# Round 5—Neg vs UMKC AF

## 1NC

### 1nc 1

**The battle for the public sphere is over—we lost. Conservatives and Liberals are now two sides of the same coin, and any movement that actually promises radical change will be destroyed as soon as it becomes visible. An invisible movement has the most subversive potential—rejecting politics is the only political act**

**The Invisible Committee, ‘7** [an anonymous group of French professors, phd candidates, and intellectuals, in the book “The Coming Insurrection” published by Semiotext(e) (attributed to the [Tarnac Nine](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tarnac_Nine) by the French police), <http://tarnac9.noblogs.org/gallery/5188/insurrection_english.pdf>]

Whatever angle you look at it from, **there's no escape from the present. That's** not the least of its virtues. For those who want absolutely to have hope, it knocks down every support. Those who claim to have solutions are proven wrong almost immediately. It's understood that now everything can only go from bad to worse. "There's no future for the future" is the wisdom behind an era that for all its appearances of extreme normalcy has come to have about the consciousness level of the first punks. The sphere of political representation is closed. From left to right, it's the same nothingness acting by turns either as the big shots or the virgins, the same sales shelf heads, changing up their discourse according to the latest dispatches from the information service. Those who still vote give one the impression that their only intention is to knock out the polling booths by voting as a pure act of protest. And we've started to understand that in fact it’s only against the vote itself that people go on voting. Nothing we've seen can come up to the heights of the present situation; not by far. By its very silence, the populace seems infinitely more 'grown up' than all those squabbling amongst themselves to govern it do. Any Belleville chibani 1 is wiser in his chats than in all of those puppets’ grand declarations put together. The lid of the social kettle is triple-tight, and the pressure inside won’t stop building. The ghost of Argentina’s Que Se Vayan Todos 2 is seriously starting to haunt the ruling heads. The fires of November 2005 will never cease to cast their shadow on all consciences. Those first joyous fires were the baptism of a whole decade full of promises. The media’s “suburbs vs. the Republic” myth, if it’s not inefficient, is certainly not true. The fatherland was ablaze all the way to downtown everywhere, with fires that were methodically snuffed out. Whole streets went up in flames of solidarity in Barcelona and no one but the people who lived there even found out about it. And the country hasn’t stopped burning since. Among the accused we find diverse profiles, without much in common besides a hatred for existing society; not united by class, race, or even by neighborhood. What was new wasn’t the “suburban revolt,” since that was already happening in the 80s, but the rupture with its established forms. The assailants weren’t listening to anybody at all anymore, not their big brothers, not the local associations assigned to help return things to normal. No “SOS Racism which only fatigue, falsification, and media omertà 4 could feign putting an end. The whole series of nocturnal strikes, anonymous attacks, wordless destruction, had the merit of busting wide open the split between politics and the political. No one can honestly deny the obvious weight of this assault which **made no demands**, and had no message other than a threat which had nothing to do with politics. But you’d have to be blind not to see what is **purely political** about this **resolute negation of politics,** and you’d certainly have to know absolutely nothing about the autonomous youth movements of the last 30 years. Like abandoned children we burned the first baby toys of a society that deserves no more respect than the monuments of Paris did at the end of Bloody Week 5 -- and knows it. There’s **no social solution** to the present situation. First off because the vague aggregate of social groupings, institutions, and individual bubbles that we designate by the anti-phrase “society” has no substance, because there’s no language left to express common experiences with. It took a half-century of fighting by the Lumières to thaw out the possibility of a French Revolution, and a century of fighting by work to give birth to the fearful “Welfare State.” Struggles creating the language in which the new order expresses itself. Nothing like today. Europe is now a de-monied continent that sneaks off to make a run to the Lidl 6 and has to fly with the low-cost airlines to be able to keep on flying. **None of the “problems” formulated in the social language are resolvable**. The “retirement pensions issue,” the issues of “precariousness,” the “youth” and their “violence” can only be kept in suspense as long as the ever more surprising “acting out” they thinly cover gets managed away police-like. No one’s going to be happy to see old people being wiped out at a knockdown price, abandoned by their own and with nothing to say. And those who’ve found less humiliation and more benefit in a life of crime than in sweeping floors will not give up their weapons, and prison won’t make them love society. The rage to enjoy of the hordes of the retired will not take the somber cuts to their monthly income on an empty stomach, and will get only too excited about the refusal to work among a large sector of the youth. And to conclude, no guaranteed income granted the day after a quasi-uprising will lay the foundations for a new New Deal, a new pact, and a new peace. The social sentiment is rather **too evaporated** for all that. As their solution, they’ll just never stop putting on the pressure, to make sure nothing happens, and with it we’ll have more and more police chases all over the neighborhood. The drone that even according to the police indeed did fly over Seine-Saint-Denis 7 last July 14 th is a picture of the future in much more straightforward colors than all the hazy images we get from the humanists. That they took the time to clarify that it was not armed shows pretty clearly the kind of road we’re headed down. The country is going to be cut up into ever more air-tight zones. Highways built along the border of the “sensitive neighborhoods” already form walls that are invisible and yet able to cut them off from the private subdivisions. Whatever good patriotic souls may think about it, the management of neighborhoods “by community” is most effective just by its notoriety. The purely metropolitan portions of the country, the main downtowns, lead their luxurious lives in an ever more calculating, ever more sophisticated, ever more shimmering deconstruction. They light up the whole planet with their whorehouse red lights, while the BAC 8 and the private security companies’ -- read: militias’ -- patrols multiply infinitely, all the while benefiting from being able to hide behind an ever more disrespectful judicial front. The catch-22 of the present, though perceptible everywhere, is denied everywhere. Never have so many psychologists, sociologists, and literary people devoted themselves to it, each with their own special jargon, and each with their own specially missing solution. It’s enough just to listen to the songs that come out these days, the trifling “new French music,” where the petty-bourgeoisie dissects the states of its soul and the K’1Fry mafia 9 makes its declarations of war, to know that this coexistence will come to an end soon and that a decision is about to be made. This book is signed in the name of an imaginary collective. Its editors are not its authors. They are merely content to do a little clean-up of what’s scattered around the era’s common areas, around the murmurings at bar-tables, behind closed bedroom doors. They’ve only determined a few necessary truths, whose universal repression fills up the psychiatric hospitals and the painful gazes. They’ve made themselves scribes of the situation. It’s the privilege of radical circumstances that justice leads them quite logically to revolution. It’s enough just to say what we can see and not avoid the conclusions to be drawn from it.

**To make micropolitics visible is to coopt it by giving resistance an object – this understanding allows resistance to be framed, to be declared a failure and prevents the immanence of imperceptible politics from coalescing around mundane practices and habitudes of existence**

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In this sense **imperceptible politics does not necessarily differ from or oppose other prevalent forms of politics, such as state-oriented politics, micropolitics, identity politics, cultural and gender politics, civil rights movements, etc**. And indeed **imperceptible politics connects with all these various forms of political engagement and intervention in an opportunistic way: it deploys them to the extent that they allow the establishment of spaces outside representation**; that is, spaces which do not primarily focus on the transformation of the conditions of the double-R axiom (rights and representation) but on the insertion of new social forces into a given political terrain. In the previous chapter we called this form of politics outside politics: the politics which opposes the representational regime of policing. Imperceptibility is the everyday strategy which allows us to move and to act below the overcoding regime of representation. **This everyday strategy is inherently anti-theoretical; that is, it resists any ultimate theorisation, it cannot be reduced to one successful and necessary form of politics** (such as state-oriented politics or micropolitics, for example). **Rather, imperceptible politics is genuinely empiricist, that is it is always enacted as ad hoc practices which allow the decomposition of the representational strategies in a particular field and the composition of events which cannot be left unanswered by the existing regime of control. If imperceptible politics resists theorisation and is ultimately empiricist, what then are the criteria for doing imperceptible politics? There are** three **dimensions which characterise imperceptible politics: objectlessness,** totality, **trust**. **Firstly, imperceptible politics is objectless, that is it performs political transformation without primarily targeting a specific political aim (such as transformation of a law or institution, or a particular claim for inclusion**, etc). **Instead imperceptible politics proceeds by materialising its own political actions through contagious and affective transformations.** **The object of its political practice is its own practices. In this sense, imperceptible politics is non-intentional - and therein lies its difference from state-oriented politics or the politics of civil rights movements**, for example - **it instigates change through a series of everyday transformations which can only be codified as having a central political aim or function in retrospect**. Secondly, imperceptible politics addresses the totality of an existing field of power. This seems to be the difference between imperceptible politics and micropolitics or other alternative social movements: imperceptible politics is not concerned with containing itself to a molecular level of action; it addresses the totality of power through the social changes which it puts to work in a particular field of action. The distinction between molar and molecular (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 275) has only analytical significance from the perspective of imperceptible politics. In fact imperceptible politics is both molar and molecular, because by being local situated action it addresses the whole order of control in a certain field. Imperceptible politics is located at the heart of a field of power and at the same time it opens a way to move outside this field by forcing the transformation of all these elements which are constitutive of this field. In this sense, imperceptible politics is a driving force which is simul­taneously both present and absent. We described this in the previous chapter by exploring the importance of speculative figurations for the practice of escape. On the everyday level of escape (a level we called in this chapter imperceptible politics) speculative figuration can be translated into trust. This is the third characteristic of **imperceptible politics**; it **is driven by a firm belief in the importance and truthfulness of its actions, without seeking any evidence for, or conducting any investigation into its practices. This is trust. Imperceptible politics is driven by trust in something which seems to be absent from a particular situation. Imperceptible politics operates around a void, and it is exactly the conversion of this void into everyday politics that becomes the vital force for imperceptible politics.**

