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#### Indefinite detention means holding enemy combatants until the cessation of hostilities – authority for it is codified in the NDAA

**Greenwald, 11** –former Constitutional and civil rights litigator (Glenn, “Three myths about the detention bill” Salon, 12/16, <http://www.salon.com/2011/12/16/three_myths_about_the_detention_bill/>)

Condemnation of President Obama is intense, and growing, as a result of his announced intent to sign into law the indefinite detention bill embedded in the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). These denunciations come not only from the nation’s leading civil liberties and human rights groups, but also from the pro-Obama New York Times Editorial Page, which today has a scathing Editorial describing Obama’s stance as “a complete political cave-in, one that reinforces the impression of a fumbling presidency” and lamenting that “the bill has so many other objectionable aspects that we can’t go into them all,” as well as from vocal Obama supporters such as Andrew Sullivan, who wrote yesterday that this episode is “another sign that his campaign pledge to be vigilant about civil liberties in the war on terror was a lie.” In damage control mode, White-House-allied groups are now trying to ride to the rescue with attacks on the ACLU and dismissive belittling of the bill’s dangers.

For that reason, it is very worthwhile to briefly examine — and debunk — the three principal myths being spread by supporters of this bill, and to do so very simply: by citing the relevant provisions of the bill, as well as the relevant passages of the original 2001 Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF), so that everyone can judge for themselves what this bill actually includes (this is all above and beyond the evidence I assembled in writing about this bill yesterday):

Myth # 1: This bill does not codify indefinite detention

Section 1021 of the NDAA governs, as its title says, “Authority of the Armed Forces to Detain Covered Persons Pursuant to the AUMF.” The first provision — section (a) — explicitly “affirms that the authority of the President” under the AUMF ”includes the authority for the Armed Forces of the United States to detain covered persons.” The next section, (b), defines “covered persons” — i.e., those who can be detained by the U.S. military — as “a person who was a part of or substantially supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.” With regard to those “covered individuals,” this is the power vested in the President by the next section, (c):

It simply cannot be any clearer within the confines of the English language that this bill codifies the power of indefinite detention. It expressly empowers the President — with regard to anyone accused of the acts in section (b) – to detain them “without trial until the end of the hostilities.” That is the very definition of “indefinite detention,” and the statute could not be clearer that it vests this power. Anyone claiming this bill does not codify indefinite detention should be forced to explain how they can claim that in light of this crystal clear provision.

It is true, as I’ve pointed out repeatedly, that both the Bush and Obama administrations have argued that the 2001 AUMF implicitly (i.e., silently) already vests the power of indefinite detention in the President, and post-9/11 deferential courts have largely accepted that view (just as the Bush DOJ argued that the 2001 AUMF implicitly (i.e., silently) allowed them to eavesdrop on Americans without the warrants required by law). That’s why the NDAA can state that nothing is intended to expand the 2001 AUMF while achieving exactly that: because the Executive and judicial interpretation being given to the 20o1 AUMF is already so much broader than its language provides.

But this is the first time this power of indefinite detention is being expressly codified by statute (there’s not a word about detention powers in the 2001 AUMF). Indeed, as the ACLU and HRW both pointed out, it’s the first time such powers are being codified in a statute since the McCarthy era Internal Security Act of 1950, about which I wrote yesterday.

#### The aff’s not topical—the object of the resolution is “war powers authority”—that's grammatically intuitive and predictable. The aff must advocate a reduction of war powers authority as the target for discussion—topicality is a voter:

#### 1. It’s the basis for neg prep which is key to engage affs without unreasonable demands on 2Ns—educational debates with realistic workloads are key to any vision for the activity—also directly key to participation.

#### 2. War powers debates are good—without topicality, there’s a competitive incentive to avoid them and the neg ground associated—

#### First, they give undergrads an opportunity to uncover a debate that would otherwise be stifled in public—that challenges conventional wisdom on a timely controversy

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Taken together, the connection between tournament competition and a public collaboration reorients the pedagogical function of debate. Gordon Mitchell and his colleagues comment on this possibility, “The debate tournament site’s potential to work as a translational pipeline for scholarly research presents unique opportunities for colleges and universities seeking to bolster their institutional infrastructure for undergraduate research” (Mitchell et al, 2010, p. 15). Indeed, the debate series affords competitors the opportunity to become part of the discussion and inform policymakers about potential positions, as opposed to the traditional reactionary format of hosting public debates at the season’s end. Empirically, these events had the effect of “giv[ing] voice to previously buried arguments” that “subject matter experts felt reticent to elucidate because of their institutional affiliations” (Mitchell, 2010, p. 107). Given the timeliness of the topic, these debates provide a new voice into the ongoing deliberation over war powers and help make the fruits of competitive research have a public purpose.

The second major function concerns the specific nature of deliberation over war powers. Given the connectedness between presidential war powers and the preservation of national security, deliberation is often difficult. Mark Neocleous describes that when political issues become securitized; it “helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms.” (2008, p. 71). Collegiate debaters, through research and competitive debate, serve as a bulwark against this “short-circuiting” and help preserve democratic deliberation. This is especially true when considering national security issues. Eric English contends, “The success … in challenging the dominant dialogue on homeland security politics points to efficacy of academic debate as a training ground.” Part of this training requires a “robust understanding of the switch-side technique” which “helps prevent misappropriation of the technique to bolster suspect homeland security policies” (English et. al, 2007, p. 224). Hence, competitive debate training provides foundation for interrogating these policies in public.

Alarmism on the issues of war powers is easily demonstrated by Obama’s repeated attempts to transfer detainees from Guantanamo Bay. Republicans were able to launch a campaign featuring the slogan, “not in my backyard” (Schor, 2009). By locating the nexus of insecurity as close as geographically possible, the GOP were able to instill a fear of national insecurity that made deliberation in the public sphere not possible. When collegiate debaters translate their knowledge of the policy wonkery on such issues into public deliberation, it serves to cut against the alarmist rhetoric purported by opponents.

In addition to combating misperceptions concerning detainee transfers, the investigative capacity of collegiate debate provides a constant check on governmental policies. A new trend concerning national security policies has been for the government to provide “status updates” to the public. On March 28, 2011, Obama gave a speech concerning Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya and the purpose of the bombings. Jeremy Engels and William Saas describe this “post facto discourse” as a “new norm” where “Americans are called to acquiesce to decisions already made” (2013, p. 230). Contra to the alarmist strategy that made policy deliberation impossible, this rhetorical strategy posits that deliberation is not necessary. Collegiate debaters researching war powers are able to interrogate whether deliberation is actually needed. Given the technical knowledge base needed to comprehend the mechanism of how war powers operate, debate programs serve as a constant investigation into whether deliberation is necessary not only for prior action but also future action. By raising public awareness, there is a greater potential that “the public’s inquiry into potential illegal action abroad” could “create real incentives to enforce the WPR” (Druck, 2010, p. 236). While this line of interrogation could be fulfilled by another organization, collegiate debaters who translate their competitive knowledge into public awareness create a “space for talk” where the public has “previously been content to remain silent” (Engels & Saas, 2013, p. 231).

Given the importance of presidential war powers and the strategies used by both sides of the aisle to stifle deliberation, the import of competitive debate research into the public realm should provide an additional check of being subdued by alarmism or acquiescent rhetorics. After creating that space for deliberation, debaters are apt to influence the policies themselves. Mitchell furthers, “Intercollegiate debaters can play key roles in retrieving and amplifying positions that might otherwise remain sedimented in the policy process” (2010, p. 107). With the timeliness of the war powers controversy and the need for competitive debate to reorient publicly, the CEDA/Miller Center series represents a symbiotic relationship that ought to continue into the future. Not only will collegiate debaters become better public advocates by shifting from competition to collaboration, the public becomes more informed on a technical issue where deliberation was being stifled. As a result, debaters reinvigorate debate.

#### Second, key to education on the particulars of the US presidency—that's a prior question to any informed criticism

Mucher, 12 [“Malaise in the Classroom: Teaching Secondary Students about the Presidency” [Stephen Mucher](http://www.bard.edu/academics/faculty/faculty.php?action=details&id=1969) is assistant professor of history education in the Master of Arts in Teaching Program at Bard College, <http://www.hannaharendtcenter.org/?p=7741>]

