#### Every day, each and every one of us participates in a war which consists of endless genocide of the non-human. This violence is rendered imperceptible by a normative understanding of war that excuses violence against the non-human as legitimate.

**Kochi 9** - Sussex Law School, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK (Tarik, “Species War: Law, Violence and Animals,” SAGE Journals)

7. The idea that war and violence sits at the foundation of law and operates creatively has been expressed in differing ways by Heraclitus, Machiavelli, Hegel, Freud and Walter Benjamin. Here, I am merely taking this insight and developing it by reflecting upon the primary role played by human violence carried out against non-human animals. the protagonist Elizabeth Costello draws a comparison between the everyday slaughter of non-human animals and the genocide of the Jews of Europe during the twentieth century. “In addressing you on the subject of animals,” she continues, “I will pay you the honour of skipping a recital of the horrors of their lives and deaths. Though I have no reason to believe that you have at the forefront of your minds what is being done to animals at this moment in production facilities (I hesitate to call them farms any longer), in abattoirs, in trawlers, in laboratories, all over the world, I will take it that you concede me the rhetorical power to evoke these horrors and bring them home to you with adequate force, and leave it at that, reminding you only that the horrors I here omit are nevertheless at the center of this lecture.” 9

A little while later she states: “Let me say it openly: we are surrounded by an enterprise of degradation, cruelty, and killing which rivals anything that the Third Reich was capable of, indeed dwarfs it, in that ours is an enterprise without end, self-regenerating, bringing rabbits, rats, poultry, livestock ceaselessly into the world for the purpose of killing them.” “And to split hairs, to claim that there is no comparison, that Treblinka was so to speak a metaphysical enterprise dedicated to nothing but death and annihilation while the meat industry is ultimately devoted to life (once its victims are dead, after all, it does not burn them to ash or bury them but on the contrary cuts them up and refrigerates and packs them so that they can be consumed in the comfort of our own homes) is as little consolation to those victims as it would have been – pardon the tastelessness of the following – to ask the dead of Treblinka to excuse their killers because their body fat was needed to make soap and their hair to stuff mattresses with.” Similar comparisons have been made before. Yer, when most of us think about the term “war” very seldom do we bother to think about non-human. A great deal of the contemporary discussion about the moral standing of animals and their treatment is owed to the work of Peter Singer. The purpose of my article is not to directly contribute to this debate. Rather, my focus is upon attempting to re-think some of the conceptual foundations of the Law of war by drawing the status of animal slaughter back into our legal categoryies. For this reason I will not attempt to discuss or survey the many arguments about the moral standing of non-human animals but will keep to a more historical, and perhaps sociological, discussion of the Law of war.

The term war commonly evokes images of states, armies, grand weapons, battle lines, tactical stand-offs, and maybe even sometimes guerrilla or partisan violence. Surely the keeping of cattle behind barbed wire fences and butchering them in abattoirs does not count as war? Surely not? Why not? What can be seen to be at stake within Elizabeth Costello’s act of posing the modern project of highly efficient breeding and factory slaughtering of non-human animals beside the Holocaust is a concern with the way in which we order or arrange conceptually and socially the legitimacy of violence and killing. In a “Western” philosophical tradition stretching at least from Augustine and Aquinas, through to Descartes and Kant, the ordering of the relationship between violence and legitimacy is such that, predominantly, non-human animals are considered to be without souls, without reason and without a value that is typically ascribed to humans. For example, for Augustine, animals, together with plants, are exempted from the religious injunction “Thou shalt not kill.” When considering the question of what forms of killing and violence are legitimate, Augustine placed the killing of non-human animals well inside the framework of religious and moral legitimacy. 12

Of relevance is the practice by which the question of legitimate violence is ordered – that is, the manner in which it is organised by philosophical, moral and cultural justifications in a way that sets out how particular acts of violence are to be understood within social-material life. Within a Western tradition the killing of animals is typically not considered a form of war because violence against animals is placed far within the accepted framework of legitimate killing. 12. Augustine, City of God against the Pagans, Dyson, R.W. tr. ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 33, I, 21. This account expresses a particular religious-cultural form of valuing the lives of non-human animals in which non-human animals are placed below humans on a Judeo-Christian and Islamic cosmic hierarchy of creation. While there are other differing cosmic conceptions, such as those found within Hinduism and Buddhism and within various indigenous cosmologies within North America and Australia and within radical utilitarian conceptions expressed by Bentham and Peter Singer focused upon “suffering,” the model of a Judeo-Christian and Islamic hierarchy of creation remains dominant within “Western” (or North Atlantic) culture and its conceptions of law. Such a hierarchy of value is further backed in the West, in differing ways, by the secular cosmology of the theory of evolution, and scientific claims about the higher mental capacities of humans over the bulk of non-human animals. Owing to these hierarchies, for Western legal systems “animal rights” still stand far below and have not been extended from human rights and while the notion of human dignity takes centre stage, notions of “animal dignity” stand at the periphery. On various approaches to the extension of moral standing to non-human animals see: Bentham, J. Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Burns, J.H. and Hart, H.L.A. eds. ( London: Methuen, 1982); Singer, P. Animal Liberation (New York: Random House, 1975); Regan, T. “The Case for Animal Rights” in Singer, P. ed. In Defence of Animals (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985); Clarke, S.R.L. The Moral Standing of Animals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977); Hursthouse, R. Ethics, Humans and Other Animals ( London: Routledge, 2000).

