# 1nc

### FW

#### A. Interpretation—the aff should defend topical action based on the resolution

#### The text of the rez calls for debate on hypothetical government action

**Ericson 3** (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### B. Vote neg—

#### 1. Prep and clash—post facto topic change alters balance of prep, which structurally favors the aff because they speak last and use perms—key to engage a prepared adversary.

#### 2. Limits—specific topics are key to reasonable expectations for 2Ns—open subjects create incentives for avoidance—that overstretches the negative and turns participation.

**3. The resolution equally divides ground to make dialogue possible. This allows for development of ideas, without excluding non-traditional perspectives. By ignoring the resolution the aff leaves the negative unheard, which is anti-educational and exclusive.**

**Galloway, 07** – Ryan, Assistant Professor and Director of Debate at Samford University (“DINNER AND CONVERSATION AT THE ARGUMENTATIVE TABLE: RECONCEPTUALIZING DEBATE AS AN ARGUMENTATIVE DIALOGUE,” Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, vol. 28, 2007, Ebsco)**Red**

### This journal previously (2004) addressed issues regarding the growing divide in policy debate. However, the role of the debate resolution in the clash of civilizations was largely ignored. Here, I defend the notion that activist approaches of critical debaters can best flourish if grounded in topical advocacy defined in terms of the resolution. This approach encourages the pedagogical benefits of debates about discourse and representations while preserving the educational advantages of switch-side debate. Debaters’ increased reliance on speech act and performativity theory in debates generates a need to step back and re-conceptualize the false dilemma of the “policy only” or “kritik only” perspective. Policy debate’s theoretical foundations should find root in an overarching theory of debate that incorporates both policy and critical exchanges. Here, I will seek to conceptualize debate as a dialogue, following the theoretical foundations of Mikhail Bakhtin (1990) and Star Muir (1993) that connects the benefits of dialogical modes of argument to competitive debate. Ideally, the resolution should function to negotiate traditional and activist approaches. Taking the resolution as an invitation to a dialogue about a particular set of ideas would preserve the affirmative team’s obligation to uphold the debate resolution. At the same time, this approach licenses debaters to argue both discursive and performative advantages. While this view is broader than many policy teams would like, and certainly more limited than many critical teams would prefer, this approach captures the advantages of both modes of debate while maintaining the stable axis point of argumentation for a full clash of ideas around these values. Here, I begin with an introduction to the dialogic model, which I will relate to the history of switch-side debate and the current controversy. Then, I will defend my conception of debate as a dialogical exchange. Finally, I will answer potential criticisms to the debate as a dialogue construct. Setting the Argumentative Table: Conceptualizing Debate as a Dialogue Conceiving debate as a dialogue exposes a means of bridging the divide between the policy community and the kritik community. Here I will distinguish between formal argument and dialogue. While formal argument centers on the demands of informal and formal logic as a mechanism of mediation, dialogue tends to focus on the relational aspects of an interaction. As such, it emphasizes the give-and-take process of negotiation. Consequently, dialogue emphasizes outcomes related to agreement or consensus rather than propositional correctness (Mendelson & Lindeman, 2000). As dialogue, the affirmative case constitutes a discursive act that anticipates a discursive response. The consequent interplay does not seek to establish a propositional truth, but seeks to initiate an in-depth dialogue between the debate participants. Such an approach would have little use for rigid rules of logic or argument, such as stock issues or fallacy theory, except to the point where the participants agreed that these were functional approaches. Instead, a dialogic approach encourages evaluations of affirmative cases relative to their performative benefits, or whether or not the case is a valuable speech act. The move away from formal logic structure toward a dialogical conversation model allows for a broader perspective regarding the ontological status of debate. At the same time, a dialogical approach challenges the ways that many teams argue speech act and performance theory in debates. Because there are a range of ways that performative oriented teams argue their cases, there is little consensus regarding the status of topicality. While some take topicality as a central challenge to creating performance-based debates, many argue that topicality is wholly irrelevant to the debate, contending that the requirement that a critical affirmative be topical silences creativity and oppositional approaches. However, if we move beyond viewing debate as an ontologically independent monologue—but as an invitation to dialogue, our attention must move from the ontology of the affirmative case to a consideration of the case in light of exigent opposition (Farrell, 1985). Thus, the initial speech act of the affirmative team sets the stage for an emergent response. While most responses deal directly with the affirmative case, Farrell notes that they may also deal with metacommunication regarding the process of negotiation. In this way, we may conceptualize the affirmative’s goal in creating a “germ of a response” (Bakhtin, 1990) whose completeness bears on the possibility of all subsequent utterances. Conceived as a dialogue, the affirmative speech act anticipates the negative response. A failure to adequately encourage, or anticipate a response deprives the negative speech act and the emergent dialogue of the capacity for a complete inquiry. Such violations short circuit the dialogue and undermine the potential for an emerging dialogue to gain significance (either within the debate community or as translated to forums outside of the activity). Here, the dialogical model performs as a fairness model, contending that the affirmative speech act, be it policy oriented, critical, or performative in nature, must adhere to normative restrictions to achieve its maximum competitive and ontological potential. This is not new. The notion of affirmative restrictions harkens back to the old controversies over switch-side debate, when proponents argued that debaters be required to argue against their own personal convictions in favor of topics they personally opposed, while opponents contended that debaters should never betray their personal convictions. Darin Hicks and Ronald Greene (2000) call this stance “rhetoric of commitment.” Initially, formats that require debaters to speak against their own personal convictions were considered unethical by opponents of switch-side debate. Defenders countered with an Aristotlean ethic that asked debaters to learn their positions from all sides. Current controversies replay elements of debates regarding switching sides. The primary addition to the discussion regards the role of speech acts and performance. Affirmative teams often defend their advocacy in the context of a larger critical project, often claiming that the benefits of their project supersede localized fairness norms so that topicality and other procedurals are outweighed. This approach powerfully challenges requirements that affirmatives be topical. Defending Debate as a Dialogue After having examined the current state of debate and the impetus for a change to a dialogical model, this section will defend three benefits to re-conceptualizing debate in a dialogic manner. First, unfettered affirmative options deny argumentative space to negative teams who become unable to meaningfully present a counter speech act to the affirmative speech act. Second, by placing a single immutable claim at the center of all debates on both sides of the topic as part of a greater project, debaters deny themselves, their opponents, and the judges the benefits of understanding the unique dynamics of contingent claims. Third, maintaining stable advocacy through both sides and on all topics, regardless of the resolution, prevents students from seriously engaging their perspective from any other position. This essay argues that re-conceptualizing fairness norms like topicality into a dialogue model will help to void these problems while licensing critical styles and modes of argumentation. Setting a Table: Fairness Norms as a Pre-Requisite for Argumentation Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure. Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table. When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. Far from being a banal request for links to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon months of preparation, research, and critical thinking not be silenced. Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning: Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate themselves to rules of discussion, are the best ways to decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197). Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits of topical advocacy. A Siren’s Call: Falsely Presuming Epistemic Benefits In addition to the basic equity norm, dismissing the idea that debaters defend the affirmative side of the topic encourages advocates to falsely value affirmative speech acts in the absence of a negative response. There may be several detrimental consequences that go unrealized in a debate where the affirmative case and plan are not topical. Without ground, debaters may fall prey to a siren’s call, a belief that certain critical ideals and concepts are axiological, existing beyond doubt without scrutiny. Bakhtin contends that in dialogical exchanges “the greater the number and weight” of counter-words, the deeper and more substantial our understanding will be (Bakhtin, 1990). The matching of the word to the counter-word should be embraced by proponents of critical activism in the activity, because these dialogical exchanges allow for improvements and modifications in critical arguments. Muir argues that “debate puts students into greater contact with the real world by forcing them to read a great deal of information” (1993, p. 285). He continues, “[t]he constant consumption of material…is significantly constitutive. The information grounds the issues under discussion, and the process shapes the relationship of the citizen to the public arena” (p. 285). Through the process of comprehensive understanding, debate serves both as a laboratory and a constitutive arena. Ideas find and lose adherents. Ideas that were once considered beneficial are modified, changed, researched again, and sometimes discarded altogether. A central argument for open deliberation is that it encourages a superior consensus to situations where one side is silenced. Christopher Peters contends, “The theory holds that antithesis ultimately produces a better consensus, that the clash of differing, even opposing interests and ideas in the process of decision making…creates decisions that are better for having been subjected to this trial by fire” (1997, p. 336). The combination of a competitive format and the necessity to take points of view that one does not already agree with combines to create a unique educational experience for all participants. Those that eschew the value of such experience by an axiological position short-circuit the benefits of the educational exchange for themselves, their opponents, as well as the judges and observers of such debates. The Devil’s Advocate: Advancing Activism by Learning Potential Weaknesses Willingness to argue against what one believes helps the advocate understand the strengths and weaknesses of their own position. It opens the potential for a new synthesis of material that is superior to the first (Dybvig & Iverson, 2000). Serving as a devil’s advocate encourages an appreciation for middle ground and nuance (Dell, 1958). Failure to see both sides can lead to high levels of ego involvement and dogmatism (Hicks & Greene, 2000). Survey data confirms these conclusions. Star Muir found that debaters become more tolerant after learning to debate both sides of an issue (Muir, 1993). Such tolerance is predictable since debate is firmly grounded in respect for the other through the creation of a fair dialogue. Ironically, opponents of a debate as dialogue risk falling prey to dogmatism and the requisite failure to respect potential middle grounds. Perceiving the world through the lens of contingency and probability can be beneficial to real-world activism when its goal is creating consensus out of competing interests. The anti-oppression messages of critical teams would benefit from a thorough investigation of such claims, and not merely an untested axiological assumption.

