### Plan

#### The United States Federal Government should grant limited jurisdiction to a federal court that prohibits uninhabited aerial vehicle targeted killings of individual United States citizens when, after being afforded notice and opportunity as well as defense from an independent public advocate, it is proven that the target is not a senior member of Al Qaeda or associated force.

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#### Advantage 1 is due process!!!!!

#### SCENARIO 1 IS HUMAN RIGHTS LEADERSHIP!

#### Despite due process reforms for detention, lack of protection for targeted killing combined with sole executive authority will collapse overall rights protections

Alford, 11 [Copyright (c) 2011 Utah Law Review Society Utah Law Review 2011 Utah Law Review 2011 Utah L. Rev. 1203 LENGTH: 41771 words ARTICLE: The Rule of Law at the Crossroads: Consequences of Targeted Killing of Citizens NAME: Ryan Patrick Alford\* BIO: \* © 2011 Ryan Patrick Alford, Assistant Professor, Ave Maria School of Law, p. lexis]

From 2001 to 2004, the constitutional order of the United States was severely tested. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, n408 the Supreme Court held that the writ of habeas corpus extended to a United States citizen held at Guantanamo Bay. n409 Eight of the nine Justices agreed that the executive branch did not have the power to hold a citizen indefinitely, without access to basic due process protections enforceable in open court. n410 This case was properly seen as a watershed, a rejection of theories of executive detention that were incompatible with the basic tenets of our common law tradition. n411 However, the clear right to habeas corpus is only slightly over three hundred years old - the right not to be killed without due process of law is twice as old and considerably more fundamental. As Blackstone made clear, habeas corpus was originally necessary because it was a prophylactic protection for Magna Carta's right not to be killed. n412 To turn a blind eye to executive death warrants would be to trample upon numerous principles the Framers believed so important as to put into a document that outlines the parameters of the state itself. It would also trample upon principles that predate the Bill of Rights: the balance of powers, the constraints on arbitrary executive action, and the specific requirements of additional due process for those accused of crimes amounting to treason. It would also make a mockery of their [\*1271] comprehensive view of due process, which precluded the use of military justice against civilians. It would allow a return to the very features of royalist justice that they and their forbearers detested, such as allowing the executive the power of judgment and denying the courts the power to intervene - this was the hallmark of the detested Star Chamber, which was abolished on these grounds in 1641. n413 What is perhaps most perplexing about this current crossroads is that there seems to be very little discussion of the importance of this case within the legal profession in general, and in particular among the scholars and lawyers who had opposed the legal framework for the indefinite detention of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay. It is difficult to understand why so much determined opposition should emerge to the withholding of the rights of habeas corpus from American citizens (which led to the decision in Hamdi), n414 while the administration's decision to issue executive death warrants has led to so little. Apart from the decision of the ACLU and the CCR to litigate the case on behalf of Nasser Al-Aulaqi, there has been very little action taken within the legal community to publicize the Obama Administration's decision to use the targeted killing program to assassinate an American citizen. n415 As the discussion of the targeted killing program after Al-Awlaki's extrajudicial execution reveals, American militants like Anwar al-Awlaki are placed on a kill or capture list by a secretive panel of senior government officials, which then informs the president of its decisions ... . There is no public record of the operations or decisions of the panel, which is a subset of the White House's National Security Council ... . Neither is there any law establishing its existence or setting out the rules by which it is supposed to operate. n416 [\*1272] Not only is there no law addressing the due process rights of Americans with respect to targeted killing, but no law on this subject can be made. The executive branch has prevented the judiciary from addressing the killing of citizens by asserting that the courts do not have jurisdiction over these cases because they present political questions. Since the judiciary may not adjudicate the claims of those about to be killed, the prevailing law of the land now comes in the form of secret memoranda created by the executive's Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC"). n417 The executive branch now has the final say on the constitutionality of its decision to kill an American citizen, since it asserts that no court has jurisdiction to review its opinion. This is executive privilege beyond James I's wildest dreams. While the administration insists that the OLC memorandum did not formulate general criteria for deciding whether Americans accused (impliedly, but not formally) of treason may be tortured or killed, n418 its version of events is actually worse than the alternative. The administration advances the position that a citizen suspected of treason may be killed after a singular determination within the executive branch that this would not violate the citizen's due process rights. "If that's true, then the Obama Administration is playing legal Calvinball, making decisions based on individual cases, rather than consistent legal criteria." n419 Unfortunately, this has been confirmed to be true: the recommendations for targeted killings are reportedly made on a case-by-case basis by "a grim debating society" of "more than 100 members of the government's sprawling national security apparatus," who provide no indication of using legal principles when determining such issues as which sort of "facilitators" of terrorism should be marked for death. n420 This sort of Star Chamber is precisely what the rule of law was designed to protect us against. After months of silence, Attorney General of the United States Eric Holder traced out the rationale for the targeted killing of an American citizen. n421 Rebutting this article's thesis, he argued: Some have argued that the president is required to get permission from a federal court before taking action against a United States citizen who is a senior operational leader of Al Qaeda or associated forces... . [\*1273] This is simply not accurate. "Due process" and "judicial process" are not one and the same, particularly when it comes to national security. The Constitution guarantees due process, not judicial process. n422 Given the Obama Administration's decision not to release the OLC memorandum or even acknowledge that they did in fact kill Al-Awlaki, n423 this will likely be the most comprehensive description of the legal case for targeted killings the American people ever receive. Its arrogance is stunning. Attorney General Holder appears to rely implicitly on a Court decision holding that those having their social security benefits terminated are not entitled to a hearing in advance in support of another proposition. Namely, that some unspecified degree of procedural fairness apportioned in secret within the executive branch is all that is required before an American citizen can be killed. The Constitution, and a tradition of resistance to arbitrary executive power that it reaffirmed that extends back to the Magna Carta, is being held for naught - on the basis of a holding from an administrative law case wrenched forcibly out of context. With this flimsy justification, the administration rationalizes the creation of a new Star Chamber, newly empowered to administer capital punishment in secret and unchallengeable proceedings. Should this pass unchallenged, this may herald the end of the rule of law in America.

#### That spills over -- it’s the knockout blow for rights guarantees

Blum and Heymann 10 (Gabriella, Assistant Professor of Law – Harvard Law School, and Philip, Professor of Law – Harvard Law School, “Law and Policy of Targeted Killing,” Harvard National Security Journal, 1 Harv. Nat'l Sec. J. 145, Lexis)

As we have shown, targeted killings may be justified even without declaring an all-out "war" on terrorism. A war paradigm is overbroad in the sense that it allows the targeting of any member of a terrorist organization. For the United States, it has had no geographical limits. When any suspected metmber of a hostile terrorist organization--regardless of function, role, or degree of contribution to the terrorist effort--might be targeted anywhere around the world without any due process guarantees or monitoring procedures, targeted killings run grave risks of doing both short-term and lasting harm. In contrast, a peacetime paradigm that enumerates specific exceptions for the use of force in self-defense is more legitimate, more narrowly tailored to the situation, offers potentially greater guarantees for the rule of law. It is, however, harder to justify targeted killing operations under a law enforcement paradigm when the tactic is used as a continuous and systematic practice rather than as an exceptional measure. Justifying targeted killings under a law enforcement paradigm also threatens to erode the international rules that govern peacetime international relations as well as the human rights guarantees that governments owe their own citizens

#### New legal framework key to effective norms – clear, national standards bridge the gap

Mutua 7 (Makau, SUNY Distinguished Professor, Professor of Law, Floyd H. & Hilda L. Hurst Faculty Scholar, and Director of the Human Rights Center – Buffalo Law School, “Standard Setting in Human Rights: Critique and Prognosis,” Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 29, http://www.law.buffalo.edu/content/dam/law/restricted-assets/pdf/faculty/mutuaM/journals/hrq2907.pdf)

Even with historic conceptual and institutional breakthroughs, a lot remains to be done to secure human dignity. Although human rights standards have been set in virtually all areas that touch on human dignity, normative gaps and weaknesses still exist in many areas. New normative frameworks are needed in some areas, while in others they must be elaborated and strengthened. Standard setting is a dynamic process that must respond to a rapidly changing globe and challenges that come with the emergence of new problems and conditions. The argument that the era of standard setting is over is not only mistaken, but dangerous.

The setting of human rights standards is not a static process. The conditions of humanity that human rights standards seek to safeguard and promote are evolving concepts. New conditions of oppression and powerlessness are forever being discovered, and new challenges are constantly emerging. For example, the gay rights movement and the campaign for the rights of people with disabilities were unthinkable just a few decades ago. The current US war on terror has similarly thrown up new obstacles to established norms. There is no doubt that these and many other issues require a normative response. The struggle for and definition of human freedom and development is a continuous and evolutionary process. These issues require unceasing vigilance, revision, re-evaluation, deepening, and re-definition. Broad norms and standards must be unpacked, broken down, elucidated, revised, and may even need to be rejected and replaced by new and different standards. The scope, reach, and content of norms must be comprehensible to their beneficiaries, as well as to those who bear the responsibility for their implementation. Vacuous, rhetorical, and vague standards accomplish little.

To be effective, standards must have a clear path for their implementation and enforcement. This is an area of weakness. Institutions that are responsible for the promotion and protection of human rights standards—states and IGOs—are largely perceived by NGOs as reluctant, unwilling, unable, or ineffectual actors. They are seen as interested mostly in blunting the bite of human rights to safeguard state sovereignty. The effect of human rights must be translated at the national level, so municipal institutions that safeguard basic rights are critical to enforcement. Judiciaries, national human rights institutions, bar associations, NGOs, police and security apparatuses, and legislatures must be in the frontline to entrench, deepen, promote, and protect human rights. However, only human rights NGOs among these institutions can usually be relied on to advance the human rights agenda with vigor, honesty, and a healthy disinterest. Human rights norms must be internalized by states in their legal and political orders to be effective.