Contemporary observers of secondary education have appropriately decried the startling lack of understanding most students possess of the American presidency. This critique should not be surprising. In textbooks and classrooms across the country, curriculum writers and teachers offer an abundance of disconnected facts about the nation’s distinct presidencies—the personalities, idiosyncrasies, and unique time-bound crises that give character and a simple narrative arc to each individual president. Some of these descriptions contain vital historical knowledge. Students should learn, for example, how a conflicted Lyndon Johnson pushed Congress for sweeping domestic programs against the backdrop of Vietnam or how a charismatic and effective communicator like Ronald Reagan found Cold War collaboration with Margaret Thatcher and Mikhail Gorbachev. But what might it mean to ask high school students to look across these and other presidencies to encourage more sophisticated forms of historical thinking? More specifically, what might teachers begin to do to promote thoughtful writing and reflection that goes beyond the respective presidencies and questions the nature of the executive office itself? And how might one teach the presidency, in Arendtian fashion, encouraging open dialogue around common texts, acknowledging the necessary uncertainty in any evolving classroom interpretation of the past, and encouraging flexibility of thought for an unpredictable future? By provocatively asking whether the president “matters,” the [2012 Hannah Arendt Conference](http://www.bard.edu/hannaharendtcenter/conference9-12/) provided an ideal setting for New York secondary teachers to explore this central pedagogical challenge in teaching the presidency. Participants in this special writing workshop, scheduled concurrently with the conference, attended conference panels and also retreated to consider innovative and focused approaches to teaching the presidency. Conference panels promoted a broader examination of the presidency than typically found in secondary curricula. A diverse and notable group of scholars urged us to consider the events and historical trends, across multiple presidencies, constraining or empowering any particular chief executive. These ideas, explored more thoroughly in the intervening writing workshops, provoked productive argument on what characteristics might define the modern American presidency. In ways both explicit and implicit, sessions pointed participants to numerous and complicated ways Congress, the judiciary, mass media, U.S. citizens, and the president relate to one another. This sweeping view of the presidency contains pedagogical potency and has a place in secondary classrooms. Thoughtful history educators should ask big questions, encourage open student inquiry, and promote civic discourse around the nature of power and the purposes of human institutions. But as educators, we also know that the aim and value of our discipline resides in place-and time-bound particulars that beg for our interpretation and ultimately build an evolving understanding of the past. Good history teaching combines big ambitious questions with careful attention to events, people, and specific contingencies. Such specifics are the building blocks of storytelling and shape the analogies students need to think through an uncertain future. Jimmy Carter’s oval office speech on July 15, 1979, describing a national “crisis of confidence” presented a unique case study for thinking about the interaction between American presidents and the populations the office is constitutionally obliged to serve. Workshop participants prepared for the conference by watching the [video footage](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KCOd-qWZB_g) from this address and reading parts of Kevin Mattson’s [history of the speech](http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/15/books/excerpt-what-the-heck-mr-president.html). In what quickly became known as the “Malaise Speech,” Carter attempted a more direct and personal appeal to the American people, calling for personal sacrifice and soul searching, while warning of dire consequences if the nation did not own up to its energy dependencies. After Vietnam and Watergate, Carter believed, America needed a revival that went beyond policy recommendations. His television address, after a mysterious 10-day sequestration at Camp David, took viewers through Carter’s own spiritual journey and promoted the conclsions he drew from it. Today, the Malaise Speech has come to symbolize a failed Carter presidency. He has been lampooned, for example, on The Simpsons as our most sympathetically honest and humorously ineffectual former president. In one [episode](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D91IlKLtIH8), residents of Springfield cheer the unveiling of his presidential statue, emblazoned with “Malaise Forever” on the pedestal. Schools give the historical Carter even less respect. Standardized tests such as the NY Regents exam ask little if anything about his presidency. The Malaise speech is rarely mentioned in classrooms—at either the secondary or post-secondary levels. Similarly, few historians identify Carter as particularly influential, especially when compared to the leaders elected before and after him. Observers who mention his 1979 speeches are most likely footnoting a transitional narrative for an America still recovering from a turbulent Sixties and heading into a decisive conservative reaction. Indeed, workshop participants used writing to question and debate Carter’s place in history and the limited impact of the speech. But we also identified, through [primary sources](http://www.livingroomcandidate.org/commercials/1976) on the 1976 election and documents around the speech, ways for students to think expansively about the evolving relationship between a president and the people. A quick analysis of the [electoral map](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File%3A1976prescountymap2.PNG) that brought Carter into office reminded us that Carter was attempting to convince a nation that looks and behaves quite differently than today. The vast swaths of blue throughout the South and red coastal counties in New York and California are striking. Carter’s victory map can resemble an electoral photo negative to what has now become a familiar and predictable image of specific [regional alignments](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/interactives/campaign08/election/uscounties.html) in the Bush/Obama era. The president who was elected in 1976, thanks in large part to an electorate still largely undefined by the later rise of the Christian Right, remains an historical enigma. As an Evangelical Democrat from Georgia, with roots in both farming and nuclear physics, comfortable admitting his sins in both Sunday School and Playboy, and neither energized by or defensive about abortion or school prayer, Carter is as difficult to image today as the audience he addressed in 1979. It is similarly difficult for us to imagine the Malaise Speech ever finding a positive reception. However, this is precisely what [Mattson](http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/02/books/review/Bai-t.html) argues. Post-speech weekend polls gave Carter’s modest popularity rating a surprisingly respectable 11-point bump. Similarly, in a year when most of the president’s earlier speeches were ignored, the White House found itself flooded with phone calls and letters, almost universally positive. The national press was mixed and several prominent columnists praised the speech. This reaction to such an unconventional address, Mattson goes on to argue, suggests that the presidency can matter. Workshop participants who attended later sessions heard Walter Russell Mead reference the ways presidents can be seen as either transformative or transactional. In many ways, the “malaise moment” could be viewed as a late term attempt by a transactional president to forge a transformational presidency. In the days leading up to the speech, Carter went into self-imposed exile, summoning spiritual advisors to his side, and encouraging administration-wide soul searching. Such an approach to leadership, admirable to some and an act of desperation to others, defies conventions and presents an odd image of presidential behavior (an idea elaborated on by conference presenter Wyatt Mason). “Malaise” was never mentioned in Carter’s speech. But his transformational aspirations are hard to miss. In a nation that was proud of hard work, strong families, close-knit communities, and our faith in God, too many of us now tend to worship self-indulgence and consumption. Human identity is no longer defined by what one does, but by what one owns. But we've discovered that owning things and consuming things does not satisfy our longing for meaning. We've learned that piling up material goods cannot fill the emptiness of lives which have no confidence or purpose. It is this process—the intellectual act of interpreting Carter and his [in]famous speech as aberrant presidential behavior—that allows teachers and their students to explore together the larger question of defining the modern presidency. And it is precisely this purposeful use of a small number of primary sources that forces students to rethink, through writing and reflection, the parameters that shape how presidents relate to their electorate. In our workshop we saw how case studies, in-depth explorations of the particulars of history, precede productive debate on whether the presidency matters. The forgotten Carter presidency can play a disproportionately impactful pedagogical role for teachers interested in exploring the modern presidency. As any high school teacher knows, students rarely bring an open interpretive lens to Clinton, Bush, or Obama. Ronald Reagan, as the first political memory for many of their parents, remains a polarizing a figure. However, few students or their parents hold strong politically consequential opinions about Carter. Most Americans, at best, continue to view him as a likable, honest, ethical man who is much more effective as an ex-president than he was as president. Workshop participants learned that the initial support Carter received after the Malaise Speech faded quickly. Mattson and some members of the administration now argue that the President lacked a plan to follow up on the goodwill he received from a nation desiring leadership. Reading [Ezra Klein](http://m.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/03/19/120319fa_fact_klein), we also considered the possibility that, despite all the attention educators give to presidential speeches (as primary sources that quickly encapsulate presidential visions), there is little empirical evidence that any public address really makes much of a difference. In either case, Carter’s loss 16 months later suggests that his failures of leadership both transformational and transactional. Did Carter’s speech matter? The teachers in the workshop concluded their participation by attempting to answer this question, working collaboratively to draft a brief historical account contextualizing the 1979 malaise moment. In doing so, we engaged in precisely the type of activity missing in too many secondary school classrooms today: interrogating sources, corroborating evidence, debating conflicting interpretations, paying close attention to language, and doing our best to examine our underlying assumptions about the human condition. These efforts produced some clarity, but also added complexity to our understanding of the past and led to many additional questions, both pedagogical and historical. In short, our writing and thinking during the Arendt Conference produced greater uncertainty. And that reality alone suggests that study of the presidency does indeed matter.

### K

#### The aff’s approach to emancipatory politics located in a specific identity fails, it provides no ground for political movement needed to fight colonialism. Only universalism solves

**Badiou, 97** – Alain, philosophy teacher at the Ecole Normale Superieure and the College International de Philosophie in Paris (“Politics and Philosophy: An Interview with Alain Badiou,” (Appendix to *Ethics*), 11/17/97, First published in Angelaki, vol. 3, no. 3, 1998, published in *Ethics* in 2001, Verso)**Red**

When I hear people say 'We are oppressed as blacks, as women', I have only one problem: what exactly is meant by 'black' or 'women'? If this or that particular identity is put into play in the struggle against oppression, against the state, my only problem is with the exact political meaning of the identity being promoted. Can this identity, in itself, function in a progressive fashion - that is, other than as a property invented by the oppressors themselves? In his preface to Les nigres, Jean Genet said that everything turns around the question: what are black people, and for starters, what colour are they? You can answer then that black people are black. But what does 'black' mean to those who, in the name of the oppression they suffer, make it a political category? I understand very well what black means for those who use that predicate in a logic of differentiation, oppression, and separation. Just as I understand very well what 'French' means when Le Pen uses the word, when ~~he~~ champions national preference, France for the French, exclusion of Arabs, and so on. If someone wants to use the words 'French' or 'Arab' in another way, to inscribe them in a progressive political affirmation, everything depends on what this determination then means for the person who uses it. And what it means for everyone, what it means universally. 'Negritude', for example, as incarnated by Cksaire and Senghor, consisted essentially of reworking exactly those traditional predicates once used to designate black people: as intuitive, as natural, as primitive, as living by rhythm rather than by concepts, and so on. It's no accident that it was a primarily poetic operation, a matter of turning these predicates upside down, of claiming them as affirmative and liberating. I understand why this kind of movement took place, why it was necessary. It was a very strong, very beautiful, and very necessary movement. But having said that, it is not something that can be inscribed as such in politics. I think it is a matter of poetics, of culture, of turning the subjective situation upside down. **It doesn't provide a possible framework for political initiative.** The progressive formulation of a cause which engages cultural or communal predicates, linked to incontestable situations of oppression and humiliation, presumes that we propose these predicates, these particularities, these singularities, these communal qualities, in such a way that they be situated in another space and become heterogeneous to their ordinary oppressive operation. I never know in advance what quality, what particularity, is capable of becoming political or not; I have no preconceptions on that score. What I do know is that there must be a progres-sive meaning to these particularities, a meaning that is **intelligible to all.** Otherwise, we have something which has its raison d'etre, but which is necessarily of the order of a demand for integration - that is, of a **demand that one's particularity be valued in the existing state of things.** This is something commendable, even necessary, but it is not, in my opinion, something to be inscribed directly in poli-tics. Rather, it inscribes itself in what I would generally call 'syndicalism' [trade unionism] - that is to say, particular claims, claims that seek to be recognized and valued in a determinate relation of forces. I would call 'political' something that - in the categories, the slogans, the statements it puts forward - is less the demand of a social fraction or community to be integrated into the existing order than something which touches on a transformation of that order as a whole. A last example on this point: what is the legitimate political usage of the category 'Jew'? It is very hard to ask this question in France, without instantly being labelled an anti-Semite. I think, though, that it is absolutely necessary, if this word is to have a progressive political signification, that it be something different from what Hitler, for instance, designated by that name. **It can’t be the same thing turned on its head.** And if it is something else, we have to ask what it might be – what relation it has or doesn’t have with the state of Israel and its practices, what relation it has or doesn’t have with religion, with the matrilineal character of Judaism, or with the revolutionary engagement of so ~~man~~y Jews in the 1930s and 1940s, and so forth. [Interviewer] *But surely most of the historical answers to this question have included an element of irreducible particularity, a constitute particularization, we might say; how to describe what the word ‘Jew’ means without referring to the theme of the chosen?* [Badiou] That there is a remnant, or a support [support], of irreducible particularity, is in fact something I would acknowledge for any kind of reality. To take up again the most urgent example in France today: it is perfectly obvious that the sans-papiers of the foyers [workers’ hostels] are very particular – they are simply Africans, but mainly from Mali, and often from a particular area in Mali. They practice a whole series of transpositions of village customs in their way of living in the foyers. They maintain a strong relation to their traditional hierarchy. When you attend a foyer meeting, you immediately notice that the meeting takes place in a particular way. But in the end, between this particularity present in the practical, concrete support of any political process, and the statements in the name of which the political process unfolds, I think there is only a relation of support, but not a relation of transitivity. It’s a bit like the relation with the economy. You can’t go from the one to the other, even if one seems to be ‘carried’ by the other. So to take up the question of the meaning of the word ‘Jew’, follows the same logic. Of course I recognize the consistency of the historical particularity covered by this word. But it in no way settles the question of in what sense the term can become a political category. I don’t say that it can’t happen, or that it shouldn’t happen. But something more than this particularity would be necessary for it to happen. Because I know very well that people try to legitimate things in the name of this particularity that I condemn absolutely, like supporting the action of the state of Israel, as well as things that I support, like the effort of some Israelis to develop positive relations with the Palestinians. In each case we have to work to make a category pass from what I called its identitarian or syndical status to a political status. [Interviewer] *Most of the verbs you usually use to describe the passage from particular to universal, however, are verbs like subtract, extract, depose. . . . Can we progress, by essentially negative or subtractive means, to a point where onces-despised particularities can attain a universal signification? You suggest that things like ‘the language we choose to speak, the things we eat, the people we marry and love, our customs and habits, all this changes, without strictly speaking anyone’s intervention’.7 the history of colonization, however, to mention only that, suggests otherwise.* [Badiou] As I said, I think the moment of turning things upside down is inevitable. And obviously, for example, the question of language, of history, of national singularity, are genuinely political questions for countries which are struggling against a colonizer, or countries which have recently emerged from colonization. But we have to recognize that **they are ultimately political only because the historical movement for popular and national liberation against imperialism carried a certain universality.** In the 1960s it was – especially for the youth of the world – major cause. Today we see clearly that everything depends on the clarity of the categories put into play; their political character is not obvious. I think, for example, that the demonization of the figure of Islam by the Western powers, and especially in France, is certainly reactionary. But this doesn't mean - unlike the case of the people's struggle in Vietnam, or the national struggle in Algeria – that the political and universalizable character of what is at stake on this point is fully transparent. It isn't. It may become so, as everything begins in confusion and obscurity, but it isn't yet. My feeling is that we are at the beginning of a new era. At the level of world history, this new era has been massively marked by the collapse of the USSR - a major historical settling of accounts [une ichiance historique majeure] - and consequently, a new period of American hegemony. As so often happens, progressive thought has fallen behind all this. To conclude on this point, and to make sure that there is no ambiguity, I want to underline the fact that no category is in itself blocked from its possible politicization. Even 'Arab', even 'Islam', even Jew', even 'French', can, at a given moment, have a progressive political signification. When de Gaulle addressed the French from London - the French meaning, for him, the resistants - 'French' had a I progressive signification, that of anti-Nazi resistance. This i proves that these things can change. On the other hand, I { would say that it is never given in advance; it is not because a term is a communal predicate, nor even because there is 1 a victim in a particular situation, that it is automatically, or even easily, transformed into a political category.