### K

#### Dominant ideology is strengthened by critical opposition. Their understanding of privilege and debate functions more to validate their efforts than address the problem. The 1ac prefigures us as ambassadors for the status quo—voting aff can only entrench that symbolic order

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Schlag presents a dark vision of what he calls "the bureaucracy," which crushes us and controls us. It operates on "a field of pain and death." n259 It deprives us of choice, speech, n260 and custom. n261 As bureaucracy cannot abide great minds, legal education must suppress greatness through mind numbing repetition. n262 In fact, legal thought is the bureaucracy and cannot be distinguished from it. n263 If legal thought tried to buck the bureaucracy, the bureaucracy would instantly crush it. n264 Schlag observes that judges have taken "oaths that require subordination of truth, understanding, and insight, to the preservation of certain bureaucratic governmental institutions and certain sacred texts." n265 Legal scholarship and lawyers generally n266 are the craven tools of bureaucracy, and those who practice law or scholarship simply serve to justify and strengthen the bureaucracy. "If there were no discipline of American law, the liberal state would have to invent it." n267 "Legal thinkers in effect serve as a kind of P.R. firm for the bureaucratic state." n268 Legal scholarship has sold out to the bureaucracy: Insofar as the expressions of the state in the form of [statutes, etc.] can be expected to endure, so can the discipline that so helpfully organizes, rationalizes, and represents these expressions as intelligent knowledge. As long as the discipline shows obeisance to the authoritative legal forms, it enjoys the backing of the state... Disciplinary knowledge of law can be true not because it is true, but because the state makes it true. n269 Scholarship produces a false "conflation between what [academics] celebrate as 'law' and the ugly bureaucratic noise that grinds daily in the [\*1946] [ ] courts...." n270 Scholarship "becomes the mode of discourse by which bureaucratic institutions and practices re-present themselves as subject to the rational ethical-moral control of autonomous individuals." n271 "The United States Supreme Court and its academic groupies in the law schools have succeeded in doing what many, only a few decades ago, would have thought impossible. They have succeeded in making Kafka look naive." n272 Lacanian theory allows us to interpret the meaning of this anti-Masonic vision precisely. Schlag's bureaucracy must be seen as a "paranoid construction according to which our universe is the work of art of unknown creators." n273 In Schlag's view, the bureaucracy is in control of law and language and uses it exclusively for its own purposes. The bureaucracy is therefore the Other of the Other, "a hidden subject who pulls the strings of the great Other (the symbolic order)." n274 The bureaucracy, in short, is the superego (i.e., absolute knowledge of the ego), n275 but rendered visible and projected outward. The superego, the ego's stern master, condemns the ego and condemns what it does. Schlag has transferred this function to the bureaucracy. As is customary, n276 by describing Schlag's vision as a paranoid construction, I do not mean to suggest that Professor Schlag is mentally ill or unable to function. Paranoid construction is not in fact the illness. It is an attempt at healing what the illness is - the conflation of the domains of the symbolic, imaginary, and real. n277 This conflation is what Lacan calls "psychosis." Whereas the "normal" subject is split between the three domains, the psychotic is not. He is unable to keep the domains separate. n278 The symbolic domain of language begins to lose place to the real domain. The psychotic raves incoherently, and things begin to talk to [\*1947] him directly. n279 The psychotic, "immersed in jouissance," n280 loses desire itself. Paranoia is a strategy the subject adopts to ward off breakdown. The paranoid vision holds together the symbolic order itself and thereby prevents the subject from slipping into the psychotic state in which "the concrete 'I' loses its absolute power over the entire system of its determinations." n281 This of course means - and here is the deep irony of paraonia - that bureaucracy is the very savior of romantic metaphysics. If the romantic program were ever fulfilled - if the bureaucracy were to fold up shop and let the natural side of the subject have its way - subjectivity would soon be enveloped, smothered, and killed in the night of psychosis. n282 Paranoid ambivalence toward bureaucracy (or whatever other fantasy may be substituted for it) is very commonly observed. Most recently, conservatives "organized their enjoyment" by opposing communism. n283 By confronting and resisting an all-encompassing, sinister power, the subject confirms his existence as that which sees and resists the power. n284 As long as communism existed, conservatism could be perceived. When communism disappeared, conservatives felt "anxiety" n285 - a lack of purpose. Although they publicly opposed communism, they secretly regretted its disappearance. Within a short time, a new enemy was found to organize conservative jouissance - the cultural left. (On the left, a similar story could be told about the organizing function of racism and sexism, which, of course, have not yet disappeared.) These humble examples show that the romantic yearning for wholeness is always the opposite of [\*1948] what it appears to be. n286 We paranoids need our enemies to organize our enjoyment. Paranoid construction is, in the end, a philosophical interpretation, even in the clinical cases. n287 As Schlag has perceived, the symbolic order of law is artificial. It only exists because we insist it does. We all fear that the house of cards may come crashing down. Paradoxically, it is this very "anxiety" that shores up the symbolic. The normal person knows he must keep insisting that the symbolic order exists precisely because the person knows it is a fiction. n288 The paranoid, however, assigns this role to the bureaucracy (and thereby absolves himself from the responsibility). Thus, paranoid delusion allows for the maintenance of a "cynical" distance between the paranoid subject and the realm of mad psychosis. n289 In truth, cynicism toward bureaucracy shows nothing but the unconfronted depth to which the cynic is actually committed to what ought to be abolished.