#### Intra executive standards aren’t enough --- creates a double standard that impacts global perception – external oversight key

Zimmerman, 13 [Evan, Citing Zenko of CFR, Jane Dao of the NYT, Kristin Roberts of the Atlantic, etc. “Secrecy and the Obama Drone Program: a Violation of the Fifth Amendment”, April 22, 2013 <http://uculr.com/articles/2013/4/22/secrecy-and-the-obama-drone-program-a-violation-of-the-fifth-amendment>]

Notwithstanding the ease with which the Administration authorized the killing of al-Awlaki, the Administration has a clear understanding that the primary impediment to lawfully killing Americans is the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution, which states that, “no person shall…be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”[19] DOJ “assumes that the rights afforded by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause…attach to a US citizen even while he is abroad.”[20] However, such a protection does not make a US citizen immune from a lethal operation if he is an enemy combatant.[21] Rather, the Administration believes it must weigh the “private interest that will be affected by the official action” against the government’s asserted interest,[22] including “the burdens the government would face in providing process.”[23] The person in question has, indeed, a very weighty, in fact “uniquely compelling,” private interest: his life.[24] However, the Administration says that its war and accordant duty to defend the lives of innocent US citizens is also compelling, maybe even more so in this context than the accused’s own life.[25] Perhaps to satisfy such Fifth Amendment concerns, the DOJ White Paper states that there are three conditions that a targeted killing of a US citizen must fulfill before death may be considered: (a) an “informed, high-level”[26] US official must believe that there is an “imminent threat of violent attack”[27] against the US; (b) capture, which is a “fact-specific, and potentially time-sensitive, question,”[28] must be infeasible, and (c) the operation to kill must be conducted in “a manner consistent with applicable law of war principles.”[29] To be killed, targets must present an “imminent threat,” the first condition.[30] Traditionally, an “imminent threat” means an attack of some sort is about to happen. However, the Administration maintains that al-Qaida “does not behave like a traditional military,”[31] meaning that this conflict is not a traditional war. Specifically, “the Constitution does not require the President to delay action until some theoretical end-stage of planning—when the precise time, place, and manner of an attack become clear,”[32] according to the Administration. So, in accordance with this unconventional war, there is a similarly unconventional definition of “imminent.” DOJ maintains that an “imminent threat” does not require the US “to have clear evidence that a specific attack on US persons and interests will take place in the immediate future,”[33] leading one to question what standard of evidence is required at all. To justify itself, the Administration agrees with the Supreme Court that there must be “the greatest respect and consideration of judgments of military authorities in matters relating to the actual prosecution of war, and…the scope of that discretion is necessarily wide.”[34] DOJ states that it is not required to refrain from action until “preparations for an attack are concluded” because that would not allow the US “sufficient time to defend itself.”[35] Furthermore, for the US to lawfully defend itself, it must demonstrate that the people it defends against are legitimate targets and that the modes of defense are legitimate, which DOJ attempts to root in the traditional laws of war. The US is in armed conflict with al-Qaida and associated forces,[36] making its members legitimate targets of the US military and conduct with them subject to national self-defense laws.[37] Congress designated as enemy combatants those who aid al-Qaida and its associated forces, prompting the Administration to cite the public authority justification[38] when targeting their members.[39] The Administration believes that, as it has the right to detain US citizens who are enemy combatants,[40] it may similarly use lethal force as an “important incident of war,”[41] against those citizens.[42] Although the Administration believes it may only unilaterally conduct a drone strike in a place where al-Qaida is believed to have a “significant and organized presence,”[43] it also believes that there is little geographical limitation of its scope to target al-Qaida militants.[44] Furthermore, although the DOJ White Paper only addresses US citizens in foreign countries, public statements of DOJ suggest that they believe there would also be lawful circumstances in which US citizens on American soil could be killed.[45] The Administration recognizes that its powers are not unlimited, and that even powers granted to it by Congress may not have unlimited scope.[46] However, it believes that these killings are within the bounds of proper executive authority. Even more, under the Administration’s position, there is no mode for the public to police the propriety and legality of targeted killings by drones, as DOJ believes there is no proper forum for any case that would be brought against the government for its use of the drone program.[47] In effect, the only form of checks and balances here is to trust the US government not to overstep its authority. IV. Criticism of Official Policy The US has indicated that it believes that it may lawfully take out a citizen with a drone. What might a citizen do to trigger this? It is difficult to say, as the government’s asserted justifications are secret and, it claims, broad. If someone is wrongfully killed by a drone, how can his or her family[48] know that they have standing to sue the US government if the program is mostly secret?[49] There is great confusion surrounding the administration of US drone strikes, and the government has provided no adequate guidance. Since the US has kept its policies governing the drone program secret, the policy of targeted killings of US citizens is also secret. Such secrecy makes it so that no one can defend himself against the authorization of a drone strike or sue for restitution if accidentally killed. Secrecy is not the only impediment to the public’s understanding of the drone program; more obfuscation arises from the Administration’s own clear contradictions of its own policies. For example, Eric Holder’s letter to Rand Paul indicates that the Administration believes that it is possible legally to take out a US citizen with a drone on US soil, notwithstanding the DOJ White Paper’s requirement that US citizens only be targeted if they are, (a) on foreign soil, and are (b) senior leaders, (c) of al-Qaida. Why? We do not know, rendering the law impermissibly unclear. Furthermore, the Administration has already broken from its own standards. The only US citizen killed who was a senior leader of al-Qaida is Anwar al-Awlaki. An American subordinate of his—who was, in fact, dismissed as collateral damage, and never considered a senior leader publicly—was killed. A few weeks later, al-Awlaki’s son was also killed despite no indication that he was even involved in any terrorism group. The Administration has clearly conducted drone strikes that violate their own stated legal framework for proper and lawful targeted killings. Compounding the issue, the Administration’s rules are built on shaky ground. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a case that is crucial foundation for the legal positions taken within the DOJ White Paper, refers to the capture and detainment of a US citizen in combat, not assassination from a distance at a time potentially far removed from the time of attack. Hamdi admits that “while the full protections…may prove unworkable and inappropriate” in combat, “threats to military operations posed by a basic system of independent review are not so weighty as to trump a citizen’s core right to challenge meaningfully the Government’s case and to be heard by an impartial adjudicator.”[50] The right to an impartial adjudicator implies the right to a place and time to be heard, as well as the right to construct and present a case that has a “meaningful” possibility of success. In sum, Hamdi demands that due process of law be maintained outside of the combat setting, which by definition is where targeted killings occur. These rights have been violated with the way that targeted killings have been carried out so far. The Administration maintains that the killing of al-Awlaki’s son was collateral damage rather than the result of an authorized strike specifically against him. But this still means that, as a result, his family is now eligible to sue for restitution.[51] How would al-Awlaki’s son’s family be granted damages from the impartial adjudicator Hamdi calls for if the program that killed him is secret?[52] How could they prove that he was not a legitimate target if the criteria for targeted killings are unknown, or at least not clearly defined? They may not, perhaps most clearly because of DOJ’s position that there is no proper forum for such a trial.[53] Additionally, the secrecy of the program - and the fact that the government maintains that any decisions regarding targeted killing may only be reached through the its own “internal deliberations”[54] - ensures that, before they are killed, targets are impeded in their efforts to collect facts about their case and therefore wage a “meaningful” defense against the government’s accusations. Both of these situations directly violate the right to a robust defense before an impartial adjudicator called for in Hamdi, presenting serious constitutional issues relating to the Fifth Amendment. It is simply incorrect to compare the power to capture someone from the battlefield[55] with the right to be tried before one is killed, considering the right to an impartial adjudicator in a non- combat situation[56] and the highly compelling—in fact, paramount—interest a person has in saving his own life from imposition by the government.[57] The government may cite its own compelling interests and the power to strike secretly, but that is not mutually exclusive from a system with an acceptable level of disclosure. The exact manner and time at which they strike may remain secret, and may conform with the laws of war, but US citizens are entitled to know what they did to be targeted, to contest their targeting in some way, and for their families to pursue just compensation—and be awarded it—if they are wrongfully killed. This is only possible if the families know how and why their kin was killed, and what laws were broken. V. Conclusion and Summary A person has a clear right to due process. It would go too far to suggest that this implies that a person is absolutely free from being killed by the government. However, it is clear that a person has the right to defend himself in court, which requires that the charges against him be made known and the laws that he has broken publicized. The secrecy of the drone program does not allow Americans these protections that the Fifth Amendment requires. There are alternatives to a fully public trial—at the very least, a person is entitled to a military tribunal, if not a grand jury, for a capital offense. Being in a state of war does not allow the government to cease following the rule of law, but merely means some of its conduct becomes governed by the laws of war instead. Wartime perhaps permits targeted persons to be tried in absentia, for which there is some precedent,[58] represented by a public defender or his family and their private attorney.[59] If there truly is no “proper forum” in existence, Congress has the power to establish a court[60] with special jurisdiction over these matters. If the US government is concerned about speed,[61] it may establish special courts with a high, but not absolute, level of secrecy that try these cases with special speed.[62] If the government is worried that a publicized drone program will harm the United States’ image, secrecy is doing so already, causing speculation that the U.S. has secret agreements with other governments.[63] This further engenders suspicion of America, particularly in countries where citizens only have state-owned media and assume such information is vetted and condoned by the Administration.[64] If the government is concerned that such actions will slow down the U.S., it already has. Rand Paul recently stopped Senate business with a 13-hour filibuster of the architect of the drone program, John Brennan’s, nomination to Director of the CIA in order to force Eric Holder to say whether the Administration would target U.S. citizens on American soil. Holder was forced to respond, thereby delaying other DOJ business. There may be more such delays in the future as dissent, already present,[65] grows. The secrecy of the drone program is harming US citizens and their right to defend themselves and their families’ rights to just compensation if the accused are unjustly harmed. The issue is not that drones as a new technology are inherently problematic, but that they are used as a proxy targeted killing program, the secrecy of which is leveraged to sidestep the provision of Fifth Amendment rights. Americans do not know whether they are targeted, or what they can be targeted for. Due process of law requires these protections, especially when one’s life is at stake. Secrecy prevents these protections from being provided, a clear violation of the Fifth Amendment. There is a distinction between secrecy provided for the purpose of national security and an unacceptable lack of oversight. And it is clear that, with its drone policy, the Administration has not afforded the public the necessary information, rights, and protections it deserves

#### Prior, judicial oversight ensures informed and impartial decision-making – vital to due process

Adelsberg 12 (Samuel, J.D. – Yale Law School, “Bouncing the Executive's Blank Check: Judicial Review and the Targeting of Citizens,” Harvard Law & Policy Review, Summer, 6 Harv. L. & Pol'y Rev. 437, Lexis)

The relevance of these precedents to the targeting of citizens is clear: the constitutional right to due process is alive and well--regardless of geographic location. We now turn to what type of process is due.

