## 1NC

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#### Geronimo is the omnipresent image of Apache culture, a proud warrior reduced to being a prisoner. The narrative at the beginning of the 1AC makes reference to the Chiricahua without acknowledging the Warm Springs people who were kidnapped by Geronimo before they were taken prisoner by the US army. The Warm Springs and their leader Chief Loco embraced a strategy of nonviolence whereas Geronimo was committed to violence which could only beget more violence. The nonviolent counternarrative of Chief Loco offers a better insight into both detention policy and the history of colonialism.

Aplin 2011

T. Christopher, Bud Shapard. Chief Loco: Apache Peacemaker. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2010. pp. Cloth, $34.95. The American Indian Quarterly Volume 35, Number 3, Summer 2011

In Indians in Unexpected Places , Phillip Deloria proposed the Bedonkohe Apache Geronimo as a metaphorical identity model for Indigenous resistance: "If you had to pick a single person to stand for Indianness , you could do worse than Geronimo," continuing, "[he is] the iconic Apache leader who stands in American popular memory for resistant warriors everywhere and the defeated prisoners we imagine they became."1 With this statement Deloria succinctly describes the conventional framework in which scholars understand and interpret "Chiricahua" history. In his long-overdue text, Loco: Apache Peacemaker , Bud Shapard turns our focus away from the resistant warriors and imprisoned victims of earlier writings and, using Chief Loco as a counternarrative, offers a necessary window into the Apachean third-way: Loco's Warm Springs Apache as agents of peaceful Indigenous resistance through political diplomacy and philosophical cosmopolitanism. So, who are Chief Loco and the Warm Springs Apache? The Warm Springs Apache were a related but politically autonomous band or principality within a larger, decentralized Apache "nation" that also included the Chiricahua, Nednai, and Bedonkohe peoples. These groups were conflated during the Apache wars, more a result of American administration than political unanimity. Shapard fleshes out the details of their reluctant consolidation in the pages of his book as he describes Loco's 1869 overtures for American peace; his commitment to enforcing treaty obligations among his community despite the influence of his more-aggressive political rival, Victorio; his steadfast reinforcement of a Warm Springs political identity over broader "Chiricahua" interests in securing a land-base for his people; and (with considerable long-term consequences for [End Page 464] his community and their descendents) his commitment to seeking reservation settlement at Ojo Caliente (also called Warm Springs, near Cañada Alamosa, New Mexico). The narrative arc of Loco is one common to the literature on the "Chiricahua" Apache, beginning with a broad biographical sketch of Loco and then jumping right into the early reservation era, the Geronimo campaign era between 1882 and 1886, and subsequent imprisonment in Florida, Alabama, and Oklahoma. The chapters on southwestern violence provide much-needed accounting for Warm Springs' activities on three separate reservations and during their 1882 abduction into Mexico. Loco and family play only a secondary role in the later chapters on Florida and Alabama imprisonment, however. Shapard's contribution in those chapters is his detailed portraiture of the imprisonment years in the East (which, as subtext, acts as a critique of the polemical nature of some Chiricahua histories). One can argue with his bottom line. But Shapard's persuasive analyses of the prisoners' imprisonment living conditions, the origins of their illness, and the role of citizen activism and public relations in shaping Apache lives rigorously evaluate the unexpected politics and experiences of imprisonment in a manner worthy of debate. There are a few issues that complicate my full embrace of this work. Like most writings on the "Chiricahua," Shapard's materials are derived from surviving American military and bureaucratic reports. Shapard develops little of the Mexican perspective during the violence of the 1880s. Loco is also light on describing intertribal connectivity and power among southwestern Indigenous nations. Loco's own actions and words are often reported secondhand in state documents. In the end, the focus of Loco 's depiction is soft due to the scant documentation directly linked to the chief and the need to stick close to the established American-centric narrative of the Apache Wars. These are mostly limitations imposed by available materials. I was personally most disappointed that Shapard dealt with the seven years the Apache prisoners spent in Alabama in two full chapters but allowed only one brief chapter (that doubles as a hasty conclusion) to describe the decade that Loco lived and died at Fort Sill—a later period in which readily available documentation is more abundant. Given his considerable access to Loco family oral histories, an important question Shapard may want to develop in future publication is, What was it like for the peaceful Loco to live in imprisonment alongside Geronimo, particularly given the Warm Springs community's action as military scouts against that famous raider and his popular embrace in captivity? As for the strengths of Loco , Shapard's contextualization of the reservation period within a broader scope of American domestic policy and Grant-era recession is sharp. Shapard is skillful in describing the events of that era in terms of budgetary economics as well as interdepartmental and interpersonal politics [End Page 465] (especially in his descriptions of the skirmishing that took place between the Executive Office and the Departments of Defense and Interior). These elements of his writing, in combination with a well-developed cast of angels and devils, including names like Clum, Bourke, Welsh, Sheridan, Miles, and Cleveland, provide a sobering commentary on the dangers inherent in the detached political sausage making of modern bureaucracy. Shapard's portrait of inter-Apache politics at San Carlos—notably regarding the suspicious sentiments White Mountain and San Carlos Apache held toward Geronimo's "raiders"—was likewise an important and well-developed contribution to Chiricahua literature. The most valuable contribution of Chief Loco: Apache Peacemaker is Shapard's Warm Springs-centered approach. Shapard is clear in detailing the sociopolitical independence of Loco's Warm Springs people both before and after they were bureaucratically conflated by national government. Most importantly (for even modern tribal members), Shapard subordinates Geronimo's status within the text in a manner appropriate to Warm Springs' perspective by introducing him late in the narrative (92-93), only after his questionable leadership (see, e.g., 6, 93, 144) began to affect Warm Springs Apache independence. Respected scholars from Opler to Debo have too often labeled Loco and his descendants the "acculturated" or "assimilated" Apache. In that light, some might argue that the Warm Springs Apache were a community that traded the dream of land and nationhood for political appeasement. Yet others like Shapard might argue that, rather than American militarism, it was a fellow Apache, Geronimo, who was responsible for the forced abduction, flight, and near destruction of an unarmed Warm Springs Apache community by Mexican forces at Alisos Creek. But, unlike the warriors and victims who found their violent end under Geronimo's sway, it is the few Loco descendents (known in modern parlance as the Fort Sill Chiricahua/Warm Springs Apache of Oklahoma) who not only survived but still dream of Ojo Caliente, of their hopeful return home through a not-yet-realized casino at Akela Flats, New Mexico. Told in these terms, it remains a question whose people—Geronimo's or Loco's—still fight one century later for their philosophy (whether of aggression or détente) or for their ideals of community and home. This is the story that Bud Shapard tells. It is the story of Loco and the Warm Springs Apache. And their story has greater relevance for the way that we understand the strategic agency of Indigenous peoples as they encountered industrial modernity in the convergent borderlands between nation-states and Indigenous nations.

#### The 1AC’s analysis of violence fails as long as it uses these war stories. Peace education is the only means of preventing extinction, a counternarrative of Chief Loco and the Warm Springs people resolves the affirmative without undue focus on warmaking.

