# 1NC

## Off

### 1NC

#### Deal coming now-missteps lead to Congressional sanctions that tank negotiations

**Slavin, Atlantic Council senior fellow, 11-12-13**

(Barbara, “Despite Hitch, Iran Nuclear Deal in Sight”, <http://www.cfr.org/iran/despite-hitch-iran-nuclear-deal-sight/p31838>, ldg)

The prospects for an interim agreement between Tehran and world powers to limit Iran's nuclear enrichment program are "better than fifty-fifty" when diplomacy resumes in Geneva next week, says Barbara Slavin, an Iran expert for the Atlantic Council. Iranian president Hassan Rouhani faces growing political pressure at home to move negotiations forward, she explains. "He's about to cross the hundred-day line, and he was supposed to get an agreement with the West to lift some of the sanctions, and he hasn't achieved that yet." Meanwhile, she says that a separate deal Iran struck with the International Atomic Energy Agency this week, which allows the nuclear watchdog access to certain nuclear facilities, was a "very important step." We've had a long weekend of nuclear diplomacy between Iran and the so-called P5+1 group [the United States, Britain, France, Russia, China, and Germany], which failed to reach an interim agreement. How close are we to an accord? My impression is that we are close. Several individuals involved in the talks that I've spoken to over the weekend said that they are optimistic, that we're not far from an agreement, that there are still a couple of important questions that need to be settled, but that they're still expecting, as Secretary of State John Kerry has said, that this is a "doable deal" when talks resume November 20. Do we know what held up the signing of an agreement this weekend? It appears that the French were adamant on a couple of points—they wanted a specific commitment by the Iranians not to complete a heavy-water reactor at Arak that poses proliferation concerns; meanwhile, the Iranians wanted an explicit acknowledgement in the document of their "right" to enrich uranium. That was something that apparently the P5+1 would not accept at this stage. So there needed to be a return to capitals to figure out how to get over these obstacles. And separately, Iran struck an agreement on Monday (November 11) with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). What is the significance there? This is an overall joint statement on a framework for cooperation. It's the first such agreement in six years. It's quite detailed and says that the Iranians will give the IAEA early notification of any new nuclear facilities it is going to undertake. This is something that Iran is not obliged to do under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, but it is something that has been eagerly sought by the IAEA for some time—so it's a very important step. If you look at the annex to the agreement, you see that there is access that will be given to a uranium mine [Gchine mine in Bandar Abbas]. Information will be provided on all new research reactors, as well as information on sixteen sites designated for the construction of nuclear power plants. But in terms of the Arak facility, the Iranians have promised access to the heavy water production plant, but not the actual reactor under construction. So this may be a point of friction. Also, there's no mention of a site called Parchin, where the Iranians are alleged to have done some nuclear weapons research. The Iranians have essentially turned the site into a parking lot, so what, if anything, the IAEA would be able to discover if it actually went there is in question. Nevertheless it has been something that [IAEA Director-General] Yukiya Amano has called for in the past. One other point: I saw Amano when he was in Washington about ten days ago, and I've never seen him so upbeat about cooperation with Iran. He said that after going around in circles for years with Iranians when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was president, the Iranians really were seeking to make significant progress. So I think this is an important agreement. It doesn't give away the whole store, but it has some important provisions that the IAEA has been looking for. Going back to the Geneva talks over the weekend, what are your thoughts? I thought they were incredibly interesting because you had the foreign ministers of the six countries, except China—which had its deputy foreign minister there—and they were all really involved. For instance, Secretary Kerry was in a meeting for five hours with the Iranian foreign minister Javad Zarif and Catherine Ashton, the European Union high representative. That's one of the most positive developments we've seen, because it's become routine for the United States and Iran to talk to each other at a high diplomatic level. It shows exactly how serious these talks are, and how close they appear to have become. It's highly ironic that the French now are being seen as an obstacle in some way to an agreement. I remember very clearly when I was researching my book, Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies, talking to French diplomats who complained bitterly about U.S. obstruction during the George W. Bush administration. The good news is that the United States and Iran are talking together routinely, and surely they have reached some understandings. The question is: can they put it into language that everybody can accept? What is driving the French on this? Why did they come out so strongly on this one? They generally take a hard line on the Iranian nuclear program. When it was the so-called "EU3," they were tougher than the British and the Germans. They have remained tough under [former president Nicolas] Sarkozy and under [President] Francois Hollande—it's the same bureaucrats who are advising Hollande as advised Sarkozy. So the French are generally tough on this, but there are other things. Hollande is going to Israel this week—maybe he's trying score some points there. The French have important arms deals with the Saudis. The French are also angry at [the United States] because we didn't bomb Syria after they went out on a limb saying they would be willing to join us, even after the British parliament refused to give approval for strikes. And the French like to be French—they like to tack left when the world goes right, and tack right when the world goes left. So when the negotiations resume November 20 in Geneva, what do you think the odds are for an interim accord? Better than fifty-fifty. I think there is a real, compelling need on the Iranian side to have an agreement. I was in Iran in August when [President] Hassan Rouhani was inaugurated, and the audience he really has to satisfy is back home. There is tremendous skepticism about his presidency. He's about to cross the hundred-day line, and he was supposed to get an agreement with the West to lift some of the sanctions, and he hasn't achieved that yet. So, the Iranians desperately need sanctions lifted. How much relief from sanctions would they get in this first round? My understanding is they get what was on the table earlier this year, namely a lifting of sanctions on petrochemical exports, trade, and precious metals. And they get access to their oil revenues, which have been frozen in bank accounts in China, Japan, South Korea, Turkey, and India—the countries that are still importing Iranian oil. And that's very important because currently they're basically stuck buying local products with the money in those accounts. The Iranians want to be able to have normal trade and purchase things like medicine from the United States and Western Europe. Do you think the failure to reach agreement in Geneva over the weekend is going to give some hard-line U.S. senators an opportunity to raise the issue of more sanctions? This is a big concern. We have two weeks now. Congress will be back in session before the Thanksgiving recess. This is supposed to be it, I think, for the Senate, and they have to pass a National Defense Authorization Bill. And there will be efforts to tack on a new Iran sanctions bill; this was done in 2011. This would be very damaging to the process right now. The sanctions currently in place are already having an enormous impact on Iran; that's one of the reasons the Iranians are at the table now. To put more sanctions on would just convince Iran's Supreme Leader that there is no point in negotiating because the United States is after regime change. It's a way for some in Congress to score points with an election year coming up, but it would be very harmful [to the negotiations].

