# Round 2—Aff vs NU MP

## 1AC

### 1ac

#### We draw inspiration from Sarah Wenanchak when they writes…

Drones are fictional, Adam Rothstein says. “[T]hey are a cultural characterization of many different things, compiled into a single concept.” I think this is persuasive and useful, conceptually, so let this be the assumption from which the rest of the argument proceeds – an expansion on one I’ve briefly explored before.

If drones are fictional, what’s the task of drone fiction? What does fiction do, ideally? Fiction immerses. It captivates and moves. It sweeps along. Its project is to make never-happened as real and true and believable as one’s own experience. We know good fiction by the degree to which it does this, even fiction that remains mostly opaque for reasons of style or subject matter. Even fiction that’s difficult to approach is still meant to be a device by which we approach something.

So drone fiction is the means – possibly the only means – by which we can approach drones. If this is the basic project of drone fiction, we should be able to gauge its success by the degree to which we can approach drones at all. And if that’s the case, this project isn’t done. It’s still getting started.

(“Drone Fiction: an expansion”, http://thesocietypages.org/cyborgology/2013/03/22/drone-fiction-an-expansion/,dml)

#### And now, a brief message from our sponsors—

**The Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army, no date**—jokers

(“About the Army”, http://www.clownarmy.org/about/about.html)

Roll up, roll up - ladies and gentlemen, boys and girls, friends and foes - welcome to the unparalleled, the unexpected, the perfectly paradoxical, the grotesquely beautiful, the new-fangled world of the Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army (CIRCA).

We are clandestine because we refuse the spectacle of celebrity and we are everyone. Because without real names, faces or noses, we show that our words, dreams, and desires are more important than our biographies. Because we reject the society of surveillance that watches, controls, spies upon, records and checks our every move. Because by hiding our identity we recover the power of our acts. Because with greasepaint we give resistance a funny face and become visible once again.

We are insurgent because we have risen up from nowhere and are everywhere. Because ideas can be ignored but not suppressed and an insurrection of the imagination is irresistible. Because whenever we fall over we rise up again and again and again, knowing that nothing is lost for history, that nothing is final. Because history doesn't move in straight lines but surges like water, sometimes swirling, sometimes dripping, flowing, flooding - always unknowable, unexpected, uncertain. Because the key to insurgency is brilliant improvisation, not perfect blueprints.

We are rebels because we love life and happiness more than 'revolution'. Because no revolution is ever complete and rebellions continues forever. Because we will dismantle the ghost-machine of abstraction with means that are indistinguishable from ends. Because we don't want to change 'the' world, but 'our' world. Because we will always desert and disobey those who abuse and accumulate power. Because rebels transform everything - the way they live, create, love, eat, laugh, play, learn, trade, listen, think and most of all the way they rebel.

We are clowns because what else can one be in such a stupid world. Because inside everyone is a lawless clown trying to escape. Because nothing undermines authority like holding it up to ridicule. Because since the beginning of time tricksters have embraced life's contradictions, creating coherence through confusion. Because fools are both fearsome and innocent, wise and stupid, entertainers and dissenters, healers and laughing stocks, scapegoats and subversives. Because buffoons always succeed in failing, always say yes, always hope and always feel things deeply. Because a clown can survive everything and get away with anything.

#### Without further ado, a spectacle—

*Arrested Development* season 4, episode 14, “Off the Hook”, 14:34-15:51

[NOTE: Unfortunately, I cannot find an online transcript of this episode. I’ll work on transcribing it when districts is over, but the episode is available on Netflix for subscribers—for those who aren’t, I’ll provide a summary. The scene displayed depicts a man who is characterized as naïve and childlike when he is unwittingly recruited to be a drone pilot. He believes that the targeted killing he engages in is a video game, and as such proves incredible adeptness at it, playing for 47 hours straight. However, eventually he begins to shoot down civilians in Madrid, and when he is informed that he is actually killing people, he collapses, causing “the army’s first injury to a drone pilot”]

#### As Wanenchak reminded us, drones are nothing more—and nothing less—than a fiction, and we can only speak of them in fiction(ed) terms. The current fiction of a drone as autonomous—abstracted—independent—renders imperceptible the sovereign behind the curtain while simultaneously constructing the drone itself as the perfect citizen, carrying out the executive’s will so efficiently that the state isn’t even there. You should be skeptical of any approach that leaves this fiction unquestioned—it’s a state tactic to engender total war into society through making killing more efficient. And here’s the real horror story—while drones aren’t autonomous now, if we don’t investigate these processes, it’s only a matter of time until they will be.

#### Thus, the 1AC offers a counter-fiction of drones—and their operators—as a little less than perfect… perhaps even human?

**Wanenchak 13**—Department of Sociology, University of Maryland

(Sarah, “Drone Obscura”, <http://thesocietypages.org/cyborgology/2013/06/19/drone-obscura/>, dml)

Both Olivia Rosane and Nathan Jurgenson – as well as many other people, in the festival and out of it – have observed that one of the primary features of much of our drone fiction is the removal of the human element, both the human operator and the human casualties (Olivia also makes the extremely important point that drone fiction can and should tear down this project). Our drone fiction denies the presence of human operators; it renders drones autonomous. The consequences of this are significant and significantly troubling.

When a drone is autonomous, there is no one to blame, no one to feel guilt, and no culpability on our own part. The killing of civilians or the surveillance of citizens can be explained away as the act of an ineffable drone god. Even the power of the state behind the drone is erased, or at least subtly minimized – although, as Asher Kohn points out, a drone is also a perfect citizen, a perfect subject of state and corporate power. But for the rest of us, a drone is just there, its power nebulous and yet intensely present, and without human responsibility no one can be held responsible for what it does. As Nathan writes:

My worry is that the agency and humanization many grant the drone deflects the intentionality, and thus responsibility, away from those controlling it. Caught in the fascinating ways the drone is “autonomous”, we spend far too few words on the overwhelming degree to which the drone is no more autonomous than previous tools of surveillance and/or destruction.

So drones aren’t autonomous. The stories we tell about drones need to reflect that; the best stories are true stories, even when they’re fictional, and our drone fiction needs to tell the truth. But what we also shouldn’t forget is that just because drones – the actual vehicles themselves, and in particular here I’m talking about vehicles designed for use in combat – aren’t autonomous yet doesn’t mean they won’t be.

And in fact this is the true, terrifying goal of the drone, the reason it exists at all: the removal of any obvious humanity from the equation.

This isn’t science fiction. The Global Hawk surveillance UAV currently operates with almost no human operator control except in takeoff and landing. Work on creating a more autonomous drone continues.

The thing about this is that, as Nathan says above, none of it is new, at least not in aim. This has always been what we do when we wage war. One of the identifiers of “total war” is industrialism, the degree of technological sophistication, and the goal of technology in war is almost always to kill more of the enemy while leaving more of one’s own forces intact.

The goal of technology in war is, in other words, to make killing more efficient. And humans are profoundly inefficient. It’s also extremely difficult – despite appearances – to get people to kill each other. Studies of soldiers in combat have revealed that a significant number of them intentionally fire over enemy heads rather than shooting to kill. But technological warfare as it’s practiced now tends to distance the killers from the killed (with notable exceptions). With the advent of aerial bombardment that distance became literal. When mass death is reduced to numbers – to physics and casualty counts – it becomes abstract, its various components as nebulous and therefore as blameless as a machine without a mind. Technological warfare obscures – it hides and removes as much as it purports to clarify.

Combat drones are the logical next step in this project. Our common fiction about them erases the people at both ends – the pilots and the casualties. But our fiction is based in something; it always is, that’s what makes it so powerful, but in this case we should be especially careful to make sure that we understand what exactly that base consists of.

On some level we want to remove human agency from drones, yes. That’s why we talk about what we talk about when we talk about drones, why we tell the stories we do. But the thing about fiction is that the line between it and fact is – as all lines are – extremely porous. We should watch what moves.

#### The role of the ballot is to make sovereignty strange—vote aff to foolishly affirm the resolution by clowning targeted killing.

