# Round 8—Aff vs Kansas BC

## 1AC

### smaeeeee

## 2AC

### framework

#### the targeted killing debate needs to be situated outside of the juridical matrix to make this space politically productive

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(Susanne, “Targeted Killing and Its Law: On a Mutually Constitutive Relationship”, Leiden Journal of International Law (2012), 25, pp. 665–682, dml)

Giorgio Agamben maintains that a legal norm, because abstract, does not stipulate its application.102 ‘Just as between language and world . . . there is no internal nexus’ between them. The norm, in this sense, exists independent of ‘reality’. This, according to Agamben, allows for the norm in the ‘state of exception’ both to be applied with the effect of ‘ceasing to apply’103 – ‘the rule, suspending itself, gives rise to the exception’104 – and to be suspended without being abolished. Although forming part of and, in fact, being the effect of applying the law, the state of exception, in Agamben’s view, disconnects from the norm. Within a perspective on law as practice, by contrast, **there is no such difference between norm and reality**. Even to ignore a pertinent norm constitutes an act that has a meaning, namely that the norm is not being enforced. It affects the norm. **Targeted killing operations**, in this sense, can never be extra-legal.105 On the contrary, provided that illegal practices come up systematically, they eventually will effectuate the transformation of the law. Equally, the exception from the norm not only suspends the norm, transforming it, momentarily or permanently, into a mere symbol without meaning and force, but at the same time also **impinges upon the validity of that norm**. Moreover, focus on the exception within the present context falls short of capturing a rather gradual transitional process that both **resists a binary deciphering of either legal or illegal and is not a matter of suspending a norm**. As practices deploying particular forms of knowledge, **targeted killing and its law** mutually constitute each other, **thus re-enforcing a new security dispositif**. **The** appropriate research question **therefore is** how positive law changes its framework of reference. Targeted killing, once perceived as illegal, **now appears to be a legal practice** on the grounds of a new understanding of international law’s own elementary concepts. The crux of the ‘compulsion of legality’ is that **legality itself is a shifting reference**.

Seen this way, the United States does not establish targeted killing as a legal practice on the grounds of its internationally ‘possessing’ exceptional power. Rather the reverse; it is able to employ targeted killing as a military tactic, **precisely because this is** accepted by the legal discourse. As a practice, targeted killing, in turn, reshapes our understanding of basic concepts of international law. **Any dissenting voice** will now be heard with more difficulty, since targeted killing is a no longer an isolated practice but, **within the now establishing security dispositif, appears to be** appropriate **and** rational. **To counter the legal discourse**, then, **would require** to interrupt it**,** rather than to respond to it, and to move on to its political implications that are rather tacitly involved in the talk about threats and security, and in the dispute about targeted killing operations’ legality.

6. CONCLUSION

Analysing targeted killing that has asserted itself as a tactic in the US fight against terrorism within a Foucauldian perspective challenges common normative approaches in legal theory towards this phenomenon. Identifying the tactic as residing between the alternatives of either being accomplished illegally or being legal **misses** some important points – first of all, **that** there is a process at work. While presenting itself as a military tactic employed in the name of defending a threatened population, targeted killing today appears to be a new phenomenon that discarded its historical association with political assassination. As a security dispositif, second, it displaces some of the established co-ordinates of international law that are able to formally stick to established legal principles. The identification of a new dimension of threats thereby marked the turning point for a new reading of international law, as it provided a space for transforming the unknowable threat into new forms of knowledge. Third, legal reasoning **that tries,** whether in supportive or critical terms**, to make sense of the current incoherence in international law** contributes to the legal acceptance of targeted killing. This is because legal reasoning, couching the issue in legal terms, **constitutes a normative reality of its own**. There is, then, finally, no superior normativity the law could be measured against and therefore **nothing principally unlegalizable**. Instead, the normative authority resides in the law itself. It is, though, neither a quality of law as such nor merely something society attributes to the law. It lies in the very moment of law’s enactment, whereas its significance depends upon the knowledge and claims thus brought into play.