#### Political capital is key to prevent more sanctions

**Pillar, Georgetown security studies professor, 10-18-13**

(Paul, “Sabotaging Iran Nuclear Talks”, <http://www.opednews.com/articles/Sabotaging-Iran-Nuclear-Ta-by-Consortium-News-Iran_Iran-Versus-Israel_Nuclear-Powers_Obama-131018-347.html>, ldg)

But if you are interested in avoiding an Iranian nuclear weapon -- the focus of negotiations this week in Geneva -- at least the way the crisis of governance in Washington ended provides a silver lining to this sorry chapter in American political history. This is because if President Obama is going to reach an agreement to keep the Iranian nuclear program peaceful and to make that agreement stick, he needs to demonstrate the ability and willingness to rein in destructive behavior in Congress that would preclude such an agreement. But it would not be sufficient, and would not be a fair trade, for the concessions and restrictions we want from Iran in a comprehensive and lasting agreement. Nor would it be sufficient for the President, as has been suggested, merely to be lax in the enforcement of legislatively impose sanctions. Besides showing disrespect for the law, this would hardly reassure the Iranians that an agreement would stick. They would understandably fear that what one U.S. president might decline to enforce the next one would. The administration will need congressional cooperation to undo sanctions that were erected supposedly to induce the Iranians to accept just such an agreement. The President can accomplish some rollback of sanctions on his own authority, and that might be sufficient for some sort of partial, interim, confidence-building deal. Even before getting to the point of striking a deal, congressional action can scuttle the prospects for one or at least make it far harder to reach an agreement. The imposition of still more sanctions, and the rattling of more sabers through legislation that refers to military force, are the sorts of congressional actions that would be a slap in the face of a new Iranian administration that has just placed a constructive proposal on the negotiating table, would feed already understandable Iranian suspicions that the United States is interested only in regime change and not in an agreement, and thereby would weaken the Iranian incentive to make still more concessions. Unfortunately legislation for more sanctions and more saber-rattling has already been introduced in Congress. Pushing back against the promoters of such legislation involves some of the same perpetrators who had to be pushed back to avoid default and to end the shutdown. All of the co-sponsors of a bill from Rep. Trent Franks, R-Arizona, that is a thinly disguised authorization for launching a war against Iran were among those who this week voted against the resolution that ended the funding and debt crisis. Mr. Obama's demonstration of backbone this month will help on the Iran issue, but there still are other reasons to question whether the administration will similarly show sufficient fortitude on behalf of an agreement to keep the Iranian nuclear program peaceful. For one thing, the President does not have the unanimous support of his own party, as he did in the standoff that just ended. A significant number of Democrats, not just Republicans, have come under the sway of those determined to prevent an agreement. Also, even those who consider the Iranian issue important have to admit that avoidance of default (and keeping the U.S. government running) is about as serious a matter as the President is likely to face, and he cannot be expected to give as much priority to every issue as he did to that one. Besides political capital, it also takes time and attention to tend directly to a foreign policy initiative, and to keep beating back unhelpful behavior in Congress that threatens to undermine the initiative. The attempt of congressional miscreants to play chicken has taken a toll here, too. The President skipped a couple of East Asian summit meetings to deal with that problem in Washington. Secretary of State Kerry subbed for him, which meant Kerry had that much less time and attention to devote to other matters that are his responsibility, such as the Israeli-Palestinian talks (remember those?) and the Iranian nuclear negotiations. That senior policymakers have only so much energy and so many hours in a day is an understandable drag on many things we expect them to do. But Obama and Kerry have to muster the time and attention for what is happening on these other issues and particularly Iran, not only at negotiating tables in the Middle East or Geneva but also on Capitol Hill.

