# Round 5—Aff vs Vermont BB

## 1AC

### 1ac

#### Every day, each and every one of us participates in a war which consists of endless genocide of the non-human. Every year, billions of nonhumans are slaughtered by humans. They are captured, detained, tortured and killed for the sake of consumption. This violence is rendered invisible by a normative understanding of war that excuses violence against the non-human as legitimate. This Western conception of war is grounded upon a hierarchy of values that regards nonhuman life as raw material for the preservation of human life.

**Kochi 9** - Sussex Law School, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK (Tarik, “Species War: Law, Violence and Animals,” SAGE Journals)

The response of the lawyer, international lawyer, politician or philosopher to the account so far might be to say that this is all very interesting but that it still has little to do with “war.” Such figures might still argue that the term “war” refers to something carried out by states and governed by “national interest,” or guided by moral ideals like freedom and human rights, or by international law. This response, however, overlooks the way in which the typical and everyday use of the term war is itself conceptually and  historically ordered in a practice that differentially values forms of life. In what follows I look more closely at how arguments about legitimate violence within two contemporary conceptions or discourses of the law of war are ordered and of how this ordering is related to the foundational moment of species war. The dominant Western conceptions of the law of war rest upon two major conceptual and historical “foundations.” The first involves the way in which the monopoly upon the legitimacy of violence is vested in the sovereignty of the state and grounded upon the principles of preservation of life, domestic peace and security from external threat. This form which sometimes expresses a reason of state or national interest approach to questions of war is often called the Westphalian system of international relations and is ambiguously historically linked to the Peace of Westphalia (1648). The second dominant narrative or form of thinking about the laws of war is represented by contemporary international humanitarian law. This approach grounds the legitimacy of war upon the maintenance of peace and  security between nations bound together with the concern for the protection of human rights and the prevention of human rights abuses, war crimes and genocide via the establishment of the United Nations (1945). While this mode of thinking about war inherits much from the Westphalian system, it is historically grounded upon an international response to “world war” and the genocide of European Jews. The natural law theories of Hugo Grotius and Thomas Hobbes are often viewed as laying down the theoretical justifications for the  modern secular state, the legitimacy of sovereign violence, and the Westphalian international order. Within the context of bloody intra-state civil wars such as the Thirty Years War (1618–48) and moments of domestic chaos such as the English Civil War (1642–51) thinkers such as Grotius and Hobbes reacted to widespread social violence often motivated by actors party to differing Christian confessions all claiming adherence to a universal  religious, moral or political truth. Grotius and Hobbes, albeit in different ways, responded by producing a de-sacralized natural law that was grounded not upon  theological conceptions of right and justice but upon more earthly, “secular,” concepts of the preservation of human life and survival. For these thinkers the chaos of civil war and intra-state civil war could be nullified if the criteria of what counted as legitimate violence were determined by an institution that guaranteed peace and security. Roughly, Grotius and Hobbes attempted to theoretically re-order  territory and space around the figure of sovereignty and inter-sovereign relations. The legitimacy of human violence is no longer grounded upon a universal conception of divine authority but is instead located around the figure and office of the sovereign who maintains peace and security over a particular, limited territory. Such an approach to the chaos of civil war can be termed the juridical ordering of the concept of war. This de-legitimisation of the right to private violence in the name of peace  creates what Max Weber later describes as the “state’s monopoly upon the legitimacy of violence.” Modern war, juridically ordered, takes on the definition of a form of violence waged between sovereigns, who hold a particular status. By this definition violence carried out by the state against a non-sovereign group is excluded from the language of “war proper” as is private violence (including rebellion, sabotage and terrorism) which is defined as crime.Grotius and Hobbes are sometimes described as setting out a prudential approach, or a natural law of minimal content because in contrast to Aristotelian or Thomastic legal and political theory their attempt to derive the legitimacy of the state and sovereign order relies less upon a thick conception of the good life and is more focussed upon basic human needs such as survival. In the context of a response to religious civil war such an approach made sense in that often thick moral and religious conceptions of the good life (for example, those held by competing Christian Confessions) often drove conflict and violence. Yet, it would be a mistake to assume that the categories of “survival,” “preservation of life” and “bare life” are neutral categories. Rather survival, preservation of life and bare life as expressed by the Westphalian theoretical tradition already contain distinctions of value – in particular, the specific distinction of value between human and non-human life. “Bare life” in this sense is not “bare” but contains within it a distinction of value between the worth of human life placed above and beyond the worth of non-human animal life. In this respect bare life within this tradition contains within it a hidden conception of the good life. The foundational moment of the modern juridical conception of the law of war already contains within it the operation of species war. The Westphalian tradition puts itself forward as grounding the legitimacy of violence upon the preservation of life, however its concern for life is already marked by a hierarchy of value in which non-human animal life is violently used as the “raw material” for preserving human life. Grounded upon, but concealing the human-animal distinction, the Westphalian  conception of war makes a double move: it excludes the killing of animals from its definition of “war **proper,” and**, **through rendering dominant the modern** juridical **definition of “war** proper” the tradition **is able to** further institutionalize and **normalize a particular conception** of the good life. Following from this original distinction of life-value realized through the juridical language of war were other forms of human life whose lives were considered to be of a lesser value under a European, Christian, “secular” natural law conception of the good life. Underneath this concern with the preservation of life in general stood veiled preferences over what particular forms of life (such as racial conceptions of human life) and ways of living were worthy of preservation, realization and elevation. The business contracts of early capitalism, the power of white males over women and children, and, especially in the colonial context, the sanctity of European life over non-European and Christian lives over non-Christian heathens and Muslims, were some of the dominant forms of life preferred for preservation within the early modern juridical ordering of war.

#### And this move to ignore species violence is based on a devaluation of the nonhuman that renders them killable

**Kochi 9** - Sussex Law School, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK (Tarik, “Species War: Law, Violence and Animals,” SAGE Journals)

Although species war remains largely hidden because it is not seen as war or even violence at all it continues to affect the ways in which juridical mechanisms order the legitimacy of violence. While species war may not be a Western monopoly, in this account I will only examine a Western variant. This variant, however, is one that may well have been imposed upon the rest of the world through colonization and globalization. In what will follow I offer a sketch of species war and show how the juridical mechanisms for determining what constitutes legitimate violence fall back upon the hidden foundation of species war. I try to do this by showing that the various modern juridical mechanisms for determining what counts as legitimate violence are dependent upon a practice of judging the value of forms of life. I argue that contemporary claims about the legitimacy of war are based upon judgements about differential life-value and that these judgements are an extension of an original practice in which the legitimacy of killing is grounded upon the valuation of the human above the non-human. Further, by giving an overview of the ways in which our understanding of the legitimacy of war has changed, I attempt to show how the notion of species war has been continually excluded from the Law of war and of how contemporary historical movements might open a space for its possible re-inclusion. In this sense, the argument I develop here about species war offers a particular way of reflecting upon the nature of law more generally. In a Western juridical tradition, two functions of law are often thought to be: the establishment of order (in the context of the preservation of life, or survival); and, the realization of justice (a thick conception of the “good”). Reflecting upon these in light of the notion of species war helps us to consider that at the heart of both of these functions of law resides a practice of making judgements about the life-value of particular “objects.” These objects are, amongst other things: human individuals, groups of humans, non-human animals, plants, transcendent entities and ideas (the “state,” “community,” etc.). For the law, the practice of making judgements about the relative life- value of objects is intimately bound-up with the making of decisions about what objects can be killed. Within our Western conception of the law it is difficult to separate the moment of judgement over life-value from the decision over what constitutes “legitimate violence.” Species war sits within this blurred middle-ground between judgement and decision – it points to a moment at the heart of the law where distinctions of value and acts of violence operate as fundamental to the founding or positing of law. The primary violence of species war then takes place not as something after the establishment of a regime of law (i.e., after the establishment of the city, the state, or international law). Rather, the violence of species war occurs at the beginning of law, at its moment of foundation, as a generator, as a motor. 7