#### impact is violence

Rozo 4

(MA in philosophy and Cultural Analysis, 2004 Diego, Forgiving the Unforgivable: On Violence, Power, and the Possibility of Justice p 19-21)

Within the legal order the relations between individuals will resemble this logic where suffering is exchanged for more, but ‘legal’ suffering, because these relations are no longer regulated by the “culture of the heart” [*Kultur des Herzens*]. (CV 245) As Benjamin describes it, the “legal system tries to erect, in all areas where individual ends could be usefully pursued by violence, legal ends that can be realized only by legal power.” (CV 238) The individual is not to take law in his own hands; no conflict should be susceptible of being solved without the direct intervention of law, lest its authority will be undermined. Law has to present itself as *indispensable* for any kind of conflict to be solved. The consequence of this infiltration of law throughout the whole of human life is paradoxical: the more inescapable the rule of law is, the less responsible the individual becomes**.** Legal and judicial institutions act as avengers in the name of the individual. Even the possibility of forgiveness is monopolized by the state under the ‘right of mercy’. Hence the responsibility of the person toward the others is now delegated on the authority and justness of the law. The legal institutions, the very agents of (legal) vengeance exonerate mefrom my essential responsibility towards the others, breaking the moral proximity that makes every ethics possible.20 Thus I am no longer obliged to an other that by his/her very presence would demand me to be worthy of the occasion (of every occasion), because law, by seeking to regulate affairs between individuals, makes this other anonymous, *virtual:* his otherness is equaled to that of every possible other. The Other becomes faceless, making it all too easy for me to ignore his demands of justice, and even to exert on him violence just for the sake of legality. The logic of evil, then, becomes not a means but an end in itself**:**21 state violence for the sake of the state’s survival. Hence, the ever-present possibility of the worst takes the form of my unconditional responsibility towards the other being delegated on the ideological and totalitarian institutions of a law gone astray in the (its) logic of self- preserving vengeance. The undecidability of the origin of law, and its consequent meddling all across human affairs makes it possible that the worst could be exerted in the name of law. Even the very notion of crimes against humanity, which seeks to protect the life of the population, can be overlooked by the state if it feels threatened by other states or by its own population.22 From now on, my responsibility towards the Other is taken from me, at the price of my own existence being constantly threatened by the imminent and fatal possibility of being signaled as guilty of an (for me) indeterminate offence. In this picture, the modern state protects my existence while bringing on the terror of state violence – the law infiltrates into and seeks to rule our most private conflicts.

#### our radical dissent is a form of reinscribing the terms of communication which is a precondition to true deliberative democracy—listen close because this card ends the debate

**Livingston 12**—Assistant prof of Government @ Cornell

(Alexander, “Avoiding Deliberative Democracy? Micropolitics, Manipulation, and the Public Sphere”, Philosophy & Rhetoric, Vol. 45, No. 3 (2012), pp. 269-294, dml)