#### Congressional debate over the plan distracts Obama from his agenda

Kriner, 10

(Douglas, Assistant professor of poly sci at Boston University, “After the

Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War”, University of Chicago Press, Dec

1, 2010)

While congressional support leaves the president’s reserve of political capital intact,¶ congressional criticism saps energy from other initiatives on the home front by forcing the¶ president to expend energy and effort defending his international agenda. Political capital¶ spent shoring up support for a president’s foreign policies is capital that is unavailable for his¶ future policy initiatives . Moreover, any weakening in the president’s political clout may have¶ immediate ramifications for his reelection prospects, as well as indirect consequences for congressional races.59¶ Indeed, Democratic efforts to tie congressional Republican incumbents to President George W. Bush and his war policies paid¶ immediate political dividends in the 2006 midterms, particularly in states, districts, and counties that had suffered the highest¶ casualty rates in the Iraq War. 60 In addition to boding ill for the president’s perceived political capital¶ and reputation, such partisan losses in Congress only further imperil his programmatic¶ agenda, both international and domestic. Scholars have long noted that President Lyndon¶ Johnson’s dream of a Great Society also perished in the rice paddies of Vietnam. Lacking the requisite¶ funds in a war-depleted treasury and the political capital needed to sustain his legislative vision, Johnson¶ gradually let his domestic goals slip away as he hunkered down in an effort first to win and¶ then to end the Vietnam War. In the same way, many of President Bush’s highest second-term¶ domestic proprieties, such as Social Security and immigration reform, failed perhaps in large part because¶ the administration had to expend so much energy and effort waging a rear-guard action¶ against congressional critics of the war in Iraq.61 When making their cost-benefit calculations,¶ presidents surely consider these wider political costs of congressional opposition to their¶ military policies. If congressional opposition in the military arena stands to derail other¶ elements of his agenda, all else being equal, the president will be more likely to judge the benefits¶ of military action insufficient to its costs than if Congress stood behind him in the¶ international arena.

#### Negotiations failure triggers military strikes and regional proliferation-causes escalatory wars and collapses the economy.

**Cordesman, CSIS, 2013**

(Anthony, “Negotiating with Iran: The Strategic Case for Pragmatism and Real Progress”, 9-23, <http://csis.org/publication/negotiating-iran-strategic-case-pragmatism-and-real-progress>, ldg)