#### To understand violence only in human terms reifies violent anthropocentric values, the human is an ethically bankrupt subject that problematizes all human forms of being and knowledge production

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(Rosemary-Claire, “Apocalypse Meow”, Capitalism Nature Socialism, 24:1, 35-41, dml)

It is an easy point to make, that apocalypse is defined in almost totally human terms. Although environmental apocalypticism is tied to statistics about species loss and habitat destruction, it is only really an apocalypse once human beings (and capitalist production for that matter) are under threat. Occasionally nonhuman species deemed extraordinary in some manner (usually in the degree to which either they are most ‘‘like us’’ or useful to us) may enter into the apocalyptic calculus\* dolphins that can recognize themselves in the mirror, chimpanzees that use tools. This is further evidence of apocalypticism’s anthropocentrism. Leftist critiques of apocalyptic narratives, while not necessarily incompatible with the previous point, have focused instead on these narratives’ depoliticizing tendencies. Swyngedouw (and obscures how the human hubris creates the conditions for these scenarios 2010a; 2011) locates apocalypse within a general trend toward environmental populism and ‘‘post-politics,’’ a political formation that forecloses the political, preventing the politicization of particulars (Swyngedouw 2010b). He argues that populism never assigns proper names to things, signifying (following Rancie`re) an erosion of politics and ‘‘genuine democracy . . .[which] is a space where the unnamed, the uncounted, and, consequently, un-symbolized become named and counted’’ (Swyngedouw 2011, 80). Whereas class struggle was about naming the proletariat, and feminist struggles were named through ‘‘woman’’ as a political category, a defining feature of post-politics is an ambiguous and unnamed enemy or target of concern. As Swyngedouw (2010b; 2011) contends, the postpolitical condition invokes a common predicament and the need for common humanity-wide action, with ‘‘human’’ and ‘‘humanity’’ vacant signifiers and homogenizing subjects in this politics. I return to this idea soon. Over a decade earlier, Katz (1995) also argues that ‘‘apocalypticism is politically ~~disabling’’~~ [debilitating] (277). She writes: ‘‘contemporary problems are so serious that rendering them apocalyptic obscures their political ecology\*their sources, their political, economic and social dimensions’’ (278). Loathe to implicate ‘‘human nature’’ as one of these sources, Katz instead targets global capitalism, which is ‘‘premised on a series of socially-constructed differences that, in apocalyptic visions, take a universal character: man/woman; culture/nature; first world/third world; bourgeoisie/working class’’ (279). Towards the end of her short chapter, she remarks that ‘‘human beings are simultaneously different from and of a piece with bees’’ (280), calling subsequently for ‘‘a usable environmental politics [that] takes seriously the political responsibility implied by the difference between people and bees’’ (280). There is so much to agree with here. But Katz misses a big binary in her list: human/animal. On the other hand, she clearly if implicitly recognizes not only the productiveness of this binary and its role in environmental politics (the humans and the bees), but also the attention it deserves. The question then remains: Although according to Katz, apocalyptic politics underplays if not entirely ignores the production process, is this inherent to apocalypticism, or is there potential to train apocalypticism onto production, particularly of the human and the human/animal binary? Neither a natural order, nor a pre-given subject position, nor a category that exists beyond politics, the human is rather an intensely political category whose ongoing production is rife with violence, contestation, and hierarchy. The central mode of this production is the human/animal binary that Haraway (2008, 18) says ‘‘flourishes, lethally, in the entrails of humanism.’’ This binary is continually re-made and re-authorized politically, legally, scientifically, religiously, and so on. It is the product of particular epistemologies, ontologies, and power relations, and it also produces these same structures. The spatial, material and discursive inclusion and exclusion of animals construct the human/animal binary. Materially, animals are included in the ‘‘human’’ project as laborers, food, clothing, and so on, but are excluded from life itself should their dead bodies be of economic value. Animals work for us, for free, and are largely ‘‘disposable workers’’ in a manner similar to and different from the ‘‘disposable women’’ Wright (2006) observes are fundamental to the workings of capital and labor in Mexican maquiladoras. The similarity lies in how both animal laborers and these women factory workers are devalued as laborers, and this devaluing of their labor actually contributes to the formation of value in the commodities and capital of the production network. They are different in that of course the women are still paid\*albeit marginally\*and their labor is recognized as labor. Animals do not just labor for free. They also die for profit and power. The most obvious example of industrial meat production aside, capitalism and the liberal state derive significant profits from the ability to kill\*often in mass numbers\*wild animals. Killing wolves, bears, cougars, and other animals has been a predominant colonial project, with bounty often the first laws passed in the colonies. Not only domesticated but also wild animals have played and continue to play a central role, materially and symbolically, in capitalism and the formation of the nation state, as symbols, commodities, and spectacle. Discursively animals found the human subject by virtue of their exclusion: the human is what is not animal. This is a juridicopolitical, ethical exclusion that is always at the same time an inclusion. The human thus appears to be a neurological or biophysiological product rather than a result of specific histories, geographies, and social relations, between humans and also humans and animals. Certainly particular socio-natural properties do become essential to a thing’s power and geopolitical centrality (think opposable thumbs, cerebral cortexes, bipedalism, and so on). But as Huber (2011, 34, emphasis added) argues in the context of oil, ‘‘biophysical capacities are only realizable through particular uneven social relations of culture, history, and power.’’ Specific conditions and relations produce the human, which is entirely different than saying that humans are the same as each other or as other animals. Their differences should not be disregarded for a host of reasons, not the least of which is the political struggle various groups have made to claim both difference and not being animals. It is not my aim to ignore, then, the particularities of the human species, although I would emphasize that these particularities are not universal and are increasingly being shown to be far less particular than we imagined.

#### Now a genealogy of the human subject proves that the category itself is rife with violence. All forms of violence – whether based on race, gender, etc. – was perfected centuries earlier with violence against the nonhuman. Anthropocentrism has been a foundational model that structures violence. Any argument that attempts to claim superiority of the human over the nonhuman rests on the same justification used by White European males to subjugate other humans

Best 7 – Associate Professor at the University of Texas in the Department of Humanities and Philosophy (Steven, “Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust, by Charles Patterson” *Journal for Critical Animal Studies*, <http://www.criticalanimalstudies.org/JCAS/Journal_Articles_download/Issue_7/bestpatterson.pdf>)

While a welcome advance over the anthropocentric conceit that only humans shape human actions, the environmental determinism approach typically fails to emphasize the crucial role that animals play in human history, as well as how the human exploitation of animals is a key cause of hierarchy, social conflict, and environmental breakdown. A core thesis of what I call “animal standpoint theory” is that animals have been key driving and shaping forces of human thought, psychology, moral and social life, and history overall. More specifically, animal standpoint theory argues that the oppression of human over human has deep roots in the oppression of human over animal.1

In this context, Charles Patterson’s recent book, The Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust, articulates the animal standpoint in a powerful form with revolutionary implications. The main argument of Eternal Treblinka is that the human domination of animals, such as it emerged some ten thousand years ago with the rise of agricultural society, was the first hierarchical domination and laid the groundwork for patriarchy, slavery, warfare, genocide, and other systems of violence and power. A key implication of Patterson’s theory is that human liberation is implausible if disconnected from animal liberation, and thus humanism -- a speciesist philosophy that constructs a hierarchal relationship privileging superior humans over inferior animals and reduces animals to resources for human use -- collapses under the weight of its logical contradictions.

