# Round 4—Neg vs Emory JS

## 1NC

### 1nc 1

#### Surrender is not topical—it’s a declaration to an opposing party, independent of any legal restriction—topical version is just to repeal the AUMF

**Anderson 2011** – Professor at Washington College of Law, American University; and Hoover Institution visiting fellow, member of Hoover Task Force on National Security and Law; nonresident senior fellow, Brookings Institution (5/19, Kenneth, Volokh, “State Department’s Harold Koh on OBL Raid”, http://www.volokh.com/2011/05/19/state-departments-harold-koh-on-obl-raid/comment-page-1/#comment-1202080)

“Finally, consistent with the laws of armed conflict and U.S. military doctrine, the U.S. forces were prepared to capture bin Laden if he had surrendered in a way that they could safely accept. The laws of armed conflict require acceptance of a genuine offer of surrender that is clearly communicated by the surrendering party and received by the opposing force, under circumstances where it is feasible for the opposing force to accept that offer of surrender. But where that is not the case, those laws authorize use of lethal force against an enemy belligerent, under the circumstances presented here.”

This statement is important and useful. This is the international law standard in the laws of war for surrender, and it is the standard applied in operational law by US JAG in operations in Afghanistan on a regular basis – in conventional operations as well as special operations. I had some fears that, in order to present what was apparently a marvelously clean operation in terms of targeting and collateral damage in its most favorable light, the administration might be tempted to raise the bar on the law of surrender. It is an act in the law of war that is much more fraught and difficult in many circumstances than it might appear. But the Legal Adviser has stated the law as it is, and as it is operationally applied by US forces on a regular basis. I welcome the Legal Adviser’s statement, and, with the additional statement on surrender, believe that it covers the major jus in bello legal issues in the Bin Laden raid.

The statement does not directly address jus ad bellum issues – the question of whether the use of force was lawful, particularly in crossing the border into Pakistan to carry out the raid. The administration has asserted, in keeping with longstanding US views of international law, that sovereignty is not a bar, other things equal, where a state is unwilling or unable to deal with terrorists in its territory. In addition, this being a defense of the OBL operation, it did not address questions of targeted killing in general – apart from the general considerations given in the 2010 address – but offered only a defense in this particular case.

#### Vote neg:

#### 1. Ground—external enforcement measures bypass core neg gorund and comparative lit on actual restrictions while inflating solvency—independent voter for object fiat.

#### 2. Predictability—blurring mechanisms makes them a conditional moving target, which un-limits the topic.

### 1nc 2

#### The solution to the world’s problem lies in the recognition that there is no solution – suffering and conflict are nothing more internal blockages – we must accept the world as it comes to us or we are doomed to the path of Don Quixote, fighting imaginary windmills for all eternity

**Khema 94**  (Ayya, 1994, Buddhist monk, “All of us beset by Birth, Decay, and Death.” Buddhism Today, <http://www.buddhismtoday.com/english/philosophy/thera/003-allofus-5.htm>)

If you have ever read Don Quixote, you'll remember that he was fighting windmills. Everybody is doing just that, fighting windmills. Don Quixote was the figment of a writer's imagination, a man who believed himself to be a great warrior. He thought that every windmill he met was an enemy and started battling with it. That's exactly what we are doing within our own hearts and that's why this story has such an everlasting appeal. It tells us about ourselves. Writers and poets who have survived their own lifetimes have always told human beings about themselves. Mostly people don't listen, because it doesn't help when somebody else tells us what's wrong with us and few care to hear it. One has to find out for oneself and most people don't want to do that either. What does it really mean to fight windmills? It means fighting nothing important or real, just imaginary enemies and battles. All quite trifling matters, which we build into something solid and formidable in our minds. We say: "I can't stand that," so we start fighting, and "I don't like him," and a battle ensues, and "I feel so unhappy," and the inner war is raging. We hardly ever know what we're so unhappy about. The weather, the food, the people, the work, the leisure, the country, anything at all will usually do. Why does this happen to us? Because of the resistance to actually letting go and becoming what we really are, namely nothing. Nobody cares to be that. Everybody wants to be something or somebody even if it's only Don Quixote fighting windmills. Somebody who knows and acts and will become something else, someone who has certain attributes, views, opinions and ideas. Even patently wrong views are held onto tightly, because it makes the "me" more solid. It seems negative and depressing to be nobody and have nothing. We have to find out for ourselves that it is the most exhilarating and liberating feeling we can ever have. But because we fear that windmills might attack, we don't want to let go. Why can't we have peace in the world? Because nobody wants to disarm. Not a single country is ready to sign a disarmament pact, which all of us bemoan. But have we ever looked to see whether we, ourselves, have actually disarmed? When we haven't done so, why wonder that nobody else is ready for it either? Nobody wants to be the first one without weapons; others might win. Does it really matter? If there is nobody there, who can be conquered? How can there be a victory over nobody? Let those who fight win every war, all that matters is to have peace in one's own heart. As long as we are resisting and rejecting and continue to find all sorts of rational excuses to keep on doing that there has to be warfare. War manifests externally in violence, aggression and killing. But how does it reveal itself internally? We have an arsenal within us, not of guns and atomic bombs, but having the same effect. And the one who gets hurt is always the one who is shooting, namely oneself. Sometimes another person comes within firing range and if he or she isn't careful enough, he or she is wounded. That's a regrettable accident. The main blasts are the bombs which go off in one's own heart. Where they are detonated, that's the disaster area. The arsenal which we carry around within ourselves consists of our ill will and anger, our desires and cravings. The only criterion is that we don't feel peaceful inside. We need not believe in anything, we can just find out whether there is peace and joy in our heart. If they are lacking, most people try to find them outside of themselves. That's how all wars start. It is always the other country's fault and if one can't find anyone to blame then one needs more "Lebensraum," more room for expansion, more territorial sovereignty. In personal terms, one needs more entertainment, more pleasure, more comfort, more distractions for the mind. If one can't find anyone else to blame for one's lack of peace, then one believes it to be an unfulfilled need. Who is that person, who needs more? A figment of our own imagination, fighting windmills. That "more" is never ending. One can go from country to country, from person to person. There are billions of people on this globe; it's hardly likely that we will want to see every one of them, or even one-hundredth, a lifetime wouldn't be enough to do so. We may choose twenty or thirty people and then go from one to the next and back again, moving from one activity to another, from one idea to another. We are fighting against our own dukkha and don't want to admit that the windmills in our heart are self-generated. We believe somebody put them up against us, and by moving we can escape from them. Few people come to the final conclusion that these windmills are imaginary, that one can remove them by not endowing them with strength and importance. That we can open our hearts without fear and gently, gradually let go of our preconceived notions and opinions, views and ideas, suppressions and conditioned responses. When all that is removed, what does one have left? A large, open space, which one can fill with whatever one likes. If one has good sense, one will fill it with love, compassion and equanimity. Then there is nothing left to fight. Only joy and peacefulness remain, which cannot be found outside of oneself. It is quite impossible to take anything from outside and put it into oneself. There is no opening in us through which peace can enter. We have to start within and work outward. Unless that becomes clear to us, we will always find another crusade.

#### Our impacts outweigh – voting negative breaks the shackles of the ego through embracing its annihilation

Perreira 10 – Ph.D. candidate at UC Santa Barbara

(Todd LeRoy, ““Die before you die”: Death Meditation as Spiritual Technology of the Self in Islam and Buddhism”, The Muslim World Vol 100, Issue 2-3, 247-267, dml)

In Theravada Buddhism, death (marana ) is understood simply as the “interruption of the life faculty included within [the limits of] a single becoming (existence).” Buddhism distinguishes between two types of death: timely and untimely. A death determined by the “exhaustion of merit or the exhaustion of the life span” is considered a timely death whereas a death determined by “kamma (Skt. karma) that interrupts [other, life-producing] kamma” is regarded as an untimely death. 52 Human birth and death are, like all other phenomena, subjected to an impersonal principal of causation known as paticca samuppada - ¯ , “dependent origination.” Buddhism regards the idea of a permanent soul or atta (Skt. a¯tman) as a mental projection which has no corresponding reality and, as such, is dangerous for it leads to false notions of “me” and “mine.” The view that the self has an inner essence or eternal soul is nurtured on what are called the “three poisons” — greed, hatred, and delusion, around which the wheel of birth and death (samsara ¯ ) turns. According to the Buddha’s analysis what, by convention, is called the “self” is, in fact, constituted by the congeries of ﬁve aggregates or khandhas (matter, sensation, perception, mental formations, and consciousness) which, in relation to paticca samuppada - ¯ or the law of cause and effect, are inherently impermanent. This explains why corpse meditation has long been, and continues to be, a practice vital to Buddhism: “For all its grave stillness there is nothing more dynamic than a corpse.” 53 It is the event of impermanence taking place before the eyes of the meditator. The corpse therefore serves as the ideal object lesson: to “die” before you die is to die to false notions of an enduring self. In spite of these two radically different perspectives both Islam and Buddhism agree that the central human predicament is not death but the unsatisfactoriness that results from our identiﬁcation with a self that hankers for the things of this world. According to al-Ghaza¯ l ı¯ the cause of this dissatisfaction is rooted in ignorance due to: (1) lengthy hopes and (2) desire for the things of this world. By lengthy hopes he means we generally go about our lives under the pretext that we can expect to enjoy a long and healthy life. To maintain this fantasy, we plunge ourselves into the pursuit of pleasure, wealth, and prestige and, in the process, become so “engrossed” we fail to recognize how brief and ephemeral these frivolities are in actuality. The Buddha offered an analogous perspective. The term he designated for the unsatisfactoriness of life is dukkha or suffering and it conveys a similar notion in that its cause is attributed to a thirsting or craving (tanha ) for sense pleasures that ultimately entrap us in the rounds of birth and death. And, as in Suﬁsm, it is the failure to penetrate the veil of ignorance (avijja¯) that keeps us from knowing the true nature of the self. Whether it is a question of gaining insight into the insubstantial nature of the “self ” (anatta), as in the case of the Buddhism, or, a need to effect a decisive break with that aspect of the “self ” (nafs) “engrossed” in worldly affairs and lengthy hopes as we ﬁnd in Suﬁsm, what is apparent in both traditions is that the experience of dying before dying seems to introduce two new forms of experience which were previously absent. The ﬁrst — that of introspection — appears to be linked to a new knowledge of how one/I/you/we should live our lives while the other is primarily one of interrogation — the minute level of scrutiny required of one who goes to battle with his[/her] own demons. This occurs at the very moment in al-Ghaza¯ l ı¯’s spiritual biography when, for the ﬁrst time, he conducts an examination of his motives for teaching and it culminates in the anxiety attack that robs him of the ability to speak in the lecture hall. In the case of Ajahn Chah this process of introspection and interrogation takes the form of an internal dialogue, one that is not willed but arises spontaneously at the moment he is seized with terror to the point of paralysis and is forced to confront the basis for his fears of death. In both cases, and this is signiﬁcant, each man temporarily loses the ability to control his external voice and, in the process, gains a new possibility for giving space over in his life to the authority of an interior voice. Thus, to access this new ﬁeld of experience one must be willing to submit to a practice of “dying” to those aspects of the self that otherwise stand in the way of spiritual development. There is also the possibility that an intimate knowledge of death and dying may, in fact, be an important vector through which notions of the ethical life are transmitted within the boundaries and parameters of a given tradition. If this is the case, if dying before dying contributes to the formation of oneself as an ethical subject, if it is generative of experiencing or imagining a new sense subjectivity, or at least new possibilities for reforming the old sense of self, then it appears to be a process of identity formation that is both morally compelling and expansive. By “dying” one rehearses, as it were, a role inscribed in the narrative ethics transmitted and performed by countless virtuosi through the ages. We saw how the ordination procedure of a new monk, together with his ﬁrst instruction in meditation, reenacts the Buddha’s response to his own confrontation with death by choosing to go forth with the Great Renunciation. Al-Ghaza¯ l ı¯’s ethical interiorization begins with his recognition that God, through the call of the inner voice beckoning him to take to the road, compelled him to renounce (i.e., “die”) to his attachment to a comfortable teaching post in what was then one of the most prestigious centers of learning in the world. New research into his life suggests this decision to turn away from the comforts of worldly life toward a life of “seclusion” (‘uzla) may also have been prompted by reports about the life of the Prophet Muhammad and about al-Ash‘arı¯, who, like other ﬁgures of Islam, had a life-changing experience at the age of forty. 54 Because turning one’s life around at age forty is a recurring motif in Muslim biographies, if true, this would conﬁrm that his decision to abandon his teaching post and embrace a mystical path of seclusion can also be understood in terms of Flood’s idea of asceticism, that is, as the “internalizing of tradition” and the shaping of the narrative of one’s life in accordance with the narrative of tradition. 55

#### Use the ballot to engage in meditative affirmation of the status quo.

**Astma 6 –** Professor of Philosophy at Columbia College

(Stephen, “Against Transcendentalism: Monty Python’s The Meaning of Life and Buddhism”, *Monty Python and Philosophy* ebook copy, dml)