Nevertheless, it makes no sense at all to reject Hassan Rouhani’s opening or condemn the Obama Administration’s response. Iran’s nuclear programs have moved to the point where it is extremely doubtful that there will be another chance to begin what may be a long and difficult process for all nations involved, and an attempt at resolution is far better than any of the real world alternatives. As long as any negotiations that follow are realistic in terms of their content, and do not endorse indefinite delay in a U.S. response while Iran’s nuclear programs move forward, they offer what will be the last real hope of avoiding preventive strikes or a process of containment that would lock the region into an Iranian-Israeli nuclear arms race, a probable Saudi effort to acquire its own nuclear weapons, and a U.S. commitment to extended deterrence. The Uncertain Outcome of Preventive Strikes The United States, Iran, and all the other nations involved need to be far more pragmatic about what will happen if time does run out and Iran does go nuclear. Iran may well face a series of preventive strikes – triggered by Israel or planned by the United States – that will destroy far more than its nuclear facilities. This may or may not actually halt the Iranian nuclear effort. A limited set of Israeli preventive strikes could either force the United States to follow up, or create a situation in which Iran rejects all arms control and UN inspection and carries out a massive new disperse nuclear program or a crash basis. It could also drive Iran to lash out into a new wave of confrontation with the United States and Iran’s neighbors. A U.S.-led set of preventive strikes would be more successful, but the United States could only be sure of suppressing a meaningful Iran nuclear effort if it quickly re-strikes any known target it fails to destroy the first time, carries out constant surveillance of Iran, and repeatedly and thoroughly strikes at the targets created by any new Iranian initiatives. The United States would need regional support to do this and probably prolonged regional agreement to U.S. basing. At a minimum, the result would be years more of a regional arms race, military tension, and Iranian efforts to find ways to attack or pressure the Arab states, Israel, and United States. As the current conflict in Syria makes all too clear, no one can predict how much support the United States will really get from any of its allies, its own U.S. Congress, and no one can predict the limits to Iran’s reactions, ability to use third parties, and willingness to confront the United States and the region with new nuclear, missile, and asymmetric threats. The United States would face an almost certain challenge in the UN from Russia and China, and there is no way any U.S. action against Iran could be separated from Iran’s efforts in Iraq, Syria, or Lebanon; Afghanistan, or any other issue where Iran could try to find some form of revenge. This is not an argument for not acting. The risk of a fully nuclear Iran is simply too great. It is a very strong argument for finding a good alternative if one can be negotiated on realistic terms. The Uncertain Outcome of Iran Nuclear Weapons and Containment: The Most Likely Outcome is a No Win Escalation Ladder Contest If there are no preventive strikes – or preventive strikes fail to halt Iran – what is now a largely quiet one-sided nuclear arms race would become far more threatening. At one level, this arms race would become one between Iran and any allies it could find and the United States and its Arab allies in or near the Gulf. A nuclear Iran could change the balance in terms of the credibility of U.S. and Arab willingness to engage against Iranian threats, intimidation, and use of its asymmetric forces. It would inevitably make Gulf petroleum exports the scene of an ongoing arms race and constant tension, and risk a clash that might escalate in untended ways. What is less apparent – and needs far more realistic attention in Iran and outside assessments of the Iranian nuclear threat – is the impact of Iran actually going nuclear. One or several crude nuclear devices do not create a nuclear force. Iran cannot produce enough capable nuclear forces for at least the next decade to pose more of an existential threat to Israel than Israel can pose to Iran. Israel would scarcely be passive, however, and Israel already has far more capable missiles than Iran. Israel also has thermonuclear weapons, rather than the early fission devices Iran will probably be limited to for at least the next half-decade. As a result Israel will pose more of an existentialist threat to an Iran as dependent on the survival of Tehran than Iran can pose to an Israel dependent on the survival of Tel Aviv. As the United States and former Soviet Union both learned during the Cold War, even Iranian parity or superiority would be meaningless. The problem with mutually assured destruction is that no state can ever win an existential strike contest. As for the rest of the Middle East, if Iran shows it is going nuclear to enhance its power and dominate the Gulf region – as may be Iran’s real motive – the resulting threat to world oil exports and the world economy is not likely to intimidate to any degree that will benefit Iran. It will push both the United States and Arab states into responding. The fact Iran succeeded in acquiring nuclear weapons might increase the level of deterrence of a direct invasion, but would not lead the United States, or surrounding Arab states to passively accept the result. The United States already is transferring more than ten times the value of Iran’s total arms imports to its Gulf allies. Its ties to Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Oman already give the United States and its Gulf allies the ability to devastatingly defeat Iran in any direct military confrontation. Iran can only vastly increase the scale of the resulting destruction that the United States and its allies inflict if Iran ever actually escalates to the use of nuclear weapons. But the United States, the Arab allies, Israel, and other regional states will suffer as well – along with the global economy – if the end result is a major interruption in the flow of Gulf petroleum exports.

### 1NC

#### The United States federal government should

#### -attach a sunset provision to the AUMF—one that is tied to the withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan, scheduled for the end of 2014

#### -pass a resolution clarifying that the international law of self-defense requires a rigorous imminence, necessity and proportionality analysis, and that the use of cross-border military force should be reserved for situations in which there is concrete evidence of grave threats to the United States or our allies that cannot be addressed through other means

#### -Create a non-partisan blue ribbon commission made up of senior experts on international law, national security, human rights, foreign policy and counterterrorism to review intelligence reports and conduct a thorough policy review of past and current targeted killing policy, evaluating the risk of setting international precedents, the impact of US targeted killing policy on allies, and the impact on broader US counterterrorism goals and follow the advice of the commission.