#### Resistance makes ideology enjoyable—they get to relish our failure to justify a system without having to dislodge any fundamental beliefs. It’s a cynical gesture to frame your vote as the arbiter of their cause

Slavoj **Zizek**  Philosopher and Psychoanalyst, Institute for Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana. Cardozo Law Review 19**95**

Emphasis should be laid on the inherent political dimension of the notion of enjoyment or on the way this kernel of enjoyment functions as a political factor. Let us probe this dimension through one of the enigmas of cultural life in postsocialist Eastern Europe: the fate of Milan Kundera. Throughout the sixties and the seventies, Kundera's novels, from The Joke to The Unbearable Lightness of Being, were hailed in the West at the quintessential cultural expression of the Central European movement, preparing the ground for the "velvet revolution" that overthrew the Communist regime in 1990. Yet in his own country, the Czech Republic, the attitude towards him in the "orthodox" dissident circles was always one of uneasiness. Even now, after the victory of democracy, he suffers a kind of excommunication in Bohemia. His works are rarely published, the media pass them over in silence, and everybody is somehow embarrassed to speak about him. In order to justify such a treatment, one rakes up old stories about his hidden collaboration with the Communist regime, about his taking refuge in private pleasures and avoiding the morally upright conflict a la Vaclav Havel, etc. However, the roots of this resistance lie deeper: Kundera conveys a message unamenable to the "normalized" democratic consciousness. At first glance, the fundamental axis that structures the universe of his works seems to be the opposition between the pretentious pathos of the official socialist ideology and the islands of everyday private life, with its small joys and pleasures, laughters and tears, beyond the reach of ideology. These islands enable us to assume a distance which renders visible the ideological ritual in its vain, ridiculous pretentiousness and grotesque meaninglessness: it is not worth the trouble to revolt against an official ideology with pathetic speeches on freedom and democracy - sooner or later, such a revolt leads to a new version of the "Big March" (Kundera's ironic name for the tightly controlled mass movement in which individual destinies are sacrificed to some sacred "progressive" ideological goal). If Kundera is reduced to such an attitude, it is easy to dismiss him via Havel's fundamental "Althusserian" insight into how the **ultimate conformist attitude** is precisely such an "apolitical" stance which, while publicly obeying the imposed ritual, privately indulges in cynical irony. It is not sufficient to ascertain that the ideological ritual is a mere appearance which nobody takes se- [\*930] riously - this appearance is essential, which is why one has to take a risk and refuse to participate in the public ritual. n8 One must therefore take a step further and consider that there is no way to simply step aside from ideology. The private indulgence in cynicism and the obsession with private pleasures are all precisely how totalitarian ideology operates in nonideological everyday life. It is how this life is determined by ideology, how ideology is "present in it in the mode of absence," if we may resort to this syntagma from the heroic epoch of structuralism. The depoliticization of the private sphere in late Socialist societies is "compulsive," marked by the fundamental prohibition of free political discussion; for that reason, such depoliticization always functions as the evasion of what is truly at stake. This accounts for the most immediately striking feature of Kundera's novels: the depoliticized private sphere in no way functions as the free domain of innocent pleasures; there is always something damp, claustrophobic, inauthentic, even desperate, in the characters' striving for sexual and other pleasures. In this respect, the lesson of Kundera's novels is the exact opposite of a naive reliance on the innocent private sphere; the totalitarian socialist ideology vitiates from within the very sphere of privacy to which we take refuge. This insight, however, is far from conclusive. Another step is needed to deal with Kundera's even more ambiguous lesson. Notwithstanding the dampness of the private sphere, the fact remains that the totalitarian situation gave rise to a series of phenomena attested by numerous chronicles of everyday life in the socialist East. In reaction to totalitarian ideological domination, not only a cynical escape into the "good life" of private pleasures took place, but also an extraordinary flourishing of authentic friendship, of paying visits at home, of shared dinners, and of passionate intellectual conversations in closed societies - features which usually fascinated visitors from the West. The problem, of course, is that there is no way to draw a clear line of separation between the two sides; they are the front and the back of the same coin, which is why, with the advent of democracy, they both get lost. It is to Kundera's credit that he does not conceal this ambiguity: the spirit of "Middle Europe" - of authentic friendship and intellectual sociability - sur- [\*931] vived only in Bohemia, Hungary, and Poland as a form of resistance to totalitarian ideological domination. Perhaps yet another step is to be ventured here; the very subordination to the socialist order brought about a specific enjoyment: not only the enjoyment provided by an awareness that people were living in a universe absolved of uncertainty (since the system possessed, or pretended to possess, an answer to everything), but above all the **enjoyment of the very stupidity of the System** - a relish in the emptiness of the official ritual, in the worn-out stylistic figures of the predominating ideological discourse. n9 An exemplary case of this enjoyment that pertains to the "totalitarian" bureaucratic machinery is provided by a scene from Terry Gallein's film, Brasil. n10 In the labyrinthine corridors of a large government building, a high-ranking functionary marches promptly, followed by several clerks desperately trying to keep pace with him. The functionary moves at a frenetic pace, inspecting documents and shouting orders to the people around him while quickly walking, in a great hurry, as if on his way to some important meeting. When this functionary stumbles upon the film's hero, Jonathan Pryce, he exchanges a couple of words with him and rushes forward, busy as ever. However, half an hour later, the hero sees him again in a distant corridor, carrying on his senseless ritualistic march. Enjoyment is provided by the very senselessness of the functionary's act: although his frantic officiating imitates efficiency, it is in the strict sense purposeless - a pure ritual repeated ad infinitum. The contemporary Russian composer Alfred Schnittke succeeded in exposing this quality in his opera, Life with an Idiot: n11 the so-called "Stalinism" confronts us with what Lacan designated as the imbecility inherent to the signifier as such. n12 The opera tells the story of an ordinary married man ("I") who, under a punishment imposed by the Communist Party, is compelled to take a person from a lunatic asylum to live with his family. This idiot, Vava, appears to be a "normal" bearded, bespectacled intellectual, constantly spouting meaningless political phrases; he soon, however, shows his true colors as an obscene intruder, first by having sex with I's wife and then with I himself. Vava stands here not only for [\*932] the **empty pseudointellectual prattle, but for the imbecile obscenity of the symbolic order itself**, of language which "runs amok" and gets entangled in the vicious cycle of enjoying its own game. Insofar as we are living in the universe of language, we are condemned to this imbecility of the superego: we can assume a minimal distance from it, thus rendering it more bearable, but we can never be rid of it.

#### The alternative is to not look for all the answers in debate—voting aff confines radicalism to a forum designed not to accomplish anything

**Gunnell, 86** - Distinguished Professor of Political Science at University of Albany (John G., “Tradition, Interpretation, and Science: Political Theory in the American Academy” pages 351-352)

There may be pointed exceptions; but, on the whole, the radicalism of political theory in the American university is now distinctly academic in both senses of that term. This is due in part to some definite historical factors internal to the evolution of the social sciences in the United States. There is a great distance between the radical activist origins of social science in America (during the twenty years from 1865 to 1885) and contemporary claims about radical social science and critical political theory. What has intervened is academic professionalism. Radical or critical political theory is an idea, largely something that is talked about rather than practiced. It is an academic fantasy and a faint memory which long ago severed any real connection with the objects in their concern. Only a strange academic pretension produces the notion that finding the right philosophical grounding can make academic political theory into something more than it is. Only another pretension implies that depth of concern or other emotive attributes can make this academic practice, as either scholarly production or classroom education, a form of political action or some equivalent to it.

