# Round 5—Neg vs Wayne BB

## 1NC

### 1

**The battle for the public sphere is over—we lost. Conservatives and Liberals are now two sides of the same coin, and any movement that actually promises radical change will be destroyed as soon as it becomes visible. An invisible movement has the most subversive potential—rejecting politics is the only political act**

**The Invisible Committee, ‘7** [an anonymous group of French professors, phd candidates, and intellectuals, in the book “The Coming Insurrection” published by Semiotext(e) (attributed to the [Tarnac Nine](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tarnac_Nine) by the French police), <http://tarnac9.noblogs.org/gallery/5188/insurrection_english.pdf>]

Whatever angle you look at it from, **there's no escape from the present. That's** not the least of its virtues. For those who want absolutely to have hope, it knocks down every support. Those who claim to have solutions are proven wrong almost immediately. It's understood that now everything can only go from bad to worse. "There's no future for the future" is the wisdom behind an era that for all its appearances of extreme normalcy has come to have about the consciousness level of the first punks. The sphere of political representation is closed. From left to right, it's the same nothingness acting by turns either as the big shots or the virgins, the same sales shelf heads, changing up their discourse according to the latest dispatches from the information service. Those who still vote give one the impression that their only intention is to knock out the polling booths by voting as a pure act of protest. And we've started to understand that in fact it’s only against the vote itself that people go on voting. Nothing we've seen can come up to the heights of the present situation; not by far. By its very silence, the populace seems infinitely more 'grown up' than all those squabbling amongst themselves to govern it do. Any Belleville chibani 1 is wiser in his chats than in all of those puppets’ grand declarations put together. The lid of the social kettle is triple-tight, and the pressure inside won’t stop building. The ghost of Argentina’s Que Se Vayan Todos 2 is seriously starting to haunt the ruling heads. The fires of November 2005 will never cease to cast their shadow on all consciences. Those first joyous fires were the baptism of a whole decade full of promises. The media’s “suburbs vs. the Republic” myth, if it’s not inefficient, is certainly not true. The fatherland was ablaze all the way to downtown everywhere, with fires that were methodically snuffed out. Whole streets went up in flames of solidarity in Barcelona and no one but the people who lived there even found out about it. And the country hasn’t stopped burning since. Among the accused we find diverse profiles, without much in common besides a hatred for existing society; not united by class, race, or even by neighborhood. What was new wasn’t the “suburban revolt,” since that was already happening in the 80s, but the rupture with its established forms. The assailants weren’t listening to anybody at all anymore, not their big brothers, not the local associations assigned to help return things to normal. No “SOS Racism which only fatigue, falsification, and media omertà 4 could feign putting an end. The whole series of nocturnal strikes, anonymous attacks, wordless destruction, had the merit of busting wide open the split between politics and the political. No one can honestly deny the obvious weight of this assault which **made no demands**, and had no message other than a threat which had nothing to do with politics. But you’d have to be blind not to see what is **purely political** about this **resolute negation of politics,** and you’d certainly have to know absolutely nothing about the autonomous youth movements of the last 30 years. Like abandoned children we burned the first baby toys of a society that deserves no more respect than the monuments of Paris did at the end of Bloody Week 5 -- and knows it. There’s **no social solution** to the present situation. First off because the vague aggregate of social groupings, institutions, and individual bubbles that we designate by the anti-phrase “society” has no substance, because there’s no language left to express common experiences with. It took a half-century of fighting by the Lumières to thaw out the possibility of a French Revolution, and a century of fighting by work to give birth to the fearful “Welfare State.” Struggles creating the language in which the new order expresses itself. Nothing like today. Europe is now a de-monied continent that sneaks off to make a run to the Lidl 6 and has to fly with the low-cost airlines to be able to keep on flying. **None of the “problems” formulated in the social language are resolvable**. The “retirement pensions issue,” the issues of “precariousness,” the “youth” and their “violence” can only be kept in suspense as long as the ever more surprising “acting out” they thinly cover gets managed away police-like. No one’s going to be happy to see old people being wiped out at a knockdown price, abandoned by their own and with nothing to say. And those who’ve found less humiliation and more benefit in a life of crime than in sweeping floors will not give up their weapons, and prison won’t make them love society. The rage to enjoy of the hordes of the retired will not take the somber cuts to their monthly income on an empty stomach, and will get only too excited about the refusal to work among a large sector of the youth. And to conclude, no guaranteed income granted the day after a quasi-uprising will lay the foundations for a new New Deal, a new pact, and a new peace. The social sentiment is rather **too evaporated** for all that. As their solution, they’ll just never stop putting on the pressure, to make sure nothing happens, and with it we’ll have more and more police chases all over the neighborhood. The drone that even according to the police indeed did fly over Seine-Saint-Denis 7 last July 14 th is a picture of the future in much more straightforward colors than all the hazy images we get from the humanists. That they took the time to clarify that it was not armed shows pretty clearly the kind of road we’re headed down. The country is going to be cut up into ever more air-tight zones. Highways built along the border of the “sensitive neighborhoods” already form walls that are invisible and yet able to cut them off from the private subdivisions. Whatever good patriotic souls may think about it, the management of neighborhoods “by community” is most effective just by its notoriety. The purely metropolitan portions of the country, the main downtowns, lead their luxurious lives in an ever more calculating, ever more sophisticated, ever more shimmering deconstruction. They light up the whole planet with their whorehouse red lights, while the BAC 8 and the private security companies’ -- read: militias’ -- patrols multiply infinitely, all the while benefiting from being able to hide behind an ever more disrespectful judicial front. The catch-22 of the present, though perceptible everywhere, is denied everywhere. Never have so many psychologists, sociologists, and literary people devoted themselves to it, each with their own special jargon, and each with their own specially missing solution. It’s enough just to listen to the songs that come out these days, the trifling “new French music,” where the petty-bourgeoisie dissects the states of its soul and the K’1Fry mafia 9 makes its declarations of war, to know that this coexistence will come to an end soon and that a decision is about to be made. This book is signed in the name of an imaginary collective. Its editors are not its authors. They are merely content to do a little clean-up of what’s scattered around the era’s common areas, around the murmurings at bar-tables, behind closed bedroom doors. They’ve only determined a few necessary truths, whose universal repression fills up the psychiatric hospitals and the painful gazes. They’ve made themselves scribes of the situation. It’s the privilege of radical circumstances that justice leads them quite logically to revolution. It’s enough just to say what we can see and not avoid the conclusions to be drawn from it.

**To make micropolitics visible is to coopt it by giving resistance an object – this understanding allows resistance to be framed, to be declared a failure and prevents the immanence of imperceptible politics from coalescing around mundane practices and habitudes of existence**

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In this sense **imperceptible politics does not necessarily differ from or oppose other prevalent forms of politics, such as state-oriented politics, micropolitics, identity politics, cultural and gender politics, civil rights movements, etc**. And indeed **imperceptible politics connects with all these various forms of political engagement and intervention in an opportunistic way: it deploys them to the extent that they allow the establishment of spaces outside representation**; that is, spaces which do not primarily focus on the transformation of the conditions of the double-R axiom (rights and representation) but on the insertion of new social forces into a given political terrain. In the previous chapter we called this form of politics outside politics: the politics which opposes the representational regime of policing. Imperceptibility is the everyday strategy which allows us to move and to act below the overcoding regime of representation. **This everyday strategy is inherently anti-theoretical; that is, it resists any ultimate theorisation, it cannot be reduced to one successful and necessary form of politics** (such as state-oriented politics or micropolitics, for example). **Rather, imperceptible politics is genuinely empiricist, that is it is always enacted as ad hoc practices which allow the decomposition of the representational strategies in a particular field and the composition of events which cannot be left unanswered by the existing regime of control. If imperceptible politics resists theorisation and is ultimately empiricist, what then are the criteria for doing imperceptible politics? There are** three **dimensions which characterise imperceptible politics: objectlessness,** totality, **trust**. **Firstly, imperceptible politics is objectless, that is it performs political transformation without primarily targeting a specific political aim (such as transformation of a law or institution, or a particular claim for inclusion**, etc). **Instead imperceptible politics proceeds by materialising its own political actions through contagious and affective transformations.** **The object of its political practice is its own practices. In this sense, imperceptible politics is non-intentional - and therein lies its difference from state-oriented politics or the politics of civil rights movements**, for example - **it instigates change through a series of everyday transformations which can only be codified as having a central political aim or function in retrospect**. Secondly, imperceptible politics addresses the totality of an existing field of power. This seems to be the difference between imperceptible politics and micropolitics or other alternative social movements: imperceptible politics is not concerned with containing itself to a molecular level of action; it addresses the totality of power through the social changes which it puts to work in a particular field of action. The distinction between molar and molecular (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 275) has only analytical significance from the perspective of imperceptible politics. In fact imperceptible politics is both molar and molecular, because by being local situated action it addresses the whole order of control in a certain field. Imperceptible politics is located at the heart of a field of power and at the same time it opens a way to move outside this field by forcing the transformation of all these elements which are constitutive of this field. In this sense, imperceptible politics is a driving force which is simul­taneously both present and absent. We described this in the previous chapter by exploring the importance of speculative figurations for the practice of escape. On the everyday level of escape (a level we called in this chapter imperceptible politics) speculative figuration can be translated into trust. This is the third characteristic of **imperceptible politics**; it **is driven by a firm belief in the importance and truthfulness of its actions, without seeking any evidence for, or conducting any investigation into its practices. This is trust. Imperceptible politics is driven by trust in something which seems to be absent from a particular situation. Imperceptible politics operates around a void, and it is exactly the conversion of this void into everyday politics that becomes the vital force for imperceptible politics.**

