# Round 3—Aff vs UMN CE

## 1AC

### nukes 1ac

#### We’ll set the stage with a quote from Stanley Kubrick’s *Doctor Strangelove*—

He [Clemenceau] said war was too important to be left to the generals. When he said that, 50 years ago, he might have been right. But today, war is too important to be left to politicians. They have neither the time, the training, nor the inclination for strategic thought.

#### 50 years later, General Jack D. Ripper’s words still hold weight within contemporary nuclear politics. Listening to our military officials, one might get the idea that nuclear decisionmaking is too important to be left to public deliberation—it instead is characterized by the centralization of classified information within a unitary executive and its subordinates.

#### This regime of secrecy demands further investigation. The nuclear presidency is directly threatened by the potential of dissensus to undermine its authority and thus establishes rhetorical conditions that foreclose democratic deliberation. Any counter-hegemonic approach must begin from that moment of rhetorical and deliberative closure—any other strategy keeps nuclear policy in the hands of elites.

**Taylor 7**—University of Colorado-Boulder

(Bryan, “‘The Means to Match Their Hatred’: Nuclear Weapons, Rhetorical Democracy, and Presidential Discourse”, Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 4, Shadows of Democracy in Presidential Rhetoric (Dec., 2007), pp. 667-692, dml)

Liberal scholars and other commentators who assess the relationship between nuclear weapons and democracy balance cynicism and optimism (see, for example, Falk 1982; Mitchell 2000; Peterson 2007). Their tone frequently evokes the morbid genres of diagnosis, autopsy, and obituary, but their grieving, condemnation, and pleading also seek a healing—if not outright resurrection—of the nuclear-democratic body. This activity typically **grows more active during periods of nuclear instability**, **in which possibilities for** reconfiguring the relationship **between nuclear officials and citizens are at least temporarily opened**. During the late Cold War and post-Cold War periods, then, several speakers addressed this relationship in the context of extraordinary changes in international politics (Deudney 1995; Falk 1982; Rosen 1989; Rosow 1989; Stegenga 1988). Collectively, these speakers considered how institutions sediment around the artifact of nuclear weapons and how that process yields rhetoric that **undermines the possibility of robust democratic speech**.

To varying degrees, these critiques all **assert a** fundamental incompatibility **between nuclear weapons and the ideals of the democratic state**. They argue that oppres sive conditions surrounding the development of nuclear weapons **subvert the capabilities of citizens to** acquire**,** deliberate**, and** act **on information concerning nuclear policy**. As a result, the nuclear public is characterized as fragmented, alienated, uninformed, **and unable to participate in deliberation with** forceful **and** reasoned **discourse**. Commonly listed elements in this indictment include: **an** official regime of secrecy **which** suppresses **and** distorts **nuclear information**; official cultivation of a climate of permanent emergency that **promotes public inertia and** acquiescence to authoritarian rule; undue deference **by** nominal agents of **congressional oversight** to the interests of military elites and corporate defense contractors; a timid and amnesiac news media; and official **demonization** of anti-nuclear dissent as extreme, irrelevant, and unpatriotic (Rosen 1989). "This long train of official lies," argues James Stegenga (1988, 89), "**has made truly informed consent** an impossibility" (emphasis in original).

These critiques grow more valuable as they conceptualize **the relationships between rhetoric, democracy, and nuclear weapons**. One provocative claim here addresses how, under conditions of MAD, all aspects of postwar American society were enrolled in the semiotic project of signifying to the Communist enemy both capability and willingness to use nuclear weapons in the national defense. Rhetorical scholars have largely failed to appreciate how, under these conditions, **the demos itself** was conscripted and disciplined as an element in this apparatus:

The continuous task of the president **and his subordinates is to make their essentially incredible threats seem credible**. So leaders have wanted to present themselves as **speaking forcefully on behalf of a** monolithically supportive **American population**. Naysayers needed to be discouraged, **the democratic debate on these matters** minimized**,** in the interest of promoting the credibility of the threats. The people are meant or **supposed to** avoid **thinking about or speaking out on these matters**. (Stegenga 1988, 89, emphasis in original; see also Bok 1989)

Clarifying this condition **helps us to conceptualize nuclear weapons as** an ontological tangle **of discursive and material phenomena**. It also establishes that—far from being a mere adornment of policy language—**rhetoric is an** inherent**,** inevitable**, and** reflexive **challenge for the nuclear nation-state**. Official rhetoric, in other words, must be developed and deployed in tandem with nuclear weapons to ensure that the whispers, conversation, and shouts of the people **do not subvert the** principal—and, according to Jacques Derrida's (1984) famous critique, sole—**function of those weapons as** rhetoric**.**

This interdependency between security and rhetoric is further clarified in argu ments conceptualizing nuclear weapons as a legitimation crisis for the liberal-democratic nation-state (Deudney 1995, 209). Rosow (1989) argues that **traditional conceptualization of nuclear deterrence as a strategic issue** obscures its status as **"**a system of social relations**"** (564). In adopting this alternate perspective, Rosow argues, **we may** reclaim **nuclear weapons from official discourses** that have sheared off from their necessary grounding in—and authorization by—the discourses of the nuclear life world: "[Strate gic] debate **scarcely touches on the experience of nuclear deterrence as a cultural and political-economic production**. . . . **The result is a** serious discontinuitybetween the claims on which the validity of nuclear policy rests . . . and the actual effects of nuclear deterrence on the material well-being and consciousness in the advanced capitalist West" (564). Rosow's argument establishes the democratic status of nuclear weapons as a rhetorical problem: he conceptualizes nuclear deterrence as a discourse composed of "interpretive claims" and imperative expressions and theorizes its mediation of both institutional structures and forms of identity. Viewed in this light, we can recognize how, as artifacts, **nuclear weapons clarify a** fundamental contradiction **between their destructive potential and their legitimating cultural discourses**: "The same forces that are to produce peace and prosperity, i.e., science, knowledge, rationality, **also produce the tools for destroying the very civilization they are designed to protect** and whose values and future they embody." Richard Falk (1982, 9) has suggested the implications of this condition for a nuclear-rhetorical democracy: "Normative opposition to nuclear weapons or doctrines inevitably draws into question **the legitimacy of state power and is**, therefore, more threatening to governmental process **than a mere debate about the property of nuclear weapons as instruments of statecraft**." As a result, Rosow concludes, changes in nuclear policy may exacerbate inherent conflict between "the [cultural] consciousness of democratic citizenship" and the legitimacy of the state (1989, 581). As the state increas ingly rests its security on weapons systems **requiring centralized control and automated decision making, it becomes** increasingly difficult **to assert that the legitimacy of those weapons arises from authentic popular consent**. Fault lines in this hegemony **are opened when public rhetoric informs Americans about the international consequences of nuclear imperialism** and encourages their identification with negatively affected groups. In the post-Cold War era, Rosow predicted, it will become increasingly difficult for the state to normalize nuclear weapons as a familiar and legitimate icon.

#### This has been mirrored in debate where the strategic disadvantage of reading a nuclear aff due to topicality evidence written by nuclear elites functions as a form of censorship to deny the intimate relationship between nuclear rhetoric and executive power—refuse this nuclear elitism

**Taylor 7**—University of Colorado-Boulder

(Bryan, “‘The Means to Match Their Hatred’: Nuclear Weapons, Rhetorical Democracy, and Presidential Discourse”, Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 4, Shadows of Democracy in Presidential Rhetoric (Dec., 2007), pp. 667-692, dml)

First, there is general agreement that nuclear weapons constitute the extreme case of secrecy in that regime (Bok 1989; Hudson 2004; Kinsella 2005). Nuclear weapons are not only a highly cherished and protected technology but **are also** the impetus **for** policies **and** procedures **that restrict the circulation of information necessary for adequate deliberation** by the public and elected officials. Here, classification and censorship buffer nuclear elites **from democratic oversight and** inhibit their accountabilityfor neglect, mistakes, fraud, and abuse.

Secrecy is arguably inherent to nuclear weapons. A wartime climate of urgency led to their covert development, and thus their introduction to the American public as a fait accompli, rather than a potential innovation requiring collective authorization of its development. Bok (1989) has argued that this secrecy **both isolated and empowered early nuclear elites**, investing them with a grave sense of professional responsibility. This structure of feeling, however, can easily shade into presumptuous entitlement. Coercive regimes of secrecy, Bok (1989) notes, also enabled Manhattan Project workers to mini mize and suppress doubts about the morality of their work and to accommodate strategic redefinition by officials of its purpose (see also Hales 1997).

Secrecy can thus **debilitate the reasoning and moral judgment of nuclear-political actors**. Institutionalized as a postwar tradition, **it has also** constrained nuclear deliberation **by facilitating** a regime of authoritarian rule (Kinsella 2005, 61). This regime is rife with irony and paradox. **It is**, for example, self-perpetuating: secrecy **limits public knowledge** of nuclear matters, and this limitation is in turn **used to justify excluding an "uninformed" public from subsequent deliberation**. Additionally, "national security" is commonly invoked to discourage public debate of nuclear policy on the assumption that such debate might damage national security itself. As discussed above, however, the symptomatic concern with "revealing secrets" discloses larger official unease with democracy's potential to subvert the necessary supporting role that public discourse itself plays in the apparatus of deterrence. This condition **makes nuclear officials** highly anxious **about the potential for oppositional discourse to create national vulnerability and to subvert their autonomy**. Far from being the ground of authority, **the public is rhetorically conceptualized and managed as** an unpredictable threat **to the stability of nuclear order** (Tannenwald 1999). Further, declared nuclear secrets are often already more publicized, and the actual effects of their disclosure less significant, than officials concede. In this way, the nuclear "secret" is less an objective, preexisting referent of security discourse than **a symbolic resource to be strategically invoked in institutional practices that produce desired effects** (see Masco 2002; Taylor 2002). Finally, notes Howard Morland (2000,54), "One of the most pernicious effects of secrecy is to cause nuclear weapons to be overvalued. . . . The United States encourages the world to copy its free market economy and its democratic institutions, but **it quakes in fear that 'rogue' nations might copy** a tenth of one percent **of its nuclear arsenal**." I will explore below the implications of Morland's claim; its relevance here involves the role of secrecy in fueling the political fetish of weaponry.

Second, as this discussion of secrecy has introduced, nuclear weapons exemplify **centralization as a condition which** limits the range of voices **in deliberation** of U.S. foreign policy and military strategy. Under this condition, "**democratic procedures are said to be** too cumbersome **for the** swiftness **and** decisiveness **required for . . . [such] decision making**" (Hudson 2004, 299). This condition is exacerbated by secrecy in that **only elites with restricted access to information are deemed responsible for nuclear decisions**. It is also intensified by the tremendously high stakes created by the destructive power of nuclear weapons and the strategic imperatives of MAD. These conditions **drastically shorten decision-making windows** in attack situations and require careful maintenance of the balance between centralized control and the predelegation of launch authority. Indeed, the risk posed by unsecured nuclear weapons has led technology scholar Langdon Winner (1980) to argue that they inherently require rigid and hierarchical institutions of governance. These systems "must be authoritarian: there is no other way" (131). Indeed, democratic states must labor to ensure that **this authoritarianism does not "spin off or** spill over into the polity as a whole" (131). As a result, Winner concludes, the democratic hopes of anti-nuclear activists are "dead wrong" (135).

This is a rhetorical matter in that centralization has historically been produced and maintained through **a discourse of nuclear "guardianship"** that shadows the more benevolent image of nuclear control as "stewardship" (Taylor and Hendry 2006; Taylor 2007). Historically, this image arises from a logical entailment constructed in nuclear discourse between the sublime "mystery" of nuclear phenomena and **the** quasi-theological authority **of officials charged with their understanding and control** (Kinsella 2005). More specifically, it has been developed in accounts of the tense relationship between civilian and military systems of control of U.S. nuclear weapons (Born 2006; Feaver 1992; Nolan 1989). Commenting on the political debate that culminated in the 1946 passage of the Atomic Energy Act, for example, Bazerman (2001, 267) notes, "At no point, interest ingly, **did the definition of civilian control [ever]** seriously includethe actual voting citizenry of the United States or other nations, nor did the issue of access to information This become framed in relation to general public access." And even in the relatively open system of postwar American democracy, note Dalton et al. (1999, 12), "a corporate culture [of nuclear weapons production] was created in which **a broader public accountability was** systematically de-emphasized **from the top down**."

