# Round 6—Aff vs MSU CZ

## 1AC

### 1ac screaming wolf

#### Every day, each and every one of us participates in a war which consists of endless genocide of the non-human. This violence is rendered imperceptible by a normative understanding of war that excuses violence against the non-human as legitimate.

**Kochi 9** - Sussex Law School, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK (Tarik, “Species War: Law, Violence and Animals,” SAGE Journals)

7. The idea that war and violence sits at the foundation of law and operates creatively has been expressed in differing ways by Heraclitus, Machiavelli, Hegel, Freud and Walter Benjamin. Here, I am merely taking this insight and developing it by reflecting upon the primary role played by human violence carried out against non-human animals. the protagonist Elizabeth Costello draws a comparison between the everyday slaughter of non-human animals and the genocide of the Jews of Europe during the twentieth century. “In addressing you on the subject of animals,” she continues, “I will pay you the honour of skipping a recital of the horrors of their lives and deaths. Though I have no reason to believe that you have at the forefront of your minds what is being done to animals at this moment in production facilities (I hesitate to call them farms any longer), in abattoirs, in trawlers, in laboratories, all over the world, I will take it that you concede me the rhetorical power to evoke these horrors and bring them home to you with adequate force, and leave it at that, reminding you only that the horrors I here omit are nevertheless at the center of this lecture.” 9

A little while later she states: “Let me say it openly: we are surrounded by an enterprise of degradation, cruelty, and killing which rivals anything that the Third Reich was capable of, indeed dwarfs it, in that ours is an enterprise without end, self-regenerating, bringing rabbits, rats, poultry, livestock ceaselessly into the world for the purpose of killing them.” “And to split hairs, to claim that there is no comparison, that Treblinka was so to speak a metaphysical enterprise dedicated to nothing but death and annihilation while the meat industry is ultimately devoted to life (once its victims are dead, after all, it does not burn them to ash or bury them but on the contrary cuts them up and refrigerates and packs them so that they can be consumed in the comfort of our own homes) is as little consolation to those victims as it would have been – pardon the tastelessness of the following – to ask the dead of Treblinka to excuse their killers because their body fat was needed to make soap and their hair to stuff mattresses with.” Similar comparisons have been made before. Yer, when most of us think about the term “war” very seldom do we bother to think about non-human. A great deal of the contemporary discussion about the moral standing of animals and their treatment is owed to the work of Peter Singer. The purpose of my article is not to directly contribute to this debate. Rather, my focus is upon attempting to re-think some of the conceptual foundations of the Law of war by drawing the status of animal slaughter back into our legal categoryies. For this reason I will not attempt to discuss or survey the many arguments about the moral standing of non-human animals but will keep to a more historical, and perhaps sociological, discussion of the Law of war.

The term war commonly evokes images of states, armies, grand weapons, battle lines, tactical stand-offs, and maybe even sometimes guerrilla or partisan violence. Surely the keeping of cattle behind barbed wire fences and butchering them in abattoirs does not count as war? Surely not? Why not? What can be seen to be at stake within Elizabeth Costello’s act of posing the modern project of highly efficient breeding and factory slaughtering of non-human animals beside the Holocaust is a concern with the way in which we order or arrange conceptually and socially the legitimacy of violence and killing. In a “Western” philosophical tradition stretching at least from Augustine and Aquinas, through to Descartes and Kant, the ordering of the relationship between violence and legitimacy is such that, predominantly, non-human animals are considered to be without souls, without reason and without a value that is typically ascribed to humans. For example, for Augustine, animals, together with plants, are exempted from the religious injunction “Thou shalt not kill.” When considering the question of what forms of killing and violence are legitimate, Augustine placed the killing of non-human animals well inside the framework of religious and moral legitimacy. 12

Of relevance is the practice by which the question of legitimate violence is ordered – that is, the manner in which it is organised by philosophical, moral and cultural justifications in a way that sets out how particular acts of violence are to be understood within social-material life. Within a Western tradition the killing of animals is typically not considered a form of war because violence against animals is placed far within the accepted framework of legitimate killing. 12. Augustine, City of God against the Pagans, Dyson, R.W. tr. ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 33, I, 21. This account expresses a particular religious-cultural form of valuing the lives of non-human animals in which non-human animals are placed below humans on a Judeo-Christian and Islamic cosmic hierarchy of creation. While there are other differing cosmic conceptions, such as those found within Hinduism and Buddhism and within various indigenous cosmologies within North America and Australia and within radical utilitarian conceptions expressed by Bentham and Peter Singer focused upon “suffering,” the model of a Judeo-Christian and Islamic hierarchy of creation remains dominant within “Western” (or North Atlantic) culture and its conceptions of law. Such a hierarchy of value is further backed in the West, in differing ways, by the secular cosmology of the theory of evolution, and scientific claims about the higher mental capacities of humans over the bulk of non-human animals. Owing to these hierarchies, for Western legal systems “animal rights” still stand far below and have not been extended from human rights and while the notion of human dignity takes centre stage, notions of “animal dignity” stand at the periphery. On various approaches to the extension of moral standing to non-human animals see: Bentham, J. Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Burns, J.H. and Hart, H.L.A. eds. ( London: Methuen, 1982); Singer, P. Animal Liberation (New York: Random House, 1975); Regan, T. “The Case for Animal Rights” in Singer, P. ed. In Defence of Animals (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985); Clarke, S.R.L. The Moral Standing of Animals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977); Hursthouse, R. Ethics, Humans and Other Animals ( London: Routledge, 2000).

#### This Western conception of war is grounded upon a hierarchy of values that regards nonhuman life as raw material for the preservation of human life.

**Kochi 9** - Sussex Law School, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK (Tarik, “Species War: Law, Violence and Animals,” SAGE Journals)

The response of the lawyer, international lawyer, politician or philosopher to the account so far might be to say that this is all very interesting but that it still has little to do with “war.” Such figures might still argue that the term “war” refers to something carried out by states and governed by “national interest,” or guided by moral ideals like freedom and human rights, or by international law. This response, however, overlooks the way in which the typical and everyday use of the term war is itself conceptually and  historically ordered in a practice that differentially values forms of life. In what follows I look more closely at how arguments about legitimate violence within two contemporary conceptions or discourses of the law of war are ordered and of how this ordering is related to the foundational moment of species war. The dominant Western conceptions of the law of war rest upon two major conceptual and historical “foundations.” The first involves the way in which the monopoly upon the legitimacy of violence is vested in the sovereignty of the state and grounded upon the principles of preservation of life, domestic peace and security from external threat. This form which sometimes expresses a reason of state or national interest approach to questions of war is often called the Westphalian system of international relations and is ambiguously historically linked to the Peace of Westphalia (1648). The second dominant narrative or form of thinking about the laws of war is represented by contemporary international humanitarian law. This approach grounds the legitimacy of war upon the maintenance of peace and  security between nations bound together with the concern for the protection of human rights and the prevention of human rights abuses, war crimes and genocide via the establishment of the United Nations (1945). While this mode of thinking about war inherits much from the Westphalian system, it is historically grounded upon an international response to “world war” and the genocide of European Jews. The natural law theories of Hugo Grotius and Thomas Hobbes are often viewed as laying down the theoretical justifications for the  modern secular state, the legitimacy of sovereign violence, and the Westphalian international order. Within the context of bloody intra-state civil wars such as the Thirty Years War (1618–48) and moments of domestic chaos such as the English Civil War (1642–51) thinkers such as Grotius and Hobbes reacted to widespread social violence often motivated by actors party to differing Christian confessions all claiming adherence to a universal  religious, moral or political truth. Grotius and Hobbes, albeit in different ways, responded by producing a de-sacralized natural law that was grounded not upon  theological conceptions of right and justice but upon more earthly, “secular,” concepts of the preservation of human life and survival. For these thinkers the chaos of civil war and intra-state civil war could be nullified if the criteria of what counted as legitimate violence were determined by an institution that guaranteed peace and security. Roughly, Grotius and Hobbes attempted to theoretically re-order  territory and space around the figure of sovereignty and inter-sovereign relations. The legitimacy of human violence is no longer grounded upon a universal conception of divine authority but is instead located around the figure and office of the sovereign who maintains peace and security over a particular, limited territory. Such an approach to the chaos of civil war can be termed the juridical ordering of the concept of war. This de-legitimisation of the right to private violence in the name of peace  creates what Max Weber later describes as the “state’s monopoly upon the legitimacy of violence.” Modern war, juridically ordered, takes on the definition of a form of violence waged between sovereigns, who hold a particular status. By this definition violence carried out by the state against a non-sovereign group is excluded from the language of “war proper” as is private violence (including rebellion, sabotage and terrorism) which is defined as crime.Grotius and Hobbes are sometimes described as setting out a prudential approach, or a natural law of minimal content because in contrast to Aristotelian or Thomastic legal and political theory their attempt to derive the legitimacy of the state and sovereign order relies less upon a thick conception of the good life and is more focussed upon basic human needs such as survival. In the context of a response to religious civil war such an approach made sense in that often thick moral and religious conceptions of the good life (for example, those held by competing Christian Confessions) often drove conflict and violence. Yet, it would be a mistake to assume that the categories of “survival,” “preservation of life” and “bare life” are neutral categories. Rather survival, preservation of life and bare life as expressed by the Westphalian theoretical tradition already contain distinctions of value – in particular, the specific distinction of value between human and non-human life. “Bare life” in this sense is not “bare” but contains within it a distinction of value between the worth of human life placed above and beyond the worth of non-human animal life. In this respect bare life within this tradition contains within it a hidden conception of the good life. The foundational moment of the modern juridical conception of the law of war already contains within it the operation of species war. The Westphalian tradition puts itself forward as grounding the legitimacy of violence upon the preservation of life, however its concern for life is already marked by a hierarchy of value in which non-human animal life is violently used as the “raw material” for preserving human life. Grounded upon, but concealing the human-animal distinction, the Westphalian  conception of war makes a double move: it excludes the killing of animals from its definition of “war **proper,” and**, **through rendering dominant the modern** juridical **definition of “war** proper” the tradition **is able to** further institutionalize and **normalize a particular conception** of the good life. Following from this original distinction of life-value realized through the juridical language of war were other forms of human life whose lives were considered to be of a lesser value under a European, Christian, “secular” natural law conception of the good life. Underneath this concern with the preservation of life in general stood veiled preferences over what particular forms of life (such as racial conceptions of human life) and ways of living were worthy of preservation, realization and elevation. The business contracts of early capitalism, the power of white males over women and children, and, especially in the colonial context, the sanctity of European life over non-European and Christian lives over non-Christian heathens and Muslims, were some of the dominant forms of life preferred for preservation within the early modern juridical ordering of war.

#### The move to exclude specieist exploitation as war is the same move by other historical acts of genocide. Our affirmative demands recognition of this unending violence as war.