**Their arguments about personal agency are ultimately conservative and de-politicizing – arguments for localizing activism within the purview of social location are the equivalent of privatizing social change, creating us as dependent on the necessity of their advocacy. The more successful their strategy is the more damage it does by making institutions necessary to our understanding of social change**

**Hershock '99**, East-West Center, 1999.  [“Changing the way society changes”, *Journal of Buddhist Ethics*, 6, 154; <http://jbe.gold.ac.uk/6/hershock991.html>]

The trouble is that, like other technologies biased toward control, the more successful legislation becomes, the more it renders itself necessary. Because it aims at rigorous definition -- at establishing hard boundaries or limits -- crossing the threshold of legislative utility means creating conditions under which the definition of freedom becomes so complex as to be self-defeating. Taken to its logical end, legally-biased social activism is thus liable to effect an infinite density of protocols for maintaining autonomy, generating a matrix of limits on discrimination that would finally be conducive to what might be called "axiological entropy" -- a state in which movement in any direction is equally unobstructed *and* empty of dramatic potential. Contrary to expectations, complete "freedom of choice" would not mean the elimination of all impediments to meaningful improvisation, but rather an erasure of the latter's conditions of possibility. The effectiveness and efficiency of "hard," control-biased technologies depend on our using natural laws -- horizons of possibility -- as fulcrums for leveraging or dictating changes in the structure of our circumstances. Unlike improvised contributions to changes taking place in our situation, dictating the terms of change effectively silences our situational partners. Technological authority thus renders our circumstances mute and justifies ignoring the contributions that might be made by the seasons or the spiritual force of the mountains to the meaning -- the direction of movement -- of our ongoing patterns of interdependence. With the "perfection" of technically-mediated control, our wills would know no limit. We would be as gods, existing with no imperatives, no external compulsions, and no priorities. We would have no reason to do one thing first or hold one thing, and not another, as most sacred or dear. Such "perfection" is, perhaps, as fabulous and unattainable as it is finally depressing. Yet the vast energies of global capital are committed to moving in its direction, for the most part quite uncritically. The consequences -- as revealed in the desecration and impoverishing of both 'external' and 'internal' wilderness (for instance, the rainforests and our imaginations) -- are every day more evident. The critical question we must answer is whether the "soft" technologies of legally-biased and controlled social change commit us to an equivalent impoverishment and desecration. The analogy between the dependence of technological progress on natural laws and that of social activism on societal laws is by no means perfect. Except among a scattering of philosophers and historians of science, for example, the laws of nature are not viewed as changeable artifacts of human culture. But for present purposes, the analogy need only focus our attention on the way legal institutions -- like natural laws -- do not prescriptively determine the shape of all things to come, but rather establish generic limits for what relationships or states of affairs are factually admissible. Laws that guarantee certain "freedoms" necessarily also prohibit others. Without the fulcrums of *unallowable* acts, the work of changing a society would remain as purely idealistic as using wishful thinking to move mountains. Changing legal institutions at once forces and enforces societal reform. By affirming and safeguarding those freedoms or modes of autonomy that have come to be seen as generically essential to 'being human', a legally-biased social activism cannot avoid selectively limiting the ways we engage with one another. The absence of coercion may be a basic aim of social activism, but if our autonomy is to be guaranteed both fair and just, its basic strategy must be one of establishing non-negotiable constraints on how we co-exist. Social activism is thus in the business of striking structural compromises between its ends and its means -- between particular freedoms and general equality, and between practical autonomy and legal anonymity. By shifting the locus of freedoms from unique persons to generic citizens -- and in substantial sympathy with both the Platonic renunciation of particularity and the scientific discounting of the exceptional and extraordinary -- social activist methodology promotes dramatic anonymity in order to universally realize the operation of 'blind justice'. Much as hard technologies of control silence the contributions of wilderness and turn us away from the rewards of a truly joint improvisation of order, the process of social activism reduces the relevance of the always unique and unprecedented terrain of our interdependence. This is no small loss. The institutions that guarantee our generic independence effectively pave over those vernacular relationships through which our own contributory virtuosity might be developed and shared -- relationships out of which the exceptional meaning of our immediate situation might be continuously realized. In contrast with Buddhist emptiness -- a practice that entails attending to the mutual relevance of all things -- both the aims and strategies of social activism are conducive to an evacuation of the conditions of dramatic virtuosity, a societal depletion of our resources for meaningfully improvised and liberating intimacy with all things.

### 2

#### A – The basis of the Aff arg about “targeted killing” is because she was recently placed on the FBI’s most-wanted list

CahokianISH ‘13

(a Blogger, writer, designer, activist, revolutionary – “Hands (and Drones) Off Assata!”

Friday, 03 May 2013 – http://www.kasamaproject.org/threads/entry/hands-and-drones-off-assata#sthash.eNs9k0f4.dpuf

Today the Obama administration's FBI added black liberation fighter Assata Shakur to its list of "Most Wanted Terrorists." They doubled the million-dollar price on her head; and she becomes the first woman on the list. Fortunately Assata Shakur is living free in Cuba after being liberated from a federal penitentiary in 1979, but it's clear her life is in mortal danger. Labeling Shakur a "terrorist" is a declaration of war against all dissenters and revolutionaries, and sets her up for murder at the hands of the state with complete impunity. It's also evidence of the continued bullying relationship between the United States and its anti-imperialist Caribbean neighbor, Cuba.

#### B – That specific order was not made by POTUS authority

Goins ‘13

(Christopher – Young Journalists Training Program at The American Spectator Past: Reporter at MarylandReporter.com, Reporter at Politic365.com, Video Editing & Journalism Intern at CNSNews.com – “FBI: Obama, Holder Not Involved Assata Shakur “Most Wanted Terrorists” Decision – May 20th – http://politic365.com/2013/05/20/fbi-obama-holder-not-involved-in-adding-assata-shakur-to-most-wanted-terrorists-list/)

The Federal Bureau of Investigation says that President Obama and Attorney General Eric Holder had nothing to do with putting the first black woman on the FBI’s “Most Wanted Terrorists” list for a crime she allegedly committed 40 years ago. The move also makes Assata Shakur, previously known as Joanne Chesimard — once active in the Black Panther Party and the Black Liberation Army in the United States at different times over 35 years ago — the first woman to be placed on the list. “Both AG and the President has nothing to do with the selection of the list or the approval and have not been involved since the creation of the list from 2001,” an FBI public affairs official told Politic365.

#### “War power” and “authority” mean specific things in this context:

Linn 2K

Alexander C. Linn, Lawyer, “International Security and the War Powers Resolution”, William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal, 8(3), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1391&context=wmborj

"War Power" is defined as "[t]he constitutional authority of Congress to declare war and maintain armed forces (U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-14), and of the President to conduct war as commander-in-chief (U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1)." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1578-79 (7th ed. 1999).

#### They’re not topical if the POTUS didn’t authorize the events of the 1AC:

West’s 8 – West's Encyclopedia of American Law, Edition 2, “President of the United States”, http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/President+of+the+United+States

The head of the Executive Branch, one of the three branches of the federal government.

#### T and Extra-T are voters – de-justifies the topic, legitimizes endless affs, and makes the 2NR impossible.

### 3

#### Next off, the speciesism counter-method—

#### The 1AC is vocal in its criticism of the racial formations within contemporary politics—but fails to address the more structural question of anthropocentric oppression. For example—if the black body is truly the locus of fungibility, how can the aff explain the inability of the slave master to eat the slave? Questions like this are important—they reveal an underlying reliance on anthropocentric hierarchies within the 1AC’s emancipatory discourse.

**Pugliese 13**—Research Director, MMCCS @ Macquarie U

(Joseph, *State Violence and the Execution of Law: Biopolitical Caesurae of Torture, Black Sites, Drones* pg 44-45, dml)

In the course of her painstaking documentation of the scenes of violent subjection that mark the life and death of black slaves, Hartman, at one juncture in her narrative, cites the testimony of the slave Charlie Moses: ‘The way us niggers was treated was awful. Master would beat, knock, kick, kill. He done ever’ thing he could ’cept eat us .’ 51 The human master can, in other words, ‘beat, knock, kick, kill’ the animal and the slave but they cannot eat the enslaved human. Charlie Moses’ testimony evidences how the homology between human slave and enslaved animal holds right up to this interdictory limit point. The critical caesura that is evidenced here opens up the space that will enable the ‘noncriminal putting to death’ of animals by humans in order to enable humans’ ‘carno- phallogocentrism.’ 52 Articulated in Moses’ testimony is the biopolitical freedom to torture and kill enslaved forms of human life with absolute impunity and the attendant prohibition on eating the human- animal-slave. It is only due to this singular prohibition that Moses can inhabit, in the most radically qualifi ed and fraught manner, the modality of the human. This intra- species prohibition functions to calibrate the human slave up one notch on the speciesist hierarchy of life. This interdiction, then, designates the only difference/division between human and animal available to the black slave. The difference between animal and human animal on the slave plantation hangs singularly on an intra- species prohibition that is animated by the most fragile of anthropocentric invocations: the only quarter granted to black slaves is to allow them a circumscribed space in which their fungibility encompasses everything but being served up as dinner on the master’s dinner table. This intra- species, anthropocentric prohibition operates as the term that cuts animals off from human animal- slaves, while articulating the entry of human slaves into a political life constituted by only one non- negotiable claim to the human: they could not be eaten.