#### This Western conception of war is grounded upon a hierarchy of values that regards nonhuman life as raw material for the preservation of human life.

**Kochi 9** - Sussex Law School, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK (Tarik, “Species War: Law, Violence and Animals,” SAGE Journals)

The response of the lawyer, international lawyer, politician or philosopher to the account so far might be to say that this is all very interesting but that it still has little to do with “war.” Such figures might still argue that the term “war” refers to something carried out by states and governed by “national interest,” or guided by moral ideals like freedom and human rights, or by international law. This response, however, overlooks the way in which the typical and everyday use of the term war is itself conceptually and  historically ordered in a practice that differentially values forms of life. In what follows I look more closely at how arguments about legitimate violence within two contemporary conceptions or discourses of the law of war are ordered and of how this ordering is related to the foundational moment of species war. The dominant Western conceptions of the law of war rest upon two major conceptual and historical “foundations.” The first involves the way in which the monopoly upon the legitimacy of violence is vested in the sovereignty of the state and grounded upon the principles of preservation of life, domestic peace and security from external threat. This form which sometimes expresses a reason of state or national interest approach to questions of war is often called the Westphalian system of international relations and is ambiguously historically linked to the Peace of Westphalia (1648). The second dominant narrative or form of thinking about the laws of war is represented by contemporary international humanitarian law. This approach grounds the legitimacy of war upon the maintenance of peace and  security between nations bound together with the concern for the protection of human rights and the prevention of human rights abuses, war crimes and genocide via the establishment of the United Nations (1945). While this mode of thinking about war inherits much from the Westphalian system, it is historically grounded upon an international response to “world war” and the genocide of European Jews. The natural law theories of Hugo Grotius and Thomas Hobbes are often viewed as laying down the theoretical justifications for the  modern secular state, the legitimacy of sovereign violence, and the Westphalian international order. Within the context of bloody intra-state civil wars such as the Thirty Years War (1618–48) and moments of domestic chaos such as the English Civil War (1642–51) thinkers such as Grotius and Hobbes reacted to widespread social violence often motivated by actors party to differing Christian confessions all claiming adherence to a universal  religious, moral or political truth. Grotius and Hobbes, albeit in different ways, responded by producing a de-sacralized natural law that was grounded not upon  theological conceptions of right and justice but upon more earthly, “secular,” concepts of the preservation of human life and survival. For these thinkers the chaos of civil war and intra-state civil war could be nullified if the criteria of what counted as legitimate violence were determined by an institution that guaranteed peace and security. Roughly, Grotius and Hobbes attempted to theoretically re-order  territory and space around the figure of sovereignty and inter-sovereign relations. The legitimacy of human violence is no longer grounded upon a universal conception of divine authority but is instead located around the figure and office of the sovereign who maintains peace and security over a particular, limited territory. Such an approach to the chaos of civil war can be termed the juridical ordering of the concept of war. This de-legitimisation of the right to private violence in the name of peace  creates what Max Weber later describes as the “state’s monopoly upon the legitimacy of violence.” Modern war, juridically ordered, takes on the definition of a form of violence waged between sovereigns, who hold a particular status. By this definition violence carried out by the state against a non-sovereign group is excluded from the language of “war proper” as is private violence (including rebellion, sabotage and terrorism) which is defined as crime.Grotius and Hobbes are sometimes described as setting out a prudential approach, or a natural law of minimal content because in contrast to Aristotelian or Thomastic legal and political theory their attempt to derive the legitimacy of the state and sovereign order relies less upon a thick conception of the good life and is more focussed upon basic human needs such as survival. In the context of a response to religious civil war such an approach made sense in that often thick moral and religious conceptions of the good life (for example, those held by competing Christian Confessions) often drove conflict and violence. Yet, it would be a mistake to assume that the categories of “survival,” “preservation of life” and “bare life” are neutral categories. Rather survival, preservation of life and bare life as expressed by the Westphalian theoretical tradition already contain distinctions of value – in particular, the specific distinction of value between human and non-human life. “Bare life” in this sense is not “bare” but contains within it a distinction of value between the worth of human life placed above and beyond the worth of non-human animal life. In this respect bare life within this tradition contains within it a hidden conception of the good life. The foundational moment of the modern juridical conception of the law of war already contains within it the operation of species war. The Westphalian tradition puts itself forward as grounding the legitimacy of violence upon the preservation of life, however its concern for life is already marked by a hierarchy of value in which non-human animal life is violently used as the “raw material” for preserving human life. Grounded upon, but concealing the human-animal distinction, the Westphalian  conception of war makes a double move: it excludes the killing of animals from its definition of “war **proper,” and**, **through rendering dominant the modern** juridical **definition of “war** proper” the tradition **is able to** further institutionalize and **normalize a particular conception** of the good life. Following from this original distinction of life-value realized through the juridical language of war were other forms of human life whose lives were considered to be of a lesser value under a European, Christian, “secular” natural law conception of the good life. Underneath this concern with the preservation of life in general stood veiled preferences over what particular forms of life (such as racial conceptions of human life) and ways of living were worthy of preservation, realization and elevation. The business contracts of early capitalism, the power of white males over women and children, and, especially in the colonial context, the sanctity of European life over non-European and Christian lives over non-Christian heathens and Muslims, were some of the dominant forms of life preferred for preservation within the early modern juridical ordering of war.