Secured (or imprisoned) within structures of the university and profession, self-ascribed academic radicals posture like actors on a stage. They only descend into the audience within the limits of certain avante-garde productions that would never, in the end, endanger their status as actors or propel the audience beyond the role of spectators. But even the audience consists primarily of other actors. Caught up in this academic theater, they come to believe after a while that the play is the most real thing, that acting is a more noble and efficacious endeavor than the actual practices of life, and that its purity must be maintained. In large measure, of course, this is rhetoric, but not the rhetoric of the street. Political myth is one thing, but mythical politics is another.

While these actors have visions of the world which they wish to reproduce, they have long since lost touch with the concrete character of society, and their world is the product of a script written by others. Maybe the greatest irony is that, while their performances are dedicated to changing the world, they seldom address the specific world in which they reside. They are content to play in a theater whose management and financing is microcosm of the world which they wish to transform, but their vision is too prodigious to be directed toward such small objects. They may complain in passing about the way the players are hired and fired and about the lack of democracy in the company, but they are on the road too frequently to get involved deeply. And, after all, it is their sinecure as permanent members of the troupe that allows them to display their grand gestures without fear of contamination or reprisal.

There are some, usually the more conservative players, who also think that society is a seamless web and that theater changes the world, and they become upset at stage histrionics which mock and criticize life. But much paranoia is surpassed only by the blind faith of those who believe that their performances transform the lives of those with whom they come into contact and that the theater is surely so much a part of life that any real distinction is forced and analytic. It is difficult to know how many have a real passion for the life which they represent on stage or the extent to which their drama is a surrogate for what the world denies them or what they have denied themselves. Probably, many are just actors with feigned and rehearsed concern which they have acquired from their masters and coaches. For them, the play is the thing. For a few, however, these scenes are a vehicle for higher purpose. Sadly, society reserves the theater for their activity, putting them safely away where anything can be said, **b**everyone knows that it is just a play. Society knows that, in the end, the demands of the profession will keep most from mixing their art with life. Of the few who escape to seek recognition outside the theater, it is safe to assume that they are too inexperienced in the ways of the world to manipulate it and that the worst oppression is simply to ignore them.

This fable is merely a way of making a long story short. But I do want to make it as clear as possible that the apoliticalness and conservatism ascribed to me is charged against a background of alienated and philosophical radicalism that seldom talks about actual practices, let alone to them. My concern with the open society, which Reid takes to reflect attachment to liberal ideology, simply comes from the observation that such a society effectively defuses radicalism. It does so particularly by reserving the university for radical talk, deprived or at least flattened of potential significance through pure tolerance. Reid wishes to pose the question of "the theorist's public responsibility," and this question should be posed. But my brief comments about the open society are less a way of legitimating the abdication of that responsibility than a way of indicating how it cannot be fulfilled in terms of alienated political theory. To couch diagnosis and prescription in this language is to continue to ensure impotence-both because it has no audience and because it obscures the world as much as the conceptual schemes of orthodox social science. It merely substitutes one reified structure for another

### Case

#### War powers key to the war on terrorism

**Stimson, 13** – Charles, Manager, National Security Law Program and Senior Legal Fellow at Heritage (“Law of Armed Conflict and the Use of Military Force,” Testimony Before Armed Services Committee United States Senate, 5/16/13, http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/2013/05/the-law-of-armed-conflict //Red)

The AUMF, by its own language, does not have an expiration date, nor should it. While it is true that over the decade we have made hard-fought gains against the al Qaeda leadership, and key members of the Taliban and associated forces, other elements of those organizations **still pose a continuing threat** to the United States. I base this opinion not on current intelligence briefings—to which I no longer have access—but my reading of open source materials. That said, Congress does have access to classified intelligence briefings, and I encourage a thorough and dispassionate evaluation of the current threats by the Congress. As to the Committee’s question regarding the geographic scope of the AUMF, both administrations have taken the unremarkable position that by its terms, and in practice, there is no geographic limit or scope to the AUMF. Rather, the AUMF gives the President the authority to confront the enemy wherever he deems the enemy resides. Just last year, in a major address at Northwestern University, Attorney General Eric Holder stated, “Our legal authority is not limited to the battlefields in Afghanistan. Indeed, neither Congress nor our federal courts have limited the geographic scope of our ability to use force to the current conflict in Afghanistan.”[9] The notion that we are at war, and that the war (and by implication the AUMF) has no geographical boundaries is anathema to some, but is nevertheless lawful and consistent with the law of armed conflict and our national and international obligations. It is also not the boundless source of tyranny and infringement upon other nations’ sovereignty that detractors profess; rather, the national security power of the politically accountable branches are subject to all of the checks and balances within our constitutional form of government, as well as the more modern checks detailed by fellow witness Jack Goldsmith in his book Power and Constraint. And it is commensurate, in this case, **with the enemy, an international terrorist movement that does not respect political or any other boundaries** and that considers the people and assets of the United States and its allies, wherever they may be, to be its targets. As to the Committee’s question regarding whether the AUMF should be modified, or by implication repealed, I would suggest that **repealing the AUMF prematurely would be unwise.** Repealing the AUMF would signal, legally, that the war against al Qaeda is over, at a time when al Qaeda and associated forces continue in fact to wage war against the United States. And it may have more specific consequences, for example, involving the continued detention of those terrorists currently in captivity and not subject to military commission or federal court proceedings. Repealing or substantially narrowing the existing AUMF could also have substantial repercussions on other sensitive operations, including but not limited to the targeted killing program. In short, the current AUMF **should remain in place** unless and until the narrow class of persons under its scope no longer poses a substantial threat to our national security. Keeping the current AUMF does not authorize a permanent state of war, as some critics have alleged. It merely retains the legal framework that has worked and served us well, to date, and acknowledges that those subject to the AUMF, although greatly diminished in number and efficacy, **should not be allowed to regain their footing.** In the context of the AUMF, **keeping the AUMF as is does not necessarily mean that the Executive Branch, this one or the next, will want to or need to employ the full extent of its authority.** We cannot foresee with precision when or if the threats posed by those subject to the narrow jurisdiction of the AUMF will be defeated or become so insignificant as to not warrant this particular AUMF.