**Kochi 9** - Sussex Law School, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK (Tarik “Species War: Law, Violence and Animals”

The meanings attached to the words we use are significant here. Many of our linguistic categories have been formulated along the distinction between human and non-human and offer different meanings based upon what object within this distinction a word denotes. Words like “killing” and “slaughter” evoke different meanings and different responseswhen applied to humans as opposed to chickens or cattle or insects. While most people would react in horror to the brutal killing of a child, they accept the daily slaughter of thousands of calves. Although there exists a bureaucratic language of regulation governing issues of efficiency, property rights, hygiene and cruelty, the breeding of animals for killing is widely accepted as a legitimate act. Such that, the killing of one animal is not considered murder and the killing of a geographical group of animals is not considered an act of genocide or species war. Yet, this ordering of the legitimacy of violence is not in anyway natural and eternal. Rather, it is contingent and both historically and cosmically temperamental. Consider a hypothetical situation where a group of “aliens” emerged from deep space with forms of technology that far surpassed our own and possessed levels of intelligence that humans could not imagine. These aliens considered humans to be without souls, they considered humans to be so devoid of reason that they made no effort to communicate with us. Our behaviour and language appeared to them just as the movements of ants, the song of birds, and the efforts of chimpanzees appear to us. Further, these aliens cared little for human suffering. If these aliens decided to enslave and breed humans for food, would this be an act of species war? Even if humans rallied together, Hollywood style, (or, like a swarm of bees protecting their hive) and called this an act of “war,” might not the aliens simply laugh, or grumble about how their new animals struggle and go on to devise new methods of capture and killing so that we humans might not bruise our flesh.13

While such an example appears at first bizarre, it is not out of the range of future possibility. Further, the example draws upon an already present heritage of anthropological, racial and colonial forms of thinking belonging to many Western traditions in which acts of violence were legitimised historically by those in positions of power and often never officially called “war.” Aspects of this historical comparison are made by Elizabeth Costello – the Nazi portrayal of Jews as “animals” playing a role in both 13. Similar hypothetical situations have been imagined within numerous science fiction stories in popular culture, most notably: Wells, H.G. The War of the Worlds (London: Heinemann, 1973). Wells makes the link between war, colonialism and the destruction of non-human animal life. At p. 4 he states:

And before we judge them too harshly, we must remember what ruthless and utter destruction our own species has wrought, not only upon animals, such as the vanished bison and the dodo, but upon its own inferior races. The Tasmanians, in spite of their human likeness, were entirely swept out of existence in a war of extermination waged by European immigrants in the space of fifty years. Are we such apostles of mercy as to complain if the Martians warred in the same spirit.

 “ ‘They went like sheep to the slaughter.’ ‘They died like animals.’ ‘The Nazi butchers killed them.’ Denunciation of the camps reverberates so fully with the language of the stockyard and slaughterhouse that it is barely necessary for me to prepare the ground for the comparison I am about to make. The crime of the Third Reich, says the voice of accusation, was to treat people like animals.” 14

#### Voting affirmative acknowledges the existence of the war against the nonhuman. We must reject the hierarchy of the human/nonhuman and reject the notion of legitimate violence.

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Although species war remains largely hidden because it is not seen as war or even violence at all it continues to affect the ways in which juridical mechanisms order the legitimacy of violence. While species war may not be a Western monopoly, in this account I will only examine a Western variant. This variant, however, is one that may well have been imposed upon the rest of the world through colonization and globalization. In what will follow I offer a sketch of species war and show how the juridical mechanisms for determining what constitutes legitimate violence fall back upon the hidden foundation of species war. I try to do this by showing that the various modern juridical mechanisms for determining what counts as legitimate violence are dependent upon a practice of judging the value of forms of life. I argue that contemporary claims about the legitimacy of war are based upon judgements about differential life-value and that these judgements are an extension of an original practice in which the legitimacy of killing is grounded upon the valuation of the human above the non-human. Further, by giving an overview of the ways in which our understanding of the legitimacy of war has changed, I attempt to show how the notion of species war has been continually excluded from the Law of war and of how contemporary historical movements might open a space for its possible re-inclusion. In this sense, the argument I develop here about species war offers a particular way of reflecting upon the nature of law more generally. In a Western juridical tradition, two functions of law are often thought to be: the establishment of order (in the context of the preservation of life, or survival); and, the realization of justice (a thick conception of the “good”). Reflecting upon these in light of the notion of species war helps us to consider that at the heart of both of these functions of law resides a practice of making judgements about the life-value of particular “objects.” These objects are, amongst other things: human individuals, groups of humans, non-human animals, plants, transcendent entities and ideas (the “state,” “community,” etc.). For the law, the practice of making judgements about the relative life- value of objects is intimately bound-up with the making of decisions about what objects can be killed. Within our Western conception of the law it is difficult to separate the moment of judgement over life-value from the decision over what constitutes “legitimate violence.” Species war sits within this blurred middle-ground between judgement and decision – it points to a moment at the heart of the law where distinctions of value and acts of violence operate as fundamental to the founding or positing of law. The primary violence of species war then takes place not as something after the establishment of a regime of law (i.e., after the establishment of the city, the state, or international law). Rather, the violence of species war occurs at the beginning of law, at its moment of foundation, as a generator, as a motor. 7

#### Our affirmative is an act of assuming a traitorous identity. The dynamics of different forms of privilege posits us all as in positions of both the oppressor and oppressed. In the species war, we are all human oppressors that are complicit in a cycle of tortuous violence. The only feasible solution for the nonhuman is to work against the structures of your own culture. This does not mean we deny our identities or claim unity with the oppressed, but it does mean that we adopt an ethic that attempts to end our own domination.

**Plumwood 2 –** (Val, “Environmental Ethics”, p.205-6)

There are, I have suggested, multiple bases for critical solidarity with nature. One important critical basis can be understanding that certain human societies position humans as oppressors of non-human nature, treating humans as a privileged group which defines the non-human nature, in terms of roles that closely parallel our own roles as recipients of oppression within human dominance orders. Our grasp of these parallels may be based upon imaginative or narrative transpositions into locations paralleling that of the oppressed non-human other: artistic representation has an important place in helping us make such transpositions. Literature has often played such a transposing role historically, especially in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, in relation to the class system, slavery, women’s oppression, and animal oppression. In recent decades science fiction narrative that imaginatively position humans as colonized or exploited reductively as food by alien invaders have provided very powerful vehicles for such imaginative transpositions into a place that parallels that of the non-human food animal. So have those cartoonists whose ‘absurd’ humour depends upon exploiting parallels in the condition of the human and non-human oppressed. A chicken coming from a human house carrying a baby passes a women coming from a chicken coop carrying a basket of eggs, for example. A Larson elephant is outraged when he notices the ivory notes on a piano keyboard at an interspecies party and makes the connection to the fate of his own kind. The leap of recognition that is often described and explained in terms of an unanalysed and capricious emotion of ‘empathy’ or ‘sympathy’ is often better understood in terms of a concept of solidarity that is based on an intellectual and emotional grasp of the parallels in the logic of the One and the Other. Since most people suffer from some form of oppression within some dominance order or other, there is a widespread basis for the recognition that we are positioned multiply as oppressors or colonizers just as we are positioned multiply as oppressed and colonized. This recognition that one is an oppressor as well as an oppressed can be developed in certain cirvumstances to become the basis for the critical ‘traitorous identity’ which analyses, opposes and actively works against those structures of one’s own culture or group that keep the Other in an oppressed position. Traitorous kinds of human identity involve a revised conception of the self and its relation to the non-human other, opposition to oppressive practices, and the abandonment and critique of cultural allegiances to the dominance of the human species and its bonding against non-humans, in the same way that male feminism requires abandonment and critique of male bonding as the kind of male solidarity that defines itself in opposition to the feminine or to women, and of the ideology of male supremacy. These ‘traitorous identities’ that enable some men to be male feminists in active opposition to androcentric culture, some whites to be actively in opposition to white supremacism and ethnocentric culture, also enable some humans to be critical of ‘human supremacism’ and in active opposition to anthropocentric culture. “Traitorous’ identities do not appear by chance, but are usually considerable political and personal achievements in integrating reason and emotion; they speak of the traitor’s own painful self-reflection as well as efforts of understanding that have not flinched away from contact with the pain of oppressed others. What makes such traitorous identities possible is precisely the fact that the relationship between the oppressed and the ‘traitor’ is not one of identity, that the traitor is critical of his or her own ‘oppressor’ group as someone from within that group who has some knowledge of its workings and its effects on the life of the oppressed group. It depends on the traitor being someone with a view from both sides, able to adopt multiple perspectives and locations that enable an understanding how he or she is situated in the relationship with the other from the perspective of both kinds of lives, the life of the One and the live of the Other. Being a human who takes responsibility for their interspecies location in this way requires avoiding both the arrogance of reading in your own location and perspective as that of the other, and the arrogance of assuming that you can ‘read as the Other’ know their lives as they do, and in that sense speak or see as the other. Such a concept of solidarity as involving multiple positioning and perspectives can exploit the logic of the gap between contradictory positions and narratives standpoint theory applies to. The traitorous identity implies a certain kind of ethics of support relations which is quite **distinct from the ethics involved in claiming unity**. It stresses a number of counter-hegemonic virtues, ethical stances with can help to minimize the influence of the oppressive ideologies of domination and self-imposition that have formed our conceptions of both the other and ourselves. As we have seen, important among these virtues are listening and attentiveness to the other, a stance which can help counter the backgrounding which obscures and denies what the non-human other contributes to our lives and collaborative ventures. They also include philosophical strategies and methodologies that maximize our sensitivity to other members of our ecological communities and openness to them as ethically considered beings in their own right, rather than ones that minimize ethical recognition or that adopt a dualistic stance of ethical closure that insists on sharp moral boundaries and denies the continuity of planetary life. Openness and attentiveness are among the communicative virtues we have already discussed; more specifically, they mean giving the other’s needs and agency attention, being open to unanticipated possibilities and aspects of the other, reconceiving and re-encountering the other as a potentially communicative and agentic being, as well as ‘an independent creature of value and originator of projects that demand my respect’. A closely allied stance, as Anthony Weston points out, is that of invitation, which risks an offering of relationship to the other in a more or less open-ended way.

#### Now, we must accept the fact that the human itself is an ethically bankrupt subject.

Kochi and Ordan 8 – Lecturer in Law and International Security at the U of Sussex, and \*Research in Translation Studies at Bar Ilan U, (Tarik and Noam, “An argument for the global suicide of humanity” borderlands”, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_6981/is\_3\_7/ai\_n31524968/

The global suicide of humanity

How might such a standpoint of dialectical, utopian anti-humanism reconfigure a notion of action which does not simply repeat in another way the modern humanist infliction of violence, as exemplified by the plan of Hawking, or fall prey to institutional and systemic complicity in speciesist violence? While this question goes beyond what it is possible to outline in this paper, we contend that the thought experiment of global suicide helps to locate this question--the question of modern action itself--as residing at the heart of the modern environmental problem. In a sense perhaps the only way to understand what is at stake in ethical action which responds to the natural environment is to come to terms with the logical consequences of ethical action itself. The point operates then not as the end, but as the starting point of a standpoint which attempts to reconfigure our notions of action, life-value, and harm. For some, guided by the pressure of moral conscience or by a practice of harm minimisation, the appropriate response to historical and contemporary environmental destruction is that of action guided by abstention. For example, one way of reacting to mundane, everyday complicity is the attempt to abstain or opt-out of certain aspects of modern, industrial society: to not eat non-human animals, to invest ethically, to buy organic produce, to not use cars and buses, to live in an environmentally conscious commune. Ranging from small personal decisions to the establishment of parallel economies (think of organic and fair trade products as an attempt to set up a quasi-parallel economy), a typical modern form of action is that of a refusal to be complicit in human practices that are violent and destructive. Again, however, at a practical level, to what extent are such acts of nonparticipation rendered banal by their complicity in other actions? In a grand register of violence and harm the individual who abstains from eating non-human animals but still uses the bus or an airplane or electricity has only opted out of some harm causing practices and remains fully complicit with others. One response, however, which bypasses the problem of complicity and the banality of action is to take the non-participation solution to its most extreme level. In this instance, the only way to truly be non-complicit in the violence of the human heritage would be to opt-out altogether. Here, then, the modern discourse of reflection, responsibility and action runs to its logical conclusion--the global suicide of humanity--as a free-willed and 'final solution'. While we are not interested in the discussion of the 'method' of the global suicide of humanity per se, one method that would be the least violent is that of humans choosing to no longer reproduce. [10] The case at point here is that the global suicide of humanity would be a moral act; it would take humanity out of the equation of life on this earth and remake the calculation for the benefit of everything nonhuman. While suicide in certain forms of religious thinking is normally condemned as something which is selfish and inflicts harm upon loved ones, the global suicide of humanity would be the highest act of altruism. That is, global suicide would involve the taking of responsibility for the destructive actions of the human species. By eradicating ourselves we end the long process of inflicting harm upon other species and offer a human-free world. If there is a form of divine intelligence then surely the human act of global suicide will be seen for what it is: a profound moral gesture aimed at redeeming humanity. Such an act is an offer of sacrifice to pay for past wrongs that would usher in a new future. Through the death of our species we will give the gift of life to others. It should be noted nonetheless that our proposal for the global suicide of humanity is based upon the notion that such a radical action needs to be voluntary and not forced. In this sense, and given the likelihood of such an action not being agreed upon, it operates as a thought experiment which may help humans to radically rethink what it means to participate in modern, moral life within the natural world. In other words, whether or not the act of global suicide takes place might well be irrelevant. What is more important is the form of critical reflection that an individual needs to go through before coming to the conclusion that the global suicide of humanity is an action that would be worthwhile. The point then of a thought experiment that considers the argument for the global suicide of humanity is the attempt to outline an anti-humanist, or non-human-centric ethics. Such an ethics attempts to take into account both sides of the human heritage: the capacity to carry out violence and inflict harm and the capacity to use moral reflection and creative social organisation to minimise violence and harm. Through the idea of global suicide such an ethics reintroduces a central question to the heart of moral reflection: To what extent is the value of the continuation of human life worth the total harm inflicted upon the life of all others? Regardless of whether an individual finds the idea of global suicide abhorrent or ridiculous, this question remains valid and relevant and will not go away, no matter how hard we try to forget, suppress or repress it.