#### The move to exclude specieist exploitation as war is the same move by other historical acts of genocide. Our affirmative demands recognition of this unending violence as war.

**Kochi 9** - Sussex Law School, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK (Tarik “Species War: Law, Violence and Animals”

The meanings attached to the words we use are significant here. Many of our linguistic categories have been formulated along the distinction between human and non-human and offer different meanings based upon what object within this distinction a word denotes. Words like “killing” and “slaughter” evoke different meanings and different responseswhen applied to humans as opposed to chickens or cattle or insects. While most people would react in horror to the brutal killing of a child, they accept the daily slaughter of thousands of calves. Although there exists a bureaucratic language of regulation governing issues of efficiency, property rights, hygiene and cruelty, the breeding of animals for killing is widely accepted as a legitimate act. Such that, the killing of one animal is not considered murder and the killing of a geographical group of animals is not considered an act of genocide or species war. Yet, this ordering of the legitimacy of violence is not in anyway natural and eternal. Rather, it is contingent and both historically and cosmically temperamental. Consider a hypothetical situation where a group of “aliens” emerged from deep space with forms of technology that far surpassed our own and possessed levels of intelligence that humans could not imagine. These aliens considered humans to be without souls, they considered humans to be so devoid of reason that they made no effort to communicate with us. Our behaviour and language appeared to them just as the movements of ants, the song of birds, and the efforts of chimpanzees appear to us. Further, these aliens cared little for human suffering. If these aliens decided to enslave and breed humans for food, would this be an act of species war? Even if humans rallied together, Hollywood style, (or, like a swarm of bees protecting their hive) and called this an act of “war,” might not the aliens simply laugh, or grumble about how their new animals struggle and go on to devise new methods of capture and killing so that we humans might not bruise our flesh.13

While such an example appears at first bizarre, it is not out of the range of future possibility. Further, the example draws upon an already present heritage of anthropological, racial and colonial forms of thinking belonging to many Western traditions in which acts of violence were legitimised historically by those in positions of power and often never officially called “war.” Aspects of this historical comparison are made by Elizabeth Costello – the Nazi portrayal of Jews as “animals” playing a role in both 13. Similar hypothetical situations have been imagined within numerous science fiction stories in popular culture, most notably: Wells, H.G. The War of the Worlds (London: Heinemann, 1973). Wells makes the link between war, colonialism and the destruction of non-human animal life. At p. 4 he states:

And before we judge them too harshly, we must remember what ruthless and utter destruction our own species has wrought, not only upon animals, such as the vanished bison and the dodo, but upon its own inferior races. The Tasmanians, in spite of their human likeness, were entirely swept out of existence in a war of extermination waged by European immigrants in the space of fifty years. Are we such apostles of mercy as to complain if the Martians warred in the same spirit.

“ ‘They went like sheep to the slaughter.’ ‘They died like animals.’ ‘The Nazi butchers killed them.’ Denunciation of the camps reverberates so fully with the language of the stockyard and slaughterhouse that it is barely necessary for me to prepare the ground for the comparison I am about to make. The crime of the Third Reich, says the voice of accusation, was to treat people like animals.” 14

#### Voting affirmative acknowledges the existence of the war against the nonhuman. We must reject the hierarchy of the human/nonhuman and reject the notion of legitimate violence.

