubt, but the rule of law to which they are committed **is** largely devoid **of meaningful constraints**.547 Continued focus on legalist band-aids merely buttresses the illusion that the Madisonian **institutions are alive and well**—and with that illusion, **an entire narrative** **premised on the assumption that it is merely a matter of** identifying a solution **and** looking to the Madisonian institutions to effect it. That frame deflects attention from the underlying malady. What is needed, if Bagehot’s theory is correct, is **a fundamental change in** the very discourse **within which U.S. national security policy is made**. For **the question is no longer**: What should the government do? The questions now are: What should be done about the government? What can be done about the government? **What are the responsibilities** not of the government **but** of the people?

#### Their advantages aren’t neutral—they’re sales pitches by the bureaucracy who controls the government’s interpretation of and response to the 1AC—there’s no way to epistemologically validate their claims outside of Trumanite sources means be skeptical of their internal links and solvency

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The Trumanites’ propensity to define security in military and intelligence terms rather than political and diplomatic ones **reinforces a powerful structural dynamic**. That dynamic can be succinctly stated: Overprotection of national security creates **costs that the Trumanite network can** externalize; under-protection creates costs that the network must internalize. The resulting incentive structure **encourages** the exaggeration of existing threats **and** the creation of imaginary ones. The security programs that emerge are, in economic terms, “sticky down”—easier to grow than to shrink.

The Trumanites sacrifice little when disproportionate money or ~~man~~power is devoted to security. The operatives that they direct do not incur trade-off costs.152 The Trumanites do, however, reap the benefits of that disproportionality—a larger payroll, more personnel, broader authority, and an even lower risk that they will be blamed in the event of a successful attack.153 Yet Madisonian institutions incur the costs of excessive resources that flow to the Trumanites. The President must submit a budget that includes the needed taxes. Members of Congress must vote for those taxes. A federal agency must collect the taxes. When it comes to picking up the tab, Trumanites are nowhere to be seen.

If national security protection is inadequate, on the other hand, **the Trumanites are held accountable**. They are the experts on whom the Madisonian institutions rely to keep the nation safe. They are the recipients of Madisonian largesse, doled out to ensure that no blame will be cast by voters seeking retribution for a job poorly done. In the event of a catastrophic attack, the buck stops with the Trumanites. **No Trumanite craves to be the target of a 9/11 commission following a catastrophic failure**. **Thus they have**, as Jeffrey Rosen put it, **an “incentive** to exaggerate risks **and pander to public fears”**154—“an incentive **to pass along** vague **and** unconfirmed **threats of future violence**, in order to protect themselves from criticism”155 should another attack occur.

Indeed, a purely “rational” actor in the Trumanite network **might hardly be expected to do anything** other than inflate threats. In this way, the domestic political dynamic reinforces the security dilemma familiar to international relations students, the quandary that a nation confronts when, in taking steps to enhance its security, it unintentionally threatens the security of another nation and thus finds its own security threatened when the other nation takes compensatory action.156 **An** inexorable **and** destabilizing **arms race** is thereby fueled by **seemingly rational domestic actors responding to seemingly reasonable threats**—threats that they unwittingly helped create.

The budget figures, compiled by David Sanger,157 reflect the incentive structure **within which the Trumanite network has** emerged **and** thrives. Over the last decade **the defense budget has grown** 67% in real terms.158 It now is **50% higher** than it was for an average year **during the Cold War**159—greater than the spending of **the next twenty largest military powers** combined.160 During the decade following the 9/11 attacks, the United States spent at least $3.3 trillion responding to the attacks.161 This represents $6.6 million for every dollar al Qaeda spent to stage the attacks.162

It is unclear the extent to which the specific threats at which the Obama national security policy is directed have been inflated; **that information is classified**, and the handful of Trumanites in a position to know the truth of the matter can hardly be expected to disclose it.163 No reliable outside threat assessment is available. Although it is the Madisonians, not the Trumanites, who are expert in assessing the preferences of the public, including public risk tolerance—the Madisonians are the ones who hear out constituents, litigants, and lobbyists—the only way to know whether more insurance is needed is **to ask the same Trumanite network that** will gladly provide it. If the precise nature of the threatened harm is uncertain, what is not uncertain is the fear of threats, **which is** essential **to the maintenance of the Trumanite network’s power**— for the fundamental driver **of Trumanite power has been emergency**, the appearance of threats that **must be addressed immediately**, without bringing in the Madisonian institutions. “[A]n entire era of crisis in which urgent decisions have been required again and again,”164 in the words of Senator J. William Fulbright, has given rise to the Trumanites’ power. Speedy decisions are required that the Madisonian institutions **are ill-equipped to make**; the Trumanites have the means at their disposal to act quickly. The perception of threat, crisis, and emergency has been the seminal phenomenon that has created and nurtures America’s double government.

#### The impact’s a permanent war economy—the model of the Trumanite bureaucracy is empirically responsible for every policy failure and disastrous authoritarianism—solvency’s a ruse to dissuade public participation

**Glennon 14**—Professor of International Law, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University [Trumanites=“the network of several hundred high-level military, intelligence, diplomatic, and law enforcement officials within the Executive Branch who are responsible for national security policymaking”]

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**Enough examples exist to persuade the public** that the network is **subject to** judicial, legislative, **and** executive **constraints**. **This appearance is** important to its operation, for the network **derives legitimacy** from the ostensible authority of the public, constitutional branches of the government. **The appearance of accountability is**, however, largely an illusion fostered by those institutions’ pedigree, ritual, intelligibility, mystery, and superficial harmony with the network’s ambitions. **The** courts**,** Congress**, and** even the presidency **in reality** impose little constraint. Judicial review is negligible; congressional oversight dysfunctional; and presidential control nominal. Past efforts to revive these institutions have thus fallen flat. Future reform efforts are **no more likely to succeed**, relying as they must **upon those same institutions** to restore power to themselves **by exercising** the very power that they lack. External constraints—public opinion and the press—are insufficient to check it. Both are manipulable, and their vitality depends heavily upon the vigor of constitutionally established institutions, which would not have withered had those external constraints had real force. Nor is it likely that any such constraints can be restored **through governmental efforts to inculcate greater civic virtue**, which would ultimately concentrate power even further. Institutional restoration **can come only from an energized body politic**. The prevailing incentive structure, however, **encourages the public to become less,** not more**, informed and engaged.**

To many, **inculcated in the hagiography of Madisonian checks and balances and** oblivious **of the reach of Trumanite power,** the response to these realizations **will be denial**. The image of a double national security government will be shocking. It cannot be right. It **sounds of conspiracy**, “a state within,” and other variations on that theme. “The old notion that our Government is an extrinsic agency,” Bagehot wrote, “still rules our imaginations.”603 That the Trumanite network could have emerged in full public view and without invidious intent makes its presence all the more implausible. Its existence **challenges all we have been taught**.

There is, however, little room for shock. The pillars of America’s double government have long stood in plain view for all to see. We have learned about significant aspects of what Bagehot described—from some eminent thinkers. Max Weber’s work on bureaucracies showed that, left unchecked, the inexorability of bureaucratization **can lead to a “**polar night of icy darkness**” in which humanitarian values are sacrificed for** abstract organizational ends.604 Friedrich Hayek’s work on political organization led him to conclude that “the greatest danger to liberty today comes from the men who are most needed and most powerful in government, namely, **the efficient expert administrators exclusively concerned with what they regard as the public good**.”605 Eric Fromm’s work on social psychology showed how people unconsciously adopt societal norms as their own to avoid anxiety-producing choices, so as to “escape from freedom.”606 Irving Janis’s work on group dynamics showed that the greater a group’s esprit de corps, “the greater the danger that independent critical thinking will be replaced by groupthink, which is likely to result in irrational and dehumanizing actions directed against out-groups.”607 Michael Reisman’s work on jurisprudence has shown how de facto operational codes can quietly arise behind publiclyembraced myth systems, **allowing for governmental conduct that is** not approved openly by the law.608 Mills’ 1956 work on power elites showed that the centralization of authority among officials who hold a common world view and operate in secrecy **can produce a “**military metaphysic**” directed at maintaining a “**permanent war economy**.**”609 One person familiar with Mills’ work was political scientist Malcolm Moos, the presidential speechwriter who five years later wrote President Eisenhower’s prophetic warning.610 “In the councils of government,” Eisenhower said, “we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. **The potential for the** disastrous rise of misplaced power **exists and will persist**.”611

Bagehot anticipated these risks. Bureaucracy, he wrote, is “the most unimproving and shallow form of government,”612 **and the executive that commands it “**the most dangerous.”613 “If it is left to itself,” he observed, “without a mixture of special and non-special minds,” decisional authority “will become technical**,** self-absorbed**,** self-multiplying.”614 The net result is responsibility that is neither fixed nor ascertainable but diffused **and** hidden,615 with implications that are beyond historical dispute. “The most disastrous decisions in the twentieth century,” in Robert Dahl’s words, “turned out to be those made by authoritarian leaders **freed from democratic restraints**.”616

The benefits derived by the United States from double government —enhanced technical expertise, institutional memory and experience, quick-footedness, opaqueness in confronting adversaries, policy stability, and insulation from popular political oscillation and decisional idiosyncrasy —need hardly be recounted. Those benefits, however, have not been costfree. The price lies in well-known risks flowing from centralized power, unaccountability, and the short-circuiting of power equilibria. Indeed, in this regard the Framers thought less in terms of risk than certainty. John Adams spoke for many: “The nation which will not adopt an equilibrium of power must adopt a despotism. There is no other alternative.”617

The trivial risk of sudden despotism, of an abrupt turn to a police state or dictatorship installed with coup-like surprise, **has created a false sense of security** in the United States.618 That a ~~strongman~~ [of the sort easily visible in history could suddenly burst forth is not a real risk. The risk, rather, is the risk of slowly tightening centralized power**, growing and evolving organically** beyond public view**,** increasingly unresponsive **to** Madisonian **checks and balances**. Madison wrote, “There are more instances of the abridgment of the freedom of the people by gradual and silent encroachments of those in power than by violent and sudden usurpations.”619 Recent history **bears out his insight**. Dahl has pointed out that in the 20th century—the century of democracy’s great triumph—**some** seventy democracies collapsed **and quietly gave way to** authoritarian regimes.620 That risk correlates with voter ignorance; the term Orwellian has little meaning to a people who have never known anything different, who have scant knowledge of history, civics, or public affairs, and who in any event have likely never heard of George Orwell. “If a nation expects to be ignorant and free, in a state of civilization,” Thomas Jefferson wrote, “it expects what never was and never will be.”621 What form of government ultimately will emerge from the United States’ experiment with double government is uncertain. The risk is considerable, however, **that it will not be a democracy**.

#### Vote neg—criticism is necessary to shift the frame from a question of law to one of politics—the alt enables public interrogation of the underlying assumptions of the aff which comes prior to their impacts

**Rana 11**—Cornell Law

(Aziz, “Who Decides on Security?”, Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers, Paper 87, dml)

If anything, one can argue that the presumptive gulf between elite awareness and suspect mass opinion has generated its own **very dramatic** political **and** legal **pathologies**. In recent years, the country has witnessed **a variety of security crises** **built on** the basic failure of ‘expertise.’195 At present, part of what obscures this fact is the very culture of secret information sustained by the modern security concept. Today, it is commonplace for government officials to leak security material about terrorism or external threat to newspapers **as a method of shaping the public debate**.196 These ‘open’ secrets allow greater public access to elite information and embody a central and routine instrument for incorporating mass voice into state decision-making. But this mode of popular involvement comes at a key cost. Secret information is **generally treated as** worthy of a higher status **than information already present in the public realm** – the shared collective information through which ordinary citizens reach conclusions about emergency and defense. Yet, oftentimes, as with the lead up to the Iraq War in 2003, although **the** actual content **of this secret information is flawed**,197 its status as secret masks these problems and allows policymakers to **cloak their positions in added authority**. This reality highlights the importance of **approaching security information with** far greater collective skepticism; it also means that security judgments may be more ‘Hobbesian’ – marked fundamentally by epistemological uncertainty **as opposed to verifiable fact** – than policymakers admit.