**Amoore and Hall 13**—Department of Geography, University of Durham AND Department of Politics, University of York

(Louise and Alexandra, “The clown at the gates of the camp: Sovereignty, resistance and the figure of the fool”, Security Dialogue 2013 44: 93, dml)

The fool’s madness and wisdom are simultaneously lauded and deplored by sovereign powers. Indeed, the relationship between the sovereign and the fool is symbiotic yet antagonistic. Shakespeare’s fools epitomize the tradition of the ‘sage fool’ and the troublesome relationship with the sovereign. King Lear’s fool, for example, is destined to see and speak the truth as Lear descends into madness. The fool acts as a counterpoint and touchstone to the follies and vanities of those around him, and his[/her/xyr] wisdom and insight are proved greater than those of his[/her/xyr] ‘superiors’. Welsford (1935: 73) characterizes the festival-fool as a ‘curiously unattached figure’ who ‘stands outside the performance’ of ritual as a bringer of luck and fortune. This ‘unattachment’ resonates with Lear’s fool, who is part of the action, yet estranged from it. His words become a commentary on the events unfolding around him, not only in the sense that they provide explanatory observations to the audience, but also in that they make sense of the unfolding tragedy in a way that is unavailable to the king. As Lear is stripped of his title and authority, abandoned by his family and descending into insanity, the fool becomes a lone voice of reason and conscience. Their roles are reversed: the king becomes a fool, and the fool becomes king, telling Lear ‘Thou wouldst make a good fool’. As they wander the heath in the storm, Lear and his fool experience the persistent trope of reliance, reversal and substitution that characterizes the history of the fool and the sovereign. What kind of relation is it that holds the sovereign together with the fool? What gives the fool the ability to speak uncomfortable truths to sovereign power? Certainly, the fool does not enjoy a position of utter impunity. Just as Lear’s fool meets an indeterminate and uncertain end – most likely hanged – so real jesters and court clowns frequently found their unimpeachable position revoked: they could be punished, banished, whipped and fall from favour. For Willeford (1969), however, the fool is ultimately indispensable to sovereign power, and inseparable from it. Ancient kingly power, he argues, was closely associated with sacred forces through which nature and the cosmos could be controlled, and the sovereign political space and its boundaries secured. The liminal fool embodied something of the threatening ‘outside’ from which the sovereign power derived. The king was human and fallible, but also divine, a mediator between the ordered, law-bound kingdom over which he ruled and the chaos beyond. Willeford (1969: 154) suggests that the figure of the fool is the subject who points to the ambiguities of kingly office. More specifically, the fool (in his madness, or clairvoyance, or idiocy) touches the scattered sources of sacred power that bolstered sovereign power, but that threatened to overwhelm it. The fool, in combining the ‘too little’ of idiocy with the ‘too much’ of madness’ (Willeford, 1969: 26), comes to occupy an ambiguous position that is at once celebrated and feared. The fool’s position means that he has acted historically as a decoy or scapegoat’ for sovereign power. Early fool mascots were kept for luck and could draw ill fortune from superiors. The fool in this sense performed a vital duty, but he could also be banished, excommunicated or even slain as a substitute for the king, ritually or literally (Welsford, 1935: 66, 68–69, 74). In sum, a consideration of the history of the clown-fool suggests that he occupies an uneasy and frequently dangerous position in relation to sovereign power. The fool is invited in, tolerated, even lauded. [s]He occupies a privileged, protected position, and the licence that he enjoys allows him[/her/xyr] to speak and act in a way that no one else can. He is outside the norms and laws that govern those around him, but he is also dependent on and vulnerable to the whims of the sovereign. His association with a disordered ‘outside’ (madness, chaos, nature) threatens the king, but his expanded line of sight makes him necessary – he may act as a scapegoat, a lucky mascot or ritual substitute. The fool, then, like Agamben’s topology of the exception, ‘being-outside, and yet belonging’, expresses something of the indistinction between inside and outside that plagues, but is necessary for, the exercise of sovereign power. In this specific sense, sovereign power requires the slippery figure of the fool, who embodies the blurred distinction between inside and outside, and who speaks from a place and with a voice that is otherwise unavailable to the king. Clowning and forms-of-life The cultural genealogy of the fool has profound ramifications for a consideration of the clown at the gates of the camp and resistance to sovereign power. First, we propose, the traditional notions of foolery as a (temporary, even licensed) chaos that reverses or ‘upturns’ modes of power does not fully capture the power of the clown to ‘make strange’. ‘Making strange’ is the process of denaturalizing political practices that appear inevitable or natural (see de Goede, 2005: 381). As a form of critique, ‘making strange’ unsettles what is usually certain, ordered and inevitable. As Foucault (1988: 155) writes, ‘a critique is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are. It is a matter of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged modes of thought the practices we accept rest’. In the context of the border, the exercise of sovereign power relies on the routine enunciation of multiple distinctions – between legal and illegal, between secure and insecure, between authorized and unauthorized. The invisibility of these designations is intrinsic to their mode of governing, and becomes part of a distinctive scopic regime of security (Amoore, 2007; Amoore and Hall, 2010). At the US–Mexican border, for example, this invisibility is twofold: The embedding of detention centres within suburban malls literally hides their materiality, making the exceptionality of the camp part of a mundane urban landscape. The border also becomes part of the everyday routine of life in the region – lining up to cross to see family, presenting documents to officials, submitting to questioning – and becomes unnoticed, familiar, normal. In the UK, similarly, the No Borders Camp at Gatwick was concerned with visually excavating the innocuous-looking detention facility from the sprawling industrial warehouses of the airport periphery. As Jonathan Crary (1992) notes, much of what enters our field of vision, what we encounter, feel, touch and hear, threatens to fall away: attention and distraction are conjoined within visual practices. Attention and distraction are both at work at the sovereign border – ordering what can be seen and what must remain hidden. Consumers at the mall barely notice the razor-wired perimeter fence of the neighbouring ICE detention facility; tourists crossing to Mexico for the day barely notice the people who cross several times a day to work and conduct family life; commuters barely notice the illegal migrants gathering outside DIY depots to be picked up for work. The clown, as we have seen, brings an expanded or enhanced vision to what is normally accepted, ignored or settled. As the clowns circled the ICE detention facility in a noisy dance with other No Border campers, temporarily claiming the highway outside the facility for a 20-minute ‘dance party’, the road, mall and facility itself took on a different aspect (see Figure 3). As the comfortable journeys of shoppers, diners and commuters were interrupted, passers-by looked on with consternation. The clowns, shaking the detention fence, calling through the gate, creeping along the floor and cavorting in front of the guards, asking innocently how they could help the guards escape, were met with blank confusion. The political significance of estrangement lies in the way it interrupts and unsettles the familiar and ordinary to make people notice what was previously taken for granted. As we have argued elsewhere and in relation to installation art, the interruption has political significance because it is unsettling; it acts without full actualization in subjects and objects (see Amoore and Hall, 2010). William Connolly (2011: 62) similarly signals the ‘interruption of smooth narratives’ that he locates in the ‘jumps in experience’ of film and theatre. As members of CIRCA note, clowning interventions act precisely with such jumps in everyday experience, there being no single ‘right interpretation’ for the action because ‘it’s already slippery’**,** as one member put it. Significantly, detention guards and police responded to the uproar by recording the clownish antics via mobile phones and video cameras, recalling the Minutemen’s angry cries to the police to ‘get these illegal clowns out of here’: ‘they don’t belong here … get them out of here … get on the other side’. **These responses were an effort to reinstate clear lines** between legal and illegal, order and disorder. The claim to represent proper citizenship within a governable order – a claim that is central to the Minutemen’s vigilanteeism, for example – rests on the designation of some who ‘don’t belong’: illegal migrants, ‘unpatriotic’ citizens, laughing clowns. The cry that the clowns ‘don’t belong’ or that their place is ‘on the other side’ seeks to place the clown in an identifiable position. The clown as form-of-life, however, always already does not belong, is already outside the law, thereby eluding efforts to be locate him comfortably within the visual economy of the border, or within a terrain where lawful and unlawful, belonging and anomaly could be clearly distinguished. Here we would also draw a distinction between clowning as mockery and clowning as a form of ‘making strange’, while noting the interrelationship between the two. Foucault (1999: 13) noted that traditions that show the powerful to be ludicrous (like clowning or ritual carnivalesque) are not sufficient for limiting the effects of power and ‘magically dethroning the person to whom one gives the crown’. Instead, showing the powerful to be ridiculous is ‘a way of giving a striking form of expression to the unavoidability, the inevitability of power, which can function in its full rigor and at the extreme point of its rationality even when in the hands of someone who is effectively discredited’ (Foucault, 1999: 13). Moreover, the clown’s ravaging of the status quo is regarded as ‘momentary’, his influence unequal to that of the king, and his critical capacities sometimes simply shoring up established norms and values (Mitchell, 1992: 19–20). However, the clown’s inability to topple the king, or to create an alternative world, does not strictly diminish the importance of laughter and foolery within the ‘manifold discursive practices that … create space for alternative imaginations’ (de Goede, 2005: 381; see also Bleiker, 2000). The history of the fool and the sovereign demonstrates that a ‘grand eschatological move of overcoming’ is unfeasible (Edkins, 2007: 87). The clown as form-of-life does not exhibit locatable identity, nor rally to a clearly-defined issue, nor call for a specific response, nor make his[/her] intentions explicit. He shatters what is normally certain, making it appear fraught and difficult. It is precisely this revelation or exposure that underpins political critique as Foucault describes it: uncovering intractability and removing the settled and definite grounds for judgement. For philosopher Thomas Keenan, such a removal of grounds is essential to political life. ‘Politics is difficult. It is difficulty itself’, he writes, such that ‘the only responsibility worthy of the name comes with the withdrawal of the rules or the knowledge on which we might rely to make our decisions for us’ (Keenan, 1997: 1). This, then, is the capacity of the clown to ‘make strange’ – to remove what we thought was certain and to reveal the difficulty that is political life. Second, the clown evades complete capture within the lines dividing inside from outside, lines on which sovereign power relies. The separation of interior and exterior is absolutely fundamental to accounts of the production of a governable political order and the operation of the sovereign border (Walker, 1993). Yet, sovereignty relies precisely on the ambiguity of the lines separating inside and outside, even as its operation seeks to clearly define them. After Agamben, sovereign power rests on the capacity to ‘take outside’, to include within the governable order by means of exclusion. The distinction between politically qualified life and life made bare is fundamental to Agamben’s account, as is the relationship of banishment and the form of personhood that is produced by the ban. Agamben summons the ancient term sacer to understand the way in which a condemned and banished life may be ‘sacred’, as it may be extinguished yet not sacrificed (see Grotanelli, 1983: 134). Homo sacer assumes a banned existence and ‘is reduced to a bare life stripped of every right’, yet remains ‘in a continuous relationship with power that banished him precisely insofar as he is at every instant exposed to an unconditional threat of death’ (Agamben, 1998: 183). Crucially, the condition of homo sacer haunts all species life – anyone, any life may become a subject from whom law is withdrawn – if such a move is deemed expedient or necessary within the sovereign decision on the exception. As Decaroli (2007: 47) argues, banishment (and sovereignty) rests on an outside – real, virtual, divine – where one can be banished. The contemporary camps, detention centres and border holding zones, like the ones in Calexico or Gatwick, are the spatial inscription of this ‘inside/outside’. Yet, the indistinction between law and violence, inclusion and exclusion in the camp, is mirrored in the other reading of banishment that the clown and fool provide. Cultural history shows the fool periodically becoming homo sacer – banished, scapegoated, exiled – but his inhabitation of the zone of indistinction does not reduce him[/her] to abject, power-less bare life. Having touched the ‘outside’, he gains a unique traction and may return to sovereign circles, as a figure of luck or awe. Banishment does not herald a complete biopolitical fracture, but a potential transformation. Indeed, ancient fables see the trickster fool condemned and banished for a criminal infraction, yet transmuting into a hero champion, invigorated by his outlaw status (see Grottanelli, 1983). Grottanelli (1983: 136–137) argues that homo sacer and the trickster fool are lowly and impure, but also important and sacred, a paradoxical status that comes from embodying the liminality and impurity of barriers. The crisis that the clown provokes rests on the way he or she troubles the topography of inside and outside on which sovereign distinctions rely. The fool-clown is not able to be taken outside in order to include, as sovereign logic demands. He is of the outside already, and he folds what sovereign power seeks to make separate (outside and inside, law and outlaw, inclusion and exile) constantly inwards. The position of the clown is akin to Didier Bigo’s (2001: 46) invocation of the Möbius strip in the context of the international securitized border, where the border between the inside and outside ‘is contingent rather than fixed’, and where ‘one never knows on which face one is located’. An alternative vision of political subjectivity within the sovereign ban, then, is one that holds together the vulnerability and exposure of homo sacer with the errant and troublesome fool, who embodies the aporia that plagues sovereign power. CIRCA describes itself as an army of fools who have ‘thrown away their sceptres and broken the chains that shackled them to the throne’, giving the clown an insolent, dangerous and disobedient capacity to challenge and provoke. In this claim, CIRCA invokes the idea of resistance or contestation necessarily breaking free or standing outside or ‘apart’ in order to face, oppose or defy the locus of power. Our point, though, is precisely that it is the very proximity of the clown to the king (and the concomitant proximity of relations of resistance to relations of power) that haunts the sovereign decisions taking place in what Connolly (2011: 135) calls the ‘shadow zone’ of contemporary security. It is important to note that the shackles that bind the fool and the sovereign together are onerous not just for the fool, and can never be entirely broken. The fool’s madness, his licence, his insanity or literal exile means that he is beyond capture within the ‘tight logic’ that Agamben proposes for sovereign power. It is the fool’s very inseparability from sovereign power that is most provocative, rather than his ability to set himself apart. The ban produces a situation where ‘it is literally not possible to say whether the one who has been banned is outside or inside the juridical order’ (Agamben, 1998: 28). To be an ‘outlaw’ is to make it impossible to be completely ‘without the law’ in the sense of homo sacer. An outlaw that is produced by sovereign power may also be an ‘existence over which power no longer seems to have any hold’ (Agamben, 1998: 153). The fool figure is not comfortably encompassed within the divisions or lines set out by sovereign power, nor by the demands for identity and cause of social movements. The clown is always outside himself, a divided and fractionated subject whose political subjectivity is layered and disordered long in advance of biopolitics. The reading we have given of the clown-fool points to a form of politics that is always already proximate to the lines and distinctions that form part of sovereign power’s logic. What is evident from the clown-fool’s history is that resistance to the ‘paradoxical logic of sovereignty’ is not that which transcends, or overcomes, but that which destabilizes via an acknowledgement that life (and sovereign distinctions) is ‘more messy, layered, and complex than any logical analysis can capture’ (Connolly, 2005: 29). The finality of the biopolitical fractures that Agamben discusses, those between political and bare life, are not complete at all.