#### Nuclear terrorism is feasible---high risk of theft and attacks escalate

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Hundreds of scientific papers and reports have been published on nuclear terrorism. International conferences have been held on this threat with participation of Russian organizations, including IMEMO and the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies. Recommendations on how to combat the threat have been issued by the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, Russian-American Elbe Group, and other organizations. The UN General Assembly adopted the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in 2005 and cooperation among intelligence services of leading states in this sphere is developing.¶ At the same time, these efforts fall short for a number of reasons, partly because various acts of nuclear terrorism are possible. Dispersal of radioactive material by detonation of conventional explosives (“dirty bombs”) is a method that is most accessible for terrorists. With the wide spread of radioactive sources, raw materials for such attacks have become much more accessible than weapons-useable nuclear material or nuclear weapons. The use of “dirty bombs” will not cause many immediate casualties, but it will result into long-term radioactive contamination, contributing to the spread of panic and socio-economic destabilization.¶ Severe **consequences can be caused by sabotaging nuclear power plants, research reactors, and radioactive materials storage facilities. Large cities are especially vulnerable to such attacks. A large city may host dozens of research reactors with a nuclear power plant or a couple of spent nuclear fuel storage facilities and dozens of large radioactive materials storage facilities located nearby.** The past few years have seen significant efforts made to enhance organizational and physical aspects of security at facilities, especially at nuclear power plants. Efforts have also been made to improve security culture. But these efforts do not preclude the possibility that well-trained terrorists may be able to penetrate nuclear facilities.¶ Some estimates show that sabotage of a research reactor in a metropolis may expose hundreds of thousands to high doses of radiation. A formidable part of the city would become uninhabitable for a long time.¶ Of all the scenarios, it is building an improvised nuclear device by terrorists that poses the maximum risk. **There are no engineering problems that cannot be solved if terrorists decide to build a simple “gun-type” nuclear device.** Information on the design of such devices, as well as implosion-type devices, is available in the public domain. It is the acquisition of weapons-grade uranium that presents the sole serious obstacle. Despite numerous preventive measures taken, we cannot rule out the possibility that such materials can be bought on the black market. Theft of weapons-grade uranium is also possible. Research reactor fuel is considered to be particularly vulnerable to theft, as it is scattered at sites in dozens of countries. There are about 100 research reactors in the world that run on weapons-grade uranium fuel, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).¶ A terrorist “gun-type” uranium bomb can have a yield of least 10-15 kt, which is comparable to the yield of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. The explosion of such a bomb in a modern metropolis can kill and wound hundreds of thousands and cause serious economic damage. There will also be long-term sociopsychological and political consequences.¶ The vast majority of states have introduced unprecedented security and surveillance measures at transportation and other large-scale public facilities after the terrorist attacks in the United States, Great Britain, Italy, and other countries. These measures have proved burdensome for the countries’ populations, but the public has accepted them as necessary. A nuclear terrorist attack will make the public accept further measures meant to enhance control even if these measures significantly restrict the democratic liberties they are accustomed to. Authoritarian states could be expected to adopt even more restrictive measures.¶ If a nuclear terrorist act occurs, nations will delegate tens of thousands of their secret services’ best personnel to investigate and attribute the attack. Radical Islamist groups are among those capable of such an act. We can imagine what would happen if they do so, given the anti-Muslim sentiments and resentment that conventional terrorist attacks by Islamists have generated in developed democratic countries. Mass deportation of the non-indigenous population and severe sanctions would follow such an attack in what will cause **violent protests in the Muslim world**. **Series of armed clashing terrorist attacks may follow**. The prediction that Samuel Huntington has made in his book “The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order” may come true. Huntington’s book clearly demonstrates that it is not Islamic extremists that are the cause of the Western world’s problems. Rather there is a deep, intractable conflict that is rooted in the fault lines that run between Islam and Christianity. This is especially dangerous for Russia because these fault lines run across its territory. To sum it up, the political leadership of Russia has every reason to revise its list of factors that could undermine strategic stability.  BMD does not deserve to be even last on that list because its effectiveness in repelling massive missile strikes will be extremely low. BMD systems can prove useful only if deployed to defend against launches of individual ballistic missiles or groups of such missiles. Prioritization of other destabilizing factors—that could affect global and regional stability—merits a separate study or studies. But even without them I can conclude that nuclear terrorism should be placed on top of the list. The threat of nuclear terrorism is real, and a successful nuclear terrorist attack would lead to a radical transformation of the global order.  All of the threats on the revised list must become a subject of thorough studies by experts. States need to work hard to forge a common understanding of these threats and develop a strategy to combat them.

#### Nuke terror causes extinction---equivalent to full-scale nuclear war

Owen B. Toon 7, chair of the Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences at CU-Boulder, et al., April 19, 2007, “Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism,” online: http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/acp-7-1973-2007.pdf

To an increasing extent, people are congregating in the world’s great urban centers, creating megacities with populations exceeding 10 million individuals. At the same time, advanced technology has designed nuclear explosives of such small size they can be easily transported in a car, small plane or boat to the heart of a city. We demonstrate here that a single detonation in the 15 kiloton range can produce urban fatalities approaching one million in some cases, and casualties exceeding one million. Thousands of small weapons still exist in the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia, and there are at least six other countries with substantial nuclear weapons inventories. In all, thirty-three countries control sufficient amounts of highly enriched uranium or plutonium to assemble nuclear explosives. A conflict between any of these countries involving 50-100 weapons with yields of 15 kt has the potential to create fatalities rivaling those of the Second World War. Moreover, even a single surface nuclear explosion, or an air burst in rainy conditions, in a city center is likely to cause the entire metropolitan area to be abandoned at least for decades owing to infrastructure damage and radioactive contamination. As the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in Louisiana suggests, the economic consequences of even a localized nuclear catastrophe would most likely have severe national and international economic consequences. Striking effects result even from relatively small nuclear attacks because low yield detonations are most effective against city centers where business and social activity as well as population are concentrated. Rogue nations and terrorists would be most likely to strike there. Accordingly, an organized attack on the U.S. by a small nuclear state, or terrorists supported by such a state, could generate casualties comparable to those once predicted for a full-scale nuclear “counterforce” exchange in a superpower conflict. Remarkably, the estimated quantities of smoke generated by attacks totaling about one megaton of nuclear explosives could lead to significant global climate perturbations (Robock et al., 2007). While we did not extend our casualty and damage predictions to include potential medical, social or economic impacts following the initial explosions, such analyses have been performed in the past for large-scale nuclear war scenarios (Harwell and Hutchinson, 1985). Such a study should be carried out as well for the present scenarios and physical outcomes.

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**Finally, the resolution is key to check exclusion – rejecting it prior to debate makes engagement with ideas impossible**

**Harrigan, 08** – Casey, Associate Debate Coach at the University of Georgia (“AGAINST DOGMATISM: A CONTINUED DEFENSE OF SWITCH SIDE DEBATE,” Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, vol 29, 2008, Ebsco)**Red**