III. BRING IN THE COURTS: BRINGING JUDICIAL LEGITIMACY TO TARGETED KILLINGS

The function of this Article is not to argue that targeted killing should be removed from the toolbox of American military options. Targeted killing as a military tactic is here to stay. n34 Targeting strikes have robust bipartisan political support and have become an increasingly relied upon weapon as the United States decreases its presence in Iraq and Afghanistan. n35 The argument being asserted here, therefore, is that in light of the protections the Constitution affords U.S. citizens, there must be a degree of inter-branch process when the government targets such individuals.

The current intra-executive process afforded to U.S. citizens is not only unlawful, but also dangerous. n36 Justice O'Connor acknowledged the danger inherent in exclusively intra-branch process in Hamdi when she asserted that an interrogator is not a neutral decision-maker as the "even purportedly fair adjudicators are disqualified by their interest in the controversy." n37 In rejecting the government's argument that a "separation of powers" analysis mandates a heavily circumscribed role for the courts in these circumstances, Justice O'Connor contended that, in times of conflict, the Constitution "most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at stake." n38 Similarly, Justice Kennedy was unequivocal in Boumediene about the right of courts to enforce the Constitution even in times of war. Quoting Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, n39 Kennedy argued that holding "that the political branches may switch the constitution on or off at will would lead to a regime in which they, not this Court, say 'what the law is.'" n40 This sentiment is very relevant to our targeted killing analysis: in the realm of targeted killing, where the deprivation is of one's life, the absence of any "neutral decision-maker" outside the executive branch is a clear violation of due process guaranteed by the Constitution.

Justices O'Connor and Kennedy are pointing to a dangerous institutional tension inherent in any intra-executive process regime. Targeting decisions are no different; indeed, the goal of those charged with targeting citizens like al-Awlaki is not to strike a delicate balance between security [\*444] and liberty but rather, quite single-mindedly, to prevent attacks on the United States. n41 In describing the precarious nature of covert actions, James Baker, a distinguished military judge, noted, "the twin necessities of secrecy and speed may pull as they do against the competing interests of deliberate review, dissent, and informed accountable decision-making." n42 While Judge Baker concluded that these risks "magnify the importance of a meaningful process of ongoing executive appraisal," he overlooked the institutional tension, seized upon by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, which would preclude the type of process that he was advocating. n43

Although there may be a role for Congress in such instances, a legislative warrant for specific cases would likely be cumbersome, carry significant security risks, and may violate the spirit of the Bill of Attainder Clause, which prohibits the legislature from performing judicial or executive functions. The current inter-branch process for covert actions, in which the President must make a finding and notify the leaders of Congress and the intelligence committees, is entirely ex post and also has not been proven to provide a meaningful check on executive power. n44 Moreover, most politicians are unqualified to make the necessary legal judgments that these situations require.

Solutions calling for the expatriation of citizens deemed to be terrorists are fraught with judicial complications and set very dangerous precedents for citizenship revocation. n45 Any post-deprivation process, such as a Bivens-style action, for a targeted attack would also be problematic. n46 Government officials charged with carrying out these attacks might be hesitant to do so if there were a threat of prosecution. Moreover, post-deprivation process for a target would be effectively meaningless in the wake of a successful attack.

 [\*445] Rather, as recognized by the Founders in the Fourth Amendment, balancing the needs of security against the imperatives of liberty is a traditional role for judges to play. Two scholars of national security law recently highlighted the value of judicial inclusion in targeting decisions: "Judicial control of targeted killing could increase the accuracy of target selection, reducing the danger of mistaken or illegal destruction of lives, limbs, and property. Independent judges who double-check targeting decisions could catch errors and cause executive officials to avoid making them in the first place." n47 Judges are both knowledgeable in the law and accustomed to dealing with sensitive security considerations. These qualifications make them ideal candidates to ensure that the executive exercises constitutional restraint when targeting citizens.

Reforming the decision-making process for executing American citizens to allow for judicial oversight would restore the separation of powers framework envisioned by the Founders and increase democratic legitimacy by placing these determinations on steadier constitutional ground. For those fearful of judicial encroachment on executive war-making powers, there is a strong argument that this will actually strengthen the President and empower him to take decisive action without worrying about the judicial consequences. As Justice Kennedy put it, "the exercise of [executive] powers is vindicated, not eroded, when confirmed by the Judicial Branch." n48 Now, we will turn to what this judicial involvement would look like.

#### It’s reverse casual – aligning the war on terror with due process builds support for US leadership on human rights – the impact is warming and legitimacy

Schulz 8 (William F., Senior Fellow – Center for American Progress, Adjunct Professor of International Relations – The New School, Former Executive Direction – Amnesty International, “Introduction,” *The Future of Human Rights: U.S. Policy for a New Era*, p. 11-14)

Which leads to the second general principle the United States must reaffirm: a commitment to global cooperation and respect for international protocols and institutions, imperfect as they are. Of Francis Fukuyama's four bedrock characteristics of neoconservatism, it is the final one" skepticism about the legitimacy and effectiveness of international law and institutions to achieve either security or justice"38-that most dramatically divides normative human rights practice from neoconservative.

Sophisticated advocates of human rights are not naive about the failures of the United Nations, the shortcomings of the UN Human Rights Council, the unproven value of the International Criminal Court, or the weakness of unenforceable international law. But to ignore international regimens, much less undermine them, is to sacrifice the best resource the United States has available for convincing the world that we do not suffer from solipsism, immune to the needs and opinions of others; that our intent is benign; and that the most powerful nation on earth is prepared to use its power fairly and wisely. Mighty as we are, we do not live in a cocoon; we cannot solve our problems by ourselves, be they Iraq or terrorism or global warming.

Respect for human rights and the processes by which they are fashioned is one of the best ways to win global friends and influence the passions of people. And whether we think the source of human rights is God, natural law, or consensualism, an international imprimatur lends legitimacy to our pursuit of them. As a study by the Princeton Project on National Security noted recently, "Liberty under law within nations is inextricably linked with a stable system of liberty under law among them. " 40 Surely even Condoleezza Rice who, during the 2000 presidential campaign, wrote that "foreign policy in a Republican administration ... will proceed from the firm ground of the national interest, not the interests of an illusory international community [emphasis added] " 41 has come to rue the day she thought the world community no more than a chimera.

Repairing the Damage

The damaging effect of neoconservative policies on human rights goes well beyond reinforcement of the suspicion that American advocacy of human rights is a mere cover for an imperialist agenda. Those policies have undermined the notion that spreading human rights and democracy around the globe are viable goals of U.S. foreign policy. They have weakened international institutions upon which human rights depend. And they have increased a certain natural reticence on the part of the American people to commit U.S. troops to humanitarian and peace keeping missions, even when they are justified, as they are, for example, in Darfur. Coupled with America's human rights practices as part of its prosecution of the war on terror-secret incommunicado detentions, denial of habeas corpus, winking acceptance of torture-the nation's ability to hold others to account for their own abuses has been severely weakened.

A new administration will certainly have its hands full repairing this damage. It will need to find a variety of ways to signal renewed US. support for the international system. RatifYing one or more international human rights treaties would help do that. Perhaps the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which all countries except the United States and Somalia have ratified, would be a place to start now that the U.S. Supreme Court has removed one of the major objections to the treaty by declaring the execution of juveniles unconstitutional. Or closing Guantanamo Bay. Or removing the reservations to various human rights treaties that declare them nonenforceable in domestic law. Or standing for election to the UN Human Rights Council, flawed though it is, and using that forum to articulate a renewed commitment to a comprehensive human rights agenda. Or revisiting U.S. concerns about the International Criminal Court with an eye toward eventually ratifYing the Rome statutes establishing the court, or at least suspending the penalties we have leveraged against those countries that have refused to immunize Americans from prosecution by the court. If Iraq has taught us anything, it ought to have demonstrated that finding ways to deal with tyrants short of military force is to the advantage of all parties.

It will need to adopt a more sophisticated, less ham-handed approach to the promotion of democracy around the globe. It ought to go without saying that human rights are served by an increase in the number of stable democracies in the world. But the key word is "stable," since we know that newly formed, unstable democratic states lacking robust civil societies and strong democratic institutions are especially prone to be breeding grounds for all sorts of mischief, not least the production of terrorists. The tragedy of the Iraq War will only be compounded if the lesson drawn from it is that, because force- . feeding democracy proved so destructive, the only alternative is quiescence. While democracy is no magic bullet, tyranny guarantees bullets aplenty. Not every nation is ready to leap into full-blown democracy on a moment's notice. But if, indeed, as worldwide surveys have found, more than 90 percent of Muslims endorse democ- Introduction 13 racy as the best form of government, what is required of us is neither perfectionism nor passivity.42 What is required of us is patience.

It will need to codify the positive obligations of the United States under the

newly minted doctrine of the "responsibility to protect. "Just as the Iraq War ought not sour us on promoting democracy, so we must not allow it to impose an unfitting shyness upon us about using military power for humanitarian ends. In 2005 the UN General Assembly endorsed the worldwide responsibility to protect civilian populations at risk from mass atrocities.43 That does not imply that the United States will have to be the proverbial "world's policeman," committing its troops willy-nilly to the far corners of the globe. But it does mean that the United States will need to take mass atrocities seriously, adopting an early warning system for populations in danger, shoring up weak and failing states, and providing leadership and support for intervention when necessary, even when it itself stays far away from battle. The American people can distinguish between unwise military posturing and morally justified humanitarian interventions. In January 2007, after more than three years and 3,000 U.S. deaths in Iraq, 63 percent of Americans, quite understandably, said that the world has grown more afraid of U.S. military force and that such fear undermines U.S. security by prompting other nations to seek means to protect themselves.44 Yet, even so, in a poll taken six months later, a plurality of Americans favored deploying U.S. troops as part of a multinational force in Darfur.45 If the American people can tell the difference between legitimate and illegitimate use of force, the American government ought to be able to also.

