# 1NC

### Fast Track 1NC

#### Fast Track fight is on the top of the agenda-Strong push from Obama is key-Failure collapses global trade momentum

Good-Farm Policy-12/31/13

The FarmPolicy.com News Summary

HEADLINE: Farm Bill; Ag Economy; and, Biofuels- Tuesday

And with respect to trade, the Chicago Tribune editorial board[18] noted yesterday that, 'President Barack Obama wants the power to negotiate free-trade treaties on a fast track. With Trade Promotion Authority, he would have a good chance of clinching huge trade pacts now being hammered out with Europe and Asia. Yet Congress may not give him that authority — for all the wrong reasons.' The Tribune opinion item stated that, 'Within months the White House hopes to finish talks on a proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership with a group of Asia-Pacific nations. Talks with the European Union on the planned Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership are progressing too. Those deals would eliminate barriers and promote economic activity between the U.S. and key allies. The upside is huge: Billions of dollars in new business would be generated if these pacts come to pass. 'Yet given the special interests that oppose free trade, neither deal stands much of a chance in Congress without TPA. Consider farm tariffs, one of the most frustrating roadblocks to any free-trade pact with Europe or Asia. The agriculture lobby here and abroad has long succeeded in imposing some of the least competitive public policies of any industry. Although farm protectionism hurts the vast majority of the world's citizens, standing up to clout-heavy constituencies such as U.S. sugar magnates requires extraordinary political courage. TPA is essential for overcoming the inevitable fight against vested interests that are determined to advance themselves at the expense of the nation's good. 'Federal lawmakers and the president have to make their case with much more gusto than we have seen so far. Congress could OK a Trade Promotion Authority bill in the first few months of 2014. But that won't happen without leadership on Capitol Hill and, especially, from the White House. Now's the time.'

#### Congressional debate over the plan tanks agenda

Kriner, 10

(Douglas, Assistant professor of poly sci at Boston University, “After the

Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War”, University of Chicago Press, Dec

1, 2010)

While congressional support leaves the president’s reserve of political capital intact,¶ congressional criticism saps energy from other initiatives on the home front by forcing the¶ president to expend energy and effort defending his international agenda. Political capital¶ spent shoring up support for a president’s foreign policies is capital that is unavailable for his¶ future policy initiatives . Moreover, any weakening in the president’s political clout may have¶ immediate ramifications for his reelection prospects, as well as indirect consequences for congressional races.59¶ Indeed, Democratic efforts to tie congressional Republican incumbents to President George W. Bush and his war policies paid¶ immediate political dividends in the 2006 midterms, particularly in states, districts, and counties that had suffered the highest¶ casualty rates in the Iraq War. 60 In addition to boding ill for the president’s perceived political capital¶ and reputation, such partisan losses in Congress only further imperil his programmatic¶ agenda, both international and domestic. Scholars have long noted that President Lyndon¶ Johnson’s dream of a Great Society also perished in the rice paddies of Vietnam. Lacking the requisite¶ funds in a war-depleted treasury and the political capital needed to sustain his legislative vision, Johnson¶ gradually let his domestic goals slip away as he hunkered down in an effort first to win and¶ then to end the Vietnam War. In the same way, many of President Bush’s highest second-term¶ domestic proprieties, such as Social Security and immigration reform, failed perhaps in large part because¶ the administration had to expend so much energy and effort waging a rear-guard action¶ against congressional critics of the war in Iraq.61 When making their cost-benefit calculations,¶ presidents surely consider these wider political costs of congressional opposition to their¶ military policies. If congressional opposition in the military arena stands to derail other¶ elements of his agenda, all else being equal, the president will be more likely to judge the benefits¶ of military action insufficient to its costs than if Congress stood behind him in the¶ international arena.

#### Free trade prevents multiple scenarios for world war and WMD Terrorism

Panzner 2008

Michael, faculty at the New York Institute of Finance, 25-year veteran of the global stock, bond, and currency markets who has worked in New York and London for HSBC, Soros Funds, ABN Amro, Dresdner Bank, and JPMorgan Chase “Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse,” pg. 136-138

Continuing calls for curbs on the flow of finance and trade will inspire the United States and other nations to spew forth protectionist legislation like the notorious Smoot-Hawley bill. Introduced at the start of the Great Depression, it triggered a series of tit-for-tat economic responses, which many commentators believe helped turn a serious economic downturn into a prolonged and devastating global disaster. But if history is any guide, those lessons will have been long forgotten during the next collapse. Eventually, fed by a mood of desperation and growing public anger, restrictions on trade, finance, investment, and immigration will almost certainly intensify. Authorities and ordinary citizens will likely scrutinize the cross-border movement of Americans and outsiders alike, and lawmakers may even call for a general crackdown on nonessential travel. Meanwhile, many nations will make transporting or sending funds to other countries exceedingly difficult. As desperate officials try to limit the fallout from decades of ill-conceived, corrupt, and reckless policies, they will introduce controls on foreign exchange. Foreign individuals and companies seeking to acquire certain American infrastructure assets, or trying to buy property and other assets on the cheap thanks to a rapidly depreciating dollar, will be stymied by limits on investment by noncitizens. Those efforts will cause spasms to ripple across economies and markets, disrupting global payment, settlement, and clearing mechanisms. All of this will, of course, continue to undermine business confidence and consumer spending. In a world of lockouts and lockdowns, any link that transmits systemic financial pressures across markets through arbitrage or portfolio-based risk management, or that allows diseases to be easily spread from one country to the next by tourists and wildlife, or that otherwise facilitates unwelcome exchanges of any kind will be viewed with suspicion and dealt with accordingly. The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters, often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an “intense confrontation” between the United States and China is “inevitable” at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war.

### 1NC WF

#### Restricting war powers risks terrorist attacks, WMD proliferation and Rouge State aggression

Yoo 12 (John, professor of law at the University of California, Berkeley, “War Powers Belong to the President,” http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/war\_powers\_belong\_to\_the\_president)

This time, President Obama has the Constitution about right. His exercise of war powers rests firmly in the tradition of American foreign policy. Throughout our history, neither presidents nor Congresses have acted under the belief that the Constitution requires a declaration of war before the U.S. can conduct military hostilities abroad. We have used force abroad more than 100 times but declared war in only five cases: the War of 1812, the Mexican-American and Spanish-American wars, and World War I and II. Without any congressional approval, presidents have sent forces to battle Indians, Barbary pirates and Russian revolutionaries; to fight North Korean and Chinese communists in Korea; to engineer regime changes in South and Central America; and to prevent human rights disasters in the Balkans. Other conflicts, such as the 1991 Persian Gulf war, the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and the 2003 Iraq war, received legislative “authorization” but not declarations of war. The practice of presidential initiative, followed by congressional acquiescence, has spanned both Democratic and Republican administrations and reaches back from President Obama to Presidents Abraham Lincoln, Thomas Jefferson and George Washington. Common sense does not support replacing the way our Constitution has worked in wartime with a radically different system that mimics the peacetime balance of powers between president and Congress. If the issue were the environment or Social Security, Congress would enact policy first and the president would faithfully implement it second. But the Constitution does not duplicate this system in war. Instead, our framers decided that the president would play the leading role in matters of national security. Those in the pro-Congress camp call upon the anti-monarchical origins of the American Revolution for support. If the framers rebelled against King George III’s dictatorial powers, surely they would not give the president much authority. It is true that the revolutionaries rejected the royal prerogative, and they created weak executives at the state level. Americans have long turned a skeptical eye toward the growth of federal powers. But this may mislead some to resist the fundamental difference in the Constitution’s treatment of domestic and foreign affairs. For when the framers wrote the Constitution in 1787 they rejected these failed experiments and restored an independent, unified chief executive with its own powers in national security and foreign affairs. The most important of the president’s powers are commander in chief and chief executive. As Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist 74, “The direction of war implies the direction of the common strength, and the power of directing and employing the common strength forms a usual and essential part in the definition of the executive authority.” Presidents should conduct war, he wrote, because they could act with “decision, activity, secrecy and dispatch.” In perhaps his most famous words, Hamilton wrote: “Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. ... It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks.” The framers realized the obvious. Foreign affairs are unpredictable and involve the highest of stakes, making them unsuitable to regulation by pre-existing legislation. Instead, they can demand swift, decisive action—sometimes under pressured or even emergency circumstances—that is best carried out by a branch of government that does not suffer from multiple vetoes or is delayed by disagreements. Congress is too large and unwieldy to take the swift and decisive action required in wartime. Our framers replaced the Articles of Confederation, which had failed in the management of foreign relations because they had no single executive, with the Constitution’s single president for precisely this reason. Even when it has access to the same intelligence as the executive branch, Congress’ loose, decentralized structure would paralyze American policy while foreign threats grow. Congress has no political incentive to mount and see through its own wartime policy. Members of Congress, who are interested in keeping their seats at the next election, do not want to take stands on controversial issues where the future is uncertain. They will avoid like the plague any vote that will anger large segments of the electorate. They prefer that the president take the political risks and be held accountable for failure. Congress’ track record when it has opposed presidential leadership has not been a happy one. Perhaps the most telling example was the Senate’s rejection of the Treaty of Versailles at the end of World War I. Congress’ isolationist urge kept the United States out of Europe at a time when democracies fell and fascism grew in their place. Even as Europe and Asia plunged into war, Congress passed the Neutrality Acts designed to keep the United States out of the conflict. President Franklin Roosevelt violated those laws to help the Allies and draw the nation into war against the Axis. While pro-Congress critics worry about a president’s foreign adventurism, the real threat to our national security may come from inaction and isolationism. Many point to the Vietnam War as an example of the faults of the “imperial presidency.” Vietnam, however, could not have continued without the consistent support of Congress in raising a large military and paying for hostilities. And Vietnam ushered in a period of congressional dominance that witnessed American setbacks in the Cold War and the passage of the ineffectual War Powers Resolution. Congress passed the resolution in 1973 over President Richard Nixon’s veto, and no president, Republican or Democrat, George W. Bush or Obama, has ever accepted the constitutionality of its 60-day limit on the use of troops abroad. No federal court has ever upheld the resolution. Even Congress has never enforced it. Despite the record of practice and the Constitution’s institutional design, critics nevertheless argue for a radical remaking of the American way of war. They typically base their claim on Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution, which gives Congress the power to “declare war.” But these observers read the 18th century constitutional text through a modern lens by interpreting “declare war” to mean “start war.” When the Constitution was written, however, a declaration of war served diplomatic notice about a change in legal relations between nations. It had little to do with launching hostilities. In the century before the Constitution, for example, Great Britain—where the framers got the idea of the declare-war power—fought numerous major conflicts but declared war only once beforehand. Our Constitution sets out specific procedures for passing laws, appointing officers and making treaties. There are none for waging war because the framers expected the president and Congress to struggle over war through the national political process. In fact, other parts of the Constitution, properly read, support this reading. Article I, Section 10, for example, declares that the states shall not “engage” in war “without the consent of Congress” unless “actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.” This provision creates exactly the limits desired by anti-war critics, complete with an exception for self-defense. If the framers had wanted to require congressional permission before the president could wage war, they simply could have repeated this provision and applied it to the executive. Presidents, of course, do not have complete freedom to take the nation to war. Congress has ample powers to control presidential policy, if it wants to. Only Congress can raise the military, which gives it the power to block, delay or modify war plans. Before 1945, for example, the United States had such a small peacetime military that presidents who started a war would have to go hat in hand to Congress to build an army to fight it. Since World War II, it has been Congress that has authorized and funded our large standing military, one primarily designed to conduct offensive, not defensive, operations (as we learned all too tragically on 9/11) and to swiftly project power worldwide. If Congress wanted to discourage presidential initiative in war, it could build a smaller, less offensive-minded military. Congress’ check on the presidency lies not just in the long-term raising of the military. It can also block any immediate armed conflict through the power of the purse. If Congress feels it has been misled in authorizing war, or it disagrees with the president’s decisions, all it need do is cut off funds, either all at once or gradually. It can reduce the size of the military, shrink or eliminate units, or freeze supplies. Using the power of the purse does not even require affirmative congressional action. Congress can just sit on its hands and refuse to pass a law funding the latest presidential adventure, and the war will end quickly. Even the Kosovo war, which lasted little more than two months and involved no ground troops, required special funding legislation. The framers expected Congress’ power of the purse to serve as the primary check on presidential war. During the 1788 Virginia ratifying convention, Patrick Henry attacked the Constitution for failing to limit executive militarism. James Madison responded: “The sword is in the hands of the British king; the purse is in the hands of the Parliament. It is so in America, as far as any analogy can exist.” Congress ended America’s involvement in Vietnam by cutting off all funds for the war. Our Constitution has succeeded because it favors swift presidential action in war, later checked by Congress’ funding power. If a president continues to wage war without congressional authorization, as in Libya, Kosovo or Korea, it is only because Congress has chosen not to exercise its easy check. We should not confuse a desire to escape political responsibility for a defect in the Constitution. A radical change in the system for making war might appease critics of presidential power. But it could also seriously threaten American national security. In order to forestall another 9/11 attack, or to take advantage of a window of opportunity to strike terrorists or rogue nations, the executive branch needs flexibility. It is not hard to think of situations where congressional consent cannot be obtained in time to act. Time for congressional deliberation, which leads only to passivity and isolation and not smarter decisions, will come at the price of speed and secrecy. The Constitution creates a presidency that can respond forcefully to prevent serious threats to our national security. Presidents can take the initiative and Congress can use its funding power to check them. Instead of demanding a legalistic process to begin war, the framers left war to politics. As we confront the new challenges of terrorism, rogue nations and WMD proliferation, now is not the time to introduce sweeping, untested changes in the way we make war.