**\*\*\*SSD = switch side debate**

Tolerating the Intolerable: A Defense of Limited Argumentative Pluralism A second criticism of SSD that has recently been voiced is that, because the practice places some restrictions upon what debaters may argue (by forcing them to take the position of the both the affirmative and the negative), it requires students to become advocates for certain intolerable ideas that should be “off limits” for discussion. For example, the increasingly prevalent usage of postmodern arguments in collegiate debate rounds has caused many teams to argue that they should not be forced to defend the “dirty” bureaucratic politics of the federal government (Solt 2004). However, the relevance of argumentation for advancing tolerant politics cannot be underestimated. The willingness to be open to alternative views has a material impact on respect for difference in at least two primary ways. First, rendering certain beliefs as “off limits” from debate and the prohibition of ideas from the realm of contestation is **conceptually indistinct from the physical exclusion of people** from societal practices. Unlike racial or gendered concerns, certain groups of people (the religious, minority political parties, etc.) are defined almost exclusively by the arguments that they adhere to. To deem these views unspeakable or irrelevant is to functionally **deny whole groups of people access to public deliberation.** Second, argument, as individual advocacy, is an expression of belief. It has the potential to persuade members of the public to either support or oppose progressive politics. Belief itself is an accurate indicator of the way individuals will choose to act—with very real implications for openness, diversity and accommodation. Thus, as a precursor to action, argument is an essential starting point for campaigns of tolerance. Argumentative pluralism can be defined as the proper tolerance for the expression of a diversity of ideas (Scriven 1975). Contrary to monism, pluralism holds that there are many potential beliefs in the world and that each person has the ability to determine for himself or herself whether these beliefs hold true. In the argumentative context, pluralism requires that participants in a debate or discussion recognize the right of others to express their beliefs, no matter how objectionable. The key here is expression: although certain beliefs may be more “true” than others in the epistemic sense, each should have equal access (at least initially) to forums of deliberation. It is important to conceptually distinguish pluralism from its commonly confused but only loosely connected counterpart, relativism. To respect the right of others to hold different beliefs does not require that they are all considered equal. Such tolerance ends at the intellectual level of each individual being able to hold their own belief. Indeed, as Muir writes, “It [pluralism] implies neither tolerance of actions based on those beliefs nor respecting the content of the beliefs” (288). Thus, while a pluralist may acknowledge the right for some to hold exclusionary views, he or she need not endorse racism or anti-Semitism, or the right to exclude itself. Even when limited to such a narrow realm of diversity, argumentative pluralism holds great promise for a politics based on understanding and accommodation that runs **contrary to** the **dominant forces of** economic, political, and social **exclusion.** Pluralism requires that individuals acknowledge opposing beliefs and arguments by forcing an understanding that personal convictions are not universal. Instead of blindly asserting a position as an “objective Truth,” advocates tolerate a multiplicity of perspectives, allowing a more panoramic understanding of the issue at hand (Mitchell and Suzuki, 2004). In doing so, the advocates frequently understand that there are persuasive arguments to be had on both sides of an issue. As a result, instead of advancing a cause through moralistic posturing or appeals to a **falsely assumed universality** (which, history has shown, frequently become justifications for scapegoating and exclusion), these proponents become purveyors of reasoned arguments who attempt to persuade others through deliberation. A clear example of this occurs in competitive academic debate. Switch-side debating has profound implications for pluralism. Instead of being personally invested in the truth and general acceptance of a position, debaters use arguments instrumentally, as tools, and as **pedagogical devices in the search for larger truths.** Beyond simply recognizing that more than one side exists for each issue, switch-side debate advances the larger cause of equality by fostering tolerance and empathy toward difference. Setting aside their own “ego-identification,” students realize that they must listen and understand their opponent’s arguments well enough to become advocates on behalf of them in future debates (Muir, 1993). Debaters assume the position of their opponents and understand how and why the position is constructed as it is. As a result, they often come to understand that a strong case exists for opinions that they previously disregarded. Recently, advocates of switch side debating have taken the case of the practice a step further, arguing that it, “originates from a civic attitude that serves as a bulwark against fundamentalism of all stripes” (English, Llano, Mitchell, Morrison, Rief and Woods, 2007). Debating practices that break down exclusive, dogmatic views may be one of the most **robust checks against violence in contemporary society.** Undoubtedly, there are many who reject argumentative pluralism in all or nearly all cases. Absolutists maintain that there are certain positions where no other side exists or where one side is of such a minority opinion that it does not warrant being the subject of debate. For those who hold a mainstream political view, statements such as, “the State is beneficial and anarchy would be chaos,” “capitalist globalization is inevitable,” or, in the most extreme, “human life has value,” are taken as givens. For pluralists, the previous **statements can be true but still be open to debate.** For argumentative monists, such positions are so “true” that further discussion would not only be a waste of time, but may also risk changing the minds of some of the debaters to be more tolerant of a dangerous position (as discussed above). In academic debate, a substantial amount of controversy has existed in recent years over the state-centric nature of policy resolutions (the subject of debate). Liberals complain that being required to debate about state politics defuses radicalism by teaching students that bureaucratic politics is the means to all ends (Massey, 2006). This is the flip-side of the previous discussion of absolutism: critics can be so convinced of their positions, even if in the minority, that they refuse discussion of dominant principles altogether. To preserve an open and accessible space of deliberation, limits need to be placed on the ability of participants to use violence or coercion to prevent others from voicing their own opinions. Some groups are so convinced of their position that they are willing to do anything, including forcefully silencing opposition, to ensure that their argument wins. Thus, some degree of exclusion is inevitable—the relevant questions are only who does that silencing and what circumstances it occurs under. As Ruth Lessl Shively, professor of political science at Texas A&M University notes: The most radical skepticism ends in the most radical conservatism. In other words, a refusal to judge among ideas and activities is, in the end, an endorsement of the status quo… To fully support political contest, one must fully support some uncontested rules and reasons. (2000)Violence seeks to destroy the open circulation of ideas that generate the progression towards truth. The arguments that prevail in an atmosphere of coercion are those promoted by the powerful elite, not the most intellectually sound. To ensure effective deliberation, certain communicative norms must be established to govern the conduct of participants. Even though the elaboration of clear rules may sometimes result in the exclusion of certain perspectives, it is a necessary means to protect the greater end of productive debate. A second exception to the rule of free expression must be made to limit irrelevant discussion and establish a common starting point for debate. In the rhetorical tradition, the belief in the necessity of a mutual topic of disagreement, known as stasis (meaning “standing” and derived from a Greek word meaning “to stand still”), has a long history dating back to Aristotle. Through several modes of proceeding, the topic of controversy between interlocutors is established and an implicit contract—that here is the shared point of disagreement—is created. Without stasis, opponents may argue back and forth without really disagreeing with each other because they are not truly speaking about the same subject. For example, when one debater argues that the United States should refuse to negotiate with North Korea to avoid legitimating its harmful human rights policies and the opponent responds that President Clinton’s accommodation of North Korea in the 1990s was the source of its current human rights dilemma, there is no true disagreement. Each position can be entirely true without discounting the other. In this instance, the truth-generating function of deliberation is short-circuited. To eliminate errors, fallacies must gradually be replaced by truths, correct positions must win out over incorrect ones, and strong arguments must gain more acceptance than weak ideas. **This process requires conflict**; it necessitates rejection. To determine that something is “true” requires that its converse is “false.” The statement that “snow is cold” requires the dismissal of its contrary. Such choices can only be made when there is a point of disagreement for debate to revolve around. Without stasis, the productive potential of deliberation is profoundly undermined. To avoid this scenario of “two ships passing in the night,” argumentation scholars have recognized the importance of a mutual agreement to disagree and have attempted to create guidelines to facilitate productive discussion. “Some agreed upon end or goal must be present to define and delimit the evaluative ground within which the interchange is to proceed,” writes Douglas Ehninger, “When such ground is lacking, **argument itself … becomes impossible**” (1958). Shively concurs, stating that, “we must agree about what it is that is being debated before we can debate it” (2000). In the academic context, policy debates create stasis by utilizing a year-long resolution that sets the topic for discussion. Affirmative teams must present a topical advocacy (one that fits within the bounds of the resolution) or they are procedurally disqualified. In public forums, the task falls upon moderators and discussion facilitators to set clear lines of relevance. Advocates, who frequently have strategic political incentives to avoid direct disagreement, need to be institutionally constrained by the framework for discussion. A position that favors a limited form of argumentative pluralism undermines the claims made by those who oppose SSD and wish to render certain controversial issues “off limits” from debate. Limits should be placed on the content of debate only because such choices as to what is debatable are inevitable, and, given that, it is preferable to choose the path that best protects the forum for deliberation by minimizing exclusion. The arbitrary choice about what content should and should not be “up for debate” threatens to render deliberation impossible–either all issues are up for debate, or none can be.