#### This is a question of starting points. No perms—the aff has decided to forego an instrumental advocacy in favor of defending a speech act—their decision to shift the discussion to something more than a normative statement about what should happen must be met with a willingness to assign links to their speech act and what they didn’t bring up. Vote for who has a better explanation for oppression—they say civil society’s founded on anti-blackness, we say it’s speciesism.

#### We’ll offer a counter-role of the ballot—write in the place of animals that die—the role of the ballot is to move towards a true political space which necessarily entails consideration of speciesism as prior

**Collard 13**—Geography Department at the University of British Columbia

(Rosemary-Claire, “Apocalypse Meow”, Capitalism Nature Socialism, 24:1, 35-41, dml)

‘‘A true political space,’’ writes Swyngedouw (2010b, 194), ‘‘is always a space of contestation for those who are not-all, who are uncounted and unnamed.’’ This true political space necessarily includes\*if only by virtue of their exclusion\*animals, the ‘‘constitutive outside’’ of humanity itself. How we respond to this dynamic ought to be a central question of critical scholarship and philosophizing. To be a philosopher, says Deleuze in the ‘‘A for Animal’’ entry to the ‘‘abecedary’’ (L’abe´ce´daire de Gilles Deleuze 1989), ‘‘is to write in the place of animals that die.’’ This is still an imperfect way of describing my objective (for one thing, I am also interested in animals that are still alive), but it is an improvement over being a ‘‘spokesperson’’ for animals, which are often characterized as speechless and may be rendered more so having spokespeople appointed to speak on their behalf. To write in the place of animals that die seems a preferable, though still fraught, characterization.

This paper is therefore written in the place of those uncounted and unnamed non-subjects of political space, the animals that die, the nonhumans, the hundreds of millions of animals that are ‘‘living out our nightmares’’ (Raffles 2010, 120): injected, tested, prodded, then discarded. We have denied, disavowed, and misunderstood animals. They are refused speech, reason, morality, emotion, clothing, shelter, mourning, culture, lying, lying about lying, gifting, laughing, crying\*the list has no limit. But ‘‘who was born first, before the names?’’ Derrida (2008, 18) asks. ‘‘Which one saw the other come to this place, so long ago? Who will have been the first occupant? Who the subject? Who has remained the despot, for so long now?’’ Some see identifying this denial as a side-event, inconsequential, even sort of silly. The belief in human superiority is firmly lodged and dear to people’s hearts and senses of themselves. It also seems a daunting task, not a simple matter of inserting the excluded into the dominant political order, which as Z ˇ izˇek (1999) writes, neglects how these very subversions and exclusions are the order’s condition of being.

#### This is exceedingly relevant to the 1AC’s political project—our demand for the recognition of the non-human shatters the concepts of humanity that they criticize—their failure to interrogate speciesism makes their supposedly radical discourse suspect

Best No Date [Steven, Chair of Philosophy at UT-EP, “Animal Rights and the New Enlightenment”, <http://www.drstevebest.org/AnimalRightsandtheNewEnlightenment.htm>]

Western society has made rapid moral progress since the 1960s. The student, black, brown, feminist, and gay and lesbian movements advanced the universalization of rights process, overcame major barriers of prejudice, and deepened human freedom. During this turbulent period of social strife, riots, mass demonstrations against the U.S. war in Vietnam, and worsening problems with poverty, homelessness, and class inequality, Martin Luther King formulated a vision of a “world house.” In this cosmopolitan utopia, all peoples around the globe would live in peace and harmony, with both their spiritual and material needs met by the fecundity of the modern world. But to whatever degree this dream might be realized, King’s world house is still a damn slaughterhouse, because humanism doesn’t challenge the needless confinement, torture, and killing of billions of animals. The humanist non-violent utopia will always remain a hypocritical lie until so-called “enlightened” and “progressive” human beings extend nonviolence, equality, and rights to the animals with whom we share this planet. The next logical step in human moral evolution is to embrace animal rights and accept its profound implications. Animal rights builds on the most progressive ethical and political advances human beings have made in the last two hundred years. Simply put, the argument for animal rights states that if humans have rights, animals have rights for the same reasons. Moral significance lies not in our differences as species but rather our commonalities as subjects of a life. This is the challenge of animal rights: can human beings become truly enlightened and overcome one of the last remaining prejudices enshrined in democratic legal systems? Can they reorganize their economic systems, retool their technologies, and transform their cultural traditions? Above all, can they construct new sensibilities, values, worldviews, and identities? The animal rights movement poses a fundamental evolutionary challenge to human beings in the midst of severe crises in the social and natural worlds. Can we recognize that the animal question is central to the human question? Can we grasp how the exploitation of animals is implicated in every aspect of the crisis in our relation to one another and the natural world? Animal rights is an assault on human species identity. It smashes the compass of speciesism and calls into question the cosmological maps whereby humans define their place in the world. Animal rights demands that human beings give up their sense of superiority over other animals. It challenges people to realize that power demands responsibility, that might is not right, and that an enlarged neocortex is no excuse to rape and plunder the natural world. These profound changes in worldview demand revolutionizing one’s daily life and recognizing just how personal the political is. I teach many radical philosophies, but only animal rights has the power to upset and transform daily rituals and social relations. “Radical” philosophies such as anarchism or Marxism uncritically reproduce speciesism. After the Marxist seminar, students can talk at the dinner table about revolution while dining on the bodies of murdered farmed animals. After the animal rights seminar, they often find themselves staring at their plates, questioning their most basic behaviors, and feeling alienated from their carping friends and family. The message rings true and stirs the soul. Let’s be clear: we are fighting for a revolution, not for reforms, for the end of slavery, not for humane slavemasters. Animal rights advances the most radical idea to ever land on human ears: animals are not food, clothing, resources, or objects of entertainment. Our goal is nothing less than to change entrenched attitudes, sedimented practices, and powerful institutions that profit from animal exploitation. Indeed, the state has demonized us as “eco-terrorists” and is criminalizing our fight for what is right. Our task is especially difficult because we must transcend the comfortable boundaries of humanism and urge a qualitative leap in moral consideration. We are insisting that people not only change their views of one another within the species they share, but rather realize that species boundaries are as arbitrary as those of race and sex. Our task is to provoke humanity to move the moral bar from reason and language to sentience and subjectivity. We must not only educate, we must become a social movement. The challenge of animal rights also is our challenge, for animal rights must not only be an idea but a social movement for the liberation of the world’s most oppressed beings, both in terms of numbers and in the severity of their pain. As with all revolutions, animals will not gain rights because oppressors suddenly see the light, but rather because enough people become enlightened and learn how rock the structures of power, to shake them until new social arrangements emerge. Are we asking for too much? Justice requires only what is right, and is never excessive. Is the revolution remotely possible? In a thousand ways, the revolution is gaining ground. From the near nation-wide ban on cockfighting to making animal abuse a felony crime in 37 states, from eliminating the use of animals to train doctors in two thirds of U.S. medical schools to teaching animal rights and the law seminars at over two dozen universities, from increasing media coverage of animal welfare/rights issues to a 2003 Gallup Poll finding that 96% of Americans say that animals deserve some protection from abuse and 25% say that animals deserve “the exact same rights as people to be free from harm and exploitation” it is clear that human beings are beginning to change their views about other species. Human beings simply will have to reinvent their identities and find ways to define humanity and culture apart from cruelty. Whether people realize it or not, this is not a burden but a liberation. One no longer has to live the lie of separation and the opening of the heart can bring a profound healing. Animal rights is the next stage in the development of the highest values modern humanity has devised – those of equality, democracy, and rights. Our distorted conceptions of ourselves as demigods who command the planet must be replaced with the far more humble and holistic notion that we belong to and are dependent upon vast networks of living relationships. Dominionist and speciesist identities are steering us down the path of disaster. If humanity and the living world as a whole is to have a future, human beings must embrace a universal ethics that respects all life. Growth is difficult and painful,and the human species is morally immature and psychologically crippled. Human beings need to learn that they are citizens in the biocommunity, and not conquerors; as citizens, they have distinct responsibilities to the entire biocommunity. The meaning of Enlightenment is changing. In the eighteenth century it meant overcoming religious dogma and tyranny; in the late twentieth century, it demanded overcoming racism, sexism, homophobia, and other prejudices; now, in the twenty-first century, it requires overcoming speciesism and embracing a universal ethics that honors all life. We can change; we must. The message of nature is evolve or die.

### 4

#### Text—we demand an end to the United States federal government.

#### It competes—it’s a counter to their speech act. They say the speech act of the 1AC is valuable—which means they should have to defend it against a rhetorical artifact and they can’t make a perm.