It is important here to stress what a critical theory of deliberative democracy is not.16 It is not the gentlemanly sport of cool, calm, and dispassionate exchange of impartial reasons. It does not depend on the knockdown force of the better argument in a single-round, one-on-one, face-to-face bout of verbal jousting. It is not the reduction of political debate to a matter of logical demonstration. And it is not a clinical exer- cise wherein citizens are extracted from their concrete political world and placed in an artificially domination-free space of the ideal speech situa- tion or deliberative focus group**.** All of these proposals, not to mention others, have been put forward in one form or another under the banner of deliberative democracy.17 If theories of deliberative democracy were limited to these options, Connolly would be right to charge them with an intel- lectualism that ignores the vagaries of lived political praxis. However, a critical theory of deliberative democracy provides both an alternative to this deliberative intellectualism as well as to Connolly’s democratic deficit. The key to this alternative approach to democracy overlooked by both Connolly and these intellectualist theories of deliberation is the complex institution of the public sphere. The public sphere is the decentered network of voluntary associations and media channels that crisscross civil society. It has no center or hub it radiates out of. Rather it is a rhizome in Deleuze and Guattari’s sense of the term: a multiplicity of lively points and intersections that hang together that lacks organization and is not subject to central control. Philippe Mengue makes just this point about the nature of the public sphere when he criticizes Deleuze and Guattari’s antipathy toward the idea of politics as the expression and contestation of public reasons. The public sphere, as he rightly notes, is precisely the kind of deterritorialized plane where movement and becoming can occur.18 Deliberative democracy is a model of democracy that explains how ideas circulate in such a public sphere; that is, how they bump into other ideas, transform them, and become transformed themselves in turn. Key to a critical theory of deliberative democracy is the claim that the exchange of reasons within this rhizomatic public sphere is what Jürgen Habermas calls “subjectless” (1996, 299). A public sphere is always more than the prudential exchange of reasons between two parties, but it is also always less than a self-reflection of a macrosubject capable of action. Rather, it is a complex mediating institution that allows ideas and reasons to become public—that is, it circulates and distributes reasons and ideas beyond the bounds of local conversations, turning them into resources to be drawn on, tested, and sometimes rejected in more local exercises of reason giving. Crucially, the reasons that do all this circulating in the public sphere must be understood in an expansive sense. At the level of democratic the- ory, no one form of discourse has a monopoly on what counts as a reason. Deliberative democracy recognizes diverse forms of communication as reason giving, including storytelling, rhetoric, and greeting. Each has a place in a deliberative politics insofar as it is capable of drawing a connec- tion between a particular claim or experience and a more general and acces- sible norm (Young 2000, 52–80; Dryzek 2000, 57–80). A public reason is always a reason for doing or avoiding doing something. First-person stories like those W. E. B. Du Bois tells in The Souls of Black Folk are vivid depic- tions of the experience of racial oppression, but they function as reasons to a nonblack audience insofar as they aim to open the eyes of white America to the complacency of its commitments to liberty and equality. A public sphere is a site where these sorts of reasons are articulated and take on broader and richer meanings, as they are received by an indefinite audience of strangers.19 The informal and diffuse network of information that spans from labor meetings to church groups to book clubs to blogs to newspapers to PTA meetings and to dissident groups carries our reasons across multiple testing sites where they are subject to uptake, rejection, or transformation, only to be recirculated again. This public exchange of reasons has the important epistemic function of improving the quality of the reasons we use to justify our interests and decisions, but the more crucial function is its critical one. The articulation and contestation of reasons in the public sphere is a motor for self-reflection. It is this function, the self-critical and self-reflection function of exposure to diverse and impersonal reasons in a public sphere, that deliberative democracy values. While the media-saturated public sphere trades in low-involvement advertising and affective manipulation, it also and more importantly can be a means of provoking us to reflect on our received identities and interests.20 These epistemic and critical functions of the public sphere come together to provide a democratic resource for inciting self- and collective transformation in novel and potentially eman- cipatory ways. Seen as a molecular interplay of constantly flowing, shifting, and transforming reasons and self-understandings that provokes new and creative (but reflective) becomings that help us cope with the challenges of political community, the circulation of ordinary talk in the public sphere is Deleuzian. The public sphere is an example of micropolitics par excellence. Once we introduce this institution of the public sphere into the discus- sion, we avail ourselves of a democratic alternative to Connolly’s politics of “cultural-corporeal infusion.” The task of generating resonance for a leftist politics can be divorced from the idea of manipulating visceral responses in favor of a politics that experiments with how reasons resonate in the public sphere, that is, with how they might function to provoke self-reflection. Reasons resonate when they make some claim on the moral and concep- tual imaginary of their audience. That is to say, their resonance is not a feature of their logical structure but rather of the receptivity of the audience to them. A reason resonates when its audience considers it what William James called a “live” hypothesis, “one which appeals as a real possibility to him to whom it is proposed” (1967, 717). Making reasons resonate, however, is the task of activists and social movements who introduce new concerns to the public sphere and rede- scribe acceptable existing practices as oppressive and harmful. To this end, an egalitarian and inclusive public sphere requires the insurgent work of its voluntary associations in the form of “deliberative enclaves” (Mansbridge 1999) or “counterpublics” (Fraser 1992) where dissidents, interests groups, social movements, and the oppressed experiment with novel discourses and redescriptions of the status quo to introduce into the public sphere’s circu- lation. When these experiments in consciousness-raising are successful, as with the feminist movement’s introduction of “date rape,” the queer move- ment’s turn away from civil unions in favor or “gay marriage” and Stephen Colbert’s introduction of “truthiness” into the American political lexicon, the terms of resonance in the public sphere change. Coining terms like “gay marriage” is not the same thing as institutionalizing it, but it does have the effect of redefining the terms of public debate around a now resonant expe- rience of exclusion that had hitherto been simply invisible or erroneously seen as harmless. To put this in the language of Deleuze, deliberative redescription can function as a war machine. The experimenting with resonating reasons in a public on the part of activists is an exercise in “plugging in” a resonance machine into the public sphere. The transformative power of the resonance machine, understood as an inventive redescription of our received practices, has the power to transform the way citizens see their shared world, their own interests, and the suffering of others. The work of counterpublics is to “smooth” the striated space of public political culture so as to displace old prejudices and allow new identities and claims to flourish.