#### The aff’s use of identity produces a violent simulacrum of the event – identifying a group for whom they act necessitates the destruction of those outside the group

**Badiou, 93** – Alain, philosophy teacher at the Ecole Normale Superieure and the College International de Philosophie in Paris (*Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil*, first published 1993, first published in English 2001, Verso, pp. 72 - 77)**Red**

D Outline of a theory of Evil I Simulacrum and terror We have seen that not every 'novelty' is an event. It must further be the case that what the event calls forth and names is the central void of the situation for which this event is an event. This matter of nomination is essential, and I cannot go through the complete theory of it here.4 But it should be easy to understand that since the event is to disappear, being a kind of flashing supplement that happens to the situation, so what is retained of it in the situation, and what serves to guide the fidelity, must be something like a trace, or a name, that refers back to the vanished event. When the Nazis talked about the 'National Socialist revolution', they borrowed names - 'revolution', 'socialism' justified by great modem political events (the Revolution of 1792, or the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917). A whole series of characteristics are related to and legitimated by this borrowing: the break with the old order, the support sought from mass gatherings, the dictatorial style of the state, the pathos of the decision, the eulogy of the Worker, and so forth. However, the 'event' thus named - although in certain formal respects it is similar to those from which it borrows its name and characteristics, and without which it would have no constituted political language in which to formulate proposals of its own - is distinguished by a vocabulary of plenitude, or of substance: the National Socialist revolution - say the Nazis - will carry a particular community, the German people, towards its true destiny, which is a destiny of universal domination. So that the 'event' is supposed to bring into being, and name, not the void of the earlier situation, but its plenitude - not the universality of that which is sustained, precisely, by no particular characteristic (no particular multiple), but the absolute particularity of a community, itself rooted in the characteristics of its soil, its blood, and its race. What allows a genuine event to be at the origin of a truth - which is the only thing that can be for all, and can be eternally - is precisely the fact that it relates to the particularity of a situation only from the bias of its void. The void, the multiple-of-nothing, neither excludes nor constrains anyone. It is the absolute neutrality of being - such that the fidelity that originates in an event, although it is an immanent break within a singular situation, is none the less universally addressed. By contrast, the striking break provoked by the Nazi seizure of power in 1933, although formally indistinguishable from an event - it is precisely this that led Heidegger astray5 - since it conceives itself as a 'German' revolution, and is faithful only to the alleged national substance of a people, is actually addressed only to those that it itself deems 'German'. **It is thus** - right from the moment the event is named, and despite the fact that this nomination ('revolution') functions only under the condition of true universal events (for example the Revolutions of 1792 or 1917) - **radically incapable of any truth whatsoever.** **When a** radical **break in a situation**, under names borrowed from real truth-processes, **convokes not the void but the 'full' particularity or presumed substance of that situation, we are dealing with a simulacrum of truth.** 'Simulacrum' must be understood here in its strong sense: all the formal traits of a truth are at work in the simulacrum. Not only a universal nomination of the event, inducing the power of a radical break, but also the 'obligation' of a fidelity, and the promotion of a simulacrum of the subject, erected - without the advent of any Immortal – **above the human animality of the others, of those who are arbitrarily declared not to belong** to the communitarian substance whose promotion and domination the simulacrum event is designed to assure. Fidelity to a simulacrum, unlike fidelity to an event, regulates its break with the situation not by the universality of the void, but by the closed particularity of an abstract set [ensemble] (the 'Germans' or the 'Aryans'). **Its invariable operation is the unending construction of this set, and it has no other means of doing this than that of 'voiding' what surrounds it.** The void, 'avoided' [chasse] by the simulacrous promotion of an 'event-substance', here returns, with its universality, as what must be accomplished in order that this substance can be. **This is to say that what is addressed 'to everyone'** (and 'everyone', here, is necessarily that which does not belong to the German communitarian substance for this substance is not an 'everyone' but, rather, some 'few' who dominate 'everyone') **is death,** or that deferred form of death which is slavery in the service of the German substance. **Hence fidelity to the simulacrum** (and it demands of the 'few' belonging to the German substance prolonged sacrifices and commitments, since it really does have the form of a fidelity) **has as its content war and massacre. These are not here means to an end: they make up the very real** [tout le reel]6 **of such a fidelity.** In the case of Nazism, the void made its return under one privileged name in particular, the name 'Jew'. There were certainly others as well: the Gypsies, the mentally ill, homosexuals, communists. . . . But the name 'Jew' was the name of names, serving to designate those people whose disappearance created, around that presumed German substance promoted by the 'National Socialist revolution' simulacrum, a void that would suffice to identify the substance. The choice of this name relates, without any doubt, to its obvious link with universalism, in particular with revolutionary universalism - to what was in effect already void [vide] about this name - that is, what was connected to the universality and eternity of truths. Nevertheless, inasmuch as it served to organize the extermination, the name 'Jew' was a political creation of the Nazis, without any pre-existing referent. It is a name whose meaning no one can share with the Nazis, a meaning that presumes the simulacrum and fidelity to the simulacrum - and hence the absolute singularity of Nazism as a political sequence. 5But even in this respect, we have to recognize that this process mimics an actual truth-process. Every fidelity to an authentic event names the adversaries of its perseverance. Contrary to consensual ethics, which tries to avoid divisions, the ethic of truths is always more or less militant, combative. For the concrete ~~man~~ifestation of its heterogeneity to opinions and established knowledges is the struggle against all sorts of efforts at interruption, at corruption, at the return to the immediate interests of the human animal, at the humiliation and repression of the Immortal who arises as subject. The ethic of truths presumes recognition of these efforts, and thus the singular operation of naming enemies. The 'National Socialist revolution' simulacrum encouraged nominations of this kind, in particular the nomination of 'Jew'. But the simulacrum's subversion of the true event continues with these namings. For the enemy of a true subjective fidelity is precisely the closed set [ensemble], the substance of the situation, the community. The values of truth, of its hazardous course and its universal address, are to be erected against these forms of inertia. **Every invocation of blood and soil, of race, of custom, of community, works directly against truths**; and it is this very collection [ensemble] that is named as the enemy in the ethic of truths. Whereas fidelity to the simulacrum, which pro- motes the community, blood, race, and so on, names as its enemy - for example, under the name of 'Jew' - precisely the abstract universality and eternity of truths, the address to all. Moreover, the two processes treat what is thus named in diametrically opposite ways. For however hostile to a truth ~~he~~ might be, in the ethic of truths every 'some-one' is always represented as capable of becoming the Immortal that ~~he~~ is. So **we may fight against the judgements and opinions** ~~he~~ exchanges with others for the purpose of corrupting every fidelity, **but not against his person** - which, under the circumstances, is insignificant, and to which, in any case, every truth is ultimately addressed. **By contrast, the void with which those who are faithful to a simulacrum strive to surround its alleged substance must be a real void, obtained by cutting into the flesh itself.** And since it is not the subjective advent of an Immortal, so fidelity to the simulacrum - that appalling imitation of truths - presumes nothing more about those they designate as the enemy than their strictly particular existence as human animals. **It is thus this existence that will have to bear the return of the void.** This is why the exercise of fidelity to the simulacrum is necessarily the exercise of terror. Understand by terror, here, not the political concept of Terror, linked (in a universalizable couple) to the concept of Virtue by the Immortals of the Jacobin Committee of Public Safety, **but the pure and simple reduction of all to their being-for-death.** Terror thus conceived really postulates that in order to let [the] substance be, **nothing must be** [pour que la substance soit, rien ne doit etre]. I have pursued the example of Nazism because it enters to a significant extent into that 'ethical' configuration (of 'radical Evil') opposed by the ethic of truths. What is at issue here is the simulacrum of an event that gives rise to a political fidelity. Such a simulacrum is possible only thanks to the success of political revolutions that were genuinely evental (and thus universally addressed). But simulacra linked to all the other possible kinds of truth-processes also exist. The reader may find it useful to identify them. For example, we can see how certain sexual passions are simulacra of the amorous event. There can be no doubt that on this account they bring with them terror and violence. Likewise, brutal obscurantist preachings present themselves as the simulacra of science, with obviously damaging results. And so on. But in each case, these violent damages are unintelligible if we do not understand them in relation to the truth-processes whose simulacra they ~~man~~ipulate. In sum, our first definition of Evil is this: **Evil is the process of a simulacrum of truth. And in its essence, under a name of its invention, it is terror directed at everyone.**