It will need to conform US. practices to international standards on fundamental human rights issues. The United States will never reclaim its reputation for human rights leadership as long as its own policies on such issues as **due process** for prisoners taken into custody in the course of the war on terror remain at such radical odds with international law and practice. There is considerable room for debate as to how cases of terror suspects should be adjudicated, especially when highly classified intelligence is involved-whether, for example, the United States should establish special national security courts or integrate such defendants into the regular criminal justice system46- but what is beyond doubt is that the current system in which suspects are cast into legal netherworlds of secret detentions and coercive interrogations cannot continue. And in a broader sense, the United States would do well in the eyes of the world to be less defensive about its own domestic practices that may fall short of international standards. Our credibility in criticizing others waxes and wanes in direct proportion to our willingness to acknowledge our own shortcomings. We should, for example, welcome to this country any UN special rapporteur who seeks an invitation to investigate; we should encourage the solicitor general of the United States to draw upon international law to buttress the government's arguments before the Supreme Court, thereby lending encouragement to those members of the court who are beginning to look to such law to inform their opinions;47 and we should issue an annual report on U.S. human rights practices to complement the State Department's reports on other countries. Mter all, since the Chinese publish such a report on us each year, it could not hurt to publish a more accurate version of our own.

#### Warming causes extinction

Don Flournoy 12, Citing Feng Hsu, PhD NASA Scientist @ the Goddard Space Flight Center and Don is a PhD and MA from UT, former Dean of the University College @ Ohio University, former Associate Dean at SUNY and Case Institute of Technology, Former Manager for University/Industry Experiments for the NASA ACTS Satellite, currently Professor of Telecommunications @ Scripps College of Communications, Ohio University, “Solar Power Satellites,” January 2012, Springer Briefs in Space Development, p. 10-11

In the Online Journal of Space Communication , Dr. Feng Hsu, a  NASA scientist at Goddard Space Flight Center, a research center in the forefront of science of space and Earth, writes, “The evidence of global warming is alarming,” noting the potential for a catastrophic planetary climate change is real and troubling (Hsu 2010 ) . Hsu and his NASA colleagues were engaged in monitoring and analyzing climate changes on a global scale, through which they received first-hand scientific information and data relating to global warming issues, including the dynamics of polar ice cap melting. After discussing this research with colleagues who were world experts on the subject, he wrote: I now have no doubt global temperatures are rising, and that global warming is a serious problem confronting all of humanity. No matter whether these trends are due to human interference or to the cosmic cycling of our solar system, there are two basic facts that are crystal clear: (a) there is overwhelming scientific evidence showing positive correlations between the level of CO2 concentrations in Earth’s atmosphere with respect to the historical fluctuations of global temperature changes; and (b) the overwhelming majority of the world’s scientific community is in agreement about the risks of a potential catastrophic global climate change. That is, if we humans continue to ignore this problem and do nothing, if we continue dumping huge quantities of greenhouse gases into Earth’s biosphere, humanity will be at dire risk (Hsu 2010 ) . As a technology risk assessment expert, Hsu says he can show with some confidence that the planet will face more risk doing nothing to curb its fossil-based energy addictions than it will in making a fundamental shift in its energy supply. “This,” he writes, “is because the risks of a catastrophic anthropogenic climate change can be potentially the extinction of human species, a risk that is simply too high for us to take any chances” (Hsu 2010 ).

#### Lack of legitimacy makes US leadership ineffective, regardless of material power

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Going against common conceptions, I argue that the United States sought to advance more than what it viewed as simply its own interest. The United States stands behind multiple collaborative enterprises and should be credited for that. Nevertheless, sometimes it has overreached, sought to gain special rights other states do not have, or presented strategies that were not compatible with the general design of the war on terrorism, to which most states subscribed. When it went too far, the United States found that, while secondary powers could not stop it from taking action, they could deny it legitimacy and make the achievement of its objectives unattainable. Thus, despite the common narrative, U.S. power was successfully checked, and the United States found the limitations of its power, even under the Bush administration. Defining Hegemony Let me begin with my conception of hegemony. While the definition of hegemony is based on its material aspects—the preponderance of power—hegemony should be understood as a part of a social web comprised of states. A hegemon relates to the other states in the system not merely through the prism of power balances, but through shared norms and a system of rules providing an umbrella for interstate relations. Although interstate conflict is ubiquitous in international society and the pursuit of particularistic interests is common, the international society provides a normative framework that restricts and moderates the hegemon's actions. This normative framework accounts for the hegemon's inclination toward orderly and peaceful interstate relations and minimizes its reliance on power. A hegemon’s role in the international community relies on legitimacy. Legitimacy is associated with external recognition of the hegemon’s right of primacy, not just the fact of this primacy. States recognize the hegemon’s power, but they develop expectations that go beyond the idea that the hegemon will act as it wishes because it has the capabilities to do so. Instead, the primacy of the hegemon is manifested in the belief that, while it has special rights that other members of the international society lack, it also has a set of duties to the members of the international society. As long as the hegemon realizes its commitment to the collective, its position will be deemed legitimate. International cooperation is hard to achieve. And, in general, international relations is not a story of harmony. A state’s first inclination is to think about its own interests, and states always prefer doing less over doing more. The inclination to pass the buck or to free ride on the efforts of others is always in the background. If a hegemon is willing to lead in pursuit of collective interests and to shoulder most of the burden, it can improve the prospects of international cooperation. However, even when there is a hegemon willing to lead a collective action and when states accept that action is needed, obstacles may still arise. These difficulties can be attributed to various factors, but especially prominent is the disagreement over the particular strategy that the hegemon promotes in pursuing the general interest. When states think that the strategy and policies offered by the hegemon are not compatible with the accepted rules of “rightful conduct” and break established norms, many will disapprove and resist. Indeed, while acceptance of a hegemon’s leadership in international society may result in broad willingness to cooperate with the hegemon in pursuit of shared interests it does not guarantee immediate and unconditional compliance with all the policies the hegemon articulates. While its legitimacy does transfer to its actions and grants some leeway, that legitimacy does not justify every policy the hegemon pursues—particularly those policies that are not seen as naturally deriving from the existing order. As a result, specific policies must be legitimated before cooperation takes place. This process constrains the hegemon’s actions and prevents the uninhibited exercise of power.

#### Extinction

Zhang and Shi 11 Yuhan Zhang is a researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C.; Lin Shi is from Columbia University. She also serves as an independent consultant for the Eurasia Group and a consultant for the World Bank in Washington, D.C., 1/22, “America’s decline: A harbinger of conflict and rivalry”, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/01/22/americas-decline-a-harbinger-of-conflict-and-rivalry/

This does not necessarily mean that the US is in systemic decline, but it encompasses a trend that appears to be negative and perhaps alarming. Although the US still possesses incomparable military prowess and its economy remains the world’s largest, the once seemingly indomitable chasm that separated America from anyone else is narrowing. Thus, the global distribution of power is shifting, and the inevitable result will be a world that is less peaceful, liberal and prosperous, burdened by a dearth of effective conflict regulation. Over the past two decades, no other state has had the ability to seriously challenge the US military. Under these circumstances, motivated by both opportunity and fear, many actors have bandwagoned with US hegemony and accepted a subordinate role. Canada, most of Western Europe, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore and the Philippines have all joined the US, creating a status quo that has tended to mute great power conflicts. However, as the hegemony that drew these powers together withers, so will the pulling power behind the US alliance. The result will be an international order where power is more diffuse, American interests and influence can be more readily challenged, and conflicts or wars may be harder to avoid. As history attests, power decline and redistribution result in military confrontation. For example, in the late 19th century America’s emergence as a regional power saw it launch its first overseas war of conquest towards Spain. By the turn of the 20th century, accompanying the increase in US power and waning of British power, the American Navy had begun to challenge the notion that Britain ‘rules the waves.’ Such a notion would eventually see the US attain the status of sole guardians of the Western Hemisphere’s security to become the order-creating Leviathan shaping the international system with democracy and rule of law. Defining this US-centred system are three key characteristics: enforcement of property rights, constraints on the actions of powerful individuals and groups and some degree of equal opportunities for broad segments of society. As a result of such political stability, free markets, liberal trade and flexible financial mechanisms have appeared. And, with this, many countries have sought opportunities to enter this system, proliferating stable and cooperative relations. However, what will happen to these advances as America’s influence declines? Given that America’s authority, although sullied at times, has benefited people across much of Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, as well as parts of Africa and, quite extensively, Asia, the answer to this question could affect global society in a profoundly detrimental way. Public imagination and academia have anticipated that a post-hegemonic world would return to the problems of the 1930s: regional blocs, trade conflicts and strategic rivalry. Furthermore, multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank or the WTO might give way to regional organisations. For example, Europe and East Asia would each step forward to fill the vacuum left by Washington’s withering leadership to pursue their own visions of regional political and economic orders. Free markets would become more politicised — and, well, less free — and major powers would compete for supremacy. Additionally, such power plays have historically possessed a zero-sum element. In the late 1960s and 1970s, US economic power declined relative to the rise of the Japanese and Western European economies, with the US dollar also becoming less attractive. And, as American power eroded, so did international regimes (such as the Bretton Woods System in 1973). A world without American hegemony is one where great power wars re-emerge, the liberal international system is supplanted by an authoritarian one, and trade protectionism devolves into restrictive, anti-globalisation barriers. This, at least, is one possibility we can forecast in a future that will inevitably be devoid of unrivalled US primacy.

#### SCENARIO TWO IS LEGAL CRISES!

#### Obama’s white paper claimed due process for citizens, but executive implementation creates a legal disaster that wrecks due process – providing notice and opportunity is key

Feldman 13 (Noah, Professor of Constitutional and International Law – Harvard University, “Obama’s Drone Attack on Your Due Process,” Bloomberg, 2-8, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-08/obama-s-drone-attack-on-your-due-process.html>)

\*gender modified

The biggest problem with the recently disclosed Obama administration white paper defending the drone killing of radical clerk Anwar al-Awlaki isn’t its secrecy or its creative redefinition of the words “imminent threat.” It is the revolutionary and shocking transformation of the meaning of due process.