Dahl (1985) argues that guardianship has been **the de facto system** of U.S. nuclear governance in the Cold War era. In this system, a minority of technocratic and military elites contrasts their expert knowledge and patriotic commitment with that of the general citizenry. Because these elites control the ideological terms on which that contrast is performed, **they are able to conclude that the needs of citizens are best served by** the elites' exclusive control of decisions concerning nuclear security and risk. In presuming that citizens are inherently unqualified to participate in arcane matters of nuclear gov ernance, and in perpetuating conditions of secrecy to inhibit that participation, **guardianship is both** anti-democratic **and** autonomous. It fosters an authoritative "priesthood" culture among nuclear professionals, in which their sense of entitlement **protects them from inconvenient challenges raised by popular voice**. In the discourse of guardianship, formal responsibility for and custody of nuclear weapons are infused with a solemn morality (Taylor 2007, 205).

The implications of this condition for nuclear democracy generally—**and constitutional constraints on presidential war powers, specifically**—are quite serious. The president is believed to be **the only one who can authorize the launch of nuclear weapons** and is commonly viewed as having the right to do so under conditions of attack. Although he is required to discuss options with advisors before transmitting his decision (and launch command codes) to military commanders, the president also has the right to predelegate launch authority to those commanders (Born 2006, 26-27). This right has been exercised throughout the Cold War in periods of crisis, and historians have demonstrated that those commanders have subsequently exercised their operational autonomy in ways that undermine declared policies (Nolan 1989; Rosenberg 1983). Additionally, Falk notes (1982, 3), "Political leaders in the United States have failed throughout the nuclear age to consult with, or disclose to, the public the occasions on which the use of nuclear weapons was seriously contemplated." This situation has created **a frightening and** largely unacknowledged **gap** between official policies of nuclear control and actual military practices **that has** heightened nuclear risk and created an ongoing mystery regarding whether and how the ideals of democratic rule are preserved in moments of crisis. Throughout the Cold War, **this problem plagued demophobic Realists** who feared on the one hand that "excessive [nuclear] power in the hands of an aroused or angry citizenry could lead to more than political upheaval and revolution; it **could lead to annihilation**" (Rosenthal 1991, 123) and, on the other, that near-disasters such as the 1962 Cuban missile crisis demonstrated an unacceptable level of risk created by nuclear elites. For philosopher Elaine Scarry (1990), **the problem of centralization is** fundamentally moral: the semi automated status of nuclear weapons subverts a requirement of democratic rule that bodies which may be destroyed in war must have the opportunity to consent to their conscription and deployment.

#### A failure to challenge this centralization of knowledge within the bureaucracy both within and outside debate is disastrous—this consensus implicitly displaces decisionmaking into the hands of elites—this makes nuclear warfare inevitable

**Schiappa 3**—Department Chair of Communication Studies at the University of Minnesota

(Edward, *Defining Reality: Definitions and the Politics of Meaning* pg 138-139, dml)

Farrell and Goodnight have suggested that the status of deliberative argument is constrained by “prevailing conceptions of the public” (1981, 299). It is clear that with regard to nuclear issues, the public has been and still is conceived **as a crowd to be calmed rather than** co-creators of public policy (cf. Park 1972). Demonstrating that the relationship between language and public attitudes has been recognized almost from the start, the 1950 book How to Survive an Atomic Bomb laments the fact that people have been scared by the words “radiation” and “radioactivity” and condemns the “loose talk” about the atomic bomb and the “rays” it makes (Gerstell 1950, 22). The public’s fears concerning atomic war in the early 1950s are well known. Accordingly, it is hard to believe that it was an accident that in 1953 the Atomic Energy Commission named measured amounts of radiation as “Sunshine Units” (Hilgartner, Bell, and O’Connor 1982, 219). During the development and testing of the hydrogen bomb, President Dwight D. Eisenhower reportedly suggested to the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission in May of 1953 that “we leave ‘thermonuclear’ out of press releases and speeches. Also ‘fusion’ and hydrogen.’” Eisenhower was reported to have said, “[K]eep them confused as to ‘fission’ and ‘fusion’” (U.S. Congress 1979, 151). Domestication of nuclear issues renders them accessible to the public, but in a trivial manner. **There is no need to deliberate over that which is not a problem or threat**. **Bureaucratization of nuclear issues** insulates them **from public inspection and critical appraisal**; indeed, as rhetorical critic Rebecca S. Bjork notes, technological issues “are shielded from public debate **due to the** cult of expertise surrounding technology, the specialized language of technicians, and the sense of awe and wonder concerning technology” (1992, 116). **The result of nukespeak is a** further decline **in** the public sphere of argumentation. Nukespeak “covertly tends to **quell citizen involvement and decision-making about the nuclear arms race**” (Totten 1984, 44). Maxine Greene, in an essay advocating that peace education be critical of positivism and “technical talk and control,” warned that “danger lies” in **the public’s acceptance of a reality** defined by “official others” (1982, 130). In Greene’s view, failure to critique self-confirming interpretations is disastrous: “The more people are drawn into technical talk and **the belief that some Other has the right to define the world**, the more likely a nuclear war will be” (134).

#### The attempt to render nuclear weapons controllable in the hands of bureaucratic elites is a quixotic task that maintains the possibility of collective nuclear suicide.

Masco 12. Joseph Masco, Professor of Anthropology and of the Social Sciences at the University of Chicago, “The Ends of Ends,” Anthropological Quarterly [Volume 85, Number 4, Fall 2012](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/anthropological_quarterly/toc/anq.85.4.html), pg. 1118

The scale of destruction detailed in sIOP-62 is a distinctive moment in human history and is, in Kant’s strict technical sense of the term, sublime. It is beyond comprehension, which raises a crucial issue about how the nuclear state resolves such terror/complexity. In national security plan- ning, the compensation for this experience of cognitive overload was a fixation on command and control, as well as the articulation of specific war calculations, marking degrees of violence for different nuclear war scenarios (see Kahn 1960, Eden 2004). What would likely be an unknown chaos of missiles and bombs launched for the first time from a vast range of technologies, located all over the planet under deeply varied condi- tions, appears on paper as a rational program of cause and effect, threat and preemption, attack and counter attack. this was an apocalyptic vi- sion presented simply as math. From 1962 until today, the sIOP nuclear war plan has been continually revised and rationalized for different global political contexts but never truly abandoned (McKinzie, cochran, Norris, and Arkin 2001). the US maintains the ability to destroy all major popula- tion centers outside the continental US within a few minutes of nuclear conflict. It is important to recognize that this technical capacity to deliver overwhelming violence to any part of the world in mere minutes has relied on structures of the imagination as well as on machines, threat projec- tions, and fantasies, as well as physics and engineering.

US policymakers have experienced many moments of rupture in their global vision, shocks that might have recalibrated how threat, security, fears, and technology were organized. After U-2 pilot Gary Powers was shot down over the soviet Union in 1960, covert spy flights over the Ussr were stopped, leaving policy makers in the Us with no definitive intelligence on soviet military activities. It is difficult today to imagine a period more fraught, more susceptible to paranoid fantasy and projection, and more primed for nuclear conflict. US policymakers lacked basic information about Soviet society and military capabilities, creating a huge information gap that invited speculation and fantasy, as well as paranoia. In a national security culture rehearsing surprise attack, and negotiating increasing confrontations in Europe, southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America, what could provoke a de-escalation in this nuclear system, which by the early 1960s was already primed for nuclear war on a minute-to-minute basis? the corona system offered a radically new perspective on cold War reali- ties but its role has been historically and culturally limited to revealing the objective facts of soviet nuclear capabilities, not the American fantasies that generated the “missile gap” in the first place.

the corona system was both cutting edge technology and a new form of expressive culture, an early planetary technology mobilized to com- bat official panic. The missed opportunity provided by the first corona photographs was to evaluate the fantasies and paranoia of an American military system that had so thoroughly misjudged the scale of the soviet technological capabilities that preemptive nuclear war was under consid- eration. Instead, the “missile gap” narrative was never publicly retracted, and the satellite photographs that proved this major discourse of the cold War to be false were classified top secret until 1995. Classification pro- tected the technology, but also the self-critique that corona photographs might have generated of official US projections. thus, an opportunity for a public discussion of how national fears are constituted out of a lack of information, fantasy, and political demonology was lost. Instead, a new effort to normalize nuclear crisis was pursued. the Us nuclear stockpile grew to over 30,000 weapons by the end of the 1960s, and space became an increasingly militarized domain. the sIOP target list would continue to grow through the 1980s, eventually including tens of thousands of global targets and constituting a nuclear war system so complex that it is very likely that no single human being understood its internal logics or likely effects. American ideologies of nuclear fear constantly threaten to over- whelm the material evidence of danger, and have become a core part of a now multigenerational commitment to militarism for its own sake. by 2011, the result is that the US spends as much as the rest of the world combined on military matters but has not yet achieved anything like “security.”

The corona system offers us, in Benjamin’s terms, an important oppor- tunity to “brush history against the grain” as it was both a technological marvel—a demonstration of the power of instrumental rationality—and a stark reality check on Us national security culture itself, offering a new optics on the psychopolitics of cold War (Orr 2006). the first photographic survey of the soviet Union from outer space showed that US policymakers took the world to the brink of nuclear war in response to their fantasies of soviet power, not the reality of soviet capabilities. this well documented insight might have produced a fundamental rethinking of how threat, secu- rity, and nuclear power were organized in the Us, establishing a caution- ary tale at the very least. but instead the corona photographs remained a highly classified set of facts through the cold War. this secrecy enabled a system of nuclear normalization to be reinforced rather than interrogated, securing the project of cold War for the next 30 years. In the end, the new optics offered by corona (on both soviet machines and American fanta- sies) were reduced simply to a push for new space technology—higher resolution photographs, better real time transition of data, and so on. In other words, the structure of the security state did not change even when confronted with evidence of its own fantasy projections and error. the “success” of corona ultimately produced an American cold War project even more focused on technological innovation and the projection of nu- clear power rather than one capable of re-thinking its own cultural terms, expert logics, or institutional practices.

The constant slippages between crisis, expertise, and failure are now well established in an American political culture. the cultural history of cold War nuclear crisis helps us understand why. Derrida (1984), work- ing with the long running theoretical discourse on the sublimity of death (which links Kant, Freud, and benjamin), describes the problem of the nuclear age as the impossibility of contemplating the truly “remainderless event” or the “total end of the archive.” For him, nuclear war is “fabulously textual” because until it occurs all you can do is tell stories about it, and because to write about it is to politically engage in a form of future making that assumes a reader, thus performing a kind of counter-militarization and anti-nuclear practice. In the early 1960s, the US nuclear war policy was officially known as “overkill,” referencing the redundant use of hydrogen bombs to destroy targets (rosenberg 1983). This “overkill” installs a new kind of biopower, which fuses an obliteration of the other with collective suicide. the means to an end here constitutes an actual and total end, making the most immediate problem of the nuclear age the problem of dif- ferentiating comprehension from compensation in the minute-to-minute assessment of crisis.

this seems to be a fundamental problem in Us national security cul- ture—an inability to differentiate the capacity for war with the act itself, or alternatively to evaluate the logics of war from inside war. today, space is filled with satellites offering near perfect resolution on the surface of the earth and able to transmit that data with great speed and precision to com- puters and cell phones, as well as early warning systems, missiles, and drones. What we cannot seem to do is find an exterior viewpoint on war itself—a perspective that would allow an assessment not only of the real- ity of conflict but also of the motivations, fantasies, and desires that sup- port and enable it. Indeed expert systems of all sorts—military, economic, political, and industrial—all seem unable to learn from failure and instead in the face of crisis simply retrench and remobilize longstanding and obvi- ously failed logics. War, for example, is not the exception but the norm in the US today—which makes peace “extreme.” so what would it take for Americans to consider not only the means to an end—that is, the tactics, the surges, the preemptions, and surgical strikes—but also to reevaluate war itself? What would it take to consider an actual end to such ends?