Upon close inspection, Buddha shows, paradise crumbles. The atman, on the other hand, is a no show. The Buddha thinks that atman is nowhere to be found except in the literary inventions of Hinduism and the confusions of its followers. Buddhism, contrary to all dualistic theories, asserts that **we are not made up of two metaphysically different parts**, a permanent spirit and an impermanent body. Buddhism breaks with most religions, East and West, by recognizing that we are each a finite tangle of qualities, all of which eventually exhaust themselves, and none of which, conscious or other, carries on independently. All humans, according to Buddha, are composed of the five aggregates (khandas ); body (rupa), feeling (vedana), perception (sanna), dispositions or volitional tendencies (sankhara) and consciousness (vinnana). If the Buddha was standing around in the battlefield setting of the Bhagavad Gita, he would certainly chime-in and object to Krishna’s irresponsible claim that a permanent soul resides in Arjuna and his enemies. Show me this permanent entity, the Buddha would demand. Is the body permanent? Are feelings permanent? What about perceptions, or dispositions, or even consciousness? The Buddha says “If there really existed the atman, there would be also something that belonged to this atman. As however, in truth and reality, neither an atman nor anything belonging to an atman can be found, is it not really an utter fool’s doctrine to say: This is the world, this am I; after death I shall be permanent, persisting and eternal?” (Mijjhima Nikaya) Buddha examines all the elements of the human being, finds that they are all fleeting, and finds no additional permanent entity or soul amidst the tangle of human faculties. There is no ghost in the machine. What’s So Grotesque about That? In their rejection of transcendentalism, Buddhism and Monty Python converge in their celebrations of the grotesque. The Python crew seems to relish the disgusting facts of human biology and they take every opportunity to render them through special effects. Throughout Monty Python’s The Meaning of Life, blood spurts, vomit spews, babies explode from birth canals, decapitated heads abound, and limbs putrefy. Theravada Buddhism also celebrates the revolting, treating it as a meditation focus for contemplating the lack of permanence. The transcendentalist consoles herself with the idea that this physical body may decay and perish, but an eternal soul will outlast the material melt-down—not so for the Buddha. In an attempt to undercut human vanity and demonstrate the impermanence of all things, Buddhist scriptures are filled with nauseating details about rotting carcasses and putrid flesh. In the Anguttara Nikaya, for example, the scripture asks, “Did you never see in the world the corpse of a man or a woman, one or two or three days after death, swollen up, blue-black in color, and full of corruption? And did the thought never come to you that you also are subject to death, that you cannot escape it?” (III, 35) When I was at a monastery in Southern Thailand, I chanced upon some reproductions of “dhamma paintings” from the mid-nineteenth century. These pictures were from a Chaiya manuscript discovered nearby, and they depicted, in detail, the “Ten Reflections on Foulness” (asubha kammatthana). The paintings illustrate the various uses of corpses as objects for contemplating impermanence. Following the great Theravadan philosopher Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga text (“Path of Purification”), the artist rendered decaying corpses in rather comprehensive stages of dismemberment and putrification. According to Buddhaghosa, staring at a bloated corpse will be particularly useful to me if I’m feeling overly attached and arrogant about the shape and morphology of my body. If instead I’m feeling snobby or bigoted about my skin’s color or complexion, I should focus on the livid corpse that ranges from green to blue-black in color. Or, if I mistakenly feel that my body is my own, I am to rectify this error by meditating on a worm-infested corpse (puluvaka). As Buddhaghosa explains, “The body is shared by many and creatures live in dependence on (all parts and organs) and feed (on them). And there they are born, grow old, and die, evacuate and pass water; and the body is their maternity home, their hospital, their charnel ground, their privy and their urinal.” Buddhist “mindfulness” (meditational awareness) about the body is being aware of its transience, its brevity, its fugacity. The physical body is slowly macerating, and to try to hold onto it or recompose it is a pipe-dream. The single issue that invited comment from film reviewers when Monty Python’s The Meaning of Life was released was its wallow in the grotesque. One exclaimed that the film’s “ramshackle bouts of surreal physical comedy—a clotted mass of frenzied bodies, debris, mud, and gore—induce feelings of revolt and despair.”53 In light of the film’s critique of transcendentalism, however, this reviewer got it just backward. Far from despairing, the Pythons aimed to smash the deceptive veneer of puritanical snobbery that devalues the flesh and overvalues the invisible spirit. Like Buddhism, Python asks us to “say yes” to our true nature, **filled as it is with impermanence and unpleasantness.** At first this may seem jarring and disturbing, but in the long run **it is preferable to self-deception through figmentary transcendent reality**. Buddha’s rejection of a permanent transcendental soul is known as the anatta, or “no-self ” doctrine (and the companion doctrine that rejects the idea of a permanent God is called paticca samuppada, or “dependent arising,” because it denies the need for any transcendent uncaused cause). The most important Buddhist critique of the transcendental soul finds place in Monty Python’s The Meaning of Life. It is the idea that belief in unseen, eternal, and divine realities ultimately **distracts us from our own humanity**. Transcendentalism **dehumanizes us by feeding selfish craving**. If we embrace a worldview that pivots on the idea that we will attain immortality, then we are going to be overly concerned with our soul’s protection and its future fate. We become **more concerned with saving our own souls** than valuing and attending to the needs of those around us. Simply put, belief in a soul and a heaven of blissful happiness actually **makes you less ethical in this life**. The rejection of souls, heaven, and God, does not lead, as so many critics contend, to bleak egoistic nihilism. Many transcendentalists foretell a gloomy picture without the security of otherworldly meaning, predicting rampant hedonism (pure pleasure seeking) or nihilistic apathy. The Buddha disagrees and thinks that these life patterns are to be avoided as much as otherworldly dogmatism. The extremes, excesses, and general sufferings of the hedonist strategy and the nihilist strategy are revealed in the film. Terry’s Jones’s Mr. Creosote, for instance, is the giant embodiment of the crass pursuit of sensual gratification. After gorging himself on multiple servings of food and wine at a fancy French restaurant, his unchecked desire for the pleasures of chocolate puts him over the edge. Though he claims he can eat no more, Cleese easily seduces him with a single, small, “vaffer-thin” chocolate mint. Mr. Creosote then begins to inflate and he soon explodes, showering the restaurant in his blood and entrails. Obviously, such hedonism and self-gratification is not an appropriate fall-back for those who reject transcendental metaphysics and ethics. Nor is it appropriate to give oneself over to despair or indifference. The folly of that is illustrated in the movie’s gruesome portrayal of a liver transplant. After Graham Chapman starts the bloody business of removing this poor chap’s liver in his dining room, his partner, Cleese, chats up the man’s wife (Terry Jones in drag) in the kitchen. Cleese asks if she too would give up her liver, but she replies, “No . . . I don’t want to die.” Cleese perseveres and introduces her to Eric Idle, who steps out of her refrigerator and commences a musical tour of the sublime immensity of the universe and the tiny insignificance of her life: Just remember that you’re standing on a planet that’s evolving And revolving at nine hundred miles an hour, That’s orbiting at nineteen miles a second, so it’s reckoned, A sun that is the source of all our power. The sun and you and me and all the stars that we can see, Are moving at a million miles a day In an outer spiral arm, at forty thousand miles an hour, Of the galaxy we call the Milky Way. The Universe itself keeps on expanding and expanding In all of the directions it can whizz As fast as it can go, at the speed of light you know, Twelve million miles a minute, and that’s the fastest speed there is. So remember when you’re feeling very small and insecure How amazingly unlikely is your birth And pray that there’s intelligent life somewhere up in space Because there’s bugger all down here on earth. “Makes you feel so sort of insignificant, doesn’t it?” Cleese and Chapman ask. “Can we have your liver then?” She gives in—“Yeah. All right, you talked me into it”—and the two doctors set upon her with their knives. Just as Mr. Creosote succumbs to sensual overindulgence, this housewife opts for a groundless underindulgence. Just because she realizes she lives in an almost infinitely large universe, that is no reason for her to think that her life is worthless in itself and not worth continuing. This is what the extreme nihilist does (indeed, this is what nihilism is all about), and the Python crew is showing us the absurdity of it. Life **does not become meaningless** once you give up the idea that you are playing a role in a transcendentally planned drama. The values of family, work, love, understanding, simple pleasures, and peace, **don’t go away** once you reject transcendent meaning. Nor does the woman’s natural desire for self-preservation and the avoidance of suffering evaporate once she realizes her own finitude. Transcendental dogmatism is dehumanizing, but so are the opposing extremes of hedonism and nihilistic skepticism. The Buddha made this point explicitly when he argued for a Middle Way between all opposing extremes. Just as **one should find a middle way** between the slaveries of excessive indulgence and excessive asceticism (self-denial), so too one must avoid embracing both absolutist worldviews (like Palin’s toadying transcendentalist chaplain) and relativist worldviews (where all values and meanings are leveled or negated). The Buddha’s Middle Way doctrine seeks to reclaim human values and meaning by avoiding overly rigid blind faith and also avoiding distracting speculations about matters that are remote from lived experience. Back Down to Earth So, what are these more down-to-earth human values that must be rescued from transcendental flights-of-fancy and nihilistic negativity? In light of the film’s critique of transcendentalism, the extremely modest list of values offered at the end as final “answers” to the meaning of life make good sense. They are introduced by Palin (in drag) as he interrupts the Vegas-style celebration of perpetual Christmas. “Well, that’s the end of the film,” she announces. “Now here’s the Meaning of Life.” She opens an envelope and reads, “Well, it’s nothing special. Try and be nice to people, avoid eating fat, read a good book every now and then, get some walking in, and try and live together in peace and harmony with people of all creeds and nations.” This rather modest sounding list makes perfect sense if we no longer pine for some more grand transcendental meaning. Once we dispatch both the otherworldly values (toadying to God and conserving our sperm, for example) and the otherworldly “realities” which ground those values (soul, heaven, God), then **matters of meaning become markedly more pragmatic and demystified**. Like Buddha’s philosophy, the essential goals in life become attempts to realize moderation, actualize one’s potential, and reduce suffering. When we try to make issues of ultimate meaning more melodramatic than this, we end up with the distracting and dehumanizing edifices of transcendentalism. The Buddha offers us Four Noble Truths that can be used to fight these temptations and distractions. First, he says “All life is suffering, or all life is unsatisfactory (dukkha).” This seems pessimistic at first, but he’s simply pointing out that to have a biological body is to be subject to pain, illness, and eventually death. To have family and friends means that we are open to inevitable loss, disappointment, and also betrayal. But more importantly, even when we feel joy and happiness, these too are transient experiences that will fade because all things are impermanent. Second, the Buddha says “Suffering is caused by craving or attachment.” When we have a pleasurable experience we try to repeat it over and over or try to hang on to it and turn it into a permanent thing. Sensual experiences are not themselves the causes of suffering—they are inherently neutral phenomena. It is the psychological state of craving that rises up in the wake of sensations which causes us to have unrealistic expectations of those feelings—sending us chasing after fleeting experiences that cannot be possessed. The Third Noble Truth states that the cure for suffering is non-attachment or the cessation of craving. In the Samyutta Nikaya text, the Buddha says that the wise person “regards the delightful and pleasurable things of this world as impermanent, unsatisfactory and without atman (any permanent essence), as a disease and sorrow—it is he who overcomes the craving” (12:66). And the Fourth Noble Truth is an eight-fold path that helps the follower to steer a Middle Way of ethical moderation. Following the simple eight-fold path, which contains simple recommendations similar those listed at the end of Monty Python’s The Meaning of Life, allows the follower to overcome egoistic craving. Perhaps the most important craving that must be overcome, according to Buddha, is the craving for immortality. The Buddha claimed that giving up transcendental tendencies would help us to better see the people all around us who need our help. We would become more compassionate, he argued, because we would not be distracted by cravings for the “other world.” Mind the Mindfulness As the Pythons suggest, however, not all dehumanizing distraction comes from “above.” Often, we lose sight of compassion and humane living by drowning ourselves in a sea of trivial diversions. In existential terms, we lose our “authentic self ” in the unimportant hustle and bustle of everyday matters. Consider again the executives of the Very Big Corporation of America. Later in the film, we learn that just before they were attacked by the mutineers sailing the Crimson Permanent Assurance they were having a meeting about “Item Six on the Agenda, the Meaning of Life.” The board chairman, Graham Chapman, turns things over to Michael Palin: “Now Harry, you’ve had some thoughts on this.” “That’s right, yeah. I’ve had a team working on this over the past few weeks,” Palin explains in his best American accent: What we’ve come up with can be reduced to two fundamental concepts. One, people are not wearing enough hats. Two, matter is energy; in the Universe there are many energy fields which we cannot normally perceive. Some energies have a spiritual source which act upon a person’s soul. However, this soul does not exist ab initio, as orthodox Christianity teaches; it has to be brought into existence by a process of guided self-observation. However, this is rarely achieved owing to man’s unique ability to be distracted from spiritual matters by everyday trivia. The other Board members sit quietly through Palin’s impressive and important report. But, they need clarification about one of the more important points: “What was that about hats again?” one of them asks. Distraction reigns again in Part IV, Middle Age, when the hyper-pleasant, smiley, and vapid American couple (Palin and, in drag, Idle) are served up a “philosophy conversation” in the form of flashcard prompts. The waiter (Cleese) tries to get the insipid couple started on their philosophy conversation by asking, “Did you ever wonder why we’re here?” They fail utterly to stay on topic. “Oh! I never knew that Schopenhauer was a philosopher,” Idle exclaims. Palin responds, “Yeah. . . . He’s the one that begins with an S. WIFE: “Oh.” HUSBAND: “Um [pause] . . . like Nietzsche.” WIFE: “Does Nietzsche begin with an S?” HUSBAND: “There’s an S in Nietzsche.” WIFE: “Oh wow! Yes there is. Do all philosophers have an S in them?” HUSBAND: “Yeah I think most of them do.” WIFE: “Oh! Does that mean [the popular singer] Selina Jones is a philosopher?” HUSBAND: “Yeah, Right. She could be. She sings about the meaning of life.” WIFE: “Yeah, that’s right, but I don’t think she writes her own material.” HUSBAND: “No. Maybe Schopenhauer writes her material?” WIFE: “No. Burt Bacharach writes it.” HUSBAND: “There’s no S in Burt Bacharach.” If we combine this tedious conversation and the Boardroom’s fascination with hats, the results of Palin’s research begins to make sense. Human beings must “create” their “souls” day-by-day (rather than simply discover them, ready made) through “a process of guided self-observation.” The great enemy of this process, these sketches show, **is distraction**. This is a conception of the soul that the Buddha could agree with. It embraces impermanence, avoids transcendentalist metaphysics, and accepts the view that we must actively cultivate our “souls.” This is the point of Buddhist “mindfulness” (sati)—a powerful meditation that cuts through the dehumanizing distractions. There’s nothing mystical or particularly fancy about it. **You can do it in your daily activities as well as in isolated contemplation**. It just requires you to focus your mind and senses in the present moment, and to resist the mind’s natural tendency to wander off into the past or future, **to replay events or imagine scenarios that fill our minds** with worries, regrets, hopes or cravings. Mindfulness is a state of awareness that comes from training and discipline, a state that shuts out the drifting distractions of life and reveals the uniqueness of each present moment. In doing this careful attending, one can become more present in his or her own life. Mindfulness helps to rehumanize a person by taking their head out of the clouds. And according to Buddhism it reconnects us better with our compassionate hearts by revealing other human beings as just human beings. Once the distractions of trivia, or theoretical, transcendental, or ideological overlays are removed, **we may become better able to know ourselves** and compassionately recognize ourselves in others. We may even come to learn that, in fact, we should all wear more hats. But **we will only know for sure if we are less distracted and more mindful**.