Patterson lays out his complex holistic argument in three parts. In Part I, he demonstrates that animal exploitation and speciesism have direct and profound connections to slavery, colonialism, racism, and anti-Semitism. In Part II, he shows how these connections exist not only in the realm of ideology – as conceptual systems of justifying and underpinning domination and hierarchy – but also in systems of technology, such that the tools and techniques humans devised for the rationalized mass confinement and slaughter of animals were mobilized against human groups for the same ends. Finally, in the fascinating interviews and narratives of Part III, Patterson describes how personal experience with German Nazism prompted Jewish to take antithetical paths: whereas most retreated to an insular identity and dogmatic emphasis on the singularity of Nazi evil and its tragic experience, others recognized the profound similarities between how Nazis treated their human captives and how humanity as a whole treats other animals, an epiphany that led them to adopt vegetarianism, to become advocates for the animals, and develop a far broader and more inclusive ethic informed by universal compassion for all suffering and oppressed beings. The Origins of Hierarchy "As long as men massacre animals, they will kill each other" –Pythagoras

It is little understood that the first form of oppression, domination, and hierarchy involves human domination over animals.2 Patterson’s thesis stands in bold contrast to the Marxist theory that the domination over nature is fundamental to the domination over other humans. It differs as well from the social ecology position of Murray Bookchin that domination over humans brings about alienation from the natural world, provokes hierarchical mindsets and institutions, and is the root of the long-standing western goal to “dominate” nature.3 In the case of Marxists, anarchists, and so many others, theorists typically don’t even mention human domination of animals, let alone assign it causal primacy or significance. In Patterson’s model, however, the human subjugation of animals is the first form of hierarchy and it paves the way for all other systems of domination such as include patriarchy, racism, colonialism, anti-Semitism, and the Holocaust. As he puts it, “the exploitation of animals was the model and inspiration for the atrocities people committed against each other, slavery and the Holocaust being but two of the more dramatic examples.”4

Hierarchy emerged with the rise of agricultural society some ten thousand years ago. In the shift from nomadic hunting and gathering bands to settled agricultural practices, humans began to establish their dominance over animals through “domestication.” In animal domestication (often a euphemism disguising coercion and cruelty), humans began to exploit animals for purposes such as obtaining food, milk, clothing, plowing, and transportation. As they gained increasing control over the lives and labor power of animals, humans bred them for desired traits and controlled them in various ways, such as castrating males to make them more docile. To conquer, enslave, and claim animals as their own property, humans developed numerous technologies, such as pens, cages, collars, ropes, chains, and branding irons.

The domination of animals paved the way for the domination of humans. The sexual subjugation of women, Patterson suggests, was modeled after the domestication of animals, such that men began to control women’s reproductive capacity, to enforce repressive sexual norms, and to rape them as they forced breeding in their animals. Not coincidentally, Patterson argues, slavery emerged in the same region of the Middle East that spawned agriculture, and, in fact, developed as an extension of animal domestication practices. In areas like Sumer, slaves were managed like livestock, and males were castrated and forced to work along with females.

In the fifteenth century, when Europeans began the colonization of Africa and Spain introduced the first international slave markets, the metaphors, models, and technologies used to exploit animal slaves were applied with equal cruelty and force to human slaves. Stealing Africans from their native environment and homeland, breaking up families who scream in anguish, wrapping chains around slaves’ bodies, shipping them in cramped quarters across continents for weeks or months with no regard for their needs or suffering, branding their skin with a hot iron to mark them as property, auctioning them as servants, breeding them for service and labor, exploiting them for profit, beating them in rages of hatred and anger, and killing them in vast numbers – all these horrors and countless others inflicted on black slaves were developed and perfected centuries earlier through animal exploitation.

As the domestication of animals developed in agricultural society, humans lost the intimate connections they once had with animals. By the time of Aristotle, certainly, and with the bigoted assistance of medieval theologians such as St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, western humanity had developed an explicitly hierarchical worldview – that came to be known as the “Great Chain of Being” – used to position humans as the end to which all other beings were mere means.

Patterson underscores the crucial point that the domination of human over human and its exercise through slavery, warfare, and genocide typically begins with the denigration of victims. But the means and methods of dehumanization are derivative, for speciesism provided the conceptual paradigm that encouraged, sustained, and justified western brutality toward other peoples. “Throughout the history of our ascent to dominance as the master species,” Patterson writes, “our victimization of animals has served as the model and foundation for our victimization of each other. The study of human history reveals the pattern: first, humans exploit and slaughter animals; then, they treat other people like animals and do the same to them.”5 Whether the conquerors are European imperialists, American colonialists, or German Nazis, western aggressors engaged in wordplay before swordplay, vilifying their victims – Africans, Native Americans, Filipinos, Japanese, Vietnamese, Iraqis, and other unfortunates – with opprobrious terms such as “rats,” “pigs,” “swine,” “monkeys,” “beasts,” and “filthy animals.”

Once perceived as brute beasts or sub-humans occupying a lower evolutionary rung than white westerners, subjugated peoples were treated accordingly; once characterized as animals, they could be hunted down like animals.6 The first exiles from the moral community, animals provided a convenient discard bin for oppressors to dispose the oppressed. The connections are clear: “For a civilization built on the exploitation and slaughter of animals, the `lower’ and more degraded the human victims are, the easier it is to kill them.”7 Thus, colonialism, as Patterson describes, was a “natural extension of human supremacy over the animal kingdom.”8 For just as humans had subdued animals with their superior intelligence and technologies, so many Europeans believed that the white race had proven its superiority by bringing the “lower races” under its command.

There are important parallels between speciesism and sexism and racism in the elevation of white male rationality to the touchstone of moral worth. The arguments European colonialists used to legitimate exploiting Africans – that they were less than human and inferior to white Europeans in ability to reason – are the very same justifications humans use to trap, hunt, confine, and kill animals. Once western norms of rationality were defined as the essence of humanity and social normality, by first using non-human animals as the measure of alterity, it was a short step to begin viewing odd, different, exotic, and eccentric peoples and types as non- or sub-human. Thus, the same criterion created to exclude animals from humans was also used to ostracize blacks, women, and numerous other groups from “humanity.” The oppression of blacks, women, and animals alike was grounded in an argument that biological inferiority predestined them for servitude. In the major strain of western thought, alleged rational beings (i.e., elite, white, western males) pronounce that the Other (i.e., women, people of color, animals) is deficient in rationality in ways crucial to their nature and status, and therefore are deemed and treated as inferior, subhuman, or nonhuman. Whereas the racist mindset creates a hierarchy of superior/inferior on the basis of skin color, and the sexist mentality splits men and women into greater and lower classes of beings, the speciesist outlook demeans and objectifies animals by dichotomizing the biological continuum into the antipodes of humans and animals. As racism stems from a hateful white supremacism, and sexism is the product of a bigoted male supremacism, so speciesism stems from and informs a violent human supremacism -- namely, the arrogant belief that humans have a natural or God-given right to use animals for any purpose they devise or, more generously, within the moral boundaries of welfarism and stewardship, which however was Judaic moral baggage official Chistianithy left behind.

#### Understanding how the value of the nonhuman shapes violence is critical to a disavowal of the human subject and a new form of being

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While what counts as human shifts dramatically in time and space, what remains for the most part constant is the animal outside that founds this category. These are not meaningless exclusions, and in the context of environmental politics, of course, they have especially pronounced momentum and significance. The naturalization of a superior, distinct species category enables systematically and casually inflicted death and suffering on an inconceivable scale. What is outside the ‘‘human’’ is far more ‘‘killable,’’ like Haraway says, more easily ‘‘noncriminally put to death,’’ says Derrida, more ‘‘precarious’’ for Butler. Although Butler’s extensive work on the politics of the human has been criticized for anthropocentrism, in a recent interview (Antonello and Farneti 2009), she questions what it might mean to share conditions of vulnerability and precariousness with animals and the environment, and suggests it undoes ‘‘the very conceit of anthropocentrism.’’ Such an undoing is precisely what I advocate. While an entrenched and powerful category, the human is also changeable and fluid. As Derrida (2008, 5) says, ‘‘the list of what is ‘proper’ to man always forms a configuration, from the first moment. For that very reason, it can never be limited to a single trait and is never closed.’’ The human’s contingencies, dependencies and destructive, homogenizing effects should be front and center in environmental politics. To show its strangeness is to show that it could be otherwise. Ultimately, we might have to reconfigure subjectivity’s contours and topographies, allow for an apocalypse of the human subject. We might have to get naked in front of our pets.