#### The President of the United States’ war powers authority over the introduction of nuclear forces into hostilities should be substantially restricted.

#### The 1AC establishes a counter-hegemonic structure of deliberation to check executive excess—the president’s ability to set the terms of debate as inaccessible to the public represents the imposition of an authoritarian telos on the future of nuclear policy—our act of dissensus serves as an irruption of a radically unknown nuclear future into the present—this is critical to correct course from an insulated executive characterized by utter ressentiment

**Glezos 11**—Department of Political Science, University of Victoria

(Simon, “The ticking bomb: Speed, liberalism and ressentiment against the future”, Contemporary Political Theory10.2 (May 2011): 147-165, dml)

The notion of a 'rift in time', and experiences of radical newness, do not just challenge the validity of a particular narrative. Instead they challenge **the very possibility of this kind of teleological narrative** of a mechanical unfolding of time. The awareness of the rift in time which speed brings produces what Rosa calls the ' " de-temporalization of life " where life is no longer planned along a line that stretches from the past into the future' (Rosa, 2003, p. 19). In doing so, the rift functions as an existential threat to a community's self-understanding. Connolly says 'Attention to the rift ... sow(s) anxiety in those who seek closure in ... territorial conceptions of politics and ethical sensibilities' (2002, p. 146). Speed is one of the vectors that can force attention to the rift. And a generalized social acceleration means many more such experiences of speed, and hence more moments of anxiety (Rosa, 2003, p. 19). Speed puts pressure on the universals and implicit teleologies of liberalism and thus challenges its sense of identity. Connolly continues by saying 'When the tempo of life accelerates it now takes more political work to protect the assumption that the identities layered into us conform to a universal model commanded by a god or decreed by nature' (2002, p. 158). This anxiety, **this sense of existential crisis, can crystallize into** what Nietzsche terms ressentiment, a reactive cultural dynamic which is unable to come to terms with a temporality **which seems unresponsive to the demand for universal norms and a teleological narrative of political identity**. This ressentiment against an open future - against an ateleological future - then **expresses itself through an attempt to** impose a telos on the future.

In this context, **the move to** **increasing executive power takes on a new coloring**. I read this shift to governance via executive prerogative not solely as a political maneuver, done for the sake of expediency, but rather as **an existential maneuver**, **to secure an** identity **and a** narrative. In times of crisis says Connolly, there is always a tendency to 'reinstate forcefully authoritative understandings' (p. 146). A unitary executive **is ideally suited to provide** a unitary account **of events**, one that will challenge the collective identity as little as possible, or at the very least, re-establish **the conditions of possibility for a stable narrative and identity**. The executive's right of 'authority' is linked to a duty of 'authorship', to write a new narrative; or rather, to write new events into the old narrative, to make the new gibe with the old, to extend the present into the future.

At this point, one might ask **why can this job not be carried out by the legislative branch**, which is to say by a democratic, pluralistic decision-making body? After all, **under normal conditions this is not viewed as a threat** to the collective narrative and identity. Well, the key term there is 'normal conditions'. Under the everyday functioning of government the historical narrative and identity of the polity are relatively intact and awareness of the rift in time is suppressed. As such debate and negotiation **can be trusted** not to upset the existential apple cart. But in times of crisis, narrative and identity are called into question, and as such **there is** no telling **what sorts of renegotiations might emerge** from democratic debate and what changes might be made to the narratives and identities with which we have become comfortable. And when a generalized social acceleration expands this time of crisis, producing a general existential anxiety, and this anxiety becomes crystallized into a general ressentiment against the future, **a move towards government via** executive fiat **becomes increasingly attractive.**

In the case of liberalism then, what we see is an ideology torn between its democratic ideals, and a temporal narrative which seeks to project these ideals (in the form of a particular political community) into the future. In principle, these two should work together in tandem. But in practice, the rift in time puts the second in jeopardy, and therefore puts the two at odds. In such a situation, the political community is forced to decide **between its ideals or the security of a settled narrative of political identity** (ironically even when that identity is rooted in those same ideals). Thus we are treated to the paradoxical image of, for example, the Bush administration authoring a narrative of advancing freedom, democracy and liberty, **through a campaign premised on** ignoring **the rule of law, and** marginalizing democratic deliberation.

This is not to say that liberalism, or liberal democracies, are inherently doomed to shift away from democracy.3 However, **avoiding this desire to hand over control to a** unitary**,** authoritative **executive means**, in at least someway, learning **to loosen one's attachment to a particular teleological narrative**, and to reaffirm one's commitment **to** **democratic deliberation,** even (or especially) in the face of **an** open **and** uncertain **future**. Such an approach would require the development and reinforcement of a liberalism that is willing to accede to the event, to think in terms of an open future and, in at least some way, to embrace speed. 4

This is by no means an easy task, and requires **the ability to** give up the sense of security **that a stable teleological projection of identity provides**. 'That is why', says Connolly, 'so many queasy democrats want to slow the world down in the name of democracy. They are worn out by the workload imposed upon them' (p. 158). That workload however, is the very thing **that is supposed to be the** central function **of democracy**: the collective production of identity and community. If we are unwilling to accept democracy in the face of an uncertain future, **then we were never truly democrats in the first place**.

What is more, far from being inefficient, this reaffirmation to democracy **can have** potentially positive effectsin terms of legislation. If we return to the discussion of the ticking bomb with which this article begins, we might notice that one of the frequent arguments for the expansion of executive power lies in what John Yoo refers to as **the 'cost of inaction'** (2005, p. x). It is important to note he does not mention a concomitant danger of action; **the danger of acting** too quickly. Indeed, in retrospect, in the case of the Iraq war, we can see that **it would have been exceedingly** desirable **if the 'vetoes of multiple decisionmakers' had been allowed 'to block warmaking**' (p. x). In this case, the political process **would have been** well served **with a touch of inefficiency** (**or rather**, with a touch of more patience **and** thoughtfulness). A willingness to accept the uncertainty and insecurity of the rift in time might also make us **more willing to accept bouts of 'inaction'**, **to allow for additional** debate **and** discussion**, thus hopefully avoiding overreaction and** unnecessary violence.

With this analysis we begin to see that the apparently urgent rush through deliberation is frequently not simply necessitated by the pace of events, but rather **by a** fear **and** ressentiment **over where that deliberation might lead**. **None of this is to** deny **the fact that are not some real 'ticking bombs' in the world** (though none so pure and ideal as the one laid out in the thought experiment). **But they are** few **and** far between. And the idea that they are, universally, incapable of being dealt with through democratic deliberation, **is** by no means **an established fact or a foregone conclusion.**

#### Debate is a uniquely important space for this—the impulse to constrain deliberation within certain rhetorical frames naturalizes the nuclear demophobia at the heart of militaristic policymaking—the impact is endless war—even if they win a nuclear topicality argument, we’ll win our aff is still an important aspect of the topic because nuclear rhetoric is crucial to justify executive power

**Taylor 7**—University of Colorado-Boulder [ableist language modified]

(Bryan, “‘The Means to Match Their Hatred’: Nuclear Weapons, Rhetorical Democracy, and Presidential Discourse”, Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 4, Shadows of Democracy in Presidential Rhetoric (Dec., 2007), pp. 667-692, dml)

Rhetorical scholars thus view speech in democracy as "the medium within which **the** ethical self-government **of autonomous individuals can be articulated** with the imperatives of democratic governance" (Hicks 2002, 224). They reconceptualize ideals of deliberative democracy such as inclusion, equality, and reason to rigorously assess their associated discursive practices. They raise questions about how these practices hail citizens to participate in the democratic process as particular kinds of acting subjects, endow them with a sense of entitlement and agency, mediate their understanding of others' interests and the effects of their actions upon those interests, and develop their ability to not only competently reason together within existing structures **but to** critique **and** transform **those structures to ensure that their limitations as means do not subvert democratic ends** (Cloud 2004, 79)- Of particular concern here is the hegemony in democracy of "reason" as **a framing standard** (i.e., of rationality) and a conventional practice of accountability **that** constrains deliberation **through normalized assumptions** **concerning the** source **and** range **of legitimate support for expression** and the ontological status of political interests in relation to language (Welsh 2002). **In challenging those assumptions**, rhetorical scholars rigorously critique the ethics and politics of self described democratic discourse. They ensure that it **does not** prematurely foreclose **the expression of relevant interests** and that it **encourages their** patient **and** ethical **cultivation** as a resource for innovative transformation of self and other. Finally, rhetorical scholars of democracy oppose corrosive discourse which forecloses the possibility of achieving mutual identification between opponents and thus cooperation.

In his related critique of rhetoric surrounding the global war on terror, Robert Ivie (2005) establishes that the continued degradation of American political culture **stems from long-standing** "demophobia." In this condition, democracy is an ideal that **must be enforced on international others** to preserve essential American interests. Simultaneously, however, **it is viewed as a** threatening source of domestic dissent **and change** that offends the republican and federalist sense of political order. Ivie unflinchingly probes this throbbing paradox in the history of U.S. war making: even as they claim to serve democracy through military adventurism abroad, U.S. officials **consistently distort the interests of their opponents** and ~~cripple~~ [devastate] citizen deliberation. They do so through use of **a "decivilizing" rhetoric** that blends irrational, aggressive, rigid, paranoid, and exceptionalist discourses to **demonize Other-ness** **and** delegitimate domestic dissent. The conse quences of this practice, Ivie argues, are grave indeed. It **degrades cultural diversity required for** successful adaptation **to changing political conditions**; it suppresses the contradiction between the ideal of deliberation and the coercive use of armed force; it **exacerbates tensions that lead to** war's irrevocable destruction; **and it** marginalizes alternate formats(such as poetry) that may serve political deliberation. Ivie's solution to these problems is neither direct nor simple: he calls for nothing less than a radical reorientation to the possibilities of political discourse. Here, political speakers would privilege the comic pole of Burkean discourse and reject short-sighted, cynical, desperate, and self-indulgent discourses. Instead, political actors resign themselves to **continuous and "adventurous" struggle** (Peterson 2007) and cultivate **the civil possibilities of rhetoric and performance for achieving** tolerance**,** coexistence**, and** dialogue. As a result, militarist and imperialist discourses of national security that have **attained unwarranted authority and autonomy may be rejoined with a** full range **of democratic voices**.

The presidency is a rich site for this inquiry. It is an article of faith among rhetoricians that presidents not only represent "the people" in their public speech but also strategically **constitute citizen identities**—and influence associated actions—**by symbolically depicting the demos in ways that** serve administration agendas (Campbell and Jamieson 1990, 5-6; Ivie 2005, 162; Medhurst 1996, xvii). In characterizing its tradi tions, essences, and missions, **presidential rhetoric shapes how the American public imagines** the possibilities for its participation in deliberation. Their rhetoric also scripts the content of frames and arguments that **citizens might bring to that activism** (Stuckey and Antczak 1998, 420). Here, critics note how presidential rhetoric provides specific, persuasive definitions of conditions, events, actors, and policies (Kuypers 1997) and also, more broadly, constitutes political culture as the source of meanings and practices that sustain or subvert robust democracy. One example here includes the negotiation by Cold War-era presidents of the diminishing possibilities for heroic action created by mutual assured destruction (MAD) as a castrating institutionalization of vulnerability (Beasley 2001, 22; Chaloupka 1992; Engelhardt 1998).