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Although species war remains largely hidden because it is not seen as war or even violence at all it continues to affect the ways in which juridical mechanisms order the legitimacy of violence. While species war may not be a Western monopoly, in this account I will only examine a Western variant. This variant, however, is one that may well have been imposed upon the rest of the world through colonization and globalization. In what will follow I offer a sketch of species war and show how the juridical mechanisms for determining what constitutes legitimate violence fall back upon the hidden foundation of species war. I try to do this by showing that the various modern juridical mechanisms for determining what counts as legitimate violence are dependent upon a practice of judging the value of forms of life. I argue that contemporary claims about the legitimacy of war are based upon judgements about differential life-value and that these judgements are an extension of an original practice in which the legitimacy of killing is grounded upon the valuation of the human above the non-human. Further, by giving an overview of the ways in which our understanding of the legitimacy of war has changed, I attempt to show how the notion of species war has been continually excluded from the Law of war and of how contemporary historical movements might open a space for its possible re-inclusion. In this sense, the argument I develop here about species war offers a particular way of reflecting upon the nature of law more generally. In a Western juridical tradition, two functions of law are often thought to be: the establishment of order (in the context of the preservation of life, or survival); and, the realization of justice (a thick conception of the “good”). Reflecting upon these in light of the notion of species war helps us to consider that at the heart of both of these functions of law resides a practice of making judgements about the life-value of particular “objects.” These objects are, amongst other things: human individuals, groups of humans, non-human animals, plants, transcendent entities and ideas (the “state,” “community,” etc.). For the law, the practice of making judgements about the relative life- value of objects is intimately bound-up with the making of decisions about what objects can be killed. Within our Western conception of the law it is difficult to separate the moment of judgement over life-value from the decision over what constitutes “legitimate violence.” Species war sits within this blurred middle-ground between judgement and decision – it points to a moment at the heart of the law where distinctions of value and acts of violence operate as fundamental to the founding or positing of law. The primary violence of species war then takes place not as something after the establishment of a regime of law (i.e., after the establishment of the city, the state, or international law). Rather, the violence of species war occurs at the beginning of law, at its moment of foundation, as a generator, as a motor. 7

#### Our affirmative is an act of assuming a traitorous identity. The dynamics of different forms of privilege posits us all as in positions of both the oppressor and oppressed. In the species war, we are all human oppressors that are complicit in a cycle of tortuous violence. The only feasible solution for the nonhuman is to work against the structures of your own culture. This does not mean we deny our identities or claim unity with the oppressed, but it does mean that we adopt an ethic that attempts to end our own domination.