‘‘A true political space,’’ writes Swyngedouw (2010b, 194), ‘‘is always a space of contestation for those who are not-all, who are uncounted and unnamed.’’ This true political space necessarily includes\*if only by virtue of their exclusion\*animals, the ‘‘constitutive outside’’ of humanity itself. How we respond to this dynamic ought to be a central question of critical scholarship and philosophizing. To be a philosopher, says Deleuze in the ‘‘A for Animal’’ entry to the ‘‘abecedary’’ (L’abe´ce´daire de Gilles Deleuze 1989), ‘‘is to write in the place of animals that die.’’ This is still an imperfect way of describing my objective (for one thing, I am also interested in animals that are still alive), but it is an improvement over being a ‘‘spokesperson’’ for animals, which are often characterized as speechless and may be rendered more so having spokespeople appointed to speak on their behalf. To write in the place of animals that die seems a preferable, though still fraught, characterization. This paper is therefore written in the place of those uncounted and unnamed non-subjects of political space, the animals that die, the nonhumans, the hundreds of millions of animals that are ‘‘living out our nightmares’’ (Raffles 2010, 120): injected, tested, prodded, then discarded. We have denied, disavowed, and misunderstood animals. They are refused speech, reason, morality, emotion, clothing, shelter, mourning, culture, lying, lying about lying, gifting, laughing, crying\*the list has no limit. But ‘‘who was born first, before the names?’’ Derrida (2008, 18) asks. ‘‘Which one saw the other come to this place, so long ago? Who will have been the first occupant? Who the subject? Who has remained the despot, for so long now?’’ Some see identifying this denial as a side-event, inconsequential, even sort of silly. The belief in human superiority is firmly lodged and dear to people’s hearts and senses of themselves. It also seems a daunting task, not a simple matter of inserting the excluded into the dominant political order, which as Zˇ izˇek (1999) writes, neglects how these very subversions and exclusions are the order’s condition of being.

But if the political is precisely, as Swyngedouw (2010b) suggests, the expansion of a specific issue into a larger universal demand against ‘‘those in power’’ (an elevation he argues is precluded by the post-political, which reduces an issue to a particular, contained, and very specific demand), then perhaps the universal demand we need to mobilize in the Left is humanity itself. We need to write in the place of animals that die, in the sense that our politics must undertake not only a re-writing of our histories of oppression, our constitutions, our global agreements (and who and what are included in them), but also, necessarily, a radical reconfiguring of how subjects are positioned in relation to each other. The human can in fact serve as the named subject of this political effort, perhaps most aptly in environmental struggles. Like Braidotti (2008, 183) argues, ‘‘sustainability is about decentering anthropocentrism.’’ It is about an ‘‘egalitarianism . . .that displaces both the old-fashioned humanistic assumption that ‘man’ is the measure of all things and the anthropocentric idea that the only bodies that matter are human’’ (183). In tackling the human category, I believe the Left would not only be more relevant, but also could bring a transformative sensibility to an environmental politics that often seems to want to blame ‘‘humankind’’ but fails to consider precisely how this material and symbolic category remains untroubled in such misanthropy**.**

#### Thus, Marc and I recognize species war and call for an apocalypse of the human subject.

#### The 1AC assumes a traitorous identity. The dynamics of different forms of privilege posits us all as in positions of both the oppressor and oppressed. In the species war, we are all human oppressors complicit with a cycle of tortuous violence. The only feasible solution is to work against the structures of our own culture, we must question the human subject. This does not mean we deny our identities or claim unity with the oppressed, but it does mean we adopt an ethic that attempts to minimize our own domination.

**Plumwood 2 –** (Val, “Environmental Ethics”, p.205-6)

There are, I have suggested, multiple bases for critical solidarity with nature. One important critical basis can be understanding that certain human societies position humans as oppressors of non-human nature, treating humans as a privileged group which defines the non-human nature, in terms of roles that closely parallel our own roles as recipients of oppression within human dominance orders. Our grasp of these parallels may be based upon imaginative or narrative transpositions into locations paralleling that of the oppressed non-human other: artistic representation has an important place in helping us make such transpositions. Literature has often played such a transposing role historically, especially in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, in relation to the class system, slavery, women’s oppression, and animal oppression. In recent decades science fiction narrative that imaginatively position humans as colonized or exploited reductively as food by alien invaders have provided very powerful vehicles for such imaginative transpositions into a place that parallels that of the non-human food animal. So have those cartoonists whose ‘absurd’ humour depends upon exploiting parallels in the condition of the human and non-human oppressed. A chicken coming from a human house carrying a baby passes a women coming from a chicken coop carrying a basket of eggs, for example. A Larson elephant is outraged when he notices the ivory notes on a piano keyboard at an interspecies party and makes the connection to the fate of his own kind. The leap of recognition that is often described and explained in terms of an unanalysed and capricious emotion of ‘empathy’ or ‘sympathy’ is often better understood in terms of a concept of solidarity that is based on an intellectual and emotional grasp of the parallels in the logic of the One and the Other. Since most people suffer from some form of oppression within some dominance order or other, there is a widespread basis for the recognition that we are positioned multiply as oppressors or colonizers just as we are positioned multiply as oppressed and colonized. This recognition that one is an oppressor as well as an oppressed can be developed in certain cirvumstances to become the basis for the critical ‘traitorous identity’ which analyses, opposes and actively works against those structures of one’s own culture or group that keep the Other in an oppressed position. Traitorous kinds of human identity involve a revised conception of the self and its relation to the non-human other, opposition to oppressive practices, and the abandonment and critique of cultural allegiances to the dominance of the human species and its bonding against non-humans, in the same way that male feminism requires abandonment and critique of male bonding as the kind of male solidarity that defines itself in opposition to the feminine or to women, and of the ideology of male supremacy. These ‘traitorous identities’ that enable some men to be male feminists in active opposition to androcentric culture, some whites to be actively in opposition to white supremacism and ethnocentric culture, also enable some humans to be critical of ‘human supremacism’ and in active opposition to anthropocentric culture. “Traitorous’ identities do not appear by chance, but are usually considerable political and personal achievements in integrating reason and emotion; they speak of the traitor’s own painful self-reflection as well as efforts of understanding that have not flinched away from contact with the pain of oppressed others. What makes such traitorous identities possible is precisely the fact that the relationship between the oppressed and the ‘traitor’ is not one of identity, that the traitor is critical of his or her own ‘oppressor’ group as someone from within that group who has some knowledge of its workings and its effects on the life of the oppressed group. It depends on the traitor being someone with a view from both sides, able to adopt multiple perspectives and locations that enable an understanding how he or she is situated in the relationship with the other from the perspective of both kinds of lives, the life of the One and the live of the Other. Being a human who takes responsibility for their interspecies location in this way requires avoiding both the arrogance of reading in your own location and perspective as that of the other, and the arrogance of assuming that you can ‘read as the Other’ know their lives as they do, and in that sense speak or see as the other. Such a concept of solidarity as involving multiple positioning and perspectives can exploit the logic of the gap between contradictory positions and narratives standpoint theory applies to. The traitorous identity implies a certain kind of ethics of support relations which is quite **distinct from the ethics involved in claiming unity**. It stresses a number of counter-hegemonic virtues, ethical stances with can help to minimize the influence of the oppressive ideologies of domination and self-imposition that have formed our conceptions of both the other and ourselves. As we have seen, important among these virtues are listening and attentiveness to the other, a stance which can help counter the backgrounding which obscures and denies what the non-human other contributes to our lives and collaborative ventures. They also include philosophical strategies and methodologies that maximize our sensitivity to other members of our ecological communities and openness to them as ethically considered beings in their own right, rather than ones that minimize ethical recognition or that adopt a dualistic stance of ethical closure that insists on sharp moral boundaries and denies the continuity of planetary life. Openness and attentiveness are among the communicative virtues we have already discussed; more specifically, they mean giving the other’s needs and agency attention, being open to unanticipated possibilities and aspects of the other, reconceiving and re-encountering the other as a potentially communicative and agentic being, as well as ‘an independent creature of value and originator of projects that demand my respect’. A closely allied stance, as Anthony Weston points out, is that of invitation, which risks an offering of relationship to the other in a more or less open-ended way.