If both objective sociological claims at the center of the modern security concept are themselves profoundly contested, what does this mean for reform efforts that seek to recalibrate the relationship between liberty and security? Above all, it indicates that **the** central problem **with the procedural solutions** offered by constitutional scholars – emphasizing new statutory frameworks **or** greater judicial assertiveness – is that **they mistake a** question of politicsfor one of law. In other words, such scholars ignore the extent to which governing practices are the product of **background political judgments about** threat**,** democratic knowledge**,** professional expertise**, and the necessity for** insulated decision-making. To the extent that Americans are **convinced that they face** continuous danger from hidden and potentially limitless assailants – danger **too complex** for the average citizen to comprehend independently – it is inevitable that institutions (**regardless of legal reform initiatives**) will **operate to** centralize power **in those hands presumed to enjoy military and security expertise**. Thus, any systematic effort **to challenge the current framing** of the relationship between security and liberty **must begin by challenging** the underlying assumptions **about knowledge and security upon which** legal **and** political **arrangements rest**. **Without a** sustained **and** public **debate** **about** the validity of security expertise, its supporting institutions, **and** the broader legitimacy of secret information, **there can be no substantive shift in our constitutional politics**. The problem at present, however, is that no popular base exists to raise these questions. Unless such a base emerges, we can expect our prevailing security arrangements **to become ever more entrenched**.

#### Demands for concrete alternatives and “weighing the aff” LOCKS IN bureaucratic thinking—full rejection’s key

**Frug 84**—Louis D. Brandeis Professor of Law at Harvard Law School

(Gerald, “THE IDEOLOGY OF BUREAUCRACY IN AMERICAN LAW”, 97 Harv. L. Rev 1276 1983-1984, dml)

In my view, modest realists have not rejected bureaucratic theory in favor of sophisticated reflection about the real world as it is. They have instead absorbed the various bureaucratic theories into their view of the world - indeed, into their very definition of themselves. Notice how the various models of bureaucracy **structure the modest realist position**. Like workers in a formalist bureaucracy, modest realists **only value** instrumental**,** programmatic **thinking**; they want to discuss **not your vision of the world** (or your critique of theirs) **but only** your plan of action**, the next** concrete step **you propose**. They are interested in means not ends, facts not values. Although they retain discretion (they have ideas about how to change the world), they accept as given **that most basic decisions are beyond their control**. Moreover, like managers in the expertise model, modest realists have a sense of the world: they know what it's like. As is characteristic of bureaucratic "experts," their self-assurance rests not on specific ideas but on their ability to assert their authority. They act as if they are in **a** **position** **to** choose dispassionately **among alternative courses of action** - as if they are competent to make impersonal judgments.

Like judicial review theorists, modest realists accept bureaucracy as a fact of life, although they are willing to limit its excesses. They too apply a deferential standard when they inquire into bureaucratic institutions because they fear that excessive attempts to change things will just make matters worse. **When asked to decide something, they act like judges:** they "balance," they "weigh,"they shift burdens of proof. Like judges, they leave the person whose ideas they are evaluating in the dark about how their ultimate decision is being made. Finally, like interest-group pluralists, modest realists think that **any proposals for changing bureaucratic institutions** should be framedin terms of legislative action. Whether or not they seek change through interest-group politics themselves, they are careful not to let their political views influence the way they act in their other roles in life. Thus they avoid using their capacity as shareholders to change the nature of corporate policy, insisting only that the corporations in which they invest advance their economic interests. Similarly, as employees, they think it wrong to bring political conflict into the workplace; they believe they owe their company a duty of loyalty as long as they continue to work for it. In their roles as shareholders and employees, in other words, they act like consumers of bureaucratic services: they are free to sell their stock or quit their jobs **but not to use these roles to transform corporate policy**.

Modest realists have so internalized the bureaucratic moves that, as we have seen, **enable them to argue** for **and** against **everything** - that it is hard to know what form of argument might convince them to rethink their approach. They are not likely to pay much attention to the theoretical critique of their position advanced in this Article; **they want to** put theory aside **and** engage in instru-mental decisionmaking. They feel they can handle the subjective/ objective structure of their position simply by making the tough choices as best they can. Indeed, if I were to conclude this Article with some specific suggestion for nonbureaucratic structures - proposing, for example, the kind of worker cooperative adopted in Mondragon 378 - they would **immediately disregard the rest** of the Article **and focus their attention** solely on the proposed alternative. ("Now," they might say, "here's something real to discuss.") In doing so, they would simply substitute their perspective for my own. **Once the argument is** cast in their preferred form, they would evaluate the suggestion **with their fine-tuned skepticism, no doubt** discarding it as"outweighed" by other, more sophisticated factors. That's the way they approach ideas; that's the way they think.

This Article is **designed to criticize this way of thinking**. I am suggesting that the modest realist approach to the world, like those more closely associated with the particular models themselves, is a way people **accommodate themselves to bureaucracy** in thought as well as in action. Modest realists substitute for the subjective/objective structure of theory the equally flexible, equally manipulable subjective/ objective structure of "modifying" **the "status quo."** They treat some aspects of the world **as** objectively necessary and other aspects as open to our joint reconstruction. Like any other subjective/objective structure, however, this is a form of self-deception - perhaps its most pervasive modern form. My critique will mean something to modest realists only if they try to get outside this way of thinking, **only if they criticize it** as a whole. **A suggestion for change** won't cause them to do so; merely reading this Article will probably not cause them to do so either. Instead, they will have to **experience the manipulability of their way of thinking themselves** - perhaps when they try to teach corporate or administrative law - or actually engage in action with others in a way that **makes the possibility of different ways of approaching the world seem real to them**.

Modest realists could abandon their effort **to treat some aspects of the world as fixed** and others as subject to human modification; they could, in other words, abandon their own characteristic attempt to secure a foundation for social life. If they (and other defenders of the bureaucratic form) thought of the world in terms of human, interpersonal contact, the idea of creating separate spheres of permanence and mobility - of creating separate spheres of subjectivity and objectivity of any kind - would seem bizarre. In our daily encounters with others, we recognize that we help create each other through our interactions. It is because these interactions are both necessary and threatening that all of them must continuously be open to reconstruction and revision. In the everyday world of human interdependence, there can be no such thing as a "foundation" that could render (even part of) social life noncontroversial.

It may be hard, however, for modest realists, as well as other readers, to think it worthwhile to give up the search for a foundation that would render human relationships unthreatening. They may, for example, believe that we risk tyranny without such a foundation. 379 It is certainly true that, without foundations, there is no guarantee against tyranny; its likelihood will depend on what people do. But foundations have never protected us against tyranny either; there are no such things. Even the fabrication of foundations hasn't helped; we have never been able to "deduce" from some ultimate foundation the things that are worth fighting for and worth fighting against. Without a (mythical) foundation for our views, we admittedly are (still) unable to say what our choices are based on. But **social choices are certainly not arbitrary**: choices about how to live and what kind of world to create **are neither "**objective**" nor "**subjective**,"** neither certain nor meaningless. They cannot be characterized either way once we recognize how crucially the nature of human relationships and institutions affect who we are. The alternative to "foundations" is **not "chaos" but** the joint reconstruction of social life, the prospect I referred to at the outset as the quest of participatory democracy.380 Acting together, **we could begin to dismantle the structure of bureaucratic organizations -** not all at once**,** but piece by piece. In their place we could substitute forms of human relationship that **better reflect our aspirations for human development and equality**. Numerous suggestions for immediate action have already been made;381 if we focus on the institutions **that currently affect our lives,** we can readily think of more ourselves**.**

### norms

#### They certainly don’t solve this—they give authority to the military, their internal link is about drone strikes generally—that’s cross-x

#### No impact to drone spread or US norms

Singh 12 (Joseph Singh is a researcher at the Center for a New American Security. “Betting Against a Drone Arms Race,” http://nation.time.com/2012/08/13/betting-against-a-drone-arms-race/)

Bold predictions of a coming drones arms race are all the rage since the uptake in their deployment under the Obama Administration. Noel Sharkey, for example, argues in an August 3 op-ed for the Guardian that rapidly developing drone technology — coupled with minimal military risk — portends an era in which states will become increasingly aggressive in their use of drones. As drones develop the ability to fly completely autonomously, Sharkey predicts a proliferation of their use that will set dangerous precedents, seemingly inviting hostile nations to use drones against one another. Yet, the narrow applications of current drone technology coupled with what we know about state behavior in the international system lend no credence to these ominous warnings. Indeed, critics seem overly-focused on the domestic implications of drone use. In a June piece for the Financial Times, Michael Ignatieff writes that “virtual technologies make it easier for democracies to wage war because they eliminate the risk of blood sacrifice that once forced democratic peoples to be prudent.” Significant public support for the Obama Administration’s increasing deployment of drones would also seem to legitimate this claim. Yet, there remain equally serious diplomatic and political costs that emanate from beyond a fickle electorate, which will prevent the likes of the increased drone aggression predicted by both Ignatieff and Sharkey. Most recently, the serious diplomatic scuffle instigated by Syria’s downing a Turkish reconnaissance plane in June illustrated the very serious risks of operating any aircraft in foreign territory. States launching drones must still weigh the diplomatic and political costs of their actions, which make the calculation surrounding their use no fundamentally different to any other aerial engagement. This recent bout also illustrated a salient point regarding drone technology: most states maintain at least minimal air defenses that can quickly detect and take down drones, as the U.S. discovered when it employed drones at the onset of the Iraq invasion, while Saddam Hussein’s surface-to-air missiles were still active. What the U.S. also learned, however, was that drones constitute an effective military tool in an extremely narrow strategic context. They are well-suited either in direct support of a broader military campaign, or to conduct targeted killing operations against a technologically unsophisticated enemy. In a nutshell, then, the very contexts in which we have seen drones deployed. Northern Pakistan, along with a few other regions in the world, remain conducive to drone usage given a lack of air defenses, poor media coverage, and difficulties in accessing the region. Non-state actors, on the other hand, have even more reasons to steer clear of drones: – First, they are wildly expensive. At $15 million, the average weaponized drone is less costly than an F-16 fighter jet, yet much pricier than the significantly cheaper, yet equally damaging options terrorist groups could pursue. – Those alternatives would also be relatively more difficult to trace back to an organization than an unmanned aerial vehicle, with all the technical and logistical planning its operation would pose. – Weaponized drones are not easily deployable. Most require runways in order to be launched, which means that any non-state actor would likely require state sponsorship to operate a drone. Such sponsorship is unlikely given the political and diplomatic consequences the sponsoring state would certainly face. – Finally, drones require an extensive team of on-the-ground experts to ensure their successful operation. According to the U.S. Air Force, 168 individuals are needed to operate a Predator drone, including a pilot, maintenance personnel and surveillance analysts. In short, the doomsday drone scenario Ignatieff and Sharkey predict results from an excessive focus on rapidly-evolving military technology. Instead, we must return to what we know about state behavior in an anarchistic international order. Nations will confront the same principles of deterrence, for example, when deciding to launch a targeted killing operation regardless of whether they conduct it through a drone or a covert amphibious assault team. Drones may make waging war more domestically palatable, but they don’t change the very serious risks of retaliation for an attacking state. Any state otherwise deterred from using force abroad will not significantly increase its power projection on account of acquiring drones. What’s more, the very states whose use of drones could threaten U.S. security – countries like China – are not democratic, which means that the possible political ramifications of the low risk of casualties resulting from drone use are irrelevant. For all their military benefits, putting drones into play requires an ability to meet the political and security risks associated with their use. Despite these realities, there remain a host of defensible arguments one could employ to discredit the Obama drone strategy. The legal justification for targeted killings in areas not internationally recognized as war zones is uncertain at best. Further, the short-term gains yielded by targeted killing operations in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, while debilitating to Al Qaeda leadership in the short-term, may serve to destroy already tenacious bilateral relations in the region and radicalize local populations. Yet, the past decade’s experience with drones bears no evidence of impending instability in the global strategic landscape. Conflict may not be any less likely in the era of drones, but the nature of 21st Century warfare remains fundamentally unaltered despite their arrival in large numbers.