#### Nuclear weapons are fabulously textual—the text is what matters.

**Derrida 84**—analyst for Fox News

(Jacques, “No Apocalypse, Not Now (Full Speed Ahead, Seven Missiles, Seven Missives)”, Diacritics, Vol. 14, No. 2, Nuclear Criticism (Summer, 1984), pp. 20-31, dml)

Now I shall venture to say that in spite of all appearances this specialty is what entitles us, and doubly so, to concern ourselves seriously with the nuclear issue. And by the same token, if we have not done so before, this entitlement, this responsibility that we would thus have been neglecting until now, directs us to concern ourselves with the nuclear issue- first, inasmuch as we are representatives of humanity and of the incompetent humanities which have to think through as rigorously as possible the problem of competence, given that the stakes of the nuclear question are those of humanity, of the humanities. How, in the face of the nuclear issue, are we to get speech to circulate not only among the self-styled competent parties and those who are alleged to be incompetent, but among the competent parties themselves. For we are more than just suspicious; we are certain that, in this area in par- ticular, there is a multiplicity of dissociated, heterogeneous competencies. Such knowledge is neither coherent nor totalizable. Moreover, between those whose competence is techno- scientific (those who invent in the sense of unveiling or of "constative" discovery as well as in the sense of production of new technical or "performing" mechanisms) and those whose competence is politico-military, those who are empowered to make decisions, the deputies of performance or of the performative, the frontier is more undecidable than ever, as it is between the good and evil of all nuclear technology. If on the one hand it is apparently the first time that these competencies are so dangerously and effectively dissociated, on the other hand and from another point of view, they have never been so terribly accumulated, concentrated, entrusted as in a dice game to so few hands: the military men are also scien- tists, and they find themselves inevitably in the position of participating in the final decision, whatever precautions may be taken in this area. All of them, that is, very few, are in the posi- tion of inventing, inaugurating, improvising procedures and giving orders where no model- we shall talk about this later on - can help them at all. Among the acts of observing, reveal- ing, knowing, promising, acting, simulating, giving orders, and so on, the limits have never been so precarious, so undecidable. Today it is on the basis of that situation- the limit case in which the limit itself is suspended, in which therefore the krinein, crisis, decision itself, and choice are being subtracted from us, are abandoning us like the remainder of that subtrac- tion - it is on the basis of that situation that we have to re-think the relations between know- ing and acting, between constative speech acts and performative speech acts, between the invention that finds what was already there and the one that produces new mechanisms or new spaces. In the undecidable and at the moment of a decision that has no common ground with any other, we have to reinvent invention or conceive of another "pragmatics."

Third reason. In our techno-scientifico-militaro-diplomatic incompetence, we may con- sider ourselves, however, as competent as others to deal with a phenomenon whose essen- tial feature is that of being fabulously textual, through and through. Nuclear weaponry depends, more than any weaponry in the past, it seems, upon structures of information and communication, structures of language, including non-vocalizable language, structures of codes and graphic decoding. But the phenomenon is fabulously textual also to the extent that, for the moment, a nuclear war has not taken place: one can only talk and write about it. You will say, perhaps: but it is not the first time; the other wars, too, so long as they hadn't taken place, were only talked about and written about. And as to the fright of imaginary anticipation, what might prove that a European in the period following the war of 1870 might not have been more terrified by the "technological" image of the bombings and extermina- tions of the Second World War (even supposing he had been able to form such an image) than we are by the image we can construct for ourselves of a nuclear war? The logic of this argument is not devoid of value, especially if one is thinking about a limited and "clean" nuclear war. But it loses its value in the face of the hypothesis of a total nuclear war, which, as a hypothesis, or, if you prefer, as a fantasy, or phantasm, conditions every discourse and all strategies. Unlike the other wars, which have all been preceded by wars of more or less the same type in human memory (and gunpowder did not mark a radical break in this respect), nuclear war has no precedent. It has never occurred, itself; it is a non-event. The explosion of American bombs in 1945 ended a "classical," conventional war; it did not set off a nuclear war. The terrifying reality of the nuclear conflict can only be the signified referent, never the real referent (present or past) of a discourse or a text. At least today apparently. And that sets us to thinking about today, our day, the presence of this present in and through that fabulous textuality. Better than ever and more than ever. The growing multiplication of the discourse- indeed, of the literature-on this subject may constitute a process of fearful domestication, the anticipatory assimilation of that unanticipatable entirely-other. For the moment, today, one may say that a non-localizable nuclear war has not occurred; it has exis- tence only through what is said of it, only where it is talked about. Some might call it a fable, then, a pure invention: in the sense in which it is said that a myth, an image, a fiction, a utopia, a rhetorical figure, a fantasy, a phantasm, are inventions. It may also be called a speculation, even a fabulous specularization. The breaking of the mirror would be, finally, through an act of language, the very occurrence of nuclear war. Who can swear that our unconscious is not expecting this? dreaming of it, desiring it? You will perhaps find it shock- ing to find the nuclear issue reduced to a fable. But then I haven't said simply that. I have recalled that a nuclear war is for the time being a fable, that is, something one can only talk about. But who can fail to recognize the massive "reality" of nuclear weaponry and of the ter- rifying forces of destruction that are being stockpiled and capitalized everywhere, that are coming to constitute the very movement of capitalization. One has to distinguish between this "reality" of the nuclear age and the fiction of war. But, and this would perhaps be the imperative of a nuclear criticism, one must also be careful to interpret critically this critical or diacritical distinction. For the "reality" of the nuclear age and the fable of nuclear war are perhaps distinct, but they are not two separate things. It is the war (in other words the fable) that triggers this fabulous war effort, this senseless capitalization of sophisticated weaponry, this speed race in search of speed, this crazy precipitation which, through techno-science, through all the techno-scientific inventiveness that it motivates, structures not only the army, diplomacy, politics, but the whole of the human socius today, everything that is named by the old words culture, civilization, Bildung, schol, paideia. "Reality," let's say the encom- passing institution of the nuclear age, is constructed by the fable, on the basis of an event that has never happened (except in fantasy, and that is not nothing at all),\* an event of which one can only speak, an event whose advent remains an invention by men (in all the senses of the word "invention") or which, rather, remains to be invented. An invention because it depends upon new technical mechanisms, to be sure, but an invention also because it does not exist and especially because, at whatever point it should come into existence, it would be a grand premiere appearance.

Fourth reason. Since we are speaking of fables, of language, of fiction and fantasy, writing and rhetoric, let us go even further. Nuclear war does not depend on language just because we can do nothing but speak of it - and then as something that has never occurred. It does not depend on language just because the "incompetents" on all sides can speak of it only in the mode of gossip or of doxa (opinion)- and the dividing line between doxa and episteme starts to blur as soon as there is no longer any such thing as an absolutely legitimizable competence for a phenomenon which is no longer strictly techno-scientific but techno-militaro-politico-diplomatic through and through, and which brings into play the doxa or incompetence even in its calculations. There is nothing but doxa, opinion, "belief." One can no longer oppose belief and science, doxa and epistemb, once one has reached the decisive place of the nuclear age, in other words, once one has arrived at the critical place of the nuclear age. In this critical place, there is no more room for a distinction between belief and science, thus no more space for a "nuclear criticism" strictly speaking. Nor even for a truth in that sense. No truth, no apocalypse. (As you know. Apocalypse means Revelation, of Truth, Un-veiling.) No, nuclear war is not only fabulous because one can only talk about it, but because the extraordinary sophistication of its technologies-which are also the technologies of delivery, sending, dispatching, of the missile in general, of mission, missive, emission, and transmission, like all techne-the extraordinary sophistication of these technologies coexists, cooperates in an essential way with sophistry, psycho-rhetoric, and the most cursory, the most archaic, the most crudely opinionated psychagogy, the most vulgar psychology.

## 2AC

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#### At the top—they link to our deliberative foreclosure arguments

**Maggio 7**—University of Florida

(J., “The Presidential Rhetoric of Terror: The (Re)Creation of Reality Immediately after 9/11”, Politics & Policy Volume 35, Issue 4, pages 810–835, December 2007, dml)

Zarefsky's (2004) argument that the president has the power of “definition” should not be taken as the power to “persuade” in the standard way this is understood. Rather, the power lies in setting the limits of debate and/or reality. In fact, Zarefsky agrees with Edwards (2003) that explicit votes or opinions are not often changed by presidential rhetoric. Yet Zarefsky argues that presidential rhetoric has an even more important role: the role to shape reality. On his account, social reality is not a predetermined set of ideas; it is a contingent set of social indicators. In this sense, all people participate in the creation of reality and its political ramifications. This “reality creation” is especially true for the president. Naming a situation provides the basis for understanding it and determining the appropriate response. Because of his prominent political position and his access to the means of communication, the president, by defining a situation, might be able to shape the context in which events or proposals are viewed by the public. (Zarefsky 2004, 611) Social reality is therefore not fixed—especially social reality that is mediated through news outlets and government spokesmen. “Reality” is fluid, and it is often shaped by presidential rhetoric (Miroff 2003, 278-80; Rubenstein 1989). The president's greatest power in shaping reality rests in the power of definition. To “define” something is to set the limits of cognition regarding that concept. Zarefsky (2004, 612) articulates his theory of “definition” in the following way. To choose a definition is, in effect, to plead a cause, as if one were advancing a claim and offering support for it. But no explicit claim is offered and no support is provided. The presidential definition is stipulated, offered as if it were natural and uncontroversial rather than chosen and contestable. Hence, to “define” is to assert without argument that something is “true” or “real.” It is to claim, in a Jeffersonian sense, that such statements are “self-evident.” Of course, at the moment of definition those terms often become the parameters of definition. It is through this moment that the president creates a kind of intellectual sovereignty. As both the chief executive and the national spokesperson, the president occupies a unique position in which to create a moment of singular definition.

#### This evidence also substantiates a we meet argument—intellectual discussion is a restriction

**Taylor and Hendry 8**—University of Colorado-Boulder AND Department of Communications at the University of New Mexico [SSP=Stockpile Stewardship Program]

(Bryan and Judith, “INSISTING ON PERSISTING: THE NUCLEAR RHETORIC OF "STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP"”, Rhetoric & Public Affairs11.2 (Summer 2008): 303-334, dml)

As a result, we judge official SSP rhetoric to be an institutional defense mounted **against the possibility of undesirable, externally imposed change** created as U.S. citizens consider the need for continued nuclear deterrence in the absence of a traditional superpower enemy. Our critique demonstrates **the need to** reinvigorate **the dormant nuclear-public sphere so that citizens**-and their elected officials-**can** adequately deliberate **issues surrounding management of the nuclear arsenal**. To achieve this goal, significant support **must be provided** for remedies that **empower public understanding** of associated technical, value, **and** policy **issues**. Ideally, robust programs ofeducation **and** debate would enable speakers to develop

**a** framework for discussion **that allows explicit room for** diverse interpretations, to make it possible to **recognize common goals** where they exist, acknowledge **the internal consistency of other positions**, and articulate clearly those areas where **participants can** agree to disagree.84

Subsequent deliberation should consider not only narrow technical arguments but also cherished Maintainer premises, including that SSP officials are **the sole credible and dispassionate judges of nuclear safety and reliability;** that claims of "confidence" in stockpile "reliability" are referential in nature, and not constitutive or performative; that alleged decreases of warhead safety and reliability resulting from the CTBT genuinely compromise national security; and that nuclear weapons are a necessary or effective instrument of that security. As a result, **new options for** thought **and** action **may emerge** for nuclear officials, workers, and citizens **who are currently producing**-whether by direct action or tacit consent-**the future of nuclear weapons.**

In the absence of such efforts, **deliberation** surrounding stockpile stewardship **will default to its** traditional "guardianship" structure, in which scientific, military, and policy elites presume to control that process **in order to protect the public from itself**. Indeed, this presumption is exacerbated by the SSP's "surprisingly strong assumption that the function of the stockpile as a deterrent is based on the credibility of weapons designers and engineers, rather than the technical characteristics of the weapons themselves."85 One means of transforming this rhetorical situation, then, **involves** directly engaging **the incongruity** between nuclear officials' nominal deference to the demos as owner of the nuclear object, **and their actual wariness of citizen voice**. Far from intruding on the domain of nuclear policy, citizens **and** scholars **engaging in this debate** **would be performing** necessary-and otherwise neglected-oversight functions. As rhetorical critic David J. Tietge notes, it is a characteristic of the Cold War that nuclear scientists had time to create, but not to adequately anticipate or reflect upon the appropriations and consequences of their creations.86

#### Vote aff, not neg. Comparative evidence.

**Foucault 88**—DHeidt’s crime-fighting alter-ego

(Michel, interview with Alessandro Fontana, *Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings, 1977-1984* pg 51-52, dml)

FOUCAULT I believe too much in truth **not to suppose that there are different truths and different ways of speaking the truth**. Of course, **one** can't expect **the government to tell the truth**, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. On the other hand, **we can demand of those who govern us** a certain truth **as to** their ultimate aims**,** the general choices of their tactics**, and** a number of particular points in their programs: this is the parrhesia (free speech) of the governed, **who** can **and** must **question those who govern them**, in the name of the knowledge, the experience they have, **by virtue of being citizens**, of what those who govern do, of the meaning of their action, of the decisions they have taken.