**Our alternative is to embrace the radical difference between each and every one of us as the starting point for a universal politics.**

**Trott, 11 –** Adreil, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas, Pan American (“THE TRUTH OF POLITICS IN ALAIN BADIOU: ‘THERE IS ONLY ONE WORLD’,” Parrhesia, No. 12, 2011, http://parrhesiajournal.org/parrhesia12/parrhesia12\_trott.pdf //Red)

Arendt’s analysis indicates the lacunae of political theories from Plato through Habermas that assume the rationality of political life. What remains unconsidered in those accounts is the power, even **whim, of the** **government or** of the **community to determine who belongs.**3 When recognition is needed before an appeal can be made, the appeal to be recognized itself can never be heard. Contemporary circumstances from Darfur to **Guantanamo**, whose occupants only appeal appears to be to human rights, exemplifies this impasse: the rights of the politically excluded, the uncounted and unrecognized, **seem impossible to secure.** This logic of two worlds, the political and the non-political, is formed by producing or excluding what the political considers non-political or not worthy of belonging. Jacques Rancière argues that Arendt herself is subject to the critique she launches against the nation-state, since she too defines political life in terms of a division into two, the exclusion of zoē from bios. Rancière reclaims human rights when he argues, contra Arendt’s analysis of their impotence, that the subject of the “rights of man” is the one who can put two worlds or two spheres into one in order to activate the dispute between them.4 It is dissensus over what is political that makes the claim of the one who is excluded challenge the given order of who belongs and who does not. This manifestation of one world out of two divided worlds—the excluded and the included, of zoē and bios, of the private and the political—draws Rancière close to Badiou in his conception of political life. Both Rancière and Badiou take politics to follow from a particular subjectivization. Both achieve this subjectivization out of the appearance of one world. I turn to Badiou in this paper for his analysis of this two-world structure and his conceptual counterpoint to it. Badiou formalizes the way the state operates so as to always bar some part that belongs. From Badiou’s account of the event follows a politics that performs the unity of the world as a **disruption to the totalizing and excluding efforts of the State.** Badiou problematizes the rationalist theories of politics that assume that whoever ought to be included will be by showing that **the reason of the state cannot accomplish this end.** Moreover, Badiou offers an account of politics that is not rooted in a founding ban. The conception of politics that requires exclusion has been criticized by feminists and critical race theorists who worry that certain persons must be kept from political life in order for it to be possible for others.5 If the problem is that an uncounted is always at work within an community and the state works to close off the dispute over the count, **the solution is not to institute a community that always counts all the uncounted, leaving itself open to similar critiques**, but to develop a notion of politics that keeps this concern at the fore, a notion that Badiou develops in his account of the confrontation between the state and the politics of one world. I begin with a consideration of Badiou’s ontology of the multiple from Being and Event which explains the operation of the count. This ontology, rooted in the multiple, exposes the project of the state as a continuous operation to control and monitor the multiples in order to achieve consistency and totalization, which ultimately fails. Second, I explain the presence of the void which testifies to the failure of the totalizing effort of the state and **opens a site for the universalizing of the political subject.** Third, I develop the meaning of Badiou’s claim, “There is one world,” as it follows from his evental politics. While this claim follows from Badiou’s ontology, it remains consistent with his phenomenology and is therefore consistent with his account of many worlds in Logics of Worlds. And fourth, I elaborate the way that subjectivization and evental politics lead to a performative notion of politics. These latter two points consider Badiou’s solution to totalizing politics as it is found in “The Communist Hypothesis,” and its expanded version, The Meaning of Sarkozy. 6 THE ONTOLOGICALLY BASIC MULTIPLE Badiou argues that it is a decision, rather than a logical conclusion, to determine that the one is ontologically basic instead of the multiple. The one, for Badiou, exists as an operation.7 The multiple is the regime of presentation, that is, of making things appear, and the one is the result of that operation. In this way, Badiou distinguishes between what can be counted as one (what is multiple and presented in a situation as one) and what is ontologically one (nothing). Crucial to the understanding of this operation is that we discern the multiple without having to make it a one, which means without having to define the multiple.8 As I have just said, ontologically speaking, the one results from the presentation of the multiple in a situation, but the one is not.9 A situation is any presented multiplicity. The one, then, is the result of the presentation of the multiple such that it can be counted; it is an operation whereby it appears as the count-as-one.10 The notone, the multiple, cannot be taken as an adding up of ones, but rather the multiple of a multiple.11 Unity is an operation performed upon multiples. This unity is what is presented in a situation. Being, which is the multiple, does not present itself; it is only being qua being, the one, that presents itself.12 Badiou considers multiplicity in the context of set theory because the process by which things belong to sets in set theory denies the ontological unity of being and hence, avoids the metaphysics of categories and forms that have presented obstacles for thinking multiplicity since the ancient Greeks. A set is emphatically not that grouping together of everything that shares a property. Multiplicities render incoherent the axioms of any account that determine its elements in terms of the properties and formulas that define the set.13 So, the multiple and the set cannot be defined, though the set can be shown to work and function in certain ways (through axiomatization which indicates the relations of belonging, but importantly, does not define the set).14 Attempts at defining either the multiple or the set are attempts at reducing the multiple to the one and both result in inconsistencies and paradoxes. Every attempt at definition suggests that what is counted is one and not multiple which stands in contradiction to the ground upon which set theory bases itself—that what is counted is multiple.15 The set cannot be an intensive set, a set formed on the basis of some property that is held in common. This property would be the more primary unity which would then make the one primary. If the multiple is primary, it cannot be said to result from some more basic unity but from nothing. This nothing that comprises each multiple is that which is not presented in the situation’s presentation of its count.16 Badiou names this nothing the void, which he argues is necessary for the multiple to be presentable in the set.17 By insisting on the primary ontological status of the multiple, Badiou opposes the ontology of presence, based on the fundamental and substantial being of the one, to the ontology of presentation, a thinking of the multiple.18 It is not the case that an individual must display a certain kind of being (having been born here, having parents of a certain citizenship status, having a certain rational capacity, any criteria the state establishes to determine who belongs and who does not) in order to be counted. This requirement supposes that the one is ontologically prior to the multiple and can be displayed prior to the political operation whereby it is represented. Belonging to the set is based on being present in the set rather than having an essential attribute by which the multiple belongs. By making the multiple ontologically basic, Badiou shows that within the set, there is fundamental equality between each multiplicity. Things don’t belong by virtue of some property they do or do not have; they are equally different and their position in the set is one of **fundamental equality.** Moreover, belonging to the set does not require an operator. Here, Badiou appears to overcome a century of debates over how to ensure that every proper member of a community is counted by dismissing the power of the counter in accomplishing the count. Representative politics and its many mutations including deliberative democratic politics inevitably lead to the question, “Who does the counting?” And so representative and deliberative democrats alike are inclined to ask of Badiou, if the multiple of multiple of multiples becomes counted as one, who is counting? If differences are rendered insignificant in this logic, who attests to that? But Badiou’s resort to mathematics as a way to think ontology sidelines this question by de-subjectivizing ontology and hence, the state structure. Without agency, “Mathematics… pronounces what is expressible of being qua being,”19 just as some argue that the poetry of Hölderlin or Celan testifies to being. Yet unlike poetry, mathematics requires no interpreter; the count is accessible and true for all according to the logic presented; the count is im-personal.20 Where ontology is a matter of what can be thought about being, we do not need a thinker to testify or legitimate that it can be thought. For Badiou, ontology is spoken of in terms of the count as organized by the situation and the state of the situation in order to show consistency in being qua being. So while we speak of presentation in the situation and the representation in the state of the situation, there is no presenter or representer, there is the operation of mathematics that works on its mathematical objects.21 In this de-subjectivizing ontology, the count is based on the functioning of mathematics not on a capable counter. Furthermore, the subjectivization that occurs in a politics that challenges the count is itself impersonal and universal. UNIVERSALITY AND THE VOID: THE MYTH OF TOTALITY Through the logic of the void, Badiou shows how equality becomes universal. The void is that upon which each situation founds its presentation yet it remains uncounted, unpresented. The procedure whereby the void comes to the fore and appears as the generic shows everything presented to belong by virtue of being in the situation. The void is included in all terms because all terms are multiples of multiples and the multiples of multiples are multiples of the multiple of nothing, since **there is no basic one that is gathered to form the multiple.** But in a situation, everything that is presented must fall under the law that organizes or structures the situation. The law of the situation is that everything within the situation must be counted and nothing can be known or can be said to count that is not the multiple formed to count as one. In this sense, **the law of the situation aims to totalize**, while the nothing that underlies the multiple shows that the count is always incomplete. The void is there, but it cannot be counted in the logic of the situation. The void then instantiates uncountability itself; the unpresentable.22 **The void in every situation testifies to the failure of the operation to totalize.** Totality in-consists; it is logically impossible, which is another way of saying that the one is not. As Badiou writes, “Insofar as the one is a result, by necessity ‘something’ of the multiple does not absolutely coincide with the result.”23 The set of all sets that do not belong to themselves is an example that demonstrates the impossibility of a totality that can include all sets. In Logics of Worlds, Badiou calls this set the “Chimera.”24 If this set includes itself, then it does not belong to itself and therefore, should not be included. If this set does not include itself, then it does belong to itself and therefore, should be included. In this sense, the Chimera inconsists and shows totality itself to be impossible since it cannot situate this set. In order to address the threat of the void, that uncounted element, a double count is introduced. The state of the situation (which in the historico-political situation is the state25) is the count of the subsets formed from the elements of the situation and the subsets that are counted are said to be included in the state of the situation. This meta-structure that organizes the count of the count attempts to totalize what the void made impossible to totalize by over-counting, over-powering, over-organizing the situation. Because the meta-structure is concerned to count what appears to be missed and hence what can be disruptive in the situation, what is included (the count of the count) in the state of the situation is always in excess of what belongs to the situation. What is over-counted in the state of the situation is not something necessarily pre-existing the meta-structure; the over-structure of the count of the count is meant to control what cannot be defined in the situation, and which thereby threatens to disrupt the count and the state’s claim to totality through its count. Yet this overcount cannot prevent the void from being universally included since the subsets still maintain a relation to the nothingness that rests at the ground of the multiples of the multiples. Badiou argues that the void is the danger of the presentation of ontology that “haunts” presentation. The situation hides the “anxiety of the void” in its structuring of the count of the count.26 In the state, the void is not eliminated by the excess of the count. **Merely increasing the count will not change the operation of the state** of the situation **which continues to maintain and control the parts of the situation.** To change the count, fidelity to the event that manifests one political world is needed. Expanding the count appears to be Rancière’s strategy, but Badiou’s concern is that this **does not change the operation or structure of the state and its count.** Jeff Love and Todd May defend Rancière by arguing that Rancière is concerned for equality whereas Badiou’s philosophy of the event appears to split the situation between those who become related to the event and those who do not, thereby introducing an implicit inequality. They argue that Badiou’s attempt at universalizing does not achieve equality.27 But this view supposes that the situation remains the same in light of the event. The event manifests the state’s count; it puts the lie to the state’s claim to totality and **thereby alters the situation** by challenging the count of the count. The state of the situation cannot endure the challenge to its totalizing claim which buttresses its operation of the count of the count. For Badiou, the task of politics is to manifest the count of the count and to show the disparity between the count of the count and the count and so to **disrupt the state by showing that it, against its own best efforts, is inconsistent** (precisely because it is totalizing). The state has within it elements that it does not count and parts that it excessively counts beyond what is included in the situation. As Hallward explains, **from inside the situation, it is impossible to apprehend** an inconsistency inaccessible to the count. The event disrupts the situation and thereby projects us outside of it such that the inconsistency becomes accessible.28 As Badiou defines politics and the thought that follows along with it: Finally to count as one that which is not even counted is what is at stake in every genuinely political thought, every prescription that summons the collective as such.29 Politics exists (in the sense of an occurrence of equality) because the whole of the community does not count a given collective as one of its parts. The whole counts this collective as nothing. **No sooner does this nothing express itself, which it can do only by declaring itself to be whole, than politics exists.** In this sense the ‘we are nothing, let us be everything’ of The Internationale sums up every politics (of emancipation, or equality).30 The presentation of the nothing, impossible in the situation, is the collective action of politics. Precisely because the state is bent on maintaining itself by maintaining its claim to totality, the disruption of the count that shows the totality to fall short is a disruption of the state. Empirically, this means that whenever there is a genuinely political event, the State reveals itself. It reveals its excess of power, its repressive dimension.31 So for Badiou, **politics, wherein the uncounted comes to the fore, puts the state at a distance and only by so doing can offer a measure for the state.**32 “THERE IS ONLY ONE WORLD” The important claim that underlies Badiou’s ontology is the priority of the multiple that prevents exclusion on the basis of qualities or lack thereof. The priority of the multiple enables us to think of all elements or sets that are in the set as belonging to it. The one of politics, however, is not ontological; it is evental.33 Badiou’s ontology of the multiple allows us to think both the logic of the state and the world of the event. The logic of the state and its pretension to totality appear to secure universality, but instead produce a division between the counted and the uncounted. This is a divided world, the insistence on two worlds. The evental disruption of this operation testifies to the universality of the truth of politics and thereby produces one world. The political world can be said to be one, for **though the one is not, unity can be performed.