Allen 7 (Douglas Allen Department of Philosophy, University of Maine “Mahatma Gandhi on Violence and Peace Education,” Project Muse)

Gandhi’s preventative peace-education approach shares much with this particular Buddhist orientation. Violence, terror, exploitation, and war are not independent, eternal, absolute, or inevitable. They exist within a violent phenomenal world of impermanent, interdependent relativity. Historical, psychological, economic, social, religious, and other forms of violence are caused and conditioned, and they themselves become causes and condition other violent consequences that then become new violent causal factors. The path and goal for peace education involves focusing on the means that allow you to decondition such violent causal factors and conditions and to introduce nonviolent causes and conditions; this will lead to more nonviolent results that will then become new causal factors. The means-ends relation involves mutual interaction, since the adoption of nonviolent ideals as ends will also have a causal influence on the shaping of appropriate means. In this way, peace education aims at transforming the causally connected, means-ends, interdependent whole, of which you are an integral part, from one constituted through ignorance, violence, and suffering to a more moral and spiritual relational whole. This very process of means-ends causal transformation, by which one transforms relations with others in order to serve their needs, is the very process by which one transforms one’s own self toward greater freedom and self-realization. The need for peace education to focus on the larger picture in order to formulate preventative approaches should be evident from previous formulations of Gandhi’s deeper and broader analysis of violence, including educational violence, and his analysis of means-ends relations for getting at the root causes and conditions underlying multidimensional violence. As Gandhi repeatedly warns us, if we do not understand and respond to the larger framework of complex multidimensional, interrelated structures and relations of violence, if we do not address the root causes, conditions, and dynamics of violence, then our short-term responses will not be sufficient for dealing with the escalating violence that creates such widespread suffering and threatens human survival. This is why Gandhi devotes so much time and effort to a radically different model of peace education with emphasis on character building and moral and spiritual development. This is why peace education must focus on psychological awareness and an analysis of how we constitute and must decondition ego-driven selfishness and greed and defense mechanisms responding to fear and insecurity, hatred, aggression, and other violent intentions and inner states of consciousness. This is why peace education must focus on the political, cultural, social, economic, linguistic, religious, and other aspects of overall socialization that contribute to, tolerate, and justify violence, oppression, exploitation, and war.

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#### The roll of the ballot is to answer the resolutional question “whether topical action is better then the status quo or competitive option”

#### “Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum

**Army Officer School 2005**

(“# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, 5-12, <http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm>)

The colon introduces the following: a. A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b. A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c. A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d. A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e. After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f. The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g. A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:" Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

####  “USFG should” means the debate is solely about a policy established by governmental means

**Ericson, California Polytechnic dean emeritus, 2003**

(Jon, The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, pg 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, should adopt here **means to put a** program or **policy into action though governmental means**. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### Debate over a controversial point of action creates argumentative stasis—that’s key to avoid a devolution of debate into competing truth claims, which destroys the decision-making benefits of the activity

**Steinberg and Freeley, Miami communication studies lecturer and Boston based attorney, 2008**

(David and Austin, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making, pg 45)

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Effective deliberative discourse is the lynchpin to solving existential social and political problems

**Lundberg, UNC Chapel Hill communications professor, 2010**

(Christian, Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century, pg 311-3)

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical •outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by •debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, debate builds capacity for critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and better public judgment. If the picture of modern political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change out pacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to re-articulation, it is open to re-articulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Dewey in The Public and Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63,154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to sort through and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly information-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them. The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, 140) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multi-mediated information environment (ibid.), Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources: To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instruction/no instruction and debate topic ... that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned... students in the Instructional [debate] group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so.... These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in [debate] These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144) Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthen and Gaylen Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthen and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials. There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the as a technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of critical-thinking skills, research and information-skills, oral-communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded, and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life. Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens who can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive and to deal with systemic threats that risk our collective extinction. Democratic societies face a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international issues of class, gender, and racial justice; wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of terrorism, intervention, and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing challenges of rapid globalization, including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges to democracy in an increasingly complex world. Given the challenge of perfecting our collective political skill, and in drawing on the best of our collective creative intelligence, it is incumbent on us to both make the case for and, more important, to do the concrete work to realize an expanded commitment to debate at colleges and universities.

#### Maintaining even division of ground and contestability is key to maintain debate’s unique potential for educational dialogue-alternative interpretations-guarantee uneducational monologues.

**Hanghoj, Aarhus education assistant professor, 2008**

(Thorkild, “Playful Knowledge An Explorative Study of Educational Gaming”, <http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information_til/Studerende_ved_SDU/Din_uddannelse/phd_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf>)

Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

#### Debating the intricacies of the topic is key reverse excessive presidential authority-impact is constant and unlimited military actions

Kelly Michael Young 13, Associate Professor of Communication and Director of Forensics at Wayne State University, "Why Should We Debate About Restriction of Presidential War Powers", 9/4, public.cedadebate.org/node/13

Beyond its obviously timeliness, we believed debating about presidential war powers was important because of the stakes involved in the controversy. Since the Korean War, scholars and pundits have grown increasingly alarmed by the growing scope and techniques of presidential war making. In 1973, in the wake of Vietnam, Congress passed the joint War Powers Resolution (WPR) to increase Congress’s role in foreign policy and war making by requiring executive consultation with Congress prior to the use of military force, reporting within 48 hours after the start of hostiles, and requiring the close of military operations after 60 days unless Congress has authorized the use of force. Although the WPR was a significant legislative feat, 30 years since its passage, presidents have frequently ignores the WPR requirements and the changing nature of conflict does not fit neatly into these regulations. After the terrorist attacks on 9-11, many experts worry that executive war powers have expanded far beyond healthy limits. Consequently, there is a fear that continued expansion of these powers will undermine the constitutional system of checks and balances that maintain the democratic foundation of this country and risk constant and unlimited military actions, particularly in what Stephen Griffin refers to as a “long war” period like the War on Terror (http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674058286). In comparison, pro-presidential powers advocates contend that new restrictions undermine flexibility and timely decision-making necessary to effectively counter contemporary national security risks. Thus, a debate about presidential wars powers is important to investigate a number of issues that have serious consequences on the status of democratic checks and national security of the United States.¶ Lastly, debating presidential war powers is important because we the people have an important role in affecting the use of presidential war powers. As many legal scholars contend, regardless of the status of legal structures to check the presidency, an important political restrain on presidential war powers is the presence of a well-informed and educated public. As Justice Potter Stewart explains, “the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power…may lie in an enlightened citizenry – in an informed and critical public opinion which alone can protect the values of a democratic government” (http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC\_CR\_0403\_0713\_ZC3.html). As a result, this is not simply an academic debate about institutions and powers that that do not affect us. As the numerous recent foreign policy scandals make clear, anyone who uses a cell-phone or the internet is potential affected by unchecked presidential war powers. Even if we agree that these powers are justified, it is important that today’s college students understand and appreciate the scope and consequences of presidential war powers, as these students’ opinions will stand as an important potential check on the presidency.