#### This means the only logical response to the terror of targeted killing is to laugh—for what else can we do in such a stupid world?

**Heath-Kelly 12**—Research Fellow, Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick

(Charlotte, “Can We Laugh Yet? Reading Post-9/11 Counterterrorism Policy as Magical Realism and Opening a Third-Space of Resistance”, Eur J Crim Policy Res (2012) 18:343–360, dml)

This neutral framing refuses knowledge of conventional understandings of targeted assassination, but is actually bound in a paradox with everything it refuses. The rational and technological delineation of the official drone strike discourse clashes profoundly with the fantastic and almost supernatural reality of UAV’s. Outside the careful discussion of drone casualties, UAV’s are unashamedly presented as terrifying flying-death-robots. For instance, they are named to inspire horror—varieties include the ‘predator’, the ‘sky warrior’ and the ‘reaper’. They are even afforded agency in descriptions of their capability to ‘loiter’ and ‘recognise and categorise’; for example:

The Predator, the most commonly used drone in the American arsenal, can loiter at 25,000 ft for nearly 40 h, and is equipped with two Hellfire missiles and two cameras— one infrared and one regular—that can read a license plate from two miles up… The Reaper can fly at twice the altitude and speed of the Predator and can carry eight Hellfire missiles or four missiles and two laser-guided bombs. It also carries an improved camera and software package that can “recognize and categorize humans and human-made objects,” such as improvised explosive devices. (Callam 2010)

If we consider the War on Terror as a magical realist text, then the technical discussion of drones fits within the modern rationalist paradigm—whereas their actual function is more akin to fantasy or science fiction. The boundary between the two paradigms is seriously blurred, as befits the style of magical realism. The exercise becomes ridiculous and amusing when counter-terrorism practitioners find it necessary to respond to this overlap. Given the semi-autonomous capacity of drones to recognise and categorise humans, there is now serious discussion within defence and academic circles about the importance of keeping ‘humans in the loop’ with regard to fighting-robots. Academics and defence professionals are invoking the prospect of rogue robots and the supernatural situation of the Terminator movies, where forays into robotic war machinery result in the near extermination of mankind. For example, in a review of P W Singer’s Robots at War, the co-authors of Moral Machines: Teaching Robots Right from Wrong highlighted the problems with granting ‘greater autonomy to robots carrying lethal weapons’ and called for ‘humans to be kept in the loop’ (Allen and Wallach 2009: 6). Even the UK Ministry of Defence fears an encroaching ‘Terminator’ style situation. In the MoD report entitled The UK Approach to Unmanned Aircraft Systems, the technological neutrality of automated death is spectacularly juxtaposed (in the magical realist style) with the supernatural threat posed by autonomous weaponised robots. For example:

Robots cannot be emotive, cannot hate. A target is a series of ones and zeros, and once the decision is made, by whatever means, that the target is legitimate, then prosecution of that target is made mechanically. The robot does not care that the target is human or inanimate, terrorist or freedom fighter, savage or barbarian. A robot cannot be driven by anger to carry out illegal actions such as those at My Lai. In theory, therefore, autonomy should enable more ethical and legal warfare. However, we must be sure that clear accountability for robotic thought exists… the UK must establish quickly a clear policy on what will constitute acceptable machine behaviour in future; there is already a significant body of scientific opinion that believes in banning autonomous weapons outright, countered by an acceptance in other areas that autonomy is inevitable. There is a danger that time is running out—is debate and development of policy even still possible, or is the technological genie already out of the ethical bottle, embarking us all on an incremental and involuntary journey towards a Terminator-like reality? (Ministry of Defence 2011: 5/11–12)

Such a remarkable third space between the neutral policy discourse of technologised death and the supernatural reality of flying ‘Terminator’ robots is compounded by apparent fears within the Ministry of Defence that our ‘controlling humanity’ might be lost in the transition to automated systems (Ibid: 5/9). Drones are placed, even in the official discourse of internal MoD reports, as blurring the boundaries between the technological paradigm of war fighting and the impending supernatural catastrophe.