**Plumwood 2 –** (Val, “Environmental Ethics”, p.205-6)

There are, I have suggested, multiple bases for critical solidarity with nature. One important critical basis can be understanding that certain human societies position humans as oppressors of non-human nature, treating humans as a privileged group which defines the non-human nature, in terms of roles that closely parallel our own roles as recipients of oppression within human dominance orders. Our grasp of these parallels may be based upon imaginative or narrative transpositions into locations paralleling that of the oppressed non-human other: artistic representation has an important place in helping us make such transpositions. Literature has often played such a transposing role historically, especially in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, in relation to the class system, slavery, women’s oppression, and animal oppression. In recent decades science fiction narrative that imaginatively position humans as colonized or exploited reductively as food by alien invaders have provided very powerful vehicles for such imaginative transpositions into a place that parallels that of the non-human food animal. So have those cartoonists whose ‘absurd’ humour depends upon exploiting parallels in the condition of the human and non-human oppressed. A chicken coming from a human house carrying a baby passes a women coming from a chicken coop carrying a basket of eggs, for example. A Larson elephant is outraged when he notices the ivory notes on a piano keyboard at an interspecies party and makes the connection to the fate of his own kind. The leap of recognition that is often described and explained in terms of an unanalysed and capricious emotion of ‘empathy’ or ‘sympathy’ is often better understood in terms of a concept of solidarity that is based on an intellectual and emotional grasp of the parallels in the logic of the One and the Other. Since most people suffer from some form of oppression within some dominance order or other, there is a widespread basis for the recognition that we are positioned multiply as oppressors or colonizers just as we are positioned multiply as oppressed and colonized. This recognition that one is an oppressor as well as an oppressed can be developed in certain cirvumstances to become the basis for the critical ‘traitorous identity’ which analyses, opposes and actively works against those structures of one’s own culture or group that keep the Other in an oppressed position. Traitorous kinds of human identity involve a revised conception of the self and its relation to the non-human other, opposition to oppressive practices, and the abandonment and critique of cultural allegiances to the dominance of the human species and its bonding against non-humans, in the same way that male feminism requires abandonment and critique of male bonding as the kind of male solidarity that defines itself in opposition to the feminine or to women, and of the ideology of male supremacy. These ‘traitorous identities’ that enable some men to be male feminists in active opposition to androcentric culture, some whites to be actively in opposition to white supremacism and ethnocentric culture, also enable some humans to be critical of ‘human supremacism’ and in active opposition to anthropocentric culture. “Traitorous’ identities do not appear by chance, but are usually considerable political and personal achievements in integrating reason and emotion; they speak of the traitor’s own painful self-reflection as well as efforts of understanding that have not flinched away from contact with the pain of oppressed others. What makes such traitorous identities possible is precisely the fact that the relationship between the oppressed and the ‘traitor’ is not one of identity, that the traitor is critical of his or her own ‘oppressor’ group as someone from within that group who has some knowledge of its workings and its effects on the life of the oppressed group. It depends on the traitor being someone with a view from both sides, able to adopt multiple perspectives and locations that enable an understanding how he or she is situated in the relationship with the other from the perspective of both kinds of lives, the life of the One and the live of the Other. Being a human who takes responsibility for their interspecies location in this way requires avoiding both the arrogance of reading in your own location and perspective as that of the other, and the arrogance of assuming that you can ‘read as the Other’ know their lives as they do, and in that sense speak or see as the other. Such a concept of solidarity as involving multiple positioning and perspectives can exploit the logic of the gap between contradictory positions and narratives standpoint theory applies to. The traitorous identity implies a certain kind of ethics of support relations which is quite **distinct from the ethics involved in claiming unity**. It stresses a number of counter-hegemonic virtues, ethical stances with can help to minimize the influence of the oppressive ideologies of domination and self-imposition that have formed our conceptions of both the other and ourselves. As we have seen, important among these virtues are listening and attentiveness to the other, a stance which can help counter the backgrounding which obscures and denies what the non-human other contributes to our lives and collaborative ventures. They also include philosophical strategies and methodologies that maximize our sensitivity to other members of our ecological communities and openness to them as ethically considered beings in their own right, rather than ones that minimize ethical recognition or that adopt a dualistic stance of ethical closure that insists on sharp moral boundaries and denies the continuity of planetary life. Openness and attentiveness are among the communicative virtues we have already discussed; more specifically, they mean giving the other’s needs and agency attention, being open to unanticipated possibilities and aspects of the other, reconceiving and re-encountering the other as a potentially communicative and agentic being, as well as ‘an independent creature of value and originator of projects that demand my respect’. A closely allied stance, as Anthony Weston points out, is that of invitation, which risks an offering of relationship to the other in a more or less open-ended way.

#### Now, we must accept the fact that the human itself is an ethically bankrupt subject.

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The global suicide of humanity

How might such a standpoint of dialectical, utopian anti-humanism reconfigure a notion of action which does not simply repeat in another way the modern humanist infliction of violence, as exemplified by the plan of Hawking, or fall prey to institutional and systemic complicity in speciesist violence? While this question goes beyond what it is possible to outline in this paper, we contend that the thought experiment of global suicide helps to locate this question--the question of modern action itself--as residing at the heart of the modern environmental problem. In a sense perhaps the only way to understand what is at stake in ethical action which responds to the natural environment is to come to terms with the logical consequences of ethical action itself. The point operates then not as the end, but as the starting point of a standpoint which attempts to reconfigure our notions of action, life-value, and harm. For some, guided by the pressure of moral conscience or by a practice of harm minimisation, the appropriate response to historical and contemporary environmental destruction is that of action guided by abstention. For example, one way of reacting to mundane, everyday complicity is the attempt to abstain or opt-out of certain aspects of modern, industrial society: to not eat non-human animals, to invest ethically, to buy organic produce, to not use cars and buses, to live in an environmentally conscious commune. Ranging from small personal decisions to the establishment of parallel economies (think of organic and fair trade products as an attempt to set up a quasi-parallel economy), a typical modern form of action is that of a refusal to be complicit in human practices that are violent and destructive. Again, however, at a practical level, to what extent are such acts of nonparticipation rendered banal by their complicity in other actions? In a grand register of violence and harm the individual who abstains from eating non-human animals but still uses the bus or an airplane or electricity has only opted out of some harm causing practices and remains fully complicit with others. One response, however, which bypasses the problem of complicity and the banality of action is to take the non-participation solution to its most extreme level. In this instance, the only way to truly be non-complicit in the violence of the human heritage would be to opt-out altogether. Here, then, the modern discourse of reflection, responsibility and action runs to its logical conclusion--the global suicide of humanity--as a free-willed and 'final solution'. While we are not interested in the discussion of the 'method' of the global suicide of humanity per se, one method that would be the least violent is that of humans choosing to no longer reproduce. [10] The case at point here is that the global suicide of humanity would be a moral act; it would take humanity out of the equation of life on this earth and remake the calculation for the benefit of everything nonhuman. While suicide in certain forms of religious thinking is normally condemned as something which is selfish and inflicts harm upon loved ones, the global suicide of humanity would be the highest act of altruism. That is, global suicide would involve the taking of responsibility for the destructive actions of the human species. By eradicating ourselves we end the long process of inflicting harm upon other species and offer a human-free world. If there is a form of divine intelligence then surely the human act of global suicide will be seen for what it is: a profound moral gesture aimed at redeeming humanity. Such an act is an offer of sacrifice to pay for past wrongs that would usher in a new future. Through the death of our species we will give the gift of life to others. It should be noted nonetheless that our proposal for the global suicide of humanity is based upon the notion that such a radical action needs to be voluntary and not forced. In this sense, and given the likelihood of such an action not being agreed upon, it operates as a thought experiment which may help humans to radically rethink what it means to participate in modern, moral life within the natural world. In other words, whether or not the act of global suicide takes place might well be irrelevant. What is more important is the form of critical reflection that an individual needs to go through before coming to the conclusion that the global suicide of humanity is an action that would be worthwhile. The point then of a thought experiment that considers the argument for the global suicide of humanity is the attempt to outline an anti-humanist, or non-human-centric ethics. Such an ethics attempts to take into account both sides of the human heritage: the capacity to carry out violence and inflict harm and the capacity to use moral reflection and creative social organisation to minimise violence and harm. Through the idea of global suicide such an ethics reintroduces a central question to the heart of moral reflection: To what extent is the value of the continuation of human life worth the total harm inflicted upon the life of all others? Regardless of whether an individual finds the idea of global suicide abhorrent or ridiculous, this question remains valid and relevant and will not go away, no matter how hard we try to forget, suppress or repress it.