#### Targeted killing key to counterterrorism-disrupts leadership and makes carrying out attacks impossible-evidence is comparative

**Anderson, American university international law professor, 2013**

(Kenneth, “The Case for Drones”, Commentary, 135.6, June, ebsco, ldg)

Targeted killing of high-value terrorist targets, by contrast, is the end result of a long, independent intelligence process. What the drone adds to that intelligence might be considerable, through its surveillance capabilities -- but much of the drone's contribution will be tactical, providing intelligence that assists in the planning and execution of the strike itself, in order to pick the moment when there might be the fewest civilian casualties. Nonetheless, in conjunction with high-quality intelligence, drone warfare offers an unparalleled means to strike directly at terrorist organizations without needing a conventional or counterinsurgency approach to reach terrorist groups in their safe havens. It offers an offensive capability, rather than simply defensive measures, such as homeland security alone. Drone warfare offers a raiding strategy directly against the terrorists and their leadership. If one believes, as many of the critics of drone warfare do, that the proper strategies of counterterrorism are essentially defensive -- including those that eschew the paradigm of armed conflict in favor of law enforcement and criminal law -- then the strategic virtue of an offensive capability against the terrorists themselves will seem small. But that has not been American policy since 9/11, not under the Bush administration, not under the Obama administration -- and not by the Congress of the United States, which has authorized hundreds of billions of dollars to fight the war on terror aggressively. The United States has used many offensive methods in the past dozen years: Regime change of states offering safe havens, counter-insurgency war, special operations, military and intelligence assistance to regimes battling our common enemies are examples of the methods that are just of military nature. Drone warfare today is integrated with a much larger strategic counterterrorism target -- one in which, as in Afghanistan in the late 1990s, radical Islamist groups seize governance of whole populations and territories and provide not only safe haven, but also an honored central role to transnational terrorist groups. This is what current conflicts in Yemen and Mali threaten, in counterterrorism terms, and why the United States, along with France and even the UN, has moved to intervene militarily. Drone warfare is just one element of overall strategy, but it has a clear utility in disrupting terrorist leadership. It makes the planning and execution of complex plots difficult if only because it is hard to plan for years down the road if you have some reason to think you will be struck down by a drone but have no idea when. The unpredictability and terrifying anticipation of sudden attack, which terrorists have acknowledged in communications, have a significant impact on planning and organizational effectiveness.

#### Rogue states multiply and cause extinction

**Johnson, Forbes contributor and Presidential Medal of Freedom winner, 2013**

(Paul, “A Lesson For Rogue States”, 5-8, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/currentevents/2013/05/08/a-lesson-for-rogue-states/>, ldg)

Although we live in a violent world, where an internal conflict such as the Syrian civil war can cost 70,000 lives over a two-year period, there hasn’t been a major war between the great powers in 68 years. Today’s three superpowers–the U.S., Russia and China–have no conflicts of interest that can’t be resolved through compromise. All have hair-trigger nuclear alert systems, but the sheer scale of their armories has forced them to take nuclear conflict seriously. Thus, in a real sense, nuclear weapons have succeeded in abolishing the concept of a winnable war. The same cannot be said, however, for certain paranoid rogue states, namely North Korea and Iran. If these two nations appear to be prospering–that is, if their nuclear threats are winning them attention and respect, financial bribes in the form of aid and all the other goodies by which petty dictators count success–other prospective rogues will join them. One such state is Venezuela. Currently its oil wealth is largely wasted, but it is great enough to buy entree to a junior nuclear club. Another possibility is Pakistan, which already has a small nuclear capability and is teetering on the brink of chaos. Other potential rogues are one or two of the components that made up the former Soviet Union. All the more reason to ensure that North Korea and Iran are dramatically punished for traveling the nuclear path. But how? It’s of little use imposing further sanctions, as they chiefly fall on the long-suffering populations. Recent disclosures about life in North Korea reveal how effectively the ruling elite is protected from the physical consequences of its nuclear quest, enjoying high standards of living while the masses starve. Things aren’t much better in Iran. Both regimes are beyond the reach of civilized reasoning, one locked into a totalitarian vise of such comprehensiveness as to rule out revolt, the other victim of a religious despotism from which there currently seems no escape. Either country might take a fatal step of its own volition. Were North Korea to attack the South, it would draw down a retribution in conventional firepower from the heavily armed South and a possible nuclear response from the U.S., which would effectively terminate the regime. Iran has frequently threatened to destroy Israel and exterminate its people. Were it to attempt to carry out such a plan, the Israeli response would be so devastating that it would put an end to the theocracy forthwith. The balance of probabilities is that neither nation will embark on a deliberate war but instead will carry on blustering. This, however, doesn’t rule out war by accident–a small-scale nuclear conflict precipitated by the blunders of a totalitarian elite. Preventing Disaster The most effective, yet cold-blooded, way to teach these states the consequences of continuing their nuclear efforts would be to make an example of one by destroying its ruling class. The obvious candidate would be North Korea. Were we able to contrive circumstances in which this occurred, it’s probable that Iran, as well as any other prospective rogues, would abandon its nuclear aims. But how to do this? At the least there would need to be general agreement on such a course among Russia, China and the U.S. But China would view the replacement of its communist ally with a neutral, unified Korea as a serious loss. Compensation would be required. Still, it’s worth exploring. What we must avoid is a jittery world in which proliferating rogue states perpetually seek to become nuclear ones. The risk of an accidental conflict breaking out that would then drag in the major powers is too great. This is precisely how the 1914 Sarajevo assassination broadened into World War I. It is fortunate the major powers appear to have understood the dangers of nuclear conflict without having had to experience them. Now they must turn their minds, responsibly, to solving the menace of rogue states. At present all we have are the bellicose bellowing of the rogues and the well-meaning drift of the Great Powers–a formula for an eventual and monumental disaster that could be the end of us all.

### 1NC CP

#### Text: The United States President, through an executive order, should restrict the use of targeted killing by the United States including the following:

#### -executive authorities should conduct an independent, impartial, prompt, and public investigation to enforce the mandates of the executive order,

#### -following up any alleged targeted killing with an independent, intra-executive investigation regarding the precision of the identification of the target and the circumstances of the attack if accused of violating the order,

#### -a private cause of action to enforce the mandates of the order,

#### -an accompanying Fact Sheet explaining the administration’s willingness to embrace aspects of the law of armed conflict on targeted killing.

#### Executive orders avoid politics, have the force of law, and are rarely overturned

Cooper-prof public administration Portland State- 2 [Phillip, By Order of the President: The Use and Abuse of Executive Direct Action” p.59

Executive orders are often used because they are quick, convenient, and relatively easy mechanisms for moving significant policy initiatives. Though itis certainly true that executive orders are employed for symbolic purposes, enough has been said by now to demonstrate that they are also used for serious policymaking or to lay the basis for important actions to be taken by executive branch agencies under the authority of the orders. Unfortunately, as is true of legislation, it is not always possible to know from the title of orders which are significant and which are not, particularly since presidents will often use an existing order as a base for action and then change it in ways that make it far more significant than its predecessors.¶ The relative ease of the use of an order does not merely arise from the fact that presidents may employ one to avoid the cumbersome and time consuming legislative process. They may also use this device to avoid some times equally time-consuming administrative procedures, particularly the rulemaking processes required by the Administrative Procedure Act.84 Because those procedural requirements do not apply to the president, it is tempting for executive branch agencies to seek assistance from the White House to enact by executive order that which might be difficult for the agency itself to move through the process. Moreover, there is the added plus from the agency's perspective that it can be considerably more difficult for potential adversaries to obtain standing to launch a legal challenge to the president's order than it is to move an agency rule to judicial review. There is nothing new about the practice of generating executive orders outside the White House. President Kennedy's executive order on that process specifically pro­vides for orders generated elsewhere

#### Solves the case-Executive procedures swamps their solvency deficits

Murphy and Radsan-prof law Texas Tech, William Michell-9 32 Cardozo L. Rev. 405

ARTICLE: DUE PROCESS AND TARGETED KILLING OF TERRORISTS

B. Due Process and Intra-Executive Control of Targeted Killing Realistically, the role we have just identified for the courts in monitoring targeted killings is vanishingly small. This makes it all the more important for the executive to develop its own rational, fair procedures for controlling targeted killing. Recall that Boumediene is best understood as an embodiment of Justice Harlan's argument that due process extends worldwide to everyone, but the form this protection takes depends on a pragmatic inquiry. 224 This pragmatic inquiry can lead to the conclusion that a particular constitutional provision - such as the right to jury trial - should not apply overseas because to do so would be "impracticable or anomalous" under local conditions. 225 More broadly, it can convince courts not to hear constitutional claims from overseas where judicial interference with executive action would likely do more harm than good. 226 It should never be impracticable or anomalous, however, for the executive branch to follow its own views of what is fair and reasonable for due process. Our conclusion flows from a simple, definitional point: By determining that a procedure is fair and reasonable, the executive necessarily concludes that the procedure is not impracticable or anomalous. Therefore, the executive's obligation to provide due process must follow it everywhere without any functionalist excuses. For this reason, FBI Director Mueller could not have been more wrong when, responding to concerns that the United States was using illegal interrogation techniques overseas, he quipped, "I'm not concerned about due process abroad." 227 The executive, like the courts, cannot practicably offer suspected terrorists full-blown notice and an opportunity to be heard before an attempted targeted killing. The CIA, before firing a missile, need not [\*446] and should not invite Osama bin Laden or his lawyer to a hearing to contest whether he is, in fact, a committed member of al Qaeda. But if due process for a targeted killing should not take the form of pre-deprivation notice and an opportunity to be heard, what form should it take? Many systems might be devised under a Mathews v. Eldridge analysis. 228 Rather than discuss the merits and demerits of imaginary systems, however, here we highlight one procedural requirement that two foreign courts have already imposed: After using deadly force in counterterrorism operations, executive authorities should conduct an independent, impartial, prompt, and (presumptively) public investigation of its legality. 229 The Supreme Court of Israel's decision in PCATI is again informative. 230 As noted above, the Court regarded the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as subject to the law of international armed conflict. 231 It categorized the Palestinian targets as "civilians" who could be targeted only when directly participating in hostilities. 232 This decision did not put security forces in a straitjacket, though, because the Court also adopted a generous interpretation of what it means to "directly participate" in hostilities. 233 The Court recognized that this generous interpretation increased the risk of improper targeting of peaceful civilians. It therefore crafted a set of legal limits to curb errors and abuses, citing customary international law, human rights case law, and a raft of secondary authorities. 234 The checks include: (a) thorough verification "regarding the identity and activity of the civilian who is allegedly taking part in the hostilities"; (b) forbidding deadly attacks if other means, such as arrest, can be used without imposing too great a risk on security forces or others; and (c) following up an attack on a civilian by an independent, intra-executive investigation "regarding the precision of the identification of the target and the circumstances of the attack." 235 [\*447] For good measure, the Court said the internal investigation should be subject to judicial review. 236 In fashioning these limits, the Israeli Court relied on, among other sources, human rights law developed by the European Court of Human Rights. For example, in McKerr v. United Kingdom, that court addressed the legality of shooting three suspected IRA terrorists after they ran a police roadblock at high-speed. 237 After years of inquests, criminal investigations, and civil litigation, the son of one of the decedents, McKerr, filed an application with the European Court of Human Rights. In this filing, McKerr claimed that the state had not satisfied its duty under Article 2 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). This provision declares that "everyone's right to life shall be protected by law," but that a killing does not violate this right if it results from the "use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary ... in defence of any person from unlawful violence ... [or] to effect a lawful arrest." 238 The European Court has repeatedly held that, by implication, protection of this right to life "requires that there should be some form of effective official investigation when individuals have been killed as a result of the use of force by ... agents of the State." 239 Responding to McKerr's petition, the Court elaborated that Article 2's purpose "is to secure the effective implementation of the domestic laws which protect the right to life and, in those cases involving State agents or bodies, to ensure their accountability for deaths occurring under their responsibility." 240 To perform this function adequately: (a) the state must initiate an investigation promptly and not rely on the next-of-kin to initiate action; (b) the persons "responsible for and carrying out the investigation" should be "independent from those implicated in the events"; (c) the investigation should be designed to determine whether the use of deadly force was justified and should lead to identification and punishment of those responsible if the use of force was illegal; and (d) there must be "a sufficient element of public scrutiny of the investigation or its results to secure accountability in practice as well as in theory." 241 In both PCATI and McKerr, the courts rooted the duty to investigate in an express right to life. In the United States, this right to life finds a home in the doctrine of substantive due process. 242 A [\*448] Mathews-style balancing suggests that to protect this right to life, the United States, too, has a duty to conduct intra-executive review of the use of deadly force through targeted killing. Of course, one can imagine situations in which an investigation that satisfied everything spelled out by the Israeli or European courts would be unwise. For instance, official acknowledgment of the United States' role in a fully public investigation of a Predator strike might cause diplomatic repercussions with countries that had helped us or had looked the other way. Further, the executive might not be able to explain its targeting decision without compromising intelligence sources and methods. 243 Internal investigations, however, do not always pose a plausible threat to national security. Consider the Predator program. Within the CIA, the task of investigating the legality of its actions is entrusted to the CIA's Inspector General (IG). He holds an office created by statute, is subject to Senate confirmation, and can only be removed by the President. 244 Where the IG's investigation finds evidence of criminality, he or she refers the matter to the Department of Justice for further investigation and possible prosecution. 245 One could easily impose a categorical requirement that all CIA targeted killings be subject to IG review. To support the IG, review teams could be established within the CIA's Clandestine Service or existing "accountability boards" could be used. The CIA's Office of General Counsel could also play a role. And the National Security Council, a link between the CIA and the White House, could coordinate the internal oversight. Review within the CIA ensures the proper handling of classified information. Plus, internal review protects private interests by encouraging careful, sparing use of targeted killing and by ensuring some accountability when mistakes or abuses do occur. The increasing accountability on Predator strikes, in turn, serves an even broader interest in the legitimacy and fairness of deadly government action. Thus, the Mathews balance favors an intra-executive review at least as intrusive as IG review. One might object that the investigatory program just sketched for Predator strikes does not go far enough to protect the right to life. Taking a page from the McKerr case, one might contend: (a) that the [\*449] IG's independence from political influence upon the CIA is questionable; 246 and (b) that internal investigations cannot generate accountability unless they are made public. 247 There are many responses to such objections. First, investigations of targeted killings could be made public except when it is clear that publicity would cause substantial harm to national security. Second, some judicial review could be included. 248 To alleviate security concerns while honoring accountability, judicial review might take place in a special national security court designed along the lines of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. 249 To the degree these (and other) moves toward openness might threaten intelligence sources or otherwise compromise security, they present closer calls under Mathews. To stress, our argument for serious intra-executive review of targeted killings, after the fact, does not preclude other types of controls - some of which due process might also require. Many such requirements may already be in place. We assume, for instance, the CIA corroborates its intelligence before anyone is targeted; a human's eyes on the target may be part of the CIA's procedures. More generally, we hope the CIA has developed pre-mission controls on targeting that draw on Department of Defense procedures. 250 Further, the legislative branch plays a role in light of the executive's statutory obligation to keep the Intelligence Committees of the House and Senate apprised of "covert actions" and other "intelligence activities" - which, under either label, include targeted killing by the CIA. 251 Congress, after all, controls the purse on the Predator program. No matter the variations between internal and external oversight, we stand by our central point: Under the Due Process Clause, the executive must conduct some kind of serious investigation of any targeted killing. In keeping with the purpose and the pragmatism of Mathews v. Eldridge, this investigation should be as thorough, independent, and public as possible without damage to national security. [\*450] Striking the balance between openness and security requires nuance. Even so, failing to develop any investigatory program for Predator strikes is not an option under law. Since executive officials swear to uphold the Constitution, they should - if they have not done so already - develop a solid review of the Predator program without waiting for a court order which is unlikely to come. Conclusion This Article has explored the implications of the due process model that the Supreme Court developed in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 252 and Boumediene v. Bush 253 for targeted killing - particularly Predator strikes by the CIA. Contrary to Justice Thomas's charge, 254 this model does not break down in the extreme context of targeted killing but, instead, suggests useful means to control this practice and heighten accountability. One modest control is for appropriate plaintiffs to bring Bivens-style actions to challenge the legality of targeted killings, no matter where they may have occurred in the world. Resolution of any such action that surmounted all the practical and legal obstacles in its way - including the state-secrets privilege and qualified immunity - would enhance accountability without causing substantial risk to national security. Yet as a practical matter, this role for the courts is vanishingly small. It is therefore all the more important that the executive branch itself develop fair, rational procedures for its use of targeted killing. Under Boumediene, it has a constitutional obligation to do so. To implement this duty, the executive should, following the lead of the Supreme Court of Israel and the European Court of Human Rights, require an independent, intra-executive investigation of targeted killing by the CIA. Even in a war on terror, due process demands at least this level of accountability for the power to kill suspected terrorists.