However, **one must** avoid a trap in which **those who govern try to catch intellectuals** and into which they often fall: "Put yourselves in our place and tell us what you would do." **It is** not **a question one has to answer**. To make a decision on some question **implies a knowledge of evidence that is refused us**, an analysis of the situation that we have not been able to make. This is a trap. Nevertheless, as governed, **we have a** perfect right **to ask questions about the truth**: "What are you doing, for example, when you are hostile to Euromissiles, or when, on the contrary, you support them, when you restructure the Lorraine steel industry, when you open up the question of private education."

#### They access approximately zero of our deliberation offense—this card ends the debate

**Livingston 12**—Assistant prof of Government @ Cornell

(Alexander, “Avoiding Deliberative Democracy? Micropolitics, Manipulation, and the Public Sphere”, Philosophy & Rhetoric, Vol. 45, No. 3 (2012), pp. 269-294, dml)

It is important here to stress what a critical theory of deliberative democracy is not.16 It is not the gentlemanly sport of cool, calm, and dispassionate exchange of impartial reasons. It does not depend on the knockdown force of the better argument in a single-round, one-on-one, face-to-face bout of verbal jousting. It is not the reduction of political debate to a matter of logical demonstration. And it is not a clinical exer- cise wherein citizens are extracted from their concrete political world and placed in an artificially domination-free space of the ideal speech situa- tion or deliberative focus group**.** All of these proposals, not to mention others, have been put forward in one form or another under the banner of deliberative democracy.17 If theories of deliberative democracy were limited to these options, Connolly would be right to charge them with an intel- lectualism that ignores the vagaries of lived political praxis. However, a critical theory of deliberative democracy provides both an alternative to this deliberative intellectualism as well as to Connolly’s democratic deficit. The key to this alternative approach to democracy overlooked by both Connolly and these intellectualist theories of deliberation is the complex institution of the public sphere.

The public sphere is the decentered network of voluntary associations and media channels that crisscross civil society. It has no center or hub it radiates out of. Rather it is a rhizome in Deleuze and Guattari’s sense of the term: a multiplicity of lively points and intersections that hang together that lacks organization and is not subject to central control. Philippe Mengue makes just this point about the nature of the public sphere when he criticizes Deleuze and Guattari’s antipathy toward the idea of politics as the expression and contestation of public reasons. The public sphere, as he rightly notes, is precisely the kind of deterritorialized plane where movement and becoming can occur.18 Deliberative democracy is a model of democracy that explains how ideas circulate in such a public sphere; that is, how they bump into other ideas, transform them, and become transformed themselves in turn. Key to a critical theory of deliberative democracy is the claim that the exchange of reasons within this rhizomatic public sphere is what Jürgen Habermas calls “subjectless” (1996, 299). A public sphere is always more than the prudential exchange of reasons between two parties, but it is also always less than a self-reflection of a macrosubject capable of action. Rather, it is a complex mediating institution that allows ideas and reasons to become public—that is, it circulates and distributes reasons and ideas beyond the bounds of local conversations, turning them into resources to be drawn on, tested, and sometimes rejected in more local exercises of reason giving.

Crucially, the reasons that do all this circulating in the public sphere must be understood in an expansive sense. At the level of democratic the- ory, no one form of discourse has a monopoly on what counts as a reason. Deliberative democracy recognizes diverse forms of communication as reason giving, including storytelling, rhetoric, and greeting. Each has a place in a deliberative politics insofar as it is capable of drawing a connec- tion between a particular claim or experience and a more general and acces- sible norm (Young 2000, 52–80; Dryzek 2000, 57–80). A public reason is always a reason for doing or avoiding doing something. First-person stories like those W. E. B. Du Bois tells in The Souls of Black Folk are vivid depic- tions of the experience of racial oppression, but they function as reasons to a nonblack audience insofar as they aim to open the eyes of white America to the complacency of its commitments to liberty and equality. A public sphere is a site where these sorts of reasons are articulated and take on broader and richer meanings, as they are received by an indefinite audience of strangers.19

The informal and diffuse network of information that spans from labor meetings to church groups to book clubs to blogs to newspapers to PTA meetings and to dissident groups carries our reasons across multiple testing sites where they are subject to uptake, rejection, or transformation, only to be recirculated again. This public exchange of reasons has the important epistemic function of improving the quality of the reasons we use to justify our interests and decisions, but the more crucial function is its critical one. The articulation and contestation of reasons in the public sphere is a motor for self-reflection. It is this function, the self-critical and self-reflection function of exposure to diverse and impersonal reasons in a public sphere, that deliberative democracy values. While the media-saturated public sphere trades in low-involvement advertising and affective manipulation, it also and more importantly can be a means of provoking us to reflect on our received identities and interests.20 These epistemic and critical functions of the public sphere come together to provide a democratic resource for inciting self- and collective transformation in novel and potentially eman- cipatory ways. Seen as a molecular interplay of constantly flowing, shifting, and transforming reasons and self-understandings that provokes new and creative (but reflective) becomings that help us cope with the challenges of political community, the circulation of ordinary talk in the public sphere is Deleuzian. The public sphere is an example of micropolitics par excellence.

Once we introduce this institution of the public sphere into the discus- sion, we avail ourselves of a democratic alternative to Connolly’s politics of “cultural-corporeal infusion.” The task of generating resonance for a leftist politics can be divorced from the idea of manipulating visceral responses in favor of a politics that experiments with how reasons resonate in the public sphere, that is, with how they might function to provoke self-reflection. Reasons resonate when they make some claim on the moral and concep- tual imaginary of their audience. That is to say, their resonance is not a feature of their logical structure but rather of the receptivity of the audience to them. A reason resonates when its audience considers it what William James called a “live” hypothesis, “one which appeals as a real possibility to him to whom it is proposed” (1967, 717).

Making reasons resonate, however, is the task of activists and social movements who introduce new concerns to the public sphere and rede- scribe acceptable existing practices as oppressive and harmful. To this end, an egalitarian and inclusive public sphere requires the insurgent work of its voluntary associations in the form of “deliberative enclaves” (Mansbridge 1999) or “counterpublics” (Fraser 1992) where dissidents, interests groups, social movements, and the oppressed experiment with novel discourses and redescriptions of the status quo to introduce into the public sphere’s circu- lation. When these experiments in consciousness-raising are successful, as with the feminist movement’s introduction of “date rape,” the queer move- ment’s turn away from civil unions in favor or “gay marriage” and Stephen Colbert’s introduction of “truthiness” into the American political lexicon, the terms of resonance in the public sphere change. Coining terms like “gay marriage” is not the same thing as institutionalizing it, but it does have the effect of redefining the terms of public debate around a now resonant expe- rience of exclusion that had hitherto been simply invisible or erroneously seen as harmless.

To put this in the language of Deleuze, deliberative redescription can function as a war machine. The experimenting with resonating reasons in a public on the part of activists is an exercise in “plugging in” a resonance machine into the public sphere. The transformative power of the resonance machine, understood as an inventive redescription of our received practices, has the power to transform the way citizens see their shared world, their own interests, and the suffering of others. The work of counterpublics is to “smooth” the striated space of public political culture so as to displace old prejudices and allow new identities and claims to flourish.

### case

#### they destroy the value of debate—star this card

Kahn, 10 (Richard Kahn, Assistant Professor of Educational Foundations and Research at the University of North Dakota, Critical Pedagogy, Ecoliteracy, and Planetary Crisis: The Ecopedagogy Movement, 2010, pp. 9-11)

Worse still, though, is that here environmental literacy has not only been co-opted by corporate state forces and morphed into a progressively-styled, touchy-feely method for achieving higher scores on standardized tests like the ACT and SAT, but in an Orwellian turn it has come to stand in actuality for a real illiteracy about the nature of ecological catastrophe, its causes, and possible solutions. As I will argue in this book, our current course for social and environmental disaster (though highly complex and not easily boiled down to a few simple causes or strategies for action) must be traced to the evolution of: an anthropocentric worldview grounded in what the sociologist Patricia Hill Collins (1993) refers to as a matrix of domination (see chapter 1); a global technocapitalist infrastructure that relies upon market-based and functionalist versions of technoliteracy to instantiate and augment its socio- economic and cultural control (see chapters 2 and 3); an unsustainable, reductionistic, and antidemocratic model of institutional science (see chapter 4); and the wrongful marginalization and repression of pro-ecological resistance through the claim that it represents a “terrorist” force that is counter to the morals of a democratic society rooted in tolerance, educational change, and civic debate (see chapter 5). By contrast, the environmental literacy standards now showcased at places like the Zoo School as “Hall- marks of Quality” (Archie, 2003, p. 11) are those that consciously fail to develop the type of radical and partisan subjectivity in students, that might be capable of deconstructing their socially and environmentally deleterious hyper-individualism or their obviously socialized identities that tend toward 10 Critical Pedagogy, Ecoliteracy, and Planetary Crisis state-sanctioned norms of competition, hedonism, consumption, marketization, and forms of quasi-fascistic patriotism. Just as Stapp (1969) theorized environmental literacy as a form of political moderation that could pacify the types of civic upheaval, that occurred during the Civil Rights era, now too during the tendentious political atmosphere that has arisen as the legacy of the George W. Bush presidency, being environmentally literate quite suspiciously means learning how to turn the other cheek and listen to “both sides” of an issue—even when the issue is the unprecedented mass extinction of life taking place on the planet. In a manner that accords more with Fox News than Greenpeace, a leading environmental literacy pamphlet (Archie, 2003) emphasizes that “Teaching and learning about the environment can bring up controversies that must be handled in a fair and balanced manner in the classroom” (p. 11). Later in the document a teacher from Lincoln High School in Wisconsin is highlighted in order to provide expert advice in a similar fashion: “I’d say the most important aspect of teaching about the environment is to look at all aspects involved with an issue or problem. Teach from an unbiased position no matter how strong your ideas are about the topic. Let the kids make decisions for themselves” (p. 12), she implores. This opinion is mirrored by the Environmental Education Division of the Environmental Protection Agency (a federal office, created by the Bush administration, dedicated to furthering environmental literacy), which on its own website underscores as “Basic Information” that “Environmental education does not advocate a particular viewpoint or course of action. Rather, it is claimed that environmental education teaches individuals how to weigh various sides of an issue through critical thinking and it enhances their own problem-solving and decision-making skills.”10 Yet, this definition was authored by an administration trumping for a wider right-wing movement that attempts to use ideas of “fair and balanced” and “critical thinking” to occlude obvious social and ecological injustices, as well as the advantage it gains in either causing or sustaining them. This same logic defending the universal value of nonpartisan debate has been used for well over a decade by the right to prevent significant action on global warming. Despite overwhelming scientific acceptance of its existence and threat, as well as of its primarily anthropogenic cause, those on the right have routinely trotted out their own pseudo-science on global warming and thereby demanded that more research is necessary to help settle a debate on the issue that only they are interested in continuing to facilitate. Ecopedagogy: An Introduction 11 Likewise, within academic circles themselves, powerful conservatives like David Horowitz have the support of many in government who are seeking to target progressive scholars and viewpoints on university and college campuses as biased evidence of a leftist conspiracy at work in higher education (Nocella, Best & McLaren, Forthcoming). In order to combat such alleged bias, “academic freedom” is asserted as a goal in which “both sides” of academic issues must be represented in classrooms, departments, and educational events. The result of this form of repressive tolerance (see chapter 5) is simply to impede action on matters worth acting on and to gain further ideological space for right-wing, corporate and other conservative-value agendas.11 It is clear, then, that despite the effects and growth of environmental education over the last few decades, it is a field that is ripe for a radical reconstruction of its literacy agenda. Again, while something like environmental education (conceived broadly) should be commended for the role it has played in helping to articulate many of the dangers and pitfalls that modern life now affords, it is also clear that it has thus far inadequately surmised the larger structural challenges now at hand and has thus tended to intervene in a manner far too facile to demand or necessitate a rupture of the status quo. What has thereby resulted is a sort of crisis of environmental education generally and, as a result, the prevailing trends in the field have recently been widely critiqued by a number of theorists and educators who have sought to highlight their limitations.