Fortunately, as seen during John Brennan’s confirmation hearing for Central Intelligence Agency director, Congress is starting to notice.

Due process is the oldest and most essential component of the rule of law. It goes back to the Magna Carta, when the barons insisted that King John agree not to kill anyone or take property without following legal procedures.

What they meant -- and what has been considered the essence of due process since -- is that the accused must be notified of the charges against him and have the opportunity to have his[\*/her\*] case heard by an impartial decision maker. If you get due process, you can’t complain about the punishment that follows. If you don’t get that opportunity, you’ve been the victim of arbitrary power.

Are U.S. enemies entitled to due process? Well, no -- not if they are arrayed against the country on the battlefield. In war, you don’t try the enemy. You kill him, preferably before he kills you. And if some of the Japanese troops at Guadalcanal had held U.S. citizenship, it wouldn’t have suddenly given them due process rights. If Awlaki was an enemy fighting on the battlefield, he wouldn’t have deserved due process while the fight was on. Off it, he should legally be like any other U.S. citizen, innocent until proven guilty.

Generous Idea

Yet, despite claiming that the Awlaki killing was justified because he was an operational leader of al-Qaeda, and thus in some sense an enemy on the battlefield, the white paper still assumes that due process applies to U.S. citizens abroad who adhere to the enemy. On the surface, this sounds plausible and even generous: Why not consider the possibility that a U.S. citizen abroad has some rights against being killed out of the blue?

In fact, though, applying due process analysis to Awlaki produces a legal disaster. The problem is, once you consider due process, you have to give it some meaning -- and the meaning you choose will cast a long shadow over what the term means everywhere else.

The white paper uses two Supreme Court cases to assess what process is due to an American about to be killed by a drone. The first, Mathews v. Eldridge, is a 1976 case in which the court held that the elaborate administrative processes necessary after a person lost his Social Security disability benefits were constitutionally acceptable even though there was no evidentiary hearing before the benefits were terminated. In that case, the court said that the process due could be determined by balancing the individual’s interest against the government’s.

The other case was 2004’s Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, where the court held that a detained enemy combatant -- in custody, not on the battlefield -- must receive “notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral decision- maker.”

Astonishingly, the white paper follows its summary of these decisions with the bald assertion that a citizen outside U.S. territory can be killed if a high-level official determines that he poses an imminent threat, it would be unfeasible to capture him and the laws of war would otherwise permit the killing.

Never Explained

The non sequitur is breathtaking. Awlaki wouldn’t receive notice, the opportunity to be heard or a hearing before a decision maker. In other words, he would receive none of the components of traditional due process -- not even one. How the absence of due process could be magically transformed into its satisfaction is never stated or explained. All we get is the assertion that a target’s interest in life must be “balanced against” the government’s interest in protecting other Americans. On this theory, no due process would be due to those accused of murder, because their lives would have to be balanced against the government’s interest in protecting their potential victims.

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#### Obama relies on internal review to legally say targeted killing meets due process – external review prevents manipulation of the law that weakens it in other areas

Powell 13 (Jeff, Professor of Law – Duke University School of Law, Former Member – Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, Former Deputy Assistant Attorney, “Jeff Powell on Targeted Killing and Due Process,” Lawfare Blog, 6-21, <http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/06/jeff-powell-on-targeted-killing-and-due-process/>)

There is much to admire in the speech President Barack Obama gave on May 23rd in which he gave us his views on “lethal, targeted action” against high ranking members of al-Qaeda and its allies, above all his acknowledgment that the “laws constrain the power of the President, even during wartime.” For all his speech’s virtues, however, Mr. Obama’s comments about one legal issue, due process, should disturb us deeply. In discussing his insistence “on strong oversight of all lethal action,” the President stated, “for the record,” that he “do[es] not believe it would be constitutional for the government to target and kill any U.S. citizen – with a drone, or a shotgun – without due process.” Mr. Obama had just referred to the killing of Anwar Awlaki, whose death was “the one instance when we targeted an American citizen,” and he plainly was not confessing constitutional error. There is no serious doubt, then, that the President thinks that the US government deprived Mr. Awlaki of his life with due process. Unfortunately, Mr. Obama’s discussion of that issue is fundamentally flawed in two ways: first, in his assumption that due process applies at all, and second, in his belief that the administration’s procedures satisfy due process.

The President’s blanket assertion that our government must always provide due process before killing a citizen may seem self-evident – after all, the Fifth Amendment demands that no person (not citizen!) shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law — but Mr. Obama was wrong nonetheless. Due process requires fairness in government’s dealings with those it governs; it simply does not apply to military decisions, in hostilities that Congress has authorized, about attacking members of enemy forces who are not under American control. Mr. Obama was not justifying the killing of Mr. Awlaki as an extrajudicial execution but as the elimination of a particular enemy officer in the field as an act of war. The Constitution imposes other constraints on presidential action in a time of war, but due process has no role in what the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld termed “the Executive in its exchanges …with enemy organizations in times of conflict.”

If there is no constitutional due process requirement at all, why does it matter that Mr. Obama assumes that there is? Is there any real harm in putting forth a standard for meeting a burden that doesn’t exist? There is, because the President’s reasoning may undercut the meaning of due process in other circumstances where the constitutional requirement does apply.

From comments he and other officials have made, and from the Justice Department “White Paper” that was leaked earlier this year, what he had in mind seems clear: it is the “strong oversight” over targeting decisions that the President himself has mandated that he and his advisors believe satisfies the Constitution. The White Paper lays out the argument: the executive branch itself has provided a targeted US citizen due process because only high-level members of al-Qaeda and its allies are targeted, the decision to use lethal force is made by an “informed, high-level official of the U.S. government,” that official must determine that the potential target poses an “imminent threat of violent attack,” and it must not be feasible to capture the individual without excessive risk to the lives of American personnel or vital American interests. As the President put it, Mr. Awlaki “was continuously trying to kill people” as part of his role in al-Qaeda, and although Mr. Obama “would have detained and prosecuted Awlaki if we captured him before he carried out a plot … we couldn’t.”

I have no objection to the procedures that the White Paper outlines: indeed they are roughly the sort of careful decisionmaking that I would hope my government would employ in such a grave matter. (Whether our current practices of targeted killing are a wise or even moral policy overall is another question.) Nor am I criticizing the determination that Mr. Awlaki met the White Paper’s targeting criteria: I have no reason or inclination to doubt the President’s view of the facts. But the White Paper’s claim that these laudable procedures amount to due process is quite indefensible.

The White Paper (correctly) invoked the Hamdi v. Rumsfeld decision for the due process analysis that applies in the war against al-Qaeda, but its understanding of the Constitution’s requirements could hardly be more at odds with the discussion of “the central meaning of procedural due process” in Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s lead opinion: “Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified. It is equally fundamental that the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,” and they must be heard by a “neutral and detached judge.” “These essential constitutional promises may not be eroded,” Justice O’Connor concluded, but the White Paper – and I think we can assume the President as well – apparently find these promises inapplicable in the context of targeted killings.

It takes only a moment’s reflection to see that the President’s laudable procedures for imposing “strong oversight” over targeting decisions are worlds apart from Hamdi’s “essential constitutional promises” – indeed, it is hard to imagine how a military decision about attacking an enemy combatant could be otherwise. Of course the White Paper does not propose that potential targets be given notice of the government’s possible interest in killing them. Of course it does not contemplate, much less require, that a targeted individual be heard at any time or in any manner as to why the government is mistaken about his identity or activities. Of course it does not provide for a neutral and detached decisionmaker to resolve any factual uncertainty: the ultimate decisionmaker here is the President in his capacity as commander in chief, who (we should hope) is not in the least neutral or detached in carrying out his responsibility for national security. Calling the executive’s own procedures the due process that is meant to check arbitrary executive decisions isn’t merely an erosion of the “essential constitutional promises” but their wholesale repudiation. If Mr. Awlaki was entitled to due process, then his killing violated the Constitution.

Since due process doesn’t apply to a US military decision, in a situation of actual and authorized hostilities, to attack a member of the enemy’s forces who is a legitimate target under the law of war, the Constitution was not in fact violated. But my concern here is to identify the patent error in the White Paper’s and the President’s thinking about due process, because that error is likely to confuse our thinking about the wisdom and morality of targeted killing. The decision to kill a known, identified human being is a brutal one, the action of doing so is ugly to think about, even apart from the fact that sometimes other people die (as Mr. Obama acknowledged with sorrow). This brutality and ugliness are part of the grim reality of war. When we pretend to ourselves that our procedures for making such decisions satisfies the constitutional requirements of due process, we cast a veil of civility and even humanity over something that is inherently violent and dehumanizing.

I am not a pacifist, and I accept that the brutality of war is sometimes unavoidable. But the law’s antiseptic language about the weighing and balancing of interests according to “the traditional due process analysis” that supplies the legal “framework for assessing the process due a U.S. citizen” (I quote from the White Paper) masks, in a deeply misleading fashion, the brutality, the terror and the violence of war – even if we are right to conclude that we should take lethal action against our enemies. It serves no good purpose for the President and his advisors, or for any of us as citizens, to pretend that targeted killing is or can be anything other than the brutality it is.

The problem with the President’s constitutional error is not limited to its power to confuse our thinking about the reality of targeted killing. Once a legal argument gains legitimacy in the courts, or among executive officials, or in public discussion, it tends to expand beyond its original boundaries – the intellectual habits of lawyers and the traditional legalism of American public debate make this almost inevitable. By dint of repetition if nothing else, the claim that the executive’s own internal cogitations can amount to constitutional due process threatens to acquire the sort of legitimacy that will tempt future lawyers, and future Presidents, to apply it in other contexts. During World War Two, Justice Robert Jackson rejected the government’s argument that it was constitutional to intern US citizens purely on the basis of their Japanese ancestry because the decision rested on the executive’s claim of military necessity. Jackson didn’t propose that the courts interfere with the military’s actions, but he vigorously objected to anyone rationalizing the decision as constitutional. Accept that conclusion, Jackson wrote, and “[t]he principle then lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.” The same worry applies to the President’s rewriting of what due process requires. Neither Mr. Obama nor anyone else can foresee or prevent future claims that we must turn the idea of due process on its head because of some perceived need to do so. The President and his advisors should rethink the White Paper’s faulty reasoning, and we should all keep in view the difference between “the essential constitutional promises” due process embodies, and the modes of military decision that our government employs in waging war.