#### Switching sides is key

Kurr-Ph.D. student Communication, Penn State-9/5/13

Bridging Competitive Debate and Public Deliberation on Presidential War Powers

http://public.cedadebate.org/node/14

The second major function concerns the specific nature of deliberation over war powers. Given the connectedness between presidential war powers and the preservation of national security, deliberation is often difficult. Mark Neocleous describes that when political issues become securitized; it “helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms.” (2008, p. 71). Collegiate debaters, through research and competitive debate, serve as a bulwark against this “short-circuiting” and help preserve democratic deliberation. This is especially true when considering national security issues. Eric English contends, “The success … in challenging the dominant dialogue on homeland security politics points to efficacy of academic debate as a training ground.” Part of this training requires a “robust understanding of the switch-side technique” which “helps prevent misappropriation of the technique to bolster suspect homeland security policies” (English et. al, 2007, p. 224). Hence, competitive debate training provides foundation for interrogating these policies in public. Alarmism on the issues of war powers is easily demonstrated by Obama’s repeated attempts to transfer detainees from Guantanamo Bay. Republicans were able to launch a campaign featuring the slogan, “not in my backyard” (Schor, 2009). By locating the nexus of insecurity as close as geographically possible, the GOP were able to instill a fear of national insecurity that made deliberation in the public sphere not possible. When collegiate debaters translate their knowledge of the policy wonkery on such issues into public deliberation, it serves to cut against the alarmist rhetoric purported by opponents. In addition to combating misperceptions concerning detainee transfers, the investigative capacity of collegiate debate provides a constant check on governmental policies. A new trend concerning national security policies has been for the government to provide “status updates” to the public. On March 28, 2011, Obama gave a speech concerning Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya and the purpose of the bombings. Jeremy Engels and William Saas describe this “post facto discourse” as a “new norm” where “Americans are called to acquiesce to decisions already made” (2013, p. 230). Contra to the alarmist strategy that made policy deliberation impossible, this rhetorical strategy posits that deliberation is not necessary. Collegiate debaters researching war powers are able to interrogate whether deliberation is actually needed. Given the technical knowledge base needed to comprehend the mechanism of how war powers operate, debate programs serve as a constant investigation into whether deliberation is necessary not only for prior action but also future action. By raising public awareness, there is a greater potential that “the public’s inquiry into potential illegal action abroad” could “create real incentives to enforce the WPR” (Druck, 2010, p. 236). While this line of interrogation could be fulfilled by another organization, collegiate debaters who translate their competitive knowledge into public awareness create a “space for talk” where the public has “previously been content to remain silent” (Engels & Saas, 2013, p. 231). Given the importance of presidential war powers and the strategies used by both sides of the aisle to stifle deliberation, the import of competitive debate research into the public realm should provide an additional check of being subdued by alarmism or acquiescent rhetorics. After creating that space for deliberation, debaters are apt to influence the policies themselves. Mitchell furthers, “Intercollegiate debaters can play key roles in retrieving and amplifying positions that might otherwise remain sedimented in the policy process” (2010, p. 107). With the timeliness of the war powers controversy and the need for competitive debate to reorient publicly, the CEDA/Miller Center series represents a symbiotic relationship that ought to continue into the future. Not only will collegiate debaters become better public advocates by shifting from competition to collaboration, the public becomes more informed on a technical issue where deliberation was being stifled. As a result, debaters reinvigorate debate.

#### Generalities are not enough; Debating specific policies on both sides is critical to make us better advocates against government violence—criticizing war without being willing to discuss actual policy details is a bankrupt strategy for social resistance.

--we can use these categories to critique them; simulation does not undercut our potential for critique

--have to roll-play the enemy to know their language and learn their strategies

Mellor 13 (Ewan E. Mellor – European University Institute, Why policy relevance is a moral necessity: Just war theory, impact, and UAVs, Paper Prepared for BISA Conference 2013, accessed: http://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Drones\_Targeted\_Killing\_Ethics\_of\_War)

This section of the paper considers more generally the need for just war theorists to engage with policy debate about the use of force, as well as to engage with the more fundamental moral and philosophical principles of the just war tradition. It draws on John Kelsay’s conception of just war thinking as being a social practice,35 as well as on Michael Walzer’s understanding of the role of the social critic in society.36 It argues that the just war tradition is a form of “practical discourse” which is concerned with questions of “how we should act.”37 Kelsay argues that: [T]he criteria of jus ad bellum and jus in bello provide a framework for structured participation in a public conversation about the use of military force . . . citizens who choose to speak in just war terms express commitments . . . [i]n the process of giving and asking for reasons for going to war, those who argue in just war terms seek to influence policy by persuading others that their analysis provides a way to express and fulfil the desire that military actions be both wise and just.38 He also argues that “good just war thinking involves continuous and complete deliberation, in the sense that one attends to all the standard criteria at war’s inception, at its end, and throughout the course of the conflict.”39 This is important as it highlights the need for just war scholars to engage with the ongoing operations in war and the specific policies that are involved. The question of whether a particular war is just or unjust, and the question of whether a particular weapon (like drones) can be used in accordance with the jus in bello criteria, only cover a part of the overall justice of the war. Without an engagement with the reality of war, in terms of the policies used in waging it, it is impossible to engage with the “moral reality of war,”40 in terms of being able to discuss it and judge it in moral terms. Kelsay’s description of just war thinking as a social practice is similar to Walzer’s more general description of social criticism. The just war theorist, as a social critic, must be involved with his or her own society and its practices. In the same way that the social critic’s distance from his or her society is measured in inches and not miles,41 the just war theorist must be close to and must understand the language through which war is constituted, interpreted and reinterpreted.42 It is only by understanding the values and language that their own society purports to live by that the social critic can hold up a mirror to that society to demonstrate its hypocrisy and to show the gap that exists between its practice and its values.43 The tradition itself provides a set of values and principles and, as argued by Cian O’Driscoll, constitutes a “language of engagement” to spur participation in public and political debate.44 This language is part of “our common heritage, the product of many centuries of arguing about war.”45 These principles and this language provide the terms through which people understand and come to interpret war, not in a deterministic way but by providing the categories necessary for moral understanding and moral argument about the legitimate and illegitimate uses of force.46 By spurring and providing the basis for political engagement the just war tradition ensures that the acts that occur within war are considered according to just war criteria and allows policy-makers to be held to account on this basis. Engaging with the reality of war requires recognising that war is, as Clausewitz stated, a continuation of policy. War, according to Clausewitz, is subordinate to politics and to political choices and these political choices can, and must, be judged and critiqued.47 Engagement and political debate are morally necessary as the alternative is disengagement and moral quietude, which is a sacrifice of the obligations of citizenship.48 This engagement must bring just war theorists into contact with the policy makers and will require work that is accessible and relevant to policy makers, however this does not mean a sacrifice of critical distance or an abdication of truth in the face of power. By engaging in detail with the policies being pursued and their concordance or otherwise with the principles of the just war tradition the policy-makers will be forced to account for their decisions and justify them in just war language. In contrast to the view, suggested by Kenneth Anderson, that “the public cannot be made part of the debate” and that “[w]e are necessarily committed into the hands of our political leadership”,49 it is incumbent upon just war theorists to ensure that the public are informed and are capable of holding their political leaders to account. To accept the idea that the political leadership are stewards and that accountability will not benefit the public, on whose behalf action is undertaken, but will only benefit al Qaeda,50 is a grotesque act of intellectual irresponsibility. As Walzer has argued, it is precisely because it is “our country” that we are “especially obligated to criticise its policies.”51 Conclusion This paper has discussed the empirics of the policies of drone strikes in the ongoing conflict with those associate with al Qaeda. It has demonstrated that there are significant moral questions raised by the just war tradition regarding some aspects of these policies and it has argued that, thus far, just war scholars have not paid sufficient attention or engaged in sufficient detail with the policy implications of drone use. As such it has been argued that it is necessary for just war theorists to engage more directly with these issues and to ensure that their work is policy relevant, not in a utilitarian sense of abdicating from speaking the truth in the face of power, but by forcing policy makers to justify their actions according to the principles of the just war tradition, principles which they invoke themselves in formulating policy. By highlighting hypocrisy and providing the tools and language for the interpretation of action, the just war tradition provides the basis for the public engagement and political activism that are necessary for democratic politics.52

#### Deliberation is the best model-continual testing bolsters advocacy and inclusion-this means we create better methods of engagement to resolve the AFF but they don’t resolve this offense-only switching sides on a limited point of stasis maximizes this potential

**Talisse, Vanderbilt philosophy professor, 2005**

(Robert, “Deliberativist responses to activist challenges”, Philosophy & Social Criticism, 31.4, project muse)