Indeed, even the attribution of agency to drones in official discourse can blur the boundaries between the ‘real’ and the supernatural. The discussion of technologising the decision to kill or to abstain, and placing it in the hands of a code which models behaviour patterns to determine terrorist behaviour, can attribute a supernatural dimensions to UAV strikes. While defending the capability of drones to distinguish between legitimate and civilian targets on the ground, political discourse frames them as an omnipotent arbiter— capable of perfectly judging those below and wreaking havoc on the guilty. The use of behavioural coding in targeting is presented as offering a form of infallible justice—which taken as suggesting Divine omnipotence.5 The perfect justice of the robot understands targets through ‘a series of ones and zeros, and once the decision is made, by whatever means, that the target is legitimate, then prosecution of that target is made mechanically. The robot does not care that the target is human or inanimate, terrorist or freedom fighter, savage or barbarian’ (Ministry of Defence 2011: 5/11). The description of the drone blurs the boundaries between technocratic governance and omnipotent supernatural God—a style we might relate to the literary genre of magical realism.

Finally, the magical of realism of drone strikes can also be seen in situations where that mechanised targeting fails to determine target identities. The boundary between the rationalist paradigm and the supernatural is once again problematised by the remarkable return of several terrorists from their (apparent) drone-strike-deaths—deaths claimed by the US military. Muhammad Idrees Ahmad notes the incredible 16 deaths of Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud in drone strikes. He quips that Mehsud seemed reluctant to settle in the afterlife (Ahmad 2011). Making comparisons with the magical realism of Gabriel Garcia Marquez’s novel One Hundred Years of Solitude, Ahmad notes the fates shared between those labelled as ‘senior Taliban targets’ and Marquez’s protagonist Melquiades—who returned to life, having been unable to bear the tedium of death (Ibid). Taking the magical realism of drone strikes to their logical conclusion, Ahmad simply states:

Death is clearly not what it used to be. (Ahmad 2011)

This humourous rendering of the magical realist dimension of the War on Terror exposes the knowledge we are encouraged to forget. Politics would like to technologise the discussion of drone-strike capability and accuracy, but in invoking the omnipotence of supposed-drone-Gods and silencing their mistakes, the force of laughter returns to identify the contours of what we remember and forget. The ridiculous juxtaposition of flying-deathrobots next to claims of beneficent and impartial warfighting has been openly mocked on popular satirical news websites, including the Onion’s report ‘Could the Use of Flying Death Robots be Hurting America’s Reputation Worldwide?’ (The Onion 2011) and the Daily Mash report ‘Predator Drone Visiting Afghan Families on Condolence Mission’ (The Daily Mash 2012). This third space of laughter might offer us a chance to resist the logic of the War on Terror by escaping the arguments for and against the accuracy/legality of drones. Such arguments reproduce the War on Terror discourse by using terminology of security, necessity and ethics, rather than showing how the War on Terror actually deconstructs its own claims by juxtaposing the apparent requirements of security against the spectre of omnipotent robot killers. Through ridicule we might re-engage with this paradox.

#### We end, again, with the Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army—

**The Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army, no date**—jokers

(“About the Army”, http://www.clownarmy.org/about/about.html)

We are an army because we live on a planet in permanent war - a war of money against life, of profit against dignity, of progress against the future. Because a war that gorges itself on death and blood and shits money and toxins, deserves an obscene body of deviant soldiers. Because only an army can declare absurd war on absurd war. Because combat requires solidarity, discipline and commitment. Because alone clowns are pathetic figures, but in groups and gaggles, brigades and battalions, they are extremely dangerous. We are an army because we are angry and where bombs fail we might succeed with mocking laughter. And laughter needs an echo.

We are circa because we are approximate and ambivalent, neither here nor there, but in the most powerful of all places, the place in-between order and chaos.

RUN AWAY FROM THE CIRCUS
JOIN THE FORCES OF THE CLANDESTINE INSURGENT REBEL CLOWN ARMY

## 2AC

### case

#### State’s irrelevant

**Fletcher 9**—Assistant Professor of Theatre History at Louisiana State University [NSMs=newest social movements]

(John, “Of Minutemen and Rebel Clown Armies: Reconsidering Transformative Citizenship”, Text and Performance Quarterly Vol. 29, No. 3, July 2009, pp. 222-238, dml)

In invoking Mikhail Bakhtin’s carnival, the suspension and reversal of normal social order, CIRCA joins a variety of other movements, many of whom combine nonviolent direct action with what Simon Critchley calls ‘‘tactical frivolity’’\*resisting not through armed revolution but through the creation of play-zones that **render authority absurd or useless** (Critchley 124).18 Activist Richard Day writes that, in contrast to Gramscian models, these ‘‘newest social movements’’ (NSMs) **show little interest in conveying a disciplined, coordinated message about** what the state should be. They operate ‘‘non-hegemonically **rather than counter-hegemonically**’’ (Day 49). The only party they’re interested in is the one they throw. And increasingly, leftist protests against events like G-8 conventions resemble big celebrations\*Carnivals Against Capitalism, flash parties\*attended by an ever-growing host of diverse groups, unified not by a shared doctrine or even a shared sense of citizenship in a state but by an ethos of community-without-state-authority. The intellectual grounding for such anti-state NSMs is not Marxism but anarchism, which has over the past decade experienced something of a renaissance.19 Anarchist David Graeber lists some features common to many of these new anarchist movements. Broadly, post-anarchists see state structures as **inherently contaminated by the corrupting effects of political authority**. They consider ‘‘within the system’’ solutions **doomed to replicate the** hierarchical oppressions **they combat**. Nevertheless, Graeber points out, anarchism does not mean anarchy; anarchists oppose not organization per se but rather what they see as the anti-democratic leaders-and-led models of much activism (Graeber 70). Post-anarchist movements favor instead what Barbara Epstein calls ‘‘prefigurative politics’’\***activist tactics that replicate the world activists wish to create** (Epstein 338). In protests, parties, or carnivals, post-anarchist social movements strive to embody a kind of nonviolent, non-coercive, flatstructured direct democracy in which no-one is in charge and **everyone takes responsibility for the health of the community**. NSMs create temporary spaces of anarchist non-state within the flux and flow of normal state operations. Crucially for my purposes, these non-states do not observe conventions of citizenship. The boundaries to anarchist play-zones are porous and indistinct. Anyone is welcome to join or leave as they like. The Clandestine Clowns take the non-citizen element to an extreme, submerging individual identities, and thus any prior nation-state attachments, beneath greasepaint and funny nicknames.

### outclowning

#### Here’s a card to explain that

**Amoore and Hall 13**—Department of Geography, University of Durham AND Department of Politics, University of York

(Louise and Alexandra, “The clown at the gates of the camp: Sovereignty, resistance and the figure of the fool”, Security Dialogue 2013 44: 93, dml)