#### That's especially true for drug-trafficking

Mataconis 13 (Doug, Private Practice Attorney, “President Obama’s Troubling Justification For Targeted Killings,” Outside the Beltway, 2-5, <http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/136544/>)

Obviously, the biggest concern here is the fact that the memo presents a fairly broadly open-ended definition of what an “imminent” attack actually is. It certainly doesn’t have the same meaning that it does in general conversation. This seems especially true given the fact that the al-Awlaki killing occurred nearly two years after the terrorist attack he was accused of masterminding, the 2009 “Underwear Bomber” attack. If we’re talking about the plot to apparently send bombs disguised as toner cartridges into the United States from Yemen, the killing took place a years after the alleged threat. Since we have never been privy to any of the evidence that the Administration supposedly had against him, it’s hard to see how he was the kind of “imminent” threat that ordinary use of the word would suggest or why it wouldn’t have been just as acceptable to capture him and bring him back to the United States for trial.

Ron Fournier points out many of the questions that arise from these memo:

1. Where does this slippery slope end? If killing Americans with no due process is OK when their alleged crime is consorting with al-Qaida, it’s not a huge intellectual leap to give government officials the same judge-and-jury authority over other heinous acts such as mass murder, drug-trafficking and pornography.

2. Shouldn’t there be a higher standard? In the torture debate, many Americans seemed to buy the concept that extreme measures might be necessary to prevent an imminent attack against the U.S. Should the standard be higher for torture than murder?

3. What makes a targeting killing lawful? Holder told the public months ago that killing Americans can be justified if “capture is not feasible.” But the memo gives more leeway to government officials, condoning the killing of an American if U.S. troops would be put at risk in an attempted capture, for example. Why the double-speak?

4. Why the secrecy? Obama promised to run the most transparent administration of modern times, and in many ways he’s kept the pledge. But not on this life-and-death issue. A group of 11 senators, led by Democrat Ron Wyden of Oregon, have urged Obama to release all Justice Department memos on targeting killings. There are many more, and more important, documents than the Isikoff memo that need exposure. The public deserves to know why its president, without due process or visibility, is issuing death sentences to alleged terrorists, some of them Americans. They learned today that the public statements of administration officials on this matter can’t be trusted.

Based on an initial reading of the memo (which is available as a PDF file), it seems pretty clear that the Administration is attempting to make it appear that their policy limits the President’s authority when, in reality, it greatly expanding it. By defining “imminence” so loosely, as well as the other qualifications that are put on the decision of whether or not to target someone for killing, they have managed to vastly expand the powers of the Presidency just as President George W. Bush did during his time in office. This is of concern for two reasons.

First, as I’ve said in other posts regarding this matter, the idea that the President can decide on his own when an American citizen can be targeted for assassination by means of a secret process which American courts cannot review is a profoundly disturbing one. Who’s to say that this some rule can’t be used to target someone in the United States, or in a foreign country that, if requested, would be more than likely to assist us in arrest of such a suspect? Once you concede the idea that a President has the right to order the death of an American citizen without trial or any other form of due process, you’ve opened the floodgates to all kinds of potential problems.

#### Broadly applying due process for trafficking is key to global support that solves organized crime

Lichter 9 (Brian A., J.D. – Northwestern School of Law, “THE OFFENCES CLAUSE, DUE PROCESS, AND THE EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW IN NARCO-TERRORISM PROSECUTIONS,” Northwestern University Law Review, 103(4), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/v103/n4/1929/lr103n4lichter.pdf)

The new narco-terrorism statute raises important constitutional issues that warrant further scholarly exploration. In a world of increasingly globalized crime, the constitutional rights of foreign nationals, the extraterritorial jurisdiction of federal courts, and Congress‘s power to legislate extraterritorially will become central questions within our constitutional framework. These issues, taken together, raise the broader question of the proper balance between individual liberties and national security interests in a post-9/11 world. This Comment argues that the government‘s power to proscribe narcoterrorism is broad. But while the Constitution should act as a shield for national interests rather than a sword in extraterritorial prosecutions, 207 the government‘s power is not—and cannot be—exercised without constraint. Although Congress‘s Offences Clause power is broad, it is not limitless. To check this broad power, the Executive is under no obligation to initiate § 960a prosecutions, particularly if a prosecution would pose thorny political and diplomatic questions. The Fifth Amendment‘s Due Process Clause also limits the extraterritorial reach of federal law. Although this Comment argues that due process does not require a territorial nexus, measuring due process pursuant to internationally accepted bases of jurisdiction in extraterritorial prosecutions is advantageous for policy reasons. Exercising jurisdiction in accordance with international law is politically beneficial because it demonstrates the United States‘ compliance with accepted norms and puts other countries on notice as to when the United States will likely assert jurisdiction. Moreover, international law, through protective jurisdiction, provides a tool by which federal courts can exercise jurisdiction over extraterritorial violations of nonperemptory norms. As this Comment suggests, this jurisdiction is a safety net that permits the U.S. government to protect its own security interests, along with those of allied governments, through the criminal law. In this way, § 960a can become a powerful prosecutorial tool in the fightagainst international crime.

#### Nuclear war

**Dobriansky, 1 -** Under Secretary for Global Affairs at the State Department (Paula, “The Explosive Growth of Globalized Crime,”http://www.iwar.org.uk/ecoespionage/resources/transnational-crime/gj01.htm

Certain types of international crime -- terrorism, human trafficking, drug trafficking, and contraband smuggling -- involve serious violence and physical harm. Other forms -- fraud, extortion, money laundering, bribery, economic espionage, intellectual property theft, and counterfeiting -- don't require guns to cause major damage. Moreover, the spread of information technology has created new categories of cybercrime.

For the United States, international crime poses threats on three broad, interrelated fronts. First, the impact is felt directly on the streets of American communities. Hundreds of thousands of individuals enter the U.S. illegally each year, and smuggling of drugs, firearms, stolen cars, child pornography, and other contraband occurs on a wide scale across our borders.

Second, the expansion of American business worldwide has opened new opportunities for foreign-based criminals. When an American enterprise abroad is victimized, the consequences may include the loss of profits, productivity, and jobs for Americans at home.

Third, international criminals engage in a variety of activities that pose a grave threat to the national security of the United States and the stability and values of the entire world community. Examples include the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, trade in banned or dangerous substances, and trafficking in women and children. Corruption and the enormous flow of unregulated, crime-generated profits are serious threats to the stability of democratic institutions and free market economies around the world.

#### Independently – culminates in misuse of surveillance drones in Syria

Sager and Schneider 13 (Josh and Dan, Writers – The Boston Occupier, “America’s Dangerous Drone Precedent: A Secret and Unaccountable Program of Targeted Killings,” Progressive Cynic, 1-29, <http://theprogressivecynic.com/2013/01/29/americas-dangerous-drone-precedent-a-secret-and-unaccountable-program-of-targeted-killings/>)

In addition to their use as a tool in extrajudicial assassination, drones are quickly becoming a hot-ticket item for government agencies that want to conduct surveillance. U.S. Customs and Border Protection currently operates nine drones, using them for border and drug trafficking surveillance; Homeland Security has used them to support FEMA during disaster relief operations; and the Seattle Police Department recently caused a stir when the Mayor and City Council found out that they were operating a pair of surveillance drones.

Support for laissez-faire regulation of this new industry is likely to find a home in the new Congress. Changes between the 112th and 113th sessions haven’t done much to alter the makeup of the House Unmanned Systems Caucus, a bipartisan group of Representatives that collectively received over $8 million in campaign donations from drone manufacturers during the 2012 elections. In early 2012, the “drone caucus” was instrumental in shaping the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA), a law passed annually to approve funding for the FAA. This year’s FAAAA contained a special section addressing unmanned aerial vehicles, and specifically requests that both representatives of the aviation and drone industries have a say in crafting how drones are deployed within the country.

This kind of private-public partnership strengthens as the use of drones for surveillance and war around the world increases, and will surely have a strong influence over which countries will have access to this technology, and will set the terms for how it is used. A September study released by NYU and Stanford pointed out the dangers in allowing drone use to spread without a legal framework for their sale and use.

When it comes to them being as a tool of war, researchers ominously noted that:

“US practices may also facilitate recourse to lethal force around the globe by establishing dangerous precedents for other governments. As drone manufacturers and officials successfully reduce export control barriers, and as more countries develop lethal drone technologies, these risks increase.”

Three months into the Afghanistan War, Ali Qaed Sinan al-Harithi and five others (including a U.S. citizen) became the first six fatalities of the U.S. drone program. Not in Afghanistan, however, but in Yemen. In 2001, the U.S. justified the strikes similarly to how Israel, during the First Intifada, justified its own “targeted killing” program. The U.S. said that because Harithi could not possibly be arrested, and was alleged to be a member of al-Qaeda, it was legal to kill him because the U.S. was “at war” with terrorism and this conflict justified ignoring the sovereignty of another state.

Without the constraint of an enforceable international law, there may be too few barriers in place to stop other nations from exploiting the same loopholes that the U.S. has to kill members of groups they deem ‘terrorists’—say, Mexican drug cartels or the Free Syrian Army—but their own citizens, as well. Seen in this light, the assassinations of Harithi, Awlaki, and thousands of others are not mere casualties of short-term war; they are the first dead in new breed of globalized warfare, bound only by feasibility and the size of one’s defense budget.