Nonetheless, the deliberativist conception of reasonableness differs from the activist’s in at least one crucial respect. On the deliberativist view, a necessary condition for reasonableness is the willingness not only to offer justifications for one’s own views and actions, but also to listen to criticisms, objections, and the justificatory reasons that can be given in favor of alternative proposals. In light of this further stipulation, we may say that, on the deliberative democrat’s view, reasonable citizens are responsive to reasons, their views are ‘reason tracking’. Reasonableness, then, entails an acknowledgement on the part of the citizen that her current views are possibly mistaken, incomplete, and in need of revision. Reasonableness is hence a two-way street: the reasonable citizen is able and willing to offer justifications for her views and actions, but is also prepared to consider alternate views, respond to criticism, answer objections, and, if necessary, revise or abandon her views. In short, reasonable citizens do not only believe and act for reasons, they aspire to believe and act according to the best reasons; consequently, they recognize their own fallibility in weighing reasons and hence engage in public deliberation in part for the sake of improving their views.15 ‘Reasonableness’ as the deliberative democrat understands it is constituted by a willingness to participate in an ongoing public discussion that inevitably involves processes of self-examination by which one at various moments rethinks and revises one’s views in light of encounters with new arguments and new considerations offered by one’s fellow deliberators. Hence Gutmann and Thompson write: Citizens who owe one another justifications for the laws that they seek to impose must take seriously the reasons their opponents give. Taking seriously the reasons one’s opponents give means that, at least for a certain range of views that one opposes, one must acknowledge the possibility that an opposing view may be shown to be correct in the future. This acknowledgement has implications not only for the way they regard their own views. It imposes an obligation to continue to test their own views, seeking forums in which the views can be challenged, and keeping open the possibility of their revision or even rejection.16 (2000: 172) That Young’s activist is not reasonable in this sense is clear from the ways in which he characterizes his activism. He claims that ‘Activities of protest, boycott, and disruption are more appropriate means for getting citizens to think seriously about what until then they have found normal and acceptable’ (106); activist tactics are employed for the sake of ‘bringing attention’ to injustice and making ‘a wider public aware of institutional wrongs’ (107). These characterizations suggest the presumption that questions of justice are essentially settled; the activist takes himself to know what justice is and what its implementation requires. He also believes he knows that those who oppose him are either the power-hungry beneficiaries of the unjust status quo or the inattentive and unaware masses who do not ‘think seriously’ about the injustice of the institutions that govern their lives and so unwittingly accept them. Hence his political activity is aimed exclusively at enlisting other citizens in support of the cause to which he is tenaciously committed. The activist implicitly holds that there could be no reasoned objection

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to his views concerning justice, and no good reason to endorse those institutions he deems unjust. The activist presumes to know that no deliberative encounter could lead him to reconsider his position or adopt a different method of social action; he ‘declines’ to ‘engage persons he disagrees with’ (107) in discourse because he has judged on a priori grounds that all opponents are either pathetically benighted or balefully corrupt. When one holds one’s view as the only responsible or just option, there is no need for reasoning with those who disagree, and hence no need to be reasonable. According to the deliberativist, this is the respect in which the activist is unreasonable. The deliberativist recognizes that questions of justice are difficult and complex. This is the case not only because justice is a notoriously tricky philosophical concept, but also because, even supposing we had a philosophically sound theory of justice, questions of implementation are especially thorny. Accordingly, political philosophers, social scientists, economists, and legal theorists continue to work on these questions. In light of much of this literature, it is difficult to maintain the level of epistemic confidence in one’s own views that the activist seems to muster; thus the deliberativist sees the activist’s confidence as evidence of a lack of honest engagement with the issues. A possible outcome of the kind of encounter the activist ‘declines’ (107) is the realization that the activist’s image of himself as a ‘David to the Goliath of power wielded by the state and corporate actors’ (106) is naïve. That is, the deliberativist comes to see, through processes of public deliberation, that there are often good arguments to be found on all sides of an important social issue; reasonableness hence demands that one must especially engage the reasons of those with whom one most vehemently disagrees and be ready to revise one’s own views if necessary. Insofar as the activist holds a view of justice that he is unwilling to put to the test of public criticism, he is unreasonable. Furthermore, insofar as the activist’s conception commits him to the view that there could be no rational opposition to his views, he is literally unable to be reasonable. Hence the deliberative democrat concludes that activism, as presented by Young’s activist, is an unreasonable model of political engagement. The dialogical conception of reasonableness adopted by the deliberativist also provides a response to the activist’s reply to the charge that he is engaged in interest group or adversarial politics. Recall that the activist denied this charge on the grounds that activism is aimed not at private or individual interests, but at the universal good of justice. But this reply also misses the force of the posed objection. On the deliberativist view, the problem with interest-based politics does not derive simply from the source (self or group), scope (particular or universal), or quality (admirable or deplorable) of the interest, but with the concept of interests as such. Not unlike ‘preferences’, ‘interests’ typically function in democratic theory as fixed dispositions that are non-cognitive and hence unresponsive to reasons. Insofar as the activist sees his view of justice as ‘given’ and not open to rational scrutiny, he is engaged in the kind of adversarial politics the deliberativist rejects. The argument thus far might appear to turn exclusively upon different conceptions of what reasonableness entails. The deliberativist view I have sketched holds that reasonableness involves some degree of what we may call epistemic modesty. On this view, the reasonable citizen seeks to have her beliefs reflect the best available reasons, and so she enters into public discourse as a way of testing her views against the objections and questions of those who disagree; hence she implicitly holds that her present view is open to reasonable critique and that others who hold opposing views may be able to offer justifications for their views that are at least as strong as her reasons for her own. Thus any mode of politics that presumes that discourse is extraneous to questions of justice and justification is unreasonable. The activist sees no reason to accept this. Reasonableness for the activist consists in the ability to act on reasons that upon due reflection seem adequate to underwrite action; discussion with those who disagree need not be involved. According to the activist, there are certain cases in which he does in fact know the truth about what justice requires and in which there is no room for reasoned objection. Under such conditions, the deliberativist’s demand for discussion can only obstruct justice; it is therefore irrational. It may seem that we have reached an impasse. However, there is a further line of criticism that the activist must face. To the activist’s view that at least in certain situations he may reasonably decline to engage with persons he disagrees with (107), the deliberative democrat can raise the phenomenon that Cass Sunstein has called ‘group polarization’ (Sunstein, 2003; 2001a: ch. 3; 2001b: ch. 1). To explain: consider that political activists cannot eschew deliberation altogether; they often engage in rallies, demonstrations, teach-ins, workshops, and other activities in which they are called to make public the case for their views. Activists also must engage in deliberation among themselves when deciding strategy. Political movements must be organized, hence those involved must decide upon targets, methods, and tactics; they must also decide upon the content of their pamphlets and the precise messages they most wish to convey to the press. Often the audience in both of these deliberative contexts will be a self-selected and sympathetic group of like-minded activists. Group polarization is a well-documented phenomenon that has ‘been found all over the world and in many diverse tasks’; it means that ‘members of a deliberating group predictably move towards a more extreme point in the direction indicated by the members’ predeliberation tendencies’ (Sunstein, 2003: 81–2). Importantly, in groups that ‘engage in repeated discussions’ over time, the polarization is even more pronounced (2003: 86). Hence discussion in a small but devoted activist enclave that meets regularly to strategize and protest ‘should produce a situation in which individuals hold positions more extreme than those of any individual member before the series of deliberations began’ (ibid.).17 The fact of group polarization is relevant to our discussion because the activist has proposed that he may reasonably decline to engage in discussion with those with whom he disagrees in cases in which the requirements of justice are so clear that he can be confident that he has the truth. Group polarization suggests that deliberatively confronting those with whom we disagree is essential even when we have the truth. For even if we have the truth, if we do not engage opposing views, but instead deliberate only with those with whom we agree, our view will shift progressively to a more extreme point, and thus we lose the truth. In order to avoid polarization, deliberation must take place within heterogeneous ‘argument pools’ (Sunstein, 2003: 93). This of course does not mean that there should be no groups devoted to the achievement of some common political goal; it rather suggests that engagement with those with whom one disagrees is essential to the proper pursuit of justice. Insofar as the activist denies this, he is unreasonable.

## 2NC

### 2NC – Overview

#### Writing a history of the Apache focusing on their warriors ignores the nonviolent ways of Loco and the Warm Spring. Prefer our evidence, it’s a compilation of oral histories from Loco’s descendents.

Shapard 2011

Bud, Great-grandson in law of Loco, Chief Loco: Apache Peacemaker (Civilization of the American Indian Series). University of Oklahoma Press.