#### Human reform is impossible, the only feasible strategy is one of unflinching animal liberation

Screaming Wolf ‘91**—**Animal Liberation Front, <http://www.reachoutpub.com/dow.pdf>

These increasingly frustrated individuals examine their assumption that educating the public about what is really happening to the animals will somehow lead to the termination of the cruelty. That assumption demands a faith in the fairness and compassion of human nature that these people no longer take on face value. They begin to question whether showing people movies and photos of monkeys with electrodes in their heads, or wolves caught by steel-jaw leghold traps, or calves immobilized in dark, claustrophobic veal crates, or chickens crowded and stressed by factory farm conditions, will motivate the common person to change their consumption patterns and other abusive behaviors. At one time, the common person would hunt, slaughter, skin, and beat animals as a regular part of life. It is an illusion of contemporary society that people today are more compassionate than in that cruel past. Actually, the general public has simply become unaccustomed to killing animals themselves. The dirty work is left to “specialists,” like butchers, trappers, animal researchers, and animal shelter workers. History has shown, however, that humans have an enormous capacity to revert to barbaric behavior at the first sign of potential personal gain. The same insensitivity that allows “specialists” to kill would allow the average person to kill, as well. At the current time, this insensitivity allows people to be comfortable in the knowledge that others are doing the killing for them. If people today are sensitive to pictures of animal abuse, then the interest people have in the products of that abuse will simply cause them to turn away from the pictures, or to accept that such acts against animals are “a necessary evil”. So these developing liberators conclude that, in the long run, showing the public pictures of animal abuse will only further desensitize people to animal suffering. Humans can adapt to all assaults to their sensibilities, especially when they are committed to certain behaviors. They then try to appeal to the public, legislators, product manufacturers, and others in power, through letter writing, boycotts, rallies, demonstrations, and marches. But their efforts get them nowhere. Every small victory is challenged. Despite years of lobbying and writing to Congressmen, the only major legislation passed in recent history for animal protection was the Federal Animal Welfare Act, designed primarily to protect animals exploited in research. Yet, before the ink could dry on the new legislation, animal abusers clamored to water down its already compromised and weakened impact. As a result of lobbying by animal abusers, farm animals are exempt from the act, as are rodents. When you consider that about 90% of animal research is done on rodents, it’s easy to see that the effect of the Act on animal suffering is minimal. Further, any acts of terror can be committed against any and all animals in the name of research, so long as it is deemed “necessary” for the research project. Since farm animals are exempt from the Act, many researchers now target pigs and sheep as totally unprotected subjects. It’s hard to keep a cruel researcher down! The increasingly angry animal defenders passionately hold onto their dubious victories to convince themselves that those victories are substantial and meaningful. They demand to legislators that the Act is enforced, a difficult task since the Department of Agriculture, which is responsible for its enforcement, has too few inspectors, and too little interest, in doing its job. This leads these soon-to-be liberators to the sad realization that laws are only as good as the intent to obey them. Recognizing these failures, they look to other signs of success to bolster their optimism. We see that vegetarianism is more acceptable than before, with more vegetarians in this country than in the past. Further examination reveals that many so called “vegetarians” eat fish and poultry. Almost all of these “vegetarians” eat dairy and/or eggs, which is merely exchanging solid flesh for liquid flesh. At most, only 3% of the population say they are “vegetarians”. When we consider a population of 270,000,000 people, 3% seems a great amount of vegetarians, surely enough to generate a market for special products and magazines. But there are still 262,000,000 people eating animal flesh, and the numbers of animals killed for food continues to increase. Put differently, 97 out of every 100 babies born in this country are being raised as flesh eaters. They turn their attention to the fur issue, an area where they can feel certain success. After all fur is no longer a fashionable commodity. Unfortunately, they discover that fur stores have opened up in Asian countries, so that the industry has simply generated ¶ new markets to replace the old ones it has lost. They also learn that fur is unfashionable primarily in the United States and England, but is still popular in some European countries. And knowing how fashions come and go, these people, increasingly anxious about making a difference for the animals, develop a uneasiness over the current fur taboo, wondering when fur will again become a desirable commodity. Finally, they turn their attention to cosmetic and household product testing on animals. Feeling certain that the general public will never sanction such blatant animal abuse, they boycott the companies selling these products of death. When some of the companies agree to stop animal testing, the animal lovers rejoice at the news. They feel vindicated in their approach of working within the system and fighting with their pocketbooks. To maintain their feeling of success, however, they try to ignore the fact that many of the companies, who say they no longer use animal tests, are farming out the tests to other companies, or are buying animal tested ingredients from suppliers to use in their allegedly cruelty free product line. Eventually, they begin to realize that fighting for the animals is like trying to put out thousands of brush fires. Tremendous effort and time is spent focusing on one fire, which may or may not be extinguished, while ten others are being started. It is a never ending battle fighting this way. And it is a losing proposition. Eventually, these animal extremists step back from the smoky field, and reflect on the causes of the fires. If they can eliminate some of the causes, they conclude, then they wouldn’t have to fight so many flames. In short, these people move towards greater and greater extremism as they find all their efforts to help the animals frustrated by the abusive system with which they are fighting. They examine and question all their assumptions and approaches, and for once they feel that they are really beginning to get in touch with the depth of the problem, and with possible solutions. Finally, they come up with bold, revolutionary ideas. In fact, they conclude that a revolution is essential for freeing the animals. Let me summarize this conclusion of people who have come to call themselves animal liberators. It will be direct, challenging, uncompromising, and frightening to all animal abuser and others invested in the system. Liberators believe in killing humans to save animals! If an animal researcher said: “It’s a dog or a child,” a liberator will defend the dog every time. A liberator also believes that disposing of a few researchers will save even more dogs from their cruelty. THE LIBERATORS 9 Liberators have come to one unavoidable conclusion: HUMANS WILL NEVER MAKE PEACE WITH ANIMALS! It is not in their natures or in the natures of the societies they have created. In fact, liberators believe that if people really want to save the animals, they must stop wasting their time trying to improve the human race and its societies. They must declare war against humans. They must join in this revolution! Liberators believe this is the only logical, consistent, and morally correct conclusion stemming from a true belief that animals should be free to live their lives unshackled from human exploitation. They believe that the nature of human society and its laws are implicitly and irrevocably immoral. Liberators are people of conscience who feel morally obligated to break those laws and revolt against this oppressive regime. But this revolution by liberators will not be like any other in the history of the world. Normally, revolutions seek to gain privileges within society for a disenfranchised group of people. The civil rights movement, for example, was dedicated to gaining protection and enforcement of those rights blacks were assured in the Constitution since the Civil War. It was a movement forinclusion in society. The same thing goes for the gay rights movement, or the feminist movement. The liberation movement to end animal exploitation is nothing like these others, as the liberators see it. And according to them, this difference has made the struggle for freedom for animals, as it has been practiced to this day, to be nothing more than an impotent whimper in the face of gross inhumanity. Liberators feel this movement demands a different approach because human groups fight for inclusion. The movement to free animals must fight for exclusion. Oppressed people want to be accepted as equals into society. Oppressed animals want to be left alone by society.1 This difference, according to liberators, dictates different strategies for the animal rights activist than for any other social reformer. For one thing, it makes non-violent tactics, as modeled by Gandhi or King, inappropriate. Liberators believe that only physical harm will dissuade people from abusing animals. Their message is not simply that we should shoot hunters, kill vivisectors, trap trappers, and butcher butchers in order to free the animals. They believe we are morally justified in doing these things, and that we must do it to free some animals. But liberators do not believe that it will change the world and result in the freedom of all animals. Liberators hold that nothing will result in the freedom of all animals, short of the extinction of human species. People will abuse other creatures so long as the human species exists. This is an observation liberators base on human nature, and they believe human nature is not about to change. Liberators are not simply pessimists in making this statement. To them, it is a realistic appraisal of the history of human blood lust and speciesism. It is their bold acceptance of what they feel many people really know deep in their hearts. But liberators expect few people will acknowledge what they feel in their hearts. Who wants to accept the fact that their efforts and hopes are useless? The liberators feel it’s time for animal defenders, and those concerned about the environment, to open their eyes and admit that they shall never overcome. In short, the liberators believe that history has shown that working within the cruel system and winning small battles for the animals will soon prove irrelevant. The carnage against animals continues. The opposition is stronger, better financed, and more numerous than animal defenders. Gains made are easily reversed. Animal abuse will go on until mankind becomes extinct, or the planet is destroyed. According to this extremist position, it follows that people who want to help the animals must not use their energy trying to change the system – that’s impossible. They must focus their efforts on rescuing as many animals as they can and give animal abusers as much trouble as possible – they must be liberators of animals! The purpose of this revolution would not be to discard the old powers and put in the new. According to the liberator philosophy, no human system will ever treat animals with respect. The animals simply need a continuous revolution to consistently, repeatedly, and uncompromisingly liberate them from human oppression. They need a revolution against human society because it is intrinsically oppressive. So long as there are people, animals will need this revolution.

#### Only an uncompromising rejection of institutions smashes the root of anthropocentric violence

Punkerslut '9 sex-positive anarchist, "The Relationship of Anarchism and Animal Rights" September http://www.punkerslut.com/articles/relationshipanarchy.html

"This system, in which mother and children are brought up to fear the father; in which school-children are brought up to fear the teacher; in which 'every German is there to be kicked by another German, and has, below him, another German to kick,' has, without any doubt, a strong bearing on the mentality which expresses itself over and over again in the shrugging phrase, Befehl ist Befehl -- 'Orders are orders.'" --Edward Crankshaw, 1956 "Gestapo: Instrument of Tyranny," Viking Press, page 233 This is not an abstract, unrealistic idea. It has been demonstrated and observed that animals have consciousness -- they have an idea of suffering, and even the "lowest" has been able to show sympathy. Humanity, being supplied with an abundance of healthy food that comes from the earth, has thrown away its harvest, and made a diet of other conscious beings. Governments and capitalists oppress and exploit us; sexist societies abuse and disempower women; parents and "teachers" beat and torture children. But, from beginning to end, every individual partakes in this mass slaughter: from child to president, every level of society contributes to a yearly murder rate exceeding ten billion. Anarchism is the only social philosophy that naturally treats Animal Rights, logically and thoughtfully. We cannot simply fight the government, if we are to remove sexism; and we cannot simply fight sexism, if we are to remove child abuse. All of these things are interconnected. They are each layers of society that seek to impose and control others. Each of them are based upon two primary concepts: the use of coercion, and the idea of property. It is government and capitalist creating poverty and assassinating unionists; man isolating woman in a society where she can own nothing and do nothing; and parents providing a cup of rice between beatings and punishments. It is not just the violence that is employed; it is that they have claimed possession of all, and this maintains the violent relationship. Property and violence. This exactly describes humanity's dominion over the world. There is no corner of the globe unpolluted by toxins, lead, mercury, carcinogens, depleted uranium, radium, or polonium. Every fish contains mercury, every city's dust contains lead, every particle of air has been contaminated with factory emissions. And the violence is unbelievable. Cows and chickens, for instance, are reared in tiny cells, deprived of nutrients to control the color of their flesh, and before they are executed, they are beaten, kicked, and tazed. It is a test of conscience if a human being is offended by the images of inside the slaughterhouses; if you cannot sympathize with those that suffer exactly like humans, how can you sympathize with humans? Today, Animal Rights activists are approaching capitalists, senators, governors, interest groups, universities, and every other foul aspect of our social order. These are the people they are going to in order to "change the world." That is, to make laws of this or that degree, or to prosecute this or that individual. In a world where the few control everything, they have appealed to the elites.? It is a vain effort. Who is more likely to understand and listen to the ideas of Animal Rights? The Capitalist who benefits from the destruction of the Earth -- the investor who reaps mountains of profits in exchange for valleys of the dead? Or the worker, the common individual, who has built everything, who has lived through the greatest misery, and who is always endowed with greater sympathy? If you approach the government and Capitalist, they will take away what they give you when it becomes convenient. But if you approach autonomous, cooperative associations, you'll have the real tool of social change.