### 1nc 3

**We offer the following declaration of war against Emory JS. We declare war on their ideals. We declare war on their project.**

**War is a fundamental expression of human passion – it makes things matter and makes life beautiful. Endorse our declaration to enjoy war in all of its splendor**

**Gelven** prof phil @ NIU **1994** (Michael, War and Existence)

Few would deny, I think, that war is essentially violent. But Schopenhauer has shown that there are profound elements at work in the warrior that embody both worlds, and that the violence in war thus pierces us to the very core of our paradoxical nature. There is, however, a further meaning to this existential mark that brings us beyond the strict metaphysical vision of Schopenhauer’s philosophy. Indeed, it may even deserve to be treated as a separate notion altogether, and that is the observation that war is passionate. Of course, passion is admittedly a kind of violence, but our understanding of the former cannot be completely accounted for by an understanding of the latter. There is little to be gained by unrestricted lengthening of our list of marks, however, and if it is possible to include what has to be said about the passionate under this heading, it shall be done.
Huge passions are provoked by war; indeed, war itself is a deeply passionate undertaking. So essential is passion for our understanding of war that it actually becomes a necessary ingredient for the success of a war. A nation that undertakes as dangerous a mission as a war, without high and sustaining morale and spirit, embarks on the enterprise at its peril. There is something refreshing about witnessing a release of violent passions, whether in an individual or a state. Somehow there is a **purity about it, a clarity in the experience.** Particularly in our staid and almost dandified atmospheres of dreary and lackluster civility, the notion of releasing these giant forces of spirit can produce a fascination for the passionate that is hard to resist. Since in many engagements the side with the most spirit may often defeat a foe with superior technology and numbers, it is important for us to understand just what is meant by this term.
Passions are not the same as emotions. The latter are thought of as characteristics of the body, feelings that can be controlled by discipline and analyzed by the psychologists. The former are of **the spirit**, and are the province of character. We ordinarily distinguish between the emotion of desire and the passion of love, the emotion of fear and the passion of overcoming it in courage. Passion also implies intensity, a heightening of feeling and spirit to hot and lofty levels of meaning. Our existence becomes operatic: the gestures are wide and generous; the sentiments, exaggerated and underscored; the pace and pulse, quickened and stirred. What is it about these bold and daring characteristics that not only attracts us but also reveals much of our nature that remains hidden in the sedate? Why is there this persuasion that passions, in spite of — or perhaps even because of—the dangers they present, are nevertheless precious? Surely one reason the passionate is favored over the tranquil is that we regard the passions as indications of caring. The passionate man cares about what is important. His demeanor reveals that his concerns are serious, untrivial, vital, urgent, and weighty. The evocation of the passions by war and of war by the passions reveals a deep level of human understanding that certain things matter. And herein lies a significant point. What does it mean to value something if I am not going to exert myself on its behalf? Does not my holding something as valuable imply that I shall be moved to some expenditure of energy because the thing exists? Let us test this suggestion in our minds. Suppose we claim that I value the institution of free speech. Suppose a tyranny takes over the government, banishes all free presses, and burns all books. Now, suppose that I accept tranquilly all this usurpation and do not even suffer the slightest unease; nevertheless, I affirm that I value a free press. Such a scenario is not intelligible, because to value something means to care, and care implies a willingness to act. It cannot be argued that care implies one will in fact do something, since there may be other restrictions on my behavior, such as fear or physical restraint or even indecision. But care is inconsistent with indifference. We do experience frequent conflicts in our values, and if I value privacy as well as a free press, the conflict may arrest my instinct to support one over the other. But to remain totally unmoved by a complete usurpation of a highly held value is totally inconsistent. In his analysis of the various modes of human existence, Heidegger argues that all modes eventually are reduced to the fundamental modality of care; this is a doctrine that attracts many readers because of our fundamental appreciation of the importance of caring. In the absence of caring, of course, nothing matters. For nothing to matter requires nihilism. As I have suggested above, **men do not fight for justice or goodness so much as they fight for meaning.**
Passion is appreciated because it emphasizes that things matter; it embodies the fundamental ontological modality of care. There are risks in passion, and most people are willing to admit that an entirely risk-free existence threatens us with a destructive boredom and indifference. Passion is a form of violence, though, and all violence brings with it pain. But although the mind cannot accept pain as a thing to be desired, it does not reject pain as an evil in and of itself. In the last analysis, we would rather die in a blaze of glory than die of boredom.

**Their liberal project is nothing more than the scum of the earth defecating all over authentic existence - a mindless desire to achieve some progress based on the truthes that it itself constructed. In response to their peaceful bullshit we offer war. And to the world we offer one choice – follow us or die**

**Van Gerven Oei and Staal 2k8** (Vincent, Jonas, dutch artists and theorists Introduction to Follow us or Die)

In recent years, the People has crept back into broad daylight. It seems proud once again, self-confident, and it contaminates towns and cities. Proudly, it looks upon the trail of filth it leaves behind on squares, streets and porticos, on the underground, buses and trains, in parks, museums and libraries. It knows it is heard, it feels empowered in its right to speak. Its screams are deafening. It drives away the last breaths of clean air with its lamentations, sullies the last vestiges of lucid thought, pollutes the rest of civilization **with its mindless urge to express itself** Amidst these hordes of creatures that leave heaps of feces in their wake, a foul noise is brewing, a sickening sound. It is the sound of “independent” media channels, gorging on conspiracy theories about government involvement in assaults, desperately latching onto the latest war zone or the next environmental disaster, intimidating their audience into doing the Good and the Ethical for the last humpback whale, which, in all of its ponderous ignorance, creates the illusion that they have right on their side. “Alternative” news channels, fed by a ceaseless stream of “concerned” griping, which results in little more than individuals chained to trees planted on toxic waste dumps, waving banners on a deflating plastic boat to obstruct poor Polynesian fishermen, or marching in “fuck the police” demonstrations and guerrilla concerts, in which there is little to no dividing line left between broadcasting news, propaganda and support of institutionalized monstrosities which have been lumped together under the name of the “Good Cause”, where to the People, **this filth, this excrement of civilization,** which now thinks it has a voice and therefore a right to exercise it, which has become convinced of the importance of its slothful and gratuitous lusts, its loathsome, uniform thoughts and the rumblings of its insatiable belly. The only truth that remains is **its** truth: that of glowing ambilight TV screens, of dolled up, spoiled pets, kitschy birds and drooling lapdogs. And the intelligentsia listens. The intelligentsia ratifies the banal mating calls of the uniform masses, whose thoughts and words are like an endless succession of the television game shows they watch, the hotlines they call, the lottery tickets they buy: all while knowing that they are merely replaceable cogs in the machine, cogs of a simplicity, of an exchangeability, of an overwhelming stupidity. And now the intelligentsia is afraid of taking any responsibility, afraid to force a standard, a model upon these mindless masses. And thus an army of parasites is ready to actually claim power, aid, instead of fighting them, our intelligentsia issues awards in the hope of involving them in the “enlightened” field of arts, where our cultural heritage is reduced to rubble by young radicals and replaced by patheticJb/klore. Civilization has become a punching bag for the scum of the earth, for whose stupidity the intelligentsia has taken responsibility. **Idiots: what have you done?!** This pamphlet is an attack on man and his society which has not arisen from a dissatisfaction that has an ideological basis. We do not wish to bring about change, to start a revolution for the benefit of proletariat or the bourgeoisie, or for the benefit of halfhearted humanism or bigoted capitalism; in short, we do not assume any kind of a linear, historical development one would dare to consider a form of “progress.” **The only possible attack we can envision is an attack for the benefit of itself:** This doesn’t require any legitimation. There’s no justifiable “right” to take a particular position. There is only the militant desire, the quest for action, as the only way to have our existence acknowledged, to define our relation to the world, to make it visible, possibly only for a single instance: taking a position as an act in its own right. The only option left to us is to use the visual arts and theory as weapons to bring about the possibility of formulating a position. There are no longer stages to scream from, no longer innovations to embrace with loud cheers, no longer nations to denounce or banish completely. We are only left with the People: the monomaniacal masses who make all thought, all nuance, impossible through their brainless weight: they form a mental gravity of pure, unparalleled stupidity. The idea that the decline of civilization rests on the old- fashioned idea of the “society of the spectacle” is a tragic illusion. The society of the spectacle is at least still a distinguishable enemy, a discrete product of a linear historiography, an enemy which was surmountable through its recognizability as entertainment. The body in the society of the spectacle also is always a dissatisfied physical body. As a result of this permanent dissatisfaction — a condition brought about by the constant desire for the same disinformation, a desire that is never fulfilled — it is always oriented toward more consumption. The body is still experienced in reality: that is to say, the reality of the red, flayed body of the People. The society of the spectacle is merely a starting point for the change of actual importance: the total digitalization of that same society to a digital mediacracy. The society of the spectacle is a prelude, because it still constitutes a temporary screen, an obstacle between the dissatisfied body and its liberation: its “ideal,” digital body. It is a prelude to a sensory world, a world without past, present or future, a world purely and solely in the hands of the ego, its lusts, its passive physical body and a satisfied, safe, digital body. The society of the spectacle is a stepping stone for the revolution of digital reality, a revolution in which ideology, media and art have no future. Nevertheless, there are those who oppose this fatalistic stampeding of the masses in pursuit of the perfect digital. With their high school shootings, Eric Harris, Dylan Klebold, Cho Seung-Hui and Pekka-Eric Auvinen typified the youthful resistance of bodies without a place in a global capitalistic society, and, in the style of this same society, only saw annihilation and self-destruction as possibilities, expressing themselves with excessive physical aggression in home videos, which hardly differ in their rhetoric from those of the militant resistance group Al-Qa’ida. Together, they form the antipode of the false and contemptible homo ludens. Both the high school killers and Al-Qa’ida represent the resistance to the actual enemy threatening us, the most intense, revolutionary development currently taking place which is neither generally accepted nor opposed: the digitalization of society, the dissolution of the body by a second life, a “desire machine” that continually reminds us of who or what we really want to be and what we really want to feel. A development taking place in computer games, chat rooms, which feeds an existence marked by a constant desire for instant gratification, something which the physical 4fè—a trap, a snare—does not offer. Obscure bodies like the high school killers and Al-Qa’ida represent the final obstacle in the way of a society whose only measure, only objective, is the gratification of individual desires. This final resistance desires to be punished, rebuked, persecuted. It seeks to be confronted with fear, to sacrifice itself for a community. The suppressed ideal to befirndamentalist, capable of turning to radicalism; so consistent, so rational, that a source of inconsistency, of irrationality, is opened as an excess: one of fire, of sickening, sacrilegious pain. The resistance to digitalization is a reminder of’ the fear, true fear, which was the basis of our society, of democracy, still long before the society of’ the spectacle came into being. **Not only artists and intellectuals, but politicians and journalists as well, seem to be blind to this development, and the disappearance of the individual** as a physical, inconvenient body, as we have known it, which at random can always succumb to cancer or torture, is not acknowledged by them. Ostensible oppositions between lifeless ideologies, rich and poor, old and new, abstract, impressionistic, conceptual, relevant, outdated, effective or sensationalist are settled in language games, while our audience disappears in front of wide-screen TVs, where the distinction between the person in front of and behind the screen, severed from the problematic characteristics of his body, fades further and further. The small amount of resistance, the small amount of aversion to this advance of the digital body—whether conscious or unconscious—we would like to call this resistance depression. Depression which the government, science and pharmaceutical-industrial complex combats with legal medicine, with our own government-sponsored Soma: uppers, antidepressants. Depression which is combated by our own body reduced to pill form, in which its inconvenience is condensed and day after day is taken by prescription, digested. In this way, all ultimate, desperate, physical resistance, every form of bodily depression is being oppressed. The hours of soulless feeding on mass entertainment is a prelude to the complete integration of man and machine, which the People has given a higher status than our resistance. Our resistance: the search for an impossible way out. We are here to fight. Enemies are interchangeable. The fiction of practicality is non-existent. The “question why” has disappeared. We are fighting against ourselves, we are fighting in the dark, in the void. This black, amorphous mass is a relief. A void that does not reveal itself in the taking of a stance, but in the process of taking it. It is the detour, the gaps in the system, the emergency exit. We, proud cowards, who will not die for the sake of the other, who will not be found bleeding, our intestines torn out of our bellies on a distant battlefield, corpse-ridden beach or barren desert, not for the Nation, not for Mankind, not for Good, not for joint resistance. No, we will continue to flee from broad daylight; we operate in the dark, when the People has locked itself up in its housing blocks, drugging themselves with the growing number of desire machines, which will soon — all too soon — be ready. T**his is where we wage the only possible confrontation, the only war left: a war against life itself, for life itself The positions have been taken.** **You have only one choice. Follow us. Or die.**