#### That causes global escalation of Syria

Rozoff 13 (Rick, investigative journalist, “U.S. Drone Strikes In Syria: Dangerous Escalation,” Global Research, 3-18, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/u-s-drone-strikes-in-syria-dangerous-escalation/5327190>)

The introduction of drone strikes by the United States inside Syria would mark a dangerous escalation in the Syrian unrest, says Rick Rozoff, manager of the Stop NATO organization.Rozoff told the U.S. Desk that if deadly U.S drone strikes are expanded to Syria, it would be “the most disturbing manifestation of the international drone warfare policy.”

Drone attacks inside Syria would be “an act of utter provocation,” he said.

“If the U.S. directly engage in military strikes, which is what drone attacks are, means that the U.S. has openly intervened and become belligerent in the war on Syria and it could lead to an escalation of tensions not only in the region but globally.”

#### Nuclear war

**Russell 9** (James, Senior Lecturer in the Department of National Security Affairs – Naval Postgraduate School, “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prosepects for Nuclear War and Escalation in the Middle East,” Online)

Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or **as a result of miscalculation** or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could **quickly escalate** in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the **context of an unstable strategic framework**. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with **substantial risk for the entire world.**

### Solvency

#### SOLVENCY!

#### Unchecked targeted killing is the largest violation of due process --- external review key

McKelvey, 11 (Benjamin, JD Candidate, Senior Editorial Board – Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, “Due Process Rights and the Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: The Unconstitutional Scope of Executive Killing Power,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, November, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1353, <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/jotl/2012/06/due-process-rights-and-the-targeted-killing-of-suspected-terrorists-the-unconstitutional-scope-of-executive-killing-power/>)

IV. CHALLENGING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TARGETED KILLING: A CLEAR VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS The President’s supposed authority to conduct targeted killings of Americans is highly questionable.119 Moreover, the DOJ’s argument that targeted killing is a political question within executive discretion inaccurately portrays the judiciary’s power to review broader questions of law.120 Yet in addition to these compelling objections to the legal underpinnings of targeted killing authority, targeted killing likely violates existing law as well.121 Targeted killing is a unilateral government execution that completely circumvents traditional notions of law enforcement and violates even minimum notions of established due process.122 A. How Due Process Rights Are Determined Despite the fact that Aulaqi was hiding in Yemen, the Fifth Amendment still protected him. The Supreme Court has held that Americans enjoy the same constitutional protections abroad as in American territory, unless the application of the Bill of Rights would prove “impracticable and anomalous.”123 The rationale for this principle is that although Americans are not completely without constitutional protections abroad, it may not always be feasible to ensure all of these protections.124 The application of the Bill of Rights abroad must take into account “the particular circumstances, the practical necessities, and the possible alternatives” of the situation at hand.125 Analyzing Aulaqi’s Fifth Amendment rights is especially complex given the many political, economic, and security problems in Yemen at the time of his killing.126 The Fifth Amendment provides, in part, that no American may be “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”127 The case of Anwar al-Aulaqi implicates procedural due process because the plaintiff’s complaint alleges that the government is attempting to deprive Aulaqi of life without any formal presentation of the charges against him or an opportunity to protest these charges at a hearing before an impartial judge.128 The Supreme Court uses a balancing test for determining the level of due process in different contexts.129 This balancing test has three factors: the private interest that will be affected by a deprivation, the risk of an erroneous deprivation by the procedural method in question, and the government interests involved.130 Aulaqi’s case represents a collision of the first and third factors.131 The deprivation in question was Aulaqi’s life, the most serious deprivation in law.132 In the case of judicial error or procedural shortfall, property can be returned and liberty can be restored, but the deprivation of life is permanent. However, the government’s interest in protecting American citizens from the unrelenting threat of terrorism is also compelling.133 The exigencies involved in combating terrorism require decisive action and safeguards for intelligence sources that help identify threats.134 Under such extraordinary circumstances, the time and resources involved in satisfying procedural due process rights might also serve to inadvertently amplify specific threats of terrorism.135 The purpose of the Fifth Amendment, however, is to provide protections for citizens, not to increase the power of government or to ease the burden of government agencies under exigent circumstances.136 Given this constitutional purpose and the unique importance of life as a civil liberty, it is clear that Aulaqi is owed at least the minimum form of due process protection. B. A Comparative Perspective: The Due Process Rights of Detainees The position that minimum due process protections are required in Aulaqi is a natural extension of the holding in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. In Hamdi, the Supreme Court held that the government may not indefinitely detain a citizen without providing some form of procedural due process.137 Yaser Hamdi was an American captured in Afghanistan in 2001 and turned over to U.S. authorities during the invasion of Afghanistan.138 He was initially held at the detention facility in Guantanamo Bay, but was transferred to military holding brigs in Virginia and South Carolina after the military learned that he was an American.139 Originally, President George W. Bush claimed the authority to hold Hamdi as an enemy combatant caught within a theatre of war.140 As an enemy combatant, Hamdi was not entitled to any procedural rights such as the right to an attorney or access to a federal court.141 However, the Eastern District of Virginia granted next-friend standing to his father, and that court subsequently found the evidence against Hamdi insufficient to support his detention.142 The Fourth Circuit reversed, citing the broad wartime powers designated to the president under Article II of the Constitution and the infringement on executive power that would occur if judicial review proceeded in this case.143 Hamdi’s father appealed the reversal of the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court granted certiori.144 Although the Court did not reach a majority opinion in its decision, a plurality of Justices agreed that the Executive Branch does not have the power to detain an American citizen indefinitely without providing some basic due process protections.145 A majority of Justices agreed that Hamdi had the right to challenge his detention.146 Because it is a plurality opinion, the extent of the due process protections required in a federal detention scenario is unclear.147 But the basic principle of Hamdi is that the Executive does not have the authority to detain an American citizen without some form of due process.148 If elements of due process are required when the government deprives an American of liberty, is it not logical to conclude that the government must also satisfy due process when depriving an American of life? This is a natural extension of the Hamdi holding, especially because a deprivation of life must be treated more seriously and carefully than a deprivation of liberty.149 Not only is the Hamdi holding a natural theoretical cousin of Aulaqi, but the legal analysis is also similar. In its brief in response to the Aulaqi complaint, the DOJ made several arguments that echo the overturned Fourth Circuit’s arguments in Hamdi: judicial review represents an infringement on textually committed executive authority and litigating this issue would involve the disclosure of sensitive intelligence that would threaten national security.150 Hamdi was an American citizen, and the government detained him due to allegations that he was fighting for the Taliban in Afghanistan.151 Similarly, Aulaqi was an American citizen accused of providing leadership and spiritual counsel to al-Qaeda terrorists.152 He was therefore considered a high-risk threat to national security, and the DOJ claims that the authority to kill Aulaqi is a nonjusticiable political question protected by the state secrets privilege.153 Because the Supreme Court held that Hamdi’s deprivation of liberty merited due process, it is a natural extension of this holding to find that the government also owes Aulaqi basic due process.However, there are important factual distinctions between Hamdi and Aulaqi to balance against the similarities. Although both cases fit the general category of due process rights in the context of national security concerns, the circumstances of the Hamdi holding limit its application to Aulaqi.154 Hamdi was captured in a theatre of war and originally accused of aiding the Taliban in hostilities against the United States.155 But once he was moved to holding brigs within the United States, Hamdi was fully secured under government control.156 Therefore, at the time of the Supreme Court’s decision, Hamdi was not an imminent threat to national security and was completely subject to government authority.157 The same cannot be said of Aulaqi. As an alleged high-value terrorist target hiding in Yemen, a known staging ground for al-Qaeda operations, Aulaqi was not under government control.158 Assuming that the government’s allegations against him were true, Aulaqi posed an imminent threat to national security.159 These are important factual distinctions that may render the Hamdi opinion inapplicable to the Aulaqi case. The lack of government control over Aulaqi and the potential for an imminent threat to national security may serve as government interests that trump Aulaqi’s due process rights. The exigencies of the Aulaqi situation are important distinctions that may render the Hamdi analysis inapplicable. However, even if the Hamdi holding is not directly controlling in the Aulaqi context, it is still highly relevant to the analysis. After Hamdi, it is clear that very serious constitutional rights are implicated, and perhaps violated, when the president authorizes the targeted killing of an American without any independent judicial review of that decision or of the criteria involved.160 As demonstrated in Aulaqi, it is equally clear that litigating this issue in federal court is an ineffective ex post mechanism for ensuring basic due process protections.161 Yet the result in Aulaqi is unsatisfactory and potentially very dangerous. Given the constitutional protections guaranteed by the Supreme Court in Hamdi, it is important to clarify the law of targeted killing and ensure basic safeguards against the abuse of this power.

#### A special court that determines the eligibility of US is key to effectively check presidential backsliding – due process will collapse absent the plan

Weinberger 13 (Dr. Seth, Associate Professor in the Department of Politics & Government – University of Puget Sound, “Enemies Among Us: The Targeted Killing of American Members of al Qaeda and the Need for Congressional Leadership,” Global Security Studies Review, 5-7, <https://blogs.commons.georgetown.edu/globalsecuritystudiesreview/2013/05/07/enemies-among-us-the-targeted-killing-of-american-members-of-al-qaeda-and-the-need-for-congressional-leadership/>)

On September 30, 2011, an American drone fired on and destroyed a convoy of members of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The target of the strike was Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S. citizen born in New Mexico in 1971, accused of being a propagandist and operational leader for AQAP. The targeted killing of an American citizen raises a simple yet extremely discomfiting problem: Should the President of the United States be able to order an American citizen to be killed without trial, without any external review process, and without appeal?