**Their arguments about personal agency are ultimately conservative and de-politicizing – arguments for localizing activism within the purview of social location are the equivalent of privatizing social change, creating us as dependent on the necessity of their advocacy. The more successful their strategy is the more damage it does by making institutions necessary to our understanding of social change**

**Hershock '99**, East-West Center, 1999.  [“Changing the way society changes”, *Journal of Buddhist Ethics*, 6, 154; <http://jbe.gold.ac.uk/6/hershock991.html>]

The trouble is that, like other technologies biased toward control, the more successful legislation becomes, the more it renders itself necessary. Because it aims at rigorous definition -- at establishing hard boundaries or limits -- crossing the threshold of legislative utility means creating conditions under which the definition of freedom becomes so complex as to be self-defeating. Taken to its logical end, legally-biased social activism is thus liable to effect an infinite density of protocols for maintaining autonomy, generating a matrix of limits on discrimination that would finally be conducive to what might be called "axiological entropy" -- a state in which movement in any direction is equally unobstructed *and* empty of dramatic potential. Contrary to expectations, complete "freedom of choice" would not mean the elimination of all impediments to meaningful improvisation, but rather an erasure of the latter's conditions of possibility. The effectiveness and efficiency of "hard," control-biased technologies depend on our using natural laws -- horizons of possibility -- as fulcrums for leveraging or dictating changes in the structure of our circumstances. Unlike improvised contributions to changes taking place in our situation, dictating the terms of change effectively silences our situational partners. Technological authority thus renders our circumstances mute and justifies ignoring the contributions that might be made by the seasons or the spiritual force of the mountains to the meaning -- the direction of movement -- of our ongoing patterns of interdependence. With the "perfection" of technically-mediated control, our wills would know no limit. We would be as gods, existing with no imperatives, no external compulsions, and no priorities. We would have no reason to do one thing first or hold one thing, and not another, as most sacred or dear. Such "perfection" is, perhaps, as fabulous and unattainable as it is finally depressing. Yet the vast energies of global capital are committed to moving in its direction, for the most part quite uncritically. The consequences -- as revealed in the desecration and impoverishing of both 'external' and 'internal' wilderness (for instance, the rainforests and our imaginations) -- are every day more evident. The critical question we must answer is whether the "soft" technologies of legally-biased and controlled social change commit us to an equivalent impoverishment and desecration. The analogy between the dependence of technological progress on natural laws and that of social activism on societal laws is by no means perfect. Except among a scattering of philosophers and historians of science, for example, the laws of nature are not viewed as changeable artifacts of human culture. But for present purposes, the analogy need only focus our attention on the way legal institutions -- like natural laws -- do not prescriptively determine the shape of all things to come, but rather establish generic limits for what relationships or states of affairs are factually admissible. Laws that guarantee certain "freedoms" necessarily also prohibit others. Without the fulcrums of *unallowable* acts, the work of changing a society would remain as purely idealistic as using wishful thinking to move mountains. Changing legal institutions at once forces and enforces societal reform. By affirming and safeguarding those freedoms or modes of autonomy that have come to be seen as generically essential to 'being human', a legally-biased social activism cannot avoid selectively limiting the ways we engage with one another. The absence of coercion may be a basic aim of social activism, but if our autonomy is to be guaranteed both fair and just, its basic strategy must be one of establishing non-negotiable constraints on how we co-exist. Social activism is thus in the business of striking structural compromises between its ends and its means -- between particular freedoms and general equality, and between practical autonomy and legal anonymity. By shifting the locus of freedoms from unique persons to generic citizens -- and in substantial sympathy with both the Platonic renunciation of particularity and the scientific discounting of the exceptional and extraordinary -- social activist methodology promotes dramatic anonymity in order to universally realize the operation of 'blind justice'. Much as hard technologies of control silence the contributions of wilderness and turn us away from the rewards of a truly joint improvisation of order, the process of social activism reduces the relevance of the always unique and unprecedented terrain of our interdependence. This is no small loss. The institutions that guarantee our generic independence effectively pave over those vernacular relationships through which our own contributory virtuosity might be developed and shared -- relationships out of which the exceptional meaning of our immediate situation might be continuously realized. In contrast with Buddhist emptiness -- a practice that entails attending to the mutual relevance of all things -- both the aims and strategies of social activism are conducive to an evacuation of the conditions of dramatic virtuosity, a societal depletion of our resources for meaningfully improvised and liberating intimacy with all things.

### 1nc 2

#### Jazz is a form of social control – the defining feature of jazz is syncopation – it relies on the inclusion of unexpected rhythms meant to disturb the status quo – however syncopation is not disruptive. Instead these disruptions must be seen as both limited by and solidly entrenched within modern forms of social control – the logic of jazz is the logic of totalitarianism – vote negative to critique the inclusion of jazz within the 1AC

Lewandowski 1996 (Joseph, “Adorno on jazz and society” Philosophy Social Criticism 1996; 22; 103)

The primary technical maneuver peculiar to jazz is syncopation. Syncopation was a requirement for early jazz arrangements - it distinguished jazz music from other, ’straight’ forms of music, and persists as a chief feature of today’s jazz. Syncopation is the common thread that runs throughout all forms of jazz, and its import should not be underestimated, for, as Peter Gammond points out in a standard work on jazz music: ... [j]azz is perpetually syncopated, the melodic line always finding points of emphasis away from the main beats of the bar. In ragtime, syncopation was of a mathematical kind that could be notated; in blues-based jazz it was more instinctive and occurred in a way that could never be accurately put down on paper. The early definitions of jazz as a syncopated music are, therefore, still valid.14 In syncopation, individual players are allowed the ’freedom’ to move away from the governing beats of the bar. Such a movement, in Armstrong’s idiomatic characterization, is a ’swinging around’: ’the boys are &dquo;swinging around&dquo;, and away from, the regular beat and melody you are used to, following the scoring very loosely and improvising as they go, by ear and free musical feeling’ (31). Given the privileged role assigned to syncopation, both by jazz musicologists and, within jazz, by musicians such as Armstrong, it is not surprising that Adorno directs much of his critical energies towards this technical maneuver - in both its ’ragtime’ (mathematical) and ’blues’ (spontaneous) forms. According to Adorno, both forms of perpetual syncopation are not simply aesthetic techniques or innovative styles that express ’free musical feeling’, but rather the embodiment of an emergent network of arbitrary social controls. Syncopation is not about ’swinging around’ freely and improvising as one goes, but of recapitulating the congealed nature of an unfree and planned society. To demonstrate how the technique of syncopation may be understood in this way, Adorno develops a connection between jazz’s use of syncopation and modern production imperatives of routinized labor schedules and repetitive, assembly-line tasks. Adorno sees jazz syncopation as a kind of gimmick or trick, whereby the purposiverational orientation of modern production is dressed up in the guise of purposelessness, of free, non-utilitarian improvisation. Such a guise of ’vitality’ is actually designed, according to Adorno, to improve jazz’s marketability and cloak or veil its commodity character. This technical veil of ’vitality’, says Adorno,... is difficult to take seriously in the face of an assembly-line procedure that is standardized down to its most minute deviations. The jazz ideologists, especially in Europe, mistakenly regard the sum of psycho-technically calculated and tested effects as the expression of an emotional state.... What enthusiastically stunted innocence sees as the jungle is actually factory-made through and through, even when, on special occasions, spontaneity is publicized as a featured attraction. (123-4, 126) So the improvisational, vital and free emotional deviation that the technique of syncopation ostensibly offers is in fact a manifestation of a disenchanted world under the imperatives of production: the enchanted world of the ’vital’ jungle, of unruly, untrammeled nature, turns into a factory-made commodity, ’through and through’. Adorno will even go so far as to say that jazz is a commodity in ’the strict sense’ insofar as its ’suitability for use permeates its production in terms none other than its marketability’ (’On Jazz’, p. 48). First nature becomes a veiled, second (constructed) nature, and syncopation cannot re-enchant a disenchanted capitalist modernity; instead, it partakes in the rigidified, commodity character of modern capitalist culture. But the problematic nature of the technique of syncopation runs deeper than its commodity character. Adorno thinks that jazz’s ’arbitrary’ nature is itself an expression of a ’rationalized’, even totalitarian, society.15 And in this ’planned purposelessness’ one sees the arbitrary nature of modern social controls: The fact that of all the tricks available, syncopation should have been the one to achieve musical dictatorship over the masses recalls the usurpation that characterizes techniques, however rational they may be in themselves, when they are placed at the service of irrational totalitarian control. Mechanisms which in reality are part and parcel of the entire present-day ideology, of the culture industry, are left easily visible in jazz. (125-6, 129) In other words, jazz’s syncopated technique shares the same features of technological mechanisms of mass control that resist opposition and change that are the hallmarks of irrational dictatorships: syncopation amounts to nothing more than the musical version of political totalitarianism - control. So-called ’rational’ techniques - e.g. ragtime syncopation - become forms of irrational control, and unruly, ’irrational’ techniques - e.g., ’blues-based jazz’ - are themselves planned arbitrariness that perpetuate modern forms of social control. Indeed, for Adorno: ... syncopation is not ... the expression of an accumulated subjective force which directed itself against authority until it had produced a new law out of itself. It is purposeless; it leads nowhere and is arbitrarily withdrawn by an undialectical, mathematical incorporation into the beat. (’On Jazz’, p. 66) Adorno’s point here amounts to this: syncopation is an undialectical technique that wants to step away from modern forms of authority - markets, capital, and so on - but doesn’t step far enough: its purposelessness leads nowhere; it ’swings around’ only and always to return, tamed, to the repetitive beat that is in time with the grand march of totalized societies. Jazz’s reliance on syncopated technique ends in a kind of performative contradiction: syncopation does not produce a new law or untrammeled nature out of itself but rather collaborates with the arbitrary nature of the society in which it is entangled. In short, Adorno claims that technically syncopated jazz and technologically syncopated life grow indistinguishable under the imperatives of capitalist society - in the defining technique of jazz, the perennial fashion becomes the likeness of a society in which chance itself is planned.16