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#### Technical solutions to war powers are a shell game which locks in exceptionalism their reaction is shrouded in a mythos of insecurity that hyper inflates threats to justify itself even though the US is in no danger. The violence they recreate is a blind spot in the western mind which is exactly why we must ask prior to debate about the plan what our national security interests are who is served by those goals

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NO. 16-2007. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=970279)

This fearsome sort of legality is largely shielded from our view (that is, from the view of Americans---the ones wielding this legality) with the veil of democracy, knitted together with the thread of process jurisprudence. Within process jurisprudence, there is no inquiry into the fundamental question: allocation of power between the branches to accomplish . . . what? It is very easy to skip that question, and thus easy to slide into or accept circular argumentation.31 With the focus on the distribution of power, arguments about what to do in this so-called war on terror start off with assumptions about the nature of the problem (crudely expressed as violent Jihadists who hate our freedoms) and then appeal to those assumptions to justify certain actions that have come to constitute this “war.” The grip of this circularity, ironically enough, gains its strength from the ideology of legality, the very thing that the Court seeks to protect in this narrative drama, because that ideology fences out considerations of history, sociology, politics, and much else that makes up the human experience. What Judith Shklar observed over forty years ago captures the point here: the “legalism” mindset--which thoroughly infuses the process jurisprudence that characterizes the Hamdi analysis--produces the “urge to draw a clear line between law and nonlaw” which, in turn, leads to “the construction of ever more refined and rigid systems of formal definitions” and thus “serve[s] to isolate law completely from the social context within which it exists.” 32 The pretense behind the process jurisprudence--and here pretense is purpose--is the resilient belief that law can be, and ought to be, impervious to ideological considerations. And so, the avoidance of the “accomplish . . . what?” question is far from accidental; it is the quintessential act of legality itself.33 More than that, this “deliberate isolation of the legal system . . . is itself a refined political ideology, the expression of a preference” that masquerades as a form of judicial neutrality we find suitable in a democracy.34 If the Executive’s asserted prerogative to prosecute a war in a way that will assure victory is confronted with the prior question about what exactly we want to accomplish in that war--if, that is, we confront the question posed by Slavoj Zizek, noted at the outset of this article—then the idea of national security trumping “law” takes on an entirely different analytical hue. Professor Owen Fiss is probably right when he says that the Justices in Hamdi “searched for ways to honor the Constitution without compromising national interests.”35 But that is a distinctly unsatisfying observation if what we are concerned about is the identification of what exactly those “national interests” are.36 We may not feel unsatisfied because, in the context of Hamdi, it undoubtedly seems pointless to ask what we are trying to accomplish, since the answer strikes us as obvious. We are in a deadly struggle to stamp out the terrorist threat posed by Al Qaeda, and more generally, terrorism arising from a certain violent and nihilistic strain of Islamic fundamentalism. Our foreign policy is expressly fueled by the outlook that preemptive attacks is not merely an option, but is the option to be used. In the words of the Bush Administration’s 2002 National Security Strategy document, “In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act.”37 O’Connor and the rest of the Court members implicitly understand our foreign policy and the goal to be pursued in these terms, which explains why the Hamdi opinion nowhere raises a question about what it is the so-called “war on terror” seeks to accomplish. After all, the stories we want to tell dictate the stories that we do tell. We want to tell ourselves stories about our own essential goodness and benevolence, our own fidelity to the rule of law; and that desire dictates the juridical story that ultimately gets told. Once one posits that our foreign policy is purely and always defensive, as well as benevolent in motivation,38 then whatever the juridical story—even one where the nation’s highest Court announces that the Executive has no blank check to prosecute a war on terror—the underlying reality inscribed upon the world’s inhabitants, the consequences real people must absorb somehow, is one where “the United States has established that its only limit on the world stage will be its military power.”39 As O’Connor sees it, the real problem here is that, given that the allocation-of-power issue is tied to the goal of eliminating the terrorist threat, we have to reckon with the probability that this allocation is not just an emergency provision, but one that will be cemented into our society, since the current emergency is likely to be, in all practicality, a permanent emergency. But to say we are in a struggle to stamp out a terrorist threat posed by Islamic fundamentalism, and to say that “the only path to safety is the path of action,” conceals--renders invisible, a postmodernist would likely put it--an even more fundamental, and more radical, question: the allocation of power that the Court is called upon to establish is in the service of eliminating a terrorist threat to accomplish . . . what? The standard answer is, our security, which most Americans would take to mean, to avert an attack on our homeland, and thus, as it was with Lincoln, to preserve the Union. And so, we accept as obvious that our dilemma is finding the right security-liberty balance. The problem with that standard answer is two-fold. First, it glosses over the fact that we face no true existential threat, no enemy that genuinely threatens to seize control over our state apparatus and foist upon us a form of government to which we would not consent. That fact alone distinguishes our current war on terrorism from Lincoln’s quest to preserve the Union against secession.40 Second, this we-must-protect-the-Homeland answer is far too convenient as a conversation stopper. When the Bush Administration=’ National Security Strategy document avers that “the only path to safety is the path of action,” we ought to ask what global arrangements are contemplated through that “path of action.” When that document announces that “this nation will act,” it surely cannot suffice to say that the goal is merely eliminating a threat to attain security. All empires and empire-seeking nations engage in aggression under the rubric of self-defense and the deployment of noble-aims rhetoric. These justifications carry no genuine meaning but are devices of the powerful and the privileged, with the acquiescence and often encouragement by a frightened populace, to quell unsettling questions from dissenters within the society.41 Stop and think for a moment, how is it that the nation with the most formidable military might--the beneficiary of the hugest imbalance in military power ever in world history--is also the nation that professes to be the most imperiled by threats throughout the world, often threatened by impoverished peasant societies (Vietnam, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Chile, Granada, etc.)?42 An empire must always cast itself as vulnerable to attack and as constantly being under attack in order to justify its own military aggression. This is most acutely true when the empire is a democracy that must garner the consent of the populace, which explains why so much of governmental rhetoric concerning global affairs is alarmist in tone. The point is that quandaries over constitutional interpretation--ought we be prudential, or are other techniques more closely tied to the text the only legitimate mode of constitutional adjudication--may very well mask what may be the most urgent issue of all, which concerns what exactly this nation’s true identity is at this moment in world history, what it is that we are pursuing. Whereas Sanford Levinson has courageously argued that “too many people >venerate= the Constitution and use it as a kind of moral compass,”43 which leads to a certain blindness, I raise for consideration an idea that Hamdi suppresses, through its narrative techniques, which is that too many people “venerate” this nation without any genuine consideration of the particular way we have, since World War II, manifested ourselves as a nation. I join Levinson’s suspicion that our Constitution is venerated as an idea, as an abstraction, without much thought given to its particulars. It is important to be open to the possibility that the same is true with regard to our nation--the possibility that we venerate the idea of America (undoubtedly worth venerating), but remain (willfully?) ignorant of the particulars of our actual responsibility for the health of the planet and its inhabitants.44 To openly consider such issues is not anti-American--an utterly absurd locution--for to suggest that it is amounts to a denial that U.S. actions (as opposed to rhetoric that leeches off of the promise and ideal of “America”) can be measured by some yardstick of propriety that applies to all nations.45 The very idea of a “yardstick of propriety” requires a prior acceptance of two ideas: one, that we are part of something larger, that we are properly accountable to others and to that larger circumstance; and two, that it is not a betrayal or traitorous for a people within a nation to look within itself.46 Issacharoff and Pildes, the most prominent process theorists, observe that process jurisprudence may be inadequate to address the risk that we “might succumb to wartime hysteria.”47 I would broaden that observation so as to be open to the possibility that the risk goes beyond just wartime hysteria, that our desire for security and military victory, rooted in our repudiation of a genuine universal yardstick of propriety that we willingly apply to ourselves (often called American exceptionalism48)--which means that security and military victory are not ipso facto the same thing--could easily slide us into sanctioning a form of sovereignty that is dangerously outmoded and far out of proportion to what circumstances warrant. Process jurisprudence supposedly has the merit of putting the balance of security and liberty into the hands of the democratic institutions of our government. But what it cannot bring into the field of vision--and what is absolutely banished from view in Hamdi--is the possibility that the democratic institutions themselves, and perhaps even the democratic culture generally, the public sphere of that culture, have been corrupted so severely as to reduce process jurisprudence to a shell game.49 More specifically, the formal processes of governmentality responding to crisis is judicially monitored, but the mythos of our national identity, particularly the idea that every international crisis boils down to the unquestioned fact that the United States at least endeavors to act solely in self defense and to promote some benevolent goal that the entire world ought to stand behind, is manufactured and thus some hegemonic pursuit in this global “war on terror” remains not just juridically ignored, but muted and marginalized in much of our public discussions about it.50 Under process jurisprudence, it is the wording of a piece of legislation, not the decoding of the slogan national security, that ultimately matters. And under process jurisprudence, fundamental decisions have already been made--fundamental decisions concerning the nature of our global ambitions and the way we will pursue them--before the judiciary can confront the so-called security-liberty balance, which means that the analytical deck has been stacked by the time the justiciable question---that is, what we regard as the justiciable question---is posed. Stacking the analytical deck in this way reduces the Court members to the role of technicians in the service of whatever pursuit the sovereign happens to choose.51 This is why it is worth asking what many might regard as a naive, if not tendentious, question: is it true that in the case of Hamdi and other post-9/11 cases, the judiciary’s quandary over allocation of power is actually in the service of genuine security, meaning physical safety of the populace? Does the seemingly obvious answer that we seek only to protect the safety of our communities against naked violence blind us to a deeper ailment within our culture? Is it possible that the allocation of power, at bottom, is rooted in a dark side of our Enlightenment heritage, an impulse within Legality that threatens us in a way similar to the Thanatos drive Freud identified as creating civilization’s discontent?52 Perhaps Hamdi itself, as a cultural document, signals yet another capitulation to the impulse to embrace a form of means-ends rationality that supports the Enlightenment drive to control and subdue.53 Perhaps what Hamdi shows is that 9/11 has not really triggered a need to recalibrate the security-liberty balance, but has actually unleashed that which has already filtered into and corrupted our culture—Enlightenment’s dark side, as the Frankfurt School understood it54’’and is thus one among many cultural documents that ought to tell us we are not averting a new dark age, but are already in it, or at least, to borrow a phrase from Wendell Berry, that we are “leapfrogging into the dark.” 55 It is impossible, without the benefit of historical distance, to answer these questions with what amounts to comforting certitude. But they are worth confronting, since the fate of so many people depends on it, given our unrivaled ability and frightening willingness to use military force. Our culture’s inability to ask such questions in any meaningful way, as opposed to marginalizing those who plead for them to be confronted, is somewhat reminiscent of how early Enlightenment culture treated scientific endeavors. “Science,” during the rise of Enlightenment culture, rebuffed the why question, banished it as a remnant of medieval darkness, because the why-ness of a certain scientific pursuit suggested that certain domains of knowledge were bad, off-limits, taboo. The whole cultural mindset of the Enlightenment was to jettison precisely such a suggestion. That cultural mindset produced a faith all its own, that all scientific pursuits, and by extension all human quests for knowledge, will in the end promote human flourishing. It has taken the devastation of our planet to reveal the folly of that faith, a blind-spot in the Western mind. It may turn out, as a sort of silver lining on a dark cloud, that the terrorism arising from Islamic jihadists may do something similar.