#### Human reform is impossible, the only feasible strategy is one of unflinching animal liberation

Screaming Wolf ‘91**—**Animal Liberation Front, <http://www.reachoutpub.com/dow.pdf>

These increasingly frustrated individuals examine their assumption that educating the public about what is really happening to the animals will somehow lead to the termination of the cruelty. That assumption demands a faith in the fairness and compassion of human nature that these people no longer take on face value. They begin to question whether showing people movies and photos of monkeys with electrodes in their heads, or wolves caught by steel-jaw leghold traps, or calves immobilized in dark, claustrophobic veal crates, or chickens crowded and stressed by factory farm conditions, will motivate the common person to change their consumption patterns and other abusive behaviors. At one time, the common person would hunt, slaughter, skin, and beat animals as a regular part of life. It is an illusion of contemporary society that people today are more compassionate than in that cruel past. Actually, the general public has simply become unaccustomed to killing animals themselves. The dirty work is left to “specialists,” like butchers, trappers, animal researchers, and animal shelter workers. History has shown, however, that humans have an enormous capacity to revert to barbaric behavior at the first sign of potential personal gain. The same insensitivity that allows “specialists” to kill would allow the average person to kill, as well. At the current time, this insensitivity allows people to be comfortable in the knowledge that others are doing the killing for them. If people today are sensitive to pictures of animal abuse, then the interest people have in the products of that abuse will simply cause them to turn away from the pictures, or to accept that such acts against animals are “a necessary evil”. So these developing liberators conclude that, in the long run, showing the public pictures of animal abuse will only further desensitize people to animal suffering. Humans can adapt to all assaults to their sensibilities, especially when they are committed to certain behaviors. They then try to appeal to the public, legislators, product manufacturers, and others in power, through letter writing, boycotts, rallies, demonstrations, and marches. But their efforts get them nowhere. Every small victory is challenged. Despite years of lobbying and writing to Congressmen, the only major legislation passed in recent history for animal protection was the Federal Animal Welfare Act, designed primarily to protect animals exploited in research. Yet, before the ink could dry on the new legislation, animal abusers clamored to water down its already compromised and weakened impact. As a result of lobbying by animal abusers, farm animals are exempt from the act, as are rodents. When you consider that about 90% of animal research is done on rodents, it’s easy to see that the effect of the Act on animal suffering is minimal. Further, any acts of terror can be committed against any and all animals in the name of research, so long as it is deemed “necessary” for the research project. Since farm animals are exempt from the Act, many researchers now target pigs and sheep as totally unprotected subjects. It’s hard to keep a cruel researcher down! The increasingly angry animal defenders passionately hold onto their dubious victories to convince themselves that those victories are substantial and meaningful. They demand to legislators that the Act is enforced, a difficult task since the Department of Agriculture, which is responsible for its enforcement, has too few inspectors, and too little interest, in doing its job. This leads these soon-to-be liberators to the sad realization that laws are only as good as the intent to obey them. Recognizing these failures, they look to other signs of success to bolster their optimism. We see that vegetarianism is more acceptable than before, with more vegetarians in this country than in the past. Further examination reveals that many so called “vegetarians” eat fish and poultry. Almost all of these “vegetarians” eat dairy and/or eggs, which is merely exchanging solid flesh for liquid flesh. At most, only 3% of the population say they are “vegetarians”. When we consider a population of 270,000,000 people, 3% seems a great amount of vegetarians, surely enough to generate a market for special products and magazines. But there are still 262,000,000 people eating animal flesh, and the numbers of animals killed for food continues to increase. Put differently, 97 out of every 100 babies born in this country are being raised as flesh eaters. They turn their attention to the fur issue, an area where they can feel certain success. After all fur is no longer a fashionable commodity. Unfortunately, they discover that fur stores have opened up in Asian countries, so that the industry has simply generated ¶ new markets to replace the old ones it has lost. They also learn that fur is unfashionable primarily in the United States and England, but is still popular in some European countries. And knowing how fashions come and go, these people, increasingly anxious about making a difference for the animals, develop a uneasiness over the current fur taboo, wondering when fur will again become a desirable commodity. Finally, they turn their attention to cosmetic and household product testing on animals. Feeling certain that the general public will never sanction such blatant animal abuse, they boycott the companies selling these products of death. When some of the companies agree to stop animal testing, the animal lovers rejoice at the news. They feel vindicated in their approach of working within the system and fighting with their pocketbooks. To maintain their feeling of success, however, they try to ignore the fact that many of the companies, who say they no longer use animal tests, are farming out the tests to other companies, or are buying animal tested ingredients from suppliers to use in their allegedly cruelty free product line. Eventually, they