#### This turns the case – the logic of syncopation prevents and inhibits the ability of individuals to articulate their own suffering – the 1AC would have been much better off without the music

(this card has some gendered language that we obviously do not endorse)

Lewandowski 1996 (Joseph, “Adorno on jazz and society” Philosophy Social Criticism 1996; 22; 103)

Though Adorno’s difficult conceptualization of the individual cannot be fully explicated here, its chief features and pertinence to his critique of jazz’s ’pseudo-individualizing’ tendencies must not be overlooked. Adorno thinks that the very question of individual, in a modernity that has both invented the individual and liquidated her, must be entirely recast.17 In perhaps the most reductive of formulations, it could be said that in Adorno’s view any ’theory’ of the individual must be a critique of a world in which ’individuality’ is increasingly threatened and seemingly impossible. Adorno’s sense of the individual is not cognitive but corporeal - something like bodily integrity is meant here by the term ’individual’. Such an integrity is badly damaged in and by rationalizing and modernizing processes (two processes which belong to capitalist modes of production - the modern individual finds herself weak and suffering under the modern imperatives of purposive-rationality (Zweckrationalitit) and capitalist production. In contradistinction, jazz claims to have emancipated itself from such imperatives. Jazz is ostensibly an assertion of individuality over - and against a rigidified world and ’musty museum culture’: via syncopated technique, the ’timeless’ fashion, after all, wants to say I am distinct; I am different; I am an individual, capable of both individual feeling and expression beyond purposive-rationality, and yet I remain within a loosely organized social collective. The implicit political function of jazz says, Democracy works, capitalism has not undermined it but somehow enabled it. Jazz putatively preserves and actualizes the possibility of individual autonomy and happiness in modern capitalism. Yet for Adorno, jazz punches out ’pseudoindividuals’ only to ’sacrifice’ them to a constricting collective. That is, ’jazz sacrifices an individuality which it does not really possess’ (’On Jazz’, p. 66) to a ’free’ collective that cannot be escaped. And in such sacrifice jazz fails to register the corporeality of suffering, delivering instead a Utopianized sense of collective freedom and happiness for autonomous individuals who persist only as pseudoindividuals. Adorno develops this line of critique by linking it to the other two criticisms - (1) fashion and (2) syncopated technique - elaborated above. First, Adorno says the fashionability of jazz that lends it its spontaneous quality and apparent individual element ... has become rigid, formulaic, spent - the individual elements are now in just the same position as social convention was previously.... The individually modern element in jazz is as illusory as the collective archaic element. (’On Jazz’, p. 60) That is, when individualization aligns itself too closely with fashion - the perennially new, the modern - it inevitably becomes the locus of a transposed set of social conventions; it becomes rigidified, codified, determinative, a kind of ’pseudo-individualization’ that can only affirm, convulsively, the very constraining social order it wants to reject. Fashion, then, is not the mother of individualization, but rather its illusion. Secondly, Adorno says that blues-based jazz’s syncopated, ’archaic element’ - its unruly stance as ’untrammeled nature’ - is in fact a commodity in which the pseudo-individual is inextricably snared. Adorno argues that: He who wants to flee from a music which has become incomprehensible or from an alienating everyday situation into jazz happens upon a musical commodity system which for him is superior to the others only in that it is not so immediately transparent, but which, with its decisive, non-improvisational elements, suppresses precisely those human claims which he laid to it. With jazz, a disenfranchized subjectivity plunges from the commodity world to the commodity world; the system does not allow for a way out. (’On Jazz’, pp. 53-4). The commodity world of syncopated technique is here again linked with the commodity world of technology; and careening from world to world is a ’disenfranchized subject’ who has no way out. Adorno says that in jazz the individual is ... contrasted as a Self against the abstract superimposed authority and yet can be exchanged arbitrarily ... this subject is not a ’free,’ lyrical subject which is then elevated into the collective, but rather one which is not originally free - a victim of the collective. (’On Jazz’, p. 64). Claims to individualized suffering or the desire to flee ’an alienating everyday situation’ are undermined by a syncopated technique that is part of the technologized world of mechanized production and routinized control: an unfree pseudo-individual becomes the victim of - and not the happily emancipated individual participant in - a collective where ’individuality’ can be exchanged arbitrarily, in precisely the same manner as indistinct commodities

(or performers, who are, at the end of the day, simply those individuals who have managed to turn themselves into both producing subjects and objects of consumption). And once individuality becomes exchangeable - one of many not dissimilar objects to be commodified - distinctly individual suffering turns into a negligible quantity. Yet the problematic logic of syncopation extends beyond its commodity character. According to Adorno, jazz’s technique forces ’pseudo-individuals’ to affirm an oppressive social status quo, ’the wrong life’. Adorno reflects on the ’social meaning of the jazz subject’ and says: ... it does not want to be engulfed in the prescribed majority, which existed before the subject and is independent of it, whether out of protest or ineptitude or both at once - until it finally is received into, or, better, subordinated to the collective as it was predestined to do; until the music indicates, in a subsequently ironic manner as the measures grow rounder, that it was a part of it from the very beginning ; that, itself a part of this society, it can never really break away from it. (’On Jazz’, pp. 64-5) Thus the jazz subject’s contradictory status lies in its ability to ’stumble’ out of a basic rhythm, ’swing around’ it and proclaim individuality, yet never resist the leveling and damaging effects of an unfree social collectivity: syncopated individualization is always already trammeled by the beat of society. The ’social meaning’ of such a status is that ... however much jazz-subjects ... may play the noncomformist, in truth they are less and less themselves. Individual features which do not conform to the norm are nevertheless shaped by it, and become marks of mutilation. Terrified, jazz fans identify with the society they dread for having made them what they are. This gives the jazz ritual its affirmative character, that of being accepted into a community of unfree equals. (126, 129) Adorno’s point here is not merely that syncopated jazz partakes in, or is shot through with, social antagonisms, but something much stronger: the social meaning of jazz lies in the way it depends upon and compels pseudo-individuals (here both performers and listeners) to identify with and affirm the very social mechanisms that have robbed them of their individual features and to gladly join a collective of ’unfree equals’.18 The ’real’ jazz subject (the pseudo-individual) must ’navigate the pattern’. Yet navigating the pattern hurts, causes suffering and ’mutilation’: the individual jazz subject is a damaged - and not a happily emancipated, ’freely swinging’ - one, yet it is never allowed more than a fleeting glimpse of such a painful self-recognition. And therein lies the root of Adorno’s critique of jazz’s pseudoindividualizing tendencies. Jazz affirms for a pseudo-individual only what is tolerated in society: a kind of (false) Utopian promise of happy, free individual expression within a collectivity and dressed up in the fashionable guise of a syncopated style that is the defining rhythmic feature of modern forms of production. Instead of suffering, jazz makes the pseudo-individual take pleasure ’precisely in its own weakness, almost as if it should be rewarded for this, for adapting itself into a collective that made it so weak’ (’On Jazz’, p. 66). Such a weak and damaged individual, rather than sing out against the falsity of the reified world that de-individualized her and made her suffer, can merely murmur affirmatively to herself: ’I am nothing. I am filth [Dreck], no matter what they do to me, it serves me right’ (132, 136).