#### Questioning the affirmatives ontology is a prior question to the advantages; the form of social relations their advocacy embodies rests on faulty epistemology and makes extinction inevitable---vote negative as a form of noncooperation with their political economy

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I. Industrial civilization is on a collision course with life itself. Facilitating its collapse is a deserved and welcomed correction, long overdue. Collapse is inevitable whether we seek to facilitate it or not. Nonetheless, whatever we do, industrial civilization, based as it is on mining and burning finite and polluting fossil fuels, cannot last because it is destroying the ecosystem and the basis of local, cooperative life itself. It knows no limits in a physically finite world and thus is unsustainable. And the numbers of our human species on earth, which have proliferated from 1.6 billion in 1900 to 7 billion today, is the consequence of mindlessly eating oil – tractors, fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides – while destroying human culture in the process. Our food system itself is not sustainable. Dramatic die-off is part of the inevitable correction in the very near future, whether we like it or not. Human and political culture has become totally subservient to a near religion of economics and market forces. Technologies are never neutral, with some being seriously detrimental. Technologies come with an intrinsic character representing the purposes and values of the prevailing political economy that births it. The Industrialism process itself is traumatic. It is likely that only when we experience an apprenticeship in nature can we be trusted with machines, especially when they capital intensive & complicated. The nation-state, intertwined more than ever with corporate industrialism, will always come to its aid and rescue. Withdrawal of popular support enables new imagination and energy for re-creating local human food sufficient communities conforming with bioregional limits. II. The United States of America is irredeemable and unreformable, a Pretend Society. The USA as a nation state, as a recent culture, is irredeemable, unreformable, an anti-democratic, vertical, over-sized imperial unmanageable monster, sustained by the obedience and cooperation, even if reluctant, of the vast majority of its non-autonomous population. Virtually all of us are complicit in this imperial plunder even as many of us are increasingly repulsed by it and speak out against it. Lofty rhetoric has conditioned us to believe in our national exceptionalism, despite it being dramatically at odds with the empirically revealed pattern of our plundering cultural behavior totally dependent upon outsourcing the pain and suffering elsewhere. We cling to living a life based on the social myth of US America being committed to justice for all, even as we increasingly know this has always served as a cover for the social secret that the US is committed to prosperity for a minority thru expansion at ANY cost. Our Eurocentric origins have been built on an extraordinary and forceful but rationalized dispossession of hundreds of Indigenous nations (a genocide) assuring acquisition of free land, murdering millions with total impunity. This still unaddressed crime against humanity assured that our eyes themselves are the wool. Our addiction to the comfort and convenience brought to us by centuries of forceful theft of land, labor, and resources is very difficult to break, as with any addiction. However, our survival, and healing, requires a commitment to recovery of our humanity, ceasing our obedience to the national state. This is the (r)evolution begging us. Original wool is in our eyes: Eurocentric values were established with the invasion by Columbus: Cruelty never before seen, nor heard of, nor read of – Bartolome de las Casas describing the behavior of the Spaniards inflicted on the Indigenous of the West Indies in the 1500s. In fact the Indigenous had no vocabulary words to describe the behavior inflicted on them (A Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies, 1552). Eurocentric racism (hatred driven by fear) and arrogant religious ethnocentrism (self-righteous superiority) have never been honestly addressed or overcome. Thus, our foundational values and behaviors, if not radically transformed from arrogance to caring, will prove fatal to our modern species. Wool has remained uncleansed from our eyes: I personally discovered the continued vigorous U.S. application of the “Columbus Enterprise” in Viet Nam, discovering that Viet Nam was no aberration after learning of more than 500 previous US military interventions beginning in the late 1790s. Our business is killing, and business is good was a slogan painted on the front of a 9th Infantry Division helicopter in Viet Nam’s Mekong Delta in 1969. We, not the Indigenous, were and remain the savages. The US has been built on three genocides: violent and arrogant dispossession of hundreds of Indigenous nations in North America (Genocide #1), and in Africa (Genocide #2), stealing land and labor, respectively, with total impunity, murdering and maiming millions, amounting to genocide. It is morally unsustainable, now ecologically, politically, economically, and socially unsustainable as well. Further, in the 20th Century, the Republic of the US intervened several hundred times in well over a hundred nations stealing resources and labor, while imposing US-friendly markets, killing millions, impoverishing perhaps billions (Genocide #3). Since 1798, the US military forces have militarily intervened over 560 times in dozens of nations, nearly 400 of which have occurred since World War II. And since WWII, the US has bombed 28 countries, while covertly intervening thousands of times in the majority of nations on the earth. It is not helpful to continue believing in the social myth that the USA is a society committed to justice for all , in fact a convenient mask (since our origins) of our social secret being a society committed to prosperity for a few through expansion at ANY cost. (See William Appleman Williams). Always possessing oligarchic tendencies, it is now an outright corrupt corporatocracy owned lock stock and barrel by big money made obscenely rich from war making with our consent, even if reluctant. The Cold War and its nuclear and conventional arms race with the exaggerated “red menace”, was an insidious cover for a war preserving the Haves from the Have-Nots, in effect, ironically preserving a western, consumptive way of life that itself is killing us. Pretty amazing! Our way of life has produced so much carbon in the water, soil, and atmosphere, that it may in the end be equivalent to having caused nuclear winter. The war OF wholesale terror on retail terror has replaced the “red menace” as the rhetorical justification for the continued imperial plunder of the earth and the riches it brings to the military-industrial-intelligence-congressional-executive-information complex. Our cooperation with and addiction to the American Way Of Life provides the political energy that guarantees continuation of U.S. polices of imperial plunder. III. The American Way Of Life (AWOL), and the Western Way of Life in general, is the most dangerous force that exists on the earth. Our insatiable consumption patterns on a finite earth, enabled by but a one-century blip in burning energy efficient liquid fossil fuels, have made virtually all of us addicted to our way of life as we have been conditioned to be in denial about the egregious consequences outsourced outside our view or feeling fields. Of course, this trend began 2 centuries earlier with the advent of the industrial revolution. With 4.6% of the world’s population, we consume anywhere from 25% to nearly half the world’s resources. This kind of theft can only occur by force or its threat, justifying it with noble sounding rhetoric, over and over and over. Our insatiable individual and collective human demands for energy inputs originating from outside our bioregions, furnish the political-economic profit motives for the energy extractors, which in turn own the political process obsessed with preserving “national (in)security”, e.g., maintaining a very class-based life of affluence and comfort for a minority of the world’s people. This, in turn, requires a huge military to assure control of resources for our use, protecting corporate plunder, and to eliminate perceived threats from competing political agendas. The U.S. War department’s policy of “full spectrum dominance” is intended to control the world’s seas, airspaces, land bases, outer spaces, our “inner” mental spaces, and cyberspaces. Resources everywhere are constantly needed to supply our delusional modern life demands on a finite planet as the system seeks to dumb us down ever more. Thus, we are terribly complicit in the current severe dilemmas coming to a head due to (1) climate instability largely caused by mindless human activities; (2) from our dependence upon national currencies; and (3) dependence upon rapidly depleting finite resources. We have become addicts in a classical sense. Recovery requires a deep psychological, spiritual, and physical commitment to break our addiction to materialism, as we embark on a radical healing journey, individually and collectively, where less and local becomes a mantra, as does sharing and caring, I call it the Neolithic or Indigenous model. Sharing and caring replace individualism and competition. Therefore, A Radical Prescription Understanding these facts requires a radical paradigmatic shift in our thinking and behavior, equivalent to an evolutionary shift in our epistemology where our knowledge/thinking framework shifts: arrogant separateness from and domination over nature (ending a post-Ice Age 10,000 year cycle of thought structure among moderns) morphs to integration with nature, i.e., an eco-consciousness felt deeply in the viscera, more powerful than a cognitive idea. Thus, we re-discover ancient, archetypal Indigenous thought patterns. It requires creative disobedience to and strategic noncooperation with the prevailing political economy, while re-constructing locally reliant communities patterned on instructive models of historic Indigenous and Neolithic villages.

## Adv 2

### A2: Public Backlash

#### No one pays attentions to drones and those that do support them

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President Obama is expected to discuss the use of drone strikes today in a speech on national security. For those who read this website, the use of unmanned aerial vehicles to take out suspected terrorists is a hot topic, but what exactly do Americans think of the practice? Frankly, most don't seem to care. Those that do have an opinion approve, in principle. Following Senator Rand Paul's filibuster aimed at shining light on the drone program, interest in the media peaked. Yet most Americans yawned – only 14% in a Gallup poll said they were following the news very closely, and 35% said they were following the news somewhat closely. Combined, the percentage of Americans following news stories about drones "closely" was below 50% (and equal to the percentage who were not following the news closely). The percentage following closely was over 10pts lower than the average percentage who follow a "big news story" closely. You might expect that the percentage of Americans following the drone news would largely oppose the use of drones, but you'd be wrong. Fifty-nine percent of Republicans, who are most likely to support drone strikes, were following drone news at least somewhat closely, compare with only 45% of Democrats following the story. That's in line with other data that suggests Republicans generally follow news more closely when it could possibly trouble the Obama administration. Either way, most Americans against drone strikes don't seem to care much about it. Indeed, most Americans at least partially favor drone strikes. Although differences in the wording of questions reveals different results, the median result falls along the lines of an April CBS News report, which found that 70% favored "the US using unmanned aircraft or 'drones' to carry out bombing attacks against suspected terrorists in foreign countries". Even the least favorable response, a Pew poll in February, found majority support for the the use of drones: 56% favoured, while only 26% opposed "conducting missile strikes from pilotless aircraft called drones to target extremists in countries such as Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia". Support for the drone program varies across demographic and political groups about like you'd expect. Across pretty much all polling, Republicans, by about 10pts, are more likely to support drone use in general than Democrats, though majorities of both parties support it. Men are more likely to favor it than women, by anywhere from 7pts to 20pts. Again, however, more women favor the drone program in general than oppose it. Why are Democrats and women more likely to oppose drone usage? It's not because of the program's murky legality. Among both groups, only 35% or less are "very concerned" about legality. With regard to the drones, Americans' number one worry is that the program endangers civilian lives. It's the only concern that garners a majority among the American people and among either Democrats or women. Of course, striking non-American citizens on foreign soil is only part of the picture. The polling is less conclusive when the pollster specifically mentions killing Americans citizens via drone attack. The aforementioned Gallup poll found that a tiny majority, 51%, were opposed to using drones to kill US citizens overseas, per the following question: "Do you think the US government should or should not use drones to launch airstrikes in other countries against US citizens living abroad who are suspected terrorists?" A Fox News poll found a majority, 60%, approved of this question: "Do you approve or disapprove of the United States using unmanned aircraft called drones to kill a suspected terrorist in a foreign country if the suspect is a US citizen?" What accounts for the difference? The Gallup poll was taken after Rand Paul's filibuster, so that could be part of it. However, CBS News showed no changed before or after Paul's polemic, and used consistent question wording. It's more likely that more proactive words, like "airstrikes" and "launch", might have raised the hackles of respondents and made a few more people oppose the program. As usual, truth probably lies between the surveys. A February CBS News poll discovered that 49%, a plurality, but not a majority, favored "the US targeting and killing American citizens in foreign countries who are suspected of carrying out terrorist activities against the US". The one thing all the polling agrees is that Americans are opposed to using drones to kill Americans in the United States. According to both Fox and Gallup, the majority is against this practice. Wording, again, makes a difference on the exact percentages, but Americans are strongly against this fantastical scenario. The fact remains, however, that on drones writ large, most Americans just don't seem to care, and aren't paying attention to the news. Those who are paying attention mostly favor the program, which fits with the overall public support of using drones to kill non-US citizens overseas. The polling is more split on killing citizens in other counties, but it seems that more American support than oppose the policy.

#### The drone program won’t collapse over allied criticism on zones of conflict issues

Benjamin Wittes 13, Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution, 2/27/13, “In Defense of the Administration on Targeted Killing of Americans,” http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/02/in-defense-of-the-administration-on-targeted-killing-of-americans/

First, some critics doubt the fundamental premise that the United States is engaged in an armed conflict that legally supports targeting the enemy with lethal force or that this armed conflict extends to the places in which, and the groups against whom, the United States is engaged in lethal-force operations. Some of these organizations and scholars deny that the United States can be engaged in a geographically non-specific armed conflict in locations remote from the hot battlefields of Afghanistan and—depending on the scholar—Pakistan. Others object to the premise that a single non-international armed conflict can authorize lethal operations against a variety of non-state actors in disparate locations around the world. The ACLU and the Center for Constitutional Rights, for example, arguing against the legality of the Al-Aulaqi strike and the separate strike that killed his son, contended that “[t]he killings of Anwar Al-Aulaqi, Samir Khan, and Abdulrahman Al-Aulaqi took place outside the context of any armed conflict.”[4] More broadly, international law scholar Kevin Jon Heller has argued that,

The actual organization of “al-Qa’ida and its associated forces” fatally undermines the White Paper. If those terrorist groups do not form a single organized armed group, there can be no single NIAC [non-international armed conflict] between the US and “al-Qa’ida and its associated forces.” And if there is no single NIAC between the United States and “al-Qa’ida and its associated forces,” the US cannot—by its own standards—justify targeting anyone who is a “senior operational commander” in one of those groups simply by citing the existence of the hostilities between the US and al-Qai’da in Afghanistan. On the contrary, in order to lawfully target a “senior operational commander” in a terrorist group that does not qualify as part of al-Qaida in Afghanistan, the US would, in fact, have to show . . . that there is a separate NIAC between the US and that group where that group is located.

This view has currency among European allies, among advocacy groups, and in the legal academy. Unfortunately for its proponents, it has no currency among the three branches of government of the United States. The courts and the executive branch have both taken the opposite view, and the Congress passed a broad authorization for the use of force and despite many opportunities, has never revisited that document to impose limitations by geography or to preclude force on the basis of co-belligerency—much less to clarify that the AUMF does not, any longer, authorize the use of military force at all. Congress has been repeatedly briefed on U.S. targeting decisions, including those involving U.S. persons.[5] It was therefore surely empowered to either use the power of the purse to prohibit such action or to modify the AUMF in a way that undermined the President’s legal reasoning. Not only has it taken neither of these steps, but Congress has also funded the relevant programs. Moreover, as I noted above, Congress’s recent reaffirmation of the AUMF in the 2012 NDAA with respect to detention, once again contains no geographical limitation.

There is, in other words, a consensus among the branches of government on the point that the United States is engaged in an armed conflict that involves co-belligerent forces and follows the enemy to the new territorial ground it stakes out. It is a consensus that rejects the particular view of the law advanced by numerous critics. And it is a consensus on which the executive branch is entitled to rely in formulating its legal views.