In June 2010, John Brennan, then Deputy National Security Adviser for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism and current CIA director, stated that “there are dozens of U.S. persons [who have joined international terrorist organizations] who are in different parts of the world and they are very concerning to us.”[1] The issue was made even more salient on February 4, 2013, when an unclassified U.S. Justice Department (DOJ) white paper was released which laid out the legal justification for the targeted killing of “a U.S. citizen who is a senior operational leader of al Qaeda or an associated force.”[2]

The release of the targeted killing white paper unleashed a barrage of criticism of the policy. One author called the brief “a disaster” and asserted that “the Obama administration…wants to justify…assassinating citizens without specific and credible evidence of imminent violence.”[3] Another warned that “what’s so terrifying about this white paper is that it’s unconstitutional, not in the sense that it violates any particular tenet of the American Constitution, but in that it doesn’t respect the premise of there being a Constitution in the first place.”[4] Yet another claims that “[the white paper] is every bit as chilling as the Bush Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) torture memos in how its clinical, legalistic tone completely sanitizes the radical and dangerous power it purports to authorize.”[5] A few voices defended the policy, arguing, for example, that “once you take up arms against the United States, you become an enemy combatant, thereby forfeiting the privileges of citizens and the protections of the Constitution,”[6] and that “American presidents…have lawfully deployed military force against citizens in insurrection, rebellion, or war against the United States from the beginning of the nation.”[7]

However, focusing on the question of whether and when the president can order the targeted killing of an American citizen who has joined al Qaeda – as did almost all of the analyses of the DOJ white paper – not only misses the more important question involved but also obscures the best avenue to a potential solution. Instead of asking whether the president ought to be able to order the killing of American members of al Qaeda, we should instead be asking whether the president should be allowed to determine when an American citizen can be considered to be a senior operational member of al Qaeda, and if so, by what process?

Why is the question of determining who is a member of al Qaeda more important than the question of whether the president can kill American senior operational members of al Qaeda? As made clear by the World War II-era case Ex Parte Quirin, American citizens who join the armed forces of an enemy of the United States during wartime forfeit many of their basic constitutional protections and can be, as was the American citizen involved in the case, tried by military tribunal and executed under the laws of war.[8] The 2004 case of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld built on the Quirin case, finding that not only were at least some of the president’s war powers activated by congressional passage of the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) in 2001, but that, as is normal under the laws of war, American citizens seized on the battlefield can be detained until the end of the conflict.[9]

However, the Hamdi decision also illustrates why the question of who is and is not a member of al Qaeda is the more critical question. The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdi contained language vital for understanding the issue. The Court acknowledged that while enemy soldiers seized on the battlefield during a “normal” war do not receive an opportunity to challenge their detention, the exigencies of the war in Afghanistan against the Taliban dictate that “the circumstances surrounding Hamdi’s seizure cannot in any way be characterized as ‘undisputed’.”[10] Furthermore, because “‘the risk of erroneous deprivation’ of [Hamdi’s] liberty is unacceptably high” and as the case dealt with “the most elemental of liberty interests – the interest in being free from physical detention by one’s own government,” the Court decided that the traditional rules of war needed adjusting for the armed conflict against the Taliban.[11] Thus, the Court ruled that “a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral decision maker.”[12] In essence, the Court ruled that the armed conflict with the Taliban sufficiently resembled traditional conflict as to allow for the indefinite military detention of enemy combatants, but that the difficulties involved in determining who is and is not an enemy combatant (for example, fighters in the Taliban neither wore uniforms nor carried identification) warranted an alteration in the normal application of the president’s war powers where American citizens are concerned.

The laws of war were designed to govern ‘traditional’ wars, in which the armies of states met on the battlefield and in which soldiers wore uniforms clearly identifying themselves as combatants. The lack of clarity that prompted the ruling in Hamdi comes from the inherent ambiguities in a low-intensity war against a non-state actor that is not limited to a specific battlefield. These ambiguities are magnified in the conflict against al Qaeda. Not only do al Qaeda’s members not wear uniforms or carry identification cards, but, given the decentralized nature of the organization, it is not even clear what exactly constitutes membership. It might be possible that one can become a “member” of al Qaeda simply by declaring or even believing oneself to be a member. In short, we should be much less confident in our judgments about who is and who is not a member of al Qaeda.

Several examples illustrate the problems caused by this ambiguity over membership in al Qaeda. First, consider Major Nidal Hassan, who stands accused of 13 counts of murder and 32 counts of attempted murder in the shootings at Ft. Hood, Texas. While Hasan had been in communication with Anwar al-Awlaki, he was ultimately court martialed rather than tried as a terrorist. This decision troubled terrorism scholar Bruce Hoffman, who argued that while he “used to argue it was only terrorism if it were part of some identifiable, organized conspiracy… this new strategy of al-Qaeda is to empower and motivate individuals to commit acts of violence completely outside any terrorist chain of command.”[13]

Next is the case of al Shabaab, an Islamist insurgent movement dedicated to bringing Sharia to Somalia. In February 2012, leaders of al Shabaab officially pledged allegiance to al Qaeda, a pledge that was enthusiastically accepted by Ayman al-Zawahiri, who succeeded Osama bin Laden as the formal head of al Qaeda.[14] Since the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) expanded the scope of the 2001 AUMF to include “associated groups,” al Shabaab is now a legitimate target for American forces. This poses several problems. First, a number of Somali-American citizens have joined al Shabaab, mostly for religious and nationalistic reasons related to the domestic political situation in Somalia.[15] Second, al Shabaab has largely confined its activities to inside Somalia, with the exceptions of a bombing in Uganda and a grenade attack in Kenya, attacks almost certainly intended to convince Uganda and Kenya to withdraw their respective troops from Somalia.[16] Third, many members have splintered-off from the main body of al Shabaab in the wake of the union with al Qaeda, apparently to keep their struggle focused on Somalia rather than the global jihad.[17] There seems to be little evidence, other than the formal affiliation, that al Shabaab has taken any actions against American citizens or interests or that al Shabaab is in any way other than name a part of the global terrorist movement.

And yet, under the 2012 NDAA, a Somali-American who becomes a senior operational leader of al Shabaab in order to liberate and Islamize Somalia is the legal equivalent of Anwar al-Awlaki and is therefore eligible for being targeted for death. Is this the enemy as envisioned by Congress and defined in the 2001 AUMF?

These examples call attention to several vital questions surrounding the Obama Administration’s use of targeted killing against American citizens. Is every group that is somehow connected to al Qaeda the “enemy” in this conflict, regardless of the threat it poses to American national interests or its involvement in global jihad? What kind of connection – formal, operational, or ideological – is sufficient justification for including an affiliated group under the scope of the 2001 AUMF and 2012 NDAA? Exactly what actions make an individual a member of al Qaeda? Given these serious questions about what constitutes involvement with al Qaeda, it is dangerous for decisions about the eligibility of American citizens for targeted killing to be made without legislative definition or judicial process or review.

The Obama Administration would likely claim that such decisions are a fundamental incident of war and therefore part of the president’s war powers that were activated by the 2001 AUMF. And under the current legal regime, the President’s use of drones to eliminate American senior operational members of al Qaeda is indeed legal.

But legal is not the same thing as prudent. Simply because a course of action is permitted does not mean it should be taken. For a number of reasons, perhaps most importantly because it is increasingly unclear what constitutes being a senior operational member of al Qaeda, we should be skeptical of allowing the Executive Branch to judge these decisions on its own. Without effective checks or definition, there can be little doubt that the bar for defining membership in al Qaeda and eligibility for targeting will move downwards, allowing more Americans to be targeted without due process. And in the absence of additional congressional actions to limit the president’s ability to make such determinations, that is exactly the situation that exists.

But how could such checks or definitions be imposed? The President’s likely defense – that under the 2001 AUMF, only the Executive Branch can determine questions of al Qaeda membership – is a strong one. Here we must return to the Hamdi decision. By focusing attention and criticism on the power to target American members of al Qaeda rather than on the power to determine eligibility for being targeted, most analysts and pundits have missed the importance of the Hamdi decision for suggesting a solution to the problem of targeted killings.

By giving Yasir Hamdi a status hearing to determine his eligibility for indefinite military detention without trial, the Supreme Court interfered with the traditional war powers of the president and altered the standard applications of the rules of war. The Court argued, as mentioned earlier, that as the prospect of indefinite detention involves the “most elemental of liberty interests,” “striking the proper constitutional balance…is of great importance to the Nation during this period of ongoing combat.”[18] What is true for an American citizen detained on the battlefield and assigned for indefinite detention is undoubtedly true for an American citizen who has been targeted for death by a U.S. drone strike. Surely, the right not to be killed by a Hellfire missile ordered by one’s own government without due process must be as elemental of a liberty interest, if not more so, as “the interest in being free from physical detention.”[19]

Furthermore, while the Court did add a hearing into the process for military detention, it still permitted the U.S. government to assign an American citizen to indefinite detention. It did so even while acknowledging that, given the undefined nature of the conflict against the Taliban, which the U.S. government might not consider won for two generations or more, “Hamdi’s detention could last for the rest of his life.”[20] The justification given for leaving the basic structure of military detention in place was the determination that conflict between the U.S. and the Taliban resembles the traditional conflicts for which the laws of war were created. However, the Court warned that “if the practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informed the development of the law of war, [the long-standing law of war principles] unravel.”[21] It seems reasonable that a conflict like the one with al Qaeda –in which drones are used to target American citizens who have been identified as senior operational leaders of decentralized affiliates of an already decentralized non-state terrorist organization – presents circumstances unlike traditional wars in which enemies were readily identifiable by their uniforms, identification cards, and adherence to a clearly visible military and political chain of command.

From the logic of the Hamdi decision, it follows that adjustments or adaptations to the traditional war powers of the president to target American citizens believed to be members of the armed forces of the enemy might be both justifiable and allowable. What options or procedures could be put into place? Two options stand out. First, Congress could attempt to identify the positive criteria for membership in al Qaeda, the nature of the relationships between al Qaeda and its various affiliates, and, more specifically, the definition of a senior operational leader. While this would undoubtedly be a difficult task, there is precedent for such efforts by the Legislative Branch. The laws surrounding conspiracy must define at what point constitutionally-protected free speech switches to the illegal preparation for criminal activity.

But once again, what is possible is not always the best course of action. Given the diffuse nature of global terrorist networks and the flexible nature of the battlefield, trusting an a priori assessment to accurately account for all possibilities and to do so in a timely manner is likely a bad idea. A better option would be the creation of a special national security court, along the lines of the courts that hear federal requests for warrantless wiretapping in accordance with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Such a court could be created and empowered by Congress to hear presidential requests to designate an American citizen as a senior operational leader of either al Qaeda or of an affiliated group as defined under the 2001 AUMF and the 2012 NDAA.