### 1nc case

#### Al Qaeda is weak but still a threat—surrender leads to unmitigated attacks

**Stimson, 13** – Charles, Manager, National Security Law Program and Senior Legal Fellow at Heritage (“Law of Armed Conflict and the Use of Military Force,” Testimony Before Armed Services Committee United States Senate, 5/16/13, http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/2013/05/the-law-of-armed-conflict //Red)

The AUMF, by its own language, does not have an expiration date, nor should it. While it is true that over the decade we have made hard-fought gains against the al Qaeda leadership, and key members of the Taliban and associated forces, other elements of those organizations **still pose a continuing threat** to the United States. I base this opinion not on current intelligence briefings—to which I no longer have access—but my reading of open source materials. That said, Congress does have access to classified intelligence briefings, and I encourage a thorough and dispassionate evaluation of the current threats by the Congress. As to the Committee’s question regarding the geographic scope of the AUMF, both administrations have taken the unremarkable position that by its terms, and in practice, there is no geographic limit or scope to the AUMF. Rather, the AUMF gives the President the authority to confront the enemy wherever he deems the enemy resides. Just last year, in a major address at Northwestern University, Attorney General Eric Holder stated, “Our legal authority is not limited to the battlefields in Afghanistan. Indeed, neither Congress nor our federal courts have limited the geographic scope of our ability to use force to the current conflict in Afghanistan.”[9] The notion that we are at war, and that the war (and by implication the AUMF) has no geographical boundaries is anathema to some, but is nevertheless lawful and consistent with the law of armed conflict and our national and international obligations. It is also **not the boundless source of tyranny** and infringement upon other nations’ sovereignty that detractors profess; rather, the national security power of the politically accountable branches are subject to all of the checks and balances within our constitutional form of government, as well as the more modern checks detailed by fellow witness Jack Goldsmith in his book Power and Constraint. And it is commensurate, in this case, with the enemy, an international terrorist movement that does not respect political or any other boundaries and that considers the people and assets of the United States and its allies, wherever they may be, to be its targets. As to the Committee’s question regarding whether the AUMF should be modified, or by implication repealed, I would suggest that **repealing the AUMF** prematurely would be unwise. Repealing the AUMF would signal, legally, that the war against al Qaeda is over, at a time when al Qaeda and associated forces continue in fact to wage war against the United States. And it may have more specific consequences, for example, involving the continued detention of those terrorists currently in captivity and not subject to military commission or federal court proceedings. Repealing or substantially narrowing the existing AUMF could also have substantial repercussions on other sensitive operations, including but not limited to the targeted killing program. In short, the current AUMF should remain in place unless and until the narrow class of persons under its scope no longer poses a substantial threat to our national security. Keeping the current AUMF does not authorize a permanent state of war, as some critics have alleged. It merely retains the legal framework that has worked and served us well, to date, and acknowledges that those subject to the AUMF, although greatly diminished in number and efficacy, **should not be allowed to regain their footing.** In the context of the AUMF, keeping the AUMF as is does not necessarily mean that the Executive Branch, this one or the next, will want to or need to employ the full extent of its authority. We cannot foresee with precision when or if the threats posed by those subject to the narrow jurisdiction of the AUMF will be defeated or become so insignificant as to not warrant this particular AUMF.

#### Extinction

**Mhyvold, 13 –** doctorate in theoretical and mathematical physics and a master's degree in mathematical economics from Princeton University; founded Intellectual Ventures after retiring from his position as chief strategist and chief technology officer of Microsoft (Nathan, “Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action” <http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Strategic-Terrorism-Myhrvold-7-3-2013.pdf>)

As horrible as this would be, such a pandemic is by no means the worst attack one can imagine, for several reasons. First, most of the classic bioweapons are based on 1960s and 1970s technology because the 1972 treaty halted bioweapons development efforts in the United States and most other Western countries. Second, the Russians, although solidly committed to biological weapons long after the treaty deadline, were never on the cutting edge of biological research. Third and most important, the science and technology of molecular biology have made enormous advances, utterly transforming the field in the last few decades. High school biology students routinely perform molecular-biology manipulations that would have been impossible even for the best superpower-funded program back in the heyday of biological-weapons research. The biowarfare methods of the 1960s and 1970s are now as antiquated as the lumbering mainframe computers of that era. Tomorrow’s terrorists will have vastly more deadly bugs to choose from. Consider this sobering development: in 2001, Australian researchers working on Mousepox, a nonlethal virus that infects mice (as chickenpox does in humans), accidentally discovered that a simple genetic modification transformed the virus.10, 11 instead of producing mild symptoms, the new virus killed 60% of even those mice already immune to the naturally occurring strains of Mousepox. The new virus, moreover, was unaffected by any existing vaccine or antiviral drug. a team of researchers at saint Louis University led by mark Buller picked up on that work and, by late 2003, found a way to improve on it: Buller’s variation on Mousepox was 100% lethal, although his team of investigators also devised combination vaccine and antiviral therapies that were partially effective in protecting animals from the engineered strain.12, 13 Another saving grace is that the genetically altered virus is no longer contagious. Of course, it is quite possible that future tinkering with the virus will change that property, too. Strong reasons exist to believe that the genetic modifications Buller made to Mousepox would work for other poxviruses and possibly for other classes of viruses as well. Might the same techniques allow chickenpox or another poxvirus that infects humans to be turned into a 100% lethal bioweapon, perhaps one that is resistant to any known antiviral therapy? I’ve asked this question of experts many times, and no one has yet replied that such a manipulation couldn’t be done. This case is just one example. Many more are pouring out of scientific journals and conferences every year. Just last year, the journal Nature published a controversial study done at the University of Wisconsin–Madison in which virologists enumerated the changes one would need to make to a highly lethal strain of bird flu to make it easily transmitted from one mammal to another.14 Biotechnology is advancing so rapidly that it is hard to keep track of all the new potential threats. Nor is it clear that anyone is even trying. In addition to lethality and drug resistance, many other parameters can be played with, given that the infectious power of an epidemic depends on many properties, including the length of the latency period during which a person is contagious but asymptomatic. Delaying the onset of serious symptoms allows each new case to spread to more people and thus makes the virus harder to stop. This dynamic is perhaps best illustrated by hiv, which is very difficult to transmit compared with smallpox and many other viruses. Intimate contact is needed, and even then, the infection rate is low. The balancing factor is that hiv can take years to progress to aids, which can then take many more years to kill the victim. What makes hiv so dangerous is that infected people have lots of opportunities to infect others. This property has allowed hiv to claim more than 30 million lives so far, and approximately 34 million people are now living with this virus and facing a highly uncertain future.15 A virus genetically engineered to infect its host quickly, to generate symptoms slowly—say, only after weeks or months—and to spread easily through the air or by casual contact would be vastly more devastating than hiv. It could silently penetrate the population to unleash its deadly effects suddenly. This type of epidemic would be almost impossible to combat because most of the infections would occur before the epidemic became obvious. A technologically sophisticated terrorist group could develop such a virus and kill a large part of humanity with it. Indeed, terrorists may not have to develop it themselves: some scientist may do so first and publish the details. Given the rate at which biologists are making discoveries about viruses and the immune system, at some point in the near future, someone may create artificial pathogens that could drive the human race to extinction. Indeed, a detailed species-elimination plan of this nature was openly proposed in a scientific journal. The ostensible purpose of that particular research was to suggest a way to extirpate the malaria mosquito, but similar techniques could be directed toward humans.16 When I’ve talked to molecular biologists about this method, they are quick to point out that it is slow and easily detectable and could be fought with biotech remedies. If you challenge them to come up with improvements to the suggested attack plan, however, they have plenty of ideas. Modern biotechnology will soon be capable, if it is not already, of bringing about the demise of the human race— or at least of killing a sufficient number of people to end high-tech civilization and set humanity back 1,000 years or more. That terrorist groups could achieve this level of technological sophistication may seem far-fetched, but keep in mind that it takes only a handful of individuals to accomplish these tasks. Never has lethal power of this potency been accessible to so few, so easily. Even more dramatically than nuclear proliferation, modern biological science has frighteningly undermined the correlation between the lethality of a weapon and its cost, a fundamentally stabilizing mechanism throughout history. Access to extremely lethal agents—lethal enough to exterminate Homo sapiens—will be available to anybody with a solid background in biology terrorists included.

#### Turns case—successful attack would reverse any social change the aff creates

**Robsinson ’10.**Sara Robinson social futurist, Why Are Conservatives Targeting Muslims? And Why Now?” <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sara-robinson/why-are-conservatives-tar_b_737007.html>

Having identified such a great potential target, the next logical step was to whip up public outrage and give people emotionally satisfying reasons to adopt this group as a worthy object of hate. Fortunately for the right wing, conservative PR folks have made an art form out of creating calculated, protracted media crises that drag on for weeks, during which they get to suck up all the news time and create "teachable moments" that put some new agenda item on dramatic public display. Take two past examples: Terry Schiavo and the Minutemen. Both were ginned-up controversies carefully designed to create a public crisis around a new right-wing political initiative.The goal in both cases was to create a public outcry that someone in a back room somewhere hoped would galvanize the nation into mass political action. Sometimes this works; sometimes, it doesn't. Schiavo was a spectacular failure. Americans of all persuasions took one look at that situation and recoiled: it turned out nobody in the country wanted Congress and/or the Southern Baptists making their end-of-life decisions for them. But the Minutemen's summer campouts on the border succeeded in bringing immigration and border security to the front burner, ultimately feeding into the militancy of the Tea Party and leading to the building of the border wall. And that's what the Ground Zero Mosque tantrum was -- yet another conservative PR confection designed to put a new boogeyman on the public agenda. (And the media, as usual, went right after the fake throw -- again. My dog is too smart for that trick, but our corporate media can be counted on to go for it every time.) The Right Wing has put us on notice that after nine years, they've abandoned Bush Era restraint here Islam is concerned, and are now declaring the entire Muslim world to be the new Devil who will fill that yawning void at the center of their cosmology. As a target, Muslims were just too tempting to resist any longer. They can be killed with impunity. They can be used to justify endless war. As a demon, they’re likely to have tremendous staying power: after all, in the white, straight, Christian enclaves where most American conservatives live, Muslims are far rarer on the ground than even gays, Latinos, or liberals.