### 1nc 3

**The 1AC project of describing the world through a systematically coherent explanation of reality that posits racial and sexual hierarchies as an originary cause for material violence insinuates an insidious new regime of conceptual totalitarianism which binds our imaginations in the ropes of the present. Explaining reality makes the oppression of racial hierarchies into an unshakeable curse. Their 1ac amounts to an nine-minute FYI about the powers that be—this attempt to philosophize suffering is perverse and in fact reinscribes the domination they criticize**

**Pelevin ‘2** Victor,Leo Kropywiansky, post-Soviet science fiction author, Buddhist scholar, “Victor Pelevin” Interview, BOMB Magazine, Issue 79 Spring 2002, , LITERATURE http://www.bombsite.com/issues/79/articles/2481

VP Since it happened a long time before I started to write, there’s no way to determine how it affected my writing. However, the effect of this book was really fantastic. **There’s an expression “out of this world.”** This book was totally out of the Soviet world. **The evil magic of any totalitarian regime is based on its presumed capability to embrace and explain all the phenomena, their entire totality, because explanation is control. Hence the term** totalitarian**. So if there’s a book that takes you out of this totality of things explained and understood, it liberates you because it breaks the continuity of explanation and thus dispels the charms. It allows you to look in a different direction for a moment, but this moment is enough to understand that everything you saw before was a hallucination** (though what you see in this different direction might well be another hallucination). The Master and Margarita was exactly this kind of book and it is very hard to explain its subtle effect to anybody who didn’t live in the USSR. **Solzhenitsyn’s books were very anti-Soviet, but they didn’t liberate you, they only made you more enslaved as they explained to which degree you were a slave.** **The Master and Margarita** didn’t even bother to be anti-Soviet yet reading this book would make you free instantly. **It didn’t liberate you from some particular old ideas, but rather from the hypnotism of the entire order of things.** LK What books have you most enjoyed reading in the last few years? In particular I wonder if there are any American authors among your recent favorites. VP I can’t say I read too much fiction. I liked Pastoralia and CivilWarLand in Bad Decline by George Saunders, but his best story I read so far was “I Can Speak!™” published in The New Yorker. I liked some stories by David Foster Wallace and plan to siege his Infinite Jest one infinite day. Talking of the old guard, I like Robert M. Pirsig. The real heroes in his books are concepts rather than humans, and they change and develop like characters do in more traditional novels: this is incredible. LK The ghost of Che Guevara appears in your most recent book, Homo Zapiens, propounding a theory of television as either (1) switched off, in which case it is like any other object, i.e., not any more or less difficult for the unquiet mind to pay attention to than, say, a rock, or (2) switched on, in which case it guides the attention of the viewer to such an extent that he becomes “possessed,” “techno-modified,” “a virtual subject” and no longer himself. In August of 2000, the Ostankino TV tower in Moscow caught fire, interrupting broadcasts for several days and rendering all television sets as objects of type (1). Was there a perceptible change of mood among Moscow citizens at that time? VP I think so. People were getting nervous and irritated, like drug addicts without a routine injection. But there were a lot of jokes about it nevertheless. As for me, I hadn’t been watching television for a long time by that moment, so I didn’t experience any personal problems. LK A big change over the last decade has been the decline in the influence of Russia’s military, which was called upon to fight a difficult war in Chechnya even as morale was falling and resources available to it were shrinking. Your father, who I understand passed away several years ago, was himself in the military. How did he view this decline in influence? VP My father was a rather strange Soviet military man, and never had any particular influence as such. He wasn’t even a party member, which made him kind of a white crow and impeded his career badly. It wasn’t his choice to join the military: the Soviet Union started its missile program when he was a student in Kiev, and many students from technical institutes were drafted to serve in this new branch of armed force as officers. Your consent wasn’t necessary for this at that time. I never had access to the inner workings of my father’s soul but I think he never totally identified himself with the Red Army’s military might, though he was a good specialist. At the time of the decline he was much more concerned with his own health, which was deteriorating quickly. But I think that, like many people who spent their entire lifetime in the USSR, he was too stunned by its demise to take any ensuing events seriously. LK In Homo Zapiens, the Russian government is portrayed as “virtual”: three-dimensional dummies on TV whose movements are scripted by screenwriters. This device seems particularly apt in describing the Yeltsin government, held together as it was with television coverage, funding from tycoons and the IMF, multiple heart bypasses and so forth. Do you believe it has become any less apt now, under the leadership of Putin? VP **Phenomenologically any politician is a TV program, and this doesn’t change from one government to another.** But if you want me to compare the government we had under Yeltsin with the one we have under Putin, I won’t be able to do it. Not only because I don’t watch television. For this kind of assessment you need a criterion. I guess the right one would be the way the government handles the economy, because its primary function is to take care of the economy. Politics is usually the function of the latter. To pass a judgment here you need to understand, even approximately, how the economy works. In the Western economy you have a set of instruments that allow you to make this assessment even if you are not a specialist. It is always clear whether it is a bull market or bear market. So you can say: bull market, good government, bear market, bad government (I know it is an oversimplification, but still). But these instruments are not applicable to the Russian economy because its very nature is different. The essence of your business cycle here in Russia is that you always have a pig market, which means that you don’t get whacked as long as you pay the pigs. And sometimes you get whacked even if you pay because it is a real pig market. Russian economy is the dimension where miracle meets subpoena and becomes state secret. How do you compare the numerous different governments that preside over this? The only criterion would be personal appeal of the ministers: a goatee fashion, a necktie color, et cetera. But for this you have to watch television. LK **Reading philosophy is in some ways a disease, like alcohol or drugs or dog racing or any other addiction.** I wonder what Western philosophers you have found most compelling. In particular I wonder if, like the moth Mitya in The Life of Insects, you have a particular affinity for Marcus Aurelius. Here I think of the Marcus Aurelius who insists upon an inner self that can’t be, except by its own assent, corrupted by the outer world. This seems to be a recurring theme in your works: the primacy of the individual mind in the face of a dangerous external world, whether the Soviet one or that of post-Soviet wild capitalism. VP If we put it your way, **the most compelling Western philosophers in my life were Remy Martin and Jack Daniels. They compelled me to do many things I otherwise would never think of. If seriously, I don’t take professional philosophers seriously even when I understand what they say. Philosophy is a self-propelled thinking, and thinking, no matter how refined, only leads to further thinking.** **Uncoerced thinking gives us the best it can when it subsides down and halts, because it is the source of nearly all our problems.** As far as I’m concerned, **thoughts are justified in two cases: when they swiftly make us rich and when they fascinate us with their beauty. Philosophy could sometimes fit into the first category—for instance, if you write “The Philosophy That Burns Fat” or something like “The Philosophy of Swimming with Sharks without Being Eaten”—but it would be an exception.** Sometimes philosophy fits into the second category (also an exception), and Marcus Aurelius is exactly the case. I read his book many times when I was a kid but I’m not sure I understood his philosophy—I was simply captivated by the noble beauty of his spirit. By the way, I read somewhere that Bill Clinton’s favorite quote came from Marcus Aurelius: “One could lead a decent life even in a palace.” The very notion of Western philosophy as opposed to Eastern seems to me quite dubious and arbitrary, though Bertrand Russell wrote a very good book on its history. This label implies that your mind starts to generalize in a different manner when it is placed in a different geographical location. But how would you classify Aldous Huxley’s Perennial Philosophy — as Eastern or Western? As for the self, it is a very tricky notion. We should define it before we use it. I prefer the term mind. I think you are absolutely right when you say that my theme is the primacy of the mind. But the external world is also your mind because the categories external and internal are purely mental. **Mind is the ultimate paradox because when you start to look for it you can’t find it. But when you start to look for something that is not mind you also can’t find it.** Mind is the central issue that interests me as a writer and as a person.

**The 1AC is a one-dimensional epistemology of oppression -- an insistence on the self-evident perspectivism of oppressed peoples by focusing attention on the uniqueness and irrefutability of their personal experience participates in a *mythos* of implicit solidarity where all oppressed peoples are thought to assume the same interests -- this orientation romanticizes complicity with totalitarian violence**

Gur-ze-ev, 98 - Senior Lecturer Philosophy of Education at Haifa, (Ilan, “Toward a nonrepressive critical pedagogy,” Educational Theory, Fall 48, <http://haifa.academia.edu/IlanGurZeev/Papers/117665/Toward_a_Nonreperssive_Critical_Pedagogy>)