** The two worlds formed by the totalizing state define two ways of being within the same overarching ontology: counted and uncounted. The one world made true by the political subject is performed and activated. In “The Communist Hypothesis,” the essay Badiou wrote after Sarkozy’s post-election charge to “do away with May ’68 once and for all,” Badiou argues for a performative unity of the world.34 As performative, this unity is not ontological and it is not fixed. The oneness of the world must be attested to continually. Badiou elaborates this view of the one world of politics in his expanded version of this essay, The Meaning of Sarkozy, where he dedicates a chapter to the axiom, “there is only one world”. 35 Against the “artificial and murderous division of the world into two,” Badiou encourages a notion of **the political world that takes all others to belong to the same world as myself.** Such a world is an “**unlimited set of differences**” but these differences make the world the same because the beings in it are equally different.36 Badiou observes that “unleashed capitalism imposes” two worlds: the world in the service of wealth and one that is excluded because unable to serve wealth.37 The first he calls the world of things, the second, the world of persons. The rule of the world of things is that there is nothing better than personal gain. Following this rule means dividing people “by and for the defense of privileges of wealth and power.”38 In a real sense, the world in the service of wealth proclaims, “If you’re not with us, you are against us,” and divides the world accordingly. The world of persons, on the other hand, is “one of living and acting beings existing in the same world with others – we can agree and disagree – but on the absolute precondition that they exist exactly as I do.”39 Rejecting the world of things and asserting the world of persons requires rejecting all things in the service of wealth and **positioning oneself from a point outside of the rule of that world.** Set theoretically, this positioning follows from the evental disruption that recognizes that there is a “nothing” that grounds the whole. Subjectivization is the process of working out the implications of the evental disruption and forming oneself in light of them, or of transforming “consuming individuals” into “subjects of a real process.”40 Yet the effort to make the rejection of the world of wealth impossible is precisely Sarkozy’s task when he claims to “do away with May ’68 once and for all”. He aims precisely to annihilate any idea that asserts that a position can be maintained outside the wealth-protecting and -serving state.41 This is the continuum hypothesis of which Badiou speaks in Theory of the Subject whereby “those multiplicities that are too ambitious” are properly controlled and expelled.42 Contrast the continuum hypothesis with the communist hypothesis whereby we can deny that there are class relations precisely because there is only one world. The dividing of the world into classes is the effect of a totalizing state operation that cannot universalize, that is, that cannot include all it purports to include.43 Badiou writes of revolution of an act of a people for whom, “The proletariat only names the One, as the One of politics.”44 When the proletariat becomes the One, there is no longer class struggle, there is now the universalizing of politics to everyone. What had formerly been denied the proletariat is now set to work in the world as the unity of that world. So to say that there is only one political subject is not to indicate one over another, but to stay more emphatically that the political subject is universal. To claim this point beyond the service of wealth, beyond this totalizing world, is to engage in the practice and collective action of challenging the world riven in two and to perform the unity of the world. In the axiom, “the world is One,” we enact the truth that all those who **live in this world exist as much as any other person who exists** in this world.45 For Badiou, there is little difference between the truth of a principle and the performance of a principle. Any true principle affects our living and “separates itself from domination and opens the field of the possible.”46 Since the oneness of the world is true, it is an axiom that must be performed. Badiou’s view is that politics is “collective action” to “develop in reality the consequences of a new possibility repressed by the dominant state of affairs.”47 This is subjectivization.48 Politics puts into motion the action that shows those excluded do belong; the axiom makes possible what was supposed to be unthinkable. For this reason, as Badiou writes, the mantra “there is only one world” unifies the multiples whose invariant being is human under the “same existential situation,” that is to say, in the same world.49 As a mantra, it is not a description of what is as much as a collective action to bring about the unity of the world. Badiou argues that excluding those who do not, for example, “love France,” as Sarkozy demanded after his election, is to have **placed conditions on belonging**, and hence to judge belonging in terms of qualities presented rather than existence in one world.50 **Such a practice denies that there is one world.** The axiom that there is one world **precludes any preconditions** for existing in the world because to assert one world is to affirm that the world in which we all belong is the place of unlimited differences, that is, to assert the being of the multiple.51 Badiou should be taken to be speaking in terms of the political truth procedure of the ontological situation when he speaks of one world. This affirmation of one world is not at odds with Badiou’s position in Logics of Worlds that human beings appear in many worlds.52 Badiou explains that what is the same ontologically can belong to different worlds, and human beings in particular appear in a great number of worlds. Badiou draws the difference between the logical construction of appearance (his phenomenology) which occurs in a plurality of worlds, and the universal of the pure multiple (his ontology) which exists in one world (his politics).53 The problem of that ontology is that it totalizes, so politics is the evental truth procedure that must perform the one world. In this way, there are three senses in which Badiou speaks of world: phenomenologically there are plural worlds, ontologically there is a totalized world, and politically there is a universal and performed world. The understanding of the world as one is the precondition for egalitarian politics, yet the egalitarianism that Badiou introduces here vigorously opposes universalizing from any one particular identity in order to achieve equality. Such a universalizing involves a recognition of something held in common that ensures equality. The one world that must be performed is one of both identity and differences where the **differences do not challenge the unity of the world and the identities do not establish it.** Because Badiou bases his ontology on the multiple, he can base belonging on differences, which become the principle of existence of this world in which everyone belongs.54 “The single world is precisely the place where an unlimited set of differences exists.”55 Of course, the significance of identity is not nothing. Identity is the gathering of multiples that comprise a self. The political consequence of “there is only one world” is that what is common in each identity is joined together. But the common that follows from the ontological priority of the multiple is nothing but their mutual presence in the world.56 (Elsewhere, Badiou calls this process subtraction.57) An example of this mutual presence is the demonstrations in Paris and on the streets of Los Angeles (and throughout the United States) that undocumented workers belong because they are here. It is their presence that makes their identity universal and a part of the one world that is. Badiou distinguishes between several kinds of identity. Static identity is the identity that makes us different than others. Dynamic identity is what does not become different in ourselves. In the performance of one world, Badiou maintains that we assert each person’s effort to develop her identity, which means, to develop the ways in which she is different from others. We must protect these efforts because in performing one world, we perform a universality in which no single “identity,” especially the majority’s, is better than any other.58 Badiou’s commitment to the multiple elucidates the meaning of identity in our one shared world. In this one set of infinite difference where what is in common is presence in the set, we are reminded that **infinite alterity is not the exception, but precisely what there is**: multiplicity.59 Infinite alterity describes what exists in the world since the multiples are as different from each other as from any other.60 From affirmation of the ontological priority of multiplicity, Badiou’s account leads to a politics that **actively affirms belonging** based on existence in the set. Such a politics stands in contrast to the metaphysics of recognition that demands the appearance of qualities and essences to justify belonging.61 So Badiou can say in his Ethics that cultural, religious and national differences hold no difference for thought since the multiplicity of humankind manifests differences everywhere such that difference is “as obvious between me and my cousin from Lyon as it is between the Shi’ite community of Iraq and the fat cowboys of Texas.”62 **Human beings are difficult to recognize, or in danger of not being recognized, only when there is an essence that determines what makes one human.** Having decentered a measure of the human, by taking multiplicity as what is most ontologically true, we see that identity only follows upon that multiplicity, and hence, **no one is more like a human than another.** THE EVENT, SUBJECTIVIZATION AND THE PERFORMANCE OF ONE WORLD The one world of equality is achieved through fidelity to the event wherein what is not counted in the “world that counts” **shows itself to be a part of that same world.** The shift from the situation to this new logic is accomplished by what Badiou calls “evental politics”. As we have seen, the event brings to appear what the situation does not count and thereby affirms the generic. The generic is the positive designation of what cannot be discerned in the situation but is in fact the truth of the situation, the truth of its being.63 In reply then to the accusations of Love and May that Badiou’s event splits the universal and splits the situation, I maintain that for Badiou the event brings what was divided into its generic universality.64 The void shows that the situation has been divided between what makes the count of the situation possible and the presented a consistent count. This division into two worlds is unified by the disruptive power of the event. The event is the performance of the universal insofar as it proclaims the generic, the inconsistent, the indeterminate, the unpresentable and shows it to belong and to be equally so for all parts. Badiou explains what we can say about being qua being, that is, ontology, in order to show what is left out; what is left out is a founding part – as the proletariat is for capitalism, and the immigrant for France. By living and working in relation to the evental rupture so as to show that the political world is One, we perform what Badiou calls the truth procedure of politics. While ontology can say nothing about the event, the event is not entirely unrelated to what is since the event must be localized within a situation.65 Evental politics begin in an ontological position, that is, from within the situation. But the truth of politics is not itself ontological. The subject of politics is formed from an event that occupies a position that permits it to see from beyond the structure of the situation and hence, to disrupt the count of the situation. Beginning from within a situation, the event is therefore localized, and its localization is the generic set, that which belongs by virtue of belonging.66 The generic has no other property than belonging. This is the property that is shared by all other terms of the situation, which is why it is called ‘generic’.67 The indiscernible possesses the properties of any part whatsoever; it is generic because its elements are the truth of the entire situation. To be here is to belong, Badiou says, and in the situation, the generic that is manifested in the event makes that apparent. In subjectivization, the political subject is formed in its effort to activate the truth of the event. In politics, this truth is the oneness of the world, which is to say that the indiscernible is as much a part of the world as any multiplicity. In its faithfulness to the event, the political subject exhibits the indiscernible as the being that belongs in so far as it belongs, and that is the generic. It is ironic, conceptually speaking, that it is only in this world of multiplicity and difference that one world comes to be. Badiou makes this distinction between what is and what comes to be at the heart of the distinction between being and event, ontology and truth. What is is the multiple. The truth of what is is the process whereby the one world of multiple-beings comes to be. Badiou calls this world Sameness. He insists that the one world must be performed in the same way that the equality between persons must be performed.68 The one world must be performed because the politics that brings it into being is a procedure, not a structure within being.69 **Egalitarianism is not a state of being, but a performance.** This egalitarianism is not the goal, but the assumption that politics is collective, that it makes an appeal to all and is thereby immediately universalizing.70 Such universalizing produces the one world which we share. The fidelity to the event that proclaims the generic is the performance of equality, and this equality is at the heart of what Badiou calls the communist hypothesis. As the title of Badiou’s original essay against Sarkozy, the communist hypothesis is the charge to assert equality in the face of division from the reign of the wealthy and the powerful. The communist hypothesis is that a “different collective organization is practicable, one that eliminates inequality of wealth and even the division of labor.”71 Badiou argues that communism is not a program, but an idea with a regulatory function, an idea of pure equality. Because the two worlds must be actively imposed by the state, the one world in contest with it must be performed, and hence, operates as a political imperative and a principle of action.72 CONCLUSION Badiou’s account of a politics of “one world” exhibits the truth of the conjunction “and” in his title, Being and Event. Badiou distinguishes ontology from ethics and politics to insist on the activity and performance of ethics and politics. Finding in the administration of state politics an ontology that attempts without success to totalize, Badiou insists on the separate order in which ethics and politics occur. This separate order activates what the world that is cannot achieve. The logic of ontology, Badiou argues, will always in-consist, but the truth of politics testifies to the unity of what that logic denies. Badiou hereby makes it possible to analyze the political situation before us, as seen in **the problems of appealing to human rights**, and to see the causes of division within this situation. When the state is driven by the effort to totalize, there will always be that which is left out based on the logic of totalities. Badiou’s division of ontology from politics encourages an active response rather than resigned pessimism to this situation, a response that performs the truth that begins from within the situation as it is given. That truth is that the political world is universal. This twin analysis of ontology and politics is made possible by Badiou’s turn to the multiple as what is ontologically real. The analysis that results from the ontology of the multiple shows that **the effort to achieve the one cannot be achieved by ontology, by the given situation, or the administration of the state, but only by the truth procedure of politics.** This evental politics performs the belonging of those who are uncounted rather than seeking, as the state continued to do, to more successfully totalize the world. The problem of human rights with which this essay began further elucidates Badiou’s solution. **People seeking human rights are those excluded from the world recognized by the state.** They occupy the void, the uncountable within the count that the count must occlude in order to be consistent. Under these circumstances, an appeal to the state does not accomplish recognition and rights to these persons. **But the performance of solidarity with those who need rights**, the performance that there is only one world, which is to say, the performance of the communist hypothesis, **enacts a politics of equality.** **In contrast to the running of the state, this true politics denies the power of the count and instead asserts the equality of the differences of multiples.** This politics shows that **it is not becoming countable but the performance of equality that must be sought to address the circumstances that lead people to claim human rights.** Recognizing the incapacity of the state to count or recognize those who must appeal to human rights, Badiou calls for a collective politics that performs the belonging of those who are uncounted. His account shows that no diplomatic recourse or pressure on governments from other governments will, for example, make the United States **grant habeas corpus to** “**unlawful combatants.**” No doctrine of human rights can show that undocumented workers belong. Only collective action to perform the unity of the world can. Badiou’s insistence on an indivisible world attests to difference at the ground of being and the universalism of politics. It follows that the difference between myself and my brother as much as between myself and the migrant workers down the road is both immeasurable (infinitely other) and insignificant (in-different) for our inclusion together in the world. We perform the unity of this world when we insist that the plight of those workers is **as much our concern as the plight of our own brothers and sisters.**