#### Congress is a wet noodle

**Glennon 14**—Professor of International Law, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University [Trumanites=“the network of several hundred high-level military, intelligence, diplomatic, and law enforcement officials within the Executive Branch who are responsible for national security policymaking”]

(Michael, “National Security and Double Government”, Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 5, pg 1-114, dml)

Like the courts, Congress’s apparent power **also** vastly outstrips **its real power over national security**. Similar to the Trumanites, its members face a blistering work load. Unlike the Trumanites, their work is **not concentrated on** the one subject of **national security**. On the tips of members’ tongues must be a ready and reasonably informed answer not only to whether the United States should arm Syrian rebels, but also whether the medical device tax should be repealed, whether and how global warming should be addressed, and myriad other issues. The pressure on legislators **to be generalists creates a need to** defer to national security experts. To a degree congressional staff fulfill this need. But **few can match the Trumanites’ informational base**, drawing as they do on intelligence and even legal analysis **that agencies** often withhold **from Congress**. As David Gergen put it, “[p]eople . . . simply do not trust the Congress with sensitive and covert programs.”344

The Trumanites’ threat assessments,345 as well as the steps they take to meet those threats, are therefore seen as presumptively correct whether the issue is the threat posed by the targets of drone strikes, by weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, or by torpedo attacks on U.S. destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin. **Looming in the backs of members’ minds is** the perpetual fear **of casting a career-endangering vote**. No vote would be more fatal than one that **might be tied causally to** a cataclysmic national security breakdown. While the public may not care strongly or even know about many of the Bush policies that Obama has continued, the public could and would likely know all **about any policy change—**and who voted for and against it**—in the event Congress bungled the protection of the nation**. No member wishes to confront the “if only” argument: the argument that a devastating attack would not have occurred if only a national security letter had been sent, if only the state secrets privilege had been invoked, if only that detainee had not been released. Better safe than sorry**, from the congressional perspective.** Safe means strong. Strong means supporting the Trumanites.

Because members of Congress are chosen **by an electorate that is** disengaged **and** uninformed, Madison’s grand scheme of an equilibrating separation of powers has failed, and a different dynamic has arisen.346 His design, as noted earlier,347 anticipated that ambition counteracting ambition would lead to an equilibrium of power and that an ongoing power struggle would result among the three branches that would leave room for no perilous concentration of power.348 The government’s “several constituent parts” would be “the means of keeping each other in their proper places.”349 But the overriding ambition of legislators chosen by a disengaged and uninformed electorate is **not to accumulate power** by prescribing policy for the Trumanites, as Madison’s model would otherwise have predicted. **Their overriding ambition is** to win reelection, **an ambition** often inconsistent **with the need to resist encroachments on congressional power**. All members of Congress know that they cannot vote to prescribe—or proscribe—**any policy for anyone if they lose reelection**. It is not that Madison was wrong; it is that the predicate needed for the Madisonian system to function as intended—civic virtue—is missing.

As a result, Trumanite influence permeates the legislative process, often eclipsing even professional committee staff. **Trumanites** draft national security bills **that members introduce**. **They endorse or oppose measures** at hearings and mark-ups. They lobby members, collectively and one-on-one. Their positions appear on the comparative prints that guide members through key conference committee deliberations. Sometimes Trumanites draft the actual language of conference reports. They wait outside the chambers of the House and Senate during floor debates, ready on-the-spot **to provide members with instant arguments and data to back them up**. Opponents frequently are blind-sided. **Much of this activity is** removed from the public eye, leading to the impression that the civics-book lesson is correct; Congress makes the laws. But the reality is that virtually everything important **on which national security legislation is based** originates with **or** is shaped by **the Trumanite network**.

Conversely, congressional influence in the Trumanites’ decisionmaking processes **is** all but nil. The courts have, indeed, **told Congress to keep out**. In 1983, the Supreme Court invalidated a procedure, called **the “legislative veto**,” which empowered Congress to disapprove of Trumanite arms sales to foreign nations, military initiatives, **and** other national security projects.350 The problem with the concept, the Court said, was that it permitted Congress to disapprove of executive action **without the possibility of a presidential veto**.351 A legislative proposal thereafter to give the Senate Intelligence Committee the power to approve or disapprove covert actions **was rejected**, on the grounds that the Court had ruled out such legislative controls.352

#### Title 10 shift fails, it decreases oversight by shifting to JSOC and expands the worst aspects of drones

**Kaplan, 13** - Edward R. Murrow press fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. (Fred, “The Drones Are in the Details” Slate, 3/21, <http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2013/03/john_brennan_wants_the_pentagon_to_take_command_of_the_cia_s_drone_strike.html>)

Given the intricate entanglements between the two in the past decade’s war on terror, does it matter whether a spymaster at Langley or a cabinet chief in the Pentagon is responsible for targeted assassinations on foreign terrorists from the sky?

Maybe. The shift could mean new restrictions and an extra layer of accountability on drone strikes, subjecting them to an entirely different command culture. Or it could have very little effect. It all depends on how the shift in power is written.

Let’s back up. Under today’s practice, the military controls the drones flying over Afghanistan because U.S. armed forces are officially at war in that country and drones are weapons in their arsenal. (The same was true of the drones over Iraq when U.S. troops were fighting there.) However, the CIA controls the drones flying over Pakistan, Yemen, and certain other countries because they are not official war zones; the drones are playing a role in covert operations (for that reason, the drone flights themselves are classified), and covert ops are the CIA’s business.

To put it in legal terms, drone strikes in Afghanistan fall under Title 10 of the U.S. Code, which sets rules for the armed forces, while drone strikes in countries outside of official war zones fall under Title 50, which provides authority for covert operations. It defines covert actions as activities “to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad” without the appearance or acknowledgment of a U.S. government role—adding that these actions do “not include traditional military activities.”\*

Shifting control of drone strikes from the CIA to the military essentially means shifting authority for those drone strikes from Title 50 to Title 10. It places them under the rubric of “traditional military activities”—and the standards and practices of U.S. armed forces. One implication of this is that it will be harder to justify drone strikes in areas where U.S. troops are not openly at war. It also means that if a president contemplates stretching the limits of Title 10—that is, if he or she considers drone strikes outside war zones—the military’s lawyers will get involved, and they tend to be more scrupulous than CIA lawyers (who, after all, deal with overseas covert actions, which often skirt, or ignore, U.S. law). One pertinent provision of Title 10 is that, in order for U.S. armed forces to operate on foreign soil, they must get permission of the local government. If the military controlled drone strikes, they couldn’t be ordered without this permission.

However, there are two ways around these strictures. First, there have been occasions when presidents—including President Obama—have simply (and legally) declared that certain members of the armed forces are, for the moment, acting under Title 50. Most notably, when Navy SEALs raided Osama Bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan, they were declared to be under CIA command. Therefore, they did not need the Pakistanis’ permission to cross the border. The same abracadabra could be recited for drone operators.

Or maybe the president wouldn’t even have to go that far. SEALs, like Delta Force and other “shadow” forces, are part of the Joint Special Operations Command. JSOC is part of the armed forces; it therefore falls under Title 10. However, under an executive order signed by President George W. Bush (and still in effect), it has authority to conduct secret operations against al-Qaida and affiliated terrorist networks worldwide.

So, if control of drone strikes is shifted from the CIA to the military and the military decides to assign the mission to JSOC, the strikes might be as frequent and far-flung as ever—maybe even more so, since Bush’s executive order allows JSOC to conduct its operations without consulting or notifying Congress. (By contrast, under Title 50, the CIA has to tell the congressional intelligence committees about its covert operations.)

The motive behind the shift may have less to do with the controversy over drone strikes than with the future of the CIA. John Brennan, the agency’s new director (and a career agency officer), said at his Senate confirmation hearings that the CIA “should not be doing traditional military activities and operations.” The statement’s meaning was ambiguous; it depends on how he defines “traditional military operations.” But he made it in the context of drone strikes. And as the White House counterterrorism chief during Obama’s first term, Brennan told several people that he would like to see the CIA pull back on some of its paramilitary operations and focus more on its original tasks of espionage and analysis.

The shift’s effect on drone strikes, then, is still a bit vague—all the more since the Wall Street Journal and The Daily Beast report that it will take place gradually. Whether this means over the course of weeks, months, or years isn’t said (or probably known). The New York Times, catching up with the story, further reports this afternoon that Obama hasn’t yet decided whether to order the shift—and that, in any case, the CIA might retain control of drone strikes on Pakistan, which, if true, would mean the shift wouldn’t be much of a shift after all.

It all depends, then, on what President Obama wants to be able to keep doing. Since presidents tend not to give up executive powers unilaterally, the shift—in terms of its actual effects on drone strikes—is likely to be slight.

### intel

#### No impact to heg – regional actors can prevent war

**Bandow 11** – senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to Ronald Reagan, he is the author of Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire (Xulon) [1-31-2011, Doug Bandow, “Solving the Debt Crisis: A Military Budget for a Republic”, January 31st, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=12746>]

More than two decades after the Cold War dramatically ended, the U.S. maintains a Cold War military. America has a couple score allies, dozens of security commitments, hundreds of overseas bases, and hundreds of thousands of troops overseas. Yet international hegemonic communism has disappeared, the Soviet Union has collapsed, Maoist China has been transformed, and pro-communist Third World dictatorships have been discarded in history's dustbin.

The European Union has a larger economy and population than America does. Japan spent decades with the world's second largest economy. South Korea has 40 times the GDP and twice the population of North Korea. As Colin Powell exclaimed in 1991, "I'm running out of demons. I'm running out of enemies. I'm down to Castro and Kim Il-sung."

Yet America accounts for roughly half of the globe's military outlays. In real terms the U.S. government spends more on the military today than at any time during the Cold War, Korean War, or Vietnam War. It is difficult for even a paranoid to concoct a traditional threat to the American homeland.

Terrorism is no replacement for the threat of nuclear holocaust. Commentator Philip Klein worries about "gutting" the military and argued that military cuts at the end of the Cold War "came back to haunt us when Sept. 11 happened." Yet the reductions, which still left America by far the world's most dominant power, neither allowed the attacks nor prevented Washington from responding with two wars.

And responding with two wars turned out to be a catastrophic mistake. Evil terrorism is a threat, but existential threat it is not. Moreover, the best response is not invasions and occupations — as the U.S. has learned at high cost in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Rather, the most effective tools are improved intelligence, Special Forces, international cooperation, and restrained intervention.

Attempts at nation-building are perhaps even more misguided than subsidizing wealthy industrialized states. America's record isn't pretty. The U.S. wasn't able to anoint its preferred Somali warlord as leader of that fractured nation. Washington's allies in the still unofficial and unstable nation of Kosovo committed grievous crimes against Serb, Roma, and other minorities. Haiti remains a failed state after constant U.S. intervention. The invasion of Iraq unleashed mass violence, destroyed the indigenous Christian community, and empowered Iran; despite elections, a liberal society remains unlikely. After nine years most Afghans dislike and distrust the corrupt government created by the U.S. and sustained only by allied arms.