### A2: European Allies

#### Intel coop empirically resilient-it is uniquely suited to not be disrupted by political disagreements

**Aldrich, Warwick international studies professor, 2009**

(Richard, “US–European Intelligence Co-operation on Counter-Terrorism: Low Politics and Compulsion”, The British Journal of Politics & International Relations, 11.1, Wiley Online, ldg)

How do we explain the paradox of public criticism and private partnership? Superficially, we might conclude that European political elites have simply wished to ‘have their cake and eat it’. European politicians, faced with the classic dilemmas of conducting counter-terrorism in a liberal society, have dealt with this by playing to public opinion with their criticisms of American covert activity; meanwhile they have approved discreet co-operation with the very same programmes. The best example is France. In 2002, the CIA and the French Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (DGSE) established a highly secret covert operations centre in Paris called ‘Alliance Base’ which has helped to conduct renditions in Europe. Moreover, during 2003, even while President Chirac was lambasting George Bush over the issue of Iraq, France had quietly agreed to deploy 200 French special forces to work with the Americans in southern Afghanistan (Priest 2005a). In April 2007, CIA Director Michael Hayden complained loudly about the hypocrisy of European political leaders who publicly denounce the CIA, but privately enjoy the enhanced security provided by joint intelligence operations. There is no question that in practical terms, the operations of the last five years have degraded al Qa'eda's formal structure, albeit at significant costs in terms of the ‘battle for hearts and minds’. Angered by European inquiries into renditions, Hayden spoke at a lunch at the German Embassy in Washington that was attended by many European diplomats. He insisted that inquiries had exaggerated the CIA's activities, adding that fewer than 100 people had been held in secret facilities since spring 2002, and that less than half had been subjected to ‘alternative procedures’ during their interrogations (Pincus 2007). Simultaneously Congress was inquiring into the impact of renditions on transatlantic co-operation and indeed upon intra-European co-operation (House of Representatives 2007). Although Hayden spoke of ‘bottomless criticism’, the phenomenon of European public criticism vs. private co-operation is complex and some of the important structural explanations for this have been ignored. While intelligence now looms larger in public discourse, the realm of grand strategy still remains unfamiliar territory for swollen ranks of the workaday intelligence officers. Unlike ministers and diplomats, theirs is not a world of ‘grand normative projects’ but instead a realm of individual cases, files and specific operations. Often characterised as sinister, the realm of intelligence is instead perhaps the most human of all aspects of government and consists to a large degree of personal relationships. The universal currency is trust. Achieving congruence on grand counter-terrorism strategy may require common ideals, but joint intelligence operations are driven by a more basic sense of mutual reliance and a track record of competence in the field (Svendsen (forthcoming)). Indeed, recent history suggests that intelligence co-operation between allies is rarely affected by disagreements over ideals or strategy. This is because the world of intelligence is remarkably fissiparous. Even a simple bilateral intelligence partnership between two countries actually consists of many intelligence relationships. Most countries boast a multiplicity of agencies, which are in turn further compartmentalised for security reasons. Intelligence is also the realm of specialists par excellence, whose particular interests, be it financial transfers or biological warfare, tend to insulate them from wider political arguments (Aldrich 1998). This has always been the case, but complexity is increasing as domestic agencies also develop stronger international relationships. French intelligence chiefs have long argued that it is perfectly possible for their operatives to work with allies on political and military targets, while remaining rivals in terms of economic and industrial espionage (Alexander 1998). Rivalry is probably at its most intense in the relatively unknown area of intelligence support to arms sales (Dover 2007). Other transatlantic phenomena stand in need of explanation, including the cautious growth of multilateral intelligence activity. Traditionally, even the longest-standing intelligence alliances have been tinged with a cautious bilateralism. Intelligence services have tended to prefer ‘need to know’ and the recent move towards ‘need to share’, often with more than one partner, reflects wider pressures that go beyond co-operation against terrorism. Arguably, Europe and the United States have little choice but to work ever more closely since an increasing number of their most troublesome opponents are transnational and are no respecters of boundaries. Intelligence agencies are now seen as the first line of defence against a whole range of illicit actors, be they terrorists, drug smugglers, people traffickers, proliferators or warlords, and seek to achieve the same fluidity as their opponents. This is an underlying trend that stretches back to 1989 and is likely to continue well beyond any termination of the ‘war on terror’.

#### They need us more than we need them

**Perry, AP correspondent, 2013**

(Nick, “Experts Say US Spy Alliance Will Survive Snowden”, 7-16, <http://www.military.com/daily-news/2013/07/16/experts-say-us-spy-alliance-will-survive-snowden.html>, ldg)

WELLINGTON, New Zealand - Britain needed U.S. intelligence to help thwart a major terror attack. New Zealand relied on it to send troops to Afghanistan. And Australia used it to help convict a would-be bomber. All feats were the result of a spying alliance known as Five Eyes that groups together five English-speaking democracies, and they point to a vital lesson: American information is so valuable, experts say, that no amount of global outrage over secret U.S. surveillance powers would cause Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand to ditch the Five Eyes relationship. The broader message is that the revelations from NSA leaker Edward Snowden are unlikely to stop or even slow the global growth of secret-hunting - an increasingly critical factor in the security and prosperity of nations. "Information is like gold," Bruce Ferguson, the former head of New Zealand's foreign spy agency, the Government Communications Security Bureau, told The Associated Press. "If you don't have it, you don't survive." The Five Eyes arrangement underscores the value of this information - as well as the limitations of the information sharing. The collaboration began during World War II when the allies were trying to crack German and Japanese naval codes and has endured for more than 70 years. The alliance helps avoid duplication in some instances and allows for greater penetration in others. The five nations have agreed not to spy on each other, and in many outposts around the world, Five Eyes agencies work side by side, allowing for information to be shared quickly. But Richard Aldrich, who spent a decade researching a book on British surveillance, said some Five Eyes nations have spied on each other, violating their own rules. The five countries "generally know what's in each other's underwear drawers so you don't need to spy, but occasionally there will be issues when they don't agree" - and when that happens they snoop, Aldrich said. In Five Eyes, the U.S. boasts the most advanced technical abilities and the biggest budget. Britain is a leader in traditional spying, thanks in part to its reach into countries that were once part of the British Empire. Australia has excelled in gathering regional signals and intelligence, providing a window into the growing might of Asia. Canadians, Australians and New Zealanders can sometimes prove useful spies because they don't come under the same scrutiny as their British and American counterparts. "The United States doesn't share information," said Bob Ayers, a former CIA officer, "without an expectation of getting something in return." Britain is home to one of the world's largest eavesdropping centers, located about 300 kilometers (186 miles) northwest of London at Menwith Hill. It's run by the NSA but hundreds of British employees are employed there, including analysts from Britain's eavesdropping agency, the Government Communications Headquarters - or GCHQ. Australia is home to Pine Gap, a sprawling satellite tracking station located in the remote center of the country, where NSA officials work side-by-side with scores of locals. The U.S. also posts three or four analysts at a time in New Zealand, home to the small Waihopai and Tangimoana spy stations. The intelligence-sharing relationship enabled American and British security and law enforcement officials to thwart a major terror attack in 2006 - the trans-Atlantic liquid bomb plot to blow up some 10 airliners. The collaboration, sometimes called ECHELON, takes place within strict parameters. Two U.S. intelligence officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they weren't authorized to speak about the program to the news media, said only U.S. intelligence officers can directly access their own vast database. A Five Eyes ally can ask to cross-check, say, a suspicious phone number it has independently collected to see if there is any link to the U.S., the officials said. But the ally must first show the request is being made in response to a potential threat to Western interests. Ferguson said that in New Zealand, cooperation with the U.S. improved markedly after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Still, he said, his agency was kept on a need-to-know basis. He said he never knew what information was being provided to other Five Eyes nations, and none of the countries would have shared all their intelligence anyway. Ferguson said a small country like New Zealand benefited by a ratio of about five-to-one in the information it received compared to what it provided. He said that as chief of the defense force, a role he held before taking over the spy agency in 2006, he could never have sent troops to Afghanistan without the on-the-ground intelligence provided by the U.S. and other allies. He said New Zealand continues to rely on Five Eyes information for most of its overseas deployments, from peacekeeping to humanitarian efforts. The intelligence is vital, he added, for thwarting potential cyber threats. In Australia, prosecutors in 2009 used evidence from a U.S. informant who had been at a terrorist training camp in Pakistan to help convict one of nine Muslim extremists found guilty of planning to bomb an unspecified Sydney target. The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation wrote in an email to The AP that "intelligence sharing between countries is critical to identifying and preventing terrorism and other transnational security threats." Canada's Department of National Defence had a similar response, saying it "takes an active role in building relationships with allies. Collaborating with the personnel of the Five Eyes community in support of mutual defense and security issues is part of this relationship building." Both agencies declined requests to provide more specific information. In the decades since World War II, the allies have formed various other intelligence allegiances, although few as comprehensive or deep as Five Eyes. While the Snowden revelations will test the relationship, it has survived tests in the past. New Zealand has long asserted an independent foreign policy by banning nuclear ships, and some are now calling for the country to go further and opt out of Five Eyes. Lawmaker Russel Norman, co-leader of New Zealand's Green Party, is one of many people calling for a public review of the relationship. "I want to live in a free society, not a total surveillance state," he said. "The old Anglo-American gang of five no longer runs the world." But John Blaxland, a senior fellow at the Australian National University's Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, said politicians Down Under have often criticized the security relationship until they've gotten into power and been briefed on its benefits. Then, he said, they tend to go silent. "The perception is that the advantages are so great, they'd be crazy to give it up," he said.

#### Multiple alt causes

**McGill, Norwich School of Graduate and Continuing Studies in Diplomacy, 2012**

(Anna-Katherine, “Challenges to International Counterterrorism Intelligence Sharing,” Global Security Studies, 3.3, ebsco, ldg)

Indeed, in the aftermath of 9/11 the US saw not only its NATO counterparts rise to action but also a new enthusiasm from its traditional bilateral relationships in improving counterterrorism coordination and more specifically intelligence sharing. Still, the rallying of support for the US following the attacks is not enough to overcome longstanding political and institutional hurdles to counterterrorism intelligence sharing. Although the US shares many political and cultural values with its traditional allies, their views diverge on issues like the invasion of Iraq, personal data protection, and the treatment or punishment of terrorists. The Invasion of Iraq The invasion of Iraq provides a perfect example of how the national interests of one nation can threaten the interests of its allies and more specifically, how policies in one arena can affect cooperation in another. According to US Senator Byrd, a major critic of the Bush administration, the invasion of Iraq “split traditional alliances, possibly crippling, for all time, international order-keeping entities like the United Nations and NATO” (qtd in Gardner 16). The central concerns arising from the 2003 Iraq invasion were the use of “preemptive” or “preventative” (depending on who you ask) strikes, unilateral action, and ultimately questionable motives. Consequently, bilateral cooperation from Germany, France, and NATO ally Turkey has taken a major hit. France argued against military intervention in favor of enforced inspections and diplomacy. Furthermore, it refuted that the US invasion of Iraq did not constitute collective security and therefore was not an obligation of NATO’s article V. Hall Gardner explains that while France has always been a reluctant ally, Germany and Turkey “represented the most loyal NATO allies during the Cold War” (3). As a result of the Iraq invasion, however, these two nations “bitterly questioned US policies and actions for very different reasons” (Gardner 3). For Germany, the use of preventative military strikes set a dangerous precedent for state behavior. They feared that should this become the norm, “it would undermine international law and concepts of national sovereignty dating back to Westphalia” (Gardner 3). Turkey, on the other hand, feared that the US invasion of Iraq would run directly counter to its national interests in regards to the Kurds of northern Iraq. While these countries have remained committed to the counterterrorism effort, the public row over the Iraq invasion shaped global public opinion of the US led war on terrorism and likely lessened domestic support for aiding the Americans in future CT endeavors. The fallout from US actions and its greater presence in the Middle East has arguably made it a larger target to terrorist organization which portray the US as a global crusader. By default, those who supported and contributed to the invasion of Iraq are also greater targets of transnational terrorist networks like al Qaeda. Additionally, the use of ultimately false intelligence on Iraqi position of WMD to justify the invasion heightened criticism of the US intelligence community and thus hurt their reputation in producing credible intelligence analysis.

 Personal data protection Personal data is critical to counterterrorism efforts because it “often provide[s] the only evidence of connections between members of terrorist groups and the types of activities that they are conducting” (Bensehal 48). However, Europe has shown resistance to freely sharing this type of information with its American counterparts since many of the US’s European allies have much more stringent views on the protection of personal data. In the EU, there are safeguards at the national and regional level that regulate the storage and sharing of personal data information. These laws are a product of Europe’s historical experience with fascism and thus its sensitivity to the abuse of such information as travel records or communications (Bensahel, 48). In “The Counterterror Coalitions: Europe, NATO, and the European Union” Nora Bensahel explains “by contrast, the United States protects personal information through legal precedents and procedures rather than [unified] legislation” which the Europeans find insufficient (48). The EU’s concerns over the US’s protection of personal data caused them to withhold information from the US and created a substantial challenge to their combined counterterrorism efforts. Following 9/11 the heightened political will to overcome such issues enabled the US and the EU to compromise on this issue but there are lingering limits to EU willingness to share personal data with the US. In the wake of the attacks, the US and Europol signed an agreement to permit the sharing of personal data. Although it increased operational effectiveness and intelligence sharing this agreement is limited to law enforcement operations which excludes personal data found in commercial activities. Furthermore, provisions in the agreement state that “personal information can be used only for the specific investigation for which it was requested” (Bensahel, 48). If the suspect is being investigated for murder and is discovered to have ties to a smuggling ring the US must submit a separate request to use the murder information in the case regarding the smuggling activities. The Rights of the Accused The US and the EU have also had substantial disagreements on the treatment and punishment of accused terrorists. This tension hinges on such issues as the use of the death penalty and “extraordinary rendition”. Fortunately, the death penalty issue was resolved with the passage of an multilateral treaty on extradition however the US has not fully recovered from the backlash of criticism and mistrust from its practice of “extraordinary rendition”. Prior to a May 2002 summit, the US and EU were at a disagreement over the death penalty. The EU’s aversion to capital punishment led it to not only hesitate from sharing information but deny requests for extradition unless the US would guarantee that the individual in question would not face the death penalty. The 2002 summit did however bring both the US and EU to at least agree in principle to a treaty on extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) and both parties ratified the treaties in 2003. The extradition treaty allowed for a blanket policy for European nations to “grant extradition on the condition that the death penalty will not be imposed” and the MLAT provided enhanced capability to gather and exchange information (Bensahel 49). The CIA’s use of “extraordinary rendition”, the practice of transporting a suspect to a third country for interrogation, has also stoked the ire of many traditional allies. Critics charge that this tactic quite simply allows the CIA to sidestep international laws and obligations by conducting interrogations in nations with poor human-rights records. In 2003, an Italian magistrate formally indicted 13 CIA agents for allegedly kidnapping an Italian resident and transporting him to a third country for interrogation. Ultimately 22 CIA agents and one US military officer were convicted in absentia of crimes connected to the abduction (Stewart, 1). The case not only heightened criticism of the US in Italy but challenged U.S. strategic communications aimed at reducing anti-Americanism worldwide (Reveron 462). According to Julianne Smith, director of the Europe program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), “[extraordinary rendition] makes it extremely difficult [for European governments] to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the U.S.” (Heller 1).