begin to realize that fighting for the animals is like trying to put out thousands of brush fires. Tremendous effort and time is spent focusing on one fire, which may or may not be extinguished, while ten others are being started. It is a never ending battle fighting this way. And it is a losing proposition. Eventually, these animal extremists step back from the smoky field, and reflect on the causes of the fires. If they can eliminate some of the causes, they conclude, then they wouldn’t have to fight so many flames. In short, these people move towards greater and greater extremism as they find all their efforts to help the animals frustrated by the abusive system with which they are fighting. They examine and question all their assumptions and approaches, and for once they feel that they are really beginning to get in touch with the depth of the problem, and with possible solutions. Finally, they come up with bold, revolutionary ideas. In fact, they conclude that a revolution is essential for freeing the animals. Let me summarize this conclusion of people who have come to call themselves animal liberators. It will be direct, challenging, uncompromising, and frightening to all animal abuser and others invested in the system. Liberators believe in killing humans to save animals! If an animal researcher said: “It’s a dog or a child,” a liberator will defend the dog every time. A liberator also believes that disposing of a few researchers will save even more dogs from their cruelty. THE LIBERATORS 9 Liberators have come to one unavoidable conclusion: HUMANS WILL NEVER MAKE PEACE WITH ANIMALS! It is not in their natures or in the natures of the societies they have created. In fact, liberators believe that if people really want to save the animals, they must stop wasting their time trying to improve the human race and its societies. They must declare war against humans. They must join in this revolution! Liberators believe this is the only logical, consistent, and morally correct conclusion stemming from a true belief that animals should be free to live their lives unshackled from human exploitation. They believe that the nature of human society and its laws are implicitly and irrevocably immoral. Liberators are people of conscience who feel morally obligated to break those laws and revolt against this oppressive regime. But this revolution by liberators will not be like any other in the history of the world. Normally, revolutions seek to gain privileges within society for a disenfranchised group of people. The civil rights movement, for example, was dedicated to gaining protection and enforcement of those rights blacks were assured in the Constitution since the Civil War. It was a movement forinclusion in society. The same thing goes for the gay rights movement, or the feminist movement. The liberation movement to end animal exploitation is nothing like these others, as the liberators see it. And according to them, this difference has made the struggle for freedom for animals, as it has been practiced to this day, to be nothing more than an impotent whimper in the face of gross inhumanity. Liberators feel this movement demands a different approach because human groups fight for inclusion. The movement to free animals must fight for exclusion. Oppressed people want to be accepted as equals into society. Oppressed animals want to be left alone by society.1 This difference, according to liberators, dictates different strategies for the animal rights activist than for any other social reformer. For one thing, it makes non-violent tactics, as modeled by Gandhi or King, inappropriate. Liberators believe that only physical harm will dissuade people from abusing animals. Their message is not simply that we should shoot hunters, kill vivisectors, trap trappers, and butcher butchers in order to free the animals. They believe we are morally justified in doing these things, and that we must do it to free some animals. But liberators do not believe that it will change the world and result in the freedom of all animals. Liberators hold that nothing will result in the freedom of all animals, short of the extinction of human species. People will abuse other creatures so long as the human species exists. This is an observation liberators base on human nature, and they believe human nature is not about to change. Liberators are not simply pessimists in making this statement. To them, it is a realistic appraisal of the history of human blood lust and speciesism. It is their bold acceptance of what they feel many people really know deep in their hearts. But liberators expect few people will acknowledge what they feel in their hearts. Who wants to accept the fact that their efforts and hopes are useless? The liberators feel it’s time for animal defenders, and those concerned about the environment, to open their eyes and admit that they shall never overcome. In short, the liberators believe that history has shown that working within the cruel system and winning small battles for the animals will soon prove irrelevant. The carnage against animals continues. The opposition is stronger, better financed, and more numerous than animal defenders. Gains made are easily reversed. Animal abuse will go on until mankind becomes extinct, or the planet is destroyed. According to this extremist position, it follows that people who want to help the animals must not use their energy trying to change the system – that’s impossible. They must focus their efforts on rescuing as many animals as they can and give animal abusers as much trouble as possible – they must be liberators of animals! The purpose of this revolution would not be to discard the old powers and put in the new. According to the liberator philosophy, no human system will ever treat animals with respect. The animals simply need a continuous revolution to consistently, repeatedly, and uncompromisingly liberate them from human oppression. They need a revolution against human society because it is intrinsically oppressive. So long as there are people, animals will need this revolution.