The clown, then, embodies ‘life’s contradictions’, as CIRCA puts it, displaying an errant subjectivity that evades and exceeds the governing of species life. The clown does not demand to be recognized or have a definable claim acknowledged, or seek to draw different authoritative lines to those of sovereign power. The way in which the clown ‘calls the bluff’ of sovereign power (Edkins, 2007) is by exhibiting a life that is indefinite, a singular existence. It is a ‘form-of-life’ that is attuned to emergent worlds, worlds of becoming that, William Connolly (2011: 10) writes, invite ‘experimental intervention in a world that exceeds human powers of attunement, explanation, prediction, mastery, or control’. The clowns exhibit just such a spirit of experimental intervention, **with** no endgame in sight**,** no desire to wrest mastery and control from the sovereign**,** no ambition to explain the present or predict the future. As exemplars of an indefinite life that is not attached to recognizable sovereign claims (‘I am a citizen’ or ‘we are a social movement’, for example), **the clowns signal a novel form of political potentiality**. Clowns are characters who exhibit and perform the fractionated and unknowable, undecidable life of all political subjects. Their playing alongside sovereign power acts through gestures, styles and forms **that defy a unified identity claim** or body politic. Moving restlessly between the echoes of apparent universals (human rights, humane treatment, collective voices and claims) and the particular and finite gestures of this ICE facility, that shopping mall, this fence, **the clowns embody singularity itself**. Their associations – with each other, with the border guards, with state and sovereign, with the fence and the mall – are less akin to a right to free association, and more like an associative life of agile connections, lively gatherings, modulated action and indefinite claims. Conclusions: The teeming life of the camp A few days after the detention-facility encounter near Calexico, the CIRCA clowns were found once more at the San Ysidro crossing into Mexico. With whistles, police costumes, and a large sign depicting an arrow and the slogan ‘One Way’, the clowns swarmed a group of academics, artists and activists who were being given a walking tour of the border. As people crossed the turnstile into Mexico, the clowns drew amused and confused glances (see Figures 4, 5). Reflecting on the event in the days that followed, one CIRCA member explained: Well they [the group] were going on a tour to see the, the contradictions of the border…. But we wanted to highlight their contradictions, like, as a group, which is, like, definitely part of the contradictions of the border. Like academics, like privileged people touring the border … turning it into this something that is in itself a contradiction. The target for this clowning action was a group of participants in the border tour who had used World Bank funding to build access stairways in Caracas slums. The clown’s desire had been to reveal what she saw as the absurdity and hypocrisy of this enterprise – of using World Bank funds to make it easier for slum dwellers to get to the ‘city where they can work for poverty wages’. A fellow clown disagreed: although accepting funds from the World Bank for a scheme such as this was ‘outrageous’, the idea of serving the community via architectural improvements was sound. It is this difficulty, **the political impossibility of** a definite target**,** established grounds**,** a defined aim**, that is an element held across not only the actions of the clowns but also** all forms and modalities of resistance politics. To confront or to turn to face sovereign power is never fully realizable. The participants in the Calexico No Border camp recognize that their gathering is held together across uncertainties, that the camp is ‘a difficult space to be in’. In this sense, the clown as a form-of-life **that exceeds identity formation is a metaphor for all forms of resistance and dissent that shatter the social movements’ demand for a being together based on** a definitive ‘we’**,** a definitive foe**,** a clear end goal. As Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau and Slavoj Zizek (2000: 2) have written: Social movements often rely on identity claims, but identity itself is never fully constituted…. It does not follow that the failure of identity to achieve complete determination undermines the social movements at issue; on the contrary, that incompleteness is essential. The incompleteness is essential – and so the manifest absence of a definite position on the border camp or actions at the border **does not negate the capacity for resistance**. On the contrary, incompleteness, uncertainty and indeterminacy **are the** conditions of possibility **for the making of political claims**. ‘We might insist’, write Butler et al. (2000: 37), ‘that universality is an emergence, or a non-place’. In the actions of clowning, **we find precisely** the absence of an identity claim, a dwelling within singularities, and a gathering of emergent elements that are chaotic, absurd, confusing and bawdy. The clowns at the gates show that the camp is teeming and thriving with life: whistles, facepaint, flags, guitars, video cameras, tents, water bottles, horns. Their objects and antics are met with confusion, laughter and the call that they ‘have no place here’, no place in law, no place on the visible landscape of qualified civic and political life. Yet, as we have shown in our reading of the genealogy of the clown-fool, **to be outside of the law**, an outlaw, to have no place, **places the clown in curious proximity to the king**. Sovereignty is an extraordinarily agile and adaptive practice, and in its contemporary form **it acts ever more voraciously on the affective, sentient and corporeal worlds of life itself**. As the CIRCA clowns with whom we opened this article insist, ‘They’re an army of clowns, we’re an army of clowns, it’s perfect.’ Not only do the clowns revel in the gaps and interstices of resistance politics, dwelling affirmatively in a world of singularities, but they haunt sovereignty’s paradox, taking on the mantle of the outside that is invited inside the court. The clown at the gates of the camp is a peculiar but fierce advocate of the life that teems within – he is a reminder of the excess, of that which will always slip away from the capacity to draw the line. Even where the border camp threatens to be gathered up within the assemblage of security itself, the clowns display, as Connolly (2011: 25) writes, ‘a vitality or excessiveness that is not entirely governed by the assemblage’. Where sovereign power **is founded on the capacity to separate naked life from its form** – as identifiable categories of ‘worker’, ‘woman’, ‘activist’, and so on (Agamben, 2000: 10.1), the clown is not reducible to a category**, not separable in form from naked life as such**. Seen through the eyes of the clown, the camp is not a bare political space but is lively, liveable, teeming with life and conviviality, a space where Agamben’s nomos of modern politics meets the coming community.

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#### we teach debaters to reduce war powers in the only method that is relevant politically

Edkins and Pin-Fat 05. Jenny Edkins, professor of international politics at Prifysgol Aberystwyth University (in Wales) and Veronique Pin-Fat, senior lecturer in politics at Manchester Universit, “Through the Wire: Relations of Power and Relations of Violence,” Millennium - Journal of International Studies 2005 34: pg. 9

In this section, we suggest that when the insights of Foucault and Agamben are combined there are unexpected implications for the notion of resistance, implications that are to be found in the depoliticised and technologised administrative depths of the camp. We argue that both Foucault and Agamben are gesturing towards the conclusion that bare life is a life where power relations are absent, and, correspondingly, that life constituted within biopolitics cannot be a political life. This moves us then towards the somewhat surprising conclusion that far from seeking to escape power relations, we should be attempting to reinstate them, and with them the possibility (and possibilities or potentialities) of politics.42 Sovereign power, despite its name, is not a properly political power relation, we will argue, but a relationship of violence**.**

For Foucault, power relations are a very specific form of social relation: ‘power relations ... are distinct from objective capacities as well as from relations of communication’.43 Power as a relation is distinct from ‘technical’ or ‘objective’ capacities. In addition, a power relation is to be seen as distinct from a relationship of violence. A relationship of violence acts ‘immediately and directly on others’, whereas a relationship of power ‘acts upon their actions’.44 Slaves in chains, for example, are not in a power relation but in a relationship of violence:

Where the determining factors are exhaustive, there is no relationship of power: slavery is not a power relationship when a man is in chains, only when he has some possible mobility, even a chance of escape.... At the very heart of the power relationship, and constantly provoking it, are the recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of freedom.45

For Foucault power relations and freedom occupy the same moment of possibility. Resistance is inevitable whenever and wherever there are power relations. Without power relations there is no possibility of resistance and no freedom. Taking this insight from Foucault and turning the question of power on its head, we can begin to ask what examples there might be, in practice, of a mode of being where resistance is impossible, and hence where there is no power relation. It can be argued, following Agamben, that the concentration camp is such an example.

In the camp the majority of prisoners become what is termed in camp jargon ‘Muselmänner.’ Primo Levi describes these as ‘the drowned’:

Their life is short, but their number is endless; they ... form the backbone of the camp, an anonymous mass, continually renewed and always identical, of non-men who march and labour in silence, the divine spark dead within them, already too empty to really suffer. One hesitates to call them living: one hesitates to call their death death, in the face of which they have no fear, as they are too tired to understand.46

The drowned are ‘bare life’ – their concerns are limited to where the next mouthful of food is coming from – and they are also homines sacri, sacred men: they can be killed at will by the camp guards, without ceremony and without justification having to be offered or provocation demonstrated. More significantly for the argument here, the drowned offer no resistance. Indeed they are indifferent to their fate. They are reduced to a state where they are unable even to commit suicide: they do not have the possibility of killing themselves as, even if there were ways in which they could engineer their own death, they no longer have the will either to live or die. In Foucault’s terms, then, for the drowned of the concentration camp there are no relations of power, only relations of violence.

The camp then is an example of where power relations vanish. What we have in the camps is not a power relation. All we have is the administration of bare life. In the camps, for those inmates who reached the depths, who faced the Gorgon, there were no relations of power, only relations of violence. As we have noted, Agamben importantly argues that what took place in the camp as a zone of indistinction has extended in the contemporary world to encompass regions outside the camp as well. In the face of a biopolitics that technologises, administers and depoliticises, and thereby renders the political and power relations irrelevant, we have all become homines sacri or bare life.

#### The role of the ballot is explained by—

**Bogad 10**—theater professor at UC Davis, co-founder of CIRCA

(L.M., “Clowndestine Maneuvers: A Study of Clownfrontational Tactics”, Thamyris/Intersecting No. 21 (2010) 179–198, dml)

I posit that the goals of tactical carnival are:

• **to** declare **and** occupy **a** joyous**,** participatory **and** semi-anonymous**,** relatively safe place **for power inversions/subversions**. “Celebrity” has been explicitly denounced in some movement literature in favor of the relative anonymity of the mass. These spaces are also meant to be non-dogmatic/sectarian, **a more open place for** wider participation. The hope is that more people will join the movement when a space for this kind of joyful participation is opened up.

• to put a friendly face on the movement as a way **to** interrupt what I refer to as **the hegemonologue of the corporate media and state rhetoric**, which often demonizes other activists as crazed, nihilistic hooligans. The idea is to insert images that at least partially disrupt or disharmonize the barrage of negative images (for example, a clown kissing a riot shield juxtaposed with the usual images of street melee and property damage), and to replace the usual “story of the battle” (street fights, vandalism, etc.) with the “battle of the story” in which colorful and creative costumes, dance, music, performance, and improvised interactions give a new look to the movement and its agenda (Interview with D. Solnit). These events also attempt to interrupt another aspect of the hegemonologue, which is that of **the** rhetoric of inevitability **of corporate globalization**, by demonstrating that better alternatives are possible.

• to key an experimental mode in which **new ways to play** with **and** around **power can be tested**. The idea is to develop **less obvious and predictable ways to interact** on the street with agents of the state, corporations, and passersby. Much of the creativity is intended to have the effect of dispelling fear and tension during confrontations with massive police presence, for example.