#### Sunsets allow time for justified authorizations while maintaining allied cooperation

Daskal and Vladeck 13 (Jennifer Daskal is a fellow at Georgetown’s Center on National Security and the Law and an adjunct professor at Georgetown Law Center. Stephen I. Vladeck is a professor of law and the Associate Dean for Scholarship at American University Washington College of Law, “AFTER THE AUMF,” http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/After-the-AUMF-Final.pdf)

An alternative option would be for Congress to write a sunset provision into the AUMF—one that is tied to the withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan, currently scheduled for the end of 2014. This approach has intuitive appeal, given the range of concerns about an open-ended and ever-expanding armed conflict without an identifiable battleground or core center of operations. The long lag time before the authorities actually sunset would provide the Executive ample opportunity to determine what, if any, additional authorities are needed to deal with the threat, and would leave Congress ample time to respond. One issue that arises with the approach, however, is the question of the Guantánamo detainees. With the formal cessation of hostilities comes the end of the authority to detain under the laws of war—and, therefore, under the AUMF. While this will be a cause for celebration for many, it is likely to be a cause of concern for some members of Congress and the Executive. A 2009 review conducted by the Obama Administration concluded that of the 166 detainees still at Guantánamo, some four dozen were deemed “too dangerous to release” but ineligible for prosecution. While conditions may have changed since that assessment was made, and some reasonable “wind-down” authority will almost certainly be permitted,55 at some point that authority will cease. That said, the government’s interest in continued detention pursuant to the laws of war ought not be the reason for the war—this would be a perverse example of the tail wagging the dog. We note that it would probably be feasible to negotiate deals to keep these detainees under surveillance, particularly with the use of sophisticated intelligence and law enforcement tools, so long as we could find a nation to take them. It is worth noting, however, that this issue may soon arise whether or not Congress formally sunsets the AUMF. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,56 the Supreme Court concluded that the authorization to use force includes the authority to detain, a plurality of the court also warned that “[i]f the practical circumstances of a given conflict [meaning boots on the ground] are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informed the development of the law of war, that understanding may unravel.”57 With the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, the relevant practical circumstances will have in fact changed, and may yield a turning point with respect to the Guantánamo detainees (especially those whose detention is based upon ties to the Taliban rather than al Qaeda), regardless of whether the AUMF sunsets. A sunset provision has the obvious benefit of making clear to our allies and to the pool of would-be terrorist recruits that,twelve years on,the United States is not engaged in, or seeking to engage in, a state of perpetual war. More significantly, it also drives home the larger point—that at some point, perhaps soon, the conflict Congress authorized in September 2001 will effectively have run its course. The Executive could, of course, treat the AUMF as lapsed, even without such legislation.

### 1NC

Repealing the AUMF collapses the war on terrorism and targeted killing operations

Stimson 13 (Charles Stimson, Senior Fellow and Manager, National Security Law Program The Heritage Foundation, 3/16. “Law of Armed Conflict and the Use of Military Force,” http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/2013/05/the-law-of-armed-conflict)

As to the Committee’s question regarding the geographic scope of the AUMF, both administrations have taken the unremarkable position that by its terms, and in practice, there is no geographic limit or scope to the AUMF. Rather, the AUMF gives the President the authority to confront the enemy wherever he deems the enemy resides. Just last year, in a major address at Northwestern University, Attorney General Eric Holder stated, “Our legal authority is not limited to the battlefields in Afghanistan. Indeed, neither Congress nor our federal courts have limited the geographic scope of our ability to use force to the current conflict in Afghanistan.”[9] The notion that we are at war, and that the war (and by implication the AUMF) has no geographical boundaries is anathema to some, but is nevertheless lawful and consistent with the law of armed conflict and our national and international obligations. It is also not the boundless source of tyranny and infringement upon other nations’ s overeignty that detractors profess; rather, the national security power of the politically accountable branches are subject to all of the checks and balances within our constitutional form of government, as well as the more modern checks detailed by fellow witness Jack Goldsmith in his book Power and Constraint. And it is commensurate, in this case, with the enemy, an international terrorist movement that does not respect political or any other boundaries and that considers the people and assets of the United States and its allies, wherever they may be, to be its targets. As to the Committee’s question regarding whether the AUMF should be modified, or by implication repealed, I would suggest that repealing the AUMF prematurely would be unwise. Repealing the AUMF would signal, legally, that the war against al Qaeda is over, at a time when al Qaeda and associated forces continue in fact to wage war against the United States. And it may have more specific consequences, for example, involving the continued detention of those terrorists currently in captivity and not subject to military commission or federal court proceedings. Repealing or substantially narrowing the existing AUMF could also have substantial repercussions on other sensitive operations, including but not limited to the targeted killing program. In short, the current AUMF should remain in place unless and until the narrow class of persons under its scope no longer poses a substantial threat to our national security. Keeping the current AUMF does not authorize a permanent state of war, as some critics have alleged. It merely retains the legal framework that has worked and served us well, to date, and acknowledges that those subject to the AUMF, although greatly diminished in number and efficacy, should not be allowed to regain their footing. In the context of the AUMF, keeping the AUMF as is does not necessarily mean that the Executive Branch, this one or the next, will want to or need to employ the full extent of its authority. We cannot foresee with precision when or if the threats posed by those subject to the narrow jurisdiction of the AUMF will be defeated or become so insignificant as to not warrant this particular AUMF.