## 2AC

### Case

#### Survival focus is unethical

Kochi and Ordan 2k8 [“An argument for the global suicide of humanity”, vol 7, no 4]

If only some of our genes but not our species has survived, maybe the emphasis we place upon the notion of 'survival' is more cultural than simply genetic. Such an emphasis stems not only from our higher cognitive powers of 'self-consciousness' or self-awareness, but also from our conscious celebration of this fact: the image we create for ourselves of 'humanity', which is produced by via language, collective memory and historical narrative. The notion of the 'human' involves an identification of our species with particular characteristics with and upon which we ascribe certain notions of value. Amongst others such characteristics and values might be seen to include: the notion of an inherent 'human dignity', the virtue of ethical behaviour, the capacities of creative and aesthetic thought, and for some, the notion of an eternal soul. Humans are conscious of themselves as humans and value the characteristics that make us distinctly 'human'. When many, like Hawing, typically think of the notion of the survival of the human race, it is perhaps this cultural-cognitive aspect of homo sapiens, made possible and produced by human self-consciousness, which they are thinking of. If one is to make the normative argument that the human race should survive, then one needs to argue it is these cultural-cognitive aspects of humanity, and not merely a portion of our genes, that is worth saving. However, it remains an open question as to what cultural-cognitive aspect of humanity would survive in the future when placed under radical environmental and evolutionary pressures. We can consider that perhaps the fish people, having the capacity for self-awareness, would consider themselves as the continuation or next step of 'humanity'. Yet, who is to say that a leap in the process of evolution would not prompt a change in self awareness, a different form of abstract reasoning about the species, a different self-narrative, in which case the descendents of humans would look upon their biological and genetic ancestors in a similar manner to the way humans look upon the apes today. Conceivably the fish people might even forget or suppress their evolutionary human heritage. While such a future cannot be predicted, it also cannot be controlled from our graves. In something of a sense similar to the point made by Giorgio Agamben (1998), revising ideas found within the writings of Michel Foucault and Aristotle, the question of survival can be thought to involve a distinction between the 'good life' and 'bare life'. In this instance, arguments in favour of human survival rest upon a certain belief in a distinctly human good life, as opposed to bare biological life, the life of the gene pool. It is thus such a good life, or at least a form of life considered to be of value, that is held up by a particular species to be worth saving. When considering the hypothetical example of the fish people, what cultural-cognitive aspect of humanity's good life would survive? The conditions of life under water, which presumably for the first thousand years would be quite harsh, would perhaps make the task of bare survival rather than the continuation of any higher aspects of a 'human heritage' the priority. Learning how to hunt and gather or farm underwater, learning how to communicate, breed effectively and avoid getting eaten by predators might displace the possibilities of listening to Mozart or Bach, or adhering to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or playing sport, or of even using written language or complex mathematics. Within such an extreme example it becomes highly questionable to what extent a 'human heritage' would survive and thus to what extent we might consider our descendents to be 'human'. In the case where what survives would not be the cultural-cognitive aspects of a human heritage considered a valuable or a good form of life, then, what really survives is just life. Such a life may well hold a worth or value altogether different to our various historical valuations and calculations. While the example of the fish people might seem extreme, it presents a similar set of acute circumstances which would be faced within any adaptation to a new habitat whether on the earth or in outer space. Unless humans are saved by radical developments in technology that allow a comfortable colonisation of other worlds, then genetic adaptation in the future retains a reasonable degree of probability. However, even if the promise of technology allows humans to carry on their cultural-cognitive heritage within another habitat, such survival is still perhaps problematic given the dark, violent, cruel and brutal aspects of human life which we would presumably carry with us into our colonisation of new worlds. Thinkers like Hawking, who place their faith in technology, also place a great deal of faith in a particular view of a human heritage which they think is worth saving. When considering the question of survival, such thinkers typically project a one-sided image of humanity into the future. Such a view presents a picture of only the good aspects of humanity climbing aboard a space-craft and spreading out over the universe. This presumes that only the 'good aspects' of the human heritage would survive, elements such as 'reason', creativity, playfulness, compassion, love, fortitude, hope. What however happens to the 'bad' aspects of the human heritage, the drives, motivations and thoughts that led to the Holocaust for example?

### h-triv

Best 7 – Associate Professor at the University of Texas in the Department of Humanities and Philosophy (Steven, “Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust, by Charles Patterson” *Journal for Critical Animal Studies*, <http://www.criticalanimalstudies.org/JCAS/Journal_Articles_download/Issue_7/bestpatterson.pdf>)

Too many people with pretences to ethics, compassion, decency, justice, love, and other stellar values of humanity at its finest resist the profound analogies between animal and human slavery and animal and human holocausts, in order to devalue or trivialize animal suffering and avoid the responsibility of the weighty moral issues confronting them. The moral myopia of humanism is blatantly evident when people who have been victimized by violence and oppression decry the fact that they “were treated like animals” – as if it is acceptable to brutalize animal, but not humans. If there is a salient disanalogy or discontinuity between the tyrannical pogroms launched against animals and humans, it lies not in the fallacious assumption that animals do not suffer physical and mental pain similar to humans, but rather that animals suffer more than humans, both quantitatively (the intensity of their torture, such as they endure in fur farms, factory farms, and experimental laboratories) and qualitatively (the number of those who suffer and die). And while few oppressed human groups lack moral backing, sometimes on an international scale, one finds not mass solidarity with animals but rather mass consumption of them. As another Nobel Prize writer in Literature, South African novelist writer J. M. Coetzee, forcefully stated: “Let me say it openly: we are surrounded by an enterprise of degradation, cruelty, and killing which rivals anything the Third Reich was capable of, indeed dwarfs it, in that ours is an enterprise without end, self-regenerating, bringing rabbits, rats, poultry, livestock ceaselessly into the world for the purpose of killing them.”37 Every year, throughout the world, over 45 billion farmed animals currently are killed for food consumption.38 This staggering number is nearly eight times the present human population. In the US alone, over 10 billion animals are killed each year for food consumption – 27 million each day, nearly 19,000 per minute. Of the 10 billion land animals killed each year in the US, over 9 billion are chickens; every day in the US, 23 million chickens are killed for human consumption, 269 per second. In addition to the billions of land animals consumed, humans also kill and consume 85 billion marine animals (17 billion in the US).39 Billions more animals die in the name of science, entertainment, sport, or fashion (i.e., the leather, fur, and wool industries), or on highways as victims of cars and trucks. Moreover, ever more animal species vanish from the earth as we enter the sixth great extinction crisis in the planet’s history, this one caused by human not natural events, the last one occurring 65 million years ago with the demise of the dinosaurs and 90% of all species on the planet. It is thus appropriate to recall the saying by English clergyman and writer, William Ralph Inge, to the effect that: "We have enslaved the rest of the animal creation, and have treated our distant cousins in fur and feathers so badly that beyond doubt, if they were able to formulate a religion, they would depict the Devil in human form."

The construction of industrial stockyards, the total objectification of nonhuman animals, and the mechanized murder of innocent beings should have sounded a loud warning to humanity that such a process might one day be applied to them, as it was in Nazi Germany. If humans had not exploited animals, moreover, they might not have exploited humans, or, at the very least, they would not have had handy conceptual models and technologies for enforcing domination over others. “A better understanding of these connections,” Patterson states, “should help make our planet a more humane and livable place for all of us – people and animals alike, A new awareness is essential for the survival of our endangered planet.”40

#### evaluate impacts using a lens of negative utilitarianism – you should act to minimize suffering rather than maximize pleasure

**Contestabile 12** – doctorate from the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (Bruno, “Negative Utilitarianism and Justice”, <http://www.socrethics.com/Folder2/Justice.htm#C3>, dml)

In the 20th century, the idea to formulate an ethical goal negatively is attributed to Karl Popper:

…there are no institutional means of making a man happy, but a claim not to be made unhappy, where it can be avoided. The piecemeal engineer will, accordingly, adopt the method of searching for, and fighting against, the greatest and most urgent evils of society, rather than searching for, and fighting for, its greatest ultimate good [Popper, 158]

At this point of chapter 9, Popper added his controversial note 2:

I believe that there is, from the ethical point of view, no symmetry between suffering and happiness, or between pain and pleasure. Both the greatest happiness principle of the Utilitarians and Kant’s principle “Promote other people’s happiness…” seem to me (at least in their formulations) wrong on this point which, however, is not completely decidable by rational argument (…). In my opinion human suffering makes a direct moral appeal, namely, the appeal for help, while there is no similar call to increase the happiness of [someone] ~~a man~~ who is doing well anyway.

A further criticism of the Utilitarian formula “Maximize pleasure” is that it assumes, in principle, a continuous pleasure-pain scale which allows us to treat degrees of pain as negative degrees of pleasure. But, from the moral point of view, pain cannot be outweighed by pleasure and especially not one man’s pain by another man’s pleasure. Instead of the greatest happiness for the greatest number, one should demand, more modestly, the least amount of avoidable suffering for all; and further, that unavoidable suffering – such as hunger in times of unavoidable shortage of food – should be distributed as equally as possible.

There is some analogy between this view of ethics and the view of scientific methodology which I have advocated in my The Logic of Scientific Discovery. It adds to clarity in the fields of ethics, if we formulate our demands negatively, i.e. if we demand the elimination of suffering rather than the promotion of happiness. Similarly, it is helpful to formulate the task of scientific method as the elimination of false theories (from the various theories tentatively preferred) rather than the attainment of established truths [Popper, 284].

#### death cannot be bad – the lack of experience is only neutral

**Smuts 12** – Department of Philosophy, Rhode Island College (Aaron, “LESS GOOD BUT NOT BAD: IN DEFENSE OF EPICUREANISM ABOUT DEATH”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly Volume 93, Issue 2, pages 197–227, June 2012, dml)

In a cryptic passage in his ‘Letter to Menoeceus,’ Epicurus presents what may at first seem to be an absurd argument for the claim that it is irrational to fear death:

Foolish, therefore, is the man who says that he fears death, not because it will pain when it comes, but because it pains in the prospect. Whatever causes no annoyance when it is present, causes only a groundless pain in the expectation. Death, therefore, the most awful of evils, is nothing to us, seeing that, when we are, death is not come, and, when death is come, we are not. It is nothing, then, either to the living or to the dead, for with the living it is not and the dead exist no longer.1

Epicurus’ principal conclusion is that death is nothing to us. Death is nothing to us, because it does not lead to any bad experiences – it is the end of experience. And only experiences are good or bad for a person. Hence, death is not bad for the one who dies. Further, he assumes that it is irrational to fear what does no harm. So, he concludes that if it is irrational to fear what does no harm, then it is irrational to fear death.

Epicurus’ letter raises two distinct questions: (1) Is it rational to fear death? And, (2) Is death bad for the one who dies? In this article, I will say fairly little about the first question concerning the fear of death. My principal goal is to provide support for his answer to the second question – that death is not bad for the one who dies. His position on the badness of death has significant implications for a range of important topics, such as: the rational fear of death, the morality of killing animals for meat and hide, the badness of murder, and the morality of euthanasia. But I will not be exploring the implications here. I have a more limited goal: to defend Epicurus's position on the badness of death and his reasons, or at least an argument in much the same spirit.