#### The 1AC is an attempt to ‘write in the place of animals that die,’ this is the only way to allow contestation of speciesism

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(Rosemary-Claire, “Apocalypse Meow”, Capitalism Nature Socialism, 24:1, 35-41, dml)

‘‘A true political space,’’ writes Swyngedouw (2010b, 194), ‘‘is always a space of contestation for those who are not-all, who are uncounted and unnamed.’’ This true political space necessarily includes\*if only by virtue of their exclusion\*animals, the ‘‘constitutive outside’’ of humanity itself. How we respond to this dynamic ought to be a central question of critical scholarship and philosophizing. To be a philosopher, says Deleuze in the ‘‘A for Animal’’ entry to the ‘‘abecedary’’ (L’abe´ce´daire de Gilles Deleuze 1989), ‘‘is to write in the place of animals that die.’’ This is still an imperfect way of describing my objective (for one thing, I am also interested in animals that are still alive), but it is an improvement over being a ‘‘spokesperson’’ for animals, which are often characterized as speechless and may be rendered more so having spokespeople appointed to speak on their behalf. To write in the place of animals that die seems a preferable, though still fraught, characterization.

This paper is therefore written in the place of those uncounted and unnamed non-subjects of political space, the animals that die, the nonhumans, the hundreds of millions of animals that are ‘‘living out our nightmares’’ (Raffles 2010, 120): injected, tested, prodded, then discarded. We have denied, disavowed, and misunderstood animals. They are refused speech, reason, morality, emotion, clothing, shelter, mourning, culture, lying, lying about lying, gifting, laughing, crying\*the list has no limit. But ‘‘who was born first, before the names?’’ Derrida (2008, 18) asks. ‘‘Which one saw the other come to this place, so long ago? Who will have been the first occupant? Who the subject? Who has remained the despot, for so long now?’’ Some see identifying this denial as a side-event, inconsequential, even sort of silly. The belief in human superiority is firmly lodged and dear to people’s hearts and senses of themselves. It also seems a daunting task, not a simple matter of inserting the excluded into the dominant political order, which as Z ˇ izˇek (1999) writes, neglects how these very subversions and exclusions are the order’s condition of being.

#### The ballot should decide between intellectual competing advocacies. Debates about war powers should not merely concern legal rules, but also the way our normative prescriptions of value infuse the law with meaning.

**Kochi 09** - Sussex Law School, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK (Tarik, “Species War: Law, Violence and Animals,” SAGE Journals)

In everyday speech, in the words of the media, politicians, protestors, soldiers and dissidents, the language of war is linked to and intimately bound up with the language of law. That a war might be said to be legal or illegal, just or unjust, or that an act might be called “war” rather than terror or crime, displays aspects of reference, connection, and constitution in which the social meaning of the concepts we use to talk about and understand war and law are organised in particular ways. The manner in which specific terms (i.e. war, terror, murder, slaughter, and genocide) are defined and their meanings ordered has powerful and bloody consequences for those who feel the force and brunt of these words in the realm of human action. In this paper I argue that the juridical language of war contains a hidden foundation – species war. That is, at the foundation of the Law of war resides a species war carried out by humans against non-human animals. At first glance such a claim may sound like it has little to do with law and war. In contemporary public debates the “laws of war” are typically understood as referring to the rules set out by the conventions and customs that define the legality of a state’s right to go to war under international law. However, such a perspective is only a narrow and limited view of what constitutes the Law of war and of the relationship between law and war more generally. Here the “Law” of the “Law of war” needs to be understood as involving something more than the limited sense of positive law. The Law of war denotes a broader category that includes differing historical senses of positive law as well as various ethical conceptions of justice, right and rights. This distinction is clearer in German than it is in English whereby the term Recht denotes a broader ethical and juristic category than that of Gesetz which refers more closely to positive or black letter laws.

1 To focus upon the broader category of the Law of war is to put specific (positive law) formulations of the laws of war into a historical, conceptual context. The Law of war contains at its heart arguments about and mechanisms for determining what constitutes legitimate violence. The question of what constitutes legitimate violence lies at the centre of the relationrship between war and law, and, the specific historical laws of war are merely different juridical ways of setting-out (positing) a particular answer to this question. In this respect the Law of war (and thus its particular laws of war) involves a practice of normative thinking and rule making concerned with determining answers to such questions as: what types of coercion, violence and killing may be included within the definition of “war,” who may legitimately use coercion, violence and killing, and for what reasons, under what circumstances and to what extent may particular actors use coercion, violence and killing understood as war? When we consider the relationship between war and law in this broader sense then it is not unreasonable to entertain the suggestion that at the foundation of the Law of war resides species war. At present, the Law of war is dominated by two cultural-conceptual formulations or discourses. The Westphalian system of interstate relations and the system of international human rights law are held to be modern foundations of the Law of war. In the West, most people’s conceptions of what constitutes “war” and of what constitutes a “legitimate” act of war are shaped by these two historical traditions. That is to say, these traditions have ordered how we understand the legitimate use of violence. 2

## 2AC

### 2ac root cause

#### Anthropocentrism is the structuring principle for all their impacts

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(Joseph, *State Violence and the Execution of Law: Biopolitical Caesurae of Torture, Black Sites, Drones* pg 38-40, dml)

As a fundamentally colonial formation of power, premised on the pivotal role of racism in governing subject peoples and assigning them positions on racialized hierarchies of life that spanned the right to genocidal extermination (of Indigenous peoples) and of enslavement (of black Africans), biopolitics is informed by a parallel history of speciesism that extends back to the very establishment of human civil and political society – as premised on animal enslavement (‘domestication’). Derrida traces the contours of this founding relation:

The socialization of human culture goes hand in hand with . . . the domestication of the tamed beast: it is nothing other than the becoming- livestock [ devenirbétail ] of the beast. The appropriation, breaking- in, and domestication of tamed livestock ( das zahme Vieh ) are human socialization . . . There is therefore neither socialization, political constitution, nor politics itself without the principle of domestication of the wild animal . . . Politics supposes livestock. 22

The violence that this terse supposition enables – politics supposes livestock – is what I will discuss in some detail in my discussion of those detainees inscribed within the biopolitical trajectories of extraordinary rendition (Chapter 4). Politics supposes livestock precisely as it also supposes the enslavement of animals and the constitution of a biopolitical hierarchy: ‘for the ox,’ writes Aristotle, ‘is the poor man’s slave’; and in Aristotle’s zoo- politics, the enslaved animal comes last in an ascending sequence that includes wife, house and, at the apex, man. 23 The political ramifi cations of this historical enslavement of animals can be further elaborated: ‘Not only did the domestication of animals provide the model and inspiration for human slavery and tyrannical government,’ Charles Patterson writes, ‘but it laid the groundwork for western hierarchical thinking and European and American racial theories that called for conquest and exploitation of “lower races,” while at the same time vilifying them as animals so as to encourage and justify their subjugation.’ 24 Jim Mason amplifi es Patterson’s thesis, arguing, in his interlinking of the enslavement of animals with larger colonial formations of power, that the establishment of ‘agri- culture’ operated as ‘a license for conquest.’ 25

The Latin etymology of the terms ‘colony’ and ‘colonial’ – colonia – evidences the modalities of power over life that intertwine the concept of ‘a farm’ and ‘a public settlement of Roman citizens in a hostile or newly conquered country.’ 26 In the prehistory of biopolitical power, the expropriated space of a conquered country is inscribed with the genocidal extermination of the ‘useless’ ‘wild’ animals and the enslavement of those that can be put to human use; in other words, there is precisely what Foucault terms the biopolitical ‘power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death.’ 27 This colonial move, then, is informed by a biopolitics of speciesism that determines who will live and who will die according to an anthropocentric hierarchy of life and its attendant values of, amongst other things, economic productivity. The non- human animal is, in this prehistorical moment, marked by an ineluctable fungibility that pre- dates the transference of this same attribute to the human slave.