Historians and writers dealing with Apaches have focused their attention almost entirely on the Indians’ tough-fisted nature and their feats as a warrior society. In this book I have done the opposite. I have followed the life of Chief Loco and his Warm Springs people, the most amicable of the Chiricahua Apaches. Little has been written about Loco’s search for a peaceful life. He generally has been banished to brief passages and footnotes. Here, I bring him to the fore. The tale is not without violence and heartbreak, but I have attempted to present the other half of the Apaches’ story—their efforts to make peace. A book such as this would be impossible without the help of many knowledgeable people. They are too numerous to list individually, but I gratefully acknowledge their help. Among the ranks of volunteers, I want to single out the following for special appreciation. My wife, Beth, acted as editor and proofreader. She watched patiently as I galloped off daily for seven years to adventure with Chief Loco and his Apaches, repeatedly proofread the manuscript, and offered countless suggestions to improve the story. Her insight and guidance have been invaluable. My deepest appreciation goes to my former father-in-law, the late Raymond Loco, who was Chief Loco’s grandson, to other Loco descendants, and to members of the Fort Sill Apache Tribe, who generously furnished material about Chief Loco’s life that is unavailable anywhere else. This work fulfills a promise I made to Raymond almost fifty years ago. He always believed the history of the Chiricahua Apaches was incomplete unless Chief Loco’s story was told.

### 2NC – Geronimo Bad

#### Geronimo was insanely violent – he killed and kidnapped other Apaches including Chief Loco.

Shapard 2011

Bud, Great-grandson in law of Loco, Chief Loco: Apache Peacemaker (Civilization of the American Indian Series). University of Oklahoma Press.

The Apaches found the Stevens crew at an outlying work camp near the ranch on the afternoon of April 17, 1882. Geronimo and his accomplices straightaway killed all the Mexicans except the foreman’s nine-year-old son, Stanislaus Mestas, who was saved after a Coyotero woman “begged hard” for his life. To keep the surviving Indians from warning the army of their arrival, the raiders forced Bylas and his men to tag along with the war party and assigned two men to keep the women at the ranch until things broke open on the reservation.2 Around twilight the following evening, the raiders slipped by the subagency at Camp Goodwin and collected Chiva’s band of thirty Chiricahuas who had been left behind when Geronimo and Juh ran for Mexico the year before.3 As the raiders continued toward San Carlos, they cut the telegraph line from the subagency. They reached the banks of the Gila River across from Loco’s camp just after midnight on April 19, concealed themselves along the river, and waited for first light. During the wait, a Nednai messenger slipped into Loco’s village to notify Zele to make ready to move the next morning. Chief Loco’s descendants believe the Nednais’ visit before the attack is proof that Zele was a spy for Geronimo.4 The kidnap party launched its attack just before six on the morning of April 19, 1882. Jason Betzinez, awakened by the commotion, remembered seeing “a line of Apache warriors spread out along the west side of the camp and coming our way with guns in their hands. Others were swimming horses across the river or pushing floating logs ahead of themselves.” The raiders surrounded Loco’s village and began a noisy assault on the drowsy Chihennes.5 Pandemonium prevailed as the attackers pulled over wickiups and clomped their horses through the crowd, but no shots were fired at first. Loco’s camp lay about a mile from the agency, and the raiders wanted to avoid attracting the Indian police with gunfire. One of the leaders, believed to be Geronimo, repeatedly bellowed above the din, “Take them all! No one is to be left in the camp. Shoot down anyone who refuses to go with us! Some of you men lead them out.” Loco’s entire band was rounded up, surrounded by the raiders.6 Loco tried to negotiate, but he got nowhere. He persisted with his arguments. Finally, one of the men with Geronimo, Chatto, leveled his rifle at the chief and threatened to kill him. Still Loco refused to leave. The incident later led Loco’s daughter to tell a scout for Colonel George Forsyth that Chatto and Naiche were leaders of the kidnapping. At the end of it all, several raiders who were said to “hesitate no more at taking a human life... than killing a rabbit” held Loco’s unarmed men at gunpoint while others started viciously beating the women with pieces of firewood and roughing up the children. It was not the Chiricahuas’ finest hour, but it was a persuasive argument. Loco gave in and agreed to leave with the raiders. Betzinez remembered, “We weren’t allowed to snatch up anything but a handful of clothing and other belongings. There was no chance to eat breakfast.”7

### 2NC – A/T Perm

#### The perm showcases a fundamental lack of understanding of Apache history. Geronimo and Loco were adversaries. The relocation of the Apaches happened because Geronimo was using the Warm Spring reservation as a base for raids. the affirmative continues to obscure the Warm Spring Chiricahuas and Chief Loco. Refusing to discriminate between the bands of Apache replicates Western violence.

Britten 2011

Thomas, Professor @ University of Texas Brownsville, Chief Loco: Apache Peacemaker. Journal of Southern History. Nov2011, Vol. 77 Issue 4, p1003-1004. 2p.

The Apaches are a resilient and adaptable people known primarily for their martial exploits in the Southwest during the later decades of the nineteenth cen- tury The Chineahua Apaches, in particular, had a reputation as fearless raid- ers and fighters led by the likes of Manga\* Coloradas. Cochise. Victorio. and Geronimo. Less well known is the history of the Warm Springs Chiricahuas (the Chihennes) and their most prominent leader. Chief Loco. Loco's fifty- year struggle (1855-1905) to protect his people by forging a tasting peace with the U.S. government provides the primary focus of this excellent and balanced biography. If Chief Loco had had his way, the Chihennes would have lived quietly along the Alamosa River near Canada Alamosa in New Mexico—the tradi- tional homeland of the Warm Springs Apaches. In the early 1870s, however, a combination of factors (the threat of scalp hunters, illegal traders, and dep- redations from other Apache groups in the region) led to their forced removal northwest to the Tularosa River Valley There Loco's people suffered from the cold, isolation, and prevalence of owls (which the Chihennes associated with malevolent spirits), not 10 mention disease and poor farming conditions. In a cost-cutting effort, the federal government relocated them temporarily to Ojo Calientc near their old home at Canada Alamosa. When Geronimo's band of Chiricahuas began using Ojo Caliente as a base for raids, reservation officials suspected that Loco's people were complicit in these activities and in May 1877 removed the whole bunch to the San Carlos reservation in Arizona. This unfortunate turn of events (guilt by association) would be repeated ad nauseam for the next three decades. Although Loco and the Warm Springs Apaches attempted to make the best of their new home at San Carlos, Geronimo and his followers fled south into Mexico and resumed a pillage-and-plunder lifestyle. In an ill-conceived effort to replenish his numbers (and to punish Loco—his longtime adversary), Geronimo launched a daring raid on San Carlos in April 1882 and managed to liberate some of his family members and to kidnap Loco and approxi- mately 150 Warm Springs Apaches before heading back to Mexico. Alerted to the Apaches\* movements, a force of Mexican soldiers ambushed the fleeing Apaches near Alisos Creek and massacred dozens of Chihennes. Women and children not killed in the attack were sold into slavery, a tragedy that haunted Loco for the rest of his life. In 1884 the Apache holdouts in Mexico agreed to return to San Carlos. The resident Apaches living there viewed all the Chiricahuas as troublemakers and did not discriminate between Gerommo's followers and those of Chief Loco. As pressure to remove the Chiricahuas mounted, federal officials decided to ship them east where unfamiliar surroundings presumably would encourage a more sedentary lifestyle. Thus began an odyssey that would take Loco and his people to Fort Marion. Florida. Mount Vernon, Alabama, and finally Fort Sill, Oklahoma. In both Florida and Alabama, the Apaches became tourist attrac- tions, and Loco's people earned money selling handmade crafts and souvenirs. Although government officials did their best to improve the Indians' health conditions, dozens died each year from tuberculosis and other ailments. Bud Shapard bases his account on a firm foundation of archival records, interviews, and previous scholarship. His evenhanded treatment of Apache and non-Apache participants is exemplary. Loco loved children and sacrificed much to advance the well-being of his followers, but he was no saint. The author also explains how Apache factionalism and questionable decisions by individual leaders were at rimes as harmful to their peoples' livelihood as gov- ernment incompetence or corruption. Shapard is a masterful storyteller, and his ability to provide a strong Indian voice makes this work a major contribution. I give it my strongest recommendation.