#### They situate decisionmaking in terms of sovereign power—that precludes deliberation and replicates violent preemptive politics

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(Liam, “Securitizing the Future? A Critical Interrogation of the Pre-emptive Turn in the Theory and Practice of Contemporary Security”, Presented at the Canadian Political Science Association Annual Conference Concordia University, Montréal, QC 1-3 June 2010, dml)

A second broader consequence of pre-emptive security that can be extrapolated from the account developed here is the emergence of **a depoliticizing impetus that** significantly curbs the influence **of democratic deliberative forces** on the governance of security. In this regard, the points made in this paper relating to the narrative of imminence that underpins pre-emptive security and the related account of **the “lightning decision”** are of particular import, as they make clear that **the political space for democratic deliberation regarding the governance of security is** diminished **by the adoption of a pre-emptive rationality**. Specifically, there are two related ways in which this is the case. Firstly, under the rationality of pre-emptive security, **any debate as to whether or not to act is** all but preordained, as the narrative of imminent catastrophe that characterizes the logic of pre-emption implies that **action must be taken, regardless of the prevailing uncertainty**. Under such circumstances, “there is little need for public deliberation and debate,” since **the potential imminence of catastrophe suggests that there is no alternative but to act now** (Elmer & Opel 2006: 479).

Secondly, the radical uncertainty against which this imperative emerges unavoidably **locates the basis for the ultimate decision regarding what precisely is to be done** in the realm of the sovereign imagination. This vests in the sovereign decider(s) **a radical decisional subjectivity**, rendering the prospect of democratic deliberation ultimately irrelevant, since the informational basis that frames the terms of the decision **consists of** imagined futures **and** affective facts **that are necessarily** of the sovereign’s own construction. Once again, the façade of (inter)national debate in the lead-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq is perhaps the best illustration of these dual, anti-democratic aspects of preemptive security (see Ehrenberg et al. 2010: passim; Kessler & Daase 2008: 226); although it merits emphasizing once more that such de-politicization is to a significant degree **inherent in the logic of preemption itself** rather than limited to the decisions behind that one particular case. Accordingly, **critical interventions** must remain cognizant **of this process of democratic closure**, while also recognizing that it is at least as much a structural result of the logic of pre-emptive security as it is a specific effect of the idiosyncratic policy decision(s) of a particular governmental authority.