The last resort of those who want America to do everything everywhere is to claim that the world will collapse into various circles of fiery hell without a ubiquitous and vast U.S. military presence. Yet there is no reason to believe that scores of wars are waiting to break out. And America's prosperous and populous allies are capable of promoting peace and stability in their own regions.

#### Diplomacy impact is silly, no terminal impact to it in the 1ac

#### Diplomacy has limited utility --- can’t be effectively practiced by the government

**Wolf and Rosen, 4** (Charles Jr. Wolf - Senior Economic Adviser and Corporate Fellow in International Economics at RAND, and Brian Rosen - Doctoral Fellow at the RAND Corporation, “Public Diplomacy: How to Think about and improve it,” www.rand.org/pubs/occasional\_papers/2004/RAND\_OP134.pdf)

Still, a reformed and enhanced public diplomacy should be accompanied by limited expectations about what it can realistically accomplish. U.S. policies—notably in the IsraelPalestine dispute as well as in Iraq—inevitably and inherently will arouse in the Middle East and Muslim worlds opposition and deafness to the public diplomacy message that the United States wishes to transmit. While these policies have their own rationale and logic, the reality is that they do and will limit what public diplomacy can or should be expected to accomplish. The antipathy for the United States that some U.S. policies arouse is yet another argument that supports outsourcing some aspects of public diplomacy. The message America is trying to sell about pluralism, freedom, and democracy need not be delivered by the U.S. government. The message itself may be popular among potential constituents who view the United States unfavorably, but if the government delivers the message, the message may go unheard. Nevertheless, even if outsourcing proves more effective, expectations should be limited. While outsourcing may put some distance between a potentially favorable message (pluralism, freedom, and democracy) and an unfavorable messenger (the United States government), inevitably the two will be linked.

#### The CIA is incapable of accurate scenario planning – it’s a history of failed prediction

**Pipes, 95 -** Richard Pipes, Baird Professor of History at Harvard, served in 1981-82 at the National Security Council as Director, East European and Soviet Affairs (“What to do about the CIA” Commentary, Alt Press Watch)

The opponents of the CIA stress its recurrent intelligence failures as an argument for its liquidation. And undeniably, the Agency has had more fiascos than the law of averages would suggest. It misjudged from the outset both the pace and the magnitude of the Soviet nuclear effort, its main responsibility: its 1966 projection of Soviet ICBM's for 1970, for instance, was half of what they turned out, in fact, to be.(1) It minimized or ignored Soviet defensive measures, such as dispersal, hardening, and redundancy of command-and-control systems, as well as shelter provisions for the leadership--measures which told a great deal about Soviet strategic intentions. Year after year, it depicted the Soviet economy as healthier than it actually was and Soviet defense expenditures as considerably lower than they actually were. On President Kennedy's accession in 1961, the CIA provided projections of Soviet economic growth, based on Moscow's statistics, from which it emerged that by the year 2000 the USSR would have a gross national product (GNP) three times that of the United States!(2) At the same time, the Agency consistently underestimated the Soviet defense budget, placing it originally at 6 to 8 percent of GNP and then, in February 1976, inexplicably doubling that figure to 10 to 15 percent.(3) As has become known since, the true figure was close to double even the doubled figure.

The reasons for these misjudgments will be spelled out in due course. Here, suffice it to say that such absurd miscalculations had serious political consequences. For by depicting the Soviet Union as both stronger and less menacing than previously thought, they pushed the United States toward accommodation with it in the form of detente and an obsession with arms-control negotiations.

The Agency's record of predictions is hardly better than its estimates. In 1950, it failed first to anticipate North Korea's invasion of South Korea and then the intervention of China. In 1962, it denied that Russia intended to install missiles in Cuba up to the very moment when photographic imagery proved beyond the shadow of a doubt that the missiles were being deployed. It anticipated neither the Warsaw Pact aggression against Czechoslovakia in 1968, nor the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979, nor the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan later that same year, nor even Iraq's assault on Kuwait in 1990. It was surprised by the crushing of Solidarity in Poland in 1981. Such instances of failure can be multiplied.

Less often mentioned are the CIA's successes. It has done an excellent job of tracking Soviet weapons developments. In the 1950's, it correctly downplayed the prospect of a Soviet attack on the United States which had many Washington politicians and generals worried. It set in motion a variety of programs to counter Communist propaganda, one of which, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, contributed powerfully to keeping alive dissent inside the Communist bloc. In the 1980's, under President Reagan and his Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), William Casey, it helped, by various covert economic, military, and political operations, to undermine Soviet authority in Poland and Afghanistan.

Many of the Agency's intelligence failures can be attributed to identifiable and remediable flaws of methodology. But even the best-functioning intelligence service cannot be counted upon reliably to predict the actions of foreign powers: divining political intentions is far and away the most difficult aspect of intelligence work. This holds especially true of dictatorial regimes, with which U.S. intelligence is particularly concerned, because their decisions are in the hands of unstable and impulsive individuals subject to few if any external controls. It is hard to predict the behavior of unpredictable personalities.

To place the CIA's performance in proper perspective, it helps to look at the record of other intelligence organizations. In the 1930's, the vaunted British secret service, notwithstanding excellent contacts in Germany, persistently misjudged Hitler's military capabilities as well as his intentions, having convinced itself that the Nazi rearmament program was purely defensive. After Hitler had gone to war in September 1939, British intelligence believed that economic exigencies would make it increasingly difficult for Germany to continue fighting beyond the spring of 1941.(4) British intelligence, which at the time, like its U.S. counterpart, lacked a center to collate secret data, firmly rejected the possibility of a Nazi-Soviet rapprochement, a German invasion of Norway, or a Wehrmacht assault on France by way of the (allegedly) impassable Ardennes Forest.(5)

Japanese intelligence, for its part, managed to persuade its superiors that once the American Pacific fleet had been crippled, the Americans, being prudent businessmen, would sue for peace rather than fight an unprofitable war. The German secret service assured Hitler that as soon as the Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact of 1939 became public, Britain would renege on its pledge to defend Poland and abandon that country to its fate. Both misjudgments had catastrophic results for the countries concerned.

Intelligence failures, it thus transpires, are not a CIA monopoly; they are not even a monopoly of the intelligence community. Despite vast sums spent on armies of securities analysts who have the advantage of a great deal of reliable public information as well as access to managements, no brokerage firm seems to have found a way of gauging the direction of the financial markets. Indeed, the unmanaged Standard & Poor index fund has been beating three-quarters of the mutual funds run by experts. Even throwing darts at a list of securities has at times produced results as good as, if not better than, those of professional analysts. Nor have economists had notable success in forecasting the course of the nation's economy despite the abundance of indicators at their disposal.(6) What can one reasonably expect, therefore, of analysis which deals with concealed and often deliberately distorted data, and with decisions made in secret by inaccessible rulers, accountable only to themselves?(7)

It needs also to be borne in mind that the sins of the CIA with respect to the Communist bloc duplicated those of academic Sovietology. Proceeding from the same premises and employing the same methodology, the overwhelming majority of professors and think-tank specialists were just as guilty as the CIA of overestimating Soviet strength and stability and of interpreting Soviet actions in defensive terms.(8)

This much conceded, it is possible nevertheless to isolate certain recurrent blunders on the part of both intelligence producers and consumers, avoidance of which would go a long way toward improving the intelligence process. The two most common of these are "mirror-imaging" and political interference.

MIRROR-IMAGING

Mirror-imaging is the tendency to interpret the actions of others in one's own terms. The analyst looks at the situation which his subject confronts and asks himself, "What would I do if I were in his shoes?" The propensity to think in this way derives from a mixture of deficient imagination and, where other nations are concerned, ethnocentricity. The approach assumes that in every situation requiring choices, one choice is the most "rational" and therefore the most likely to be made.

The trouble with this premise is that "rationality" applies only to the means, not to the ends.(9) The person engaged in mirror-imaging, however, assumes that all human actions tend toward the same end--namely, his own--and that, by placing himself in the position of an adversary, he can anticipate the adversary's behavior. It is, without a doubt, the most common error of intelligence-estimating, much more prevalent in political affairs than in military ones, since in warfare the end is always the same--victory--and thus the means can be more reliably calculated in terms of their "rationality."(10)

## 2NC

### solvency

#### Even if Congress tried to go against the executive, the court would shut it down

**Glennon 14**—Professor of International Law, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University [Trumanites=“the network of several hundred high-level military, intelligence, diplomatic, and law enforcement officials within the Executive Branch who are responsible for national security policymaking”]

(Michael, “National Security and Double Government”, Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 5, pg 1-114, dml)

The judiciary, in short, does not have the foremost predicate needed for Madisonian equilibrium: “**a will of its own**.”304 Whatever the court, judges normally are able to find **what appear to the unschooled to be** sensible**,** settled **grounds for** tossing out challenges **to the Trumanites’ projects**. Dismissal of those challenges is couched in arcane doctrine that harks back to early precedent, invoking implicitly the courts’ mystical pedigree and an aura of politics-transcending impartiality. But challenges to the Trumanites’ projects **regularly get dismissed** before the plaintiffever has a chance to argue the merits either before the courts or, sometimes more importantly, the court of public opinion. Try challenging the Trumanites’ refusal to make public their budget305 on the theory that the Constitution does, after all, require “a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money”;306 or the membership of Members of Congress in the military reserve307 on the theory that the Constitution does, after all, prohibit Senators and Representatives from holding “any office under the United States”;308 or the collection of phone records of the sort given by Verizon to the NSA on the theory that the law authorizing the collection is unconstitutional.309 **Sorry, no standing,** case dismissed.310 Try challenging the domestic surveillance of civilians by the U.S. Army311 on the theory that it chills the constitutionally protected right to free assembly,312 or the President’s claim that he can go to war without congressional approval313 on the theory that it is for Congress to declare war.314 **Sorry, not ripe for review,** case dismissed.315 Try challenging the introduction of the armed forces into hostilities in violation of the War Powers Resolution.316 Sorry, political question**,** non-justiciable**,** case dismissed.317 Try challenging the Trumanites’ refusal to turn over relevant and material evidence about an Air Force plane accident that killed three crew members through negligence,318 or about racial discrimination against CIA employees,319 or about an “extraordinary rendition” involving unlawful detention and torture.320 Sorry, state secrets privilege, case dismissed.321

#### Here’s more ev—also proves our info manipulation claims

**Glennon 14**—Professor of International Law, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University [Trumanites=“the network of several hundred high-level military, intelligence, diplomatic, and law enforcement officials within the Executive Branch who are responsible for national security policymaking”]

(Michael, “National Security and Double Government”, Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 5, pg 1-114, dml)

Sometimes the courts have no plausible way of avoiding the merits of national security challenges. **Still, the Trumanites win**. The courts eighty years ago devised a doctrine—the “non-delegation doctrine”—that forbids the delegation of legislative power by Congress to administrative agencies.322 Since that time it has rarely been enforced, and never has the Court struck down any delegation of national security authority to the Trumanite apparatus.323 Rather, **judges stretch to find** “implied” congressional approval **of Trumanite initiatives**. Congressional silence, as construed by the courts, **constitutes acquiescence**.324 Even if that hurdle can be overcome, **the evidence necessary to succeed is** difficult to get; as noted earlier,325 the most expert and informed witnesses all have signed nondisclosure agreements, **which** prohibit **any discussion of “classifiable” information without** pre-publication review by the Trumanites. As early as 1988, over three million present and former federal employees had been required to sign such agreements as a condition of employment.326 Millions more have since become bound to submit their writings for editing and redaction before going to press. And **as the ultimate trump card**, the Trumanites are cloaked in, as the Supreme Court put it, “the very delicate, plenary **and** exclusive **power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government** in the field of international relations—a power **which** does not require **as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress**.”327 The basis of their power, the Court found, is, indeed, not even the Constitution itself; the basis of Trumanite power **is** external sovereignty—the membership of the United States in the community of nations, which confers extra-constitutional authority upon those charged with exercising it.328

#### Their affirmative misunderstands how easily the DOD can hide its own programs – far more effectively than the CIA can. Vote neg on presumption – the best case is the aff does nothing, the worst case is it turns itself

**Caruso, 11 -** veteran of the United States Navy, and has served in a variety of capacities on active duty and as a contractor for the United States Government (Robert, “Time-Sensitive Targeting, The Crush on Drones and the Fallacy of ‘Transparency’ in Covert Operations”<http://robertandrewcaruso.tumblr.com/post/12604690718/time-sensitive-targeting-the-crush-on-drones-and-the>)

Now, some people — namely, Katherine Tiedemann and Peter Bergen, among others — are under the mistaken and somewhat fantastical impression that merely transferring control of the drone program(s) to Department of Defense ‘control’ will result in equal measures of transparency and accountability.