In fi guring forth her compelling thesis that it is fungibility that characterizes the life and death of the black slave, Saidya Hartman delineates its complex dimensions:

The relation between pleasure and the possession of slave property, in both fi gurative and literal senses, can be explained in part by the fungibility of the slave – that is, the joy made possible by virtue of the replaceability in interchangeability endemic to the commodity – and by the extensive capacities of property – that is, the augmentation of the master subject through his embodiment in external objects and persons. 28

In the colonial prehistory of biopolitics, non- human animals are branded as either vermin to be exterminated so that, in Foucault’s titular phrase, ‘society can be defended’ or, alternatively, as fungible objects that are infi nitely replaceable and exchangeable. The anthropocentrism of the master subject augments the sense of embodied ownership over the enslaved animal while legitimating their right over its life/death. The archaic development of colonial regimes of governance over the life of animals pivots on a series of biopolitical technologies that include capture, enclosure, harness, enforced labour, controlled breeding, castration, branding and auctioning at markets. All of these animal technologies are invested, in their ancient inception, 29 with the biopolitical ‘power of regularization, and it . . . consists in making live and letting die.’ 30 Moreover, all of these animal technologies will effectively be transposed to regimes of human slavery: ‘the management of livestock,’ Mason notes, operated ‘as a model for the management of slaves.’ 31 Biopolitical technologies of animal enslavement were effectively drawn upon in the development of modern slave plantations, with programs of captive breeding/rape of black women by either the master or his overseers, confi ned spaces for quartering, controlled food rations, auctioning at markets and the use of a range of disciplinary technologies – the whip, the branding iron, shackles and the coffl e, that ‘train of slaves or beasts driven along together’; 32 the use of the conjunction ‘or’ testifi es to a sedimented history that binds animals to slaves. Europe’s prehistorical animal- slave practices are what will be later exported out to the colonies in the establishment of human slave plantations. If, as Cary Wolfe contends, ‘the practices of modern biopolitics forged themselves in the common subjection and management of the “factical existence” of both humans and animals – not in the least, in the practices and disciplines of breeding, eugenics, and high- effi ciency killing’ 33 – then the co- articulation between the animal farm and the slave plantation offers another historical dimension of the biopolitical formation of power.

### 2ac human knowledge

#### While their knowledge production may be counter-hegemonic, as an academic politics it still relies on the concept of a knowing subject who is by definition human—this failure to critically interrogate the schema of the human reproduces speciesism and causes academic cooption of their struggle by pre-existing neoliberal forces

**Wolfe 9**—Bruce and Elizabeth Dunlevie Professor of English at Rice University

(Cary, “Human, All Too Human: “Animal Studies” and the Humanities”, PMLA, Volume 124, Number 2, March 2009, pp. 564–575 (12), dml)

Such a genealogy, appealing as it is, ought to give us pause, however, for at least a couple of reasons that have to do with the overly rapid adoption of the cultural studies template for animal studies. The rubrics animal studies and human-animal studies are both problematic, I think, in the light of the fundamental challenge that animal studies poses to the disciplinarity of the humanities and cultural studies. In my view, the questions that occupy animal studies can be addressed adequately only if we confront them on two levels: not just the level of content, thematics, and the object of knowledge (the animal studied by animal studies) but also the level of theoretical and methodological approach (how animal studies studies the animal). To put it bluntly, just because we study nonhuman animals does not mean that we are not continuing to be humanist—and therefore, by definition, anthropocentric. Indeed, one of the hallmarks of humanism—and more specifically of the kind of humanism called liberalism—is precisely its penchant for the sort of “pluralism” that extends the sphere of consideration (intellectual or ethical) to previously marginalized groups without in the least destabilizing or throwing into question the schema of the human who undertakes such pluralization. And in that event pluralism becomes incorporation, and the projects of humanism (intellectually) and liberalism (politically) are extended—indeed, extended in a rather classic sort of way.

In piggybacking on the cultural studies template (if you’ll allow the phrase in this context), animal studies too readily takes on itself some of the problems that have made cultural studies a matter of diminishing returns for many scholars. Ellen Rooney, for example, has observed that cultural studies is “perhaps even more intractably caught than literary criticism in the dilemma of defining its own proper form”; it is “a welter of competing (and even incompatible) methods, and a (quasi-)disciplinary form increasingly difficult to defend, intellectually or politically” (21). Even more pointedly, Tilottama Rajan has argued that this “dereferentialization” and “inclusive vagueness” has allowed much of cultural studies to be appropriated for the ideological work of the neoliberal order, in which capitalist globalization gets repackaged as pluralism and attention to difference (69). As “a soft-sell for, and a personalization of, the social sciences” (74), she writes, the effect if not the aim of cultural studies in the humanities “is to simulate the preservation of civil society after the permutation of the classical public sphere” into an essentially market and consumerist logic of “representation” (69–70). For my purposes here, the problem, in other words, is not just the disciplinary incoherence or vagueness of current modes of cultural studies; the problem is that that incoherence or vagueness serves to maintain a certain historically, ideologically, and intellectually specific form of subjectivity while masking it as pluralism—including (in this case) pluralism extended to nonhuman animals. In this light, animal studies, if taken seriously, would not so much extend or refine a certain mode of cultural studies as bring it to an end.5

This is so because animal studies, if it is to be something other than a mere thematics, fundamentally challenges the schema of the knowing subject and its anthropocentric underpinnings sustained and reproduced in the current disciplinary protocols of cultural studies (not to mention literary studies). (Indeed, as Susan McHugh notes in her overview of literary scholarship on animals, “a systematic approach to reading animals in literature necessarily involves coming to terms with a discipline that in many ways appears organized by the studied avoidance of just such questioning.”) For Rooney and Rajan—many others could be added to the list—the problem with cultural studies, at least in its hegemonic modes of practice in North America, is that despite its apparent oppositional, materialist, and multicultural commitments, it ends up reproducing an ideologically familiar mode of subjectivity based, philosophically and politically, on the canons of liberal humanism (whose most familiar expression would be the extension of the juridical subject of “rights” from the human to the animal sphere).6 The full force of animal studies, then, resides in its power to remind us that it is not enough to reread and reinterpret—from a safe ontological distance, as it were—the relation of metaphor and species difference, the cross-pollination of speciesist, sexist, and racist discursive structures in literature, and so on. That undertaking is no doubt praiseworthy and long overdue, but as long as it leaves unquestioned the humanist schema of the knowing subject who undertakes such a reading, then it sustains the very humanism and anthropocentrism that animal studies sets out to question. And this is why, if taken seriously, animal studies ought not to be viewed as simply the latest flavor of the month of what James Chandler calls the “subdisciplinary field,” one of “a whole array of academic fields and practices” that since the 1970s “have come to be called studies: gender studies, race studies, and cultural studies, of course, but also film studies, media studies, jazz studies . . .”—the list is virtually endless (358).7