#### Key to solve terrorism

Anderson 13 (Kenneth, professor of international law at Washington College of Law, American University, Washington, visiting fellow at Hoover “The Case for Drones,” http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2013/05/24/the\_case\_for\_drones\_118548-full.html)

Other critics argue that drone warfare is ineffective because killing one operational commander merely means that another rises to take his place. This is the source of the oft-heard remark that drone warfare is a “whack-a-mole” strategy: Kill one here and another pops up there. Drone warfare is nothing more than a tactic masquerading as a strategy, it is said. Worse, it indulges one of the oldest and most seductive quests of modern military technology, the one that says you can win a war from the air alone. The whack-a-mole criticism is wildly overstated and, as a matter of terrorist leadership, simply not true. Captured terrorist communications show that qualified and experienced operational commanders are not so easy to come by. One can argue that the failure to carry off large-scale attacks in the West is the result of the defensive hardening of targets and better homeland security, which is certainly true; but culling the ranks of terrorist leaders and the resulting inability to plan another 9/11 is also critical. Drone warfare today is integrated with a much larger strategic counterterrorism target—one in which, as in Afghanistan in the late 1990s, radical Islamist groups seize governance of whole populations and territories and provide not only safe haven, but also an honored central role to transnational terrorist groups. This is what current conflicts in Yemen and Mali threaten, in counterterrorism terms, and why the United States, along with France and even the UN, has moved to intervene militarily. Drone warfare is just one element of overall strategy, but it has a clear utility in disrupting terrorist leadership. It makes the planning and execution of complex plots difficult if only because it is hard to plan for years down the road if you have some reason to think you will be struck down by a drone but have no idea when. The unpredictability and terrifying anticipation of sudden attack, which terrorists have acknowledged in communications, have a significant impact on planning and organizational effectiveness.

#### Will target undersea cables-they have the means

**Krepinevich, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments president, 2011**

(Andrew, “The Terrorist Threat Beneath the Waves”, 11-2, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203687504577005811739173268.html>, ldg)

This vast infrastructure was built with the assumption that while it would have to weather natural disasters, it would not be a target in war. In military parlance, much of the infrastructure comprises "soft" targets that would not require much in the way of explosives to cause significant, and perhaps catastrophic, damage. Fortunately many of these targets have not been easy to reach—until now. This brings us to the second development: the diffusion of military technology and weaponry that can threaten the undersea economy with a new form of commerce raiding. In recent years, Latin-American narco-cartels have begun moving their cargo by submarine. While not even remotely in a class with the U.S. Navy's submarines, these simple boats are nevertheless capable of operating undersea in littoral waters while moving tons of cocaine. They have a range of up to 2,000 miles and cost but a few million dollars to build. These submarines can submerge to depths of a few dozen feet, which is sufficient to make detection difficult, allowing them to approach offshore oil platforms with little or no warning. Even more disturbing is the proliferation of unmanned underwater vehicles, or UUVs, which were once almost exclusively operated by Western militaries. With the growth of the undersea economy, civilian development and production took off in the 1980s. UUVs are now widely used for a variety of commercial and scientific purposes. These UUVs are perhaps best known for their role in locating sunken ships. Unlike the small submarines operated by narco-cartels, UUVs can descend to the ocean floor. If adapted for military purposes, they could carry mines and other explosives, as well as cameras and electronic sensors. They are also becoming cheaper, with a wide variety of systems available for sale in the private sector. Then there are naval mines, now manufactured in more than 30 countries. Some producers, like Russia, are developing mines with better sensors, target-recognition systems, stealthy coatings, and self-propulsion systems to enable them to move about. But mines don't need to be sophisticated to be effective, especially against the thousands of soft targets populating the continental shelf. While narco-cartels are interested in making money, not war, this is not the case with radical nonstate entities or their state sponsors. Some groups, including al Qaeda, seek to achieve victory not by defeating their enemies on the battlefield but by inflicting unacceptable pain or damage, either against defenseless civilians or economic infrastructure. Toward this end, radical Islamists have undertaken attacks, employing far less sophisticated means and with minimal success, on an oil tanker in the Gulf of Aden in October 2002 and Saudi oil production facilities in February 2006. Should the U.S. find itself in a confrontation with Iran, it might employ proxies to achieve similar ends. For a relatively small effort on their part, in short, America's enemies could potentially impose enormous costs on its undersea economy, including loss of energy resources, damaged infrastructure and environmental degradation.