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#### This links to our sovereign decisionmaking disad

**Maggio 7**—University of Florida

(J., “The Presidential Rhetoric of Terror: The (Re)Creation of Reality Immediately after 9/11”, Politics & Policy Volume 35, Issue 4, pages 810–835, December 2007, dml)

Zarefsky's (2004) argument that the president has the power of “definition” should not be taken as the power to “persuade” in the standard way this is understood. Rather, the power lies in setting the limits of debate and/or reality. In fact, Zarefsky agrees with Edwards (2003) that explicit votes or opinions are not often changed by presidential rhetoric. Yet Zarefsky argues that presidential rhetoric has an even more important role: the role to shape reality. On his account, social reality is not a predetermined set of ideas; it is a contingent set of social indicators. In this sense, all people participate in the creation of reality and its political ramifications. This “reality creation” is especially true for the president. Naming a situation provides the basis for understanding it and determining the appropriate response. Because of his prominent political position and his access to the means of communication, the president, by defining a situation, might be able to shape the context in which events or proposals are viewed by the public. (Zarefsky 2004, 611) Social reality is therefore not fixed—especially social reality that is mediated through news outlets and government spokesmen. “Reality” is fluid, and it is often shaped by presidential rhetoric (Miroff 2003, 278-80; Rubenstein 1989). The president's greatest power in shaping reality rests in the power of definition. To “define” something is to set the limits of cognition regarding that concept. Zarefsky (2004, 612) articulates his theory of “definition” in the following way. To choose a definition is, in effect, to plead a cause, as if one were advancing a claim and offering support for it. But no explicit claim is offered and no support is provided. The presidential definition is stipulated, offered as if it were natural and uncontroversial rather than chosen and contestable. Hence, to “define” is to assert without argument that something is “true” or “real.” It is to claim, in a Jeffersonian sense, that such statements are “self-evident.” Of course, at the moment of definition those terms often become the parameters of definition. It is through this moment that the president creates a kind of intellectual sovereignty. As both the chief executive and the national spokesperson, the president occupies a unique position in which to create a moment of singular definition.

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#### No, no, no, no

**Mermet and Castoriadis 11**—French journalist AND dead French philosopher

(Daniel and Cornelius, *Postscript on Insignificancy* pg 8-12, dml)