This is sophomoric, at best.

To understand the hypocrisy of all this, you have to understand compartmentalization. And wouldn’t you know, the only way to fathom compartmentalization is to understand the rather arcane way compartmented programs are administered in practice.

The Agency’s controlled access programs, or CAPs, are controlled in name only and afford a great deal of transparency to both members of Congress and people even tangentially involved with their execution. They are not ad hoc, enjoy the legal concurrence of the Agency’s general counsel and more often than not have visibility at the highest levels of government. They are not true secrets, and the few things that should remain secret — the genesis of the Agency’s Counter-terrorism Pursuit Teams, for example — quickly make their way into the hands of journalists. They are anything but a clandestine organization.

Conversely, the Department of Defense has a very different take on compartmentalization and how it is implemented — not in theory, but in practice. All Special Access Programs, or SAPs, within the Department of Defense are governed by 'the bible' — the 5205 series. Perusing the document for even a few moments would likely have given Bergen and his scribe pause.

Within the special access programs themselves, the ‘umbrellas’, there can be and often are sub-compartments — that is, smaller, even more tightly controlled compartmented programs. And we’re just getting started.

In a stratosphere above that, you have USAPs, or unacknowledged special access programs. It is not appropriate to delineate what goes on at that echelon in an unclassified medium. Suffice it to say, it does anything but provide even a modicum of transparency into the compartmented ecosystem subsisting within it. Of course, this is the exact opposite of what transparency proponents want to achieve. That is unfortunate.

"But, Rob," you may ask, "Isn’t this prohibitively expensive? Wouldn’t the costs of instituting a SAP that will ultimately be notified to Congress negate the very secrecy you’re attempting to sheathe it in?"

Why, yes it is. And that is why we have ACCMs. More transparency!

Alternative Compensatory Control Measures, or ACCMs, are conceived of and given legal top-cover at the absolute lowest level necessary. Commodores, Commanders, Commanding Generals…even lower-echelon officers-in-charge can choose to stand up ACCMs if they feel the scope of their mandate warrants that. No prior written or verbal approval from the Office of the Secretary Defense’s Office of General Counsel, nor the Department of Justice. ACCMs — essentially pared down special access programs that are even more expensive to run, because the physical and static site security requirements are discarded in favor of administrative and physical obscurity — can be established at the behest of a young lieutenant. They can even — egads! — be established by senior non-commissioned officers.

Not for frivolous reasons, mind you; that has punitive repercussions we cannot delve into in an unclassified medium. But if he or she deems existing special security mechanisms insufficient, they can and do have the authority to stand up an ACCM.

The SAPCO, or special access program control office, administers each services’ programs and the euphemistic ‘special activities’ within each. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence has the CAPCO, or controlled access program control office, that it absorbed from the Agency and is supposed to coordinate with the Pentagon. In reality, it does not and the Pentagon, the services and service-like commands — can you say, USSOCOM? — have a relatively free reign to compartmentalize whatever they choose. Say, heavily modified Fire Scouts.

Armed with these boring facts and DoD instructions and policy memoranda, sensible observers can only reach one conclusion, however uncomfortable: moving the program would be an exceedingly stupid idea. The Department of Defense is notoriously secretive, already controls the very platforms used to carry out the Agency’s program in addition to its own compartmented time-sensitive targeting programs, and fosters a culture of often unnecessary compartmentalization that is, at best, ad-hoc.

So, yes. Let’s move the drone program there! So they can be together! Transparency!

### k

#### The second is value to life—

**Frug 84**—Louis D. Brandeis Professor of Law at Harvard Law School [gendered language modified—the first instance of “Man” is struck through rather than substituted because it’s referring to a book title]

(Gerald, “THE IDEOLOGY OF BUREAUCRACY IN AMERICAN LAW”, 97 Harv. L. Rev 1276 1983-1984, dml)

These stances represent ways to define ourselves in terms of the formalist vision. But these forms of self-definition, like the model itself, are tolerable only as long as there is some space (at home, in the voting booth) where we can express our subjectivity - our sense of self - **without its being infected by the bureaucracies we have created**. The dangerous supplement analysis should help us see how **such a protection of the self is** unattainable. Because the experience of subjectivity **cannot be disentangled from the structures in which people live**, no realm of subjectivity can be protected **from the attempt to objectify bureaucratic life**. There are no "shareholders" or "citizens" in the world **who are not simultaneously** subordinates within bureaucratic structures. The attempt to objectify human life **within bureaucracies threatens to** affect people in their lives as a whole - **it shapes their way of dealing with the world** even in their "free" activities as citizens or shareholders. Thus, the inability to divide people into components means that bureaucratic objectivity invades **and** transforms **the subjective experience** of the very people who are supposed to control - and take responsibility for - bureaucratic objectivity. Everyone is in danger of becoming "One Dimensional ~~Man~~," 122 **a human being who has** lost the ability **to** sense the rich possibilities of human existence **by reducing life** to the terms of instrumental rationality. Because all human existence is affected by bureaucratic structures, the formalist model's attempt to rob some aspects of life of "personal" qualities threatens the life experience itself. Max Weber articulated this fear by imagining the cloak of rationality becoming in the end [hu]man's iron cage:

#### This is the critical internal link into education—restraints are meaningless absent a focus on what debate can train us as students to do

**Young 13**—didn’t expect this card to be read this way

(Kelly, Associate Professor of Communication and Director of Forensics, Wayne State University, “Why Should We Debate About Restriction of Presidential War Powers”, <http://public.cedadebate.org/node/13>, dml)

Lastly, debating presidential war powers is important because we the people **have an important role in affecting the use of presidential war powers**. As many legal scholars contend, regardless of the status of legal structures to check the presidency, an important political restrain on presidential war powers **is the presence of a** well-informed **and** educated **public**. As Justice Potter Stewart explains, “the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power…**may lie in** an enlightened citizenry – in **an** informed **and** critical **public opinion** which alone can protect the values of a democratic government” (http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC\_CR\_0403\_0713\_ZC3.html). As a result, this is not simply an academic debate about institutions and powers that that do not affect us. As the numerous recent foreign policy scandals make clear, anyone who uses a cell-phone or the internet is potential affected by unchecked presidential war powers. Even if we agree that these powers are justified, it is important that today’s college students understand and appreciate the scope and consequences of presidential war powers, as **these students’ opinions will stand as an** important potential check **on the presidency**.

#### Their framework is depoliticizing and teaches the wrong solutions—beginning with individual action is comparatively more productive

Pitkin 98 (hanna, Prof of polis ci @ Berkeley, *The Attack of the Blob*, pp 274-284, thanks zane)

That brings us to the second half of Arendt's account of how our thinking furthers the social: the void in what we think about. Besides being thoughtless, we lack the very ideas of action, of politics, of freedom. We use those words, but only as empty cliches, in hortatory and manipulative ways or cynical and reductionist ones. These ideas are not serious for us, not actionable. So our thinking promotes the social also because we cannot even imagine a real alternative. Action and freedom are our lost treasure: forgotten, inadequately articulated, never theorized systematically, desperately difficult to convey to people who lack the relevant experiences.

To restore access to these ideas, Arendt employed several methodological devices, which also illuminate the sort of thinking that encourages free citizenship. The first of these devices is what she called "pearl diving," dredging up from the depths of the past the lost meaning of some crucial term. As the term, which had become a cliche, is restored to lively, actionable meaning, it is like a precious gem, refracting light on contemporary realities we had missed. Arendt quoted Shakespeare's Tempest: "Full fathom five thy father lies. . . .w78 She was trying, she said, "to discover the real origins of traditional concepts in order to distill from them anew their original spirit which has so sadly evaporated from the very key words of political language—such as freedom and justice, authority and reason, responsibility and virtue, power and glory—leaving behind empty shells."7\*

Most words, however, do not have an identifiable "real origin" nor any "original meaning" that scholarship can recover. Linguists simply trace a word's ancestry back from one language to another until the evidence runs out. Furthermore, Arendt never made clear why the earlier meanings of words should be authoritative for us, and indeed for some words, such as "society" and "revolution," she preferred the modern to the earlier meaning.

Arendt's "pearl diving" thus remains ambiguous. It can be understood in two distinct ways, with radically different implications for thinking and the social: as authoritative scholarly research or as a mode of empowerment accessible to everyone. On the first reading, Arendt is one more expert, a scholar of ancient languages who teaches the rest of us what a word "originally" meant and therefore still ought to mean, issuing an authoritative definition to which we are expected to submit. As chapter 8 suggested, Arendt is particularly drawn to this mode of presenting her work when she doubts her own authority and wants to fend off any possible objections in advance. Paradoxically, this way of explicating the lost treasure actually teaches unthinking deference, and thus is likely to promote the social.

On the second reading, however, what is to be retrieved is not a word's original meaning but, as in the passage quoted above, its "original spirit," which I take to mean the spirit of origins, the creative capacity of speakers, employed in a word's "origin" but also in every subsequent extension of its meaning. A word, as Arendt wrote late in her life, "is something like a frozen thought that thinking must unfreeze."\*0 Young-Bruehl reports that Arendt also sometimes called her enterprise "conceptual analysis," a phrase suggesting that it involves not a historical but a contemporary investigation, within the capabilities of any thoughtful person.81 Etymological information can sometimes help, as can a knowledge of history that reveals the real political struggles, with real winners and losers, which shaped the meanings of words that we inherit. But ulti-....CONTINUES

The depressing sense of hopelessness that results from examining the array of conditions in our lives conducive to the social and inhibiting free citizenship is partly an artifact of the way we have been examining those conditions. There is something else to be said, something so far omitted from consideration, not exactly an additional fact or condition but another perspective on what we have seen: a fourth and final path into the thicket of the social. It would be ironic indeed if a study criticizing Arendt for having mystified the social were to end with only the three unmystified approaches we have examined, for each and all of them srill miss what is most valuable in her theorizing. Stopping with these three paths would amount to throwing out Arendt's achievement along with her unfortu nate Blob. So we must add one more approach, akin to the outlook of existentialism, which we shall call the path of "Just do it!"

We have been discussing the lost ideas of action, politics, and freedom, but discussing them in the same manner as we discussed institutional arrangements and character structure: as possible explanations for the social, suggesting possible remedial policies. These are certainly relevant to politics, but they still lack the existential impetus that might carry us across the conceptual gap between the spectator's outlook and that of the engaged citizen. A political approach must include not just thinking *about* *action* but thinking *as an actor*: not as a hypothetical world dictator magically imposing an ideal policy but as one free citizen among others, whose joint commitment and effort will be required for accomplishing the right sort of changes.