#### Undersea cables are the lynchpin of the global economy and US warfighting

**Matis, USNA commander and Master in Strategic Studies, 2012**

(Michael, “The Protection of Undersea Cables: A Global Security Threat”, July, online pdf, ldg)

Undersea cables are a valuable commodity in the 21st century global communication environment. The undersea consortium is owned by various international companies such as ATT, and these companies provide high-speed broadband connectivity and capacity for large geographic areas that are important entities of trade and communications around the globe.41 For example, the U.S. Clearing House Interbank Payment System processes in excess of $1 trillion a day for investment companies, securities and commodities exchange organizations, banks, and other financial institutions from more than 22 countries.42 The majority of their transactions are transmitted via undersea cables. In addition, the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) <<NCW>> net-centric warfare and Global Information Grid <<GIG>> rely on the same undersea cables that service the information and economic spheres.43 If undersea cables were cut or disrupted outside of the U.S. territorial waters, even for a few hours, the capability of modern U.S warfare that encompasses battle space communications and awareness, protection, and the stability of the financial networks would be at risk. As one analyst has noted, “the increase demand is being driven primarily from data traffic that is becoming an integral part of the everyday telecommunications infrastructure and has no boundaries.44 Maintaining the viability of these cables is extremely important. An example of the magnitude of data that reaches the international market every day is demonstrated by the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT), which is the global provider of secure financial messaging services.45 This organization transmits financial data between 208 countries via undersea fiber optic cables.46 In addition, the security of international transactions via undersea cables could create chaos for global markets if the cables linking U.S., Europe and/or Asia were cut. The disproportionate importance of these cables to the nation’s communication infrastructure cannot be overestimated. If all of these cables were suddenly cut, only seven percent of the U. S. traffic could be restored using every single satellite in the sky.47 Satellites were important to the global communication industry but, were overtaken by undersea fiber-optic cable technology in terms of volume and/or capacity amongst users in 1986.48 There is a misconception amongst telephone, cell phones, and internet recipients around the globe that believe satellites are the primary means of communicating. There are significant limitations utilizing satellites as an efficient means of communication. Finn and Yang, note that satellites take a quarter of a second for signals to make the round trip to and from a geostationary orbit 22,000 miles above the Earth and one bounce is enough to throw off the verbal timing of a conversation. Also, the transmission quality of the satellite system could be erratic with echoes, screeches or dead-air calls.49 A major portion of DoD data traveling on undersea cables is unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) video. In 2010, UAVs flew 190,000 hours, and the Air Force estimates that it will need more than one million UAV hours annually to be prepared for future wars.50 The Department of State and its diplomatic and consular posts are also heavily dependent on uninterrupted global undersea cable traffic. The importance of these cables makes them a potential target for other states or terrorists.

#### Regardless of relative power, military operations solve all conflict.

Kagan and O’Hanlon 7

Frederick Kagan and Michael O’Hanlon, Fred’s a resident scholar at AEI, Michael is a senior fellow in foreign policy at Brookings, “The Case for Larger Ground Forces”, April 24, 2007, <http://www.aei.org/files/2007/04/24/20070424_Kagan20070424.pdf>