Daniel Mermet: Why did you choose this title, The Rising Tide of Insignificancy? Is that what characterizes the present era? C.C.: What characterizes the contemporary world is, of course, its crises, its contradictions, its oppositions, its fractures, and so on, but what strikes me above **all is precisely its insignificancy**. Take the quarrel between Right and Left. It has now lost its meaning—not because there would be nothing to fuel a political quarrel, and even a very great political quarrel, but **because both sides are** saying the same thing. Since 1983, the French Socialists have implemented a policy, then Édouard Balladur came in and he implemented the same policy, then the Socialists returned and they implemented with Pierre Bérégovoythe same policy,Balladur returned and he implemented the same policy, Jacques Chirac won the {1995 presidential} elections saying “I am going to do something else” and he implemented the same policy. This distinction is meaningless. D.M.: What are the mechanisms by which this political class is reduced to impotence? That’s the big word today, impotence. C.C.: It’s not a big word, and they are impotent, that’s for sure. The only thing they can do is go with the current, that is to say, apply the ultraliberal policy {in the Continental European sense of conservative ideological advocacy of “free market” policies} that is in fashion. The Socialists haven’t done anything else, and I don’t think that they would do anything else if they returned to power. They aren’t statesmen [politiques], in my opinion, **but politicians**—in the sene of micropoliticians. **They’re people who** chase after votes by any means whatsoever. D.M.: Political marketing, for example? C.C.: Yes, marketing. They have no program. **Their goal is to remain in power or return to power**, and for that end they are capable of anything. Bill Clinton conducted his electoral campaign solely by following the polls: “If Isay this, will it go down well?”—opting each time for what suits public opinion. As another guy said, “I’m their leader, therefore I follow them.” What is fascinating in this era—as 1 in every era, moreover—is how things conspire with one another. There is an intrinsic tie between this sort of nullity of politics, this becoming-null of politics, and this insignificancy in other fields, in the arts, in philosophy, or in literature. That’s the spirit of the times: without any conspiracy on the part of any specific power one could point to, everything conspires together, in the sense of respiring, of breathing, of heading in the same direction, **thereby yielding the same result**, that is to say, insignificancy. D.M.: How is one to do politics? C.C.: Politics is a bizarre craft. Even this kind of politics. Why? Because it presupposes two abilities that have no intrinsic relation. The first is acceding to power. If one does not accede to power, one can have the best ideas in the world, but that’s of no use; there is, therefore, an art of acceding to power. The second ability, once one is in power, is to do something with it, that is to say, govern. Napoleon knew how to govern. Georges Clemenceau knew how to govern. Winston Churchill knew how to govern. Those were people who aren’t in my line of politics, but I am describing here a historical type. Nothing guarantees that someone who knows how to govern would know, for all that, how to accede to power. In absolute monarchy, what was involved in acceding to power? It was to flatter the king; it was to be in the good graces of Madame de Pompadour. Today, in our pseudodemocracy, acceding to power means being telegenic, sniffing out public opinion. **Once in power, what does one do?** What Mr. Chirac is doing today {in 1996}: nothing. **One goes along with the current.** If need be, one switches positions because one glimpses that, in order to accede to power, **one had to tell a bunch of stories and that these stories are inapplicable**. D.M.: You say pseudodemocracy . . . C.C.: I have always thought that so-called representative democracy is not true democracy. Its representatives hardly represent at all the people who elect them. First of all, **they represent** themselves **or represent** special interests**,** lobbies**,** and so on. And even if that weren’t the case, to say that someone is going to represent me for five years {as in France} without being subject to recall boils down to saying that I am stripped of my sovereignty as a people. Jean-Jacques Rousseau already said this: The English believe that they are free because they elect representatives every five years, but **they are free only one day every five years,** on election day**.** 2 And even that isn’t true: the election is rigged. Not that the ballot boxes would be stuffed; it’s rigged because the choices are defined in advance. **No one asked the people what they want to vote on**. They are told, for example: “Vote for or against the Maastricht Treaty.” But who drew up that treaty? It wasn’t us. There is that marvelous phrase from Aristotle in answer to the question of who is a citizen. “A citizen is someone who is capable of governing and being governed.”3 Are there forty million citizens in France at this time? Why wouldn’t they be capable of governing? Because all of political life **aims precisely at making them forget what they’ve learned about governing**. It is aimed at convincing them that there are experts to whom affairs should be entrusted. There is, therefore, political countereducation. While people ought to become accustomed to exercising all sorts of responsibilities and taking initiatives, **they are accustomed to** following the choices others present to them **or voting for such choices**. And as people are far from being idiots, the result is that they believe in it less and less and they become cynical, falling into a sort of political apathy. D.M.: As far as citizen responsibility and the exercise of democracy are concerned, do you think that things were better in the past? Or that elsewhere, today, it’s better than in France? C.C.: No, it’s certainly not better elsewhere today; it can even be worse. Once again, the American elections show that. But in the past, it was better from two standpoints. In modern societies—let’s say, starting from the American and French Revolutions until around World War II —there still was some lively social and political conflict. People rose up in opposition. People demonstrated. They did not demonstrate in favor of this or that line of the national railroad company [de la SNCF]—I’m not saying that that’s contemptible, at least it’s an objective—but in the past workers demonstrated or went on strike for political causes and not just for tiny corporatist interests. There were big issues that concerned all wage earners. Those struggles have left their mark on the past two centuries. Now, what one observes at present is a drop in activity on people’s part. And here we have a vicious circle. The more people withdraw from activity, the more a few bureaucrats, politicians, and socalled responsible officials take over. They have a good justification: “I am taking the initiative because people aren’t doing anything.” And the more those people dominate the situation, the more other people say to themselves, “There’s no point in joining in; there are enough who are involved; and, in any case, nothing can be done.” That’s the first standpoint. The second standpoint, which is connected with the first one, involves the breakdown of the great political ideologies. I’m talking about either revolutionary ideologies or truly reformist ideologies, **the ones that really wanted to change things in society**. For a thousand and one reasons, those ideologies have been discredited; they have ceased to correspond to the era, to people’s aspirations, to the societal situation, and to historical experience. There was this huge event that is the collapse of the Soviet Union and Communism. Can you point out to me a single person, among the politicians—not to mention the political wheeler-dealers [politicards]—on the Left who **would have truly reflected on what happened** and on the reasons why it happened, and who, as is stupidly said, has drawn some lessons from it? And yet a development of this sort, in its initial phase—the rise of this monstrosity, totalitarianism, the Gulag, etc.—and then in its collapse, **merited some very in-depth reflection**, as well as a conclusion, about what a movement aimed at changing society can do, is to do, is not to do, and cannot do. No reflection at all! How then do you want what is called the people, the masses, **to arrive at its own conclusions when** it is not truly enlightened?