The postmodern and the multicultural discourses that influenced Giroux took a one-dimensional attitude towards power. They denoted the importance of deconstructing cultural reproduction and the centrality of relations of dominance to the “voices” of groups whose collective memory ,knowledge, and identity were threatened or manipulated by power relations and knowledge conceptions that reflect and serve the hegemonic groups. Freire is not aware that this manipulationhas two sides, negative and a positive. The negative side allows the realization of violence by guaranteeing possibilities for the successful functioning of a normalized human being and creating possibilities for men and women to become more productive in “their” realm of self-evidence.Their normality reflects and serves this self-evidence by partly constituting the human subject aswell as the thinking self. Giroux easily extracted from Freire’s Critical Pedagogy the elements denoting the importance of acknowledging and respecting the knowledge and identity of marginalized groups and individuals. In fact, this orientation and its telos are in contrast to the central concepts of postmodern educators on the one hand and Critical Theories of Adorno,Horkheimer, and even Habermas on the other. But many similar conceptions and attitudes are present as well. **The aim of** Freire’s **Critical Pedagogy is to restore to marginalized groups their stolen “voice”,to enable them to recognize identify, and give their name the things in the world.** The similarity to postmodern critiques is already evident in his acknowledgment that to correctly coin a word isnothing less than to change the world. 10 However, to identify this conception with the postmodernstand is a over-hasty because the centrality of language in Freire‘s thought relates to his concept of “truth” and a class struggle that will allow the marginalized and repressed an authentic “voice”, 11 asif their self-evident knowledge is less false than that which their oppressors hold as valid**. Implicitly, Freire contends that the interests of all oppressed people are the same, and that one general theory exists for deciphering repressive reality and for developing the potentials absorbed in their collective memory**. An alternative critique of language which does not claim to empower the marginalized and the controlled to conceive and articulate their knowledge and needs on the onehand, and is not devoted to their emancipation on the other, is mere “verbalism”, according toFreire. 12 The purpose or common cause of the educator and the educated, the leader and the followers, in a dialogue between equal partners is called here “praxis”. Praxis in education aims to bridge the gap between theory and transformational action that effectively transforms human existence. This concept of transformation contrasts with educational concept of Critical Theory. Here learning andeducation are basically the individual’s responsibility and possibility, and are always an ontological issue while epistemologically concretized in the given historical social context. They are conditioned by an individual’s competence to transcend the “father image”, prejudices, habits, and external power relations that constitute the collective in order to attain full personal and humangrowth. 13 According to Freire, this personal development is conditioned by critical acknowledgment and should occur as part of the entire community’s revolutionary practice. Only there can successful educational praxis realize its dialogical essence. The dialogue is an authentic encounter between one person and another, an educator and her/his fellow who wants to be dialogically educated, and the encounter should be erotic or not realized at all. “Love” is presented as the center and the essence of dialogue. 14 Freire’s **Critical Pedagogy** is foundationalist and positivist, in contrast to his explicit negation of this orientation. It **is a synthesis between dogmatic idealism and vulgar collectivism meant to soundthe authentic voice of the collective, within which the dialogue is supposed to become aware of itself and of the world. The educational links of this synthesis contain a tension between its mystic-terroristic and its reflective-emancipatory dimensions. In Freire’s attitude towards Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, the terroristic potential contained in the mystic conception of the emancipated“group”, “people”, or “class” knowledge is revealed within the concept of a dialogue**. **Freire introduces Che Guevara as an ideal model for anti-violent dialogue between partners in the desirable praxis. Che Guevara used a structurally similar rhetoric to that of Ernst Juenger and National Socialist ideologues on the creative power of war, blood, and sweat in the constitution of a new man, the real “proletar” in South America. Freire gives this as an example of the liberation of the oppressed within the framework of new “love” relations which allow to speak the silenced“voice”.**

Their attempt to locate a CENTER to violence is precisely the enabling condition for oppression, as it SCRIPTS THE POSSIBILITIES FOR RESISTANCE IN ADVANCE. Our challenge to their description is our alternative. Before establishing the desirability of their speech act, we must first understand how they act upon the edifices of Power which they claim to change. Our politicization of THOUGHT ITSELF is necessary to a truly liberatory politics of conceptual mobility

**Deleuze ’87** Gilles, famous philosopher, Professor of Philosophy at the Sorbonne, (two translations used) *The Opera Quarterly* 21.4 (2005) 716-724 AND Dialogues II, European Perspectives, with Claire Parnet, freelance journalist, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, 2002 pgs.61-62

**How does one "act" on something,** and what is the act or actuality of this potential? **The act is reason. Notice that reason is not a faculty but a process, which consists precisely in actualizing a potential or giving form to matter.** Reason is itself a pluralism, because nothing indicates that we should think of matter or the act as unique. **We define or invent a process of rationalization each time we establish human relations in some material form, in some group, in some multiplicity.****[4](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/opera_quarterly/v021/21.4deleuze.html" \l "FOOT4) The act itself, qua relation, is always political.** **Reason, as a process, is political.** This may well be the case within a city, but it goes for other, smaller groups as well, or even for myself—and nowhere but in myself. Psychology, or rather the only bearable psychology, is politics, because I am forever creating human relationships with myself. There is no psychology, but rather a politics of the self. There is no metaphysics, but rather a politics of being. No science, but rather a politics of matter, since man is entrusted with matter itself. The same even applies to sickness: we have to "manage" it when we cannot conquer it, and thereby impose on it the form of human relationships. Consider the case of sonorous matter. The musical scale, or rather *a* musical scale, is a process of rationalization that consists in establishing human relationships via this matter in a manner that actualizes its potentiality and it itself becomes human. Marx analyzed the sense organs in this way in order to demonstrate through them the immanence of man and Nature: the ear becomes a human ear when the resonant object becomes musical. The very diverse group of processes of rationalization is what constitutes human becoming or activity, Praxis, or practices. We do not know in this regard if there is such a thing as a human unity, whether from the historical or the generic point of view. Is there a properly human matter, pure potential, distinct from actuality, that has the ability to fascinate us? **There is nothing like "freedom" within us that does not also appear as its opposite: as something that "imprisons" us,** as Châtelet is always saying. **It would be quite obtuse of potentiality to oppose the act capable of realizing it—an inversion of reason, more than its opposite, a privation or alienation. It is as if there were a nonhuman relationship that nevertheless was internal or immanent to human relations, an inhumanity specific to humans: freedom that becomes the capacity of man to vanquish man, or to be vanquished.** Potentiality is pathos, which is to say passivity or receptivity, but receptivity is first and foremost the power to receive blows and to give them: a strange kind of endurance. To be sure, **one can draw up the history of systems of domination, in which the activity of the powerful is at work; but this activity is nothing without the appetite of those who aspire to give blows in the name of the blows they have received. They fight for their servitude as if it were their freedom,** as Spinoza put it. Thus, whether exercised or endured, **power is not merely the activity of man's social existence; it is also the passivity of man's natural existence.** There is a unity of war **[End Page 717]** and land, the traces of which Châtelet detected in the work of Claude Simon—or in Marxism, which never separated the active existence of man as a historical being from its "double," the passive existence of man as a natural being: Reason and its irrationality: this was Marx's own theme, [and] it is also ours. . . . He wants to produce a critical science of the actual, fundamental passivity of humanity. Man does not die because he is mortal (any more than he lies because he is a "liar," or loves because he is a "lover"): he dies because he does not eat enough, because he is reduced to the state of bestiality, because he is killed. Historical materialism is there to remind us of these facts, and Marx, in *Capital*, lays the foundations for what might be a method enabling us to analyze, for a given period—quite a revealing period, in fact—the mechanisms at work in the fact of passivity. . . .[5](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/opera_quarterly/v021/21.4deleuze.html" \l "FOOT5) Aren't there values specific to pathos? Maybe in the form of a despair about the world, something which is quite present in Châtelet, underneath his extreme politeness. **If human beings are constantly in a process of mutual demolition, we might as well destroy ourselves, under pleasant, even fanciful conditions. "Of course all life is a process of breaking down,"** as Fitzgerald said.[6](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/opera_quarterly/v021/21.4deleuze.html" \l "FOOT6) This "of course" has the ring of a verdict of immanence: the inhuman element in one's relationship to oneself. Châtelet's only novel, *Les années de démolition* (*The Demolition Years*), has a profoundly Fitzgeraldian motif, an elegance in the midst of disaster. **It is not a question of dying, or of a desire to die, but of investing the temptation to die in a sublime element like music.** Once again, this has less to do with psychoanalysis than with politics. We must take account of this vector of destruction, which can traverse a community or a man, Athens or Pericles. *Périclès* was Châtelet's first book.[7](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/opera_quarterly/v021/21.4deleuze.html" \l "FOOT7) Pericles was always the very image of the great man, or great hero, for Châtelet—even in Pericles's "passivity," even in his failure (which was also the failure of democracy), even in spite of his disturbing trajectory [*vecteur* ]. Another value proper to pathos is politeness—a Greek politeness, in fact, which already contains an outline of human relationships, the beginnings of an act of reason. Human relationships begin with a reasoned system, an organization of space that undergirds a city. An art of establishing the right distances between humans, not hierarchically but geometrically, neither too far nor too close, to ensure that blows will not be given or received. To make human encounters into a rite, a kind of ritual of immanence, even if this requires a bit of schizophrenia. **What the Greeks taught us,** and [Louis] Gernet or [Jean-Pierre] Vernant reminded us, **is to not let ourselves be nailed down to a fixed center, but to acquire the capacity to transport a center along with oneself, in order to organize sets of symmetrical, reversible relations established by free men.** This may not be enough to defeat the despair of the world, for there are fewer and fewer polite men, and there must be at least two for the quality itself to exist. But François Châtelet's **[End Page 718]** extreme politeness was also a mask concealing a third value of pathos: what one might term goodness, a warm benevolence. The term is not quite right, even though this quality, this value, was deeply present in Châtelet. More than a quality or a value, **it is a disposition of thought, an act of thinking. It consists in this: not knowing in advance how someone might yet be able to establish a process of rationalization, both within and outside himself. Of course there are all the lost causes, the despair. But if there is a chance** [at establishing a process of rationalization], **what does that someone need, how does he escape his own destruction? All of us, perhaps, are born on terrain favorable to demolition, but we will not miss a chance. There is no pure reason or rationality par excellence. There are processes of rationalization—heterogeneous and varied, depending on conditions, eras, groups, and individuals. These are constantly being aborted, receding, and reaching dead ends, and yet resuming elsewhere, with new measures, new rhythms, new allures.** The inherent plurality of processes of rationalization is already the object of classic epistemological analyses (Koyré, Bachelard, Canguilhem), and sociopolitical analyses (Max Weber). In his late works, Foucault too pushed this pluralism toward an analysis of human relationships, which would constitute the first steps toward a new ethics from the standpoint of what he called "processes of subjectification": Foucault's analysis emphasized bifurcations and derivations, the broken historicity of reason, which is always in a state of liberation or alienation as it equates to man's relationship to himself. Foucault had to go back as far as the Greeks, not in order to find the miracle of reason par excellence, but merely in order to diagnose what was perhaps the first gesture toward a process of rationalization, and one that would be followed by many others, in different conditions, under different guises. Foucault no longer characterized the Greek polis in terms of the organization of a new space, but as a human relation that could take the form of a rivalry between free men or citizens (in politics, but also in love, gymnastics, or justice . . . ). Within this sort of process of rationalization and subjectification, a free man could not govern other free men, in principle, unless he were capable of governing himself. This is the specifically Greek act or process, which cannot be treated as a foundational act but rather as a singular event in a broken chain. It is undoubtedly here that Châtelet, having taken the Greek polis as his point of departure, meets Foucault. Châtelet defines the Greek polis with reference to the magistrate—not only in terms of how he differs from other functionaries, such as the priest or the imperial civil servant, but also with respect to his correlative duties, which belong to a corresponding process of rationalization (for instance, the drawing of lots). No one has analyzed how the process of drawing lots captures the gist of reason better than Châtelet. For Châtelet, rationalization is also a historical and political **[End Page 719]** process, in which Athens is its key event yet is also its failure and its erasure—namely, Pericles, from which other events spin off and are absorbed into other processes. Athens was not the advent of an eternal reason, but the singular event of a provisional rationalization, and is as such all the more striking. **When we posit a single, universal reason de jure, we are falling precisely into what Châtelet calls** **presumption**—a kind of metaphysical rudeness. He diagnoses this ailment in Plato: **even when we recognize that reason is a human, solely human, faculty, a faculty tailored to human ends, we nevertheless continue to grant it theological transcendence. We draw up a dualism of processes instead of a pluralism of processes; this dualism opposes discourse to violence, as if violence were not already concealed within discourse itself, providing it with its various impetuses and ins and outs.** For a long time, under the influence of Eric Weil[8](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/opera_quarterly/v021/21.4deleuze.html" \l "FOOT8) and according to a Platonic and Hegelian model, **Châtelet** believed in the opposition between violence and discourse. But what he **discovers,** on the contrary, is **the ability of discourse to give voice to man's distinct inhumanity. Indeed, it is the purview of discourse to engage the process of its own rationalization, but only in a certain becoming, and due to the pressure of certain motivations and events.** This is of extreme importance in Châtelet's *La naissance de l'histoire (The Birth of History)*[9](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/opera_quarterly/v021/21.4deleuze.html" \l "FOOT9) , because the image of discourse or Logos that he presents there is closer to Thucydides than to Plato or Hegel. Indeed, **he never ceases challenging the two corollaries of a doctrine of universal reason: first, the utopian need to invoke an ideal city or a universal State of right, which would prevent against a democratic future; second, the apocalyptic impetus to locate *the* moment, the fundamental alienation of reason that occurred once and for all, comprising in one stroke all violence and inhumanity**. It is one and the same presumption that grants transcendence to both reason and to reason's corruption, and, since Plato, renders the one the twin of the other.