#### The aff got it wrong – ending the war in failure won’t cause a shift to new narratives of national security – in fact, it entrenches current discourses by putting politicians on the defensive – that turns case and leads to the continuation of the conservative, realist logic that justified the war in \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ to begin with

**Krebs, 11** – Ronald R., associate professor of political science at the University of Minnesota (“Military Conflict and the Politics of Narrative: The Rise and Fall of the Cold War Consensus,” pp. 1-2, 3/7/11, http://blog.lib.umn.edu/gpa/globalnotes/Krebs,%20MIRC%202011\_final.pdf)**Red**

**When it comes to many political phenomena, including** the dominant discourses and ideas that underpin the making of **foreign policy, the prevailing view is that inertia is the norm and that** substantial **innovation comes only in the wake of** **massive policy failure.** Failure may not itself dictate the new path, but it discredits dominant ideas, reworks power structures, and shakes up stagnant organizations. **When it comes to political language, however, a common view is that changeability is the norm: politicians adopt and jettison formulations as they see fit, maneuvering according to the political winds.** This paper argues that **these familiar perspectives both have it wrong** when it comes to the rise and fall of dominant **narratives of national security.** First, such narratives **exhibit far more stability than the realist view suggests, and they are marked by discontinuities, rather than continuous flux.** Among scholars, there is growing awareness of the ways in which language structures politics and shapes contestation,1 which would be impossible if it were not often relatively stable.2 Second, **the politics of failure trump its psychology.** As a result, **even substantial foreign policy failure is not likely to prompt a narrative revolution. In fact, policy success,** more than failure, **can open space for change** in dominant narratives. These claims are provocative, but they nicely fit the history of **the** so-called **Cold War** consensus, as the paper shows. Its **logic legitimated US intervention in two wars widely seen as frustrating failures. Yet the Korean War did not undermine, but rather consolidated the emerging narrative. The Vietnam War,** **often portrayed as the moment of that narrative’s unraveling, was nothing of the sort, because the prior consensus had begun to erode well before the war’s Americanization,** let alone the Tet Offensive. In the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis, liberal Cold Warriors increasingly argued that the rules of the international game had changed, that demonstrated American power and will had finally persuaded the Soviet Union of shared interests. **Narrative divergence thus preceded the Vietnam War. If anything, the war limited the extent of the liberal-left’s challenge,** and it even promoted a new consensus, as long-standing conservative skeptics finally jumped fully and enthusiastically onto the internationalist wagon. **What accounts for this** complex mix of stability and change in the Cold War **narrative, and** perhaps **more generally in narratives of national security?** I argue that **the answer lies in the social-political production of conflict outcomes. Failures of military ventures do not reveal themselves as such all at once. Early on, political opponents have incentives to hedge their rhetorical bets, critique the war from the terrain of the dominant narrative, and thus reproduce or at best emend that narrative**—as did conservative nationalists during Korea and liberal internationalists during Vietnam. **Military failure provides the impetus for a challenge to the dominant security narrative, but its politics deprive alternatives of powerful advocates. In contrast, even though military success does not provide actors with strong reasons to challenge the underlying narratives, it does create conducive political conditions** if they are so inclined: **success can be interpreted as** proving the wisdom of the status quo, but it can also can be interpreted as **having been so successful as to require a new framework.** Indeed, some liberals made precisely this argument after the Cuban Missile Crisis. Success, however, legitimates alternatives without delegitimizing the status quo, and the result, therefore, is not the establishment of a new dominant narrative, but rather the collapse of consensus.

#### The aff misidentifies the internal link to narrative change – winning the war on terror is key to create the space for broader change. The plan simply re-entrenches dominant ideas.

**Krebs, 13** – Ronald R., associate professor of political science at the University of Minnesota (“Military Conflict and the Politics of Narrative: Explaining the Rise and Fall of the Cold War Consensus,” University of Minnesota, 8/30/13, Online //Red)

Contemporaries and historians have often blamed the errors and tragedies of US policy during the Cold War—from military brinkmanship and imprudent intervention to alliance with rapacious autocrats and brutal rebels to an inflated defense budget—on the “Cold War consensus.” By this account, an ideological and policy consensus so took hold by 1948 that alternatives to militarized global containment could not get a hearing. That consensus dragged the United States into the disastrous Vietnam War, and it unraveled only amidst the trauma of Vietnam in the late 1960s.1 This story of the Cold War consensus’ rise and fall appears to fit well with a well-established and intuitive theory of change in major foreign policy ideas and discourses. That theory avers that large-scale shocks, often unexpected military defeats, unsettle settled minds and discredit dominant ideas with respect to national security policy and thus are crucial drivers of change.2 This article shows that the standard history of the Cold War consensus **is wrong** and develops an alternative theoretical architecture to explain its consolidation and collapse. It points toward a reinterpretation of major puzzles of the Cold War, but it also has substantial theoretical stakes: **how we explain fundamental change in the national security arena** and in other policy domains as well. Scholars have long invoked the Cold War consensus, but they have failed to study it rigorously. This article attempts to do so by conceptualizing the Cold War consensus as a dominant public narrative of national security and by tracking that narrative via a content analysis of foreign affairs editorials. The consensus’ history then looks quite different: the zone of narrative agreement was narrower than many believe; this narrow Cold War narrative did not achieve dominance—that is, the consensus did not coalesce—until well into the 1950s; it began to erode before the Americanization of the Vietnam War in 1965; and a new dominant narrative (or consensus) did not take its place. How to explain the Cold War narrative’s rise to dominance and its subsequent fall from that perch? The answer cannot lie simply with the shifting realities of global politics: the narrative was most dominant precisely when the communist bloc was becoming more diverse—that is, when the consensus was least apropos—and no new consensus took its place in the 1960s. This article points rather to the surprising domestic politics surrounding triumph and frustration on Cold War battlefields. In a nutshell, the argument is that **the politics of protracted military failure impede change in the national security narrative** in whose terms government officials had legitimated the mission, while **victory generates space for unorthodox ideas to penetrate.** Dominant narratives of national security, such as the Cold War consensus, depict the protagonists and the setting of security competition, and they define the range of sustainable policy options. They endure as long as leading political and cultural elites continue to reproduce them, and their dominance erodes when elites publicly challenge key tenets. However, early on in an uncertain and protracted military campaign, battlefield setbacks give both doves (war opponents) and hawks (war supporters) in the opposition **incentives to criticize the war’s conduct while reaffirming the underlying narrative.** While opposition doves pull their rhetorical punches to avoid bearing the political costs of wartime criticism, opposition hawks are moved by the prospect of gain, but the effect is the same: to blunt the scope of wartime critique and to bolster the underlying narrative of national security. In contrast, **victory creates a political opening for its** “**owners**” **to advance an alternative**: riding a political high, they can argue that, as a result of their wise and resolute policies, **the world has changed**, that a different narrative is now more apposite. In short, this article argues that, when it comes to public narratives of national security, the **conventional wisdom has it backwards: military failure promotes the consolidation or continuation of narrative dominance**, while **victory opens space for narrative challenge.** Applying this theoretical argument to the two signal events of the first half of the Cold War, I show how the frustrations of the Korean War facilitated the Cold War narrative’s rise to dominance, while the triumph of the Cuban Missile Crisis made possible the consensus’ breakdown before the upheaval of Vietnam. The high costs of the Korean War might have undermined the Cold War globalism in whose name the United States had waged the war. But leading Republican opponents, who supported the war but opposed its globalist logic, insisted that the war had resulted from the fact that the Truman administration’s battle against communism had **not been global enough.** They thus helped consolidate the global Cold War that they feared would yield **an imperial presidency and an imposing national-security state.** The Cuban Missile Crisis, seen at the time as a one-sided triumph for John F. Kennedy, paradoxically created political space for the young president to deviate publicly from the previously dominant narrative, from the Cold War consensus. Kennedy had long privately articulated a more sophisticated view of the Soviet Union’s ambitions, the diversity of communist regimes, and the superpowers’ shared interests, but **only after his great victory did he feel free to articulate publicly the narrative foundation for détente.** Hawkish opponents drew precisely the opposite lesson: that the crisis was proof of the wisdom of the Cold War narrative’s core propositions. As a result, no new national security narrative emerged as dominant in the crisis’ wake. Documenting and explaining the rise and fall of the Cold War narrative is intrinsically important, as it speaks to enduring questions of the Cold War—from the origins of America’s national-security state to the conditions of possibility for détente to the drivers of the US intervention in Vietnam. But the Cold War consensus is also an important case. Hardly questioned narratives often structure national debates over security and foreign policy for a time. We know them by shorthand expressions that encapsulate their portraits of the protagonists, scene, and action of a global drama: the civilizing mission of liberal empire, the Nazi obsession with “living space,” the Gaullist vision of French restoration and grandeur, the communist faith in capitalist aggression and imperialism, the Iranian Revolutionary regime’s Great and Little Satans, the Israeli discourse of “no partner for peace,” and **most recently the War on Terror.** These constitute what the historian Ernest May once termed the “axiomatic” dimension of foreign policy: the “**broad formulation that fixes priorities and provides standards** by which the appropriate choices among alternatives may be made.”3 Scholars have devoted the lion’s share of their attention, however, to what May called the “calculated”: the level of effort expended, the scope of targets, the means states employ. Even Legro, in his important work on states’ ideas about international society, focuses on collective “causal beliefs” about the “effective means for achieving interests” in international politics.4 The narrative underpinnings of policy debate have received far less attention, yet are arguably more important. Through its examination of the Cold War consensus, this article suggests rethinking conventional theories of change in foreign policy—and perhaps in other arenas too.

## 2NC

### WAR

#### in response to the terrorist we must KILL

**Peters**, retired Army officer, **2004** Ralph, Winter, *In Praise of Attrition,* Parameters, pp. 24-32, http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/04summer/peters.htm

Consider our enemies in the War on Terror. Men who believe, literally, that they are on a mission from God to destroy your civilization and who regard death as a promotion are not impressed by elegant maneuvers. You must find them, no matter how long it takes, then kill them. If they surrender, you must accord them their rights under the laws of war and international conventions. But, as we have learned so painfully from all the mindless, left-wing nonsense spouted about the prisoners at Guantanamo, you are much better off killing them before they have a chance to surrender.

We have heard no end of blather about network-centric warfare, to the great profit of defense contractors. If you want to see a superb—and cheap—example of “net-war,” look at al Qaeda. The mere possession of technology does not ensure that it will be used effectively. And effectiveness is what matters.

It isn’t a question of whether or not we *want* to fight a war of attrition against religion-fueled terrorists. We’re *in* a war of attrition with them. We have no realistic choice. Indeed, our enemies are, in some respects, better suited to both global and local wars of maneuver than we are. They have a world in which to hide, and the world is full of targets for them. They do not heed laws or boundaries. They make and observe no treaties. They do not expect the approval of the United Nations Security Council. They do not face election cycles. And their weapons are largely provided by our own societies.

We have the technical capabilities to deploy globally, but, for now, we are forced to watch as Pakistani forces fumble efforts to surround and destroy concentrations of terrorists; we cannot enter any country (except, temporarily, Iraq) without the permission of its government. We have many tools—military, diplomatic, economic, cultural, law enforcement, and so on—but we have less freedom of maneuver than our enemies.

But we do have superior killing power, once our enemies have been located. Ultimately, the key advantage of a superpower is super power. Faced with implacable enemies who would kill every man, woman, and child in our country and call the killing good (the ultimate war of attrition), we must be willing to use that power wisely, but remorselessly.

We are, militarily and nationally, in a transition phase. Even after 9/11, we do not fully appreciate the cruelty and determination of our enemies. We will learn our lesson, painfully, because the terrorists will not quit. The only solution is to kill them and keep on killing them: a war of attrition. But a war of attrition fought on our terms, not theirs.

Of course, we shall hear no end of fatuous arguments to the effect that we can’t kill our way out of the problem. Well, until a better methodology is discovered, killing every terrorist we can find is a good interim solution. The truth is that even if you can’t kill yourself out of the problem, you can make the problem a great deal smaller by effective targeting.

And we shall hear that killing terrorists only creates more terrorists. This is sophomoric nonsense. The surest way to swell the ranks of terror is to follow the approach we did in the decade before 9/11 and do nothing of substance. Success breeds success. Everybody loves a winner. The clichés exist because they’re true. Al Qaeda and related terrorist groups metastasized because they were viewed in the Muslim world as standing up to the West successfully and handing the Great Satan America embarrassing defeats with impunity. Some fanatics will flock to the standard of terror, no matter what we do. But it’s far easier for Islamic societies to purge themselves of terrorists if the terrorists are on the losing end of the global struggle than if they’re allowed to become triumphant heroes to every jobless, unstable teenager in the Middle East and beyond.

Far worse than fighting such a war of attrition aggressively is to pretend you’re not in one while your enemy keeps on killing you.

Even the occupation of Iraq is a war of attrition. We’re doing remarkably well, given the restrictions under which our forces operate. But no grand maneuvers, no gestures of humanity, no offers of conciliation, and no compromises will persuade the terrorists to halt their efforts to disrupt the development of a democratic, rule-of-law Iraq. On the contrary, anything less than relentless pursuit, with both preemptive and retaliatory action, only encourages the terrorists and remaining Baathist gangsters.