The fourth approach to the problem of the social, then, is not one more rival explanation or policy prescription but more like an essential supplement to any and all of the other approaches, more about how they are to be employed than an alternative to them. If one puts the perspective of the agent at the center, then the only "explanation" of the social one needs or can have is that we aren't (yet) doing anything to diminish it. And the only "policy" that can help bring about free politics is to start enacting it. As an explanation of how we are getting in our own way and as a prescription for what we should do, this obviously is not much help. As a way of persuading people to act and use their capacities, it is just about useless. Yet as a supplement to explanations and policy suggestions it is essential, if our goal is free politics or diminishing the social. For this fourth approach reminds us that whatever we may learn along the other paths will have to be enacted by and among people, not imposed on inanimate material or cattle, because this particular goal can only be achieved by enlisting people's action, inducing their own free citizenship. Action, as Arendt insists, has no causes. That is a logical or conceptual point: to look on human conduct from the perspective of agency is to see (some of) that conduct as originating in the agent "whose" action it is, so that he deserves the credit or the blame, unlike a storm, a chemical process, or the movements of a puppet. That is why she says that, from the perspective of explanation and policy prescription, action always "looks like a miracle."" The agent is hy definition an unmoved mover, the inexplicable origin ot something uncaused, even though we know that from a different perspective action does not exist and that every apparent action also has a causal history and an intended goal. If politics is concerted action, then, the kind of "taking charge" it involves will be very different from homo faber\ efficient technical mastery of materials. The basic political question remains "What shall we do?" and both the "do" and the "we" are always problematic, contestable, continually being (reconstituted.

Approaching the social by the fourth path reminds us that the various conditions discovered along the other paths arc, singly and in combination, neither necessary nor sufficient to displace the social or assure free politics, though they can indeed facilitate or hinder, invite or discour-age, aid or inhibit. They are not necessary because the social is a matter of degree, not a metaphysical transformation, and the human capacities for action and judgment cannot be lost. We learn that truth from ihe Resistance; we learn it from popular rebellions and revolutions; we learn it from social movements; we learn it from the story of Anton Schmidt: action can never be ruled out. Whether one inquires conceptually—about the meaning of agency—or historically—about past times and places where previously apolitical people in large numbers have begun to engage actively in a concerted effort to direct their shared fate—the result is the same: there can be no absolute prerequisite to freedom. We are always already free-to-become-free. Or at least, since there is no guarantee of success, we are always already free-to-begin-moving-toward-freedom, free-to-enlarge-the-degree-of-our-freedom, both individually and collectively. A public arena already institutionalized may facilitate action, but concerted action can also create arenas. Courage and responsibility may be conducive to action, but often we only discover our real capacities in action. Awareness of what action and freedom really are may help, but one of the best ways to gain such awareness is through experiencing them.

Similarly, no set of facilitating conditions is sufficient to produce action or assure free citizenship. No conceptualization or theorizing can guarantee their remembrance; no institutions can assure their continuation; no type of character suffices to make people free agents, because freedom is not something that can be caused, given, or imposed. It has to be taken, chosen, exercised, enacted, if it is to exist at all. Nothing can guarantee its coming into existence except doing it; nothing can make it endure except continuing to do it.

These matters are too often discussed today in terms of "resistance" and "identity," located in "civil society," and contrasted to government and politics." Though Arendt began from Jewish identity and resistance to the Nazis, it seems to me that she was right to move beyond them toward a more general theory of active citizenship and to identify such citizenship with politics. Resistance to unjust power is surely important, and there may be need for it in any collectivity. But it retains a conceptual division between "they," who have power and are guilty, and ourselves, who resist their initiatives but are not in charge. The problem of the social, however, is that people are power without having it, that even the "powerful," whose decisions affect hundreds of thousands, are unable to alter the ineni.il drift as long as everyone keeps doing as we now do.

One may have to begin with resistance, but it is not the goal, is not enough. Seeking to force "them" to change "their" government and pol-icy does not yet recognize that government and policy as (potentially and properly) ours, everyone's concern. And though, under conditions of the social, the beginnings of free action are very likely to take place outside of the formal institutions of government, thus in "civil society," they surely are political if they aim at redirecting, taking some charge of the collectivity. When, as Tocqueville said of France in the 1830s, the officially political institutions of government are devoid of "political life itself," so that in them all is "languor, impotence, stagnation, and boredom," then it may happen that elsewhere, among those excluded or withdrawn, "political life beg[ins] to make itself manifest."99 Such unofficial political life is not merely resistance—negative or defensive—but instead, as Char said about the French Resistance, "a public realm" where free citizens address the real "affairs of the country."100 Thus Arendt was right to insist, with Tocqueville, that what we need is politicization, the arousal of now subjected, withdrawn, or irresponsible people to their own real capacities, needs, and responsibilities. Politicization here implies neither increased managerial intrusion into people's personal lives nor dutiful submission to official authorities, but, on the contrary, responsible and effective participation in self-government that addresses people's real troubles and needs.

Reviewing the conditions of our world along any of the first three paths into the thicket of the social, we noted, can be discouraging, suggesting that we have become entrapped in a vicious cycle. The conditions we would need for escaping it are precisely what we lack: institutions reflect character, character reflects ideas, ideas emerge out of praxis, everything depends on everything else, and here we are, deep in the social. The fourth path into the thicket reminds us that, precisely because everything depends on everything else and because freedom has no absolute preconditions, any step in the right direction—be it institutional, charac-terological, or ideational—can have further, widening effects, enlarging the space for freedom. Where one steps forward, others may follow. Where one speaks the truth, others may recognize it and take heart to do the same. The only place to begin is where we are, and there are a hundred ways of beginning, as Arendt says, "almost any time and anywhere," because action "is the one activity which constitutes" our public, shared world.101 Once we do begin, moreover, we may find others already under way, may discover all sorts of organizations and movements—be they about ecology, feminism, disarmament, torture, human rights, or nuclear power—movements locally generated but aimed at public responsibility and power.

Too hortatory and idealistic? Out of keeping with this book's stress on dialectical balance and on the seriousness of the problem of the social? Yes, of course. But that is because we have been pursuing the fourth path in isolation, when it is actually an essential supplement to the others. Blind activism is no help—no more than impotent thought. Political action requires realism, responsibility, thoughtfulness about conditions and trends, possibilities and policies, ends and means, and only then does it also require something more. Though Arendt calls action a miracle, if you wait for your own action to befall you, it will not; you have to just do it. Others may or may not join you. Your action and the others may or may not succeed in extending freedom rather than furthering the social. There are no guarantees. But who will do it if we do not? Reversing our present drift into the social is everyone's task, and one we must do together. That follows from recognizing that the social is not a Blob. The task is not slaying an alien monster but reconstituting ourselves: reorganizing institutions, reforming character, contesting ideas. That may not be easy, but it can never become impossible. We arc depressingly the problem; we are encouragingly the solution.

#### The interruption disad—the 1nc was a process of systemic critique which is both necessary and sufficient to resist the bureaucratic structure—the aff’s focus on subjective violences can’t access this

**Saas 12**—doctoral candidate in the Department of Communication Arts and Sciences at the Pennsylvania State University

(William, “Critique of Charismatic Violence”, symploke Volume 20, Numbers 1-2, 2012, dml)

Hidden in plain sight: **a sprawling bureaucracy designed to** justify **and** deliver **military violence**—clothed in the new war lexicon—to the world. How might one critique this massive network of violence that has become so enmeshed in our contemporary geo-socio-political reality? **Is there any hope for** reversing the expansion **of executive violence** in the current political climate, in which the President **enjoys** minimal resistance **to his most egregious uses of violence?** How does exceptional violence become routine? Answers to these broad and difficult questions, derived as they are from the disorientingly vast and hyper-accelerated retrenchment of our current political situation, are best won through **the broad strokes of** what Slavoj Žižek calls "systemic" critique. For Žižek, looking squarely at **interpersonal or subjective violences** (e.g., torture**,** drone strikes), drawn as we may be by their gruesome and immediate appeal, **distorts the critic's broader field of vision**. For a fuller picture, **one must** pull one's critical focus back several steps **to reveal the** deep**,** objectivestructures **that undergird the spectacular manifestations of** everyday**,** subjective **violence** (Žižek 2008, 1-2). Immediately, however, one confronts the limit question of Žižek's mandate: how does one productively draw the boundaries of a system without too severely dampening the force of objective critique?

#### But, the perm interrupts this process with a normative demand that obscures legal structures and jacks solvency

**Schlag 90**—the grumpiest lawyer in all the land

(Pierre, “Normative and Nowhere to Go”, Stanford Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Nov., 1990), pp. 167-191, dml)

But then again, that is precisely one of my points. And there is no point in overdoing it-normative legal thought is overdoing it all by itself, getting more repetitive all the time, **asking "**What should we do?What should the law be?What do you propose?**" over and over again**.

In fact, even as you read and even as I write, normative legal thought is busy urging us (you and me) to ask these very same questions of this very essay at this very moment. "What should we do? What's the point?" asks normative legal thought. "If normative legal thought isn't going anywhere, what should we do instead?" "What do you propose?" "What's the solu- tion?" These familiar questions are usually asked in searching, serious, som- ber tones. There is no trace of irony in their articulation-no self- consciousness at all. It is as if the intellectual legitimacy, the political im- port, of the questions **were themselves self-evident**, beyond question.27 "Yes, yes-but what should we do? How do these observations help?" Usually, the questions are asked with such earnest, self-assured self-certainty that it is as if **the body of knowledge that** **enables the questions** to be stated in the first place **were somehow** outside the problem, outside the difficulty-already in- tellectually whole, **already** politically competent **to provide the answers**.2 "Right, right, but the question is, what should we do with all this?"

Now you'll notice that here the "What should we do?" **is an interruption**. It is an interruption posing as an origin. It poses as an origin in that it takes itself to be the original motivation for engaging in legal thought.29 And yet here, **the "What should we do?"** interrupts the process **of** trying to under- stand **what enterprise we, as legal thinkers,** are already engaged in. It inter- rupts the process of attempting to **reveal the character of our** disciplines **and our** practices **as legal thinkers**. "O.K., O.K., but how would such revelations help us decide what we should do?"

You'll notice that here (as elsewhere) normative legal thought has a very pressing and urgent tone. It wants to know right away **what should be done**. Right away. And true to its name, normative legal thought wants to engage right away in the enterprise of norm-selection. Normative legal thought wants to decide as quickly as possible which norm (which doctrine, which rule, which theory) should govern a particular activity.

Now as intellectually stifling and politically narrow as the enterprise of norm-selection may be,30 it still offers legal thinkers some residual possibility of posing interesting philosophical, social, psychological, economic, or semi- otic inquiries about law. Yet **normative legal thought** can't wait **to shut down** these intellectual **and** political **openings** as well. It cannot wait to en- velop these inquiries in its own highly stylized ethical-moral form of norm- justification. Normative legal thought cannot wait to enlist epistemology, semiotics, social theory or any other enterprise in its own ethical-moral argu- ment structures about the right, the good, the useful, the efficient (or any of their doctrinally crystallized derivatives). It cannot wait to reduce world views, attitudes, demonstrations, provocations, and thought itself, to norms. In short, **it cannot wait to tell you** (or somebody else) **what to do**.

In fact, normative legal thought is so much in a hurry that **it will tell you what to do even though** there is not the slightest chancethat you might actually be in a position to do it. For instance, when was the last time you were in a position to put the difference principle31 into effect, or to **restruc-ture** the doctrinal corpus of **the first amendment?** "In the future, we should ... ." When was the last time you were in a position to rule whether judges should become pragmatists, efficiency purveyors, civic republicans, or Her- cules surrogates?