Many call the position that death is not bad for the one who dies Epicureanism about the badness of death. Since this label is easily confused with Epicurus's related, but distinct, position on whether it is rational to fear death, I adopt the label innocuousism for the claim that death is not bad for the one who dies.2 This position holds that death is prudentially innocuous because it does no injury to the departing.

I defend innocuousism in the face of a widely accepted style of refutation – the deprivation account of the badness of death.3 The deprivation account holds that death is bad for the one who dies when it deprives her of good experiences that she would have had otherwise. That is, death is bad because it deprives one of the goods of life. This account of the badness of death gives rise to a number of well-known puzzles that I will not explore.4 Instead, I attack the theory of extrinsic badness at the core of the most convincing formulations of the deprivation account. The central goal of this article is to provide reasons to think that the deprivation account is wrong.

Recent defenders of the deprivation account, such as Fred Feldman and Ben Bradley, hold that although death is not intrinsically bad, it is extrinsically bad.5 They argue that death is sometimes extrinsically bad, not because it leads to intrinsically bad states of affairs, but because it leads to states that are less intrinsically good. I argue that this account of extrinsic badness conflates things that are merely less good with those that are bad.6 I intend to show that if we respect the distinction between states of affairs that are bad and those that are merely less good, the deprivation account fails as an objection to innocuousism.

My argument proceeds in a few steps. I begin by developing a contemporary version of Epicurus' argument that I call the Dead End Argument for Innocuousism. I then explain the deprivation account of the badness of death. In response, I raise several objections to the theory of extrinsic badness at the heart of the deprivation account. In support of innocuousism, I defend a competing account of extrinsic badness that avoids these problems. Along the way, I also provide positive support for non-comparative accounts of extrinsic badness. Finally, I respond to several objections to the prima facie absurd suggestion that death is not bad for the one who dies.

2. The Dead End argument for innocuousism

The Dead End Argument for Innocuousism concludes that death is not bad for the one who dies. This is because death leads to nothing – death is an experiential dead end. Since death is the end of experience, it is not intrinsically bad for the one who dies. Neither is it extrinsically bad. To be extrinsically bad, something must lead to intrinsically bad states of affairs. But there are no intrinsically bad states of affairs after death. Only experiences are intrinsically bad or good for a person. Hence, death is neither intrinsically nor extrinsically bad for the one who dies. Death is prudentially innocuous.

Here is a formalization of the argument:

The Dead End Argument for Innocuousism

1The sole bearers of intrinsic prudential value are mental states. (mental statism)

2Death is an experiential blank.

3Hence, the state of being dead is not intrinsically prudentially bad.

4An event is extrinsically bad if and only if it leads to intrinsically bad states of affairs. (causal hypothesis7)

5Hence, death is not extrinsically prudentially bad.

6Therefore, death is not prudentially bad for the one who dies. (innocuousism)

#### We must embrace nuclear extinction. In our world, humans are the vampires who, without fear, can thrive at the expense of the majority. Accepting nuclear extinction allows the end of animal suffering

**Dolan 2 –** Ph.D in writing of the marquis de Sade from Berkely, professor and essayist, (John, April 21st, “The Case for Nuclear Winter” <http://www.exile.ru/articles/detail.php?ARTICLE_ID=6495&IBLOCK_ID=35>)

There are no nihilists any more. That fact is the most damning evidence of a great betrayal which has happened in the last half century. In 1945, when the Bomb gave us the option of quitting this dirty, rigged game of Darwinian strip poker, we learned that not one of the anti-life artists meant what they said. In a few years, all the anti-life art of the early twentieth century vanished. The artists who had made their careers documenting the horrors of life on earth and denouncing the cycle of animal existence yelped away like scared puppies the moment a real chance to end the suffering appeared.

They saw that magnificent mushroom cloud and instead of falling down to worship it, they ran to the nearest church or Christian Science Reading Room or Socialist meeting hall. After convincing thousands of adolescents to kill themselves in the name of holy despair, these sleazy careerists ran to hug the knees of GAIA, the bloody mother. They Chose Life -- the swine!

Go ahead, pick a culture, any culture! Any culture you can name, during any historical period you choose, will furnish hundreds of examples of anti-life rhetoric which was taken very, very seriously -- up until the moment when it actually meant something. Take, say, Europe in the nineteenth century, that cheery and bustling period. OK; here's its greatest philosopher on the subject:

"If you imagine...the sum total of distress, pain and suffering which the sun shines upon, you will be forced to admit that it would have been better if the surface of the earth were still as crystalline as that of the moon....For the world is Hell, and men are on the one had the tormented souls and on the other the devils in it."

That was Schopenhauer, telling the Germans in their bristly abstract way what Darwin told the English in their fussier, more detailed language: there is no point but suffering. There is no hidden redemptive meaning in any of this. It's just an unfortunate industrial accident, organic life.

Both Schopenhauer and Darwin resorted to animal examples to convey the horror which summed up the world. They were trying to overcome the popular heresy that somehow, it all must "balance out" somehow. It doesn't, because it was never designed to do so: "compare the pleasure of an animal engaged in eating another animal with the pain of the animal being eaten."

By the beginning of the twentieth century, Schopenhauer and Darwin were in play in the higher European circles, mixing and strengthening each other. It was the bravest moment in the history of our species; something truly dangerous, a final anti-life epiphany, seemed ready to happen. This is what poor sweet Nietzsche meant with his heartbreaking faith in "the men who are coming."

Nihilism's one great weakness was that it had always been an elite cult, not considered transmissible to the masses. This was in fact why Buddhism was replaced by a mindless demotic cult like Hinduism in India: Nirvana was too cold a doctrine for peasants who equated fecundity with happiness.

 But in the early twentieth century, a demographic anomaly appeared: the elite was big, and getting bigger. They brought their cult with them; art began serving as the propaganda wing of Nihilism. What we call "Modernism" was actually a multimedia offensive which was beginning to make Nihilism palatable to the masses. The fuzzy "Modern/Postmodern" distinction is best seen as a change in popular religion: from 1910-1945, art did an honorable job of preparing the masses to abandon their attachment to the biosphere; from 1945 to the present, art borrows Nihilist images, diction and narrative without the least intention of employing them to free us from attachment to organic life.

The echoes of that dangerous early twentieth-century art are still audible:

"I've always been surprised by everyone's going on living." Birth, and copulation and death. That's all the facts when you come to brass tacks: Birth, and copulation, and death. I've been born, and once is enough. You don't remember, but I remember, Once is enough. It's sad for the dog. He lives only because he was born, just like me.... So they sang. And many believed them. Maybe a few of them really meant it -- Schopenhauer especially. What would Schopenhauer have said about nuclear weapons? My guess is he'd be all for them; he was a serious man, an honorable man. But the rest -- they never meant it, and only talked so grandly against Life because they knew there was no alternative, no way to end the world. When the cat's away, the mice will ham it up.

But since 1945, they self-censored themselves, to the effect that no matter how many Nihilist images you may borrow, you will do nothing truly dangerous -- nothing that could make anyone press that nuclear trigger. You can wear all the black you want; you can worship suicide -- individual suicide, that is -- ; you can write songs about how life sucks; but you can't mean it.

Of course, not everybody's in on the double-talk scam. Those dangerous anti-lifers are still floating around, infecting those naive enough to listen to them. Cobain and Courtney are the classic example: both wore the rags, the scowls, the sulk; both screamed and ranted against life; but only one of them ever believed it. He, poor bastard, took it all seriously; she, a much more typical representative of the treacherous 20th-century avant garde, knew better.

When you think of poor Cobain now, it all seems inevitable, from the moment he chose that fatal name for his band. "Nirvana": a quaint Buddhist term, taken by most American bohemians to mean something like "nice peaceful feeling." But that's not what it means at all: "nirvana" means, literally, "the blowing out of a candle." Extinction, a return to stillness. Poor Cobain! He took it seriously, and made Nirvana for himself...and Courtney inherited, pouting all the way to the bank.

They're all Courtneys, the ones who still live. Lou Reed, who invented black, wrote hymns to heroin as the best available anti-life, and provided the soundtrack for God knows how many thousands of adolescent suicides, showed up recently at a memorial service for John "All You Need Is Love" Lennon. There he was, up on the stage with a dozen other rich old popstar vampires, singing treacly Beatles songs. They were praying, really -- praying to be granted another few years of life. "Choose life!" That's a vulture's favorite proverb, and these wrinkled undead were singin' it with feeling.

The ones who meant it, even a little -- they die. Sid died because he believed it; John Lydon said so, giggling at his dead comrade's stupidity in a recent interview. Sid, he explained, took all the punk stuff seriously, and died of it. Lydon knew better, he explained from poolside. He looked over at his pool frequently during the interview -- scanning his LA mansion, just overjoyed with his good sense and deriving an especially piquant satisfaction from the thought of poor old Sid. Johnny chose life.

It's not hard to see why a popstar chooses life; his life comes at the expense of everyone else's. A vampire universe feels great -- to a vampire. But what about the rest of us, the nobodies? The feeding cows? What do we have to lose?

There's always been a lot of preaching against suicide. In some way, any choice to choose non-life frightens the ruling vampires. Their favorite argument is, of course, guilt: "Think of the pain you leave behind you!" I remember a scraggly hippie mystic on Sproul denouncing suicide as "a slap in the face to everybody who loves you," and adding, "Even the worst bum on Skid Row has somebody who loves him." It impressed me at the time; I thought he must have had some special knowledge of the affectional backgrounds of bums which I didn't possess. It was several years before I knew for certain that he was simply preaching, another damn Christian-without-Christ babbling the ruling vampires' cliches.

Suicide is unpatriotic; that's why it offends them. It deprives the vampires of a jugular to sip. How can you not like this boneyard? This is the finest torture-chamber in the universe! How dare you opt out of it! But since 1945, the vampire lords have had another, much stronger reason to fear the idea of suicide: individual suicide is only Nuclear Winter writ small. Nuclear Winter is universal Nirvana.

And that makes it utterly different from individual suicide -- because there will be no survivors to mourn and grieve. There will be no mourning and grief at all, ever again.

Thus nuclear winter offers a true cure for suffering -- which the sermons against suicide do not. OK; you decide not to kill yourself because it will hurt your parents, friends, pit bull, roommates, chess club pals, whatever. So what? You're gonnna go anyway, and in some way much more agonizing than a bullet to the head: cancer, car wreck, genetic glitch, rafting accident, heart valve pop. And when you do, that suffering of the survivors will begin, the ten billionth wail of grief heard on Earth.

And the grieving die in their turn, and when they go another wail sets up....It's not just horrible -- it's silly. Just plain dumb. Squint at it -- draw your head back just a little and squint at it -- and it's truly "laughable, man": these creatures whose life consists of a ride down a conveyor belt towards a meat grinder, making a continual wail of surprise as another one goes over the edge. Every one a surprise. "Oh! He went in! How could this happen?" "Ah, she fell! My God!" Well Duh. What'd you expect?

That's what suffering is: going over the edge one at a time. The experience of individual death while the world grinds on. What would happen in the Nuclear Winter scenario is utterly different: all jump into the meatgrinder at once. No one is left to suffer or mourn. When some die and some live, there is suffering; when all die, blown out like a candle, there is no suffering. There is something else, something for which we have no name. But one thing is clear: it is not suffering. "We shall not suffer, for we shall not be."

It has been done on a small scale -- communal suicide, oblivion. The Old Believers; Jonestown; and some of the tribes hunted for sport by the Europeans. The Carib -- the last Carib jumped off a cliff rather than be taken. As did the last few bands of Tasmanians. They saw the suffering of their children ahead, and took the kids with them over the cliff. Are they were right. Imagine the prospects of a Tasmanian child in the hands of the British colonists who had killed its parents for sport. Life as a souvenir, mascot, bum-boy or -girl, stuffed exhibit in a museum… for what? So that in ten generations, one of its partial descendants might live to collect a guilt-dole from the Australian government? So that in another two generations, an even more attenuated descendant could pen a jargon-stuffed "indictment" of the crime, hoping for publication and a tenure-track affirmative-action job at a new regional polytech?