### 2ac white privilege

#### The only reason that meat is more readily available is due to anthropocentric practices. Even if they were to win it is privileged, that does not justify an abandonment of our moral ideals. Their argument can only make sense in an anthropocentric lens

Bailey 7 – Professor and Chair of Philosophy at Minnesota State University-Mankato (Cathryn, “We Are What We Eat: Feminist Vegetarianism and the Reproduction of Racial Identity” Hypatia 22.2 39-59

One of the problems with George's argument in Animal, Vegetable, or Woman? and in a 1994 article that received much criticism, is that many, if not all, of the reasons she cites for why vegetarianism may be out of reach for many poor women is precisely a result of the patriarchal system that devalues women and animals in the first place. It is not a randomly produced feature of the world that women and children make up the greatest poverty class or that the health of women and children is especially precarious. Nor is it an accident that "animal protein" in the form of cheap lunchmeat or fast food is often more readily available than vegetables in the United States. From the point of view of feminist ethical vegetarianism, these conditions result from the very racism, sexism, classism, and anthropocentrism that is being challenged. As Greta Gaard and Lori Gruen have pointed out, "What she [George] ignores is the well-known fact that, around the world, it is the men and boys who eat the first and most foods, while the girls and women eat last and least" (1996, 236). Moreover, moral ideals need not themselves be thought of as discriminatory or elitist in the ways George has suggested, despite the fact that, in some sense, exemplifying moral virtue may often be tied to some kind of privilege. Consider, for example, the poor mother who is paid to be complicit with fascist torturers. Certainly, resisting participating in such a moral atrocity is more difficult for her than for many others, but we do not thereby abandon the moral ideal of avoiding aiding and abetting torturers. We might be more understanding of her participation, but we should not use it as a basis for abandoning the moral ideal. George's suggestion that nearly all ethical vegetarians are moral elitists, however, threatens to slide into moral condescension, as if there ought to be a multiple-tier, separate-but-equal system of moral ideals. Not incidentally, George's suggestion that feminist vegetarianism is classist and ethnocentric ignores the fact that "most non-Western diets are largely vegetarian (perhaps by virtue of necessity): consider Chinese, Indian, and African traditional cuisines. If anything, it is meat-eating that is a Western norm that 'development' has imposed upon non-Western nations" (Donovan 1995, 227). Ironically, George's position erases the number of poor women who are vegetarians by ethical choice, revealing the hidden privileged perspective that serves the edifice of her argument. Often vegetarianism has been caricatured as epitomizing petty moral privilege, with the self-appointed morally empowered vegetarian depicted as lording it over others. As one character criticizes the vegetarian in Coetzee's novel, "It's nothing but a power-game. Her great hero Franz Kafka played the same game with his family. He refused to eat this, he refused to eat that, he would rather starve, he said. Soon everyone was feeling guilty about eating in front of him, and he could sit back feeling virtuous" (1999, 68). Similarly, George objects, ethical vegetarianism assumes that "a single definable class of persons is designated as better than—more morally virtuous than—all others simply because of its physiology and power" (2000, 2). What I suspect lurks below the surface of George's critique is the worry that ethical vegetarianism is somehow antihumanism (antiwomanism), that one must choose between animals and humans. As Donovan argues in the introduction to her co-edited book, it is a familiar strategy: "Just as feminists were charged with man-hating when we began to channel our energies and our theorizing to women's needs and experiences, animal activists now stand accused of people hating" (Donovan and Adams 1996, 4). Here, too, there is the suggestion that one cannot be both for poor women and children and for animal welfare. The response of the New Haven Register to the PETA exhibit described above further illustrates the point: "If you care about animals more than people, the comparison [in the PETA exhibit described above] may seem apt. . . . There is little common ground for agreement if PETA sees the slaughter of livestock for food as the same as the lynching of blacks or the extermination of millions of people in Europe" (quoted in Christie 2005). Not only is this analysis a speciesist objection to the comparison but it also implies that one who takes animals seriously is ipso facto demonstrating a failure to take humanity seriously; by George's parallel account, a feminist who takes animals seriously is failing to take women seriously. With respect to ethical vegetarianism, I think it is clear that such a divide-and-conquer strategy only works if one accepts the racist, sexist, classist terms of the discussion. Part of what is required to understand some of the resistance to vegetarianism is to appreciate the logic that undergirds it. We should not, of course, automatically dismiss those who resist vegetarianism as insensitive dupes. To that end, it helps to appreciate that whether one is a meat eater or a vegetarian would not carry such visceral moral and emotional impact if it were not experienced as deeply entwined with the production and reproduction of identity. That our identities are so constituted is not a neutral or inalterable fact, however. The perpetuation of the patriarchy depends, in part, on the fact that we understand our racial, gendered, and sexual selves as contingent upon eating practices in the ways described above. Only then can vegetarianism be used as a wedge to divide people along racial, sexual, or class lines. A context-sensitive feminist vegetarianism with a deep critique of the knotted relationship between racism, sexism, and anthropocentrism offers great promise. Certainly, no viable feminist vegetarianism can proceed without attempting to understand and dismantle such connections. As I have argued, this is so not only because of the complex ways that the philosophical ideas have been twisted and bound together, but also for practical reasons. As it stands now, many people still do not wish to be associated with the animal welfare and vegetarian movements. If white Western feminist vegetarians, even well meaning ones, overlook or trivialize the historical and conceptual ties between racism and anthropocentrism by failing to appreciate the connections between eating practices and racial identity, feminist ethical vegetarianism will be stalled at the class and color lines. However, we should not concede that ethical vegetarianism is an intrinsically racist, classist, or colonialist endeavor because doing so effectively allows the continued masking of the ways in which racism, classism, and imperialism have created foodways privileging the global elite. It also serves to divide and isolate the most oppressed, limiting human animals with respect to their ethical agency and access to quality food and leaving nonhuman animals where, for most of us, they have been all along—on our plates.

### 2ac impact

#### And the desire to distance species war from conventional conceptions of violence is the problem. Every day, 27 animals are slaughtered. Every year, 45 billion; the war against the nonhuman is an unending form of exploitation that will guarantee planetary extinction

Best 7 – Associate Professor at the University of Texas in the Department of Humanities and Philosophy (Steven, “Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust, by Charles Patterson” *Journal for Critical Animal Studies*, <http://www.criticalanimalstudies.org/JCAS/Journal_Articles_download/Issue_7/bestpatterson.pdf>)

Too many people with pretences to ethics, compassion, decency, justice, love, and other stellar values of humanity at its finest resist the profound analogies between animal and human slavery and animal and human holocausts, in order to devalue or trivialize animal suffering and avoid the responsibility of the weighty moral issues confronting them. The moral myopia of humanism is blatantly evident when people who have been victimized by violence and oppression decry the fact that they “were treated like animals” – as if it is acceptable to brutalize animal, but not humans. If there is a salient disanalogy or discontinuity between the tyrannical pogroms launched against animals and humans, it lies not in the fallacious assumption that animals do not suffer physical and mental pain similar to humans, but rather that animals suffer more than humans, both quantitatively (the intensity of their torture, such as they endure in fur farms, factory farms, and experimental laboratories) and qualitatively (the number of those who suffer and die). And while few oppressed human groups lack moral backing, sometimes on an international scale, one finds not mass solidarity with animals but rather mass consumption of them. As another Nobel Prize writer in Literature, South African novelist writer J. M. Coetzee, forcefully stated: “Let me say it openly: we are surrounded by an enterprise of degradation, cruelty, and killing which rivals anything the Third Reich was capable of, indeed dwarfs it, in that ours is an enterprise without end, self-regenerating, bringing rabbits, rats, poultry, livestock ceaselessly into the world for the purpose of killing them.”37 Every year, throughout the world, over 45 billion farmed animals currently are killed for food consumption.38 This staggering number is nearly eight times the present human population. In the US alone, over 10 billion animals are killed each year for food consumption – 27 million each day, nearly 19,000 per minute. Of the 10 billion land animals killed each year in the US, over 9 billion are chickens; every day in the US, 23 million chickens are killed for human consumption, 269 per second. In addition to the billions of land animals consumed, humans also kill and consume 85 billion marine animals (17 billion in the US).39 Billions more animals die in the name of science, entertainment, sport, or fashion (i.e., the leather, fur, and wool industries), or on highways as victims of cars and trucks. Moreover, ever more animal species vanish from the earth as we enter the sixth great extinction crisis in the planet’s history, this one caused by human not natural events, the last one occurring 65 million years ago with the demise of the dinosaurs and 90% of all species on the planet. It is thus appropriate to recall the saying by English clergyman and writer, William Ralph Inge, to the effect that: "We have enslaved the rest of the animal creation, and have treated our distant cousins in fur and feathers so badly that beyond doubt, if they were able to formulate a religion, they would depict the Devil in human form."