### Case

#### Narrative focus stifles discourse by mandating sympathy or painting the neg into the corner of attacking them personally

Coughlin 95—associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. (Anne, REGULATING THE SELF: AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL PERFORMANCES IN OUTSIDER SCHOLARSHIP, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1229)

The imbroglio with her editors, however, reveals the inauthenticity of Williams's invitation to her readers. n191 When readers raise doubts about the meaning created through the literary device that she selected, ostensibly to engage their assistance in the production of meaning, she censures them with accusations that only a hardy [\*1281] (perhaps, foolhardy) reader could contemplate enduring. n192 Intersubjectivity is well and good, this episode cautions, but only if readers endorse precisely the meaning Williams has in mind.

The warning this episode conveys to readers signals more than a textual incoherence or the failure of Williams's own collaborative engagement. More fundamentally, it reveals the inherent inadequacy of autobiography as a tool of social criticism. The institutional spaces where the outsider stories have their existence, including the lecture tour podium and the pages of scholarly journals, are arenas that foster, indeed, depend on, vigorous inquiry and dialectical exchange. Before we agree to reorder society along lines a group of scholars may propose, scrupulous testing of their theories seems wholly appropriate. Yet, as Williams's bitter rebuke of her editors portends, personal stories tend to pre-empt responses other than sympathy or silence, precisely because any critical commentary or desire for clarification may be dismissed as ad hominem - and any criticism necessarily is ad hominem, since the material available for criticism or clarification is the scholar's personal experience. n193 Ironically, therefore, the power of the autobiographical exchange to inspire readers' sympathy turns out to be a significant shortcoming within the context of an academy whose participants, even when sympathetic to an idea, are committed to immediate, often face-to-face, critical inquiry and debate. n194 By rejecting any critical reaction as a treacherous failure of sympathy for the author's pain, if not as the product of prejudiced ignorance[\*1282] , and dismissing criticism as a personal attack on the author's character, autobiographical rhetoric is no less coercive of readers than the legal rhetoric that the outsiders desire to supersede. n195

#### Political action is critical---Narrative alone presumes purity of vision and renders the oppositional viewpoint irrelevant

Conway 97—philosophy, Penn State (Daniel, Nietzsche and the political, 135-6)

This preference is clearly political in nature, and Haraway makes no pretense of aspiring to epistemic purity or foundational innocence. For Haraway, any epistemic privilege necessarily implies a political (i.e., situated) preference. Her postmodern orientation elides the boundaries traditionally drawn between politics and epistemology, and thus renders otiose the ideal of epistemic purity. All perspectives are partial, all standpoints situated—including those of feminist theorists. It is absolutely crucial to Haraway's postmodern feminist project that we acknowledge her claims about situated knowledge as themselves situated within the political agenda she sets for postmodern feminism; feminist theorists must therefore accept and accommodate the self-referential implications of their own epistemic claims.

The political agenda of postmodern feminism thus assigns to (some) subjugated standpoints a political preference or priority. Haraway, for example, believes that some subjugated standpoints may be more immediately revealing, especially since they have been discounted and excluded for so long. They may prove especially useful in coming to understand the political and psychological mechanisms whereby the patriarchy discounts the radically situated knowledges of others while claiming for its own (situated) knowledge an illicit epistemic privilege:

The standpoints of the subjugated ... are savvy to modes of denial through repression, forgetting, and disappearing acts— ways of being nowhere while claiming to sec comprehensively. The subjugated have a decent chance to be on to the god-trick and all its dazzling—and, therefore, blinding—illuminations.34

But these subjugated standpoints do not afford feminist theorists an epistemically privileged view of the world, independent of the political agendas they have established. Reprising elements of Nietzsche's psychological profile of the "slave" type, Haraway warns against the

serious danger of romanticizing and/or appropriating the vision of the less powerful while claiming to see from their positions. To see from below is neither easily learned nor unproblematic, even if "we" "naturally" inhabit the great underground terrain of subjugated knowledges. The positionings of the subjugated are not exempt from critical re-examination, decoding, deconstruction, and interpretation; that is, from both semiological and hermeneutic modes of critical enquiry. The standpoints of the subjugated are not "innocent" positions.35

A subjugated standpoint may shed new light on the ways of an oppressor, but it in no way renders superfluous or redundantthe standpoint of the oppressor. Because neither standpoint fully comprises the other, the aggregation of the two would move both parties (or a third party) closer to a more objective understanding of the world. If some feminists have political reasons for disavowing this project of aggregation, or for adopting it selectively, then they must pursue their political agenda at the expense of the greater objectivity that they might otherwise have gained.