#### Allies agree that TKs are appropriate as a first resort even outside of conflict zones

**Corn, South Texas presidential research professor, 2012**

(Geoffrey, “Blurring the Line Between the Jus ad Bellum and the Jus in Bello,” in Non-International Armed Conflict in the Twenty-First Century, pg 75-6, ldg)

The statement by Legal Advisor Koh following the Bin Laden raid addressing U.S. legal authority for the mission and for killing Bin Laden is perhaps as clear an articulation of a legal basis for a military action ever provided by the Department of State.175 Indeed, the fact that Koh articulated an official U.S. interpretation of both the jus ad helium and jus in bello makes his use of a website titled Opinio Juris176 especially significant (as such a statement by a government official in Koh's position is clear evidence of opinio juris). Unlike his earlier statement at a meeting of the American Society of International Law,'77 Koh did not restrict his invocation of law to the jus ad helium. Instead, he asserted the U.S. position that the mission was justified pursuant to the inherent right of self-defense, but also that Bin Laden's killing was lawful pursuant to the jus in bello. Koh properly noted that as a mission executed in the context of the armed conflict with al Qaeda, the LOAC imposed no obligation on U.S. forces to employ minimum necessary force. Instead, Bin Laden's status as an enemy belligerent justified the use of deadly force as a measure of first resort, and Bin Laden bore the burden of manifesting his surrender in order to terminate that authority. Hence, U.S. forces were in no way obligated to attempt to capture Bin Laden before resorting to deadly force.178 A recent statement made by John Brennan, Deputy National Security Advisor for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, further clarifies the current administration's justification for using deadly force as a first resort against al Qaeda operatives: The United States does not view our authority to use military force against al-Qa'ida as being restricted solely to "hot" battlefields like Afghanistan. Because we are engaged in an armed conflict with al-Qa'ida, the United States takes the legal position that... we have the authority to take action against al-Qa'ida and its associated forces without doing a separate self-defense analysis each time---- This Administration's counterterrorism efforts outside of Afghanistan and Iraq are focused on those individuals who are a threat to the United States, whose removal would cause a significant—even if only temporary—disruption of the plans and capabilities of al-Qa'ida and its associated forces. Practically speaking, then, the question turns principally on how you define "imminence." We are finding increasing recognition in the international community that a more flexible understanding of "imminence" may be appropriate when dealing with terrorist groups, in part because threats posed by non-state actors do not present themselves in the ways that evidenced imminence in more traditional conflicts… Over time, an increasing number of our international counterterrorism partners have begun to recognize that the traditional conception of what constitutes an "imminent" attack should be broadened in light of the modern-day capabilities, techniques, and technological innovations of terrorist organizations.1'9

#### Allies will inevitably come around on US drone doctrine questions---they know they’re the future of war and won’t want to be left out

**Franke, Oxford IR PhD candidate, 2013**

(Ulrike, “Just the new hot thing? The diffusion of UAV technology worldwide and its popularity among democratic states”, <http://files.isanet.org/ConferenceArchive/4269932e782d47248d5269ad381ca6c7.pdf>, ldg)

As shown in the first part of this paper, democracies seem to be particularly interested in drone technology. Niklas Schoerning argues that especially western democracies are fuelling a global UAV arms race.56 I argue that in addition to the aforementioned arguments, there are three main reasons why democracies and especially western democracies are particularly interested in the unmanned technology. Prestige (among partners): Not only autocracies have an interest in depicting their armed forces as modern and powerful. Democracies use UAVs to show off as well – however, their aim is rather to portray themselves as capable and reliable coalition partners for other western democracies and especially with an eye on the United States. French General Patrick Charaix points out: “If [France] wants to remain powerful within a coalition, we need to bring an unmanned capability to the table. Indeed, those countries that count have this military means which contributes on the one hand to the success of a mission and on the other hand increases the power and influence of the country.57 German defence minister Thomas de Maizière voiced a similar opinion in a recent speech on UAVs in the Bundestag: “We cannot say ‘we’ll keep the stagecoach’ while all others are developing the railway”.58 UAVs, according to this interpretation, are the irresistible future – those who are not part of it will lose out. An important aspect of this desire not to lose out is interoperability.59 Western states rarely go to war alone anymore. Today’s western wars are fought by coalitions, namely within NATO. This has important consequences for the equipment that is needed: the members of the coalition need to use the same kind of material in order to be effective and powerful.60 As NATO is dominated by the US and since the US is the most capable user of UAVs, this has important repercussions on the other NATO members. For Frans Osinga, NATO is “an obvious and important avenue of infusion of US military […] technology”.61

#### Can’t appease allies

**Anderson, American university law professor, 2009**

(Kenneth, “Targeted Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law”, 5-11, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2009/5/11%20counterterrorism%20anderson/0511_counterterrorism_anderson.pdf>, ldg)

Similarly, very few people in the United States, regardless of political persuasion, would regard the Predator strike in Yemen on November 3, 2002—which killed six people, including a senior member of al Qaeda, Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi, in a vehicle on the open road—as anything other than a good thing, regardless of how one characterizes it legally. Yet the U.N. Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions described it as a “clear case of extrajudicial killing.”58 The legal analysis followed that held by Amnesty International and many others—to wit, that it does not matter whether the targeted killing takes place in armed conflict or not, nor how the United States justifies it legally, because international human rights law continues to apply no matter what and to require that the governments involved seek to arrest, rather than to kill. A subsequent U.N. special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions summarized his office’s view in 2004: “Empowering Governments to identify and kill ‘known terrorists’ places no verifiable obligation upon them to demonstrate in any way that those against whom lethal force is used are indeed terrorists, or to demonstrate that every other alternative had been exhausted.”59 Once again, it is hard to see how targeted killing as a policy could survive in any form with such a legal characterization. Various European allies have been extremely hostile toward the practice. Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh was among the most outspoken critics of the U.S. targeting of al-Harethi in November 2002. She described the operation as “a summary execution that violated human rights…Even terrorists must be treated according to international law. Otherwise any country can start executing those whom they consider terrorists.”60 The criticism is even stronger when the actor is Israel—which undertakes targeted killing in keeping with the peculiarly long-term, “mixed” war-security and intelligence-law enforcement nature of its struggle—and, incidentally, with far more procedural protections than the United States uses, including judicial review. Then the gloves come off completely in expressions of international hostility to the practice.61 To be clear, under the standards these groups are articulating, these practices are regarded as crimes by a sizable and influential part of the international community. This is so whether or not these acts are currently reachable by any particular tribunal. As the coercive interrogation debate shows, with Spain and other countries considering prosecutions in their own courts, the trend is toward an expansion of jurisdiction of such tribunals. And America’s claim that these are killings of combatants in an armed conflict governed by either self-defense or IHL does not cut much ice against the views of those who either reject the armed conflict claim outright or else claim that even in armed conflict, human rights standards will apply. American officials seem to believe that by appealing to the detailed and specific requirements of IHL on the formal and technical definition of combatancy as an apparent condition of finding a lawful target, they have done an especially good and rigorous parsing of the legal requirements. As far as the international law community is concerned, however, the combatancy standard is not some especially rigorous approach that shows how concerned a party is for international law. To the contrary, it is by definition a relaxation of the ordinary standard of international human rights law, including prohibitions on murder and extrajudicial killing—and it can only be justified by the existence of an armed conflict that meets the definitions of IHL treaties. At times it appears that the United States government has little idea how much its concession of formal requirements of combatancy concedes. Yet when the United States argues that it’s okay to target someone because he is a combatant, it effectively concedes that the conflict must meet the definition of an IHL conflict for such an attack to be legitimate. By contrast, what the United States needs, and its historic position has asserted, is a claim that self-defense has an existence as a doctrine apart from IHL armed conflict that can justify the use of force against an individual. The United States has long assumed, then-Legal Adviser to the State Department Abraham Sofaer stated in 1989, that the “inherent right of self defense potentially applies against any illegal use of force, and that it extends to any group or State that can properly be regarded as responsible for such activities.”62 To put the matter simply, the international law community does not accept targeted killings even against al Qaeda, even in a struggle directly devolving from September 11, even when that struggle is backed by U.N. Security Council resolutions authorizing force, even in the presence of a near-declaration of war by Congress in the form of the AUMF, and even given the widespread agreement that the U.S. was both within its inherent rights and authorized to undertake military action against the perpetrators of the attacks. If targeted killing in which the international community agreed so completely to a military response against terrorism constitutes extrajudicial execution, how would it be seen in situations down the road, after and beyond al Qaeda, and without the obvious condition of an IHL armed conflict and all these legitimating authorities? In the view of much of the international law community, a targeted killing can only be something other than an extrajudicial execution—that is, a murder—if • It takes place in an armed conflict; • The armed conflict is an act of self-defense within the meaning of the UN Charter, and • It is also an armed conflict within the meaning of IHL; and finally, • Even if it is an armed conflict under IHL, the circumstances must not permit application of international human rights law, which would require an attempt to arrest rather than targeting to kill. As a practical matter, these conditions would forbid all real-world targeted killings. As we now turn to see, the United States has never accepted these criteria. The result is that a strategic centerpiece of U.S. counterterrorism policy rests upon legal grounds regarded as deeply illegal—extrajudicial killing is one of the most serious violations of international human rights, after all, as well it should be—by large and influential parts of the international community. The change of administration from Bush to Obama gives some protection to the policy, but not likely for all of the Obama term and still less likely beyond it. We turn now from how the international law community sees targeted killing to U.S. views of the subject under both international and domestic law.

### a/t terror

#### The plan specifically and narrowly creates restrictions on targeted killings---those killings are legally and operationally distinct from “signature strikes”

**Dunn et al., Birmingham International politics reader, 2013**

(David, “Drone Use in Counter-Insurgency and Counter-Terrorism: Policy or Policy Component?”, March, <http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Hitting_the_Target.pdf>, ldg)

Yet an important distinction needs to be drawn here between acting on operational intelligence that corroborates existing intelligence and confirms the presence of a specific pre-determined target and its elimination – so-called ‘targeted strikes’ (or less euphemistically, ‘targeted killings’) – and acting on an algorithmic analysis of operational intelligence alone, determining on the spot whether a development on the ground suggests terrorist activity or association and thus fulfils certain (albeit, to date, publicly not disclosed) criteria for triggering an armed response by the remote pilot of a drone – so-called ‘signature strikes’.6 Targeted strikes rely on corroborating pre-existing intelligence: they serve the particular purpose of eliminating specific individuals that are deemed crucial to enemy capabilities and are meant to diminish opponents’ operational, tactical and strategic capabilities, primarily by killing mid- and top-level leadership cadres. To the extent that evidence is available, it suggests that targeted strikes are highly effective in achieving these objectives, while simultaneously generating relatively little blowback, precisely because they target individual (terrorist) leaders and cause few, if any, civilian casualties. This explains, to a significant degree, why the blowback effect in Yemen – where the overwhelming majority of drone strikes have been targeted strikes – has been less pronounced than in Pakistan and Afghanistan.7 Signature strikes, in contrast, can still be effective in diminishing operational, tactical and strategic enemy capabilities, but they do so to a certain degree by chance and also have a much higher probability of causing civilian casualties. Using drones for signature strikes decreases the dependence on pre-existing intelligence about particular leaders and their movements and more fully utilises their potential to carry out effective surveillance and respond to the conclusions drawn from it immediately. Signature strikes have been the predominant approach to drone usage in Pakistan and Afghanistan.8 Such strikes have had the effect of decimating the rank and file of the Taliban and their associates – but they have also caused large numbers of civilian casualties and, at a minimum, weakened the respective host governments’ legitimacy and forced them to condemn publicly, and in no uncertain terms, the infringement of their states’ sovereignty by the US. In turn, this has strained already difficult relations between countries which have more common than divergent interests when it comes to regional stability and the fight against international terrorist networks. That signature strikes have a high probability of going wrong and that such failures prove extremely counterproductive is also illustrated by a widely reported case from Yemen, in which twelve civilians were killed in the proximity of a car identified as belonging to an Al-Qa’ida member.9 The kind of persistent and intimidating presence of a drone policy geared towards signature strikes, and the obvious risks and consequences involved in repeatedly making wrong decisions, are both counterproductive in themselves and corrosive of efforts that seek to undercut the local support enjoyed by insurgent and terrorist networks, as well as the mutual assistance that they can offer each other. Put differently, signature strikes, in contrast to targeted killings, do anything but help to disentangle the links between insurgents and terrorists.

## Adv 1

### No Drone Prolif – 1NC

#### Tech isn’t the key---no one has the human capital or intel to conduct wide scale drone operations

Boyle 12 (Ashley, is an Adjunct Junior Fellow at the American Security Project, “The US and its UAVs: Addressing Legality and Overblown Scenarios,” http://americansecurityproject.org/blog/2012/the-us-and-its-uavs-addressing-legality-and-overblown-scenarios/)

While there is no question that the US has used drones, it is hardly alone in wielding the technology. Approximately fifty nations possess and use drones. However, Wikipedia informs us that of these nations, only twelve have lethal drones of which only three nations – China, Iran, and Russia – may be of concern. Possessing the technology is only one part of the picture. Nations must also have the capabilities to maintain and operate these aircraft, as well as an intelligence network that informs their surveillance or strike activities. The supporting systems required to operate drones is greatly underestimated, and it is difficult to see China, Iran, or Russia having the resources or desire to launch expansive drone programs in the short- to mid-term. While the long-term picture always requires discussion, alarmist messages about impending drone wars are just that: alarming and unfounded.

### A2: China Drones

#### Afraid it helps the US

Erickson and Strange 13 (ANDREW ERICKSON is an associate professor at the Naval War College and an Associate in Research at Harvard University’s Fairbank Center. Follow him on Twitter @andrewserickson. AUSTIN STRANGE is a researcher at the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute and a graduate student at Zhejiang University. “China Has Drones. Now What?,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139405/andrew-erickson-and-austin-strange/china-has-drones-now-what?page=show)

Drones, able to dispatch death remotely, without human eyes on their targets or a pilot's life at stake, make people uncomfortable - even when they belong to democratic governments that presumably have some limits on using them for ill. (On May 23, in a major speech, US President Barack Obama laid out what some of those limits are.) An even more alarming prospect is that unmanned aircraft will be acquired and deployed by authoritarian regimes, with fewer checks on their use of lethal force.¶ Those worried about exactly that tend to point their fingers at China. In March, after details emerged that China had considered taking out a drug trafficker in Myanmar with a drone strike, a CNN blog post warned, "Today, it's Myanmar. Tomorrow, it could very well be some other place in Asia or beyond." Around the same time, a National Journal article entitled "When the Whole World Has Drones" teased out some of the consequences of Beijing's drone programme, asking, "What happens if China arms one of its remote-piloted planes and strikes Philippine or Indian trawlers in the South China Sea?"¶ Indeed, the time to fret about when China and other authoritarian countries will acquire drones is over: they have them. The question now is when and how they will use them. But as with its other, less exotic military capabilities, Beijing has cleared only a technological hurdle - and its behaviour will continue to be constrained by politics.¶ China has been developing a drone capacity for over half a century, starting with its reverse engineering of Soviet Lavochkin La-17C target drones that it had received from Moscow in the late 1950s. Today, Beijing's opacity makes it difficult to gauge the exact scale of the programme, but according to Ian Easton, an analyst at the Project 2049 Institute, an American think-tank devoted to Asia-Pacific security matters, by 2011 China's air force alone had over 280 combat drones. In other words, its fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles is already bigger and more sophisticated than all but the United States'; in this relatively new field Beijing is less of a newcomer and more of a fast follower. And the force will only become more effective: the Lijian ("sharp sword" in Chinese), a combat drone in the final stages of development, will make China one of the very few states that have or are building a stealth drone capacity.¶ This impressive arsenal may tempt China to pull the trigger. The fact that a Chinese official acknowledged that Beijing had considered using drones to eliminate the Myanmar drug trafficker, Naw Kham, makes clear that it would not be out of the question for China to launch a drone strike in a security operation against a non-state actor. Meanwhile, as China's territorial disputes with its neighbours have escalated, there is a chance that Beijing would introduce unmanned aircraft, especially since India, the Philippines and Vietnam distantly trail China in drone funding and capacity, and would find it difficult to compete. Beijing is already using drones to photograph the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands it disputes with Japan, as the retired Chinese major-general Peng Guangqian revealed earlier this year, and to keep an eye on movements near the North Korean border.¶ Beijing, however, is unlikely to use its drones lightly. It already faces tremendous criticism from much of the international community for its perceived brazenness in continental and maritime sovereignty disputes. With its leaders attempting to allay notions that China's rise poses a threat to the region, injecting drones conspicuously into these disputes would prove counterproductive. China also fears setting a precedent for the use of drones in East Asian hotspots that the United States could eventually exploit. For now, Beijing is showing that it understands these risks, and to date it has limited its use of drones in these areas to surveillance, according to recent public statements from China's Defence Ministry.