The construction of industrial stockyards, the total objectification of nonhuman animals, and the mechanized murder of innocent beings should have sounded a loud warning to humanity that such a process might one day be applied to them, as it was in Nazi Germany. If humans had not exploited animals, moreover, they might not have exploited humans, or, at the very least, they would not have had handy conceptual models and technologies for enforcing domination over others. “A better understanding of these connections,” Patterson states, “should help make our planet a more humane and livable place for all of us – people and animals alike, A new awareness is essential for the survival of our endangered planet.”40

### 2ac philosophical animism

#### Philosophical animism doesn’t link to anything

**Rose 13** – Environmental Humanities Program, University of New South Wales, is a Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia, and a founding co-editor of Environmental Humanities. Recent books include Wild Dog Dreaming: Love and Extinction (2011, University of Virginia Press), the re-released second edition of Country of the Heart: An Indigenous Australian Homeland (2011), and the third edition of the prize-winning ethnography Dingo Makes Us Human (2009) (Deborah Bird. “Val Plumwood’s Philosophical Animism: attentive interactions in the sentient world” Environmental Humanities)

Val was a significant thinker in philosophical debates about ethical relationships between humans and nonhumans not only for what she offered, but for how she side-stepped many approaches that may be defensible through logic but that do not lead us into ways of opening ourselves to an ethical involvement with our earth others. Her aim was to open ethics for action, not to offer further iterations of abstract analysis of the logic of ethics.

Most of her argument was laid out extensively in *Environmental Culture*. Here she put forward an interspecies ethic of recognition which depended on a particular stance toward the nonhuman world. That is, she was not making a set of truth claims about the world, but rather was asking what kind of stance a human can take that will open her to a responsive engagement in relation to nonhuman others. Her answer was that to recognise “earth others as fellow agents and narrative subjects is crucial for all ethical, collaborative, communicative and mutualistic projects, as well as for place sensitivity.”17 One effect of opening one’s self, as human, would be to dispel the myth of mindlessness, not through a logical account of mind, but through the experience of being one amongst many in a world already replete with mindfulness. In opening one’s self to others as communicative beings, one places one’s self in a position of being able to experience communication. She saw this as a step toward a post- Cartesian reconstruction of mind.18 It would recognise intentionality, and it would include communication, exchange, and agency.19

One of the things that is so remarkable about Val’s approach to ethics is that it avoids all those abstract questions of who or what is morally considerable, and what may be meant by that. Rather than querying others, it asks the human to query herself, and it seeks to open the human to the experience of others in the contexts of their own communicative and expressive lives. Here, as elsewhere, she was concerned with paths (toward others) rather than answers (about others). An approach that starts with recognition of expression is a ‘gateway’ through which we can find ourselves encountering the force of the fact “that the larger-than-human world counts for something in its own terms as well as in terms of our relationship to it.”20

This gateway (or ‘door’ as she described it in her definition of what philosophical animism does), entails interspecies communication. 21 Here again, she is not defining communication in strictly human terms; there is no suggestion that other creatures sit around debating philosophy, but she is asserting that as other creatures live their lives, so they communicate aspects of themselves. Amidst all this communication, one finds one’s self encountering expressiveness and mindfulness within the world of life.22 And amidst all this mindfulness, there arises a dialogical concept of self for both the human and for others.23

In sum, Plumwood’s philosophical animism “opens the door to a world in which we can begin to negotiate life membership of an ecological community of kindred beings.”24 Her use of the term ‘kindred’ means beings with whom we are kin; she was claiming an earth kindred, or kinship amongst those she called earth others. We tend to think of kinfolk as organic beings, but Val was open even to thinking about kinship with stones and other inorganic ‘beings.’25

# 1AR

### 1ar cultural relativism

#### **This argument relies on an anthropocentric hierarchy, the affirmative takes a stance against the marginalization of the nonhuman which relies on the same logic as the marginalization of any marginalized human body. To argue that we cannot reject animal exploitation because it is part of another group’s culture justifies defending slavery as a part of American culture**

TVL 11—This Vegan Life (2/15/11, “On Animal Rights, Racism and Elitism,” http://www.thisveganlife.org/on-animal-rights-racism-and-elitism/, RBatra)

As I see it, defending animal exploitation on the basis of tradition makes as much sense as defending American slavery as a tradition of colonists, or defending the oppression of women as a tradition of men. Just because something is a tradition doesn’t make it ethical or desirable.

“Issues of justice are issues of justice, ” remarks Gary Francione in Ms. Fox’s article. “And, as a matter of fundamental justice, we cannot morally justify animal use, however ‘humane.’ We ought, of course, always to endeavor to present issues of justice in a way that is culturally sensitive and not racist. But there are some who think that promoting the position that we cannot justify any animal use is inherently racist or culturally insensitive.” He continues:

Those in this group beg the question and assume that speciesism is justified. That is, their position amounts to the view that it is racist or culturally insensitive to seek to protect the interests of another marginalized and particularly vulnerable group, nonhuman animals. I would imagine that most of those who have this view would not object if the marginalized beings were other humans. But this is just another way of asserting human supremacy and exceptionalism. I find that as objectionable as asserting racial supremacy.

We can try to educate people who have this view, and we should do so. But in the end, if the choice is between maintaining an abolitionist position or not doing so in order to appease speciesism and human exceptionalism presented as cultural sensitivity or non-racism, I refuse to appease. I am sincerely sorry if my views offend anyone but throughout human history, there has not been an idea that has not offended someone.

Ms. Fox also quotes Francione as rejecting the charge of racism leveled at those who promote ethical veganism:

Racism is failing to include people as full members of the moral/legal community on the basis of race. How is taking the reasoned position that exploiting nonhumans cannot be morally justified racist?” he queries. “The only way that it can be racist is if the concept of a ‘person’ in ‘person of color’ includes a protected interest in exploiting nonhumans. As I said earlier, that begs the fundamental moral question in favor of human exceptionalism.

And on the presumption that veganism is elitist, he says:

I find the notion that a diet that rejects violence is elitist is bizarre. There is nothing more elitist – and I mean nothing – than the notion that it is morally acceptable to impose suffering and death on a sentient being because you like the taste.

It is true that there is a market for expensive, processed vegan foods. But so what? That does not make a vegan diet inherently elitist any more than a market for people who can buy designer clothes makes wearing clothes inherently elitist.

It remains incomprehensible to me how many people involved in other social justice work cannot see the connections between racism, classism, sexism and speciesism. As Nekeisha Alexis-Baker has so eloquently noted:

The same ideology that supports speciesism is present in ideologies that encourage and justify sexism and racism…As a black woman who is vegan, I am particularly sensitive to the ways in which forms of exploitation are intertwined… So rather than being concerned with animal liberation or women’s liberation or black and other people of color’s liberation, I think we need to understand how they are all tied together and to know that we can’t free one group if we allow the same kinds of oppressive ideologies to enslave another group. Liberation has to come for all.