The cliff-edge has more dignity and sense.

We have given other species the gift of oblivion, sent them over the cliff: the Mammoth, the Moa Eagle, the Tasmanian Wolf...all the finest species, really, are going or gone. A hundred years from now, when all the big cats are gone, no one will understand how we thought the life of a hundred million Tamils worth that of even one Bengal Tiger.

Life on earth hit its peak during the Ice Ages, and we are now killing off the few species from that period who survived our first coup, ten thousand years ago. We have very little to lose, destroying the remaining fauna, now that the best is gone. The lives of all the horrible humans in Houston are not worth even one Columbia Mammoth.

So we have guides sent ahead of us into oblivion. When we pull the plug, press the button, drop the nuclear dime on ourselves, we will suffer no more than the Mammoth suffers. We owe them; let's join them. We can make our first act in the afterlife a formal apology to the Tasmanian Wolf, the Cave Bear, the Mammoth.

But at least their suffering is over now. The Mammoths' suffering ended when the last calf, watching its mother being hacked to death by ugly apes wearing caribou skins, trumpeted in shock and pain and tried to run -- and was hacked to death, screaming, then silent. And when its life went out -- the blowing out of a candle -- the suffering of all Mammoths ceased, gave way to something entirely different: Nirvana. The Nirvana of the Mammoths, where they wait for us now.

But we have to be sure of one thing: that it will be oblivion, death for all, rather than another partial slaughter. That would be worse even than the present. The thought of a post-nuke world of wretched survivors is the only real argument against detonation now. That's why the notion of Nuclear Winter is crucial. If, say, a nuclear war killed even five billion of us, it would leave a billion sobbing, burned survivors; and their offspring, mutant children limping across a boneyard; and hundreds of billions of mammals, birds, and reptiles mourning their kin. This is not Nirvana. Agreed.

But that argument has been specious since the early 1980s, when a team of physicists including that annoying geek Carl Sagan suggested that a major nuclear war would create a cloud of ash which would blot out the sun for decades, blocking 99% of solar energy for a period of three to 12 months, and thus extinguishing the photosynthetic engine which runs this big green torture chamber called Earth. Here's their scenario:

"Nuclear explosions will set off firestorms in the cities and surrounding forest areas. The small particles of soot are carried high into the atmosphere. The smoke will block the sun's light for weeks or months. The land temperatures would fall below freezing.

### Fw

### AT: “topicality”

#### SSD bad

Kahn, 10 (Richard Kahn, Assistant Professor of Educational Foundations and Research at the University of North Dakota, Critical Pedagogy, Ecoliteracy, and Planetary Crisis: The Ecopedagogy Movement, 2010, pp. 9-11)

Worse still, though, is that here environmental literacy has not only been co-opted by corporate state forces and morphed into a progressively-styled, touchy-feely method for achieving higher scores on standardized tests like the ACT and SAT, but in an Orwellian turn it has come to stand in actuality for a real illiteracy about the nature of ecological catastrophe, its causes, and possible solutions. As I will argue in this book, our current course for social and environmental disaster (though highly complex and not easily boiled down to a few simple causes or strategies for action) must be traced to the evolution of: an anthropocentric worldview grounded in what the sociologist Patricia Hill Collins (1993) refers to as a matrix of domination (see chapter 1); a global technocapitalist infrastructure that relies upon market-based and functionalist versions of technoliteracy to instantiate and augment its socio- economic and cultural control (see chapters 2 and 3); an unsustainable, reductionistic, and antidemocratic model of institutional science (see chapter 4); and the wrongful marginalization and repression of pro-ecological resistance through the claim that it represents a “terrorist” force that is counter to the morals of a democratic society rooted in tolerance, educational change, and civic debate (see chapter 5). By contrast, the environmental literacy standards now showcased at places like the Zoo School as “Hall- marks of Quality” (Archie, 2003, p. 11) are those that consciously fail to develop the type of radical and partisan subjectivity in students, that might be capable of deconstructing their socially and environmentally deleterious hyper-individualism or their obviously socialized identities that tend toward 10 Critical Pedagogy, Ecoliteracy, and Planetary Crisis state-sanctioned norms of competition, hedonism, consumption, marketization, and forms of quasi-fascistic patriotism. Just as Stapp (1969) theorized environmental literacy as a form of political moderation that could pacify the types of civic upheaval, that occurred during the Civil Rights era, now too during the tendentious political atmosphere that has arisen as the legacy of the George W. Bush presidency, being environmentally literate quite suspiciously means learning how to turn the other cheek and listen to “both sides” of an issue—even when the issue is the unprecedented mass extinction of life taking place on the planet. In a manner that accords more with Fox News than Greenpeace, a leading environmental literacy pamphlet (Archie, 2003) emphasizes that “Teaching and learning about the environment can bring up controversies that must be handled in a fair and balanced manner in the classroom” (p. 11). Later in the document a teacher from Lincoln High School in Wisconsin is highlighted in order to provide expert advice in a similar fashion: “I’d say the most important aspect of teaching about the environment is to look at all aspects involved with an issue or problem. Teach from an unbiased position no matter how strong your ideas are about the topic. Let the kids make decisions for themselves” (p. 12), she implores. This opinion is mirrored by the Environmental Education Division of the Environmental Protection Agency (a federal office, created by the Bush administration, dedicated to furthering environmental literacy), which on its own website underscores as “Basic Information” that “Environmental education does not advocate a particular viewpoint or course of action. Rather, it is claimed that environmental education teaches individuals how to weigh various sides of an issue through critical thinking and it enhances their own problem-solving and decision-making skills.”10 Yet, this definition was authored by an administration trumping for a wider right-wing movement that attempts to use ideas of “fair and balanced” and “critical thinking” to occlude obvious social and ecological injustices, as well as the advantage it gains in either causing or sustaining them. This same logic defending the universal value of nonpartisan debate has been used for well over a decade by the right to prevent significant action on global warming. Despite overwhelming scientific acceptance of its existence and threat, as well as of its primarily anthropogenic cause, those on the right have routinely trotted out their own pseudo-science on global warming and thereby demanded that more research is necessary to help settle a debate on the issue that only they are interested in continuing to facilitate. Ecopedagogy: An Introduction 11 Likewise, within academic circles themselves, powerful conservatives like David Horowitz have the support of many in government who are seeking to target progressive scholars and viewpoints on university and college campuses as biased evidence of a leftist conspiracy at work in higher education (Nocella, Best & McLaren, Forthcoming). In order to combat such alleged bias, “academic freedom” is asserted as a goal in which “both sides” of academic issues must be represented in classrooms, departments, and educational events. The result of this form of repressive tolerance (see chapter 5) is simply to impede action on matters worth acting on and to gain further ideological space for right-wing, corporate and other conservative-value agendas.11 It is clear, then, that despite the effects and growth of environmental education over the last few decades, it is a field that is ripe for a radical reconstruction of its literacy agenda. Again, while something like environmental education (conceived broadly) should be commended for the role it has played in helping to articulate many of the dangers and pitfalls that modern life now affords, it is also clear that it has thus far inadequately surmised the larger structural challenges now at hand and has thus tended to intervene in a manner far too facile to demand or necessitate a rupture of the status quo. What has thereby resulted is a sort of crisis of environmental education generally and, as a result, the prevailing trends in the field have recently been widely critiqued by a number of theorists and educators who have sought to highlight their limitations.

#### Now, counter-definitions—

#### Resolved means to personally think about things

**AHD 2k6.** American Heritage Dictionary

resolved v. To cause (a person) to reach a decision.

#### And topicality is determined by relevancy

**Merian Webster App** (<http://i.word.com/idictionary/topical>, Merriam Webster Iphone App)

“1a: of, relating to, or arranged by topics <set down in topical form> b: referring to topics of the day or place: of local or temporary interest <a topical novel> <topical references>

#### We are the USFG

**Raney 10** [Gary Raney – Ada County Sherriff, “ Ada County Sheriff Gary Raney Response to Inquiry regarding Oathkeepers”, October 25th, 2010, <http://wearechangeidaho.org/CategoryArticles.php?id=1>]

First premise: “They” – the federal government – are not a distant body beyond our control. We are a republic and **we are the federal government** by the power of our vote. It is disingenuous for people to talk about the government as something foreign, like an enemy. In my opinion, it is our general apathy as voters that, by an omission of a vote, allow our government to do things we don’t want them to do.

### fw

#### the democratic politics of framework can never include the non-human – political life is worthless and ought to be divested of value

**Calarco 8** – Ph.D, SUNY Binghamton, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Fullerton University (Matthew, “Zoographies: The Question of the Animal from Heidegger to Derrida” p.95-97)

The reader who takes up careful study of Agamben’s work from this angle, seeking answers to sub questions, will be well positioned to grasp its novelty. The overarching thesis of Agamben’s work over the past decade is that there is in fact an “inner solidarity” between democracy and totalitarianism, not at an empirical level, but at a historical and philosophical level. Despite the enormous empirical differences between these two political systems, they are nevertheless united in their investment in the politics of the anthropological machine and in seeking to separate bare (animal) life from properly political (human) life. Even if democratic regimes maintaining safeguards designed to prevent many of the totalitarian excesses perpetrated against bare life (and Agamben’s references to Karen Quinlan and others make it clear that democracies are actually far from successful in such matters), they continue unwittingly to create the conditions of possibility for such consequences. This hidden implication of democracy comes to the fore especially in those instances where the rule of law is suspended, for example, in the declarations of sovereign exception of the law or in the refugee crisis that accompanies the decline of nation-states. Such states of exception are, Agamben argues (following Walter Benjamin), becoming more and more the rule in contemporary political life – and the examples one might adduce in support of this thesis are indeed becoming increasingly and troublingly commonplace. It is considerations of this kind that lead Agamben to the conclusion that the genuine political task facing us today is not the reform, radicalization or expansion of humanism, democracy and sovereignty but creating an altogether different form of political life.

Agamben’s work faces two important challenges at this level. On the one hand, neohumanists will (justifiably) wonder whether Agamben’s “coming community” and rejection of the humanist tradition in favor of a nonsovereign and nonjuridical politics will be better able than current democracies to guard against the injustices he condemns. On the other hand, theorists of a more deconstructionist and Levinasian orientation will lkkley see Agamebn’s project as being constituted by a false dilemma between humanist democracy and a nonessentialist thought of community. Although such theorists would share Agamben;s concerns about the problematic virtual possibilities of democratic politics and its ontology, they would be less sanguine about completely rejecting the democratic heritage. For them, the chief political task would consist in filtering through our democratic inheritance to unlock its radical possibilities, in siting on democracy’s commitment to perfectibility so as to expand democracy’s scope and to open democratic politics to its Other. This would bring democracy and its humanist commitments into relation with another though of being with Others that is similar to Agamben’s coming community.

I should say that I find neither of these critical perspectives particularly persuasive and that I believe Agamben offers us overwhelmingly persuasive accounts of the limits of current forms of democracy and humanism. Furthermore, it should be noted that there are moments throughout his work where he gives instances of how his alternative thoughts of politics *can* be actualized in concrete circumstances. But even the most charitable reading of his work must acknowledge that in terms of the kinds of questions posed by neohumanists and deconstructionists, much remains to be worked out at the theoretical and concrete political level in Agamebn’s project. And if the scope of this discussion were limited to an anthropocentric politics, I would argue that the questions and criticisms raised by neohumanists and deconstructionists are very difficult to circumvent. Humanism, democracy and human rights are complicated and rich historical constructs with the intrinsic potential for extensive and remarkably progressive reforms.