## 2NC

### jazz k

#### We aren’t merely elitism

Thompson 2k9 (Michael, prof pol sci @ “Th. W. Adorno Defended against His Critics, and Admirers: A Defense of the Critique of Jazz” http://www.academia.edu/208239/A\_Defense\_of\_Adornos\_Critique\_of\_Jazz

For Adorno, the overriding problem with jazz was not in the fact that it was fashionable, it was in the formal aspects of it as an art form. The link between the formal qualities of a work of art—especially when analyzing music—and individual thought were essential for Adorno because he was struggling with the central problematic of critical theory: reification. Critical theory’s concern with the problem of reification was simple: the lack of critical reflection in modern society was a function of capitalism and the way that political economy had structured culture and patterns of social relations. It was not to be dismissed as merely »superstructural«—as it was by orthodox Marxists—but was to be investigated as a problem in its own right. This was a move made first by Georg Lukács who saw that the problem of revolutionary social change was dependent not merely on the structure of society itself, but also, and just as importantly, with the means of reflection that individuals could impose on that structure. Consciousness was an essential category in speaking about social critique since it was only through critical reflection that there was any possibility for political action. With the political failures of the left after the rise of fascism and the emergence of the totalitarian nature of the Soviet Union, the emphasis for those who made up the project of critical theory was centered on the issue of culture and the patterns of culture that would inhibit critical consciousness. This was the central thesis of the »culture industry« argument from the beginning. If the function of culture, of art in particular, is to somehow preserve the consciousness of human freedom, to illuminate the repressed desire for the expansion of human liberation and the creative capacities inherent in that liberation, then any form of culture which fails to perform this function leads only to our debasement as humans.23 Jazz is not alone at fault for this, to be sure; but the reason Adorno spent time critiquing jazz was because it masqueraded as performing this function whereas he saw in its formal structure the very opposite tendency. Even worse, Adorno’s critique of jazz argues that it participates in a general dumbing down of listening capacities through the banality of its formal qualities, thereby further regressing the capacity of listeners to comprehend more complex forms of musical language. The defense against reification therefore requires the critique of those cultural forms which inhibit any sense of true subjectivity— i.e., that kind of subjectivity which is in opposition to standardization, to commodification, and the reduction of human expression to the categories of exchange value.24 This kind of culture is a »protest against integration which always violently opposes that which is qualitatively different; in a certain sense this criticism is directed against the idea of levelling unification itself.«25 In this sense, it is only by connecting Adorno’s concept of form and seeing how this relates to his broader understanding of the operation of culture under the con- ditions of late capitalism. The connection between musical form, subjective consciousness, and the capacity of art to provide an illuminatory function in modernity is, in my view, the most fruitful way to read Adorno’s jazz critique. Adorno’s ideas are in line with the tradition of German aesthetics, but it is also tied to the concept of Enlightenment which saw human freedom as possible only through the actions of autonomous subjects whose freedom was grounded in throwing off what Kant referred to as their »self-imposed immaturity.« The reason the culture industry poses a threat to democratic life is because it encourages conformity, a reconciliation with non-democratic forms of life, i.e., those forms of life which are defined by asymmetrical relations of power such as those created by the market and its imperatives. Critical consciousness is dependent upon autonomous self-reflection. It is predicated on the capacity of individuals to think for themselves. The culture industry robs people of this capacity. »It impedes the development of autonomous, independent individuals who judge and decide consciously for themselves. These, however, would be the precondition for a democratic society which needs adults who have come of age in order to sustain itself and develop.«26 Musical form therefore plays a crucial role in the larger project of a democratic society by means of fostering a form of knowledge of reality itself (Erkenntnis der Realität). The connection between critical consciousness and musical form lies in the ways in which it mediates social reality. Jazz, in this sense not unlike other forms of popular music or art, contributes to this cultural-political dilemma. This provides a new foundation for cultural criticism in general since now cultural production becomes tied to the very nature of social and political life. One can argue about the extent to which this may or may not be the case, but Adorno’s criticisms of jazz need to be read within the context of this understanding and not dismissed as mere elitism or a misunderstanding of jazz. Through its predictable, stereotyped, and therefore banal nature, jazz reconciles the listener to the social system rather than place him in opposition to it. It participates in, rather than frustrates, the mechanics of the culture industry which leads to the degeneration of musical form, and musical language, and which leads to the formation of »retarded listeners.« Adorno comes to this conclusion from an immanent analysis of musical form itself, not from cultural assumptions about jazz or popular music more broadly. In this sense, Adorno’s critique of jazz takes on a new relevance with the deepening of the culture industry and its effects. The crucial task of cultural criticism therefore becomes unmasking the extent to which cultural products have social and indeed political effects. It must also concern itself with the emancipatory nature of culture, of music in particular, that »surviving message of despair from the shipwrecked.«27