#### Federal government action, even if it’s a negative action is exclusive with refusal of the government at all.

#### Solves best—it’s a demand against the state, not on the state. That’s fundamentally more incoherent to modernity than the plan, which represents a specific demand for governmental action. It’s not as unimaginable as they think—their specific demand turns case

**Paul 11**

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The occupations' power has largely rested in their newness. This is not to say that the occupation-form is new itself, or that the current struggle is not entangled with the many struggles for liberation that have come before it. Indeed, many have already pointed out and examined the histories of "occupation" in North America, radical at some moments and devastating at others.[2] Rather, it is as if the emergence of the occupations has made the current historical moment seem open and flowering with possibility. The entire situation became new in the moment that the enclosure of what was imagined as possible expanded and unfolded. What has been made abundantly clear is how contained our imaginations were before this moment, and how many of us had come to expect nothing more than the status quo of crisis and austerity. Indeed, the occupations have provided the world with a moment of defamiliarization. The limited horizons of our imaginations before the #Occupy movement have been ruptured by the continued life of the occupations themselves, and as a result we are able to collectively say and dream much more - the discourse has opened up. This process of sending things into motion and opening pathways to new potentialities can be described as taking the form of a line of flight.[3] The lines of flight present in the occupations should not be thought of as acts of fleeing or deserting from the current system, but rather as a process of collectively remapping our shared realities, lives and futurities. By conceptualizing the occupations as being potentially composed of many lines of flight flowing in common directions, we can begin to think through how to magnify and multiply their potential to set in motion further deterritorialization. Binaries and Multiplicities Following these lines of flight, we must be careful to not be captured in the binary logics of the current structures of power. The dangerous temptation is to be either for or against a political party, to be a part of this group or another, to be for or against an initiative. As soon as the occupation movement becomes fixed within a binary logic (us/them, for/against, inside/outside), the horizon of that movement and line of flight becomes fixed. One of the main strengths of this current movement is that it remains radically undetermined while simultaneously increasing its potential for horizontal collectivity and action. It is generative rather than oppositional. In order to avoid capture, participants should aim to escalate the generative capacities of the occupations while avoiding binary oppositions until binary conflict becomes unavoidable or forced.[4] The urgency declared by the mainstream media for clear and quantifiable demands from the occupations persists because those in power wish to make the occupations rational and legible. As soon as the movement becomes about this single issue or that single demand, the occupations position themselves only to negotiate, and the possibilities and potentialities of the occupations collapse into this single plane. Similarly, it is likely that the full range of political parties will attempt to capture the momentum of the occupations by provoking them into solidarity or conflict. Such provocations aim to recuperate the occupations and must be resisted. It is obvious to those of us in the 99% what the movement is about, and it need not be parsed in simple demands for the occupations to continue to proliferate. The occupations have provided a space for us to find each other and to have the conversations necessary for dynamic and mobile political forms to emerge. They are as much a process of deterritorializing public space as they are a process of becoming-collective. They are not a space of representation in the sense of the political, but are rather a space of production in which people from diverse contexts and situations can both articulate their desires and produce the collectivities necessary for struggle. In this way, the occupations have been successful thus far in transmitting their collective desire for transformation without having to narrow the scope of or flatten that desire. We should ensure that the complex multiplicity of our desires and needs remain intact, and if any demands are to be made that they reflect the impossibility of the current structure's ability to remedy our grievances. Images of Thought The occupations should be thought of not as a thing that we inhabit, but rather should be understood as a set of practices and relationships that we decide to engage in. When the police sweep away, attack and even dismantle the encampments, the collective behaviors of the occupation have the potential to persist in the everyday lives of the participants. This is illustrative of how the occupations are radically centered on questions of immanence, or in other words are concerned with what they do in the world rather than what they are. The occupations are defined not by their qualities but rather by their capacities, and as such the practices of the occupations have the potential to expand beyond the physical spaces of the encampments. The current occupations have been so incredibly inspiring not only because of their resounding yell of 'No!' in rejection of the current political and economic structures, but also because of their clear cry of 'Yes!', expressed in the collectivity and horizontality of the practices of the occupations themselves. These cries have obviously resonated with a multitude of people of across the globe, and we must continue to look to ways of amplifying and transmitting them. The democratic form of the occupations speaks more loudly against the systems of oppression than any single demand ever could, and we should organize to allow these forms to permeate more and more of society. Furthermore, the occupations continue to develop practices of thinking the world differently, and finding ways of spreading these modes of thought is of great importance. The lifespan of the occupation movement is wonderfully unpredictable, but we should not make the mistake of assuming that they will perpetuate themselves indefinitely. Forms of organization must emerge which are capable of outlasting the initial cycle of uprising if any of the gains are to be held. What is learned and experienced in the occupations must have mechanisms for transmitting these new forms of knowledge to people who did not participate directly. Similarly, participants of the occupations must develop structures for continuing the logics of the occupations after the encampments themselves have ended. Whether this means attempting to federate the occupations, establishing larger democratic structures for planning future #Occupy actions, or even constructing yet to be imagined models of organization remains unclear. With this being said, the form that the #Occupy movement must inevitably stratify itself into must be decided and articulated from within the general assemblies of the occupations themselves. If this fails to happen before the initial wave of struggle subsides, all that will remain after the dissolution of the encampments is recuperation. The Questions of Collectivity If the occupations are to become more than an action and instead a prolonged collective struggle, we must question what collectivity can mean to us in the imagination of the occupations. How are we to account for the very real differences within the 99% while also affirming the shared experiences and collectivity of the struggle? [5] Where do we as occupiers come from and what histories do we bring along with us? How do we envision solidarity amongst the 99%? The current participatory and open form of the occupations both make these questions unanswerable but also necessitates that we continually ask them. As groups such as "Occupy the Hood" have made more than clear, the occupations exist in a history of exploitation and violence and need to respond to these histories in their actions and analysis.[6] It is important to first acknowledge that the struggle of the occupations cannot remain a struggle against a single hierarchy (namely, a struggle against capitalism or a class-based struggle), but rather must begin thinking about how they are situated in a heterarchy (a system of many overlapping and at times contradictory power systems). This will mean taking into account not just the global economic powers, but also the racist, patriarchal, heterosexist and colonial systems which are also present both within the occupations and outside of them. We must develop ways of aligning the trajectories and velocities of the many potential lines of flight present in each of these structures of power if we don't want to simply escape one system to find ourselves trapped in a multiplicity of others. The struggle to overthrow just a single manifestation of oppression will always keep the others intact. Furthermore, we should conceptualize power as something that is simultaneously above us and between us. Irreconcilable differences exist between the participants of the occupations, and the productive activity of the occupations must reflect and address these differences in the way they choose to organize, dream and act. And perhaps most importantly, we must ask the hardest questions that we can ask of ourselves, namely what would have to pass for us to overcome the current structural forms of oppression and violence. Not only are there systems to be dismantled outside of the occupations, but we must also deeply question our own behaviors, assumptions and ideals within the occupations themselves. The predominant discourse has seemed to center on the structural inequality generated by financial capital. Other voices within the occupation movement have declared that police are the primary obstacle to overcome. What I hope that I have made clear is that the movement must be much larger and more ambitious than either of these single trajectories. If the movement becomes captured in just these smaller fights, they will have lost much of what was so promising about the occupations – their unboundedness. We must develop new theories and ideas concerning the material, ideological and social systems that oppress us and imagine new compositions and formations which can combat these systems. The movement of the occupations must be keenly aware of the necessity of generating new concepts which we can use to dismantle systems of power. The struggle for liberation will be a much longer fight than any of us can anticipate and is likely a project without end. Fortunately for us, the horizontal and directly democratic forms of the occupations provide us with the tools to generate liberatory forms of knowledge and experience that have the potential to transform not only the participants of the occupations but also all of society. Let us count this first month of the occupations as simply the beginning of something much larger – something unpredictable and undetermined and with unknown potentials and capacities. The occupations, in all of their immanence and uncertainty, offer us a moment of rupture – let's follow it and see how far the tear will go.