And yet, if the question of the animal were taken seriously here and the political discussion were moved to that level as well, the stakes of the debate would change considerably. Who among those activists and theorists working in defense of animals seriously believes that humanism, democracy and human rights are the sine qua non of ethics and politics? Even those theorists who employ the logic of these discourses in extensionist manner so as to bring animals within the sphere of moral and political considerability do not seem to believe that an ethics and a politics **that genuinely respects animal life can be accomplished within the confines of the traditions they use.**

Of this political terrain, neohumanist arguments concerning the merits of the democratic tradition have little if any weight. Even if one were to inscribe animal rights within a democratic liberatory narrative of expansion and perfectibility (as is sometimes done), such gestured can only appear tragicomic in light of the massive institutionalized abuse of animals that contemporary democracies not only tolerate but encourage on a daily basis. And in many democracies the support of animal abuse goes much further. Currently, militant animal activists in the United States who engage in economic sabatoge and property destruction in the name of stopping the worst forms of animal abuse are not just criticized (and in many cases without sound justification) but are placed at the top of the list of “domestic terrorists” by the F.B.I. and subject to outrageously unjust penalties and prison sentences. In view of the magnitude of such problems, animal activists are currently embroiled in a stricter protracted debate over the merits of reformist (welfarist) versus a stricter and more radical rightist (incrementalist) approach to animal issues and over which approach is more effective in the contemporary political and legal contexts. However, the real question seems to me to lie elsewhere – precisely in the decision to be made between the project of radicalizing existing politics to accommodate nonhuman life (an expansion of neohumanism and deconstruction) and that of working toward the kind of coming politics advocated by Agamben that would allow for an entirely new economy of human-animal relations. While Agamben’s thought is sometimes pejoratively labeled by critics as utopian inasmuch as it seeks a complete change in our political thinking and practices without offering the concrete means of achieving such change, from the perspective of the question of the animal, the tables can easily be turned on the critics. Anyone who argues that existing forms of politics can be reformed or radicalized so as to do justice to the multiplicity of forms of nonhuman life is clearly the unrealistic and utopian thinker, for what sings or sources of hope do we have that humanism and democracy (both of which are grounded in an agent-centered conception of subjectivity) can be radicalized or reformed as to include and give direct consideration to beings beyond the human?

#### Nothing less that total abandonment of modernism can solve the aff – outweighs framework

Kochi and Ordan 8 – Lecturer in Law and International Security at the U of Sussex, and \*Research in Translation Studies at Bar Ilan U, (Tarik and Noam, “An argument for the global suicide of humanity” borderlands”, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_6981/is\_3\_7/ai\_n31524968/)

What helps to render a certain type of action problematic is each individual’s ‘complicity’ in the practice of speciesist violence. That is, even if one is aware of the ways in which modern life destroys or adversely affects the environment and inflicts suffering upon nonhuman animals, one cannot completely subtract one’s self from a certain responsibility for and complicity in this. Even if you are conscious of the problem you cannot but take part in doing ‘evil’ by the mere fact of participating within modern life. Take for example the problematic position of environmental activists who courageously sacrifice personal wealth and leisure time in their fight against environmental destruction. While activists assume a sense of historical responsibly for the violence of the human species and act so as to stop the continuation of this violence, these actors are still somewhat complicit in a modern system of violence due to fact that they live in modern, industrial societies. The activist consumes, acquires and spends capital, uses electricity, pays taxes, and accepts the legitimacy of particular governments within the state even if they campaign against government policies. The bottom line is that all of these actions contribute in some way to the perpetuation of a larger process that moves humanity in a particular direction even if the individual personally, or collectively with others, tries to act to counter this direction. Despite people’s good intentions, damage is encapsulated in nearly every human action in industrial societies, whether we are aware of it or not.

#### Agency – their understanding of power is exclusively focused on a macro level which ignores how power is constituted every day in our lives. We must understand that how the spaces we occupy shape power and can affect change.

**Deckha 12**—Associate Professor at the University of Victoria Faculty of Law (Maneesha, © 2012, Animal Law 18 Animal L. 207, “CRITICAL ANIMAL STUDIES AND ANIMAL LAW,” Lexis Nexis, RBatra)

CAS scholars have increasingly applied Foucault's insights to human-animal relations, particularly in the area of food production and consumption, to explore, for example, the ethics of confined animal feed operations (CAFOs) and of eating animals. n34 Scholars have argued [\*215] that slaughterhouses function as "technologies of power" against both human and nonhuman animal subjects. n35 The multiple hierarchies in CAFOs preclude the operation of any sort of care and compassion and render both human and nonhuman animals vulnerable and nameless. n36 Extensions of Foucauldian insights on power to animals have also addressed topics such as wildlife management, educational practice, and media representations. n37 A unifying theme in these analyses is a belief not only in the localized and diverse instantiations of power by which animal oppression occurs, but also in **the possibility of instability** in these regimes and resistance to them. n38 Foucault's imprint is discernible here, revealing that CAS scholars are eager to adopt a nuanced analysis of power, searching for it not only in legal and economic institutions, but also in **how we speak, the spaces we inhabit, and the cultural practices that constitute our identities**.

2. Animal Subjectivity Is Marginalized

Power relations also exert an epistemological impact. Cultural discourses and practices, through which power circulates, construct particular ways of seeing the world and those who inhabit it. n39 Through these processes, dominant representations materialize that classify some as central and others as peripheral to society. The question of the subject and subjectivity has thus constituted a primary focus in critical theory across all disciplines. Critical scholars Deleuze and Guattari's concept of "becoming-animal" n40 has been very influential in this decentering of human subjectivity and in the attempts to relocate animals from the margins literally and theoretically. n41 CAS scholars have adopted the concept to evaluate how to approach human-animal relations, viewing it as an important tool to de-hierarchize human and [\*216] nonhuman animal relations and afford animals their subjectivity. n42 To be recognized as a subject with subjectivity is to be seen as a person and not an object. n43 A subject is entitled to respect, dignity, autonomy and all the other normal markers of personhood status in Western societies. When treatment that accords with these values does not materialize, injustices arise, most often along the lines of objectification and dehumanization. n44

Literary analysis is a field within CAS rich with recent discussion about these representation issues. Indeed, borrowing from feminist standpoint theory from the 1980s, Josephine Donovan uses the term "animal-standpoint criticism" to signal an animal-centered perspective from which to examine the aesthetic exploitation and the absences of animals in literature. n45 True to standpoint theory, which generally argues that the subjectivity of historically marginalized groups can be properly recuperated only when analyses proceed from their perspectives, Donovan argues that literature can accurately depict animals only if they are conceived as subjects in their own right and do not simply function as literary devices designed to convey human situations. n46

The subjectivity of animals has also received concerted attention in feminist science studies. Tracy Smith-Harris has addressed the similar ways in which both women and animals have been reduced to their biologies in scientific accounts that flatten the differences within the group. n47 While gross generalizations have become increasingly illegitimate as "good science" when made about women, n48 Smith-Harris notes how researchers still perpetuate this reductive construction about animals. n49 Even feminist science studies scholars, who are typically suspect [\*217] of scientific claims to objectivity and representations about the social meaning of biology, accept scientists' representation of animals at face value. n50 Smith-Harris urges feminists to not shy away from animals in their critiques. n51 Other feminist science scholars have tried to restore agency and subjectivity to the ubiquitous laboratory rat by critically exploring the discursive representations that present the rat as a repository and/or vehicle for scientific labor rather than as a living, breathing, agentic individual made the subject of non-consensual and painful research. n52 The authors seek to disrupt the associations between human with culture on the one hand, and animals with nature on the other, extending theories of performativity to laboratory rats to illuminate their participation in making scientific meaning. n53 As with literary studies, CAS scholars in feminist science studies are questioning the normalized disavowal of the subjectivity of animals and their passive and objectified representations by humans.

3. Animals as Other

Correlated with the denial of subjectivity for animals is their placement as a cultural "Other." The idea of the Other is a long-standing philosophical concept, popularized by postcolonial theorists, and in particular, by Edward Said's Orientalism. n54 Postcolonial theory examines Western representations of non-Western societies and cultures, taking care to note the imperial and ongoing hierarchical and instrumental agendas animating Western discourses about non-Western geopolitical spaces. n55 It is through the idea and body of the Other that the Western Self makes sense of its own identity, defining the Other in contrast to how it wishes to see itself. n56 Law constitutes a critical component of this self-definition, prompting one legal scholar to comment that the subjectivity of the law itself is defined through what the Western gaze judged to be the lawlessness of non-Western societies. n57 The British lauded common law's exaltation of the rule of law and reason as distinctive Western features and exported the common law as a civilizing agent to areas of the globe purported to lack these values. Both of these features demarcating the common law from non-Western "customary" practices also demarcated the Western "rational," "restrained," and "orderly" Self from the "irrational," "pleasure-seeking," [\*218] "indulgent/excessive" Other. n58 Ideas of racial and cultural difference, although presented as innate, were socially constructed. The Other, as a concept, was a vital element of colonial and legal logic that socially constructed groups as inferior and uncivilized, thereby justifying the imposition of the common law and other "carriers" of Western civilization.

CAS scholars have used the concept of the Other, and the premise of the social construction of difference on which it relies, to explore and explain how human identity is constituted against and through the animal Other. Society projects dominant characteristics onto animals (instinctual, unaware, dirty, gluttonous, promiscuous, violent, etcetera) to distinguish and underscore that which we wish to claim for ourselves (rational, self-conscious, orderly, logical, tempered, deliberative, altruistic, etcetera) as uniquely human. n59 In her discussion of animal Othering, Helena Pedersen takes care to note that in addition to this type of "conceptual Othering," scholars have also identified the "geographical Othering" of animals that happens through human insistence on keeping their lives separate and away from the spaces that humans occupy (think of zoos and wildlife management policies in urban spaces). n60 Undoing this entrenched self-Other relationship between humans and animals requires not only wide-scale social change but also an ongoing vigilance by those who wish to improve the conditions of the lives of animals to monitor and evaluate their representations. The existence of animals as humanity's Other prompts CAS scholars to caution how humans theorize about them even when an end to their exploitation is a theorist's goal. n61 Even with benevolent ends in mind, humans still shape how animals are represented in discourse and thus hold the epistemological power. n62 Moreover, beyond a certain level, an incommensurability arises, making it impossible for humans to fully "know" animals. n63 Indeed, to long to "know" animals for many reasons - to be closer to them, to understand them better, to learn more about ourselves - mirrors colonial desires to "know" the non-Western Other for the colonizer's own purposes. n64 Lisa Kemmerer [\*219] urges humans who theorize about animals to guard against such "vested interests." n65

At the same time that CAS scholars note the parallels between animal Othering and the Othering of marginalized humans, n66 they also suggest that **animal Otherness serves as an archetype for all forms of Otherness, available as a category into which marginalized human groups may be readily assimilated**. n67 Given the cultural and legal force of anthropomorphism, animalization operates as an ongoing threat of dehumanization into a fully abject ethical and legal Other. n68 As we know, animals as a group are socially constructed as lacking morally relevant characteristics (reason, language, self-awareness, complex emotions, and so on). n69 This lack purportedly justifies their dismal treatment and Othered status. n70 Yet, those same characteristics may extend to domesticate and police human groups that are troublesome to the hegemonic order. n71 The Other is a powerful exclusionary tool because of its conceptual ability to apply across oppressions. n72

a. Interconnectedness of Oppressions and Social Constructions of Difference

Related to this archetypal conceptualization of animal Otherness, CAS emphasizes interactive dynamics between the processes and practices that constitute animal exploitation and those that give rise to human exploitation. n73 Central to these dynamics is the shared modernist Western history that positions animals and marginalized human groups as subordinate to those considered fully human. n74 Epistemologically, this was achieved through Cartesian dualisms that considered the mind, reason, and culture to be in sharp contrast and superior to, respectively, the body, emotion, and nature. n75 Thus, a critical insight of CAS is that hegemonic narratives about animals, which [\*220] purportedly justify their exploitation, have counterparts in the subordinating stories that were historically told about marginalized groups and which continue to have influence today. Both animal and intra-human differences are socially constructed through these narratives based on the norms and values of modernist dichotomies. n76