### 2NC – A/T You are a floating pic

#### Violent scholarship cannot produce political change, pedagogy must critically interrogate instances of militarism in order to challenge the permanent violence of the status quo.

Allen 7 (Douglas Allen Department of Philosophy, University of Maine “Mahatma Gandhi on Violence and Peace Education,” Project Muse)

Gandhi, of course, is very concerned with violence in the more usual sense of overt physical violence. He devotes considerable attention to identifying such violence, trying diverse approaches to conflict resolution, and providing nonviolent alternatives. This is evident in his many writings and struggles directed at war, overt terrorism, outbreaks of class and caste violence, and Hindu-Muslim communal violence. 6 However, for Gandhi, such serious overt violence constitutes only a small part of the violence that must be addressed by peace education. Gandhi’s approach to education emphasizes both the multidimensional nature of violence and the structural violence of the status quo. Educational violence cannot be separated from linguistic, economic, psychological, cultural, political, religious, and other forms of violence. These many dimensions of violence interact, mutually reinforce each other, and provide the subject matter and challenge for peace education. For example, language, inside or outside the classroom, can serve as a violent weapon used to control, manipulate, humiliate, intimidate, terrorize, oppress, exploit, and dominate other human beings. ‘‘Peaceful’’ situations, free from overt violent conflict, may be defined by deep psychological violence. If I am filled with ego-driven hatred, manifested as self-hatred and hatred for others, I am a very violent person. This will be manifested in how I relate to myself and to others, even if I repress or control my desire to strike out violently at the targets of my hatred. In his analysis of ‘‘normal’’ British colonial education in India, Gandhi frequently analyzes how the structures, values, and goals of such educational models inflicted great psychological and cultural violence on colonized Indians. Unlike most philosophers and others who adopt ethical and spiritual approaches, Gandhi places a primary emphasis on basic material needs and the ‘‘normal’’ state of economic violence. Repeatedly, he uses ‘‘violence’’ as synonymous with exploitation. He is attentive to unequal, asymmetrical, violent power relations in which some, who possess wealth, capital, and other material resources, are able to exploit and dominate those lacking such economic power. Gandhi identifies with the plight of starving and impoverished human beings and with the plight of peasants, workers, and others who are disempowered and dominated. He emphasizes that such economic violence is not the result of supernatural design or an immutable law of nature. It involves human-caused oppression, exploitation, domination, injustice, and suffering, and, hence, we as human beings are responsible. If I could change conditions and alleviate suffering, but I choose either to profit from such structural violence or not to get involved, I perpetuate, am complicit in, and am responsible for the economic violence of the status quo. Obviously, incorporating such concerns of economic violence broadens and radically changes the nature of peace education. In pointing to Gandhi’s radical challenges and to his value as a catalyst, we may touch briefly on a few aspects of educational violence in typical modern university settings. While focusing on universities, we must keep in mind that Gandhi submits that peace education must emphasize the formative training and socialization of young children. Most people do not think of universities and classroom teaching as violent, but Gandhi argues that ‘‘normal’’ university education is very violent, in terms of both multidimensional violence and the violence of the status quo. From Gandhi’s perspective, the ‘‘peaceful,’’ seemingly nonviolent classroom can be a very violent place, even when there are no actual outbursts of violence. A professor may use the grade as a weapon to threaten, intimidate, terrorize, and control students, including those who raise legitimate concerns questioning the analysis of the teacher who has institutional power over their futures. A teacher may use language, or even facial expressions and other body-language communication, in a violent way as when ignoring, humiliating, or ridiculing students who ask questions. Most often, these students will become silenced and will not subject themselves to the dangers of any further such terrifying humiliation. In more general terms, Gandhi would emphasize that universities educate students and do research in violent ways. Modern universities have increasingly become commodified and corporatized. Education is a good investment. Commodified students, as a means to some corporate end, are our most important ‘‘product.’’ Through education we increase their market-driven exchange value. Central Gandhian ethical, cultural, spiritual, social, and humanistic priorities regarding peace and nonviolence are usually ignored, occasionally attacked as unrealistic, and sometimes acknowledged but then unfunded and marginalized. Gandhi views many courses, departments, and colleges as violent even if this is taken as the status quo in no need of justification. Economic and business courses assume a framework and orientation in which students are educated to calculate how to maximize their narrow, ego-defined self-interests and how to defeat opponents and win economically in a world of adversarial, win-lose relations. For Gandhi, we are ‘‘educating’’ our students to such dominant economic models, models in which economic success is synonymous with maximizing economic exploitation, and exploitation is always violent. Similarly, Gandhi’s peace education would analyze most political science or government courses as inherently violent since they claim to be value-free but actually assume, as an immutable given, a status quo framework in which we live in a violent world of antagonistic adversarial relations. The goal is to win by amassing greater power and dominating those challenging one’s power interests. Similarly, public relations and communications courses usually adopt a violent framework in which the goal is to use language, images, and media to manipulate and control others, to get one’s way, and to maximize one’s narrow interests in winning in a world of violent relations. In terms of his own professional background, Gandhi was a barrister, and he makes the same kinds of criticisms of the violent adversarial legal system in which the goal is not cooperation, reconciliation, and peaceful relations, but exacerbating and exploiting multidimensional violence and winning at any cost by defeating the other. To provide one other, disciplinary illustration, Gandhi’s peace education points to the normal violence of the status quo reflected in most disciplines of the sciences, engineering, and technology. Scholars uncritically adopt models of instrumental rationality in which they provide the means allowing for the ends of control, domination, and exploitation of other human beings and of nature. Gandhi is not focusing on individual professors or students who are rewarded for acquiring and applying such scientific and technological means. His more fundamental and radical critique is of the unacknowledged structural violence that defines such disciplines and has devastating violent economic, military, political, and environmental effects on most of humanity and on nature. One of the most valuable contributions of Gandhi’s approach to violence is to broaden our focus so that we are able to situate our peace-education concerns in terms of the larger dominant, multidimensional structures of the violence of the status quo. For example, we uncritically accept the existence of a permanent war economy as just the way things are. We do not critique how the permanent war economy was created, is maintained, and flourishes best under conditions of insecurity, terror, violence, and war. We do not critique how it removes resources that could be provided to meet vital human needs and to provide alternative nonviolent ways of relating. Instead we accept a view of jobs and economic security dependent on a permanent war economy of insecurity, and we train students to become functionaries and contributors to a more effective war economy based on the perpetuation and domination of structural violence. Similarly, Gandhian peace education raises an awareness of how universities have increasingly become integral parts of what President Eisenhower called the military-industrial complex and what Senator J. William Fulbright reformulated as the military-industrial-academic complex.7 Universities increasingly approach transnational corporations, the military, the government, and other funding sources and promote themselves as valuable places to invest. Universities, as institutions of educational violence, provide the means, in terms of applied research and the education of students, to further the ends of the structural violence of the military-industrial complex based on the hierarchical, multidimensional, and violent relations of control, exploitation, and domination.