#### We solve, thanks for the card

Kelly Michael **Young 13**, Associate Professor of Communication and Director of Forensics at Wayne State University, "Why Should We Debate About Restriction of Presidential War Powers", 9/4, public.cedadebate.org/node/13

**Beyond its obviously timeliness, we believed debating about presidential war powers was important because of the stakes involved in the controversy. Since the Korean War, scholars and pundits have grown increasingly alarmed by the growing scope** and techniques **of presidential war making**. In 1973, in the wake of Vietnam, Congress passed the joint War Powers Resolution (WPR) to increase Congress’s role in foreign policy and war making by requiring executive consultation with Congress prior to the use of military force, reporting within 48 hours after the start of hostiles, and requiring the close of military operations after 60 days unless Congress has authorized the use of force. **Although the WPR was a significant legislative feat, 30 years since its passage, presidents** have frequently **ignore**s **the WPR requirements and the changing nature of conflict does not fit neatly into these regulations.** After the terrorist attacks on 9-11, **many experts worry that executive war powers have expanded far beyond healthy limits. Consequently, there is a fear that continued expansion of these powers will undermine the constitutional system of checks and balances that maintain the democratic foundation of this country and risk constant and unlimited military actions**, particularly in what Stephen Griffin refers to as a “long war” period like the War on Terror (http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674058286). In comparison, pro-presidential powers advocates contend that new restrictions undermine flexibility and timely decision-making necessary to effectively counter contemporary national security risks. Thus, **a debate about presidential wars powers is important to investigate a number of issues that have serious consequences on** the status of **democratic checks and national security** of the United States.¶ Lastly, **debating presidential war powers is important because we the people have an important role in affecting the use of presidential war powers**. As many legal scholars contend, regardless of the status of legal structures to check the presidency, **an important political restrain on presidential war powers is the presence of a well-informed and educated public**. **As Justice Potter Stewart explains, “the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power…may lie in an enlightened citizenry – in an informed and critical public opinion which alone can protect the values of a democratic government”** (http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC\_CR\_0403\_0713\_ZC3.html). As a result, **this is not simply an academic debate about institutions and powers that that do not affect us. As the numerous recent foreign policy scandals make clear, anyone who uses a cell-phone or the internet is** potential **affected by unchecked presidential war powers. Even if we agree that these powers are justified, it is important that today’s college students understand and appreciate the scope and consequences of presidential war powers, as these students’ opinions will stand as an important potential check on the presidency.**

### da

#### Independently executize isolation hierarchizes society—the nuclear elite is given the ability to manage the subservient population—this makes endless destruction inevitable

**Coviello 2k**—assistant professor of English at Bowdoin College

(Peter, “Apocalypse from Now On”, *Queer Frontiers: Millennial Geographies, Genders, and Generations* pg 40-41, dml)

Perhaps. But to claim that American culture is at present decisively postnuclear is not to say that the world we inhabit is in any way post-apocalyptic. Apocalypse, as I began by saying, changed – it did not go away. And here I want to hazard my second assertion: if, in the nuclear age of yesteryear, apocalypse signified an event threatening everyone and everything with (in Jacques Derrida’s suitably menacing phrase) “remainderless and a-symbolic destruction,” then in the postnuclear world apocalypse is an affair whose parameters are definitively local. In shape and in substance, apocalypse is defined now by the affliction it brings somewhere else, always to an “other” people whose very presence might then be written as a kind of dangerous contagion, threatening the safety and prosperity of a cherished “general population.” This fact seems to me to stand behind Susan Sontag’s incisive observation, from 1989, that, “Apocalypse is now a long running serial: not ‘Apocalypse Now’ but ‘Apocalypse from Now On.’” The decisive point here in the perpetuation of the threat of apocalypse (the point Sontag goes on, at length, to miss) is that the apocalypse is ever present because, as an element in a vast economy of power, it is ever useful. That is, though the perpetual threat of destruction – through the constant reproduction of the figure of the apocalypse – the agencies of power ensure their authority to act on and through the bodies of a particular population. No one turns this point more persuasively than Michel Foucault, who in the final chapter of his first volume of The History of Sexuality addressess himself to the problem of a power that is less repressive than productive, less life-threatening than, in his words, “life-administering.” Power, he contends, “exerts a positive influence on life … [and] endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations.” In his brief comments on what he calls “the atomic situation,” however, Foucault insists as well that the productiveness of modern power must not be mistaken for a uniform repudiation of violent or even lethal means. For as “managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race,” agencies of modern power presume to act “on the behalf of the existence of everyone.” Whatsoever might be construed as a threat to life and survival in this way serves to authorize any expression of force, no matter how invasive, or, indeed, potentially annihilating. “If genocide is indeed the dream of modern power,” Foucault writes, “this is not because of a recent return to the ancient right to kill’ it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population.” For a state that would arm itself not with the power to kill its population, but with a more comprehensive power over the patterns and functioning of its collective life, the threat of an apocalyptic demise, nuclear or otherwise, seems a civic initiative that can scarcely be done without.

#### Delaying nuclear responses doesn’t hurt deterrence or perception—their evidence relies on outdated theories

**Buchan et al 3**—RAND Corporation

(Glen, with David Matonick, Calvin Shipbaugh, and Richard Mesic, “FUTURE ROLES OF U.S. NUCLEAR FORCES”, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/MR1231.pdf>, dml)

The effect of a delay in a U.S. nuclear response is clearer. There is nothing about a strategy of deterrence based on nuclear retaliation that requires a prompt response. There never has been. The only rationale for a quick response during the Cold War was the fragility of U.S. forces and command and control systems. The choice might have been between a quick response and no response at all. Nothing about the target base ever required a quick response,13 which is even more true in the current world. Indeed, as we have discussed in other sections of this report and elsewhere, a prerequisite for credible contemporary deterrence enforced by a threat of nuclear retaliation is certainty about what happened and who is to blame. That puts a premium on being able to delay a response. Thus, a dealerted U.S. nuclear force, assuming it can be made survivable, should still be capable of enforcing a strategy of deterrence based on a threat of nuclear retaliation.

#### Means only a risk of offense—failure to break down the elitist hierarchy of nuclear policy drastically increases the risk of miscalc through military groupthink—extinction

**Ellsberg 9**—former high-level military analyst, leaked official government documents before Snowden made it cool

(Daniel, “Hiroshima Day”, <http://www.thenation.com/article/hiroshima-day?page=full>, dml)

We have long needed and lacked the equivalent of the Pentagon Papers on the subject of nuclear policies and preparations, nuclear threats and decision-making: above all in the United States and Russia but also in the other nuclear-weapons states. I deeply regret that I did not make known to Congress, the American public and the world the extensive documentation of persistent and still-unknown nuclear dangers that was available to me forty to fifty years ago as a consultant to and official in the executive branch working on nuclear war plans, command and control and nuclear crises. Those in nuclear-weapons states who are in a position now to do more than I did then to alert their countries and the world to fatally reckless secret policies should take warning from the earlier inaction of myself and others: and do better.

That I had high-level access and played such a role in nuclear planning is, of course, deeply ironic in view of the personal history recounted above. My feelings of revulsion and foreboding about nuclear weapons had not changed an iota since 1945, and they have never left me. Since I was 14, the overriding objective of my life has been to prevent the occurrence of nuclear war.

There was a close analogy with the Manhattan Project. Its scientists--most of whom hoped the Bomb would never be used for anything but as a threat to deter Germany--were driven by a plausible but mistaken fear that the Nazis were racing them. Actually the Nazis had rejected the pursuit of the atomic bomb on practical grounds in June 1942, just as the Manhattan Project was beginning. Similarly, I was one of many in the late '50s who were misled and recruited into the nuclear arms race by exaggerated, and in this case deliberately manipulated, fears of Soviet intentions and crash efforts.

Precisely because I did receive clearances and was exposed to top-secret intelligence estimates, in particular from the Air Force, I, along with my colleagues at the RAND Corp., came to be preoccupied with the urgency of averting nuclear war by deterring a Soviet surprise attack that would exploit an alleged "missile gap." That supposed dangerous US inferiority was exactly as unfounded in reality as the fear of the Nazi crash bomb program had been, or, to pick a more recent example, as concern over Saddam Hussein's supposed WMDs and nuclear pursuit in 2003.

Working conscientiously, obsessively, on a wrong problem, countering an illusory threat, I and my colleagues distracted ourselves and helped distract others from dealing with real dangers posed by the mutual and spreading possession of nuclear weapons--dangers which we were helping make worse--and from real opportunities to make the world more secure. Unintentionally, yet inexcusably, we made our country and the world less safe.

Eventually the Soviets did emulate us in creating a world-threatening nuclear capability on hair-trigger alert. That still exists; Russian nuclear posture and policies continue, along with ours, to endanger our countries, civilization and much of life itself. But the persistent reality has been that the nuclear arms race has been driven primarily by American initiatives and policies and that every major American decision in this 64-year-old nuclear era has been accompanied by unwarranted concealment, deliberate obfuscation, and official and public delusions.

I have believed for a long time that official secrecy and deceptions about our nuclear weapons posture and policies and their possible consequences have threatened the survival of the human species. To understand the urgency of radical changes in our nuclear policies that may truly move the world toward abolition of nuclear weapons, we need a new understanding of the real history of the nuclear age.