Moreover, the justificatory narratives overlap and support each other. Thus, CAS is not a stand-alone theory that conceptualizes human-animal relations as separate from intra-human relations. To the contrary, CAS views gender, race, ethnicity, class, and other axes of socially constructed difference as **indelibly connected to the constitution, meaning, and impacts of species difference**. n77 Some analyses examine the mutual historical constitution of species with other differences. n78 Others illuminate how the human-animal dichotomy continues to function as a "fundamental driving mechanism" of race, sex, and colonial oppression. n79

A primary and globally resonant example of this is what transpired at Abu Ghraib Prison, documented by images of Iraqi prisoners made to assume animal-like, sexualized positions by American soldiers. n80 The specific representation of the sexualized acts was meant to animalize the racialized bodies of the Iraqi men. n81 As Colleen Boggs notes, animalization works to stigmatize and degrade only because of the logic of human exceptionalism that renders animality a "position of nonsubjectivity and of socially sanctioned abjection." n82 The [\*221] interlocking oppressions of racism, sexism, and homophobia in this instance are driven by mechanisms of shame and violence related to animality. n83 **Rather than trying to use anthropocentric concepts** such as human rights to tackle issues of violence and injustice against humans, **scholars have called for attention to be placed on minimizing the human-animal boundary.** n84 Such an emphasis should enrich not just understandings of "animal" issues, but also of issues identified as central to feminism, postcolonialism, queer studies, etcetera. n85

An exciting, yet nascent, area within this subfield of the literature is the application of queer studies to animal issues. Carmen Dell'Aversano extends to the human-animal dichotomy the dominant focal points of queer theory, addressing prohibited love, domesticated desires, regulated sex, and gender performance. n86 Similar to the regulation of romantic/sexual desires for another human being socially viewed as not of the "opposite" sex or gender, Dell'Aversano examines the cultural limits imposed on the type of love humans should have for animals. n87 For example, she investigates the strong social disapprobation people who (platonically) love animals experience when this level of affection goes too high or is directed at the wrong species, thus exceeding the "normal" feelings we are permitted to have for (certain species) of animals. n88 Just as heteronormativity compels "opposite-sex," monogamous partnering as the romantic norm and condemns those who love and have sex outside of this as abnormal, Dell'Aversano coins the term "humanormativity" to encapsulate those social forces that dictate that we hold humans in higher regard than animals and that we form our primary and serious emotional attachments with other humans. n89 Those humans that transgress these norms violate anthropocentric codes of normalcy. n90 In effect, they are not following the proper social script for human identity.

With this insight, Dell'Aversano extends the concept of performance, popularized by the work of queer theorist Judith Butler, n91 to animals. n92 [\*222] The concept of gender as a performance suggests that we perform gender identity through everyday practices of dress, comportment, body language, grooming, etcetera. n93 Dell'Aversano builds on this idea by noting that we also perform our species identities as humans through affective scripts that influence how we interact with animals. n94 Farm children, for example, learn to accept the slaughter and consumption of animals they once knew and loved, because of the norms they absorb about what it means to be human. n95

Dell'Aversano reminds us that one of the purposes of queer theory is to liberate love. n96 If (platonic) love is truly liberated, Dell'Aversano argues, then "it would have nothing to do with species distinctions." n97 What should follow for queer theorists, and everyone committed to their projects, is the insight that human and animal interests can no longer be understood as mutually exclusive and separate concepts. n98 In making such connections across species, scholars are mindful of the potential of emphases on similarity to occlude vital differences in the formation and trajectories of different forms of hierarchies. There is a danger that, in the hope of convincing critical scholars of the importance of the "animal question" to issues of race and disability, for example, animal studies scholars will suppress the nuances and histories of racism and disability prejudices. n99

CAS scholars are also aware of the discomfort that their critiques may prompt from critical theorists who have always assumed an anthropocentric orientation, the inclusivity of a human rights framework, and the need for a wider reading of who counts as human - not a disruption of the category. n100 In a recent special issue of Feminism & Psychology devoted to animal studies, Richard Twine notes the discomfort and even disgust some feminist scholars feel toward the arguments [\*223] that animals' oppression parallels women's oppression and that feminism should thereby recognize its kinship with posthumanism. n101 He argues that this affective response, while understandable, is nevertheless in need of critical reflection since it rests on an unacknowledged (and unsustainable) belief in a human-animal hierarchy. n102 Further, Twine stresses that feminist scholars must accept that posthumanist debates already occupy a significant part of feminist theory. n103 Other CAS scholars have made similar pleas for better understanding across the "human" social justice sphere. n104

b. Advocacy and Coalitional Commitment

Given the stress on interconnections among oppressions, it is not surprising that CAS has a commitment to **using academic theory for activism**. CAS is a discipline that explicitly supports the application of theory to actual and tangible projects advocating for an end to animal exploitation. n105 Further, the activist commitment is based on an intersectional idea of coalition. The principal belief that oppressions are interconnected, coupled with the advocacy element, leads CAS to promote a coalition ethic that seeks to connect animal advocacy efforts with social justice efforts broadly. n106

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#### Nuclear war causes human extinction

**PHILLIPS 2000** (Dr. Allen, Peace Activist, Nuclear Winter Revisited, October, <http://www.peace.ca/nuclearwinterrevisited.htm>)

Those of us who were involved in peace activities in the 80's probably remember a good deal about nuclear winter. Those who have become involved later may have heard little about it. No scientific study has been published since 1990, and very little appears now in the peace or nuclear abolition literature. \*It is still important.\* With thousands of rocket-launched weapons at "launch-on-warning", any day there could be an all-out nuclear war by accident. The fact that there are only half as many nuclear bombs as there were in the 80's makes no significant difference. Deaths from world-wide starvation after the war would be several times the number from direct effects of the bombs, and the surviving fraction of the human race might then diminish and vanish after a few generations of hunger and disease, in a radioactive environment.

#### Nuclear war causes the earth to explode

**CHALKO 2003** (Dr. Tom J., MSc., Ph.D., Head of Geophysics Research, Scientific E Research P/L, “Can a Neutron Bomb Accelerate Global Volcanic Activity?” http://sci-e-research.com/neutron\_bomb.html)

Consequences of using modern nuclear weapons can be far more serious than previously imagined. These consequences relate to the fact that most of the heat generated in the planetary interior is a result of nuclear decay. Over the last few decades, all superpowers have been developing so-called "neutron bombs". These bombs are designed to emit intensive neutron radiation while creating relatively little local mechanical damage. Military are very keen to use neutron bombs in combat, because lethal neutron radiation can peneterate even the largest and deepest bunkers. However, the military seem to ignore the fact that a neutron radiation is capable to reach significant depths in the planetary interior. In the process of passing through the planet and losing its intensity, a neutron beam stimulates nuclei of radioactive isotopes naturally present inside the planet to disintegrate. This disintegration in turn, generates more neutron and other radiation. The entire process causes increased nuclear heat generation in the planetary interior, far greater than the initial energy of the bomb. It typically takes many days or even weeks for this extra heat to conduct/convect to the surface of the planet and cause increased seismic/volcanic activity. Due to this variable delay, nuclear tests are not currently associated with seismic/volcanic activity, simply because it is believed that there is no theoretical basis for such an association. Perhaps you heard that after every major series of nuclear test there is always a period of increased seismic activity in some part of the world. This observable fact CANNOT be explained by direct energy of the explosion. The mechanism of neutron radiation accelerating decay of radioactive isotopes in the planetary interior, however, is a VERY PLAUSIBLE and realistic explanation. The process of accelerating volcanic activity is nuclear in essence. Accelerated decay of unstable radioactive isotopes already present in the planetary interior provides the necessary energy. The TRUE danger of modern nuclear weaponry is that their neutron radiation is capable to induce global overheating of the planetary interior, global volcanic activity and, in extreme circumstances, may even cause the entire planet to explode.

#### Cockroach survives

**Radford 10**—Life's Little Mysteries Contributor

(Benjamin, “Could Cockroaches Really Survive A Nuclear Winter?”, <http://www.livescience.com/32749-could-cockroaches-really-survive-a-nuclear-winter.html>, dml)

Still, there are about 4,000 different species of cockroaches, and billions of them out there. With so many cockroaches all over the world, it's possible that a few might survive a global nuclear holocaust, depending largely on their radiation exposure. But the ones that did would have plenty of company.

#### Humans will build lab universes – causes infinite suffering

**Dawrst 8**– pen name for Brian Tomasik, Swarthmore College

(Alan, “Creating Infinite Suffering: Lab Universes”, <http://www.utilitarian-essays.com/lab-universes.html>, dml)

Abstract. I think there's a small but non-negligible probability that humans or their descendants will create infinitely many new universes in a laboratory. Under weak assumptions, this would entail the creation of infinitely many sentient organisms. Many of those organisms would be small and short-lived, and their lives in the wild would often involve far more pain than happiness. Given the seriousness of suffering, I conclude that creating infinitely many universes would be infinitely bad.

#### That outweighs everything

**Dawrst 8**– pen name for Brian Tomasik, Swarthmore College

(Alan, “Creating Infinite Suffering: Lab Universes”, <http://www.utilitarian-essays.com/lab-universes.html>, dml)

Starting a chain of eternal inflation in the laboratory would produce infinitely many new universes. But what types of universes would emerge? Suppose we assume--as do Jaume Garriga and Alex Vilenkin in their 2001 article "Many worlds in one"--that there are only finitely many possible universe histories of a particular duration (say, 13.7 billion years, the age of our universe); call these "histories" for short. The existence of infinitely many universes needn't, in general, imply the existence of all possible histories. As Alex Vilenkin notes in his 2006 book Many Worlds in One, the sequence 1, 3, 5, 7, ... contains infinitely many integers but doesn't contain all possible integers, and one might imagine an analogous situation for universe histories (p. 114). However, because "the initial conditions at the big bang are set by random quantum processes during inflation" (p. 114), the theory of inflation does imply that lab universes would instantiate all possible histories infinitely many times.[1] This would, of course, include infinitely many replications of the Holocaust, infinitely many acts of torture, and so on. Indeed, there would be infinitely many universes in which Hitler won World War II, as well as infinitely many universes that would be as close as physically possible to "hell on earth" (or on any other planet). The assumption of finitely many possible histories is not really important. As long as we assume that the probability is greater than zero that suffering will emerge in a random universe, creating infinitely many universes would create infinite amounts of suffering.[1] For negative utilitarians, this consequence is automatically infinitely terrible. For classical utilitarians, the question arises as to what the relative amounts of suffering vs. happiness would be in the new universes. Of course, the total amount of both suffering and happiness would be infinite, but one might hope still to find some meaningful way to compare their relative proportions.[2] I'll point out some reasons for thinking that pain would significantly preponderate over pleasure. For one thing, I think suffering outweighs happiness right now on earth.[3] While it's dubious whether this is true for humans, it probably is the case for the tremendous numbers of animals that live and die in the wild (including large numbers of small organisms that die at a very young age, since most species produce far more offspring than reach adulthood). If insects are sentient, the evidence for net suffering over happiness becomes even stronger. Furthermore, we should be cautious of taking our own observable universe as typical because of anthropic considerations. We necessarily find ourselves in a world containing intelligent life (where our intelligence has allowed us partially to overcome some of the pains of ordinary existence), but there are likely many more worlds on which only low-level sentient organisms (perhaps similar to insects, other invertebrates, fish, etc.) have emerged. As Dave Pearce notes, Darwinian life is statistically far more common in the Multiverse than post-Darwinian life. For what it's worth, Frank Drake estimated the fraction of planets containing life that would go on to develop intelligent life at 0.01, and modern estimates put the figure at 0.0000001 (source). And given the Fermi Paradox, this fraction is plausibly much smaller. (Of course, not all life is sentient -- many planets would probably just contain unicellular microorganisms like bacteria -- so the fraction of planets with intelligent life out of all those containing sentient life is considerably bigger than the fraction of planets with intelligent life out of all those merely containing life.) Finally, it's worth considering that some of the organisms that would emerge in the new universes might endure infinite amounts of suffering, say in hell. (Even if only humans could go to hell, the new universes would contain infinitely many humans.[1]) Thus, creating lab universes would, in that case, cause infinitely many new instances of eternal torment.