#### Quare studies don’t go far enough – it only understands things from an African American perspective and is thus too limiting – the permutation has a unique net benefit of understand identity on a more multiple and larger scale

Sapinoso 2009 (Joyleen Valero (JV), “FROM “QUARE” TO “KWEER”: TOWARDS A QUEER ASIAN AMERICAN CRITIQUE” dissertation, proquest dissertations)

Expanding Queer of Color Critique: From ”Quare” to “Kweer” Studies We need a study of racial formations that will not oblige heteropatriarchy, an analysis of sexuality not severed from race and material relations, an interrogation of African American culture that keeps company with other racial formations, and an American studies not beguiled by the United States. (Ferguson 29) It’s not that I disagree with the argument Ferguson makes in the quotation above, but rather that I am not satisfied by how his earlier postulations of queer of color analysis boil down here only to an African American cultural context. In no way do I mean to elide the importance and value of Ferguson’s work. Without a doubt, Johnson and Ferguson’s texts each compellingly undertakes an intersectional approach that successfully engages an integrated analyses of sexuality in conjunction with race and racial formation. The centrality of African American racial formations in these texts, however, must be taken into account. Given the vastly different histories between African American and Asian American racial formations, including, but not limited to the ways in which these racial groups have historically been pitted against one another (for the betterment of privileged whites), it is especially important that we consider how the specificities of African American subjects and subjectivities and of Asian American subjects and subjectivities might account for distinct queer of color critiques within a U.S. context.9 Rather, in moving toward a queer Asian American critique I mean to build from the base Ferguson provides and consider, as the subtitle of Frank H. Wu’s book Yellow states, Race in America Beyond Black and White. In Yellow, Wu writes, “If the color line runs between whites and people of color, Asian Americans are on one side; if the color line runs between blacks and everyone else, Asian Americans are on the other side” (18). What Wu points out here is that Asian Americans find themselves positioned on either one side of the color line or the other according to how specific contexts and situations are classified. In her book Feminism Without Borders Chandra Talpade Mohanty similarly asserts, “the color line differs depending on one’s geographical location in the United States” (134). More specifically, Mohanty distinguishes between her experiences living on the East Coast versus San Diego, California. She writes: Having lived on the East Coast for many years, my designation as “brown,” “Asian,” “South Asian,” “Third World,” and “immigrant” has everything to do with definitions of “blackness” (understood specifically as African American). However, San Diego, with its histories of immigration and racial struggle, its shared border with Mexico, its predominantly brown (Chicano and Asian-American) color line, and its virulent anti-immigrant culture unsettled my East Coast definitions of race and racialization. I could pass as Latin until I spoke my “Indian” English, and then being South Asian became a question of (in)visibility and foreignness. Being South Asian here was synonymous with being alien, non-American. (134) Whereas Wu’s formulation is in relationship to a black/white color line, Mohanty’s experiences speak to the more nuanced relationships among communities of color, positing a brown/Asian color line. Still, however, it’s clear from both these examples that inhabiting such a variable racial position uniquely situates queer Asian American subjects and subjectivities within discourses of queer of color critique, and demands yet another fundamentally different approach. Taking queer of color critique—a tool for taking into account racialized sexualities—to a level that directs attentions to nationality and national belonging, my critical project moves beyond the black/white binary which currently predominates in the field. In addition to addressing the limitations of discussing race in the U.S. in terms of a black/white binary, moving towards a queer Asian American critique also helps to disrupt notions of homosexuality as a specifically white American phenomenon, as well as notions of Asians in America as perpetual foreigners. These two misconceptions have worked in tandem to reify the unintelligibility and impossibility of queer Asian American subjects and subjectivities by positing Asianness and queerness, as well as Asian heritages and American identities as mutually exclusive. The work by Asian American Studies scholars to point out “the ways in which Asians in America, immigrant and native-born, have been made into a race of aliens” (R. Lee xi), or how “in the last century and a half, the American citizen has been defined over against the Asian immigrant, legally, economically, and culturally” (L. Lowe 4), along with the work by LGBT Studies scholars to demonstrate the racial and ethnic diversity of LGBT people, has made definite progress in challenging these misconceptions, respectively. It is through a queer Asian American critique that I integrate these analyses so as to consider the dynamics of nationality and national belonging at play within a U.S. context of queer identifications. I advocate kweer studies as a practice (re-)dedicated to speaking about the material existence of a fuller range of bodies of various colors, and aimed at understanding the complexity of racial differences as they intersect with sexual identities. By no means are Asian Americans the only ones to find themselves disregarded by the black/white binary of race predominant in the U.S.; the experiences of American Indians, Latin Americans, as well as the growing population of mixed race people in the U.S. are also elided by the black/white binary. Writing specifically about mixed race people and the black/white binary, Gigi Otalvaro- Hormillosa argues that, “colonial violence maintains itself by the creation of black/white paradigms of race that render other cultures invisible or prone to locating themselves on either side of this paradigm” (337). Otalvaro-Hormillosa’s argument goes even further than Wu’s, pointing not only to the limits of black/white paradigms of race, but also revealing how taking up the discourse of a black/white binary maintains colonial violence. Otalvaro-Hormillosa’s focus on colonial violence is particularly useful in expanding queer of color critique to account for a wider range of racialized experiences.

#### Quare studies need to be disrupted – vote affirmative to disrupt their disruption

Sapinoso 2009 (Joyleen Valero (JV), “FROM “QUARE” TO “KWEER”: TOWARDS A QUEER ASIAN AMERICAN CRITIQUE” dissertation, proquest dissertations)

I invest in “kweer” as another way, different although not wholly unlike Johnson’s conception of “quare,” to challenge queer studies’ tendency towards white hegemony. One way in which to think about the relationship between “kweer” and “quare” is that similar to “quare,” “kweer” visibly differs from “queer,” signaling to readers its (racial) distinctiveness.12 Aside from their visual elements, “kweer” and “quare” can also be compared to “queer” according to their pronunciation. In fact, Johnson’s discussion of “quare” is specifically tied to his grandmother’s utterance, suggesting the significance of its oral transmission.13 In contrast, “kweer” and “queer” are homonyms, aurally undistinguishable from one another.14 In fact, it has often been the case that when telling people the title of this dissertation, they have mistakenly thought me to be saying “from quare to queer” instead of “from quare to kweer,” and questioned why the turn away from “quare’s” focus on race to “queer’s” hegemonic whiteness. I take the risk of “kweer” being mistaken for “queer” in order to highlight “kweer’s” difference from “quare.” Although both “quare” and “kweer” aim to challenge how whiteness has become naturalized within queer studies, “kweer” also challenges the naturalization of blackness as the sole focus of queer of color critique; hence my decision to deploy a similar rhetorical strategy as Johnson in order to propose “kweer” as a visually and aurally marked racial term distinct from “quare” that can explore nuances of racialized cultural rituals and lived experiences within a fuller range of various cultures—particularly, but not limited only to, Asian Americans. Kweer Disruptions The importance of intersectional analysis lays not only in acknowledging the fuller range of people’s material realities, but also in the larger project of queer studies to challenge the stability of supposedly naturalized categories of identity, especially sexuality. As Geoffrey Bowker and Susan Leigh Star write in their book, Sorting Things Out, “the more at home you are in a community of practice, the more you forget the strange and contingent nature of its categories seen from the outside” (293-295). This being “at home” and forgetting of strangeness are what define being naturalized. Naturalization is an on going, and ever evolving process. For example, “queer” has been deployed to disrupt assimilationist uses of “gay” and “lesbian,” and “quare” has been deployed to disrupt and denaturalize (mis-)conceptions of the hegemonic whiteness of “queer.” Kweer is another strategy aimed at examining our assumptions and taken-for-granted beliefs of who queers of color are and what queer of color critique entails in order to retain a certain level of strangeness that ultimately allows for a more nuanced, and complex understanding of nationality and national belonging at play within a U.S. context of queer identifications. The main reason I turn to a kweer strategy is to purposefully denaturalize not only the assumption of the hegemonic whiteness of “queer,” but also to disrupt the ways in which blackness is being naturalized as the sole focus of queer of color studies. Certainly, black queer studies is a crucial project, necessary, as E. Patrick Johnson and Mae G. Henderson argue, for “nam[ing] the specificity of the historical and cultural differences that shape the experiences and expressions of ‘queerness’” (7). In their “Introduction: Queering Black Studies/’Quaring’ Queer Studies,” Johnson and Henderson make clear the importance and significance of considering the specificity attached to the marker “black” (7). Indeed, despite all the work that has been done on questions of black lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender identities, that Johnson and Henderson’s edited anthology, Black Queer Studies, published in 2005 can be said to be the first of its kind reveals the extent to which attention to specificities of blackness have largely been marginalized. Still, given the differing histories and contexts of particular groups’ racial formations in the U.S., it is important to consider the specificity attached to racial, historical, and cultural markers aside from “black.” For example, as Angelo Ancheta, Jacinta Ma, and Don Nakanishi argue in their introduction to AAPI Nexus’ Special Issue on Civil Rights, “Asian Americans are frequently absent from the largely black-white civil rights discourse, and if they are considered, they are often relegated to secondary or tertiary roles. Major components of the Asian American civil rights agenda are ignored altogether” (v). In this instance, kweer studies helps to disrupt the black/white binary and bring Asian Americans and Asian American issues into sharper and more central focus. Furthermore, Ancheta, Ma, and Nakanishi point to the various populations included under the umbrella term “Asian American” to make clear that not only do we have to consider the relationships between Asian Americans and other communities of color, but among different populations within Asian American communities themselves.15 This latter project of looking to specificities aside from “black,” which I term kweer studies, is not in competition with black queer studies, but rather another avenue alongside black queer studies, in the service of the larger realm of queer of color studies. Thus, despite black queer studies’ relatively recent emergence as a visible and developing field of study, and its very attention to black racial differences, we must continue to push towards recognizing other racial differences. My point here is that my concern is not for the specificity on black queers that texts such as Black Queer Studies and Aberrations in Black make central, but rather that these texts’ specificity on blackness be highlighted and distinguished from wider investigations of queer people of color, including, but not limited to black people. In this way, “queer people of color” does not come to stand only for black queers, and we maintain the potential to focus on a fuller range of queer racial formations. As AnaLouise Keating writes in her essay “Forging El Mundo Zurdo,” “it’s not differences that divide us but rather our refusal to openly discuss the differences among us” (520). We must not only discuss our differences, but also recognize the complexity of our differences. In her essay “Age, Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redefining Difference,” Audre Lorde makes clear that such complex recognition of our differences is the key to successfully challenging systematized oppression and creating a better society for us all. I take Keating’s and Lorde’s messages to heart as I attempt to move towards a kweer studies which is indebted to, but distinct from much prior work in queer of color critique that focuses on race in terms of African Americans and blackness, and so calls for even greater attention to differences. Furthermore, a queer Asian American critique makes a significant contribution to Women’s Studies’ focus on intersectionality. Feminist scholarship is not free from a problematic history of centering on white, middle-class, Eurocentric and heterosexual women, although it is the case that women of color, working-class women and lesbians’ critique of that kind of feminist scholarship has led to foregrounding the study of the intersectionality of race, class, gender, and sexuality that is now at the heart of Women’s Studies. In her book, Understanding Race, Class, Gender, and Sexuality, Lynn Weber writes at length about the benefits of intersectional analysis, citing such things as recognizing limiting views of others, achieving good mental health, and realistically assessing our environment (11-14). Beyond contributing to the field of Women’s Studies by mere virtue of being an intersectional analysis, this dissertation also seeks to make a contribution by challenging Women’s Studies’ approach to intersectionality. More specifically, my research illustrates that some kinds of intersectionality have been prioritized at the cost of others. This critique is by no means unique. For example, in their book Scattered Hegemonies, Inderpal Grewal and Caren Kaplan point out that “race, class, and gender are fast becoming the holy trinity that every feminist feels compelled to address even as this trinity delimits the range of discussion around women’s lives. What is often left out of these U.S.-focused debates are other categories of identity and affiliation that apply to non-U.S. cultures and situations” (19). The intervention Grewal and Kaplan attempt to make here is one specifically on behalf of transnational feminism, arguing for the need to pay attention to women in a global context. Since the publishing of Scattered Hegemonies in 1994, there has certainly been a significant increase in work transnational feminism, and Women’s Studies in global contexts.