#### Only an uncompromising rejection of institutions smashes the root of anthropocentric violence

Punkerslut '9 sex-positive anarchist, "The Relationship of Anarchism and Animal Rights" September http://www.punkerslut.com/articles/relationshipanarchy.html

"This system, in which mother and children are brought up to fear the father; in which school-children are brought up to fear the teacher; in which 'every German is there to be kicked by another German, and has, below him, another German to kick,' has, without any doubt, a strong bearing on the mentality which expresses itself over and over again in the shrugging phrase, Befehl ist Befehl -- 'Orders are orders.'" --Edward Crankshaw, 1956 "Gestapo: Instrument of Tyranny," Viking Press, page 233 This is not an abstract, unrealistic idea. It has been demonstrated and observed that animals have consciousness -- they have an idea of suffering, and even the "lowest" has been able to show sympathy. Humanity, being supplied with an abundance of healthy food that comes from the earth, has thrown away its harvest, and made a diet of other conscious beings. Governments and capitalists oppress and exploit us; sexist societies abuse and disempower women; parents and "teachers" beat and torture children. But, from beginning to end, every individual partakes in this mass slaughter: from child to president, every level of society contributes to a yearly murder rate exceeding ten billion. Anarchism is the only social philosophy that naturally treats Animal Rights, logically and thoughtfully. We cannot simply fight the government, if we are to remove sexism; and we cannot simply fight sexism, if we are to remove child abuse. All of these things are interconnected. They are each layers of society that seek to impose and control others. Each of them are based upon two primary concepts: the use of coercion, and the idea of property. It is government and capitalist creating poverty and assassinating unionists; man isolating woman in a society where she can own nothing and do nothing; and parents providing a cup of rice between beatings and punishments. It is not just the violence that is employed; it is that they have claimed possession of all, and this maintains the violent relationship. Property and violence. This exactly describes humanity's dominion over the world. There is no corner of the globe unpolluted by toxins, lead, mercury, carcinogens, depleted uranium, radium, or polonium. Every fish contains mercury, every city's dust contains lead, every particle of air has been contaminated with factory emissions. And the violence is unbelievable. Cows and chickens, for instance, are reared in tiny cells, deprived of nutrients to control the color of their flesh, and before they are executed, they are beaten, kicked, and tazed. It is a test of conscience if a human being is offended by the images of inside the slaughterhouses; if you cannot sympathize with those that suffer exactly like humans, how can you sympathize with humans? Today, Animal Rights activists are approaching capitalists, senators, governors, interest groups, universities, and every other foul aspect of our social order. These are the people they are going to in order to "change the world." That is, to make laws of this or that degree, or to prosecute this or that individual. In a world where the few control everything, they have appealed to the elites.? It is a vain effort. Who is more likely to understand and listen to the ideas of Animal Rights? The Capitalist who benefits from the destruction of the Earth -- the investor who reaps mountains of profits in exchange for valleys of the dead? Or the worker, the common individual, who has built everything, who has lived through the greatest misery, and who is always endowed with greater sympathy? If you approach the government and Capitalist, they will take away what they give you when it becomes convenient. But if you approach autonomous, cooperative associations, you'll have the real tool of social change.