### A/T Yancy

#### Multiple possible strategies for resistance

McLendon 2004

John, Associate Professor of African American and American Cultures Studies at Bates College, The Journal of Speculative Philosophy Vol 18, No 4, p. 308

Additionally, the function of various forms of social stratification—especially the impact of class contradictions—harbors the real possibility for different ideological responses to commonly experienced conditions of life. In the manner of the Marxist conception of ideology, as found in The German Ideology, I presume that philosophy (ontology) is a form of ideology (Marx and Engels 1976). Hence, only on the presupposition that the African American community is socially homogeneous can it plausibly be argued that African Americans all share the same ontology. Given it is not the case that the African American community is homogeneous, then there is no plausible warranting for the belief that all African Americans share a common ontology. This leads directly to point three and my charge of Yancy’s (and Smitherman’s) vindicationism, where he argues that resistance to white supremacy is the defining characteristic of African American culture and hence language. When African American vindicationism is bereft of dialectical theory and method, as a determinate philosophical approach to African American culture, it neglects a very important aspect of the historical dialectic of African American culture, viz. that African American culture is not in any way a monolithically formed culture where there are only manifestations of resistance. There is more to African American history and culture than a continuous line of resistance to oppression, for, by way of example, not all African Americans sang the spirituals with an eye to joining the Underground Railroad (Fisher 1990). Some believed that freedom was wearing a robe in “heaben” and that washing in the blood of Jesus would make one “as white as the snow.” Or that loyalty to Massa was the highest virtue and resistance and revolt were of the greatest folly. The modern day connotation for “Uncle Tom” did not enter the lexicon of African American language without the historical presence of real, existing “Toms.” It is no accident that there is the current exercise in African American locution of playing on this word (Tom) whenever Supreme Court Justice, Clarence “Tomto- us” is mentioned among African American political speakers. After all, the historical record indicates that the failure of Gabriel Prosser’s, Denmark Vesey’s, and Nat Turner’s slave insurrections were due in part to other slaves that were more loyal to Massa than their own liberation. Mind you that those who ratted out the slave revolts shared in the same language, ate the same food, lived the same experiences, but also had a different worldview (conception of reality) and set of values. The idea that social ontology and identity among African Americans, past and present, are preeminently the same for all is the sort of reductionism that flattens out the cultural, social, political, and ideological landscape called African American culture.

## 1NR

### Prefer our Interp

#### Dialogue is the biggest impact—the process of discussion precedes any truth claim by magnifying the benefits of any discussion

**Morson, Northwestern professor, 2004**

(Gary, Bakhtinian Perspectives on Language, Literacy, and Learning (Learning in Doing: Social, Cognitive and Computational Perspectives), pg 330-2)

A belief in truly dialogic ideological becoming would lead to schools that were quite different. In such schools, the mind would be populated with a complexity of voices and perspectives it had not known, and the student would learn to think with those voices, to test ideas and experiences against them, and to shape convictions that are innerly persuasive in response. This very process would be central. Students would sense that whatever word they believed to be innerly persuasive was only tentatively so: the process of dialogue continues.We must keep the conversation going, and formal education only initiates the process. The innerly persuasive discourse would not be final, but would be, like experience itself, ever incomplete and growing. As Bakhtin observes of the innerly persuasive word: Its creativity and productiveness consist precisely in the fact that such a word awakens new and independent words, that it organizes masses of our words from within, and does not remain in an isolated and static condition. It is not so much interpreted by us as it is further, that is, freely, developed, applied to new material, new conditions; it enters into interanimating relationships with new contexts. . . . The semantic structure of an innerly persuasive discourse is not finite, it is open; in each of the new contexts that dialogize it, this discourse is able to reveal ever newer ways to mean. (DI, 345–6) We not only learn, we also learn to learn, and we learn to learn best when we engage in a dialogue with others and ourselves. We appropriate the world of difference, and ourselves develop new potentials. Those potentials allow us to appropriate yet more voices. Becoming becomes endless becoming. We talk, we listen, and we achieve an open-ended wisdom. Difference becomes an opportunity (see Freedman and Ball, this volume). Our world manifests the spirit that Bakhtin attributed to Dostoevsky: “nothing conclusive has yet taken place in the world, the ultimate word of the world and about the world has not yet been spoken, the world is open and free, everything is in the future and will always be in the future.”3 Such a world becomes our world within, its dialogue lives within us, and we develop the potentials of our ever-learning selves. Letmedraw some inconclusive conclusions, which may provoke dialogue. Section I of this volume, “Ideologies in Dialogue: Theoretical Considerations” and Bakhtin’s thought in general suggest that we learn best when we are actually learning to learn. We engage in dialogue with ourselves and others, and the most important thing is the value of the open-ended process itself. Section II, “Voiced, Double Voiced, and Multivoiced Discourses in Our Schools” suggests that a belief in truly dialogic ideological becoming would lead to schools that were quite different. In such schools, the mind would be populated with a complexity of voices and perspectives it had not known, and the student would learn to think with those voices, to test ideas and experiences against them, and to shape convictions that are innerly persuasive in response. Teachers would not be trying to get students to hold the right opinions but to sense the world from perspectives they would not have encountered or dismissed out of hand. Students would develop the habit of getting inside the perspectives of other groups and other people. Literature in particular is especially good at fostering such dialogic habits. Section III, “Heteroglossia in a Changing World” may invite us to learn that dialogue involves really listening to others, hearing them not as our perspective would categorize what they say, but as they themselves would categorize what they say, and only then to bring our own perspective to bear. We talk, we listen, and we achieve an open-ended wisdom. The chapters in this volume seem to suggest that we view learning as a perpetual process. That was perhaps Bakhtin’s favorite idea: that to appreciate life, or dialogue, we must see value not only in achieving this or that result, but also in recognizing that honest and open striving in a world of uncertainty and difference is itself the most important thing. What we must do is keep the conversation going.

### AT: We Meet

#### A course of action is key-only predictable reading of the resolution

**Parcher, former Georgetown debate coach, 2001**

(Jeff, February, <http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html>)

(1) Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constituent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in original) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Frimness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A **course of action** determined or decided on. A formal statement of a decision, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconceivable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desireablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committtee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the prelimanary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution. Affirmative and negative are the equivalents of 'yes' or 'no' - which, of course, are answers to a question.

### A2: Policing

#### Arguments stand or fall based on whether they are good – nothing more nothing less – the negatives argument isn’t policing

Amanda Anderson 6, Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Humanities and English at Brown University, Spring 2006, “Reply to My Critic(s),” Criticism, Vol. 48, No. 2, p. 281-290