# 2nc

**Link – Home**

**\*\*\*Also at Perm**

**The security of a home destroys value – only through the traumatic break with the home can politics emerge**

**Eisenstein and McGowan, 12** – Paul, professor of English and Dean of the School of Arts and Sciences at Otterbein University, and Todd, associate professor of cultural theory and film at the University of Vermont (*Rupture: on the Emergence of the Political*, Northwestern University Press, 2012, pp. 36 //Red)

The rupture is always a traumatic cut. Though the rupture gives birth to political values like freedom and equality, it does so through **disconnecting individuals from the bonds of tradition through which they receive a sense of identity and belonging.** To remain within the rupture is to exist **without the security of a place in the world.** One is traumatically cut adrift, and even the solidarity one experiences with other subjects does not provide the assurance of a collective identity. It is a solidarity of isolated and singular subjects who have **no home** with which to identify or **to strive for.** We find value only through the embrace of trauma. The values worth fighting for are the ones that would also destroy us. Perhaps it is impossible to remain wholly within the rupture. Despite its value, the trauma of it may be unsustainable. But what is not impossible is making the traumatic rupture the organizing principle of the political order that we constitute. Rather than trying to create a political order to function as a rampart against trauma, we can build a **recognition of the centrality of rupture into the political order itself.** This recognition requires at every point highlighting the connection between the political value at stake and its genesis in the traumatic rupture: we believe because God is absent; we can access universality because being is divided; we are in solidarity because we have no group of our own; we are equal because we have no proper place; we are free because we have given ourselves the law; we are singular because our system is incomplete; and we are human because we have been ripped out of our animality. **When we lose the connection with the traumatic rupture, we lose whatever value we are I fighting for.**

**Impact – Extinction/Try or Die**

**Their form of politics makes extinction inevitable**

**Badiou and Tarby, 13** – Alain, Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the École Normale Supérieure and Fabiel, philosopher and author of several books (*Philosophy and the Event*, Polity Press, 2013, pp. 35-36 //Red)

That said, in today's situation, characterized by both a radical weakness of emancipatory politics and the obscure combat between tradition and merchandise, **everything could well deteriorate.** There is not an operative rationality capable of controlling the trends that might be provoked by a catastrophe, the displacement of populations or a national affair that goes wrong. The situation in the Middle East alone is capable of sparking off a **nuclear war**. This shows the extreme weakness, today, of what I call the Idea. Without the Idea, the only thing left is an animalized humanity. Capitalism is the animalization of the human beast, who no longer lives except in terms of its interests and what it deems to be its due. This animalization is extremely dangerous because it is **devoid of values and laws.** If humanity does not work towards its own unfurling, its own invention, it has, effectively, **no other option than to work towards its destruction.** That which is not under the reign of the Idea is **under the reign of death.** It is not an anodyne matter for the human species to be animal. Humanity is the species that has need of the Idea in order to dwell reasonably in its own world.

### 2nc Framework argument

#### The alt is a pre-requisite – the 1ac’s investigation of power misses the opportunity to reframe politics entirely – that strips the aff of its emancipatory potential and destroys value to life

**Eisenstein and McGowan, 12** – Paul, professor of English and Dean of the School of Arts and Sciences at Otterbein University, and Todd, associate professor of cultural theory and film at the University of Vermont (*Rupture: on the Emergence of the Political*, Northwestern University Press, 2012, pp. 18-20 //Red)

**A genuinely political rupture cannot name or calculate its outcome in advance.** It cannot even specify or symbolize completely the content of its cause. In this way, rupture – in the sense in which we are advocating it – cannot be tarnished with the pox of the horrors of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. In our view, Nazism, its genocidal successors, and contemporary fundamentalist violence are the exemplars of spurious ruptures: rather than make visible the divided nature of being, they seek to heal the division in being and make it whole. This is why **a politics aimed at the proper distribution of power misses where the true struggle lies**: rather than argue over the rationale for this or that allocation of power, theory today must clarify the very source of the values on which politics depends. The distributiton of power always occurs within what Alain Badiou calls a situation – the everyday arrangement of society. **No matter how drastically we change the distribution of power within the situation, we cannot disrupt the monotony that characterizes the situation.** Within the situation, everything is given, and the situation demands that subjects accept its givens. **Existence purely within a situation leaves us with nothing to live for and with no cause to rouse our desire.** It is a dull and banal existence because it is constituted through the repression of the rupturing cut, which **stimulates and gives value to our lives.** **The point is not to mitigate the dreariness of the situation – transforming the distribution of power – but to escape this dreariness altogether.** The situation which assign identity through equivalence and counting, has **no place for the irreducible singularity of the subject.** Though proper names provide an apparent singularity for different participants in the situation, every being within the logic of the situation is exchangeable with every other. I occupy a certain position within the factory or the office; I inhabit a certain location within a particular city; I earn some amount of money; I define myself through the purchase of various commodities. In each of these ways of being, I remain replaceable and lack any singularity. Someone else could take my place in the office; someone else could adopt my particular style of dress. In the situation, I am a particular being but I am never a singular being. Pariticularity within the situation cannot rise to the level of singularity. Even if the distribution of power were to change radically – if as a proletarian I gained access with my fellow workers to control of the state – this newfound power would leave me still without the irreducible singularity that would constitute me as a subject. Within the logic of the situation, those with power abandon their singularity just as fully as those without. The CEO is as much a replaceable quantity as the worker on the assembly line. Conceived in terms of power (which is the logic of the situation), identity is always quantifiable. **As a result, the situation provides an infinite number of identities, but it provides no place for subjectivity**, however we imagine the distribution of power. **The subject can exist only through the rupture.**

# 1nr

### FW

**It’s a prior question—otherwise there's nothing to require structured disagreement**

Adolf G. **Gundersen,** Associate Professor of Political Science, Texas A&M, **2000**

POLITICAL THEORY AND PARTISAN POLITICS, 2000, p. 104-5. (DRGNS/E625)

Indirect political engagement is perhaps the single most important element of the strategy I am recommending here. It is also the most emblematic, as it results from a fusion of confrontation and separation. But what kind of political engagement might conceivably qualify as being both confrontational and separated from actual political decision-making? There is only one type, so far as I can see, and that is deliberation. Political deliberation is by definition a form of engagement with the collectivity of which one is a member. This is all the more true when two or more citizens deliberate together. Yet deliberation is also a form of political action that **precedes the actual** taking and **implementation** of decisions. It is thus simultaneously connected and disconnected, confrontational and separate. It is, in other words, a form of indirect political engagement. This conclusion, namely, that we ought to call upon deliberation to counter partisanship and thus clear the way for deliberation, looks rather circular at first glance. And, semantically at least, it certainly is. Yet this ought not to concern us very much. Politics, after all, is not a matter of avoiding semantic inconveniences, but of doing the right thing and getting desirable results. In political theory, therefore, the real concern is always whether a circular argument translates into a self-defeating prescription. And here that is plainly not the case, for what I am suggesting is that deliberation can diminish partisanship, which will in turn contribute to conditions amenable to continued or extended deliberation. That "deliberation promotes deliberation" is surely a circular claim, but it is just as surely an accurate description of the real world of lived politics, as observers as far back as Thucydides have documented. It may well be that deliberation rests on certain preconditions. I am not arguing that there is no such thing as a deliberative "first cause." Indeed, it seems obvious to me both that deliberators **require something to deliberate about and that** deliberation **presumes certain institutional structures** and shared values. Clearly something must get the deliberative ball rolling and, to keep it rolling, the cultural terrain must be free of deep chasms and sinkholes. Nevertheless, however extensive and demanding deliberation's preconditions might be, we ought not to lose sight of the fact that, once begun, deliberation tends to be self-sustaining. Just as partisanship begets partisanship, deliberation begets deliberation. If that is so, the question of limiting partisanship and stimulating deliberation are to an important extent the same question.