Normative legal thought **doesn't seem overly concerned with such worldly questions** **about** the character and the effectiveness of its own dis- course. It just goes along and proposes**,** recommends**,** prescribes**,** solves**, and** resolves. Yet despite its obvious desire to have worldly effects, worldly con- sequences, normative legal thought remains seemingly unconcerned that for all practical purposes, **its only consumers are** legal academics **and** perhaps a few law students-persons who are virtually never in a position **to put any of its wonderful normative advice into effect**.32

### dedev

#### Dedev!!!!!!!

**Jamail 12/17/13**—writer for The Nation, internally cites a whole slew of qualified climate experts including renowned wizard James Hansen

(Dahr, “The Coming ‘Instant Planetary Emergency’”, [http://www.thenation.com/article/177614/coming-instant-planetary-emergency#](http://www.thenation.com/article/177614/coming-instant-planetary-emergency), dml)

Climate-change-related deaths are already estimated at 5 million annually, and the process seems to be accelerating **more rapidly than most climate models have suggested**. Even without taking into account the release of frozen methane in the Arctic, some scientists are already painting a truly bleak picture of the human future. Take Canadian Wildlife Service biologist Neil Dawe, who in August told a reporter that he wouldn’t be surprised if the generation after him witnessed the extinction of humanity. All around the estuary near his office on Vancouver Island, he has been witnessing the unraveling of “the web of life,” and “it’s happening very quickly.”

“Economic growth isthe biggest destroyerof the ecology,” Dawe says. “Those people who think you can have a growing economy and a healthy environment are wrong. **If we don’t reduce our numbers, nature will do it for us**.” And he isn’t hopeful humans will be able to save themselves. “Everything is worse and we’re still doing the same things. Because ecosystems are so resilient, they don’t exact immediate punishment on the stupid.”

The University of Arizona’s Guy McPherson has similar fears. “We will have very few humans on the planet because of lack of habitat,” he says. Of recent studies showing the toll temperature increases will take on that habitat, he adds, “They are only looking at CO2 in the atmosphere.”

Here’s the question: Could some version of extinction or near-extinction overcome humanity, thanks to climate change—and possibly incredibly fast? **Similar things have happened in the past**. Fifty-five million years ago, a five-degree Celsius rise in average global temperatures seems to have occurred in just thirteen years, according to a study published in the October 2013 issue of the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. A report in the August 2013 issue of Science revealed that in the near-term Earth’s climate will change **ten times faster than at any other moment** in the last 65 million years.

“The Arctic is warming faster than anywhere else on the planet,” climate scientist James Hansen has said. “There are potential irreversible effects **of melting the Arctic sea ice**. If it begins to allow the Arctic Ocean to warm up, and warm the ocean floor, then we’ll begin to release methane hydrates. And if we let that happen, that is a potential tipping point that we don’t want to happen. If we burn all the fossil fuels then we certainly will cause the methane hydrates, eventually, to come out **and cause several degrees more warming**, **and** it’s not clear that civilization could survive that extreme climate change.”

Yet, long before humanity has burned all fossil fuel reserves on the planet, **massive amounts of methane will be released**. While the human body is potentially capable of handling a six-to-nine-degree Celsius rise in the planetary temperature, **the** crops **and** habitat **we use for food production are not**. As McPherson put it, “If we see a 3.5 to 4C baseline increase, **I see no way to have habitat**. We are at .85C above baseline and we’ve already triggered all these self-reinforcing feedback loops.”

He adds: “All the evidence points to a locked-in 3.5 to 5 degree C global temperature rise above the 1850 ‘norm’ by mid-century, possibly much sooner. **This guarantees a positive feedback**, already underway, leading to 4.5 to 6 or more degrees above ‘norm’ and that is a level lethal to life. This is partly due to the fact that humans have to eat and plants can’t adapt fast enough to make that possible for the 7-to-9 billion of us—so we’ll die.”

If you think McPherson’s comment about lack of adaptability goes over the edge, consider that the rate of evolution trails the rate of climate change by a factor of 10,000, according to a paper in the August 2013 issue of Ecology Letters. Furthermore, David Wasdel, director of the Apollo-Gaia Project and an expert on multiple feedback dynamics, says, “We are experiencing change 200 to 300 times faster than any of the previous major extinction events.”

Wasdel cites with particular alarm scientific reports showing that **the oceans have already lost 40 percent of their phytoplankton,** the base of the global oceanic food chain, because of climate-change-induced acidification and atmospheric temperature variations. (According to the Center for Ocean Solutions: “The oceans have absorbed almost one-half of human-released CO2 emissions since the Industrial Revolution. Although this has moderated the effect of greenhouse gas emissions, it is chemically altering marine ecosystems 100 times more rapidly than it has changed in at least the last 650,000 years.”)

“This is already a mass extinction event,” Wasdel adds. “The question is, **how far is it going to go?** How serious does it become? If we are not able to stop the rate of increase of temperature itself, and get that back under control, then a high temperature event, perhaps another five to six degrees [C], **would** obliterate **at least 60 percent to 80 percent of the populations and species of life on Earth.”**

What Comes Next?

In November 2012, even Jim Yong Kim, president of the World Bank Group (an international financial institution that provides loans to developing countries), warned that “a 4C warmer world can, and must be, avoided. Lack of action on climate change threatens to make the world our children inherit a completely different world than we are living in today.”

A World Bank–commissioned report warned that we are indeed on track to a “4C world” marked by extreme heat waves and life-threatening sea-level rise.

The three living diplomats who have led UN climate change talks claim **there is little chance** the next climate treaty, if it is ever approved, will prevent the world from overheating. “There is nothing that can be agreed in 2015 that would be consistent with the two degrees,” says Yvo de Boer, who was executive secretary of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 2009, when attempts to reach a deal at a summit in Copenhagen crumbled. “The only way that a 2015 agreement **can achieve a two-degree goal is to** shut down the whole global economy.”

Atmospheric and marine scientist Ira Leifer is particularly concerned about the changing rainfall patterns a recently leaked IPCC draft report suggested for our future: “When I look at what the models predicted for a 4C world, I see very little rain over vast swaths of populations. If Spain becomes like Algeria, where do all the Spaniards get the water to survive? We have parts of the world which have high populations which have high rainfall and crops that exist there, and **when that rainfall and those crops go away** and the country starts looking more like some of North Africa, **what keeps the people alive?**”

The IPCC report suggests that we can expect a generalized shifting of global rain patterns further north, robbing areas that now get plentiful rain of future water supplies. History shows us that **when food supplies collapse,** wars begin**, while famine and disease spread**. All of these things, scientists now fear, **could happen** on an unprecedented scale, especially given the interconnected nature of the global economy.

**No impact- econ decline doesn’t cause war**

Barnett ‘9 (Thomas P.M. Barnett, senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC, “The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis,” 8/25/2009)

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces. So, to sum up: \* No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?); \* The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places); \* Not a single state-on-state war directly caused (and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered); \* No great improvement or disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy); \* A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and \* No serious efforts by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan or supplant its role. (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional deployments of strategic assets to the Western hemisphere and its weak efforts to outbid the United States on basing rights in Kyrgyzstan; but the best include China and India stepping up their aid and investments in Afghanistan and Iraq.) Sure, we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the previous world record set in the late 1980s, but even that's likely to wane given the stress on public budgets created by all this unprecedented "stimulus" spending. If anything, the friendly cooperation on such stimulus packaging was the most notable great-power dynamic caused by the crisis. Can we say that the world has suffered a distinct shift to political radicalism as a result of the economic crisis? Indeed, no. The world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that remain decidedly friendly to both markets and trade. In the short run, there were attempts across the board to insulate economies from immediate damage (in effect, as much protectionism as allowed under current trade rules), but there was no great slide into "trade wars." Instead, the World Trade Organization is functioning as it was designed to function, and regional efforts toward free-trade agreements have not slowed. Can we say Islamic radicalism was inflamed by the economic crisis? If it was, that shift was clearly overwhelmed by the Islamic world's growing disenchantment with the brutality displayed by violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And looking forward, austere economic times are just as likely to breed connecting evangelicalism as disconnecting fundamentalism. At the end of the day, the economic crisis did not prove to be sufficiently frightening to provoke major economies into establishing global regulatory schemes, even as it has sparked a spirited -- and much needed, as I argued last week -- discussion of the continuing viability of the U.S. dollar as the world's primary reserve currency. Naturally, plenty of experts and pundits have attached great significance to this debate, seeing in it the beginning of "economic warfare" and the like between "fading" America and "rising" China. And yet, in a world of globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial markets, such "diverging interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead. Frankly, I don't welcome a world in which America's fiscal profligacy goes undisciplined, so bring it on -- please! Add it all up and it's fair to say that this global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II international liberal trade order.

#### Royal votes neg—economic declines dis-incentivize costly saber-rattling—here’s the next page

Royal, your author, 10—director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense (Jedediah, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises”, published in *Economics of War and Peace*: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 217, google books, AL)

There is, however, another trend at play. Economic crises tend to fragment regimes and divide polities. A decrease in cohesion at the political leadership level and at the electorate level **reduces the ability** of the state to coalesce a sufficiently strong political base **required to undertake costly balancing measures** such as economic costly signals. Schweller (2006) builds on earlier studies (sec, e.g., Christensen, 1996; Snyder, 2000) that link political fragmentation with decisions **not to balance** against rising threats or to balance only in minimal and ineffective ways to demonstrate a tendency for states to 'underbalance'. Where political and social cohesion is strong, states are more likely to balance against rising threats in effective and costly ways. However, 'unstable and fragmented regimes that rule over divided polities will be significantly constrained in their ability to adapt to systemic incentives; they will be least likely to enact bold and costly policies **even when their nation's survival is at stake** and they are needed most' (Schweller, 2006, p. 130).

## 1NR

### heg

#### Nope – empirics prove the opposite

**Fettweis 10** – Professor of national security affairs @ U.S. Naval War College (Chris, Georgetown University Press, “Dangerous times?: the international politics of great power peace” Google Books) Jacome

Simply stated, the hegemonic stability theory proposes that international peace is only possible when there is one country strong enough to make and enforce a set of rules. At the height of Pax Romana between 27 BC and 180 AD, for example, Rome was able to bring unprecedented peace and security to the Mediterranean. The Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century brought a level of stability to the high seas. Perhaps the current era is peaceful because the United States has established a de facto Pax Americana where no power is strong enough to challenge its dominance, and because it has established a set of rules that a generally in the interests of all countries to follow. Without a benevolent hegemony, some strategists fear, instability may break out around the globe. Unchecked conflicts could cause humanitarian disaster and, in today’s interconnected world economic turmoil that would ripple throughout global financial markets. If the United States were to abandon its commitments abroad, argued Art, the world would “become a more dangerous place” and, sooner or later, that would “rebound to America’s detriment.” If the massive spending that the United States engages in actually produces stability in the international political and economic systems, then perhaps internationalism is worthwhile. There are good theoretical and empirical reasons, however, the belief that U.S. hegemony is not the primary cause of the current era of stability.

First of all, the hegemonic stability argument overstates the role that the United States plays in the system. No country is strong enough to police the world on its own. The only way there can be stability in the community of great powers is if self-policing occurs, ifs **states have decided that their interest are served by peace**. If no pacific normative shift had occurred among the great powers that was filtering down through the system, then no amount of international constabulary work by the United States could maintain stability. Likewise, if it is true that such a shift has occurred, then most of what the hegemon spends to bring stability would be wasted. The 5 percent of the world’s population that live in the United States simple could not force peace upon an unwilling 95. At the risk of beating the metaphor to death, the United States may be patrolling a neighborhood that has already rid itself of crime. Stability and unipolarity may be simply coincidental.

In order for U.S. hegemony to be the reason for global stability, the rest of the world would have to expect reward for good behavior and fear punishment for bad. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not always proven to be especially eager to engage in humanitarian interventions abroad. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been sufficient to inspire action. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influence those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. Ethiopia and Eritrea are hardly the only states that could go to war without the slightest threat of U.S. intervention. Since most of the world today is free to fight without U.S. involvement, something else must be at work. Stability exists in many places where no hegemony is present.