Lets first examine the claim that my book is "unwittingly" inviting a resurrection of the "Enlightenment-equals-totalitarianism position." How, one wonders, could a book promoting argument and debate, and promoting reason-giving practices as a kind of common ground that should prevail over assertions of cultural authenticity, somehow come to be seen as a dangerous resurgence of bad Enlightenment? Robbins tells us why: I want "argument on my own terms"-that is, I want to impose reason on people, which is a form of power and oppression. But what can this possibly mean? Arguments stand or fall based on whether they are successful and persuasive, even an argument in favor of argument. It simply is not the case that an argument in favor of the importance of reasoned debate to liberal democracy is tantamount to oppressive power. To assume so is to assume, in the manner of Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, that reason is itself violent, inherently, and that it will always mask power and enforce exclusions. But to assume this is to assume the very view of Enlightenment reason that Robbins claims we are "thankfully" well rid of. (I leave to the side the idea that any individual can proclaim that a debate is over, thankfully or not.) But perhaps Robbins will say, "I am not imagining that your argument is directly oppressive, but that what you argue for would be, if it were enforced." Yet my book doesn't imagine or suggest it is enforceable; I simply argue in favor of, I promote, an ethos of argument within a liberal democratic and proceduralist framework. As much as Robbins would like to think so, neither I nor the books I write can be cast as an arm of the police. Robbins wants to imagine a far more direct line of influence from criticism to political reality, however, and this is why it can be such a bad thing to suggest norms of argument. Watch as the gloves come off: Faced with the prospect of submitting to her version of argument roughly, Habermass version-and of being thus authorized to disagree only about other, smaller things, some may feel that there will have been an end to argument, or an end to the arguments they find most interesting. With current events in mind, I would be surprised if there were no recourse to the metaphor of a regular army facing a guerilla insurrection, hinting that Anderson wants to force her opponents to dress in uniform, reside in well-demarcated camps and capitals that can be bombed, fight by the rules of states (whether the states themselves abide by these rules or not), and so on-in short, that she wants to get the battle onto a terrain where her side will be assured of having the upper hand. Lets leave to the side the fact that this is a disowned hypothetical criticism. (As in, "Well, okay, yes, those are my gloves, but those are somebody elses hands they will have come off of.") Because far more interesting, actually, is the sudden elevation of stakes. It is a symptom of the sorry state of affairs in our profession that it plays out repeatedly this tragicomic tendency to give a grandiose political meaning to every object it analyzes or confronts. We have evidence of how desperate the situation is when we see it in a critic as thoughtful as Bruce Robbins, where it emerges as the need to allegorize a point about an argument in such a way that it gets cast as the equivalent of war atrocities. It is especially ironic in light of the fact that to the extent that I do give examples of the importance of liberal democratic proceduralism, I invoke the disregard of the protocols of international adjudication in the days leading up to the invasion of Iraq; I also speak about concerns with voting transparency. It is hard for me to see how my argument about proceduralism can be associated with the policies of the Bush administration when that administration has exhibited a flagrant disregard of democratic procedure and the rule of law. I happen to think that a renewed focus on proceduralism is a timely venture, which is why I spend so much time discussing it in my final chapter. But I hasten to add that I am not interested in imagining that proceduralism is the sole political response to the needs of cultural criticism in our time: my goal in the book is to argue for a liberal democratic culture of argument, and to suggest ways in which argument is not served by trumping appeals to identity and charismatic authority. I fully admit that my examples are less political events than academic debates; for those uninterested in the shape of intellectual arguments, and eager for more direct and sustained discussion of contemporary politics, the approach will disappoint. Moreover, there will always be a tendency for a proceduralist to under-specify substance, and that is partly a principled decision, since the point is that agreements, compromises, and policies get worked out through the communicative and political process. My book is mainly concentrated on evaluating forms of arguments and appeals to ethos, both those that count as a form of trump card or distortion, and those that flesh out an understanding of argument as a universalist practice. There is an intermittent appeal to larger concerns in the political democratic culture, and that is because I see connections between the ideal of argument and the ideal of deliberative democracy. But there is clearly, and indeed necessarily, significant room for further elaboration here.

#### Effective argumentation is better able to create broader inclusion---radical rejection of existing systems as exclusionary is ineffective and reductionist

Amanda Anderson 6, Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Humanities and English at Brown University, Spring 2006, “Reply to My Critic(s),” Criticism, Vol. 48, No. 2, p. 281-290

In closing, I'd like to speak briefly to the question of proceduralism's relevance to democratic vitality. One important way of extending the proceduralist arguments put forth by Habeimas is to work on how institutions and practices might better promote participation in democratic life. The apathy and nonparticipation plaguing democratic institutions in the United States is a serious problem, and can be separated from the more romantic theoretical investments in a refusal to accept the terms of what counts as argument, or in assertions of inassimilable difference. With respect to the latter, which is often glorified precisely as the moment when politics or democracy is truly occurring, I would say, on the contrary democracy is not happening then-rather, the limits or deficiencies of an actually existing democracy are making themselves felt. Acknowledging struggle, conflict, and exclusion is vital to democracy, but insisting that exclusion is not so much a persistent challenge for modern liberal democracies but rather inherent to the modern liberal-democratic political form as such seems to me precisely to remain stalled in a romantic critique of Enlightenment. It all comes down to a question of whether one wants to work with the ideals of democracy or see them as essentially normative in a negative sense: this has been the legacy of a certain critique of Enlightenment, and it is astonishingly persistent in the left quarters in the academy. One hears it clearly when Robbins makes confident reference to liberalisms tendency to ignore "the founding acts of violence on which a social order is based." One encounters it in the current vogue for the work of Giorgio Agamben and Carl Schmitt. Saying that a state of exception defines modernity or is internal to the law itself may help to sharpen your diagnoses of certain historical conditions, but if absolutized as it is in these accounts, it gives you nothing but a negative diagnostic and a compensatory flight to a realm entirely other-the kind of mystical, Utopian impulse that flees from these conditions rather than confronts and fights them on terms that derive from the settled-if constantly evolving-normative basis of democratic modernity. If one is outraged by the flagrant disregard of democratic procedures in the current U.S. political regime, then one needs to be able to coherently say why democratic procedures matter, what principles underwrite them, and what historical movements and institutions have helped us to secure and support them. Argument as a critical practice and as a key component of democratic institutions and public debate has a vital role to play in such a task.

## 2NR

### 2NC – A/T Warm Spring=Assimilation

#### Loco recognized that continued violence would result in the annihilation of his people. Geronimo’s insistence on violence ultimately doomed the Apache. Geronimo’s violence wasn’t any kind of resistance it was for its own sake.

Shapard 2011

Bud, Great-grandson in law of Loco, Chief Loco: Apache Peacemaker (Civilization of the American Indian Series). University of Oklahoma Press.

Chief Loco of the Warm Springs Chiricahuas was among a minority of Apache visionaries who recognized that the Apaches would have to change to accommodate the Americans. As a band leader in his early thirties, he made his first peaceful overtures to the Americans in 1855. His unflagging struggle for peace continued through fifty turbulent years until his death in 1905. Unfortunately, Loco was ahead of his time. Initially, few of his friends and compatriots could grasp the concept of life on a reservation without raiding. Loco was caught between two fractious worlds. The Americans tended to discredit or ignore his gestures for peace. They focused on the troublemakers. When there were problems, Loco’s band often drew the blame, mostly because they were stationary and easy to find, and the Apache firebrands habitually ran for the protection of Loco’s camps on the reservation. Conversely, some Apaches criticized Loco because they believed he was afraid to fight, or possibly crazy. They claimed his attitude was certainly not Chiricahua-like. Ironically, Chief Loco’s motivation to remain at peace stemmed largely from a deep-rooted tradition among the Chiricahuas, the love of their children. Affection and concern for the band’s youngsters stood as an important feature of Chiricahua society. Adults were deeply devoted to the rearing and training of their children. This affection was the basis of dozens of rituals employed to shield a child from harm that began as soon as the mother learned she was pregnant. The rituals continued until the youngster was well into his or her teens. All of Loco’s descendants emphasized that the chief’s intense affinity for the children’s safety often affected his decisions and the subsequent course of events.3 Loco was among the first Apache leaders to recognize—and probably the only one initially to comprehend—that to continue the old Apache way at any level would lead to certain annihilation of the entire Warm Springs band.4 Nevertheless, when he worked a successful peace deal with the Americans in 1869, more Apaches from all bands gathered under his leadership at Ojo Caliente, New Mexico, than under any leader before or after, with the possible exceptions of Mangas Coloradas and Cochise. The Apache wars would have ended there except for a complex tangle of inept or corrupt bureaucrats, bad luck, and a few intractable Apaches who continued to stir up the Americans with their raiding. Despite this, by early 1886 most of the Chiricahuas understood that a continuation of their ancestral lifestyle would lead to their destruction, and they were following Loco’s example by settling peacefully on the reservation. Some Apaches, to be sure—especially Geronimo—never adjusted to the idea of settling down and continued to raid in spite of the odds. Geronimo was not the last standing Apache paladin of homeland defense, as he has been pictured. Nevertheless, by 1886 most of the Chiricahuas were quietly farming on the reservation, and Geronimo was virtually a loner. No evidence suggests that his actions had anything to do with restoring the motherland to the Apaches. It was his refusal to settle on the reservation and his persistent raiding that finally ended any opportunity for peace, dashed hopes for a Chiricahua reservation in Apachería, and landed the entire tribe in prison for twenty-seven years.5