• to create an **celebratory culture of** active defiance as an alternative to the everyday life experience of many people—in response to a widespread frustration that many participants feel—regarding their official relegation to the role of consumers of culture and spectacle rather than creators/spectactors (Boal).

#### The 1NC wasn’t funny—that’s a voting issue

**Heath-Kelly 12**—Research Fellow, Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick

(Charlotte, “Can We Laugh Yet? Reading Post-9/11 Counterterrorism Policy as Magical Realism and Opening a Third-Space of Resistance”, Eur J Crim Policy Res (2012) 18:343–360, dml)

In reading the War on Terror as a magical realist text, the paper has argued that contemporary security policy narrates its own third space—one that can be funny in the juxtapositions it employs. The War on Terror undermines itself by narrating a liminal space where its claims of security appear ridiculous. Its security claims draw upon the supernatural to position and legitimate themselves in opposition. Utilising the ideas of Luce Irigaray, it can be argued that a space of laughter is not only useful for resisting the practices of the War on Terror, but also that a failure to laugh consolidates the War on Terror discourse and the joke it is playing on us by taking it seriously. And given the absurdity of some of the War on Terror discourse examined here, who would want to take it seriously? Perhaps the surreal humour deployed within the War on Terror can itself render ‘difficult’ the ‘facile gestures’ (Foucault 1988: 154–5) involved in performing the terrorist threat—and all we need to do is begin recognising this.

#### Now, counter-definitions—

#### Resolved means to personally think about things

**AHD 2k6.** American Heritage Dictionary

resolved v. To cause (a person) to reach a decision.

#### And topicality is determined by relevancy

**Merian Webster App** (<http://i.word.com/idictionary/topical>, Merriam Webster Iphone App)

“1a: of, relating to, or arranged by topics <set down in topical form> b: referring to topics of the day or place: of local or temporary interest <a topical novel> <topical references>

#### We are the USFG

**Raney 10** [Gary Raney – Ada County Sherriff, “ Ada County Sheriff Gary Raney Response to Inquiry regarding Oathkeepers”, October 25th, 2010, <http://wearechangeidaho.org/CategoryArticles.php?id=1>]

First premise: “They” – the federal government – are not a distant body beyond our control. We are a republic and **we are the federal government** by the power of our vote. It is disingenuous for people to talk about the government as something foreign, like an enemy. In my opinion, it is our general apathy as voters that, by an omission of a vote, allow our government to do things we don’t want them to do.

#### Our practice of dissent is net more agonistic than their imposition of a narrow agenda for debate—you don’t teach democracy, you practice it

Norval 12**—**University of Essex—Government

(Alleta, “''Don't Talk Back!''−−The Subjective Conditions of Critical Public Debate”, Political Theory December 2012 vol. 40 no. 6 802-810, dml)

While Habermas’s sentiments clearly mirror the disdain for mass culture ¶ found generally in the writings of other critical theorists, one has to reflect ¶ on whether they are also a sign of what Macpherson long ago has called “the ¶ liberal fear of the masses.” This is echoed in Simone Chambers’s recently ¶ articulated question as to whether deliberative democracy has abandoned ¶ mass democracy?¶ 26¶ Mass publics, she argues, seem to have been abandoned ¶ in favour of **carefully constructed mini-publics**, in which **controlled critical** ¶ reasoning (**deliberation**) **can take place**.¶ 27¶ Chambers links this question, as it ¶ should be, to the deep mistrust of rhetoric, and its associations with the ¶ masses and the “wasteland of nondeliberative politics.” However, even ¶ though Chambers raises this important question, the sentiments so clearly ¶ expressed in Habermas are re-affirmed through the introduction of another ¶ dichotomy: the distinction between deliberative rhetoric and plebiscitory ¶ rhetoric, which suffers from all the pathologies Habermas attributed to mass ¶ publics. As in Habermas, Chambers touches upon the importance of the ¶ question of how “citizens form their opinions,” arguing that it is “an integral ¶ part of a theory of deliberative democracy.”¶ 28¶ To think about the how is not ¶ a matter of multiplying mini-publics, but of fostering the promotion and ¶ proliferation of a multiplicity of citizen–citizen encounters. Such “face-toface encounters of everyday talk” could promote “the skills needed to be a ¶ critical yet receptive audience.”¶ 29¶ Could the uses of the social media with which I started this short piece be ¶ considered cases of such interaction, if not face-to-face then in peer-to-peer ¶ networks and engagements between citizens and the state mediated via the ¶ new media? I would argue that, indeed, they could and ought to be treated as ¶ such. However, for this to become possible, and to be able to note the democratic potential of such interactions, the fundamentally dichotomous thinking ¶ that inspires both Habermas’s text and deliberative accounts of democracy ¶ more generally, must be abandoned, for it is part of the problem. As Habermas ¶ notes with respect to Räsonnement, the nuances of both sides are preserved¶ in the term. The same holds here: publics are both capable of being critical ¶ and of being manipulated; it is not the case that the virtue of the critical use ¶ of reason belongs to a particular sociological group or form of society. Democratic subjectivity is cultivated through **participation in practices of** ¶ “**talking back**.” It may include the education to which Habermas refers, but it ¶ also depends upon embodied practices of habituation,¶ 30¶ upon political imagination and upon the operation of exemplars, and upon actions that manifest ¶ for us other possibilities of being and acting.¶ 31¶ The particular forms such “talking back” take is of lesser importance: they ¶ can take a range of forms, **not all of which would** **correspond to a neatly rationalized image of deliberation**.¶ 32¶ But, **that makes them no less valuable**. Of ¶ fundamental importance is the thought that critical abilities are verified in the ¶ articulation of wrongs, as Rancière may put it.¶ 33¶ That is, the ability to act ¶ critically is fostered, enacted, and deepened in the very process of expressing ¶ demands and making claims.¶ 34¶ The fostering of virtues associated with ¶ democracy—**giving voice to senses of wrong and injustice**, protesting, occupying, listening to others, critically debating options, giving and receiving ¶ reasons, coming to see things in a different way through critical engagement ¶ with others, proposing alternatives, aspiring to higher selves and better societies, to name but a few—come about in and through construction of and ¶ **participation in** **critical, oppositional activities**.¶ 35¶ While recognising the limitations of the Internet as discursive space, policy analysts and political theorists experimenting with these new spaces and their potential contribution to ¶ democratic politics are emphasizing the extent to which they contribute to ¶ “the broad objective of **making policy debate** . . . **accessible and meaningful** ¶ and at the same time **agonistically authentic** and equitable.” In particular, it ¶ contributes to the expansion of available narratives that may compel policy ¶ makers to **avoid setting agendas too narrowly**, enabling the promotion of nonhegemonic political alternatives and policy options and facilitating the voicing of views in a wide variety of ways. As Coleman argues, there are virtues ¶ to digital storytelling that fosters and values situated contingency, “acknowledgement of the local and quotidian, and a willingness to embrace existential ¶ ambiguity” in a pluralistic political universe.¶ 36¶ **One becomes a democrat**;¶ 37¶ **one is not taught—from above—to be one**. ¶ Intuition and provocation takes precedence over tuition and instruction.¶ 38¶ The ¶ emphasis Habermas puts on teaching and training in the historical analysis of ¶ The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere is crucial. However, for ¶ these insights to take their proper place in thinking about democracy, they ¶ need to be democratized, opened up to **possibilities that** **cannot be contemplated within** the **structures** of the critical public–mass distinction. If we think ¶ of democracy **in less restrictive terms**, it becomes possible to focus on fostering the development of radical democratic subjectivities, that cannot be anticipated nor held “accountable to any theoretical formulation”; radical democratic utterances both proclaim and enact the coming into being of a democratic ¶ subjectivity.¶ 39¶ This necessary openness only becomes a possibility once one ¶ takes the fundamental abilities and capacities of all, the counted and the ¶ uncounted, seriously. Emerson, like Rancière, suggests that each of us is ¶ capable of developing judgments from a standpoint that “all and sundry” ¶ “may be expected to find in themselves.”¶ 40¶ Emerson is clear about the continuous work on the self that this involves. He is also clear that it involves ¶ aversion to society and to the “herd.”¶ 41¶ Yet, this is never expressed in any ¶ other way than that those aspects of the self and of society that resemble the ¶ “herd”—the “mass” for Habermas—run through each and every one of us. ¶ Aversion to those aspects is crucial, but it is not achieved through external ¶ means, nor is it something associated with or limited to specific groups. “The ¶ virtue most in request [in society] is conformity. Self-reliance is its aversion.”¶ 42¶ Aversion opens the way to activities through which we can foster the ¶ virtues associated with a critical engagement and development of a better self ¶ and society. The perfectionism invoked here is non-elitist and non-teleological: ¶ it is a possibility open to each and all.¶ 43¶ **It does not predetermine and prefigure what is possible**, and along which road we must all travel. To quote ¶ Cavell, “The better world we think . . . is not a world that is gone, hence it is ¶ not to be mourned, but one to be borne, witnessed.”¶ 44¶ We should not mourn ¶ the loss of the bourgeois public sphere, but work on the possibilities opened ¶ up by the world coming into being.