Second, the limited empirical evidence we have suggests that there is little connection between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. During the 1990s the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially, By 1998 the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990. To internationalists, defense hawks, and other believers in hegemonic stability this irresponsible "peace dividend" endangered both national and global security "No serious analyst of American military capabilities," argued Kristol and Kagan, "doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet Americas responsibilities to itself and to world peace."" If the pacific trends were due not to U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, however, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence.

The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable Pentagon, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove mistrust and arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat ofinternational war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and it kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. It is also worth noting for our purposes that the United States was no less safe.

#### This transition will be uniquely peaceful

**Macdonald and Parent 11** (Paul, **Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, and Joseph, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”. International Security** Spring 2011, Vol. 35, No. 4, Pages 7-44.)

Contrary to these predictions, our analysis suggests some grounds for optimism. Based on the historical track record of great powers facing acute relative decline, the United States should be able to retrench in the coming decades. In the next few years, the United States is ripe to overhaul its military, shift burdens to its allies, and work to decrease costly international commitments. It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes than the average great power and to settle these disputes more amicably. Some might view this prospect with apprehension, fearing the steady erosion of U.S. credibility. Yet our analysis suggests that retrenchment need not signal weakness. Holding on to exposed and expensive commitments simply for the sake of one’s reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble than withdrawing to cheaper, more defensible frontiers.

Some observers might dispute our conclusions, arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. Theoretically, hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability, which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them. Further, they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions, and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation. In addition, hegemonic powers, almost by definition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations.

We believe the empirical record supports these conclusions. In particular, periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone than those of acute decline. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the Anglo- American transition, which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. The tenor of that transition may have been inºuenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires, the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War, and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Although China and the United States differ in regime type, similar factors may work to cushion the impending Sino-American transition. Both are large, relatively secure continental great powers, a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition.93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges, including strains among rival regions, which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism.94

#### Empirics prove that cooperation will prevail

**Gartzke 9** \*Erik Gartzke is an associate professor of political science at UC San Diego [Gartzke Power Shuffle: Will the Coming Transition Be Peaceful? [Gartzke, Erik](http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/docview.lateralsearchlink:lateralsearch/sng/author/Gartzke,+Erik/$N?t:ac=200780115/fulltext/1359B17966B78DAEF0F/7&t:cp=maintain/resultcitationblocks). [Current History](http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/docview.lateralsearchlinkbypubid:lateralsearch/sng/pubtitle/Current+History/$N/41559?t:ac=200780115/fulltext/1359B17966B78DAEF0F/7&t:cp=maintain/resultcitationblocks) 108,721 (Nov 2009): 374-380]

THE BRITISH PRECEDENT There is precedent for a successful policy of engagement in hegemonic transition. At the dawn of the twentieth century, Great Britain found it could work with the nouveau riche United States. Unlike in preceding transitions, protagonists did not become antagonists because they had so much in common. The United States, late to the European-led game of imperial enterprise, quickly discovered that conquest did not pay. America, after fiascos in Cuba and the Philippines, was happy to be a commercial, rather than imperial, power. Britain, too, found that the promotion of free commerce served its interests. As the world's largest trading power, the United Kingdom benefited disproportionately from encouraging a system of reciprocal access to national and colonial markets. Market economics rapidly made control of territory much less important than access to consumers. Promoting the prosperity of dependent powers further weakened the appeal of colonial administration. Thus the United States was able to peacefully assume the mantle of hegemon because the two powers had developed compatible international objectives through a common system of global commerce. Under British hegemony, the United States had obtained much of what it wanted from the established world order, and it enjoyed the additional benefit of not having to pay the high price of policing a system that was largely acceptable. The United States could free-ride on British efforts to manage a market-based global economy. The British, meanwhile, respected the US sphere of influence in the Americas, while the United States had no interest in controlling traditional British spheres of influence in Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia, as long as American manufacturers retained access to commercial markets in these regions. This system, though it included numerous colonial holdings, was not all that different from the one that the United States preferred and eventually sponsored. Indeed, the problem from an international perspective was that America was reluctant to inherit hegemony. The United States persisted as a largely demilitarized power until World War II, despite the fact that the United Kingdom's relative decline was taxing its ability to sustain the system from which the United States benefited. Only in the aftermath of World War II, when it became clear that Britain could no longer manage the global system, did the United States decide to run the world. More important than British decline, however, was the fact that the Soviet Union posed the chief alternative to American hegemony. Recognition of the increasing importance of global public goods to its own and other nations' prosperity, and cognizance of the consequences of a Soviet-led system, forced the United States to dramatically shift its foreign policy and assume the position of global leadership. It is tempting to conclude that the peaceful transition from British to US hegemony was the result of a common Anglo culture, or of unique characteristics of the United States as a nation. But Anglo amity had not prevented the American Revolution, nor had a common Anglo culture stopped the Union and the Confederacy from fighting the deadliest contest in US history. And while it is possible that American accession to hegemony was exceptional, one must hope this is not the case, given the inevitability that the United States will someday be replaced as hegemon. THE RISE OF THE REST For a time in the post-World War II period, it appeared that the Soviet Union might surpass the United States. In retrospect, those fears appear wildly misplaced, but they exemplify the power of uncertainty as a determinant of international affairs. Not knowing caused the United States to be more defensive than was perhaps necessary, while uncertainty supplied the Soviets with ammunition that made them more effective than if the truth had been fully known. World War III was avoided thanks to luck and caution, rather than averted as a product of power relations and system structure. For a time in the 1980s strategic thinkers contemplated a succession by Europe or Japan. Anglo culture, inci- dentally, cannot explain how the United States and other powers addressed debate over the prospect of these transi- tions. While there was consid- érable anxiety in the United States about commercial com- petition, there was never a serious suggestion that Japanese or European aspirations constituted a real threat to the security of the United States. Europe was at peace with itself, while the Japanese seemed more eager to copy the United States commercially than to eclipse it politically. Again, a power transition between the United States and its allies never came to pass, but it is exceedingly unlikely in any case that such a transition would have involved significant international violence. What emerged in the twentieth century, and what appears likely to persist in the twenty-first century, is the realization that commerce creates compatible interests among world powers. Other objectives remain in tension today; if substantial enough they could open up the opportunity for ambiguity, conflict, and possibly war. But a common commitment to global trade at least creates the basis for an important set of mutual or compatible interests among states. America's fear is that a successor hegemon, or a group of powers enjoying dominance over different regions, might be inimical to US interests. Such hegemons could alter or supplant the institutions and commercial, social, and political norms that have helped the United States govern a prosperous system and made America thrive as well. If hegemonic successors or competing coalitions are bound to want different things, then the United States may find that it prefers to resist the transition to a new configuration of power. If, in addition, the net effect of conflict is difficult to judge, then conflict itself will be more likely, since both sides in a dispute could expect that they might prevail in a fight. Fortunately, there is reason to believe that the interests of current and future rivals for global power may not be incompatible. As with the [Anglo-American](http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/docview/200780115/fulltext/1359B17966B78DAEF0F/7?accountid=465) transition, future power transitions may involve states that want very similar things from the international system. Changes in the global economy since the late twentieth century have made global governance more important, valuable, and relatively neutral in terms of political conflict. The developed world, the BRIC nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China), and other developing countries all benefit from institutions that promote trade, finan- cial stability, and politi- cal consensus. The more that China, for example, becomes integrated into the global economic system, the more that its preferences will reflect objectives similar to those of the United States. Indeed, development has led to a world system in which most candidates for regional or global power have common or compatible interests. Whereas in the past, power reflected an inherent incompatibility with other nations, today power derives from the very interactions that make nations more similar. If there is a good prospect that the world will remain peaceful, it is because the power now needed to run the world comes from cooperation, not from military conflict.

### moar dedev

#### Growth unsustainable, collapse k2 solve extinction

Homer-Dixon ‘11

[Thomas Homer-Dixon, CIGI chair of global systems at the Balsillie School of International Affairs in Waterloo, Canada, “ECONOMIES CAN'T JUST KEEP ON GROWING”, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/02/unconventional_wisdom?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full>]

Humanity has made great strides over the past 2,000 years, and we often **assume** that our path, notwithstanding a few bumps along the way, goes ever upward. But we are **wrong**: Within this century, **environmental** and **resource constraints** will likely bring **global economic growth to a halt**. Limits on available resources already restrict economic activity in many sectors, though their impact usually goes unacknowledged. Take rare-earth elements -- minerals and oxides essential to the manufacture of many technologies. When China recently stopped exporting them, sudden shortages threatened to crimp a wide range of industries. Most commentators believed that the supply crunch would ease once new (or mothballed) rare-earth mines are opened. But such optimism overlooks a fundamental **physical reality**. As the best bodies of ore are exhausted, miners move on to less concentrated deposits in more difficult natural circumstances. These mines cause more pollution and require more energy. In other words, opening new rare-earth mines outside China will result in **staggering environmental impact**. Or consider petroleum, which provides about 40 percent of the world's commercial energy and more than 95 percent of its transportation energy. Oil companies generally have to work harder to get each new barrel of oil. The amount of energy they receive for each unit of energy they invest in drilling has dropped from 100 to 1 in Texas in the 1930s to about 15 to 1 in the continental United States today. The oil sands in Alberta, Canada, yield a return of only 4 to 1. Coal and natural gas still have high energy yields. So, as oil becomes harder to get in coming decades, these energy sources will become increasingly vital to the global economy. But they're fossil fuels, and burning them generates **climate-changing carbon dioxide.** If the World Bank's projected rates for global economic growth hold steady, global output will have risen almost **tenfold** by 2100, to more than $600 trillion in today's dollars. So **even if** countries make **dramatic reductions** in carbon emissions per dollar of GDP, global carbon dioxide emissions will triple from today's level to more than **90 billion metric tons a year**. Scientists tell us that tripling carbon emissions would cause such extreme **heat waves**, **droughts**, and **storms** that farmers would likely find they couldn't produce the food needed for the world's projected population of **9 billion** people. Indeed, the economic damage caused by such climate change would probably, **by itself**, **halt growth**. Humankind is in a box. For the 2.7 billion people now living on less than $2 a day, economic growth is essential to satisfying the most basic requirements of human dignity. And in much wealthier societies, people need growth to pay off their debts, support liberty, and maintain civil peace. To produce and sustain this growth, they must expend vast amounts of energy. Yet our best energy source -- fossil fuel -- is the main thing contributing to climate change, and climate change, if unchecked, will halt growth. We can't live with growth, and we can't live without it. This contradiction is **humankind's biggest challenge** this century, but as long as conventional wisdom holds that growth can continue forever, **it's a challenge we can't possibly address.**

#### Transition leads to sustainable localized communities

**Lewis 2000** – PhD, University of Colorado at Boulder (Chris H, “The Paradox of Global Development and the Necessary Collapse of Global Industrial Civilization” http://www.cross-x.com/archives/LewisParadox.pdf)

With the collapse of global industrial civilization, smaller, autonomous, local and regional civilizations, cultures, and polities will emerge. We can reduce the threat of mass death and genocide that will surely accompany this collapse by encouraging the creation and growth of sustainable, self-sufficient regional polities. John Cobb has already made a case for how this may work in the United States and how it is working in Kerala, India. After the collapse of global industrial civilization, First and Third World peoples won't have the material resources, biological capital, and energy and human resources to re-establish global industrial civilization.

Forced by economic necessity to become dependent on local resources and ecosystems for their survival, peoples throughout the world will work to conserve and restore their environments. Those societies that destroy their local environments and economies, as modern people so often do, will themselves face collapse and ruin.