**Engaging the state, even negatively, feeds its corrupt form.**

Baudrillard, 08 (Jean Baudrillard, *Present Considerations: The uncertainty of all value* *systems*, journal of Baudrillard studies http://www.ubishops.ca/baudrillardstudies/vol5\_1/v5-1-article2-petit.html)

Baudrillard: The State and political power sit atop all this in a very, very fragile position; they are, so to speak, like filigree-work upon a translucent society, like **a fiction** woven from multiple complicities. They allow themselves to be regenerated by **all who combat them**. The political class gets itself investigated and regenerated by the examining magistrates. It's as though there were a strategy here (the government putting itself in the position of victim), but in fact there isn't any political will at the top any longer. There's merely an internal perversion, an internal convolution of the system, which means that one can no longer be in an oppositional position. There is, then, a dangerous pretension on the part of the government to govern when it hasn't either the means or the will to do so any longer; but there's an even more deceitful and dangerous pretension among those who think they can reverse or overthrow the system, for even if they have the will to do so, they do precisely the opposite of what they intended. Now, the worst thing today is the lack of lucid­ity. When you're in a trap, you're in a trap. There's no point fighting on a terrain where the **models for neutralizing opposition are strongest**, where you're up against the spiralling trap of a system that is master both of the positive and of the negative. In that. Case you mustn’t look to some internal negativity any longer. You have to look either to the achievement, by saturation and concentration – by the system's excess of positivity – of a critical mass, and then it's no longer the negative but the more positive-than-positive that produces the upheaval; or to singularities, perfectly anomalous objects or events, which are neither inside nor outside. It's in this twisting of the system, in its automatic recycling by the negative, its absorption of all dysfunctions, that the essence of corruption and the baneful destiny of democracy lie. Petit: Listening to you, that destiny seems inescapable. It's no use asking what you think of those who are intent on refounding democratic citizenship. Baudrillard: At the current time, democracy is a social form that's about as ancestral as the symbolic exchange of primitive societies. And we dream of it in the same way. The political in general continues to be the waking dream of Western societies – of the exoteric societies where everything is expressed by technics. The esoteric societies, for their part (whether they are disinherited or traditional societies), long since brought politics into line with tribal arrangements. They have trapped and tamed the Western machinery of politics, law, democracy and the universal in their per­sonal structures and relations; they have integrated linearity and history into their own cycle. We may ask ourselves whether, on a much vaster scale and by the roundabout route of rationality, it isn't the same with our Western societies. Doesn't the political sphere obey impulses, obligations, challenges and fantasies that have lit­tle to do with public affairs? This incorruptible truth of evil, of the irrational, shows through in the very corruption of the political, which must therefore be interpreted positively as the impossibility of Political Reason realizing itself. This is what explains why the more imperative transparency becomes, the greater the corrup­tion. By wishing merely to take into account a politically correct human nature ­a fundamentally Rousseauist vision – the militants of the good democratic cause – of those who, more subtly, wish to rehabilitate the “essence” of the political – merely **feed this corrupt form of the social**. What is the point of setting a purpose for an enlightened dimension of the political and the social spheres, when it's becoming increasingly obvious, most particularly in the economic sphere, that these things are caught up with much stranger purposes, if not indeed with no purpose at all? There's a kind of savage delusion and – not to put too fine a point on it – stupid­ity, in stubbornly pressing on in the right direction when there is no direction, in wishing to change the form of the equation when it's equal to zero. Just look at all the battles everywhere on corrupt fronts: in the electoral system, where people are led to fight for equivalent castes; in the employment field, where everyone has to fight to find a place in a system of exploitation, a relatively favoured spot in a labour market which simultaneously serves the government as a black-mailing technique. Everywhere we're trapped in false problems, false alternatives, false issues, in which we lose out come what may.

## 2NC

### anthro

#### anthropocentrism ensures unimaginable suffering and the unending slaughter of billions per year – this categorically outweighs

Best 7 – Associate Professor at the University of Texas in the Department of Humanities and Philosophy (Steven, “Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust, by Charles Patterson” *Journal for Critical Animal Studies*, <http://www.criticalanimalstudies.org/JCAS/Journal_Articles_download/Issue_7/bestpatterson.pdf>)

Too manypeople with pretences to ethics, compassion, decency, justice, love, and other stellar values of humanity at its finestresist the profound analogies between animal and human slavery and animal and human holocausts, in order to devalue or trivialize animal suffering and avoid the responsibility of the weighty moral issues confronting them. The moral myopia of humanism is blatantly evident when people who have been victimized by violence and oppression decry the fact that they “were treated like animals” – as if it is acceptable to brutalize animal, but not humans. If there is a salient disanalogy or discontinuity between the tyrannical pogroms launched against animals and humans, it lies not in the fallacious assumption that animals do not suffer physical and mental pain similar to humans, but rather that animals suffer more than humans, both quantitatively (the intensity of their torture, such as they endure in fur farms, factory farms, and experimental laboratories) and qualitatively (the number of those who suffer and die). And while few oppressed human groups lack moral backing, sometimes on an international scale, one finds not mass solidarity with animals but rather mass consumption of them. As another Nobel Prize writer in Literature, South African novelist writer J. M. Coetzee, forcefully stated: “Let me say it openly: we are surrounded by an enterprise of degradation, cruelty, and killing which rivals anything the Third Reich was capable of, indeed dwarfs it, in that ours is an enterprise without end, self-regenerating, bringing rabbits, rats, poultry, livestock ceaselessly into the world for the purpose of killing them.”37 Every year, throughout the world, over 45 billion farmed animals currently are killed for food consumption.38 This staggering number is nearly eight times the present human population. In the US alone, over 10 billion animals are killed each year for food consumption – 27 million each day, nearly 19,000 per minute. Of the 10 billion land animals killed each year in the US, over 9 billion are chickens; every day in the US, 23 million chickens are killed for human consumption, 269 per second. In addition to the billions of land animals consumed, humans also kill and consume 85 billion marine animals (17 billion in the US).39 Billions more animals die in the name of science, entertainment, sport, or fashion (i.e., the leather, fur, and wool industries), or on highways as victims of cars and trucks. Moreover, ever more animal species vanish from the earth as we enter the sixth great extinction crisis in the planet’s history, this one caused by human not natural events, the last one occurring 65 million years ago with the demise of the dinosaurs and 90% of all species on the planet. It is thus appropriate to recall the saying by English clergyman and writer, William Ralph Inge, to the effect that: "We have enslaved the rest of the animal creation, and have treated our distant cousins in fur and feathers so badly that beyond doubt, if they were able to formulate a religion, they would depict the Devil in human form."

The construction of industrial stockyards, the total objectification of nonhuman animals, and the mechanized murder of innocent beings should have sounded a loud warning to humanity that such a process might one day be applied to them, as it was in Nazi Germany. If humans had not exploited animals, moreover, they might not have exploited humans, or, at the very least, they would not have had handy conceptual models and technologies for enforcing domination over others. “A better understanding of these connections,” Patterson states, “should help make our planet a more humane and livable place for all of us – people and animals alike, A new awareness is essential for the survival of our endangered planet.”40

#### Anthropocentrism is the structuring principle for all their impacts

**Pugliese 13**—Research Director, MMCCS @ Macquarie U

(Joseph, *State Violence and the Execution of Law: Biopolitical Caesurae of Torture, Black Sites, Drones* pg 38-40, dml)

As a fundamentally colonial formation of power, premised on the pivotal role of racism in governing subject peoples and assigning them positions on racialized hierarchies of life that spanned the right to genocidal extermination (of Indigenous peoples) and of enslavement (of black Africans), biopolitics is informed by a parallel history of speciesism that extends back to the very establishment of human civil and political society – as premised on animal enslavement (‘domestication’). Derrida traces the contours of this founding relation:

The socialization of human culture goes hand in hand with . . . the domestication of the tamed beast: it is nothing other than the becoming- livestock [ devenirbétail ] of the beast. The appropriation, breaking- in, and domestication of tamed livestock ( das zahme Vieh ) are human socialization . . . There is therefore neither socialization, political constitution, nor politics itself without the principle of domestication of the wild animal . . . Politics supposes livestock. 22

The violence that this terse supposition enables – politics supposes livestock – is what I will discuss in some detail in my discussion of those detainees inscribed within the biopolitical trajectories of extraordinary rendition (Chapter 4). Politics supposes livestock precisely as it also supposes the enslavement of animals and the constitution of a biopolitical hierarchy: ‘for the ox,’ writes Aristotle, ‘is the poor man’s slave’; and in Aristotle’s zoo- politics, the enslaved animal comes last in an ascending sequence that includes wife, house and, at the apex, man. 23 The political ramifi cations of this historical enslavement of animals can be further elaborated: ‘Not only did the domestication of animals provide the model and inspiration for human slavery and tyrannical government,’ Charles Patterson writes, ‘but it laid the groundwork for western hierarchical thinking and European and American racial theories that called for conquest and exploitation of “lower races,” while at the same time vilifying them as animals so as to encourage and justify their subjugation.’ 24 Jim Mason amplifi es Patterson’s thesis, arguing, in his interlinking of the enslavement of animals with larger colonial formations of power, that the establishment of ‘agri- culture’ operated as ‘a license for conquest.’ 25

The Latin etymology of the terms ‘colony’ and ‘colonial’ – colonia – evidences the modalities of power over life that intertwine the concept of ‘a farm’ and ‘a public settlement of Roman citizens in a hostile or newly conquered country.’ 26 In the prehistory of biopolitical power, the expropriated space of a conquered country is inscribed with the genocidal extermination of the ‘useless’ ‘wild’ animals and the enslavement of those that can be put to human use; in other words, there is precisely what Foucault terms the biopolitical ‘power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death.’ 27 This colonial move, then, is informed by a biopolitics of speciesism that determines who will live and who will die according to an anthropocentric hierarchy of life and its attendant values of, amongst other things, economic productivity. The non- human animal is, in this prehistorical moment, marked by an ineluctable fungibility that pre- dates the transference of this same attribute to the human slave.