#### Deliberation!

**Livingston 12**—Assistant prof of Government @ Cornell

(Alexander, “Avoiding Deliberative Democracy? Micropolitics, Manipulation, and the Public Sphere”, Philosophy & Rhetoric, Vol. 45, No. 3 (2012), pp. 269-294, dml)

It is important here to stress what a critical theory of deliberative democracy is not.16 It is not the gentlemanly sport of cool, calm, and dispassionate exchange of impartial reasons. It does not depend on the knockdown force of the better argument in a single-round, one-on-one, face-to-face bout of verbal jousting. It is not the reduction of political debate to a matter of logical demonstration. And it is not a clinical exer- cise wherein citizens are extracted from their concrete political world and placed in an artificially domination-free space of the ideal speech situa- tion or deliberative focus group**.** All of these proposals, not to mention others, have been put forward in one form or another under the banner of deliberative democracy.17 If theories of deliberative democracy were limited to these options, Connolly would be right to charge them with an intel- lectualism that ignores the vagaries of lived political praxis. However, a critical theory of deliberative democracy provides both an alternative to this deliberative intellectualism as well as to Connolly’s democratic deficit. The key to this alternative approach to democracy overlooked by both Connolly and these intellectualist theories of deliberation is the complex institution of the public sphere.

The public sphere is the decentered network of voluntary associations and media channels that crisscross civil society. It has no center or hub it radiates out of. Rather it is a rhizome in Deleuze and Guattari’s sense of the term: a multiplicity of lively points and intersections that hang together that lacks organization and is not subject to central control. Philippe Mengue makes just this point about the nature of the public sphere when he criticizes Deleuze and Guattari’s antipathy toward the idea of politics as the expression and contestation of public reasons. The public sphere, as he rightly notes, is precisely the kind of deterritorialized plane where movement and becoming can occur.18 Deliberative democracy is a model of democracy that explains how ideas circulate in such a public sphere; that is, how they bump into other ideas, transform them, and become transformed themselves in turn. Key to a critical theory of deliberative democracy is the claim that the exchange of reasons within this rhizomatic public sphere is what Jürgen Habermas calls “subjectless” (1996, 299). A public sphere is always more than the prudential exchange of reasons between two parties, but it is also always less than a self-reflection of a macrosubject capable of action. Rather, it is a complex mediating institution that allows ideas and reasons to become public—that is, it circulates and distributes reasons and ideas beyond the bounds of local conversations, turning them into resources to be drawn on, tested, and sometimes rejected in more local exercises of reason giving.

Crucially, the reasons that do all this circulating in the public sphere must be understood in an expansive sense. At the level of democratic the- ory, no one form of discourse has a monopoly on what counts as a reason. Deliberative democracy recognizes diverse forms of communication as reason giving, including storytelling, rhetoric, and greeting. Each has a place in a deliberative politics insofar as it is capable of drawing a connec- tion between a particular claim or experience and a more general and acces- sible norm (Young 2000, 52–80; Dryzek 2000, 57–80). A public reason is always a reason for doing or avoiding doing something. First-person stories like those W. E. B. Du Bois tells in The Souls of Black Folk are vivid depic- tions of the experience of racial oppression, but they function as reasons to a nonblack audience insofar as they aim to open the eyes of white America to the complacency of its commitments to liberty and equality. A public sphere is a site where these sorts of reasons are articulated and take on broader and richer meanings, as they are received by an indefinite audience of strangers.19

The informal and diffuse network of information that spans from labor meetings to church groups to book clubs to blogs to newspapers to PTA meetings and to dissident groups carries our reasons across multiple testing sites where they are subject to uptake, rejection, or transformation, only to be recirculated again. This public exchange of reasons has the important epistemic function of improving the quality of the reasons we use to justify our interests and decisions, but the more crucial function is its critical one. The articulation and contestation of reasons in the public sphere is a motor for self-reflection. It is this function, the self-critical and self-reflection function of exposure to diverse and impersonal reasons in a public sphere, that deliberative democracy values. While the media-saturated public sphere trades in low-involvement advertising and affective manipulation, it also and more importantly can be a means of provoking us to reflect on our received identities and interests.20 These epistemic and critical functions of the public sphere come together to provide a democratic resource for inciting self- and collective transformation in novel and potentially eman- cipatory ways. Seen as a molecular interplay of constantly flowing, shifting, and transforming reasons and self-understandings that provokes new and creative (but reflective) becomings that help us cope with the challenges of political community, the circulation of ordinary talk in the public sphere is Deleuzian. The public sphere is an example of micropolitics par excellence.

Once we introduce this institution of the public sphere into the discus- sion, we avail ourselves of a democratic alternative to Connolly’s politics of “cultural-corporeal infusion.” The task of generating resonance for a leftist politics can be divorced from the idea of manipulating visceral responses in favor of a politics that experiments with how reasons resonate in the public sphere, that is, with how they might function to provoke self-reflection. Reasons resonate when they make some claim on the moral and concep- tual imaginary of their audience. That is to say, their resonance is not a feature of their logical structure but rather of the receptivity of the audience to them. A reason resonates when its audience considers it what William James called a “live” hypothesis, “one which appeals as a real possibility to him to whom it is proposed” (1967, 717).

Making reasons resonate, however, is the task of activists and social movements who introduce new concerns to the public sphere and rede- scribe acceptable existing practices as oppressive and harmful. To this end, an egalitarian and inclusive public sphere requires the insurgent work of its voluntary associations in the form of “deliberative enclaves” (Mansbridge 1999) or “counterpublics” (Fraser 1992) where dissidents, interests groups, social movements, and the oppressed experiment with novel discourses and redescriptions of the status quo to introduce into the public sphere’s circu- lation. When these experiments in consciousness-raising are successful, as with the feminist movement’s introduction of “date rape,” the queer move- ment’s turn away from civil unions in favor or “gay marriage” and Stephen Colbert’s introduction of “truthiness” into the American political lexicon, the terms of resonance in the public sphere change. Coining terms like “gay marriage” is not the same thing as institutionalizing it, but it does have the effect of redefining the terms of public debate around a now resonant expe- rience of exclusion that had hitherto been simply invisible or erroneously seen as harmless.

To put this in the language of Deleuze, deliberative redescription can function as a war machine. The experimenting with resonating reasons in a public on the part of activists is an exercise in “plugging in” a resonance machine into the public sphere. The transformative power of the resonance machine, understood as an inventive redescription of our received practices, has the power to transform the way citizens see their shared world, their own interests, and the suffering of others. The work of counterpublics is to “smooth” the striated space of public political culture so as to displace old prejudices and allow new identities and claims to flourish.

### schmitt

#### Ethical obligation to vote aff—the alt precludes the kind of political decisionmaking that really matters—we’re a prerequisite

Edkins and Pin-Fat 05. Jenny Edkins, professor of international politics at Prifysgol Aberystwyth University (in Wales) and Veronique Pin-Fat, senior lecturer in politics at Manchester Universit, “Through the Wire: Relations of Power and Relations of Violence,” Millennium - Journal of International Studies 2005 34: pg. 14

One potential form of challenge to sovereign power consists of a refusal to draw any lines between zoe- and bios, inside and outside**.**59 As we have shown, sovereign power does not involve a power relation in Foucauldian terms. It is more appropriately considered to have become a form of governance or technique of administration through relationships of violence that reduce political subjects to mere bare or naked life. In asking for a refusal to draw lines as a possibility of challenge, then, we are not asking for the elimination of power relations and consequently, we are not asking for the erasure of the possibility of a mode of political being that is empowered and empowering, is free and that speaks: quite the opposite. Following Agamben, we are suggesting that it is only through a refusal to draw any lines at all between forms of life (and indeed, nothing less will do) that sovereign power as a form of violence can be contested and a properly political power relation (a life of power as potenza) reinstated. We could call this challenging the logic of sovereign power through refusal. Our argument is that we can evade sovereign power and reinstate a form of power relation by contesting sovereign power’s assumption of the right to draw lines, that is, by contesting the sovereign ban. Any other challenge always inevitably remains within this relationship of violence. To move outside it (and return to a power relation) we need not only to contest its right to draw lines in particular places, but also to resist the call to draw any lines of the sort sovereign power demands.

The grammar of sovereign power cannot be resisted by challenging or fighting over where the lines are drawn. Whilst, of course, this is a strategy that can be deployed, it is not a challenge to sovereign power per se as it still tacitly or even explicitly accepts that lines must be drawn somewhere (and preferably more inclusively). Although such strategies contest the violence of sovereign power’s drawing of a particular line, they risk replicating such violence in demanding the line be drawn differently**.** This is because such forms of challenge fail to refuse sovereign power’s line-drawing ‘ethos’, an ethos which, as Agamben points out, renders us all now homines sacri or bare life.

