The NYPD uses its power to trail Muslim students in the Northeast. When asked about this, state elites like Michael Bloomberg defended their actions.

**Baker and Taylor 2012** (Al and Kate, Writers for the New York Times, “Bloomberg Defends Police’s Monitoring of Muslim Students on Web”)

The United States flows the model of securitization closely, where once a security threat is declared, any emergency action is taken to eliminate that threat. The US has declared Muslims and people who are foreign to be security threats and use legislation like the Authorization of Military Force against terror to eliminate those “threats.”

**Holbradd and Pederson 2012** (Martin Holbraad and Morten Axel Pedersen (2012). Revolutionary securitization: an anthropological extension of securitization theory. International Theory, 4, pp 165­197)

**‘Security’ is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization. In theory, any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from nonpoliticized (meaning the state does not deal with it and it is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision) through politicized (meaning the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations or, more rarely, some other form of communal governance) to securitized (meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure)** (Buzan et al. 1998, 23–24).

**The non-political realm, then, is the realm in which subjects act in relative autonomy from the sovereign power.** **Conversely, the extra-political realm of securitization is the realm in which the sovereign power acts in relative autonomy from its subjects, by way of emergency measures that have not been legitimated through the ordinary political channels. And ‘politics’ stands in the middle as the buffer-realm, in which the competing pressures of subjects’ and sovereigns’ autonomy are kept in balance. On their side, subjects recognize that some of their concerns can only be dealt with within the framework of rules that the authority of the sovereign power is able to guarantee. On its side, the sovereign power recognizes that its authority over subjects depends on the ‘legitimate’ exercise of its power, which requires that, under ordinary circumstances, it too must abide by the framework of rules or laws with whose guarantee it is entrusted. Framed in this way, the paradigmatic form of securitization is a tilting of just this balance of competing claims to autonomy: securitization becomes a process in which the sovereign power’s capacity for autonomy is given precedence over the constraints of ordinary political arrangements.**

As a result, the USFG should revoke the AUMF on terror to increase statutory restrictions on the WPA of the President in introducing USAF into hostilities by use of surveillance tactics, just as the debate community should increase statutory restrictions on the power of the resolution to define what hostilities are.

Revolutionary politics is a revolt against the state and systems of power and seeks to inject a new revolutionary ethos into the system. This prevents harmful security acts.

**Holbradd and Pederson 2012** (Martin Holbraad and Morten Axel Pedersen (2012). Revolutionary securitization: an anthropological extension of securitization theory. International Theory, 4, pp 165­197)

**A truly revolutionary politics**, then, **is one that is deliberately geared towards an erosion of the very distinction between the state and the people and their respective needs.** The liberal charge of totalitarianism is ‘refuted’, in Guevara’s words, inasmuch as the Cuban state’s task is **not to ‘abolish’ the individual, but rather to fashion it into a new subjectivity or consciousness that not only embodies the revolutionary ethos, but enacts the very revolutionary condition** that the socialist state is charged with bringing about. **At stake, then, is not a clash between two contrasting ways of instituting and organizing the relationship between a state and a people (liberal, say, vs. totalitarian), but rather two alternative ontological positions on what might count as ‘state’ and ‘people’ in the first place**. Where liberal assumptions premise the two sides of this political equation as (to a degree) mutually independent variables – viz. sovereigns and subjects who retain their respective scopes for autonomy, with different degrees of relativity – Guevara seeks to articulate revolutionary politics in Cuba as a concerted attempt to render them mutually dependen*t****:* a ‘society in formation’,** as he writes, ‘**that will permit a complete identification between the government and the community in its entirety’** (Guevara and Castro 2009, 16, emphases added).

**In essence, then, revolutionary ontology is founded on a syllogism that, as it were, has death as its major premise. If to be revolutionary is to be prepared to die for the revolution, and death is understood as the paradigmatic and most complete form of self-sacrifice** (see Willerslev 2009), **it follows that revolutionary subjectivity takes an entirely encompassed form: no part of the revolutionary subject, so to speak, remains beyond the revolution**. **It is in this sense, then, that the mantra-like slogan ‘Revolution or death’, taken seriously as a logical disjunction, implies the notion of revolution as a political form that,** strictly speaking and in line with Castro’s logic, **has no legitimate outside.**

The alternative model that we are here proposing is conditional on the critique we have already offered of securitization theory, and runs as follows. We saw that securitization theory is unable to provide a fully satisfactory analysis of revolutionary ontology because it posits an ontological separation where revolutions posit an ontological identification. We also saw that the ontological identification that revolutions presuppose depends on the idea of self-sacrifice: **it is the fact that people are willing to die that renders them revolutionary, and this is the premise upon which the ontological identification of revolutionary states and revolutionary subjects is built. This, then, would suggest an alternative ‘move’ of securitization. What if one were to define revolutionary securitization as the move by which the dualism of liberal ontology – state vs. subject – is collapsed into itself, so as to yield the kinds of totalizing politics revolutionary states such as Cuba take for granted?** On such a view, **the act of armed revolution against the reigning powers effectively takes the role of a primordial act of political cosmogony, as it were. The people take arms, not just to usurp state power, but, through the self-sacrificial logic of revolution, to render themselves ontological coterminous with it, thus giving birth, effectively, to a new political universe.**

Hence, the liberal pre-revolutionary starting-point of people and state as overlapping but mutually autonomous realms (and the corresponding distinctions between non-political, political, and extra-political fields of activity) simply does not provide adequate conceptual coordinates for articulating the securitizing moves of revolutions. Rather, **the logical form of revolutionary self-sacrifice gives rise to an alternative model of securitization, which centres on the ontological fusion between people and state and involves two logically (and temporally) sequential moves. In the first move, which corresponds to the period of revolutionary struggle, the reigning powers are rendered ontologically external to the people through revolutionary violence. The reigning powers become ‘anti-revolutionary’** (**in the ontological as well as the political sense, so to speak as ‘anti-matter’ to the ‘matter’ of revolution), such that any political force that runs against the revolution is to be annihilated.** **The second move,** **then, corresponds to the period following the annihilation of the reigning powers, when the revolutionary forces, identified with ‘the people’, take the reins of state power and thus institute so-called state revolution. Premised on the self-sacrifice that the period of revolutionary struggle exemplifies, and which is carried forward as an ongoing process of popular self-transformation** (sas per the formation of the New Man in Cuba and elsewhere), **this is the move of ontological fusion between state and people. Following the cosmogonic upheaval of revolutionary struggle, the period of state revolution purports to consummate a peculiarly totalizing political ontology, according to which state and people are ontologically fused – fused, that is, under the sign of revolution, understood as an ever-ongoing political, economic, social, and, above all, ethical and personal process. In this totalizing revolutionary logic, counter- revolutionary threats now feature only under ontological erasure.**