#### Deterrence theory is inaccurate

**Gartzke et al 13**—Associate Professor, Political Science Department, University of California, San Diego

(Erik, with Jon Lindsay and Michael Nacht, “Cross-Domain Deterrence: Strategy in an Era of Complexity”, <http://igcc.ucsd.edu/assets/001/505132.pdf>, dml)

The bilateral nuclear bargaining envisioned by classical deterrence theory contrasts starkly with today’s environment of asymmetric weapons, interdependent resources, and numerous state and non-state adversaries. As a recent Air Force Chief of Staff and the current Chief of Naval Operations put it, “The fragility of chokepoints in air, space, cyberspace and on the sea enable an increasing number of entities, states and non-state actors alike to disrupt the global economy with small numbers of well-placed, precise attacks…these strategies and the weapons that support them are also no longer the exclusive province of large states…America’s adversaries today are embracing a strategy of access denial to counter American power projection.” 3

These disruptive capabilities often cross over established jurisdictional, environmental, or conceptual boundaries in order to undermine conventional military power, or even a nation’s nuclear deterrent; thus they pose “cross domain threats.”4 Examples include cyber warfare and espionage, anti-satellite kinetic and directed energy weapons, autonomous robotics (drones) and guided missiles, information operations to shape opinions or spark panic, and other innovations still barely imagined. Some of these carry the potential for extremely destructive effects, but many of them open up new options for much lower intensity—even nonlethal—effects. The range of political actors who may have the ability and the motivation to exploit these capabilities is large and growing, to include rising near-peer competitors like China, regional spoilers like Russia, Iran, or North Korea, domestic factions of fickle allies like Pakistan and Iraq, allies like Israel or France who seek competitive advantage in non-military domains, transnational terrorists like al Qaeda or social movements like Anonymous, and the list goes on.5

“Cross domain deterrence” (CDD), therefore, is the problem of both exploiting and countering cross domain threats in order to prevent unacceptable attacks. Unfortunately, the complex linkages of actions and effects across boundaries are poorly understood, and policymakers do not really know how their own governments will respond to unconventional attacks. Tremendous uncertainty in the current and future threat environment, together with the practical challenges of integrating diverse instruments of power across domains, makes comprehending CDD daunting.6

#### Be extremely skeptical of their epistemology

**Taylor and Hendry 8**—University of Colorado-Boulder AND Department of Communications at the University of New Mexico [SSP=Stockpile Stewardship Program]

(Bryan and Judith, “INSISTING ON PERSISTING: THE NUCLEAR RHETORIC OF "STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP"”, Rhetoric & Public Affairs11.2 (Summer 2008): 303-334, dml)

In the sphere of nuclear-policy deliberation, this rhetoric has traditionally enjoyed presumption, partly due to the symbolic and paradoxical conditions of nuclear deterrence. Under those conditions, nuclear weapons are deemed "effective" by their possessors if they are perceived by opponents as suffi- ciently reliable to inhibit their aggression. However, as security studies scholar Alexander Montgomery argues, a negative certification of the nuclear stockpile, or the suspected invalidity of a positive certification arising from perceptions of declining technical competence among nuclear stewards, corrodes "political confidence" in the nuclear deterrent. Because government officials strongly desire the support of this political confidence by nuclear stewards, they may be unwilling or unable to critically discern whether proposed stewardship activities actually increase the validity of certifications. As a result, those officials may support any minimally plausible proposal represented as maintaining or enhancing the stewards' technical competence, in the hope that it will contribute to political confidence.43

For this and other reasons, Maintainer rhetoric is viewed with suspicion by Denuclearizers, who charge that Maintainers have deliberately mystified the necessity of, the challenges facing, and the requirements for maintaining their professional expertise. This "scientific overkill," Denuclearizers claim, serves a "true" and "hidden" purpose: preserving the jobs-and thereby the culture- of nuclear weaponeers.44 Representative David Hobson (R-OH), then chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, for example, reported with some ambivalence the findings of his tours of DOE facilities during 2003 and 2004:

**Faith in deterrence leads to a mentality of invincibility that leads to nuclear war – additionally their perceptions are not objective – only part of the fantasy of deterrence**

**Chernus 91 –** Professor of Religious Studies at UC Boulder, Ira, Nuclear Madness: on Religion and Psychology in the Nuclear Age, p19-20

The omnipotence fantasy is also reflected in the various strategies of nuclear deterrence. With the amount of violence at our disposal apparently infinite, it seems possible to compel the whole world to live within our chosen deterrence fantasy forever. But deterrence images speak more loudly of the complementary fantasy: just as freedom behind the false self means omnipotence, so security means isolation and invulnerability. Ontological insecurity makes every relationship a potential pitfall. Relationships can only be arenas for self-preservation at best, never for true self-enhancement. Thus the best relationship is one in which the other is unable to touch the self. Of course once the self is cut off from the other it can have no real knowledge of the other; it can only relate to its fantasy images of the other.

The world of mutual deterrence is a perfect image of a society of schizoids. Deterrence strategies are based not on what “the other side” is actually doing, but on our perceptions (and fears) of what the other might do—or merely be able to do—at any time in the future in a worst case scenario. Psychologists have long noted that deterrence strategies make it increasingly difficult for us to have any real knowledge of “the other side”; instead they persuade us to believe ever more firmly in our frightening fantasies. Inevitably those fantasies convince us that we must be absolutely invulnerable. It is hardly suprising that each side also strives to develop whatever defensive system it can technologically and economically afford. The American Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI or “Star Wars”) plan, as originally proposed by Ronald Reagan in 1983, is perhaps the ultimate analogue to the false self—a fantasy of a shield providing perfect protection against whatever attack the other might mount.

As long as there is reality and life in the world, however, the world remains independent, unpredictable, and threatening. The schizoid can feel completely secure only by imagining the world as a vast empire of inert objects ruled by the self’s unfettered will. The appeal of nuclear deterrence rests in part on such a fantasy. Each side renders the other too petrified to make a move. Each side maps out its global strategy as if every other nation were merely a piece in the strategists’ puzzle—an object that can be manipulated at will. The ultimate result is the Pentagon officer (and no doubt his Moscow counterpart) choosing nuclear targets at random, never stopping to think that each new pin in the map may represent several million dead human beings**.**

**Deterrence doesn’t apply – Their realist discourse creates makes war seem inevitable and therefore rational // humans become expendable and mere instruments for war making – violence permeates being and thus it becomes the logical option**

**Burke 07 –** professor of politics and IR—Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations in the University of New South Wales (Anthony, *Theory & Event*, Volume 10, Issue 2, 2007, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason,” Project MUSE,)

his essay develops a theory about the causes of war -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses based either on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities and political manipulation, or the play of institutional, economic or political interests (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors are important to be sure, and should not be discounted, but they flow over a deeper bedrock of modern reason that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but the apparently solid ground of the real itself. In this light, the two 'existential' and **'rationalist' discourses of war-making** and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war are more than merely arguments, rhetorics or even discourses. Certainly they mobilise forms of knowledge and power together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale. But they run deeper than that. They are truth-systems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: ontologies, statements about truth and being which claim a rarefied privilege to statewhat is **and how it must be maintained** as it is.

I am thinking of ontology in both its senses: ontology as both a statement about the nature and ideality of being (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), and as a statement of epistemological truth and certainty, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty (in this case, the development and application of strategic knowledge for the use of armed force, and the creation and maintenance of geopolitical order, security and national survival). These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes'.17 In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and power, I see ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity, existence and action; one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly historical and contingent, that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind. In short, ontology is the 'politics of truth'18 in its most sweeping and powerful form.

I see such a drive for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim: a drive for ideational hegemony and closure that limits debate and questioning, that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic, one that is grounded in the truth of being, in the truth of truth as such. The second is its intimate relation with violence: the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here we are witness to an epistemology of violence (strategy) joined to an ontology of violence (the national security state). When we consider their relation to war, the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to quicken the resort to war and to lead to its escalation either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects. In such a context **violence** is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- it **permeates being**.

This essay describes firstly the ontology of the national security state (by way of the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt and G. W. F. Hegel) and secondly the rationalist ontology of strategy (by way of the geopolitical thought of Henry Kissinger), showing how they crystallise into a mutually reinforcing system of support and justification, especially in the thought of Clausewitz. This creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. The ethical problem arises because of their militaristic force -- they embody and **reinforce a norm of war** -- and because they enact what Martin Heidegger calls an 'enframing' image of technology and being in which **humans are merely utilitarian instruments** for use, control and destruction, and force -- in the words of one famous Cold War strategist -- can be thought of as a 'power to hurt'.19 The pragmatic problem arises because force so often produces neither the linear system of effects imagined in strategic theory nor anything we could meaningfully call security, but rather **turns in upon itself in a nihilistic spiral of pain and destruction**. In the era of a 'war on terror' dominantly conceived in Schmittian and Clausewitzian terms,20 the arguments of Hannah Arendt (that violence collapses ends into means) and Emmanuel Levinas (that 'every war employs arms that turn against those that wield them') take on added significance. Neither, however, explored what occurs when war and being are made to coincide, other than Levinas' intriguing comment that in war persons 'play roles in which they no longer recognises themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance'. 21

What I am trying to describe in this essay is a complex relation between, and interweaving of, epistemology and ontology. But it is not my view that these are distinct modes of knowledge or levels of truth, because in the social field named by security, statecraft and violence they are made to blur together, continually referring back on each other, like charges darting between electrodes. Rather they are related systems of knowledge with particular systemic roles and intensities of claim about truth, political being and political necessity. Positivistic or scientific claims to epistemological truth supply an air of predictability and reliability to policy and political action, which in turn support larger ontological claims to national being and purpose, drawing them into a common horizon of certainty that is one of the central features of past-Cartesian modernity. Here it may be useful to see ontology as a more totalising and metaphysical set of claims about truth, and epistemology as more pragmatic and instrumental; but while a distinction between epistemology (knowledge as technique) and ontology (knowledge as being) has analytical value, it tends to break down in action.

The epistemology of violence I describe here (strategic science and foreign policy doctrine) claims positivistic clarity about techniques of military and geopolitical action which use force and coercion to achieve a desired end, an end that is supplied by the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order. However in practice, technique quickly passes into ontology. This it does in two ways. First, instrumental violence is married to an ontology of insecure national existence which itself admits no questioning. The nation and its identity are known and essential, prior to any conflict, and the resort to violence becomes an equally essential predicate of its perpetuation. In this way knowledge-as-strategy claims, in a positivistic fashion, to achieve a calculability of effects (power) for an ultimate purpose (securing being) that it must always assume. Second, strategy as a technique not merely becomes an instrument of state power but ontologises itself in a technological image of 'man' as a maker and user of things, including other humans, which have no essence or integrity outside their value as objects. In Heidegger's terms, technology becomes being; epistemology immediately becomes technique, immediately being. This combination could be seen in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon war, whose obvious strategic failure for Israelis generated fierce attacks on the army and political leadership and forced the resignation of the IDF chief of staff. Yet in its wake neither ontology was rethought. Consider how a reserve soldier, while on brigade-sized manoeuvres in the Golan Heights in early 2007, was quoted as saying: 'we are ready for the next war'. Uri Avnery quoted Israeli commentators explaining the rationale for such a war as being to 'eradicate the shame and restore to the army the "deterrent power" that was lost on the battlefields of that unfortunate war'. In 'Israeli public discourse', he remarked, 'the next war is seen as a natural phenomenon, like tomorrow's sunrise.' 22

The danger obviously raised here is that these dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and decisions into a single, unbroken chain whose very process of construction cannot be examined. As is clear in the work of Carl Schmitt, being implies action, the action that is war. This chain is also obviously at work in the U.S. neoconservative doctrine that argues, as Bush did in his 2002 West Point speech, that 'the only path to safety is the path of action', which begs the question of whether strategic practice and theory can be detached from strong ontologies of the insecure nation-state.23 This is the direction taken by much realist analysis critical of Israel and the Bush administration's 'war on terror'.24 Reframing such concerns in Foucauldian terms, we could argue that obsessive ontological commitments have led to especially disturbing 'problematizations' of truth.25 However such rationalist critiques rely on a one-sided interpretation of Clausewitz that seeks to disentangle strategic from existential reason, and to open up choice in that way. However without interrogating more deeply how they form a conceptual harmony in Clausewitz's thought -- and thus in our dominant understandings of politics and war -- tragically violent 'choices' will continue to be made.

The essay concludes by pondering a normative problem that arises out of its analysis: if the divisive ontology of the national security state and the violent and instrumental vision of 'enframing' have, as Heidegger suggests, come to define being and drive 'out every other possibility of revealing being', how can they be escaped?26 How can other choices and alternatives be found and enacted? How is there any scope for agency and resistance in the face of them? Their social and discursive power -- one that aims to take up the entire space of the political -- needs to be respected and understood. However, we are far from powerless in the face of them. The need is to critique dominant images of political being and dominant ways of securing that being at the same time, and to act and choose such that we bring into the world a more sustainable, peaceful and non-violent global rule of the political.