#### Lastly, war is beautiful! Vote negative and embrace our declaration of war to see the tanks and gunfire form a concerto of aesthetic glory.

Marinetti 1912 (Francisco, manifesto in the Italian invasion of Ethiopia)

War is beautiful because it establishes [hu]man’s dominion over the subjugated machinery by means of gas masks, terrifying megaphones, flame throwers, and small tanks. War is beautiful because it initiates the dreamt-of metalization of the human body. War is beautiful because it enriches a flowering meadow with the fiery orchids of machine guns. War is beautiful because it combines the gunfire, the cannonades, the cease-fire, the scents, and the stench of putrefaction into a symphony.

**The question of authenticty comes prior to how we understand the world and thus prior to all other impacts – only an ontology that makes our lives authentic through war should be accepted**

**Gelven** prof phil @ NIU **1994** (Michael, War and Existence)

In his description of what he calls the ‘existential analytic,’ that is, the analysis of the ways we exist, Heidegger argues that there are certain categories of explanation that are a priori and that apply only to the question of our existence. He calls these existentials, and among them are being-in-the-world and being-with. To say that being-in-the-world is an a priori existential is to claim that one does not first know oneself privately and then later discover an “external” world that somehow provides a landscape for the individual; rather one understands oneself already (a priori) within the world, so that the notion of “world” is not the result of external experience at all but is a precondition for making any sense of existence whatsoever. In characterizing this mode of existence, being-in-the- world, we see that one way in which being-in-the-world happens is to be with. Again, we must see that being-with is a priori; it is a necessary way we think about ourselves: it predates any particular experience.
In order to grasp the nature of this being-with, it must be contrasted with being-next-to. I can only be with another person; I can be next to a thing. However, I can also be next to another person, but I cannot be with a thing. An example of how we use ordinary language may show what this means. Suppose I visit a movie theater and I enter the auditorium alone. I sit down next to another person. We would not say I am “with” that person. However, if I enter the theater with a friend and we sit down together, we would say that I am with that person. What this shows is that there is a simple but profound difference in the way we think about being-with and being- next-to. Should I enter a theater and sit next to a post, there would be no existential difference between that and my sitting next to another person. I may indeed even be physically closer to the person I am next to than the person I am with (my friend’s chair may be several inches further away from me than the chair of the stranger). Indeed, I may even be next to a friend and with a nonfriend, so that how I feel about the person next to me cannot be said to determine the existential meaning. There is nothing spectacular about this; it is manifested in the way we use language, and as soon as we see the point of the distinctions, the mind grasps the difference as meaningful and important. But I cannot adequately account for the distinction between being-with and being-next-to merely by appealing to physical predicates; the difference concerns how we think and, specifically, how we think about the meaning of our existence.
Recognizing that being-with, therefore, is an a priori existential, not a mere accidental property of physical objects, we can now see that being- with is one of the ways we can be said to be-in-the-world (also an existential a priori). Thus, being-with is an essential part of how I understand myself. If we allow ourselves to leap ahead in Heidegger’s analysis, we will also see that in his description of our temporality, he shows that our historicality is also an existential a priori and, further, that an essential dimension of our historicality is our heritage, fate, and destiny. If we put together the notion of our heritage and our being-with, we have the basis for communal existence. It is not merely that as a matter of fact we happen to live with others who share our heritage; it is rather that being-with-others and sharing a heritage are **essential to our self-understanding.**
Heidegger develops a simple expedient for making sense out of the various modalities of our existence. We are either authentic or inauthentic in our modalities. Authenticity is the way in which our meaning is manifest in the ways in which we exist; inauthenticity is the way in which that meaning does not occur. To put it simply, each and every one of the various a priori existentials, such as being-in-the-world and being-with, can be either authentic or inauthentic.
Authentic being-with and authentic heritage require that one’s historical and one’s communal existence be made meaningful. In other words, I cannot remain indifferent to who I am or what my history is and remain true to myself. Who I am is determined in part by who I am with. Thus, my American historicality and my American being-with provide their inevitable destiny. It is on the basis of this that we recognize the primordial right of every man and woman to his and her own meaningfulness. **Since this meaningfulness is necessarily historical and communal, it explains why war is accepted as a grim but undeniable right. Not to sacrifice on behalf of what is mine is to discredit the very authenticity of being at all.**

**Attaining a authentic method of being is more important and should come before everything – this card is sick nasty good**

**Gelven** prof phil @ NIU **1994** (Michael, War and Existence)

The personal pronouns, like “I” and “We,” become governed existentially by the possessive pronouns, like “ours,” “mine,” “theirs”; and this in turn becomes governed by the adjective “own.” What is authentic becomes what is our own as a way of existing. The meaning of this term is less the sense of possession than the sense of belonging to. It is a translation of the German eigen, from which the term eigentlich (authentic) is derived. **To lose this sense of one’s own is to abandon any meaningfulness, and hence to embrace nihilism.** To be a nihilist is to deny that there is any way of being that is our own; for the nihilist, what is one’s own has no meaning. **The threat here is not that what is our own may yield to what is not, but rather that the distinction itself will simply collapse.** **Unless I can distinguish between what is our own and what is not, no meaningfulness is possible at all.**
This is the foundation of the we-they principle. The pronouns in the title do not refer to anything; they merely reveal how we think. Like all principles, this existential principle does not determine specific judgments, any more than the principle of cause and effect determines what the cause of any given thing is. The we-they principle is simply a rule that governs the standards by which certain judgments are made. Since it is possible to isolate the existential meanings of an idea from the thinglike referent, the notions of we-ness and they-ness can be articulated philosophically. On the basis of this primary understanding, it is possible to talk about an “existential value,” that is, the weight or rank given to ways of existing in opposition to

other kinds of value, such as moral or psychological values. But the principle itself is not, strictly speaking, a principle of value; it is an ontological principle, for its foundation is in the very basic way in which I think about what it means to be. The ground of the we-they principle is, quite simply, the way in which we think about being. **Thus, it is more fundamental than any kind of evaluating or judging.**
One of the things that the authentic I can do, of course, is to concern itself with moral questions. Whether from a deontological sense of obligation or from a utilitarian projection of possible happiness, an I that considers these matters nevertheless is presupposed by them. Although authenticity and morality are distinct, a sense of who one is must precede a decision about how to act. Thus, the question of authenticity comes before the question of obligation. And since the worth of the I is generated from the prior worth of the we, it follows there can be no moral judgment that cancels out the worth of the I or the We. This is not to say that anything that benefits the we is therefore more important than what ought to be done. It is merely to say that any proper moral judgment will in fact be consistent with the integrity of the we. Thus, I would be morally prohibited from offending someone else merely for my own advantage, but no moral law would ever require me to forgo my existential integrity. This is true not only for moral questions but for any question of value whatsoever**: all legitimate value claims must be consistent with the worth of the I and the We.** It is only because my existence matters that I can care about such things as morality, aesthetics, or even happiness. Pleasure, of course, would still be preferable to pain, but to argue that one ought to have pleasure or even that it is good to have pleasure would simply reduce itself to a tautology: if I define pleasure as the satisfaction of my wants, then to say I want pleasure is tautological, for I am merely saying that I want what I want, which may be true but is not very illuminating.
The existential worth of existing is therefore fundamental and cannot be outranked by any other consideration. **Unless I am first meaningful, I cannot be good; unless I first care about who I am, I cannot genuinely care about anything else, even my conduct**. To threaten this ground of all values, the worth of my own being, then becomes the supreme assault against me. To defend it and protect it is simply without peer. It is beyond human appeal or persuasion.

**War is comparativly better than war because it allows us to know ourselves and thus understand the value of peace**

**Gelven** prof phil @ NIU **1994** (Michael, War and Existence)

So there are uniquely existential judgments that cannot be reduced either to factual assertions about the world or to emotive attitudes about the subject. One of these existential judgments is the principle that our meaning as a people (the we) is more fundamental than our ordinary concerns for peace. On the other hand, our sentiments for peace are well grounded. This is an intellectual paradox because we seem to have two differing and conflicting sets of principles that guide our thinking about war, but it is also an emotional paradox because we seem to feel in two totally different ways about our own warlikeness. Conflicts of this sort are either mistakes (one of our instincts is simply misguided or erroneous), or they are contradictory (the conflicting instincts simply cannot coexist, so that one must be sacrificed on behalf of rational coherence), or they are genuinely paradoxical, which means the conflicting sentiments are both valid, their coexistence does not produce a contradiction, and the task of inquiry is to ascertain exactly why and how the two conflicting instincts can coexist. War reveals itself as a genuine paradox in this philosophical sense; so, if we are to understand war, we must isolate those principles that make us go to war, analyze them in terms of their unique presuppositions and values, and test
their validity.
The paradox of war is not only conceptual, it is also deeply existential. It is not merely an abstract problem for those who like to speculate about principles, it is a felt and endured agony of the soul that can be ignored only at the peril of self-defeat. The inquiry into war, initiated with a profound realization of its paradoxical nature, thus becomes an essential task for all honest self-knowledge. If we are to know ourselves, the supreme commandment for the philosopher, we must know how to think through this paradox. To understand war is thus to understand ourselves.

**We should risk nuclear war for authenticity – we must be willing to fight!**

**Gelven** prof phil @ NIU **1994** (Michael, War and Existence)

The Nuclear Pacifist. There are those who argue that all four of the traditional pacifists are indeed corrupt and unacceptable, and who would agree with the indictment of them that is presented above. But they would argue that the existence of nuclear weapons completely alters the picture. For now the question is not the moral one of supporting violence or the existential one of supporting what is one’s own. Rather, the argument is that the entire human race is in jeopardy and that no one has the right to threaten the species. It may be correct, they argue, to point out that one should fight against a tyrant or a foreign invader, but it cannot be right or even existentially meaningful to hazard the entire globe with nuclear incineration. This gives rise to a radically different kind of pacifist, the nuclear pacifist, who defends his antiwar position with reference to the ultimate threat, global suicide.
According to this way of thinking, 1945 has driven a wedge into the course of history, forever disjoining the past from the present and future. Those who live after 1945 simply must think differently than those who lived before 1945. What makes this new kind of thinking imperative is an argument that has curious force and persuasion and needs to be analyzed.