#### African-american jazz gets commodified

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It is wrong to assume that Adorno’s reading of jazz fundamentally rests on anything other than his understanding of its formal properties.6 It is wrong to dismiss Adorno as having not understood jazz, not heard enough of it, and so on. Adorno’s reading of jazz is done at the level of form, taking the architectonics of the various factors of musical structure—melody, harmony, rhythm, etc.—and provides an analysis of their organization in the completed composition. Far from seeing music in terms of genre or in merely cultural terms, he sees musical form in objective terms. Without this objective analysis, there is no way to overcome the insuperable problem of subjectivity in musical reception. Of course, Adorno’s emphasis on musical form means that any composition is analyzed internally and then dialectically through its relation to the audience, or to the listener. Thus, jazz is not simply critiqued as a genre, but first internally at the level of formal analysis. This means that Adorno wants to explore the ways that the formal structure of musical works—in the present instance, of jazz—gives expression to the various ways in which the production of culture within the context of capitalist society regresses the individual’s capacity to experience an integral rationality which itself would simultaneously enable a critical awareness of society as well as awaken a full expression of the individual’s emancipator interests. In this sense, form plays a mediating role with respect to the experience of the work of art. True art has the capacity to hint at a transformed social world, and it does this by opposing any semblance of a commodity character of art, its victimi- zation by exchange value.7 The object of this experience (Erfahrung) is the illusion created by the work of art. The experience of this illusion ought to communicate something to the listener, some kind of claim about the nature of the social world. Form is the means, the process by which illusion is communicated to the listener. But it is also much more: it is also a feature of a work which molds consciousness as a whole. It mediates the subject’s relation to the musical material which in turn mediates the listener’s relation to society. Mediation (Vermittlung) is a Heglian category used to define the process by which the particular and the universal are connected; it is the process of connecting two things through the presence of a third moment, its opposite being any form of immediate experience which Hegel felt could only lead to the subject’s uncritical relation to the object being expe rienced. More importantly, it is the process through which consciousness is shaped by objective forms of experience (i.e., in terms of the way in which thought is shaped by forms of life external to the subject). In this sense, musical experience mediates the listening subject and the social totality around him. It can either inhibit or encourage the experience of illusion—it is this that separates »good« from »bad« music in Adorno’s sense. Form is the means by which this takes place, and it is here that music’s critical function as art can be glimpsed: Music will be better, the more deeply it is able to express—in the antinomies of its own formal language—the exigency of the social condition and to call for change through the coded language of suffering. It is not for music to stare in helpless horror at society: it fulfills its social function more precisely when it presents social problems through its own material and according to its own formal laws—problems which music contains within itself in the innermost cells of its technique. The task of music as art thus enters into a parallel relationship to the task of social theory.8 The problem with music is that it is inherently abstract and can be easily manipulated. Here is where the central problem of Adorno’s music sociology and his aesthetics of music intersect: since form is the process by which musical meaning is conveyed, it plays a mediating role between the listener and the social context within which that listener finds himself. Hence, it is with the formal nature of the musical work that the analysis must begin since it is there that musical experience is shaped, and Adorno argues that musical form becomes distorted through the pressures of the culture industry, thereby »regressing« the capacity of listen- ers.9 This is one of the core elements of Critical Theory: the attempt to diagnose those forms of life, thought, and culture which regress or, the individual’s capacity to grasp the totality of capitalist society.10 There emerges a »commercial hardening and leveling of musical life,« and a disintegration of the capacity of music to illuminate the contradictions in society.11 Once this occurs, the ability to comprehend more complex experiences that are capable of containing truth-content erodes, and listeners are only able to experience the most basic kinds of musical form and, as a result, music loses its ability to allow for a critical cognition of the social world, »it no longer expresses anything of social misery and contradiction, but forms rather in itself one single contradiction to this society.«12 Music, as with other arts, possesses what Adorno refers to as a »language-character« (Sprachcharakter), which means that the formal properties of art are organized in order to communicate meaning.13 It is through the formal aspects of art works, through the way that they organize their meaning to »say something,« that one can assess their »truth-content.« It is from this point that Adorno’s views on jazz can be more fruitfully understood. The analysis of jazz cannot be separated from its formal characteristics, in terms of the way it as musical language is organized. In Adorno’s reading, jazz is »perennial fashion«; it is a musical form that masquerades as rebellious but which, in actuality, breeds conformity: However little doubt there can be regarding the African elements in jazz, it is no less certain that everything unruly in it was from the very beginning integrated into a strict scheme, that its rebellious gestures are accompanied by the tendency to blind obeisance, much like the sado-masochistic type described by analytic psychology, the person who chafes against the father-figure while secretly admiring him, who seeks to emulate him and in turn derives enjoyment from the subordination he overtly detests.14 Jazz represents that form of cultural production that is able to pass itself off as radical, as different and as a potent musical force for expanding the experience of the individual against the culture industry. For Adorno this is simply nonsense because at the level of concrete musical structure, at the level of form, jazz is nothing of the kind. It breeds conformity no less than the most banal forms of pop music. It does this through masking its non-radical character—appearance is confused with essence. Jazz is seen as radical because it appears to go against the established forms of rhythm and harmony that popular music, or light music (Leichtmusik) engender: regular beats, clean harmonies, and so on. Jazz is perceived by many listeners as going against symmetrical forms of rhythm and harmony, of breaking conventional musical forms and remaking them anew. But it is precisely these formal characteristics that Adorno sees as debased in jazz through this schematization. They are false to the extent that they create the illusion of arhythmicality and forms of atonality when in fact they do just the opposite: they mask an inherent banality. Rhythmically, jazz provides merely an illusion of improvisation by its reliance of syncopation which Adorno sees as nothing more than masked rhythmic regularity: »In all of these syncopations, which occasionally in virtuoso pieces yield an extraordinary complexity, the f undamental beat is rigorously maintained; it is marked over and over again by the bass drum.«15 Adorno’s critical appraisal of the formal aspects of jazz therefore centers on its predictability which is masked by the appearance of spontaneity and dynamism. The banality of jazz lies therefore in its basic structure: in its overall »schema« which the soloist simply accentuates or from which he barely deviates. What appears as variation is merely the ornamentation of a highly-determined form. The problem therefore lies in what Adorno refers to as its »stereotypology« by which he means its simplicity of rhythm, harmony and melody which reduces the musical language to a series of repeated sequences and rehashed elements. The formal dullness of jazz is therefore due to »the fact that it maintains an inexorably rigid stereotypology and at the same time does everything it can to let that stereotypology be forgotten by means of individualizing elements, which are again ultimately determined by the stereotypology.«16 It is this that serves as the basis for Adorno’s use of terms such as »banal«: the extent to which the formal dimensions of jazz actually can reproduce the mechanized nature of late capitalist society. But even more importantly, it is in the way that these predictable elements in terms of form encompass the entire structure of jazz’s musical language which sets the fundamental ground for Adorno’s critique. These formal aspects of jazz are of particular importance for Adorno because he wants to point out the similarities of jazz not only to more commercialized popular music, but also to the more banal tendencies in »serious« music as well à la Delius, Sibelius, and so on. For Adorno, jazz cannot contribute to the larger aesthetic project of illuminating human freedom and utopia since by its nature it constrains and even hinders the capacity for musical progress. Its language is not one of newness, but of recycling what is already known. But it does this, not unlike the rest of popular music, by simplifying the language of music. Using Adorno’s own categories of analysis, it contributes to the »regression of listening« through its repeated »utilization of certain well-defined tricks, formulas and clichés to the exclusion of everything else.«17 The regression of listening is a key aspect to understanding Adorno’s attack on jazz and popular music more broadly simply because once musical form becomes so deeply predictable, simple, banal, then the general ability for listeners to comprehend more complex formal aspects of music diminishes. What Adorno refers to as »commodity listening« has the effect of eroding subjectivity, not highlighting it. Formal simplicity is necessary for the widest distribution of cultural products. Conformity is a necessary, not contingent, result of this process. As a result, any form of individual subjectivity itself is reified and »liquidated«: The sacrifice of individuality, which accommodates itself to regularity of the successful, the doing of what everybody does, follows from the basic fact that in broad areas the same thing is offered to everybody by the standardized production of consumption goods. But the commercial necessity of concealing this identity leads to the manipulation of taste and the official culture’s pretense of individualism, which necessarily increases in proportion to the liquidation of the individual.18 It is in the »manipulation of tastes« which itself results from standardization that a regression of listening takes place. This regression means that one »listens according to formula« and without any kind of resistance to the musical material itself. Listeners lack the »capacity to make demands beyond the limits« of the music that is supplied.19 The regression of listening is made possible by the reproduction of trite, predictable musical forms, and jazz, in Adorno’s reading of it, is a central part of this process of regression. Jazz is able to do this through its »fetish character«: by giving the listener the »happiness of renewed encounter,« or offering up what is already familiar to them. Ornamented rehashing of familiar tunes, simplified rhythms, harmonic structures which constantly repeat, and so on: »Beneath the opulent surface of jazz lies the—barren, unchanged, clearly detachable— most primitive harmonic-tonal scheme with its breakdown into half- and full-cadences and equally primitive meter and form.«20 The formal aspects of jazz therefore have the capacity to shape musical listening and musical experience.