Taking Agamben’s conclusion on board, we now turn to look at how the assumption of bare life can produce forms of challenge. Agamben puts it in terms of a transformation:

This biopolitical body that is bare life must itself instead be transformed into the site for the constitution and installation of a form of life that is wholly exhausted in bare life and a bios that is only its own zoe-.... If we give the name form-of-life to this being that is only its own bare existence and to this life that, being its own form, remains inseparable from it we will witness the emergence of a field of research beyond the terrain defined by the intersection of politics and philosophy, medico-biological sciences and jurisprudence.60

#### Their view about the inevitability of enmity and its possible productive deployments don’t assume the contemporary generalization of the state of exception which co-opts and contains these possibilities

McLoughlin 13. Daniel McLoughlin, professor of law at the University of South Wales, “The Fiction of Sovereignty and the Real State of Exception: Giorgio Agamben’s Critique of Carl Schmitt,” Law, Culture and the Humanities 0(0) pg. 15

This account of the “mystery of anomia” provides a crucial lens through which to read Agamben’s account of the distinction between real and fictitious states of excep- tion. Schmitt’s justification of sovereign violence is solidly grounded in the tradition that says that the state is necessary to prevent civil war. However, the normalization of the state of emergency means that, instead of political actors using anomie to preserve or create law, there is only a condition of generalized violence. The contemporary state is thus a threat to the very life it is ostensibly designed to protect: far from being a force that protects its citizens from civil war (katechon), the contemporary state is a lawless power (anomos) that is “leading the West towards global civil war.”75 For Benjamin, life in the absence of the Torah is just life: similarly, for Agamben, life in a real state of exception has “shed every relation to law.”76 While political violence in the normal- ized state of exception is very real, under such conditions, the sovereign claim that this violence acts with the force-of-law is a fiction. This is because Schmitt maintains that political violence in the state of exception is the necessary precondition of law and order and so carries the force-of-law. This idea keeps the law working beyond its sus- pension, differentiating the state of exception from chaos, and maintaining the rela- tionship between anomie and law. However, this claim is only plausible as long as the state of exception remains temporary: once the exception becomes the rule, it is no longer conceptually viable to assert that anomie is different from chaos. Benjamin’s eighth thesis thus brings about a real state of exception by unmasking the force-of-lawas a fiction. This nullifies the Nothing of sovereignty, severs the relationship between law and anomie that sovereignty had maintained, and brings to light the absolute inop- erativity of the law.

For Agamben, however, the idea that sovereignty is a fiction that covers over the inoperativity of law does not only apply to the claims of the contemporary state: the law is, he writes, founded “on the essential fiction according to which anomie (in the form of auctoritas, living law, or the force of law) is still related to the juridical order.”77 For Agamben, then, the sovereign claim to act with the force-of-law has always been a fic- tion. In order to develop this claim and what is at stake in it, we need to examine Schmitt’s critique of Weimar liberalism, before returning to Agamben’s Benjaminian critique of Schmitt.

#### The alt’s politics should seem disturbingly familiar—it’s the same ideology that justified Bush’s invasion of Iraq—the aff also explains why that failed

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(J., “The Presidential Rhetoric of Terror: The (Re)Creation of Reality Immediately after 9/11”, Politics & Policy Volume 35, Issue 4, pages 810–835, December 2007, dml)

The fact that Bush, as the president, presented unity as strength provides **a prime example** of Carl Schmitt's determination of the sovereign: **the ability to** define the difference **between “friend” and “enemy.”** For Schmitt, this distinction had real “concrete” meaning, for, in his words, “[t]he concepts friend, enemy, and battle have a real meaning; they obtain and retain this meaning especially through their reference to the real possibility of physical killing” (Schmitt 1985, 4). **The underside of Bush's rhetoric of “unity” and “strength” is** the real possibility of bloodshed. “Unity,”“safety,” and “strength” are not just empty political slogans; **such rhetoric—when connected to the sovereign decision to define the “enemy”—**is attached to actual violence. This violence is the Schmittian “impact” of the use of such sovereignty (Frye 1966, 820). All this begins to highlight the pertinence of Schmitt's theory for understanding post-9/11 rhetoric. In addition to defining “unity” in a certain way, Bush also offers a type of what Zarefsky calls “frame shifting” in this passage. The frame shifting here is not, however, of the standard kind. Bush asserts that the government is at heightened security, and it is not simply “business as usual.” Yet he also says we must “go forward” and not allow the attackers to “restrict our freedoms” or “challenge our way of life.” This can be interpreted as **a kind of “exceptional” state of non-exceptionalness**, a normal state of emergency. This is the exact moment that Schmitt's notion of the state of “exception” becomes relevant and useful in fleshing out Zarefsky's ideas a little further. Schmitt (1985) famously wrote that the “[s]overeign is he who decides the exception” (5). **This is a moment of “**lawful lawlessness**” where the sovereign itself gets to define the power of life and death**, of legal and illegal (Cooper 2004, 515). It is the instant that sovereignty reveals itself. Bush defines, as the sovereign, that we are in both a “state of emergency”and that such a state shall not “challenge our way of life.” Of course, this rhetoric implies the questions “who will be affected by this ‘emergency?’ ” and “what is our ‘way of life?’ ” When applying the law, it is the sovereign—**in this case** the executive branch **of the government**—that decides when this “rhetoric” is transformed into violence. Hence, **this rhetorical sovereignty,** as declared by President Bush**, is key to the almost “total erosion of the conceptual distinction between war and politics**” (Newman and Levine 2006, 23). Schmitt's notion of the “state of exception” clearly influenced Giorgio Agamben's work to the point where he titled one of his most famous books after the concept.5 Agamben is fascinated by the notion that the “state of exception” is both “outside of” and “contained in” the law. Like Derrida's famous notion of a “pharmakon,” the “state of exception” is both within and outside. Newman and Levine (2006, 24) capture the basic point when saying that “enshrined within the law is the legal provision that enables the law itself to be suspended.” This illuminates Agamben's (2005, 50) view of the state of exception, which “is not a dictatorship (whether constitutional or unconstitutional, commissarial or sovereign) but a space devoid of law, a zone of anomie in which all legal determinations—and above all the very distinction between public and private—are deactivated.” For both Agamben and Schmitt, it is at this moment that one can see the inner workings of the power of sovereignty. So, applying such analysis to Bush's statements, the president himself claims the power of sovereignty by deciding that a “state of emergency” exists and by defining this using presidential rhetoric. For many, **it appeared as if the United States had entered a world of** a permanent state of exception and/or emergency, where the old divisions now exist in a “through-the-looking glass” universe. This is the moment of hermeneutic sovereignty on the part of Bush. He defines, or claims the right to define, the state of “emergency.” It is at this moment of decision—the moment of exception—that one can witness the rhetorical sovereignty of the president. Of course, Schmitt was also concerned with the inner workings of the decision to implement the “exception” on the material world: in other words, the moment when the exception becomes violence. This is also an interest of Agamben (1998, 168-9), who argues that the “camp” has become the physical manifestation of the “state of exception.” That said, in the context of the United States the physical manifestation of the “state of exception”—the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the detainee camps—have been “implemented” by many people; the conceptual world in which such things can exist is defined in Bush's state of emergency. In other words, **the “state of exception” is** more **than a purely theoretical complaint or puzzle**. **This “state” has** physical manifestations **in**, among other things, the **Guantanamo** Bay detainee camp **and** the **Abu** **Ghraib** prisons. Bush's rhetoric—his power of definition—helped create a reality where the disturbing pictures of the mistreatment at Abu Graihb can coexist alongside the persistent belief that the United States still has moral responsibilities and duties in the world. The actions at Abu Graihb and the corresponding images are the fruits sown from the seeds of Bush's post-9/11 rhetoric. Nevertheless, in a world defined by a state of exception, the government must still stress security. Hence, when Bush (2001c) spoke to the public two days later, on September 15, he began by stating, “[g]ood morning. This weekend I am engaged in extensive sessions with members of my National Security Council, as we plan a comprehensive assault on terrorism.” Here, the president has associated the attackers with “terrorism” and has explained that the National Security Team is planning a “comprehensive assault on terrorism.” Again, security is the primary issue, and it is the first topic of the speech. Later in the same speech Bush (2001c) opines that “[i]n Washington, D.C., the political parties and both houses of Congress have shown a remarkable unity, and I'm deeply grateful. A terrorist attack designed to tear us apart has instead bound us together as a nation.” Again, unity is a key to the nation being safe from terrorists. **There is a strong association between unity and security**. In fact the point may be pushed further; **Bush** now **associates disunity with the goal of the terrorist attack**. Hence, to not be unified is to play into the terrorists' hands. Once more, **we see Schmitt's notions of sovereignty come into play**, this time with a combination of the power to define an “us” and a “them” as well as the power to declare a “state of exception.” **According to Bush's rhetoric, the attacks will fail because we have** clearly defined **who the “us” is, and—in this state of emergency—**we will remain united against the “them.”