The argument has four premises, one of which is a factual claim, one a
moral imperative, and two predictive scenarios. The argument is as follows:
1. We now possess enough nuclear armament to destroy the entire planet and with it all of humankind.
2. An all-out nuclear war between superpowers would in fact result in the total destruction of humankind.
3. Any war, even a nonnuclear war, ultimately involves the superpowers and enhances the possibility of (2).
4. It is unthinkable and unspeakable to bring about the total annihilation of the planet and the human species, and as a corollary, it is morally wrong to do that which threatens the annihilation of humankind or which makes the annihilation more likely.
Each of these four premises is, in some way, vulnerable. Nevertheless, the argument is used by many otherwise nonpacifists to argue that the development of nuclear weapons has completely altered our moral understanding to the point that although all pre-1945 pacifists may have been deficient, it is now morally imperative to indict **all war,** not only nuclear war, because of the threat it brings to the human species. This produces a “new” kind of pacifist, the nuclear pacifist. The issue is, of course, complex. For example, the veracity of (1) can be disputed by the layman only by appeal to various experts, who themselves disagree. Granted that the majority support the claim, but there are many who do not. The layman, of course, believes the expert with whom he is in agreement. Or consider briefly the two scenarios:
they have no more authority than any other suggestion of probable or even possible happenings. As for (4), the moral imperative, it may be believed by many, but it seems to come from nowhere. There is no imperative against a risky individual existence; why should there be one against the race as such? To prohibit any action that may imperil the race may entail an indictment of any and every social system that allows individual creativity and genius. Do we forbid all private research lest it stumble across a lethal strain of disease? Do we forbid space travel altogether if there appears to be the likelihood of counteraggression from aliens? We may argue that it would be prohibited (by ordinary moral principles) to imperil any large numbers of people (much less the entire race) if we were certain of the results of our actions, but of course no human activity is ever that certain, especially not the premises that support this curious argument.
The proper place, however, for the analysis of this argument in detail is elsewhere; it is enough to mention merely that none of the four premises that support the nuclear pacifist is invulnerable to critique. What is deserving of our attention here is not the validity or invalidity of the argument but what is entailed by the meaning. Let us assume, if not complete validity, at least considerable persuasion by the argument. This means, then, that modern (post-1945) **humanity is prohibited from sharing precisely in those courageous and sacrificial acts that are necessary for human meaning**. **If the argument is valid, no man can join up with others to struggle against a tyrant, and no nation can resist an invasion from another. Those who violate this principle cannot be punished, since only by arming oneself against an invader can a determined invader be stopped**. **It is now considered wrong to love one’s country as one’s own, precisely because that love supports the idea of a nation, and the idea of a nation supports the idea of a war. That all nations might live in spontaneous brotherhood without the need for armies** but with a mutual respect for the various independent autonomies is simply denying historical and psychological reality. And even if it were possible for there to be an agreement among extant nations never to go to war again, what should happen if a single leader in a single nation in some future time decided to expand? There are countless suggestions of this sort that appall the mind and reveal that we do not favor such possibilities, but nonetheless the attraction of the argument stands.
The most disturbing characteristic of this argument and of the nuclear pacifist generally is the cruel wedge it drives between us and our forefathers. It is no longer possible, according to this view, for us even to think like those who have come before us and whose boldness and courage created our history. Our children cannot stir to the magnificence of Henry V’s speech at Agincourt or fill their hearts with patriotism in hearing Churchill’s vow to fight the enemy on the beaches and the streets. We ourselves can no longer share the sentiments of Washington or Lee or Patton; we must forever be divorced from the Shakespearean Caesar, from Sophocles’ Antigone or Homer’s Achilles, for under the guise of this persuasion, all patriotism, all spirited triumph of men at arms, all heroes, and all martial sacrifice are grounded in sentiments that are wicked, false, and immoral. **We must cluck in sad deprecation and superior wisdom at all who believe in being able to fight and die for something**. And this ugliness is a very real threat, for the public now senses in the nuclear pacifist not only a hatred of war but **a hatred of history.** It is not only that we should scorn all warlikeness, we should also scorn the noble heroes of the past. For the reasoning is clear, their values are no longer ours. The nuclear pacifist inevitably finds himself a historical nihilist. History can be read only as an interesting but sad specimen of immoral events, a chronicle that offers no values but only information.
The year 1945 does indeed offer a wedge for many people, forever sundering the two species of history. The date threatens to replace that of the birth of Christ as the watershed for measuring events: Before Hiroshima and After Hiroshima, A.H. implies the new value system, with emphasis on pacifism, submission, simple hedonism, and the dread of nuclear annihilation. B.H. implies the old value system, with violence, savagery, nobility, and bloodletting honor. For if the argument is valid, how can we maintain any reverence for those virtues that unite men to fight against a foreign enemy? If the argument is valid, surely a reverence for the great men of history is misprized. New heroes, gentler, kindlier, surrendering, prudent, and fearful, must be created; new epics and tragedies in which the hero is praised not for his valor but for his meekness must be written. Or at the very least, the old ones must be reevaluated or recast, as Nathum Tate rewrote the ending of King Lear, making it into a comedy. Lest this seem a fantastic suggestion, one need only reflect that such gruesome reexamination is being done right now. Many students come to the great heroic classics uneasy and suspicious of their glorification of war and recognize that such bygone values no longer apply in a nuclear age.
Reverence for history is among the first values to suffer in any revolutionary period, of course, but this is unique because it rests on a certain kind of moralist argument. The threatening of the entire species has become a new kind of real possibility with the development of our horrible new weapons, and with this technological development (one can hardly call it an advance), there is a natural concomitant development of moral standards. The nuclear pacifist is a special and peculiar phenomenon, for he argues that the technology has literally revolutionized the ethical vocabulary. Since there is a “new evil,” the destruction of the entire species, there must be new ways of thinking about what ought and ought not to be done.
**There are no “new” moral principles**, and usually those who argue that there are, whether in the nuclear age or in any other, are simply championing variants of a different form of immorality. There have been different forms of fear and psychological terrorism throughout history to distract us from our freedom and our integrity. The nuclear pacifist is simply another in a long line of those who would persuade us that we must submit to blackmail and surrender our freedoms lest we be killed. But the appeal in the public consciousness cannot be denied, and the blackmail and threat of the nuclear pacifist cannot be dismissed as trivial merely because it is wrong. It is important for us to realize just what the ransom money is, however. To avoid the possibility of the “new evil” of threatening the entire species, we must surrender all martial piety and commitment to the male and heroic virtues, must sever all true linkage with our tradition, and must even forfeit all sentiment that puts the warrior in a good light.
Many, if not most, people will simply not accept the blackmail, and unless the entire population of the globe accepts it, the payment is forfeit. It is the twin insult of rejecting our tradition and relying on naïveté that so upsets us, I think, about the nuclear pacifist in particular and all pacifists in general. It is simply too high a price to surrender our historical values merely on an empty hope that can be realized only if everyone suddenly becomes saintly. The contemporary appeal of pacifism may be intensified by the threat of global destruction, **but its essence has not changed.** In the first description of the modern pacifist, he was recognized as essentially a moral man, perhaps naïve and overly gentle, but still moral or at least moralistic. But on deeper analysis we see that “moral” is simply an improper adjective. Why is it any more noble to submit to fear and blackmail than to stand up to the threatener? Why is concern for one’s own death more worthy than concern for one’s dignity? Why is the pacifist who upsets the social order in his attempt to bring about unilateral disarmament any more enviable than a young man willing to offer his life for his culture, tradition, and country? It is not necessary to doubt the sincerity of either of them or the depth of their convictions and commitments. Yet if both can be admired for their devotion to their causes, why is the pacifist always instinctively seen as morally on a loftier plane than his warrior fellow? The answer to this obviously lies in the earlier recognition in this work of the paradoxical nature of war: we cannot look cheerfully into the face of Mars. At least, however, geared with the present arguments, one should resist the overly ready tendency to grant to the pacifist critic the natural halo. At bottom, the pacifist is a nihilist, in all of his guises. **When the true light of thought is cast on these two young men, the warrior can be more admired than the pacifist.**

## 1NR

### case

#### Here is some evidence – Ending the war can’t solve – politicians’ positions are too entrenched for a radical reconsideration of dominant narratives, and attempts to do so will be deemed irresponsible

**Krebs, 11** – Ronald R., associate professor of political science at the University of Minnesota (“Military Conflict and the Politics of Narrative: The Rise and Fall of the Cold War Consensus,” pp. 8-9, 3/7/11, http://blog.lib.umn.edu/gpa/globalnotes/Krebs,%20MIRC%202011\_final.pdf)**Red**

**Once the scale of the failure becomes fully known, however, why would opposition elites not try to recast the narrative basis of national security? Because they bear the weight of their past utterances and are thus already “narratively committed.”** Had critics who took a public stand ahead of the tipping point known in prospect what they know in retrospect, they might have sought a more radical revision of the tropes and terms in which national security is debated. But **the uncertainties** **of** the **war**’s course **and the corresponding political pressures cast alternatives to the margins in the war’s early stages**—**and there they remain.** War, especially defeat, often does shake up the established political order and bring **new personalities** into politics, but even they **are not unconstrained.** Although not personally shackled by a wartime rhetorical past, **they normally require political veteran allies who are, and thus even political neophytes are compelled to obey narrative conventions in a war’s waning days.** **Furthermore, early criticism sets the boundaries of the “responsible opposition,” and exceeding those lines of argument, and the dominant narrative on which they draw, positions actors as irresponsible.** With apologies to Marx, people write narratives of national security, but not entirely of their own choosing. **We live in a world that is always already narrated,** in which most of us most of the time are readers and speakers, not writers.

#### By declaring defeat, the aff locks in dominant national security narrative – entrenched political positions from early in the conflict make it impossible for defeat to serve as the basis for critique.

**Krebs, 13** – Ronald R., associate professor of political science at the University of Minnesota (“Military Conflict and the Politics of Narrative: Explaining the Rise and Fall of the Cold War Consensus,” University of Minnesota, 8/30/13, Online //Red)

Public Narrative and the Pressures of Politics **The prevailing model of change is insufficiently sensitive to politics.** It typically treats events, notably military defeat and triumph, as exogenous and as “proving” national security policies and ideas right or wrong. While events—from natural disaster to economic recession to military conflict—are very real, their social import—whether they are seen as shocking “crises” or as manageable problems—is not determined by any objective feature of the events themselves. Crisis is, in this important sense, endogenous to political contestation.47 Moreover, **implicit is a prevailing image of substantial failure, including battlefield defeat, as a moment of intellectual awakening, an epiphany.** The image is sometimes apt, such as when defeat is overwhelming and when wars are so short that there is little intrawar interpretation. At such times, the conventional wisdom has merit. But the collective perception of defeat normally coalesces only at the end of a protracted process in which actors seek to make sense of accumulating setbacks. Few military contests have ended as decisively as the Second World War did for Germany and Japan, and even substantial battlefield defeats have permitted interpretations, such as the “stab in the back,” that legitimated rather than rejected the past. While it is true that short wars are more common than even scholars generally realize,48 most wars have provided ample opportunity while combat is raging for debate over their lessons. Although crises are figured as times of national unity and thus beyond politics, **protracted conflicts are rife with political disputes over the military’s stumbles.** An adequate theory of change must account for this competition over meaning, because, as the logic of path dependence suggests, it conditions the scope and direction of subsequent change. **The breakdown of dominant narratives is a deeply political process.** Even when victory and defeat are clear,49 accounting for these outcomes and assessing their implications are normally **a matter of intense public debate**—not just in retrospect but in the moment. As battlefield travails come to light, domestic political contestation centers on how these are to be explained. Is the army being outgunned or outsmarted? Does it lack fighting spirit, or did the nation’s leaders dispatch it to an unwinnable war? Does the problem lie at the level of tactics, operations, or strategy, or with the war’s fundamental rationale? These public interpretive contests are not a matter of apolitical puzzling. The contestants, stylized here as doves and hawks, as opponents and supporters of military action and hard-line policies, **aim to further their strategic agendas**, and their public accounts of the conflict’s ups and downs should be understood in that light. The course of major conflict—whether the war is going well, whether the use of force is successful—is a crucial part of the context in which those interpretive contests take place, for it affects who possesses interpretive authority. Government spokespeople enjoy substantial starting advantages in the exercise of “interpretive leadership,”50 and, as the owners of the military campaign, victory redounds to their benefit. Military setbacks, however, erode public trust, diffuse authority, and empower the opposition. The question is whether the circumstances inhibit the opposition from pursuing change at the axiomatic level, in the narrative in whose terms the war was legitimated, or, conversely, provide an opening for it to do so. I argue that, **early in a faltering war whose ultimate outcome is uncertain, neither dovish nor hawkish opponents have incentives to jump through that rhetorical window**, and the effect is to preserve or consolidate the dominance of the legitimating narrative. The conventional wisdom fails to grasp how **the politics of failure create impediments to change** and thus how **national security narratives survive even the substantial failures** that can reasonably be laid at their feet. Consider first political opponents who oppose the war. Doves confront a difficult choice: they can seize the opportunity that military struggles provide to assail the underlying narrative, or they can offer a more modest attack on the war that reaffirms that narrative. For instance, the surprising persistence and effectiveness of the Sunni insurgency in Iraq created an opening for Democratic doves to take on the Bush administration. They could have exploited US struggles in Iraq to confront the Terror narrative, into which the Iraq invasion had been bound. But they also could have criticized the Iraq War from safe narrative terrain—as a distraction from the “real” War on Terror, against al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan. When **leading Democrats opted for the second course**, they naturally disappointed many supporters, but **their choice was not surprising** in light of the fog of war and the politics of military failure. When evidence of military difficulties has begun to accumulate but before the perception of irrevocable failure has crystallized, doves are **reluctant to launch a thoroughgoing critique that challenges the war’s ends and not just its means**, that takes on its underlying narrative. Criticism in wartime is always dangerous, but the deeper it strikes, the more vulnerable critics are to charges that they are emboldening the enemy, demoralizing the troops, and prolonging the fight. This is especially true early in a war, when its outcome is still seen as uncertain and thus when vocal criticism arguably can affect whether the war ends in victory or defeat, not just the terms and costs of the inevitable conclusion. Should the war’s course reverse, critics’ judgment will be severely questioned, and should the nation’s forces continue to flounder, they may be held responsible, not lauded for their prescience. **Given the stakes, caution reigns, the pressure to conform to the dominant narrative is intense, and foundational critique is rarely heard.** It is far safer for doves to criticize the war’s conduct, insist that the strategy is sound but its application flawed, or propose withdrawal on the grounds of excessive cost or insufficient likelihood of victory. As a result, even as the war’s costs mount, doves typically express themselves within the terms of the dominant narrative. Politics does not stop at war’s edge, at least not for long, but wartime politics is normally waged within narrative bounds. Wartime political dynamics thus narrow the scope of criticism in a protracted campaign’s early stages, and this **has long-term consequences.** Once there is widespread agreement of defeat—that is, beyond the tipping point of failure—doves might find it appealing in principle to try to recast the narrative basis of national security, **but that option is no longer available.** Their past utterances, which reinforced the dominant narrative, have established the conventions to which the public expects members of the “responsible opposition” to adhere. Those who move beyond those boundaries are predictably assailed as **reckless radicals.** Had doves known in prospect what they know in retrospect, they might have coupled their wartime criticism to a revision of the nation’s security narrative. But the politics of an uncertain and failing war cast narrative alternatives to the margins in war’s early stages—and **there they remain.** This mechanism of lock-in is at work not only when the political opposition’s leadership is stable, but even when military defeat shakes up the established order and brings new personalities into politics who are not personally shackled by a wartime rhetorical past. All mainstream politicians who wish to avoid the radical label are confined to the dominant narrative. In fact, Barack Obama, who more than any other top Democrat made opposition to the Iraq War the centerpiece of his political persona, remained in thrall to the Terror narrative as a senator and presidential candidate. In criticizing the Iraq War as having obstructed prosecution of the War on Terror properly conceived, leading Democrats tied Obama’s hands.51 Consider now political opponents who support the war. Hawks face a seeming dilemma. On the one hand, they do not wish to undermine public support for the war, which may already be flagging: were they to challenge the war’s legitimating logic, the public might lose faith entirely. On the other hand, they wish to exploit battlefield setbacks for political gain: supporting the policies and echoing the arguments of the wartime leadership will not position them as a credible political alternative. There is at least one way they can sidestep the dilemma: by accusing the government of not having been sufficiently faithful to its own articulated worldview and by **suggesting that greater fidelity would have led to better battlefield outcomes**, or even have made the war and its attendant sacrifices unnecessary. Criticizing the war’s conduct and presenting themselves as the true believers, hawks seek to renew the mass public’s commitment, redouble the military’s efforts, and offer the public a distinctive political stance. Opposition hawks thus make political headway, albeit at the cost of principle if their rationale for war differs from that of the wartime government—that is, if their hawkish preferences are rooted in a different narrative of national security. In contrast to opposition doves, who seek to evade the perils of criticism, hawks are lured by the prospect of gain. But the effect is the same: to curb wartime critique and to shore up the underlying narrative of national security. In fact, the politics of **military failure** can work to **consolidate narrative dominance**, when hawks are enticed to sign on to a narrative they had previously refused to endorse.