In fi guring forth her compelling thesis that it is fungibility that characterizes the life and death of the black slave, Saidya Hartman delineates its complex dimensions:

The relation between pleasure and the possession of slave property, in both fi gurative and literal senses, can be explained in part by the fungibility of the slave – that is, the joy made possible by virtue of the replaceability in interchangeability endemic to the commodity – and by the extensive capacities of property – that is, the augmentation of the master subject through his embodiment in external objects and persons. 28

In the colonial prehistory of biopolitics, non- human animals are branded as either vermin to be exterminated so that, in Foucault’s titular phrase, ‘society can be defended’ or, alternatively, as fungible objects that are infi nitely replaceable and exchangeable. The anthropocentrism of the master subject augments the sense of embodied ownership over the enslaved animal while legitimating their right over its life/death. The archaic development of colonial regimes of governance over the life of animals pivots on a series of biopolitical technologies that include capture, enclosure, harness, enforced labour, controlled breeding, castration, branding and auctioning at markets. All of these animal technologies are invested, in their ancient inception, 29 with the biopolitical ‘power of regularization, and it . . . consists in making live and letting die.’ 30 Moreover, all of these animal technologies will effectively be transposed to regimes of human slavery: ‘the management of livestock,’ Mason notes, operated ‘as a model for the management of slaves.’ 31 Biopolitical technologies of animal enslavement were effectively drawn upon in the development of modern slave plantations, with programs of captive breeding/rape of black women by either the master or his overseers, confi ned spaces for quartering, controlled food rations, auctioning at markets and the use of a range of disciplinary technologies – the whip, the branding iron, shackles and the coffl e, that ‘train of slaves or beasts driven along together’; 32 the use of the conjunction ‘or’ testifi es to a sedimented history that binds animals to slaves. Europe’s prehistorical animal- slave practices are what will be later exported out to the colonies in the establishment of human slave plantations. If, as Cary Wolfe contends, ‘the practices of modern biopolitics forged themselves in the common subjection and management of the “factical existence” of both humans and animals – not in the least, in the practices and disciplines of breeding, eugenics, and high- effi ciency killing’ 33 – then the co- articulation between the animal farm and the slave plantation offers another historical dimension of the biopolitical formation of power.

Dvorsky 12—Canadian bioethicist, transhumanist, and futurist (George, 8/23/12, “Prominent scientists sign declaration that animals have conscious awareness, just like us,” http://io9.com/5937356/prominent-scientists-sign-declaration-that-animals-have-conscious-awareness-just-like-us, RBatra)

An international group of prominent scientists has signed The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness in which they are proclaiming their support for the idea that animals are conscious and aware to the degree that humans are — a list of animals that includes all mammals, birds, and even the octopus. But will this make us stop treating these animals in totally inhumane ways?

While it might not sound like much for scientists to declare that many nonhuman animals possess conscious states, it's the open acknowledgement that's the big news here. The body of scientific evidence is increasingly showing that most animals are conscious in the same way that we are, and it's no longer something we can ignore.

What's also very interesting about the declaration is the group's acknowledgement that consciousness can emerge in those animals that are very much unlike humans, including those that evolved along different evolutionary tracks, namely birds and some cephalopods.

"The absence of a neocortex does not appear to preclude an organism from experiencing affective states," they write, "Convergent evidence indicates that non-human animals have the neuroanatomical, neurochemical, and neurophysiological substrates of conscious states along with the capacity to exhibit intentional behaviors."

Consequently, say the signatories, the scientific evidence is increasingly indicating that humans are not unique in possessing the neurological substrates that generate consciousness.

The group consists of cognitive scientists, neuropharmacologists, neurophysiologists, neuroanatomists, and computational neuroscientists — all of whom were attending the Francis Crick Memorial Conference on Consciousness in Human and Non-Human Animals. The declaration was signed in the presence of Stephen Hawking, and included such signatories as Christof Koch, David Edelman, Edward Boyden, Philip Low, Irene Pepperberg, and many more.

The declaration made the following observations:

The field of Consciousness research is rapidly evolving. Abundant new techniques and strategies for human and non-human animal research have been developed. Consequently, more data is becoming readily available, and this calls for a periodic reevaluation of previously held preconceptions in this field. Studies of non-human animals have shown that homologous brain circuits correlated with conscious experience and perception can be selectively facilitated and disrupted to assess whether they are in fact necessary for those experiences. Moreover, in humans, new non-invasive techniques are readily available to survey the correlates of consciousness.

 The neural substrates of emotions do not appear to be confined to cortical structures. In fact, subcortical neural networks aroused during affective states in humans are also critically important for generating emotional behaviors in animals. Artificial arousal of the same brain regions generates corresponding behavior and feeling states in both humans and non-human animals. Wherever in the brain one evokes instinctual emotional behaviors in non-human animals, many of the ensuing behaviors are consistent with experienced feeling states, including those internal states that are rewarding and punishing. Deep brain stimulation of these systems in humans can also generate similar affective states. Systems associated with affect are concentrated in subcortical regions where neural homologies abound. Young human and nonhuman animals without neocortices retain these brain-mind functions. Furthermore, neural circuits supporting behavioral/electrophysiological states of attentiveness, sleep and decision making appear to have arisen in evolution as early as the invertebrate radiation, being evident in insects and cephalopod mollusks (e.g., octopus).

 Birds appear to offer, in their behavior, neurophysiology, and neuroanatomy a striking case of parallel evolution of consciousness. Evidence of near human-like levels of consciousness has been most dramatically observed in African grey parrots. Mammalian and avian emotional networks and cognitive microcircuitries appear to be far more homologous than previously thought. Moreover, certain species of birds have been found to exhibit neural sleep patterns similar to those of mammals, including REM sleep and, as was demonstrated in zebra finches, neurophysiological patterns, previously thought to require a mammalian neocortex. Magpies in articular have been shown to exhibit striking similarities to humans, great apes, dolphins, and elephants in studies of mirror self-recognition.

 In humans, the effect of certain hallucinogens appears to be associated with a disruption in cortical feedforward and feedback processing. Pharmacological interventions in non-human animals with compounds known to affect conscious behavior in humans can lead to similar perturbations in behavior in non-human animals. In humans, there is evidence to suggest that awareness is correlated with cortical activity, which does not exclude possible contributions by subcortical or early cortical processing, as in visual awareness. Evidence that human and nonhuman animal emotional feelings arise from homologous subcortical brain networks provide compelling evidence for evolutionarily shared primal affective qualia.

#### The importance of individuality and self-consciousness are only important by human standards – non-human animals are simply different, not inferior

**Korsgaard 4**\* – a [B.A.](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bachelor_of_Arts) from the [University of Illinois](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Illinois_at_Urbana-Champaign) and a [Ph.D](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doctor_of_Philosophy) from Harvard, where she was a student of [John Rawls](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Rawls). She received an LHD [Doctor of Humane Letters](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doctor_of_Humane_Letters) from the [University of Illinois](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Illinois) in 2004.(Christine M., Harvard University “Human Beings and the Other Animals” <http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~korsgaar/CMK.MA3.pdf>)

\*Last date cited

But to say that we are important to ourselves in a way that the other animals are not important to themselves is not the same thing as to say that we are more important to ourselves than the other animals are. If I am correct about the nature of human-animal differences, there is a sense in which the other animals, even though they have personality differences, may be less individual than human beings. We have a self of our own, a self of our own making, in a way that they don’t. But we shouldn’t think that animals are less important to themselves as individuals because to us they seem to be less individual than we are – for that is nothing from their own point of view: each of them has a subjectivity that is still uniquely her own, however similar its contents are to that of others.15 And this point illustrates the larger conceptual problem that is at work here. If the argument did show that we are more important to ourselves than the other animals are to themselves, it would still only show it by our own standard**s** . It is important to us to live as if life were a project that can succeed or fail and to try succeed at that project because it is our nature to do so. And so we tend to think that the lives of animals are somehow lesser because they do not do that. But the fact that they do not do this does not make the animals less important to themselves by their standards, if I may put it that way, because it is not part of their good to do so.16 What’s important to them, I suppose, is to lead keen lives of appetite and sensation, to eat and to mate and to play. Earlier I imagined philosophical non-human animals, who think human lives are somehow lesser because we don’t do that. If they did that, they’d be making a mistake, because that is not our good. But if we think their lives are lesser because their lives are not narrative quests to live up to ideals, we would be making the exact same mistake. The relativity of value to a being’s nature is a very deep matter.

I don’t know whether it is reasonable or not, but I still think it possible that the kind of difference I have been describing plays a role in our sense that the death of a human being is more tragic, or perhaps just tragic in a different way, than the death of another animal. And it might have some moral consequences as well. If we have a life in a sense they don’t, we lose something when we lose our lives that they don’t. On the other hand, though, even if a human being loses something that another animal does not when he loses his life, it is important to remember that a human being and a non-human animal who lose their lives both lose everything that they have – everything that is important to them.17 There is something imponderable about the comparison.

I conclude from all this that there is indeed an important difference between the human good and the good of the other animals. But the difference is a difference of kind, not of degree, and it does not support the moral asymmetry. We are not more important than the other animals – again, not because we are equally important, but because such cosmic rankings make no sense. We are just very different.