#### Timeframe based try or die calculations justify the invocation of speed as a political ontology, which destroys their ability to limit war powers.

Vivian 13. Bradford Vivian, Professor of Communication and Rhetorical Studies at Syracuse University, “Times of Violence,” Quarterly Journal of Speech Published online: 27 Mar 2013 pg. 1

The ways that authoritative institutions invoke and order time as a means of consolidating and expressing power often engender violence. Conflicting interpreta- tions of holy writ and spiritual obligation have incited bloody religious persecutions and armed conflicts for centuries. Slavoj Zizek contends that secular (not only religious) regimes justify radical police or military action by invoking apocalyptic senses of time: ‘‘Apocalyptic time is the time of the end of time, the time of emergency, of the state of exception when the end is nigh.’’2 States of exception in liberal-democratic nations are also times of exception: executive authorities exercise unprecedented forms of violence both within and without national borders by citing as justification allegedly temporary episodes of state emergency.3

#### The invocation of speed causes thermonuclear war and all aff impacts.

Kellner 08. Douglas Kellner, professor of philosophy at UCLA, "Preface The Ideology of HIgh-Tech/Postmodern War vs. the Reality of Messy Wars." <http://gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/essays/2008_Kellner_MessyWarPreface_ver29052008FINAL.pdf>

Hence, phenomenal new military technologies are being produced in the Third Millennium, described as the instruments of an emergent postmodern warfare, and envisaged earlier by Philip K. Dick and other SF writers. These military technologies, described in Messy Wars, are changing the nature of warfare and are part of a turbulent technological revolution with wide-ranging effects. They are helping to engender a novel type of highly intense "hyperwar," cyberwar, or technowar, where technical systems make military decisions and humans are put out of the loop, or are forced to make instant judgments based on technical data. As computer programs displace military planners and computer simulations supplant charts and maps of the territory, technology supersedes humans in terms of planning, decision making and execution. On the level of the battlefield itself, human power is replaced by machines, reducing the soldier to a cog in a servomechanism. These developments are alarming and led French theorist Paul Virilio (1989, 84) to comment in War and Cinema: The disintegration of the warrior's personality is at a very advanced stage. Looking up, he sees the digital display (optoelectronic or holographic) of the windscreen collimator; looking down, the radar screen, the onboard computer, the radio and the video screen, which enables him to follow the terrain with its four or five simultaneous targets; and to monitor his selfnavigating Sidewinder missiles fitted with a camera of infra-red guidance system. The autonomization of warfare and ongoing displacement of humans by technology creates the specter of technology taking over and the possibility of military accidents, leading to, Virilio warns us, the specter of global catastrophe. There is a fierce argument raging in military circles between those who want to delegate more power and fighting to the new "brilliant" weapons opposed to those who want to keep human operators in charge of technical systems. Critics of cyberwar worry that as technology supplants human beings, taking humans out of decision-making loops, the possibility of accidental firing of arms at inappropriate targets and even nuclear war increases. Since the 1980s, Virilio criticized the accelerating speed of modern technology and indicated how it was producing developments that were spinning out of control, and that, in the case of military technology, could lead to the end of the human race (see Virilio and Lotringer’s Pure War 1983). For Virilio, the acceleration of events, technological development, and speed in the current era unfolds such that "the new war machine combines a double disappearance: the disappearance of matter in nuclear disintegration and the disappearance of places in vehicular extermination" (Virilio 1986: 134). The increased pace of destruction in military technology is moving toward the speed of light with laser weapons and computer-governed networks constituting a novelty in warfare in which there are no longer geostrategic strongpoints since from any given spot we can now reach any other, creating "a strategy of Brownian movement through geostrategic homogenization of the globe" (Virilio 1986: 135). Thus, "strategic spatial miniaturization is now the order of the day," with microtechnologies transforming production and communication, shrinking the planet, and preparing the way for what Virilio calls "pure war," a situation where military technologies and an accompanying technocratic system come to dominate every aspect of life. In Virilio's view, the war machine is the demiurge of technological growth and an ultimate threat to humanity, producing "a state of emergency" where nuclear holocaust threatens the very survival of the human species. This consists of a shift from a "geo-politics" to a "chrono-politics," from a politics of space to a politics of time, in which whoever commands the means of instant information, communication, and destruction is a dominant sociopolitical force. For Virilio, every technological system contains its specific form of accident and a nuclear accident would be catastrophic. Hence, in the contemporary era, in which weapons of mass destruction could create an instant world holocaust, we are thrust into a permanent state of emergency with hightech networks that enables military state to impose its imperatives on ever more domains of political and social life, as shown in Messy Wars’ chapter 3 about war environment.