**They can use it as the locus point for a broader project, a way of criticizing status quo transportation policies, or a demand on the state. The resolution has no one, built in conclusion, but provides ground for multiple perspectives. That means we don’t exclude their advocacy, just require that it be grounded in a predictable point of stasis for the negative.**

**Resolution provides ground for multiple perspectives**

**Galloway, 07** – Ryan, Assistant Professor and Director of Debate at Samford University (“DINNER AND CONVERSATION AT THE ARGUMENTATIVE TABLE: RECONCEPTUALIZING DEBATE AS AN ARGUMENTATIVE DIALOGUE,” Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, vol. 28, 2007, Ebsco)**Red**

Finally, there has been a concerted community effort to ensure that the resolution provides subjects of controversy that are controversial, balanced, and anticipate a nuanced approach. Ross Smith notes, “Affirmative teams try to find what they think might be a slam dunk case, but in crafting resolutions the idea is to find a controversial area with ground for both sides” (2000). The resolution is the result of a painstaking process; it is thoroughly discussed, debated, and ultimately submitted to the debate community for a vote. It is framed, ultimately, as an issue about which reasonable minds could differ. Reliance upon alternative systems, such as germaneness, lists of ground provided by the other side in the debate, or the fact that a team has run a case in the past, betrays the central point of having a dialogue about the resolution and undermines the consensus upon which the whole enterprise depends. And while there are obviously some valid complaints about individual topics, as a whole, resolutions allow for a wide range of approaches to issues of the day. It is striking on the 20082009 resolution that conservative groups like the Heritage Foundation and the CATO Institute as well as Oxfam and the Sierra Club oppose agricultural subsidies, if for very different reasons. Teams could easily find evidence that subsidies go down a rat-hole, are counter-productive to free market economics, as well as arguing that subsidies entrench racism both domestically and globally, and prevent an ethic of care toward the global environment. Those that argue that the topic does not access issues relevant to a wide variety of special interests and minority groups may simply be asking for too much. Establishing the resolution as the bright line standard for evaluation of equity at the argumentative table allows all sides to the controversy access to formulating their approach to both sides of the topic question. Topics are Carefully Worded and Vetted Several argue that contemporary topics focus on subject matter of limited interest to minority students. Ede Warner contends that topics which “directly affect” the lives of those interested in social justice struggles are more likely to find acceptance than topics “of lesser direct relevance to their lives” (2003, p. 71). The consequence of these topics, as Beth Skinner alleges, is to leave minority students likely to “opt out of the topic altogether” (Skinner, 2008). At the same time, allowing for an “opt out” clause any time anyone is unhappy with the topic undoes the benefits of learning about a wide variety of subject matter and the benefits of being a devil’s advocate. It also undermines the benefits of engaging in dialogue. Debaters obviously have individual preferences and variations in what they enjoy researching, and not every topic will be to their liking. They also have multiple years in the activity to learn about a wide variety of subjects. The topics one debates throughout their time in the activity serve as an academic curriculum, creating a broad base of knowledge by the time one graduates. Furthermore, students are actively encouraged to write topic papers and advocate for particular causes. Both the 20062007 resolution on Middle East policy and the 2007-2008 resolution on agricultural support policy were co-written by students. The choice of agricultural subsidies over topics like Russia and arms control may give hope to individuals who feel that topics are too uni-dimensional. Finally, study of records at national tournaments indicates that the topic committee has done a pretty good job balancing ground. According to Jon Bruschke’s statistical compilations at debateresults, over the last several years, affirmative and negative win percentages have been very close to comparable. Whether this is because debate tends to reward the team that does the better debating, or because the topics are fairly evenly balanced, the notion that topics are so bad that affirmative teams have no choice but to flee from the discussion is not supported by the competitive data. Conclusion Conceiving debate as a dialogue instead of a more rigid and formalistic dialectical mode of argument offers a means of incorporating a discursive exchange of ideas on both policy and critical concepts. **Certain limits to debate are necessary.** The debate as dialogue model rejects a policy only model while providing for the opportunity for a thorough exchange of ideas over emerging rhetorical and performative styles. While hardly a panacea, the notion of debate as a dialogue allows for argumentative clash over emerging academic controversies.

**Debate becomes meaningless without the resolution**

**O’Donnell, 04** – Timothy M., Director of Debate at the University of Mary Washington (“And the Twain Shall Meet: Affirmative Framework Choice and the Future of Debate,” Google)**Red**

The answer, I believe, resides deep in the rhetorical tradition in the often overlooked notion of stasis. Although the concept can be traced to Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, it was later expanded by Hermagoras whose thinking has come down to us through the Roman rhetoricians Cicero and Quintillian. Stasis is a Greek word meaning to “stand still.” It has generally been considered by argumentation scholars to be the point of clash where two opposing sides meet in argument. Stasis recognizes the fact that interlocutors engaged in a conversation, discussion, or debate need to have some level of expectation regarding what the focus of their encounter ought to be. To reach stasis, participants need to arrive at a decision about what the issue is prior to the start of their conversation. Put another way, they need to mutually acknowledge the point about which they disagree. What happens when participants fail to reach agreement about what it is that they are arguing about? They talk past each other with little or no awareness of what the other is saying. The oft used cliché of two ships passing in the night, where both are in the dark about what the other is doing and neither stands still long enough to call out to the other, is the image most commonly used to describe what happens when participants in an argument fail to achieve stasis. In such situations, genuine engagement is not possible because participants have not reached agreement about what is in dispute. For example, when one advocate says that the United States should increase international involvement in the reconstruction of Iraq and their opponent replies that the United States should abandon its policy of preemptive military engagement, they are talking past each other. When such a situation prevails, it is hard to see how a productive conversation can ensue. I do not mean to suggest that dialogic engagement always unfolds along an ideal plain where participants always can or even ought to agree on a mutual starting point. The reality is that many do not. In fact, refusing to acknowledge an adversary’s starting point is itself a powerful strategic move. However, it must be acknowledged that when such situations arise, and participants cannot agree on the issue about which they disagree, the chances that their exchange will result in a productive outcome are diminished significantly. In an enterprise like academic debate, where the goals of the encounter are cast along both educational and competitive lines, the need to reach accommodation on the starting point is urgent. This is especially the case when time is limited and there is no possibility of extending the clock. The sooner such agreement is achieved, the better. Stasis helps us understand that we stand to lose a great deal when we refuse a genuine starting point. How can stasis inform the issue before us regarding contemporary debate practice? Whether we recognize it or not, it already has. The idea that the affirmative begins the debate by using the resolution as a starting point for their opening speech act is nearly universally accepted by all members of the debate community. This is born out by the fact that affirmative teams that have ignored the resolution altogether have not gotten very far. Even teams that use the resolution as a metaphorical condensation or that “affirm the resolution as such” use the resolution as their starting point. The significance of this insight warrants repeating. Despite the numerous differences about what types of arguments ought to have a place in competitive debate we all seemingly agree on at least one point – the vital necessity of a starting point. This common starting point, or topic, is what separates debate from other forms of communication and gives the exchange a directed focus.

**Switch Side debate is key to decision-making--- that skill is key to solve extinction level threats**

Harrigan 8NDT champion, debate coach at UGA (Casey, thesis submitted to Wake Forest Graduate Faculty for Master of Arts in Communication, “A defense of switch side debate”, http://dspace.zsr.wfu.edu/jspui/bitstream/10339/207/1/harrigancd052008, p. 57-59)RaPa