#### While their knowledge production may be counter-hegemonic, as an academic politics it still relies on the concept of a knowing subject who is by definition human—this failure to critically interrogate the schema of the human reproduces speciesism and causes academic cooption of their struggle by pre-existing neoliberal forces

**Wolfe 9**—Bruce and Elizabeth Dunlevie Professor of English at Rice University

(Cary, “Human, All Too Human: “Animal Studies” and the Humanities”, PMLA, Volume 124, Number 2, March 2009, pp. 564–575 (12), dml)

Such a genealogy, appealing as it is, ought to give us pause, however, for at least a couple of reasons that have to do with the overly rapid adoption of the cultural studies template for animal studies. The rubrics animal studies and human-animal studies are both problematic, I think, in the light of the fundamental challenge that animal studies poses to the disciplinarity of the humanities and cultural studies. In my view, the questions that occupy animal studies can be addressed adequately only if we confront them on two levels: not just the level of content, thematics, and the object of knowledge (the animal studied by animal studies) but also the level of theoretical and methodological approach (how animal studies studies the animal). To put it bluntly, just because we study nonhuman animals does not mean that we are not continuing to be humanist—and therefore, by definition, anthropocentric. Indeed, one of the hallmarks of humanism—and more specifically of the kind of humanism called liberalism—is precisely its penchant for the sort of “pluralism” that extends the sphere of consideration (intellectual or ethical) to previously marginalized groups without in the least destabilizing or throwing into question the schema of the human who undertakes such pluralization. And in that event pluralism becomes incorporation, and the projects of humanism (intellectually) and liberalism (politically) are extended—indeed, extended in a rather classic sort of way.

In piggybacking on the cultural studies template (if you’ll allow the phrase in this context), animal studies too readily takes on itself some of the problems that have made cultural studies a matter of diminishing returns for many scholars. Ellen Rooney, for example, has observed that cultural studies is “perhaps even more intractably caught than literary criticism in the dilemma of defining its own proper form”; it is “a welter of competing (and even incompatible) methods, and a (quasi-)disciplinary form increasingly difficult to defend, intellectually or politically” (21). Even more pointedly, Tilottama Rajan has argued that this “dereferentialization” and “inclusive vagueness” has allowed much of cultural studies to be appropriated for the ideological work of the neoliberal order, in which capitalist globalization gets repackaged as pluralism and attention to difference (69). As “a soft-sell for, and a personalization of, the social sciences” (74), she writes, the effect if not the aim of cultural studies in the humanities “is to simulate the preservation of civil society after the permutation of the classical public sphere” into an essentially market and consumerist logic of “representation” (69–70). For my purposes here, the problem, in other words, is not just the disciplinary incoherence or vagueness of current modes of cultural studies; the problem is that that incoherence or vagueness serves to maintain a certain historically, ideologically, and intellectually specific form of subjectivity while masking it as pluralism—including (in this case) pluralism extended to nonhuman animals. In this light, animal studies, if taken seriously, would not so much extend or refine a certain mode of cultural studies as bring it to an end.5

This is so because animal studies, if it is to be something other than a mere thematics, fundamentally challenges the schema of the knowing subject and its anthropocentric underpinnings sustained and reproduced in the current disciplinary protocols of cultural studies (not to mention literary studies). (Indeed, as Susan McHugh notes in her overview of literary scholarship on animals, “a systematic approach to reading animals in literature necessarily involves coming to terms with a discipline that in many ways appears organized by the studied avoidance of just such questioning.”) For Rooney and Rajan—many others could be added to the list—the problem with cultural studies, at least in its hegemonic modes of practice in North America, is that despite its apparent oppositional, materialist, and multicultural commitments, it ends up reproducing an ideologically familiar mode of subjectivity based, philosophically and politically, on the canons of liberal humanism (whose most familiar expression would be the extension of the juridical subject of “rights” from the human to the animal sphere).6 The full force of animal studies, then, resides in its power to remind us that it is not enough to reread and reinterpret—from a safe ontological distance, as it were—the relation of metaphor and species difference, the cross-pollination of speciesist, sexist, and racist discursive structures in literature, and so on. That undertaking is no doubt praiseworthy and long overdue, but as long as it leaves unquestioned the humanist schema of the knowing subject who undertakes such a reading, then it sustains the very humanism and anthropocentrism that animal studies sets out to question. And this is why, if taken seriously, animal studies ought not to be viewed as simply the latest flavor of the month of what James Chandler calls the “subdisciplinary field,” one of “a whole array of academic fields and practices” that since the 1970s “have come to be called studies: gender studies, race studies, and cultural studies, of course, but also film studies, media studies, jazz studies . . .”—the list is virtually endless (358).7

#### your ballot can take a stand—it signifies an orientation against animal exploitation—which necessarily means taking a stance against other forms of oppression and has a tangible impact of saving non-human lives which outweighs

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But there are signs that the pendulum may, as a general matter, be swinging back. People are starting to realize that democracy has been hijacked by corporate special interests. People are getting tired of the resurgence of racism and anti-semitism. People are getting tired of the rampant and disempowering sexism that has pervades our culture. People are becoming increasingly aware that our "representatives" in Congress are nothing but pawns of the highest bidder, and are so devoid of integrity that they will attack "welfare mothers" as a financial drain on an economy that spends more money on a few new war toys than it spends on the entire system of welfare on a yearly basis. People want change. More and more people are becoming concerned about matters of social justice and nonviolence generally. Many people opposed the Gulf War; we just were not told about them by media that just happened to be controlled by the same corporations that make the bombs that we dropped on a lot of people and animals. Change will come, sooner or later. We can only hope that it will be sooner rather than later. We can only hope that it will be nonviolent. We must ask ourselves, however, whether that hope is itself morally justifiable in light of the violence that we have caused and tolerated to be caused by others who claim to act on our behalf. If the animal rights movement is to survive the backlash of animal exploiters, and if the movement is going to harness both its own internal energy and the general level of political dissatisfaction, the movement needs to re-strategize and re-organize in light of the New World Order. Now is the time to develop a radical--nonviolent but radical--approach to animal rights as part of an overall program of social justice.

The solution will not be simple, but we must make a start. Consider the following suggestions:

We must recognize that if animal rights means anything, it means that there is no moral justification for any institutionalized animal exploitation. Many people believe that as long as a person "cares" about animals, that caring makes someone an advocate of animal "rights." But that is no more the case than merely "caring" for women makes one a feminist. Feminism requires justice for women, and justice means, at the very least, the recognition that women have certain interests that cannot be sacrificed. Rape is prohibited; it is not left to whether or not a potential rapist "cares" about women. Similarly, if animals have rights, then the interests protected by those rights must receive protection and cannot be sacrificed merely because humans believe that the beneficial consequences for humans of such sacrifice outweigh the detriment for animals. We cannot talk simultaneously about animal rights and the "humane" slaughter of animals.

We need to reshape the movement as one of grassroots activists, and not "professional activists" who populate the seemingly endless number of national animal rights groups. For many people, activism has become writing a check to a national group that is very pleased to have you leave it to them. Although it is important to give financial support to worthy efforts, giving money is not enough and giving to the wrong groups can actually do more harm than good. For the most part, support local groups that you work with or that operate in your area. Significant **social change has to occur** on a local level**.**

We need to recognize that activism can come in many forms. Many people think that they cannot be good activists if they cannot afford to have big, splashy campaigns, often involving the promotion of legislation or big lawsuits. There are many forms of activism, and one of the most potent is education. We were all educated, and we need to educate others--one by one. If each of us succeeded in educating five people per year about the need for personal and social nonviolence, the results multiplied over ten years (including the people educated by those with whom we have contact, etc.) would be staggering. **Those of us inclined should reach out to greater audiences**--on radio or television talk shows, in print media, in the classroom, or in the context of peaceful demonstration--to teach about nonviolence as a paradigm of justice.

But it is important to realize that **these issues are too important to leave to anyone else**. We--each of us--has an obligation to seek justice for all persons, human and nonhuman. And we--**each of us--can help** effect that justice on a daily basis **by sharing our ideas** with those with whom we come in contact. Never underestimate the power of the individual and of small groups: Fidel Castro liberated Cuba with literally a handful of comrades.

If we decide to pursue legislation, we should stop pursuing welfarist solutions to the problem. Animal welfare seeks to regulate atrocity by making cages bigger or by adding additional layers of bureaucratic review to ensure that the atrocity is "humane." We should pursue legislation that seeks to abolish particular forms of exploitation. For example, a carefully focused campaign to end federal funding for animal use in psychological experiments, or for military purposes, may very well be received sympathetically by a public increasingly skeptical of continued public funding of animal use. And any campaign should be accompanied by the political message of ultimate abolition of all institutionalized exploitation. Animal advocates should always be up-front about their ultimate objective, and use all campaigns as an opportunity to teach about nonviolence and the rejection of all institutionalized animal exploitation.

We should recognize that there is a necessary connection between the animal rights movement and other movements for social justice. Animal exploitation involves species bias or speciesism, and is as morally unacceptable as other irrelevant criteria such as race, sex, sexual orientation, or class, in determining membership in the moral universe. But if we maintain that speciesism is bad because it is like racism, sexism, or homophobia, then we have necessarily taken a stand on those other forms of discrimination. And anyone who maintains that speciesism is morally wrong but that sexism or racism or homophobia are not, deserves the title of misanthrope. We need to recognize that the movement to achieve animal rights is a movement that is related to, but different from, the political left. The animal movement is related to the left because it necessarily supports other progressive and nonviolent struggles for human liberation. The animal movement is different because it emphasizes the concept of nonviolence.