Friend and Enemy: Violent Ontologies of the Nation-State

In his Politics Among Nations Hans Morgenthau stated that 'the national interest of a peace-loving nation can only be defined in terms of national security, which is the irreducible minimum that diplomacy must defend with adequate power and without compromise'. While Morgenthau defined security relatively narrowly -- as the 'integrity of the national territory and its institutions' -- in a context where security was in practice defined expansively, as synonymous with a state's broadest geopolitical and economic 'interests', what was revealing about his formulation was not merely the ontological centrality it had, but the sense of urgency and priority he accorded to it: it must be defended 'without compromise'.27 Morgenthau was a thoughtful and complex thinker, and understood well the complexities and dangers of using armed force. However his formulation reflected an influential view about the significance of the political good termed 'security'. When this is combined with the way in which security was conceived in modern political thought as an existential condition -- a sine qua non of life and sovereign political existence -- and then married to war and instrumental action, it provides a basic underpinning for either the **limitless resort to strategic violence** without effective constraint, or the perseverance of limited war (with its inherent tendencies to escalation) as a permanent feature of politics. While he was no militarist, Morgenthau did say elsewhere (in, of all places, a far-reaching critique of nuclear strategy) that the 'quantitative and qualitative competition for conventional weapons is a rational instrument of international politics'.28

The conceptual template for such an image of national security state can be found in the work of Thomas Hobbes, with his influential conception of the political community as a tight unity of sovereign and people in which their bodies meld with his own to form a 'Leviathan', and which must be defended from enemies within and without. His image of effective security and sovereignty was one that was intolerant of internal difference and dissent, legitimating a strong state with coercive and exceptional powers to preserve order and sameness. This was a vision not merely of political order but of existential identity, set off against a range of existential others who were sources of threat, backwardness, instability or incongruity.29 It also, in a way set out with frightening clarity by the theorist Carl Schmitt and the philosopher Georg Hegel, exchanged internal unity, identity and harmony for permanent alienation from other such communities (states). Hegel presaged Schmitt's thought with his argument that individuality and the state are single moments of 'mind in its freedom' which 'has an infinitely negative relation to itself, and hence its essential character from its own point of view is its singleness':

Individuality is awareness of one's existence as a unit in sharp distinction from others. It manifests itself here in the state as a relation to other states, each of which is autonomous vis-a-vis the others...this negative relation of the state to itself is embodied in the world as the relation of one state to another and as if the negative were something external.30

Schmitt is important both for understanding the way in which such alienation is seen as a definitive way of imagining and limiting political communities, and for understanding how such a rigid delineation is linked to the inevitability and perpetuation of war. Schmitt argued that the existence of a state 'presupposes the political', which must be understood through 'the specific political distinction...between friend and enemy'. The enemy is 'the other, the stranger; and it sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in an extreme case conflicts with him are possible'.31 The figure of the enemy is constitutive of the state as 'the specific entity of a people'.32 Without it society is not political and a people cannot be said to exist:

Only the actual participants can correctly recognise, understand and judge the concrete situation and settle the extreme case of conflict...to judge whether the adversary intends to negate his opponent's way of life and therefore must be repulsed or fought in order to preserve one's own form of existence.33

Schmitt links this stark ontology to war when he states that the political is only authentic 'when a fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity. The enemy is solely the public enemy, because everything that has a relationship to such a collectivity of men, particularly to the whole nation, becomes public by virtue of such a relationship...in its entirety the state as an organised political entity decides for itself the friend-enemy distinction'.34 War, in short, is an existential condition:

 the entire life of a human being is a struggle and every human being is symbolically a combatant. The friend, enemy and combat concepts receive their real meaning precisely because they refer to the real possibility of physical killing. War follows from enmity. War is the existential negation of the enemy.35

Schmitt claims that his theory is not biased towards war as a choice ('It is by no means as though the political signifies nothing but devastating war and every political deed a military action...it neither favours war nor militarism, neither imperialism nor pacifism') but it is hard to accept his caveat at face value.36

When such a theory takes the form of a social discourse (which it does in a general form) such an ontology can only support, as a kind of originary ground, the basic Clausewitzian assumption that **war can be a rational way of resolving political conflicts** -- because the import of Schmitt's argument is that such 'political' conflicts are ultimately expressed through the possibility of war. As he says: 'to the enemy concept belongs the ever-present possibility of combat'.37 Where Schmitt meets Clausewitz, as I explain further below, the existential and rationalistic ontologies of war join into a closed circle of mutual support and justification.

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#### Humans are not rational

**Krieger 2k –** [The Irrationality of Deterrence: A Modern Zen Koan by David \*, April 7, , *\** David Krieger is President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. <http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2000/04/07_krieger_irrationality.htm>]

\*\*\*Do not endorse gendered language\*\*\*

Even more detrimental to the theory of deterrence is irrationality. Can anyone seriously believe that humans always act rationally? Of course not. We are creatures who are affected by emotions and passions as well as intellect. Rationality is not to be relied upon. People do not always act in their own best interests. Examples abound. Almost everyone knows that smoking causes terrible diseases and horrible deaths, and yet hundreds of millions of people continue to smoke. We know that the stock markets are driven by passions as much as they are by rationality. The odds are against winning at the gambling tables in Las Vegas, and yet millions of people accept the odds, believing that they can win despite the odds. Nuclear deterrence is based on rationality -- the belief that a rational leader will not attack a country with nuclear weapons for fear of retaliation. And yet, it is clearly irrational to believe that rationality will always prevail. Let me put it another way. Isn't it irrational for a nation to rely upon deterrence, which is based upon humans always acting rationally (which they don't), to provide for its national security? Those who champion deterrence appear rational, but in fact prove their irrationality by their unfounded faith in human rationality. With nuclear deterrence, the deterring country threatens to retaliate with nuclear weapons if it is attacked. What if a country is attacked by nuclear weapons, but is unable to identify the source of the attack? How does it retaliate? Obviously, it either guesses, retaliates against an innocent country, or doesn't retaliate. So much for deterrence. What if a national leader or terrorist with a nuclear weapon believed he could attack without being identified? It doesn't matter whether he is right or wrong. It is his belief that he is unidentifiable that matters. So much for deterrence. What if a leader of a country doesn't care if his country is retaliated against? What if he believes he has nothing more to lose, like a nuclear-armed Hitler in his bunker? So much for deterrence! It takes only minimal analysis to realize that nuclear deterrence is a fool's game. The unfortunate corollary is that those who propound nuclear deterrence are fools in wise men's garb. The further corollary is that we have entrusted the future of the human species to a small group of fools. These include the political and military leaders, the corporate executives who support them and profit from building the weapons systems, and the academics and other intellectuals like Henry Kissinger, who provide the theoretical underpinnings for the concept of deterrence.

#### Deterrence is non-falsifiable and empirically has failed

Wilson 08 (Ward, former Fellow at the Robert Kennedy Memorial Foundation, “The Myth Of Nuclear Deterrence,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 15, No. 3, November, TH)

Some people try to make the case for nuclear deterrence not by explaining its theoretical basis but by simply pointing to its track record. They assert that nuclear deterrence prevented nuclear attacks for the thirty years from 1950 to 1980 and claim that that is proof enough of its efficacy. There are problems with this, however. In order to answer the question, ‘‘did deterrence work?’’ you must first be able to know whether your opponent had a fully formed intention to attack and then refrained from doing so because of your threat. Questions of intention, particularly the intention of world leaders - who are typically reluctant to admit being thwarted in almost any circumstances - are rarely documented, and when documentary evidence is present, difficult to judge. As George and Smoke note, ‘‘It is difficult . . . to identify cases of deterrence success reliably in the absence of better data on the policy calculations of potential initiators who were presumably deterred. Instances of apparently successful deterrence...may be spur- ious.’’39 There are also a number of other plausible explanations for the absence of war during this period. Most major wars are followed by periods, sometimes quite long periods, of relative peace. The hundred years following the Napoleonic wars were for the most part ones of peace in Europe. The period following the Thirty Years War also was strikingly pacific. Why does it make sense to attribute the peace following the Thirty Years War and the Napoleonic Wars to ‘‘war weariness,’’ ‘‘economic exhaustion,’’ or ‘‘domestic political distraction,’’ but the peace after World War II to nuclear deterrence? Consider, for example, the case of chemical weapons following World War I. The conditions necessary for deterrence with these weapons of mass destruction were present. In the early 1920s, Germany, England, France, Italy, Russia, the United States, and others possessed the means necessary (industrial capacity to mass produce the chemical agents, bombers with sufficient range and carrying capacity, naval ships capable of firing large shells over long ranges) to use chemical weapons against the densely populated coastal and interior urban centers of their enemies.40 Such attacks, properly planned and executed, could have killed hundreds of thousands. They would certainly have ranked on a par with the most deadly city attacks in World War II. Yet no standard histories of the post􏰀World War I era ascribe the peace that was maintained during those years to a ‘‘delicate balance’’ of deadly weapons of mass destruction. We do not rush to give deterrence the credit for the peace of those years. If nuclear weapons are seen as preventing war from 1950 to 1980, why is it that chemical weapons are not seen as having prevented war for the seven years from 1918 to 1925?41 Locating the reason why an action or phenomenon did not occur, finding the cause of an absence, is always problematic. For example, I believe firmly that the garlic I wear around my neck has prevented vampire attacks. The proof, I say, is that no vampires have, as yet, attacked me. Yet objective observers might still be skeptical. The problem with the claim about deterrence is that although there were contingency plans on both sides, there is little evidence that either the United States or the Soviet Union was ever on the brink of launching an aggressive war against the other. There is certainly no evidence of such an action that was planned, agreed to, and then thwarted by the threat of nuclear counterattack.42 How is it possible to assert that deterrence prevented war without clear evidence that war was ever imminent? It might be argued that while there is no particular war that was abandoned because of deterrence, deterrence did engender a general mutual restraint both in normal diplomatic relations and during the numerous crises of the Cold War. It is true that the large nuclear arsenals in the United States and the Soviet Union induced caution during this period. Numerous memoirs of leaders on both sides attest to this fact. But this is not evidence that deterrence worked. The mutual caution of the Cold War is evidence that nuclear weapons are dangerous, not that they are effective weapons of war or useful for threatening. To understand this, imagine a counterfactual involving biological weapons. No one argues that biological weapons are ideal weapons. They are blunt instruments, clumsy and difficult to employ effectively. Targeting with precision is a particular problem, as the wind has an unfortunate tendency to blow in unexpected directions, and the biological agents can, under certain circumstances, blow back on your own troops or population. No one argues that biological weapons are decisive weapons of war, crucial for security. They argue instead that biological weapons are dangerous, clumsy weapons that are best banned. Imagine, however, that following World War II the United States and Soviet Union had been armed with large arsenals of biological weapons mounted on missiles kept on hair-trigger alert. Is it difficult to believe that such arsenals would have induced caution on both sides? Yet we would not take this caution as proof that biological weapons were any less clumsy, difficult to aim, or difficult to control. We would not take this caution as proof that biological weapons are actually more militarily effective than we had previously thought. In the same way, nuclear weapons are dangerous (and induce caution) without being particularly effective. The caution on both sides during the Cold War is not proof of the deterrent value of nuclear weapons. Although the successes of nuclear deterrence over the thirty years from 1950 to 1980 are speculative, its failures are not. Despite expectations to the contrary, the U.S. nuclear monopoly in the four years after World War II did not yield significantly greater diplomatic influence.43 Far from being cowed, the Soviets were very tough in post-war negotiations, culminating in the 1948 showdown over access to Berlin. Nuclear weapons also failed to give their possessors a decisive military advantage in war. The United States was fought to a draw in Korea and subsequently lost a war fought in Vietnam, despite possessing the ‘‘ultimate weapon.’’ The Soviet Union found that its nuclear arsenal could not prevent failure in its own guerrilla war in Afghanistan. Since Vietnam, the United States has fought in the Persian Gulf, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.44 In none of these wars were its opponents intimidated into surrendering, nor could a practical use for nuclear weapons be devised.