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#### They say economic rationality etc is productive, that’s uniquely debilitating

**Bifo 11** – Whit Whitmore’s pen name

(Franco “Bifo” Berardi, *After the Future* pg 64-66 (of my copy), dml)

Economics became a science when, with the expansion of capitalism, rules were established as general principles for productive activity and exchange. But if we want these rules to function we must be able to quantify the basic productive act. The time-atom described by Marx is the keystone of modern economics. Calculating the time necessary for the production of a commodity makes possible the regulation of the entire set of economic relations. But when the main element in the global productive cycle is the unforeseeable work of the mind, the unforeseeable work of language, when self-reproducing information becomes the universal commodity, it is no longer possible to reduce the totality of exchanges and relations to an economic rule. Drucker continues: In any system as complex as the economy of a developed country, the statistically insignificant events, the events at the margin, are likely to be the decisive events, short range at least. By definition they can neither be anticipated nor prevented. Indeed, they cannot always be identified even after they have had their impact. (Drucker 1989: 166) Economic science is founded on a quantitative and mechanistic paradigm that could comprehend and regulate industrial production, the physical manipulation of mechanical matter, but is unable to explain and regulate the process of immaterial production based on an activity that can’t easily be reduced to quantitative measurements and the repetition of constants: mental activity. Due to the new technologies, Jacques Robin (1989: 39) explains how even the concept of productivity fails to resist the challenge raised by the new realities like growth without job creation. With the new technologies the majority of production costs are determined by research and equipment expenses that actually precede the productive process. Little by little, in digitalized and automated enterprises, production is no longer subjected to the variations concerning the quantity of operational factors. Marginal cost, marginal profits: these bases of neoclassical economic calculations have lost a good part of their meaning. The traditional elements of salary and price calculation are crumbling down. Mental work is not computable in precise and predictable terms like the work performed by an industrial worker. Therefore, the determination of value – the keystone of classical economy both as a science and as daily economic practice – becomes aleatory and indefinable. “Realist” economies (the economies based on the relationship to a computable amount of labor time) were governed by their goals: a naïve goal of producing use value for the satisfaction of specific needs, or a subtler goal of valorization as the increase of invested capital. Now, instead, it is impossible to explain our economies on the basis of their goals, whether we identify them with the intentions of certain individuals or certain groups or with the goals of an entire society. The economy is governed by a code, not by its goals: Finality is there in advance, inscribed in the code. The order of goals has simply ceded its place to a molecular play, as the order of signified has yielded to the play of infinitesimal signifiers, reduced to their aleatory commutation. (Baudrillard 1993a: 59) In Baudrillard’s vision, the economy therefore appears as a hyperreality, a simulated, double, and artificial world that cannot be translated in terms of real production. Consequently, economic science can no longer explain the fundamental dynamics governing humanity’s productive activities; nor can it explain their crisis. Economics has to be replaced by a global science whose characteristics and field of inquiry are still unknown: a science that would be able to study the processes of formation of Cyberspace, i.e. the global network of signs-commodities.