Animal advocates should stop worrying about being "mainstream." How long will it take us to understand that the mainstream is irreversibly polluted. Animal advocates--indeed, many progressives--are afraid to be labeled as "extremists." But what does it mean to be an "extremist" when people like Newt Gingrich and Rush Limbaugh are revered by millions? When a man of color in Harlem has a lower life expectancy than a man living in the poorest of nations? When millions go without health care or even minimal shelter or adequate food in the wealthiest nation on earth? When billions of animals are slaughtered yearly for absolutely no reason other than "it tastes good."? Perhaps it is time that animal advocates learned to be proud to be called "extremists."

Perhaps we all need to be a bit more "extremist." In closing, I emphasize that the most important point is that we can no longer look to others to solve the enormous problems that we confront. We must work with other likeminded people, but we can never ignore or underestimate the ability--or the responsibility--of each person to affect significant change on a personal and social level. And we cannot wait any longer for "moderation" to work. Time is running out for us, for nonhuman animals, and for the planet.

## 1NR

### imperceptibility

**their ressentiment against exclusion prevents us from loving the present enough to change it**

**Tsianos et al. ‘8** Vassilis, teaches sociology at the University of Hamburg, Germany, Dimitris Papadopoulos teaches social theory at Cardiff University, Niamh Stephenson teaches social science at the University of New South Wales. “Escape Routes: Control and Subversion in the 21st Century” Pluto Press

**New tools of subversion are emerging, but they have not crystallised, they are ungraspable**. This describes our encounter with imperceptible politics; it is not simply situated in our present conditions of postliberal sovereignty. Of course, **imperceptible politics is demanded by our situatedness.** But at the same time, it is imaginary and outside of the present historical chronotope. It is only possible to work on the real conditions of the present by invoking imaginaries which take us beyond the present. **And this trajectory away from the present is achieved by working in time, by intensifying the present. Imperceptible politics works with the present. Time is fractured and non-synchronous - the historical present can be understood both as containing residues of the past and as anticipating the future** (Marvakis, 2005; Bloch, 1986). Yet it is impossible to identify either the past or the future by moving backwards or forwards in time. Neither move is possible. **Time forces us to work in the present, by training our senses to examine what appears evident as well as what is absent. This sensibility enables us to perceive and imagine things and ourselves in unfamiliar ways, to follow open trajectories.** **Time contains both experiences of the world which have been rendered invisible and the seeds of experience which maybe possible to realise** (Santos, 2003). **Imperceptible politics can be neither perceived nor conducted from a transcendent perspective; that is, elaborating a 'metaphysics of the present'** (as criticised in Adam, 1995) **can reveal nothing of the mode of engagement with the present we are describing. This engagement entails experiencing time in a subjective and embodied way, being forced to transform ourselves in order to deal with this current predicament of resistance.** **Situated in the present historical regime of control, imperceptible politics involves remaking the present by remaking our bodies: the ways we perceive, feel, act. Imperceptible politics transforms our bodies. Loving the present, existing in the present, imperceptible politics is practised in the present.** **It works with social reality in the most intimate and immanent ways, recalling the whole history and practice of escape, as we described earlier, and rethinking it anew.** **Doing imperceptible politics entails the refusal to use our perceptual and action systems as instruments for representing the current political conditions of resistance.** It functions through diffraction rather than reflection (Haraway, 1997, 1991c): diffraction creates 'effects of connection, of embodiment, and of responsibility for an imagined elsewhere that we may yet learn to see and build here' (Haraway, 1992, p. 295). In this sense **imperceptible politics is more concerned with changing the very conditions of perception and action than with changing what we see.** **Only such bodily, lived transformations are sufficient for interrupting the pervasive sensibilities being shaped by sovereign powers.**

**the 1ac results in radicals being rounded up and destroyed because they don’t conform quite enough—this turns the case.**

**Delgado ’02.** Richard Delgado, professor of Law at the University of Colorado-Boulder ““Explaining the Rise and Fall of African American Fortunes: Interest Convergence and Civil Rights Gains,” Review of Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy, Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, Volume 37 [37 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 369], pp. 369-387 at 376-7

Dudziak impressively demonstrates that Brown v. Board of Education n62 and the landmark civil rights legislation of the 1960s n63 were a result of interest convergence and Cold War concerns. n64 But these forces not only explain how the Civil Rights era came about; they also provide insight into why the Civil Rights movement came to an end ten years later.

One corollary to the softening of domestic attitudes exemplified by Brown and the 1964 Civil Rights Act was an implicit bargain in which African Americans, in return for civil rights gains, were expected to demonstrate loyalty to America and hostility to communism. They were expected to support foreign wars and purge their ranks of overt communists. n65 Dudziak's own data suggest this implicit bargain. She offers the early examples of singer Josephine Baker n66 and actor-singer Paul Robeson n67 [\*377] to support the implicit understanding--if not overt warning--that if blacks did not support the government, the government would take action.

With this implicit bargain in mind, Dudziak's thesis can also be used to explain some of the traumatic events of the late 1960 and early 1970s. During this period Black Power (as well as its Chicano counterpart) appeared on the scene, challenging the role assigned to blacks in the implicit bargain. n68 Panthers began reading and quoting from Marx and Lenin. n69 Malcolm X called white people "satanic" and America "the devil-nation." n70

With that bargain breaking down, the government and other elite groups responded in two ways. First, they cracked down on the Panthers with brutal force. n71 Second, to assure that minority leaders were indebted to the government, they instituted the War on Poverty program and enlisted many minority leaders, including former militants like Denver's Corky Gonzales, in that program, giving them federal grants, jobs, and patronage in the form of positions they could fill with their friends. n72 Additionally, at this time mainstream elite groups in the private sector poured millions of dollars into the black community. n73 As a result, black economic well-being surged a second time, but the radical thrust of the Civil Rights movement was largely lost.

#### Their activist stance commodifies the experiences of the oppressed they claim to speak for -- this renders their political act meaningless and creates a destructive model of dissent that depends upon authoritarian institutions and imprisons the rhetorical value of the 1ac via commodification that denies the dignity of the represented

James 3. Joy James, Professor of Africana Studies @ Brown “Academia, activism, and imprisoned intellectuals.” http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Academia,+activism,+and+imprisoned+intellectuals.-a0133368005

Activism is as multidimensional in its appearances as the academy; as academia's alter ego, or problematic twin, it also reflects the best and worst tendencies of the marketplace. When structured by the market, activism is not inherently infused with responsible behavior or compassion. In its push for productivity--more rallies, demos, conferences, meetings--it can lose sight of effective strategies, community, and the importance of young activists exercising decision-making power. To value one's presence, i.e., just showing up for work, class, or demonstrations, over one's preparedness to fully participate in transformational acts is a feature of the crass market (where volume or quantity of a product register more than quality or utility). Likewise, **expectations for unquestioning obedience to managerial elites--whether radical instructor or organizer--are also features of the market found in activism and academia. Thus, beyond confronting the social crises and military and ideological wars enacted by the state, we are disturbed, destabilized, and therefore challenged by the commodification of our own educational sites and political movements. The marketplace--as the dominant metaphor and construct--influences our consciousness and regulates our lives to shape both academia and activism. Conformity and compliance, rebellion and resistance, are often channeled through and structured by markets that turn intellect and action into objects for trade and barter in competition for status and acquisition, while making our ideals (freedom and justice) and their representatives (prisoners of resistance) into commodities.** Through books, videos, and CDs, political representations are purchased and circulated with the intent of creating greater demand not only for the "product," but also for social justice, release campaigns, opposition to expanding police and military powers, and executions and state violence. For the imprisoned, the possibility of release, or at least remembrance, mitigates their social death in prison (or physical death, as in the cases of MOVE's [Merle](http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/merle) Africa and former Black Panther Albert Nuh Washington). Academics and activists use the market to highlight the human rights abuses and conditions of the imprisoned, the 2.5 million people locked in U.S. penal institutions, and the perpetuation of torture and slavery through the Thirteenth Amendment. **The irony is that commodification is another form of containment. Although Harlow advocates the "activist counterapproach" to consumption, not all activism provides an alternative. Some of it re-inscribes the competition, opportunism, disciplinary mechanisms, and demands for institutional loyalty that characterize the marketplace**. Activism or activists, like academia and academics, have their own forms of commerce. **At their weakest and most problematic points, they share, in their respective sites,** [**careerism**](http://www.thefreedictionary.com/careerism)**, appropriation, and the assertion of "authoritative" voices. For instance, the "political prisoner-as-icon" can be deployed to minimize or silence external and internal critiques. Editors, translators, and advocates can wield iconic power as surrogates (and in surreal fashion use that proxy against the incarcerated themselves). The structural position that the non-incarcerated possess, a quite valuable commodity, permits the appropriation of voice and new forms of dependencies.** Perhaps, the imprisoned use self-censorship not only as a shield against their guards (as Marilyn Buck describes in On Self-Censorship), but also as armor against their allies. Political prisoners have strategies to counter "free" progressives, given that in the social death of the prisoner rebel, the state is not the only entity that has the ability to capitalize on or [cannibalize](http://www.thefreedictionary.com/cannibalize) captive bodies. If indeed the political prisoner or imprisoned intellectual can be either "freed" or frozen in academic and/or activist discourse and productivity, then it is essential that academics-activists, students-scholars, directly communicate with political prisoners, as openly as possible given the structural disparities.