### Restraint Fails – 1NC

#### U.S. drone use doesn’t set a precedent, restraint doesn’t solve it, and norms don’t apply to drones at all in the first place

Amitai Etzioni 13, professor of international relations at George Washington University, March/April 2013, “The Great Drone Debate,” Military Review, <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20130430_art004.pdf>

Other critics contend that by the United States using drones, it leads other countries into making and using them. For example, Medea Benjamin, the cofounder of the anti-war activist group CODEPINK and author of a book about drones argues that, “The proliferation of drones should evoke reﬂection on the precedent that the United States is setting by killing anyone it wants, anywhere it wants, on the basis of secret information. Other nations and non-state entities are watching—and are bound to start acting in a similar fashion.”60 Indeed scores of countries are now manufacturing or purchasing drones. There can be little doubt that the fact that drones have served the United States well has helped to popularize them. However, it does not follow that United States should not have employed drones in the hope that such a show of restraint would deter others. First of all, this would have meant that either the United States would have had to allow terrorists in hardto-reach places, say North Waziristan, to either roam and rest freely—or it would have had to use bombs that would have caused much greater collateral damage.

Further, the record shows that even when the United States did not develop a particular weapon, others did. Thus, China has taken the lead in the development of anti-ship missiles and seemingly cyber weapons as well. One must keep in mind that the international environment is a hostile one. Countries—and especially non-state actors— most of the time do not play by some set of self constraining rules. Rather, they tend to employ whatever weapons they can obtain that will further their interests. The United States correctly does not assume that it can rely on some non-existent implicit gentleman’s agreements that call for the avoidance of new military technology by nation X or terrorist group Y—if the United States refrains from employing that technology.

I am not arguing that there are no natural norms that restrain behavior. There are certainly some that exist, particularly in situations where all parties beneﬁt from the norms (e.g., the granting of diplomatic immunity) or where particularly horrifying weapons are involved (e.g., weapons of mass destruction). However drones are but one step—following bombers and missiles—in the development of distant battleﬁeld technologies. (Robotic soldiers—or future ﬁghting machines— are next in line). In such circumstances, the role of norms is much more limited.

# 2NC

### Xo

#### Their evidence doesn’t assume the counterplan that creates an explicit cause of action for private enforcement – no judicial review thing

Ostrow-GW law review-87 55 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 659, \*

55 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 659

NOTE: ENFORCING EXECUTIVE ORDERS: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY ACTION UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT. \*

Even if an executive order has the force and effect of law, courts will not recognize a private cause of action against the government under the executive order unless there is evidence of presidential intent to create a cause of action. 32 For example, in Acevedo v. Nassau County, 33 members of low-income minority groups brought a class action alleging that the General Services Administration had violated an executive order 34 by planning a federal office building without considering the adequacy of low-income housing in the area. 35 The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal on the ground, inter alia, that the executive order created no right of action, either express or implied. 36 The court found that the order did not expressly grant a cause of action and that the obligations imposed by the order were "so broad and vague" that inferring a private cause of action might engender protracted lawsuits by persons with little at stake. 37 If presidential intent is not explicit, courts frequently will look to the history of the executive order or the administrative scheme established by the order to determine whether there exists an implied right of action. Using this analysis, some courts refuse to allow a cause of action under an executive order based on an "exclusivity [\*666] of remedy" rationale. 38 The Fifth Circuit in Farkas v. Texas Instrument, 39 for example, held that there was no right of action under an executive order because the administrative remedies prescribed by the order were intended to be the exclusive mode of enforcement. 40 Plaintiff asserted that he was discharged in violation of an executive order 41 that forbade government contractors from discriminating against employees or applicants on the basis of national origin. 42 Plaintiff had unsuccessfully pursued his administrative remedies under the order by seeking relief before the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity. 43 The court concluded that the Committee's refusal to grant relief was final and that the President did not contemplate a private cause of action directly under the order "[i]n light of the Order's emphasis on administrative methods of obtaining compliance with the required contractual provisions." 44 It therefore affirmed the district court's dismissal of the discrimination claim for failure to state a cause of action. 45 These decisions illustrate the formidable barriers that plaintiffs must overcome to assert a cause of action directly under an executive order. Courts have been extremely reluctant to infer rights of action when, as is frequently the case, the orders are silent on the subject of private enforcement and establish their own administrative remedial schemes. 46 Instead of looking exclusively to the executive order for a cause of action, courts should look to the APA as an alternative basis for judicial review of an agency's violation of an order.

### 2NC Future Presidents Rollback

#### ---Fiat Solves---A minimal interpretation of structural fiat would preserve the existence of the executive order, just like legislation or court decisions would survive elections or appointments. At best this is a question of implementation and enforcement.

#### ---Political barriers check – new, stronger constituencies

Branum-Associate Fulbright and Jaworski- 2

Tara L, Associate, Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P, “President or King? The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders in Modern Day America” Journal of Legislation 28 J. Legis. 1

Congressmen and private citizens besiege the President with demands  [\*58]  that action be taken on various issues. [n273](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.689002.875983458&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220903297496&returnToKey=20_T4511783216&parent=docview" \l "n273) To make matters worse, once a president has signed an executive order, he often makes it impossible for a subsequent administration to undo his action without enduring the political fallout of such a reversal. For instance, President Clinton issued a slew of executive orders on environmental issues in the weeks before he left office. [n274](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.689002.875983458&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220903297496&returnToKey=20_T4511783216&parent=docview" \l "n274) Many were controversial and the need for the policies he instituted was debatable. [n275](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.689002.875983458&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220903297496&returnToKey=20_T4511783216&parent=docview" \l "n275) Nevertheless, President Bush found himself unable to reverse the orders without invoking the ire of environmentalists across the country. [n276](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.689002.875983458&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220903297496&returnToKey=20_T4511783216&parent=docview" \l "n276) A policy became law by the action of one man without the healthy debate and discussion in Congress intended by the Framers. Subsequent presidents undo this policy and send the matter to Congress for such debate only at their own peril. This is not the way it is supposed to be.

#### ---Future administrations rarely overturn previous executive orders

Washington Times 8/23/99

 “Clinton’s Executive Orders are Still Packing a Punch: Other Presidents Issued More, but His are Still Sweeping” Frank Murray [http://www.questia.com/library/1G1-55543736/clinton-s-executive-orders-still- are-packing-a-punch](http://www.questia.com/library/1G1-55543736/clinton-s-executive-orders-still-%20are-packing-a-punch)

Clearly, Mr. Clinton knew what some detractors do not: Presidential successors of the opposite party do not lightly wipe the slate clean of every order, or even most of them. Still on the books 54 years after his death are 80 executive orders issued by Franklin D. Roosevelt. No less than 187 of Mr. Truman's orders remain, including one to end military racial segregation, which former Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Colin Powell praised for starting the "Second Reconstruction." "President Truman gave us the order to march with Executive Order 9981," Mr. Powell said at a July 26, 1998 ceremony marking its 50th anniversary. Mr. Truman's final order, issued one day before he left office in 1953, created a national security medal of honor for the nation's top spies, which is still highly coveted and often revealed only in the obituary of its recipient.

### Solves rollback

#### That the CP is justified by complying with international norms on armed conflict means their 1ac Zenko card is a CP solvency card- it says even non-legally codified restrictions still set norms- (read yellow)

**Zenko ’13** [Micah, Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously, he worked for five years at the Harvard Kennedy School and in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service, and State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies,” January, Council Special Report No. 65, online]

In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, President Obama declared:¶ “Where force is necessary, we have a moral and strategic interest in¶ binding ourselves to certain rules of conduct. Even as we confront a¶ vicious adversary that abides by no rules, I believe the United States of¶ America must remain a standard bearer in the conduct of war.”63 Under¶ President Obama drone strikes have expanded and intensified, and they¶ will remain a central component of U.S. counterterrorism operations¶ for at least another decade, according to U.S. officials.64 But much as the¶ Bush administration was compelled to reform its controversial counterterrorism¶ practices, it is likely that the United States will ultimately¶ be forced by domestic and international pressure to scale back its drone¶ strike policies. The Obama administration can **preempt** this pressure¶ by clearly articulating that the rules that govern its drone strikes, like all¶ uses of military force, are based in the laws of armed conflict and international¶ humanitarian law; by engaging with emerging drone powers;¶ and, most important, by matching practice with its stated policy by¶ limiting drone strikes to those individuals it claims are being targeted¶ (which would reduce the likelihood of civilian casualties since the total¶ number of strikes would significantly decrease).¶ The choice the United States faces is not between unfettered drone¶ use and sacrificing freedom of action, but between drone policy reforms¶ by design or drone policy reforms by default. Recent history demonstrates¶ that domestic political pressure could severely limit drone¶ strikes in ways that the CIA or JSOC have not anticipated. In support of¶ its counterterrorism strategy, the Bush administration engaged in the¶ extraordinary rendition of terrorist suspects to third countries, the use¶ of enhanced interrogation techniques, and warrantless wiretapping.¶ Although the Bush administration defended its policies as critical to¶ protecting the U.S. homeland against terrorist attacks, unprecedented¶ domestic political pressure led to significant reforms or termination. Compared to Bush-era counterterrorism policies, drone strikes are¶ vulnerable to similar—albeit still largely untapped—moral outrage,¶ and they are even more susceptible to political constraints because they¶ occur in plain sight. Indeed, a negative trend in U.S. public opinion¶ on drones is already apparent. Between February and June 2012, U.S.¶ support for drone strikes against suspected terrorists fell from 83 percent¶ to 62 percent—which represents less U.S. support than enhanced¶ interrogation techniques maintained in the mid-2000s.65 Finally, U.S.¶ drone strikes are also widely opposed by the citizens of important allies,¶ emerging powers, and the local populations in states where strikes¶ occur.66 States polled reveal overwhelming opposition to U.S. drone¶ strikes: Greece (90 percent), Egypt (89 percent), Turkey (81 percent),¶ Spain (76 percent), Brazil (76 percent), Japan (75 percent), and Pakistan¶ (83 percent).67¶ This is significant because the United States cannot conduct drone¶ strikes in the most critical corners of the world by itself. Drone strikes¶ require the tacit or overt support of host states or neighbors. If such¶ states decided not to cooperate—or to actively resist—U.S. drone¶ strikes, their effectiveness would be immediately and sharply reduced,¶ and the likelihood of civilian casualties would increase. This danger is¶ not hypothetical. In 2007, the Ethiopian government terminated its¶ U.S. military presence after public revelations that U.S. AC-130 gunships¶ were launching attacks from Ethiopia into Somalia. Similarly, in¶ late 2011, Pakistan evicted all U.S. military and intelligence drones, forcing¶ the United States to completely rely on Afghanistan to serve as a¶ staging ground for drone strikes in Pakistan. The United States could¶ attempt to lessen the need for tacit host-state support by making significant¶ investments in armed drones that can be flown off U.S. Navy ships,¶ conducting electronic warfare or missile attacks on air defenses, allowing¶ downed drones to not be recovered and potentially transferred to¶ China or Russia, and losing access to the human intelligence networks¶ on the ground that are critical for identifying targets.¶ According to U.S. diplomats and military officials, active resistance—¶ such as the Pakistani army shooting down U.S. armed drones—¶ is a legitimate concern. In this case, the United States would need to¶ either end drone sorties or escalate U.S. military involvement by attacking¶ Pakistani radar and antiaircraft sites, thus increasing the likelihood¶ of civilian casualties.68 Beyond where drone strikes currently take place,¶ political pressure could severely limit options for new U.S. drone bases. For example, the Obama administration is debating deploying armed¶ drones to attack al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in North¶ Africa, which would likely require access to a new airbase in the region.¶ To some extent, anger at U.S. sovereignty violations is an inevitable and¶ necessary trade-off when conducting drone strikes. Nevertheless, in¶ each of these cases, domestic anger would partially or fully abate if the¶ United States modified its drone policy in the ways suggested below.¶ The United States will inevitably improve and enhance the lethal¶ capabilities of its drones. Although many of its plans are classified, the¶ U.S. military has nonspecific objectives to replace the Predators and¶ Reapers with the Next-Generation Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA)¶ sometime in the early-to-mid 2020s. Though they are only in the early¶ stages of development, the next generation of armed drones will almost¶ certainly have more missiles of varying types, enhanced guidance and¶ navigation systems, greater durability in the face of hostile air defense¶ environments, and increased maximum loiter time—and even the capability¶ to be refueled in the air by unmanned tankers.69 Currently, a senior¶ official from the lead executive authority approves U.S. drone strikes in¶ nonbattlefield settings. Several U.S. military and civilian officials claim¶ that there are no plans to develop autonomous drones that can use lethal¶ force. Nevertheless, armed drones will incrementally integrate varying¶ degrees of operational autonomy to overcome their most limiting and¶ costly factor—the human being.70¶ Beyond the United States, drones are proliferating even as they are¶ becoming increasingly sophisticated, lethal, stealthy, resilient, and¶ autonomous. At least a dozen other states and nonstate actors could¶ possess armed drones within the next ten years and leverage the technology¶ in unforeseen and harmful ways. It is the stated position of the¶ Obama administration that its strategy toward drones will be emulated by other states and nonstate actors. In an interview, President Obama¶ revealed, “I think creating a legal structure, processes, with oversight¶ checks on how we use unmanned weapons is going to be a challenge for¶ me and for my successors for some time to come—partly because technology¶ may evolve fairly rapidly for other countries as well.”71¶ History shows that how states adopt and use new military capabilities¶ is often influenced by how other states have—or have not—used¶ them in the past. Furthermore, norms can deter states from acquiring new technologies.72 Norms—sometimes but not always codified as¶ legal regimes—have dissuaded states from deploying blinding lasers¶ and landmines, as well as chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. A well-articulated and internationally supported normative framework, bolstered by a strong U.S. example, can shape armed drone proliferation¶ and employment in the coming decades. Such norms would not¶ hinder U.S. freedom of action; rather, they would internationalize¶ already-necessary domestic policy reforms and, of course, they would¶ be acceptable only insofar as the limitations placed reciprocally on U.S.¶ drones furthered U.S. objectives. And even if hostile states do not accept¶ norms regulating drone use, the existence of an international normative framework, and U.S. compliance with that framework, would preserve¶ Washington’s ability to apply diplomatic pressure. Models for¶ developing such a framework would be based in existing international¶ laws that emphasize the principles of necessity, proportionality, and¶ distinction—to which the United States claims to adhere for its drone¶ strikes—and should be informed by comparable efforts in the realms of¶ cyber and space.¶ In short, a world characterized by the proliferation of armed¶ drones—used with little transparency or constraint—would undermine¶ core U.S. interests, such as preventing armed conflict, promoting¶ human rights, and strengthening international legal regimes. It would¶ be a world in which targeted killings occur with impunity against anyone¶ deemed an “enemy” by states or nonstate actors, without accountability¶ for legal justification, civilian casualties, and proportionality. Perhaps¶ more troubling, it would be a world where such lethal force no longer¶ heeds the borders of sovereign states. Because of drones’ inherent¶ advantages over other weapons platforms, states and nonstate actors¶ would be much more likely to use lethal force against the United States¶ and its allies.