#### They play into the hands of power

Lewandowski 1996 (Joseph, “Adorno on jazz and society” Philosophy Social Criticism 1996; 22; 103)

Hence the question to be pursued here cannot be merely whether Adorno gets jazz ’right’, that is, whether Adorno understands jazz correctly; he is, as we shall see, both right and wrong about jazz and its entwinement with the culture industry of capitalist modernity. So what is needed is to give an account of how and why Adorno can be both right and wrong about the place and critical possibilities of music in modernity. For when Adorno writes about jazz he always has in his sights a much larger target. Indeed, Adorno’s social interpretation of artworks seeks to discern the ways in which a specific social phenomenon - e.g. jazz - is bound up with the social structure and ensemble of relations in which it emerges and from which it never completely disentangles itself. Artworks for Adorno are shot through with social antagonisms; they do not reflect such antagonisms so much as they embody and actualize them.l° Thus, when Adorno poses the question of ’art’, it must be understood, to paraphrase a line from his essay ’On Lyric Poetry and Society’, as a consideration of the question: How is a society - in all its tensions and antagonisms - manifest in an artwork?11 And, how does the enigmatic character of artworks resist such a manifestation? Here social criticism and aesthetic inquiry coalesce. What Adorno on jazz amounts to, then, is an immanent social critique (and not simply an elaborate aesthetic and Eurocentric quibble about the ’inferiority’) of the social phenomenon of jazz. Such a critique emerges, I shall argue, in a constellation of three intertwined claims: (1) a criticism of jazz’s claim to improvisation and fashionability - what Adorno calls jazz’s ’manneristic interpretation’ (‘Manier der Interpretation’) (122, 125); (2) a demonstration of jazz’s entwinement with the technologization of everyday life - what Adorno calls jazz’s collaboration in the ’technological veil’ (’technologischen Schleier’) of the modern world (125, 128); and (3) an attempt to link the affirmative gesture of the ’jazz subject’ to the dissolution of the individual and the possibility of individual expression of suffering in modern capitalist society - what Adorno calls the emergence of ’pseudo-individualization’ (’Pseudoindividualisierung’) (126, 129).

## 1NR

### visibility

**their ressentiment against exclusion prevents us from loving the present enough to change it**

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**New tools of subversion are emerging, but they have not crystallised, they are ungraspable**. This describes our encounter with imperceptible politics; it is not simply situated in our present conditions of postliberal sovereignty. Of course, **imperceptible politics is demanded by our situatedness.** But at the same time, it is imaginary and outside of the present historical chronotope. It is only possible to work on the real conditions of the present by invoking imaginaries which take us beyond the present. **And this trajectory away from the present is achieved by working in time, by intensifying the present. Imperceptible politics works with the present. Time is fractured and non-synchronous - the historical present can be understood both as containing residues of the past and as anticipating the future** (Marvakis, 2005; Bloch, 1986). Yet it is impossible to identify either the past or the future by moving backwards or forwards in time. Neither move is possible. **Time forces us to work in the present, by training our senses to examine what appears evident as well as what is absent. This sensibility enables us to perceive and imagine things and ourselves in unfamiliar ways, to follow open trajectories.** **Time contains both experiences of the world which have been rendered invisible and the seeds of experience which maybe possible to realise** (Santos, 2003). **Imperceptible politics can be neither perceived nor conducted from a transcendent perspective; that is, elaborating a 'metaphysics of the present'** (as criticised in Adam, 1995) **can reveal nothing of the mode of engagement with the present we are describing. This engagement entails experiencing time in a subjective and embodied way, being forced to transform ourselves in order to deal with this current predicament of resistance.** **Situated in the present historical regime of control, imperceptible politics involves remaking the present by remaking our bodies: the ways we perceive, feel, act. Imperceptible politics transforms our bodies. Loving the present, existing in the present, imperceptible politics is practised in the present.** **It works with social reality in the most intimate and immanent ways, recalling the whole history and practice of escape, as we described earlier, and rethinking it anew.** **Doing imperceptible politics entails the refusal to use our perceptual and action systems as instruments for representing the current political conditions of resistance.** It functions through diffraction rather than reflection (Haraway, 1997, 1991c): diffraction creates 'effects of connection, of embodiment, and of responsibility for an imagined elsewhere that we may yet learn to see and build here' (Haraway, 1992, p. 295). In this sense **imperceptible politics is more concerned with changing the very conditions of perception and action than with changing what we see.** **Only such bodily, lived transformations are sufficient for interrupting the pervasive sensibilities being shaped by sovereign powers.**

**Their claim that they cannot be political without discussing their identities is NOT TRUE -- the political actions of groups like Anonymous and the ethical hacker movement include people of color and rely on anonymity -- they represent a potential alternative political model -- we are not suggesting that this is a universal model, merely that it is a possible one**

**Halpin '12** Harry, "The Politics of Anonymous: Ontological Politics without Identity" Nov/Dec

http://www.radicalphilosophy.com/article/the-philosophy-of-anonymous

**You cannot arrest an idea**. The last tweet of Topiary, before his arrest **Ranging from WikiLeaks to the global struggle against treaties such as ACTA, over the last few years the Web has become a centre of political struggle *in and of itself* rather than a mere adjunct of other struggles. At the same time, a new social force has emerged from the Internet: Anonymous. It is unclear at this moment even what Anonymous *is*, much less where it is going.** Is Anonymous the vanguard defending the Internet, the Internet not only in-itself but for-itself, whose denial-of-service attacks are ‘Internet street protests’, as Richard Stallman put it?1 **Is Anonymous the incarnation of the long-awaited altruistic invisible army of hackers needed by various social movements, as promised by science-fiction writers for the last decade?** Or is Anonymous a phenomenon more similar to a mass panic, a sort of collective behaviour that falls outside of organized politics, an ‘Internet Hate Machine’ that embodies the libidinal subconscious of the lost children of the Web? All of these theories are attempts to grasp something that is both radically new and the return of a certain long-repressed collective force whose existence pre-dates the Enlightenment ideology of the individual. **Anonymous**, it will be argued here, **is an ontological shift on the terrain of identity at the very moment that identity has become the highest form of selection and exploitation in cognitive capitalism, the first glimpse of a form of life without identity on the Internet**. Heidegger was wrong: the coming of the gods after cybernetics is possible: they do not forgive and they do not forget.

**Their critique of expertist language is a case in point—reading the 1ac played into the hands of status quo elites who use arguments like the aff to sell products**

**Blumenkranz et al. 13.** Carla Blumenkranz, Keith Gessen, Mark Greif, Nikil Saval, all senior editors at n + 1, *The Intellectual Situation*, “Too Much Sociology: Cultural Capital = Capital,” pg. 2

With the generalization of cultural soci- ology, however, the critical impact has van- ished. Sociology has ceased to be demystify- ing because it has become the way everyone thinks. Discussions about the arts now have an awkward, paralyzed quality: few judg- ments about the independent excellences of works are offered, but everyone wants to know who sat on the jury that gave out the award. It’s become natural to imagine that networks of power are responsible for the success or failure of works of art, rather than any creative power of the artist herself.

We’ve reached the point at which the CEO of Amazon, a giant corporation, in his attempt to integrate bookselling and book production, has perfectly adapted the lan- guage of a critique of the cultural sphere that views any claim to “expertise” as a mere mask of prejudice, class, and cultural privi- lege. Writing in praise of his self-publishing initiative, Jeff Bezos notes that “even well- meaning gatekeepers slow innovation. . . . Authors that might have been rejected by establishment publishing channels now get their chance in the marketplace. Take a look at the Kindle bestseller list and com- pare it to the New York Times bestseller list—which is more diverse?” Bezos isn’t talking about Samuel Delany; he’s adopt- ing the sociological analysis of cultural capital and appeals to diversity to validate the commercial success of books like Fifty Shades of Grey, a badly written fantasy of a young woman liberated from her mod- ern freedom through erotic domination by a rich, powerful male. Publishers have responded by reducing the number of their own “well-meaning gatekeepers,” actual edi- tors actually editing books, since quality or standards are deemed less important than a work’s potential appeal to various com- munities of readers.

The danger is that the critical insights of what was called “critical sociology” have been repurposed as the status-quo thinking of “concerned liberalism”—the very thing that it set out to subvert. Thinking of every- thing as a scripted game show hasn’t led to change. Instead, sociological thinking has hypostatized and celebrated the script. Or to put it another way: hate the players, love the game. Even the sinister David Brooks managed to use (and only partly travesty) Bourdieu, when he suggested that the rise of “bourgeois bohemians” had largely solved the titanic conflicts of the Sixties. In such instances, sociology, which intended to explain in order to criticize the glacial stability of bourgeois society, has passed almost seamlessly into the hands of those wanting to justify that society.

How this happened may have something to do with the ambiguity of the demystifi- cation project itself. We can see the prob- lem in the documentary about Bourdieu, Sociology Is a Martial Art, when a passerby recognizes him and tells him that his work changed her life. “I thought I was free, but I wasn’t,” she says, smiling. Bourdieu may have chafed at the enormous simplification, but it’s a relatively accurate conclusion to draw from his work. Yet the political take- away of such thinking was always unclear. So you’ve learned you aren’t free—good.

What do you do now?