Along these lines, the greatest benefit of switching sides, which goes to the heart of contemporary debate, is its inducement of critical thinking. Defined as “reasonable reflective thinking that is focused on deciding what to believe or do” (Ennis, 1987, p. 10), critical thinking learned through debate teaches students not just how advocate and argue, but how to decide as well. Each and every student, whether in debate or (more likely) at some later point in life, will be placed in the position of the decision-maker. Faced with competing options whose costs and benefits are initially unclear, critical thinking is necessary to assess all the possible outcomes of each choice, compare their relative merits, and arrive at some final decision about which is preferable. In some instances, such as choosing whether to eat Chinese or Indian food for dinner, the importance of making the correct decision is minor. For many other decisions, however, the implications of choosing an imprudent course of action are potentially grave. As Robert Crawford notes, there are “issues of unsurpassed importance in the daily lives of millions upon millions of people…being decided to a considerable extent by the power of public speaking” (2003). Although the days of the Cold War are over, and the risk that “the next Pearl Harbor could be ‘compounded by hydrogen’” (Ehninger and Brockriede, 1978, p. 3) is greatly reduced, the manipulation of public support before the invasion of Iraq in 2003 points to the continuing necessity of training a well-informed and critically-aware public (Zarefsky, 2007). In the absence of debate-trained critical thinking, ignorant but ambitious politicians and persuasive but nefarious leaders would be much more likely to draw the country, and possibly the world, into conflicts with incalculable losses in terms of human well-being. Given the myriad threats of global proportions that will require incisive solutions, including global warming, the spread of pandemic diseases, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cultivating a robust and effective society of critical decision-makers is essential. As Louis Rene Beres writes, “with such learning, we Americans could prepare…not as immobilized objects of false contentment, but as authentic citizens of an endangered planet” (2003). Thus, it is not surprising that critical thinking has been called “the highest educational goal of the activity” (Parcher, 1998). While arguing from conviction can foster limited critical thinking skills, the element of switching sides is necessary to sharpen debate’s critical edge and ensure that decisions are made in a reasoned manner instead of being driven by ideology. Debaters trained in SSD are more likely to evaluate both sides of an argument before arriving at a conclusion and are less likely to dismiss potential arguments based on his or her prior beliefs (Muir 1993). In addition, debating both sides teaches “conceptual flexibility,” where decision-makers are more likely to reflect upon the beliefs that are held before coming to a final opinion (Muir, 1993, p. 290). Exposed to many arguments on each side of an issue, debaters learn that public policy is characterized by extraordinary complexity that requires careful consideration before action. Finally, these arguments are confirmed by the preponderance of empirical research demonstrating a link between competitive SSD and critical thinking (Allen, Berkowitz, Hunt and Louden, 1999; Colbert, 2002, p. 82).

#### Turns case—supplanting dialogue to protest oppression leads to even worse forms of authority

**Morson 4**

http://www.flt.uae.ac.ma/elhirech/baktine/0521831059.pdf#page=331

Northwestern Professor, Prof. Morson's work ranges over a variety of areas: literary theory (especially narrative); the history of ideas, both Russian and European; a variety of literary genres (especially satire, utopia, and the novel); and his favorite writers -- Chekhov, Gogol, and, above all, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy. He is especially interested in the relation of literature to philosophy.

Bakhtin viewed the whole process of “ideological” (in the sense of ideas and values, however unsystematic) development as an endless dialogue. As teachers, we find it difficult to avoid a voice of authority, however much we may think of ours as the rebel’s voice, because our rebelliousness against society at large speaks in the authoritative voice of our subculture. We speak the language and thoughts of academic educators, even when we imagine we are speaking in no jargon at all, and that jargon, inaudible to us, sounds with all the overtones of authority to our students. We are so prone to think of ourselves as fighting oppression that it takes some work to realize that we ourselves may be felt as oppressive and overbearing, and that our own voice may provoke the same reactions that we feel when we hear an authoritative voice with which we disagree. So it is often helpful to think back on the great authoritative oppressors and reconstruct their self-image: helpful, but often painful. I remember, many years ago, when, as a recent student rebel and activist, I taught a course on “The Theme of the Rebel” and discovered, to my considerable chagrin, that many of the great rebels of history were the very same people as the great oppressors. There is a famous exchange between Erasmus and Luther, who hoped to bring the great Dutch humanist over to the Reformation, but Erasmus kept asking Luther how he could be so certain of so many doctrinal points. We must accept a few things to be Christians at all, Erasmus wrote, but surely beyond that there must be room for us highly fallible beings to disagree. Luther would have none of such tentativeness. He knew, he was sure. The Protestant rebels were, for a while, far more intolerant than their orthodox opponents. Often enough, the oppressors are the ones who present themselves and really think of themselves as liberators. Certainty that one knows the root cause of evil: isn’t that itself often the root cause? We know from Tsar Ivan the Terrible’s letters denouncing Prince Kurbsky, a general who escaped to Poland, that Ivan saw himself as someone who had been oppressed by noblemen as a child and pictured himself as the great rebel against traditional authority when he killed masses of people or destroyed whole towns. There is something in the nature of maximal rebellion against authority that produces ever greater intolerance, unless one is very careful. For the **skills** of fighting or refuting an oppressive power are not those of openness, self-skepticism, or real **dialogue**. In preparing for my course, I remember my dismay at reading Hitler’s Mein Kampf and discovering that his self-consciousness was precisely that of the rebel speaking in the name of oppressed Germans, and that much of his amazing appeal – otherwise so inexplicable – was to the German sense that they were rebelling victims. In our time, the Serbian Communist and nationalist leader Slobodan Milosevic exploited much the same appeal. Bakhtin surely knew that Communist totalitarianism, the Gulag, and the unprecedented censorship were constructed by rebels who had come to power. His favorite writer, Dostoevsky, used to emphasize that the worst oppression comes from those who, with the rebellious psychology of “the insulted and humiliated,” have seized power – unless they have somehow cultivated the value of dialogue, as Lenin surely had not, but which Eva, in the essay by Knoeller about teaching The Autobiography of Malcolm X, surely had. Rebels often make the worst tyrants

because their word, the voice they hear in their consciousness, has borrowed something crucial from the authoritative word it opposed, and perhaps exaggerated it: the aura of righteous authority. If one’s ideological becoming is understood as a struggle in which one has at last achieved the truth, one is likely to want to impose that truth with maximal authority; and rebels of the next generation may proceed in much the same way, in an ongoing spiral of intolerance.

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#### Their aff is exactly how “marginalized knowledge” can recreate the problem—the false dichotomy with “hegemonic knowledge” is an attempt to represent the interests of an entire group—that's misleading and essentialist

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From this perspective, the consensus reached by the reflective subject taking part in the dialogue offered by Critical Pedagogy is naive, especially in light of its declared anti-intellectualism on the one hand and its pronounced glorification of "feelings", "experience", and self-evident knowledge of the group on the other. Critical Pedagogy, in its different versions, claims to inhere and overcome the foundationalism and transcendentalism of the Enlightenment's emancipatory and ethnocentric arrogance, as exemplified by ideology critique, psychoanalysis, or traditional metaphysics. Marginalized feminist knowledge, like the marginalized, neglected, and ridiculed knowledge of the Brazilian farmers, as presented by Freire or Weiler, is represented as legitimate and relevant knowledge, in contrast to its representation as the hegemonic instrument of representation and education. This knowledge is portrayed as a relevant, legitimate and superior alternative to hegemonic education and the knowledge this represents in the center. It is said to represent an identity that is desirable and promises to function "successfully". However, neither the truth value of the marginalized collective memory nor knowledge is cardinal here. "Truth" is replaced by knowledge whose supreme criterion is its self-evidence, namely the potential productivity of its creative violence, while the dialogue in which adorers of "difference" take part is implicitly represented as one of the desired productions of this violence. My argument is that the marginalized and repressed self-evident knowledge has no superiority over the self-evident knowledge of the oppressors. Relying on the knowledge of the weak, controlled, and marginalized groups, their memory and their conscious interests, is no less naive and dangerous than relying on hegemonic knowledge. This is because the critique of Western transcendentalism, foundationalism, and ethnocentrism declines into **uncritical acceptance** of marginalized knowledge, which becomes foundationalistic and ethnocentric in presenting "the truth", "the facts", or ''the real interests of the group" - even if conceived as valid only for the group concerned. This position cannot avoid vulgar realism and naive positivism based on "facts" of self-evident knowledge ultimately realized against the self-evidence of other groups.