# 1NR

### Impact Calc---2NC

#### Terrorism, prolif, rouge state aggression and great power war are inevitable, the US will have to be involved because we are the hegemon, it’s a question of speed and effectiveness at stamping conflicts out before they get bigger, that’s Yoo

### No Enforcement

#### Targeted killing is the only game in town---deterrence will be ineffective because there is no territory to strike

Yoo 11 (John, Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley, “Assassination or Targeted Killings After 9/11,” http://www.nylslawreview.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/Yoo-56-1.pdf)

Using targeted killing as a primary tactic also takes better account of the new kind of war facing the United States. The United States has prevailed in conventional wars by invading the territory of an enemy nation, destroying its armed forces on the battlefield, and capturing key cities and population centers. It has won by outproducing its opponents. During the lead-up to World War II, President Franklin D. Roosevelt aptly declared the United States to be the great “arsenal of democracy.”37 Historically, the United States has deployed its large productive capacity and population in war, and its large, well-equipped and well-supplied armies and navies have, generally speaking, overwhelmed the soldiers of the other side. The United States cannot win the war on terrorism by producing more tanks, fielding more army divisions, or setting more carrier battle groups and submarines to sail than this enemy. This did not work in Vietnam and it will not work against the even more diffuse enemy of today. Military plans based on traditional deterrence and the threat of retaliation will not be effective against this terrorist network because it has no territory or armed forces to crush, and its members welcome death. The amount of actual force needed to frustrate or cripple al-Qaeda is quite small, and well within the capabilities of a single division of U.S. troops. Indeed, the problem is not with the strength of America’s power, but how and where to aim it. Al-Qaeda does not mass its operatives into units onto a battlefield, or at least it has not after its setbacks in Afghanistan in the fall and winter of 2001. Instead, al-Qaeda will continue to disguise its members as civilians, hide its bases in remote mountains and deserts or among unsuspecting city populations, and avoid military confrontation. The only way for the United States to defeat al-Qaeda is to destroy its ability to function—by selectively killing or capturing its key members. In fact, the unique circumstances of the war on terrorism make a compelling case for taking out individual al-Qaeda leaders. Al-Qaeda is a social network of friends, acquaintances, or companies interlocked through various cross-ownerships and relationships; it is not unlike the Internet, which gives it remarkable resiliency. A killed or captured leader seems to be quickly replaced by the promotion of a more junior member and, as in Iraq, other arms of the network spring to the fore. Most nation-states would have collapsed after the kinds of losses inflicted by the armed forces and the CIA over the last decade: thousands of operatives killed, two thirds of al-Qaeda’s leadership killed or captured, and its open bases and infrastructure destroyed in Afghanistan.38 But al-Qaeda operatives continue to attempt to infiltrate the United States, and they have succeeded in carrying out new terrorist attacks in London, Madrid, and Bali.39

#### Targeted killing is critical to demoralize

Yoo 12 (John, Prof of Law, Cal Berkeley, “Assassination or Targeted Killings after 9/11,” http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2215&context=facpubs)

War, however, brings forth a different set of concerns. When a nation goes to war, it seeks to defeat the enemy in order to prevent future harms to society inflicted by enemy attacks. Because war deals with prospective concerns, it must rely less on exact information and more on probabilities, predictions, and guesswork. Often the military attempts to destroy a building because it estimates with varying degrees of certainty that enemy soldiers are hiding within it or enemy munitions are located there. It does not wait to attack until it has proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or even probable cause; that would risk allowing the enemy forces to escape, to strengthen their position, or to live to attack the country's own forces or citizens another day. War by its nature seeks prevention, not punishment. When the United States considered terrorism to be a matter for the criminal justice system, it waited until after attacks on the United States had occurred before attempting to capture al-Qaeda leaders. Now that the United States is at war with al-Qaeda, it is entitled to kill the enemy's commanders. This is done in an effort to demoralize the enemy, throw their troops into confusion and disarray, undermine their planning, and remove their most able leaders. Such is a well-documented wartime strategy. World War II and the Korean War witnessed numerous attacks on enemy military leaders." In the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan ordered U.S. jets to bomb Libyan locations where Colonel Muammar Qadhafi might be living and working. 6

#### Can’t constrain the executive---its not a question of yes/no intervention, just a question of speed and effectiveness

Posner and Vermeule 11(Eric, Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law, The University of Chicago, and Adrian, John H. Watson Professor of Law, Harvard Law School “DEMYSTIFYING SCHMITT,” http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/333-eap-Schmitt.pdf)

Schmitt believed that constitution-writing assemblies and legislatures cannot enact substantive laws that govern the executive during emergencies; the most the rulemaker can specify in advance is who will exercise emergency powers.30 The argument falls out of the rules/standards analysis. Emergencies are, by their nature, unique. Every threat to the nation is different. If emergencies are unique, then their features cannot be predicted on the basis of the past, which means that legislatures will not be able to use rules to govern the executive’s behavior during them. The cost of predicting the nature of the next security threat is too high; and given their busy agendas, legislatures have little motivation to invest the resources in trying to predict the future. Instead of enacting rules that govern the executive during emergencies, legislatures enact standards, in effect delegating to the executive the power to take aggressive actions to defend the nation under ill-defined conditions and subject to ill-defined constraints. In the United States, most emergency legislation takes the forms of standards; and it exists alongside a constitutional understanding that the executive has the primary responsibility for fending off foreign attacks and addressing other threats, and may draw on military and law enforcement resources to do so. If Congress cannot regulate in advance of emergencies, might it not be able to regulate once the emergency begins? The problem is that in the early stages of the emergency, the legislature is hampered by its many-headed structure. Large bodies of people deliberate and act slowly (unless they act as mobs). The best that the legislature can do is ratify the executive’s actions by blessing it with a retroactive authorization, or call a halt to the executive’s response by defunding it. As the emergency matures, the legislature continues to be hampered. Crises unfold in an unpredictable fashion; secrecy will be at a premium. Public deliberation compromises secrecy; the unpredictability of the threat eliminates the value of lawmaking. The legislature’s role in the emergency is marginal. It can grant or withhold political support; and it can legislate along the margins. The legislature may be able to undermine the executive response by defunding it, but it will rarely do so because some response is always better than none. The problem for the legislature is that it cannot make policy in a fine-grained way; its choice—broad support or none at all—is no choice at all. Anticipating a body of literature in positive political theory, Schmitt noted that “the extraordinary lawmaker [i.e. the President of the Reich] can create accomplished facts in opposition to the ordinary legislature. Indeed, especially consequential measures, for example, armed interventions and executions, can, in fact, no longer be set aside.”31 The President’s first-mover role – the “presidential power of unilateral action”32 – implies that he can create a new status quo that constrains Congress’ subsequent response, both in practical terms and because the President can use his veto powers to block legislative attempts to restore the status quo ante. Courts face similar problems. Detailed statutes enacted before the emergency will seem antiquated and inapt. Courts will feel pressure to interpret them loosely or use procedural obstacles to avoid their application. For this reason, violations of FISA and the Anti-Torture Act never led to prosecutions. Vague statutes enacted before and after the emergency provide no rule of decision, and courts are reluctant to substitute their views about policy for those of the executive, which has far more expertise and resources. Commentators have urged courts to use constitutional norms or even international law to control the executive, but these norms also prove to be ambiguous standards rather than clear-cut rules. To apply such standards, courts would have to engage in judicial policymaking. But judges do not believe that they have the information or expertise to make policy during emergencies and so they have seldom taken this approach. The upshot is that the Madisonian theory is a poor description of how modern democratic governments operate during emergencies and in anticipation of emergencies. Congress cannot realistically enact rules in advance, and cannot commit to enforce them if violated, so the policymaking authority during emergencies rests with the executive. Indeed, because the executive has responsibility for protecting the country during emergencies, only the executive has motivation to prepare for emergencies, which it does by putting into place institutions and agencies, and the legal authority that they will rely on. It is the executive that has constructed the national security state; Congress has mostly ratified the policies adopted by a series of presidents. Congress retains a very crude veto power; it can interfere executive policymaking during emergencies only by withdrawing funds and, in effect, calling the emergency off. But Congress is highly constrained by the nature of the threat, and can use this blunt instrument only in extreme circumstances. The current system, then, is better described as one of executive primacy than separation of powers. The president makes and executes policy subject to weak vetoes by Congress and the courts, which can be exercised only after the president has committed the country to a response to the perceived threat, and hence have little practical effect.

### congress

#### Statutory restrictions collapse national security---

#### a.) Speed Congress is too large and unwieldy to take the swift and decisive action

#### b.)Isolationist tendencies; congress doesn’t want the blame for the next Vietnam, they vote against intervention and constrain action

c.) deterrence credibility; friends and foes will think the US can’t intervene

Walker 88 (WALLACE EARL WALKER Ph.D. THE CITADEL, Charleston, South Carolina ¶ Dean of Business Administration and Robert A. Jolley Professor, “Congressional Resurgence ¶ and the Destabilization of ¶ US Foreign Policy,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA516915)

Statutory constraints have limited the president's ability to forge a new consensus on foreign affairs and to guarantee American support to allies or friendly Third World nations. The Harkin Amendment's emphasis on human rights has served as a polarizing issue, both within and without the government. Thus we have observed dramatic diplomatic shifts on this issue from the Carter to the Reagan Administrations. The War Powers Act, the CIA restrictions, and liberal concerns in Congress about "another Vietnam" have impeded US ability to sustain a military or paramilitary intervention, thereby creating doubts about the reliability of an American response in a crisis. Allies must now hedge against the unwillingness of the United States to intervene in the first place or, in the event of intervention, against precipitate American withdrawal regardless of the international consequences.43 Potential adversaries, superpower and Third World alike, are no longer faced with what one senior foreign policy official called the "long shadow of military force" that can intervene and remain in place to back up American negotiating stances. The recent intervention in Grenada and the bombing attack against Libya clearly demonstrate that any US military involvement will be short-lived. Just as congressional frustration over the handling of the Vietnam War beg at the War Powers Act, so that act begat the Weinberger doctrine which has imposed a number of preconditions on the use of military force: e.g. clearly defined political and military objectives, a commitment to winning, and clear support of the Congress and the American public. 44 Such preconditions have created considerable strain in the national security establishment, with Secretary of State George Schultz and then-National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane having, at one point, been critical of the Defense Secretary and these preconditions. US national security policy is thus destabilized with no consensus over what aims should be pursued and what means are appropriate. Clearly congressional resurgence has played a central role in creating this state of ¶ affairs.

#### Congressional declarations-cause delay, inflexibility and compromises secrecy

**Yoo, Berkeley law professor, 2006**

(John, “Energy in the Executive: Re-examining Presidential Power in the Midst of the War on Terrorism”, 4-24, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2006/04/energy-in-the-executive-reexamining-presidential-power-in-the-midst-of-the-war-on-terrorism>, ldg)

On the other hand, congressional action has led to undesirable outcomes. Congress led us into two "bad" wars, the 1798 quasi-war with France and the War of 1812. Excessive congressional control can also prevent the U.S. from entering conflicts that are in the national interest. Most would agree that congressional isolationism before World War II harmed U.S. interests and that the United States and the world would have been far better off if President Franklin Roosevelt could have brought us into the conflict much earlier. Congressional participation does not automatically, or even consistently, produce desirable results in war decision-making. Critics of presidential war powers exaggerate the benefits of declarations or authorizations of war. What also often goes unexamined are the potential costs of congressional participation: delay, inflexibility, and lack of secrecy. Legislative deliberation may breed consensus in the best of cases, but it also may inhibit speed and decisiveness. In the post-Cold War era, the United States is confronting several major new threats to national security: the proliferation of WMD, the emergence of rogue nations, and the rise of international terrorism. Each of these threats may require pre-emptive action best undertaken by the President and approved by Congress only afterwards. Take the threat posed by the al-Qaeda terrorist organization. Terrorist attacks are more difficult to detect and prevent than those posed by conventional armed forces. Terrorists blend into civilian populations and use the channels of open societies to transport personnel, material, and money. Despite the fact that terrorists generally have no territory or regular armed forces from which to detect signs of an impending attack, weapons of mass destruction allow them to inflict devastation that once could have been achievable only by a nation-state. To defend itself from this threat, the United States may have to use force earlier and more often than was the norm during the time when nation-states generated the primary threats to American national security. In order to forestall a WMD attack, or to take advantage of a window of opportunity to strike at a terrorist cell, the executive branch needs flexibility to act quickly, possibly in situations where congressional consent cannot be obtained in time to act on the intelligence. By acting earlier, perhaps before WMD components have been fully assembled or before an al-Qaeda operative has left for the United States, the executive branch might also be able to engage in a more limited, more precisely targeted, use of force. Similarly, the least dangerous way to prevent rogue nations from acquiring weapons of mass destruction may depend on secret intelligence gathering and covert action rather than open military intervention. Delay for a congressional debate could render useless any time-critical intelligence or windows of opportunity.