#### Winning solves – it allows for the incorporation of the aff’s alternative narratives by opening new spaces for political though

**Krebs, 13** – Ronald R., associate professor of political science at the University of Minnesota (“Military Conflict and the Politics of Narrative: Explaining the Rise and Fall of the Cold War Consensus,” University of Minnesota, 8/30/13, Online //Red)

**While the politics of military failure stifle change, success on the battlefield and in significant episodes of coercive diplomacy opens space for departures from the dominant narrative.** This seems counterintuitive from the perspective of actors’ motives. But motive is only half the story, and **triumph alters the opportunity structure facing officials who wish to narrate the world differently but had previously felt politically constrained.** Success boosts government spokesmen’s interpretive authority, loosening those constraints and permitting them to advance an alternative if they so desire. It creates an opening for its owners **to argue that the rules** **of the global game have changed** because their policy was so successful. Success does not, in and of itself, end narrative dominance, but it makes its breakdown possible—depending on whether doves or hawks occupy positions of authority: doves can reveal their true colors, while hawks are free to continue toeing the narrative line. Success is not, however, conducive to the consolidation of a new dominant narrative, because it **creates space for alternative futures** without delegitimizing the past. It has not only many fathers, but many lessons: it can also be interpreted as proving the wisdom of the status quo from which deviation is dangerous. The erstwhile dominant narrative retains its legitimacy, and so, even when doves seize the opportunity that success provides, the result is at most the erosion of narrative dominance. This theoretical framework puts strategizing political elites at the center of the dynamics of national security narrative. This **is not to deny significance to those beyond the halls of power**, and indeed **activists and intellectuals are often the progenitors of alternative narratives.** **But those alternatives remain sidelined until political elites take them up**. Whether elites do so depends in part on whether the alternatives are compatible with their established political identity and in part on whether they see it as politically profitable. Nor is this to reduce dominant narratives to elite strategizing alone. Whether elites can productively advance specific narratives of national security depends on deeper and more enduring structures of national identity discourse, in which those narratives must be grounded. Moreover, in line with the logic of path dependence, elites’ choices with respect to narrative have long-run, often unintended, and sometimes undesirable consequences. Whether, at nodal points, they reproduce the dominant narrative or break from it has implications for politics downstream, limiting subsequent policy legitimation. This theoretical framework helps make sense of the peculiar dynamics of the Cold War narrative. The protracted war in Korea—frustrating to Americans fresh off World War II, persuaded of their rectitude, and sure that their wealth and know-how guaranteed swift victory— might have led to the rejection of globalist underpinnings, but the Republican party leadership composed of hawkish conservatives behaved in line with theoretical expectations. Worried about undercutting the war effort yet eager to strike political gains, they abandoned their preferred narrative that denied the world’s tight interconnectedness. In assailing the Truman administration for having left East Asia to communist predation—that is, for pursuing a containment policy that was insufficiently global—they deprived a non-globalist alternative of its leading voices and helped consolidate the Cold War consensus. A decade later, the Cuban Missile Crisis allowed the liberals who “owned” that triumph to articulate a different vision of the Soviet Union, global communism, and the possibilities for negotiation. During the Cold War, superpower crisis is what passed for the battlefield, and **the administration’s victory created an opening, which Kennedy eagerly seized.** **The Cuban Missile Crisis made possible the demise of a dominant Cold War narrative.** The next sections trace the workings of the theoretical logic in these two episodes, one contributing to the dominance of the Cold War narrative and the other to its erosion.

#### That’s specifically true of terrorism

**Krebs, 11** – Ronald R., associate professor of political science at the University of Minnesota (“Military Conflict and the Politics of Narrative: The Rise and Fall of the Cold War Consensus,” pp. 56, 3/7/11, http://blog.lib.umn.edu/gpa/globalnotes/Krebs,%20MIRC%202011\_final.pdf)**Red**

To the extent that Terror has become a less prominent theme in American political discourse today, it is because the Great Recession allowed the Obama administration to focus its attention, and its rhetorical energies, elsewhere. But **the administration has not challenged the Terror narrative directly, and it likely will not—at least not without its own Cuban Missile Crisis, without a striking victory that it can argue has changed the rules of the game. Whether the U**nited **S**tates **is engaged in a “long war” or a “struggle against extremism,” it will find such victories few and far between. And so the post-9/11 consensus will survive.**

#### Losing ensures that their project will be written off as radical and excluded from political discourse – elites won’t feel secure in reconsidering dominant narratives of American hegemony because the political risk is too high

**Krebs, 11** – Ronald R., associate professor of political science at the University of Minnesota (“Military Conflict and the Politics of Narrative: The Rise and Fall of the Cold War Consensus,” pp. 7-8, 3/7/11, http://blog.lib.umn.edu/gpa/globalnotes/Krebs,%20MIRC%202011\_final.pdf)**Red**

**Battlefield travails, even before the war is** widely **seen as a**n unmitigated **disaster, undermine the public’s faith in the nation’s leaders and boost the status of political opponents. But the existence of an opening does not mean that actors have incentives to jump through it and offer a thoroughgoing critique of the underlying narrative in whose terms the war was legitimated.** After all, **criticism in wartime is dangerous. Critics are vulnerable to charges that they are weakening national resolve**, emboldening the enemy, prolonging the fight, failing to support the troops, even murdering the nation’s youth by proxy. **Should the war’s course reverse, their judgment will be severely questioned, and should the nation’s armed forces continue to flounder, they may be held** partly **responsible,** not lauded for their prescience. **Offering a**n alternative **narrative that questions the war’s foundation is especially risky.** **While the prospective payoff is high, so is the risk** that the speaker will be at best ignored and at worst dismissed as naïve, foolish, or even treasonous. **It is, therefore, not surprising that,** as evidence begins to accumulate of military difficulties, opposition **politicians shy away from anything beyond a critique of the war’s conduct** on the existing narrative terrain. Even as the war’s costs mount, **criticism,** though vigorous and bitter, **is** typically **framed within the terms of the dominant narrative**—e.g., suggesting that another strategy would bring victory, or proposing withdrawal on the grounds of excessive cost, or insisting that the sound basic strategy was wrongly applied to country X. Politics does not stop at war’s edge, at least not for long, but it is normally waged within the dominant narrative’s bounds. **Democrats’ criticism of the Iraq War as a distraction from the War on Terror properly conceived**—against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in the Af-Pak region—**and a drain on national resources is a case in point.**

#### Success in \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ solves best – only a victory can bring about a political space in which a rethinking is possible

**Krebs, 11** – Ronald R., associate professor of political science at the University of Minnesota (“Military Conflict and the Politics of Narrative: The Rise and Fall of the Cold War Consensus,” pp. 9-10, 3/7/11, http://blog.lib.umn.edu/gpa/globalnotes/Krebs,%20MIRC%202011\_final.pdf)**Red**

If this is right, **the prevailing image—of national-security narratives switching tracks in the wake of unanticipated** policy, especially **battlefield, failure—has it wrong.** **Even after failure, narratives tend to proceed along a familiar track. At most, the opposition introduces emendations** to the narrative, akin to a new branch line rather than a new main line. The **opposition’s rhetoric,** reproducing the war’s legitimating narrative, **may even work to silence alternatives.** During the Korean War, the way Republican leaders responded to the battlefield reversals and subsequent stalemate consolidated the Cold War consensus rather than advance the nationalist alternative they favored. **Democrats during the Iraq War reproduced the Terror narrative,** disappointing supporters on the Left who perceived a missed opportunity to undo what 9/11 had wrought. The conventional wisdom is right that military failure gives actors motives to overturn the narrative status quo, but it fails to comprehend how **the politics of failure closes off change.** **National security narratives thus survive even** the **military failures** that can be laid at their feet. The other surprising implication is that **narrative change is more likely**—albeit not very likely—**to follow policy success.** There is good reason to think that nothing fails like success. As Legro presents this common sense, when policy produces desirable returns, “societal actors would find little reason to reassess the prevailing orthodoxy.”16 Yet **a great triumph may sufficiently change the world so that previously dominant narratives seem outdated.** Consider the extreme case of **the end of the Cold War.** Upon the dissolution of the Soviet empire and then of the Soviet Union, **Americans** proclaimed themselves the victors in the Cold War. But they also **believed that their great victory had brought forth a new world whose shape was not yet clear but in which old frameworks were certain to be irrelevant.** **Numerous narratives**—the clash of civilizations, the end of history, a rising China, the “indispensable nation”—**competed** **in the** relatively unstructured **public square.** **This** welter of competing narratives **was the product of America’s overwhelming,** and (according to analysis dating back to George Kennan) expected, **success**—not its failure. **Even** more **modest successes,** however, **can raise the issue of whether the rules of the game have changed** because the policy was so successful. The Cuban Missile Crisis, widely narrated in the United States as a one-sided victory in which the Russian bear had backed down, occasioned such a debate and thus opened up gaps in the Cold War consensus. Liberal internationalists in the Kennedy administration “owned” that success, and thus their ideological compatriots were particularly well positioned to question Cold War orthodoxy. The success of deterrence, these liberal Cold Warriors argued, had finally awakened the Soviet Union to the reality of shared interests and had transformed a formerly zero-sum superpower competition into a mixed-motive game. It was not the failure of America’s Cold War posture, but its **success**, that they credited with **necessitating a rethinking of the world Americans inhabited.** The conventional wisdom is right that **success** does not provide the motivation for narrative change, but it does **create the political space** for it—**if there are actors who are, for whatever reason, so motivated.** But dissensus, not a new dominant narrative, is the result. Success creates space for alternative futures without delegitimizing the past. It has not only many fathers, but many lessons.

#### The aff has it backwards – surrender and withdraw reinforce conventional national security discourses – only winning allows for the emergence of alternatives

**Krebs, 13** – Ronald R., associate professor of political science at the University of Minnesota (“Military Conflict and the Politics of Narrative: Explaining the Rise and Fall of the Cold War Consensus,” University of Minnesota, 8/30/13, Online //Red)

Contemporaries and historians have often blamed the errors and tragedies of US policy during the Cold War on the “Cold War consensus.” Its usual periodization, according to which it came together by around 1948 and persisted until the late 1960s when it unraveled amidst the trauma of the Vietnam War, fits well with a common theory of change in ideas and discourse. That theory expects stasis until a substantial unexpected failure (in this domain, military defeat) discredits dominant ideas and unsettles dominant coalitions. But the Cold War consensus has never been systematically studied. This article does so for the first time via a large-scale content analysis of foreign affairs editorials. By this measure, the consensus did not coalesce until well into the 1950s and began to erode even before the Americanization of the Vietnam War in 1965. To make sense of this puzzle, I argue that **the theoretical conventional wisdom is inadequate** when it comes to the dominant public narratives that underpin and structure debate over national security. I argue that the politics of protracted military failure impede change in these dominant narratives, while **victory generates political space for unorthodox ideas to penetrate.** Processtracing reveals causal dynamics consistent with my theory highlighting the domestic politics of the military and diplomatic battlefield: **failure in the Korean War**, which might have undermined Cold War globalism, instead **facilitated the Cold War narrative’s rise to dominance** (or consensus); and the triumph of the Cuban Missile Crisis made possible that dominant narrative’s breakdown before the upheaval of Vietnam. This hard and important case suggests the **need to rethink the relationship between success, failure, and change in dominant narratives of national security**—and perhaps in other policy domains as well.