We live at a time when wars not only rage in nearly every region but threaten to erupt in many places where the current relative calm is tenuous. To view this as a strategic military challenge for the United States is not to espouse a specific theory of America’s role in the world or a certain political philosophy. Such an assessment flows directly from the basic bipartisan view of American foreign policy makers since World War II that overseas threats must be countered before they can directly threaten this country’s shores, that the basic stability of the international system is essential to American peace and prosperity, and that no country besides the United States is in a position to lead the way in countering major challenges to the global order. Let us highlight the threats and their consequences with a few concrete examples, emphasizing those that involve key strategic regions of the world such as the Persian Gulf and East Asia, or key potential threats to American security, such as the spread of nuclear weapons and the strengthening of the global Al Qaeda/jihadist movement. The Iranian government has rejected a series of international demands to halt its efforts at enriching uranium and submit to international inspections. What will happen if the US—or Israeli—government becomes convinced that Tehran is on the verge of fielding a nuclear weapon? North Korea, of course, has already done so, and the ripple effects are beginning to spread. Japan’s recent election to supreme power of a leader who has promised to rewrite that country’s constitution to support increased armed forces—and, possibly, even nuclear weapons— may well alter the delicate balance of fear in Northeast Asia fundamentally and rapidly. Also, in the background, at least for now, SinoTaiwanese tensions continue to flare, as do tensions between India and Pakistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan, Venezuela and the United States, and so on. Meanwhile, the world’s nonintervention in Darfur troubles consciences from Europe to America’s Bible Belt to its bastions of liberalism, yet with no serious international forces on offer, the bloodletting will probably, tragically, continue unabated. And as bad as things are in Iraq today, they could get worse. What would happen if the key Shiite figure, Ali al Sistani, were to die? If another major attack on the scale of the Golden Mosque bombing hit either side (or, perhaps, both sides at the same time)? Such deterioration might convince many Americans that the war there truly was lost—but the costs of reaching such a conclusion would be enormous. Afghanistan is somewhat more stable for the moment, although a major Taliban offensive appears to be in the offing. Sound US grand strategy must proceed from the recognition that, over the next few years and decades, the world is going to be a very unsettled and quite dangerous place, with Al Qaeda and its associated groups as a subset of a much larger set of worries. The only serious response to this international environment is to develop armed forces capable of protecting America’s vital interests throughout this dangerous time. Doing so requires a military capable of a wide range of missions—including not only deterrence of great power conflict in dealing with potential hotspots in Korea, the Taiwan Strait, and the Persian Gulf but also associated with a variety of Special Forces activities and stabilization operations. For today’s US military, which already excels at high technology and is increasingly focused on re-learning the lost art of counterinsurgency, this is first and foremost a question of finding the resources to field a large-enough standing Army and Marine Corps to handle personnel intensive missions such as the ones now under way in Iraq and Afghanistan.

## Case

### Can’t Solve

#### Can’t solve – you concede yourself that the plan action of the affirmative isn’t enough to abolish the legislation which justifies human rights abuses

#### The public and party structures are committed to an aggressive foreign policy-it’s what the people want-and any outbreak of terrorism will turn us more neocon

**McDonough, Dalhousie Centre for Foreign Policy Studies fellow, 2009**

(David, “Beyond Primacy: Hegemony and ‘Security Addiction’ in U.S. Grand Strategy”, Winter, Orbis, ScienceDirect, ldg)

The reason that the current debate is currently mired in second-order issues of multilateral versus unilateral legitimacy can be attributed to the post 9/11 security environment. **A grand strategy is, after all, ‘‘a state’s theory about how it can best cause security for itself.’**’ 35 It would be prudent to examine why the **neoconservative ‘‘theory’’ proved to be** so **attractive to American decision-makers after the 9/11 attacks**, and why the **Democrats have begun to rely on an equally primacist ‘‘theory’’** of their own. As Charles Kupchan has demonstrated, a sense of vulnerability is often directly associated with dramatic shifts in a state’s grand strategy.Kupchan is, of course, largely concerned with vulnerability to changes in the global distribution of power. 36 Even so, **the 9/11 terrorist attacks have dramatically increased the U.S. sense of strategic vulnerability to both global terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda and even to more traditional threats that are seen,** as Donald Rumsfeld said, ‘‘in a dramatic new light–through the prism of our experience on 9/11.’’ 37 Perhaps more than any previous terrorist action, **these attacks demonstrated the potential inﬂuence of non-state terrorist groups like Al Qaeda. U.S. strategic primacy makes conventional responses unattractive and ultimately futile to potential adversaries.** The country’s **societal vulnerability to terrorist attacks will likewise lead to** extremely costly **defensive reactions against otherwise limited attacks. For both the United States and its asymmetrical adversaries, the advantage clearly favors the offense over the defense.** With the innumerable list of potential targets, ‘‘**preemptive and preventive attacks will accomplish more** against. . .[terrorists or their support structures], dollar for dollar, than the investment in passive defenses.’’ 38 As former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith has argued, a primary reliance on defense requires instrusive security measures that would inevitably endanger American civil liberties and curtail its free and open society. 39 Strategic preponderance ensures that the United States will continue to face adversaries eager to implement asymmetrical tactics, even as it offers the very resources necessary to implement both offensive and less effective defensive measures. Unfortunately, terrorist groups with strategic reach (i.e., capable of inﬂuencing the actions of states) will likely increase in the coming years due to a combination of factors, including the ‘‘democractization of technology,’’ the ‘‘privatization of war’’ and the ‘‘miniaturization of weaponry.’’ **As more groups are imbued with sophisticated technological capabilities and are able to employ increasingly lethal weapons, the United States will be forced to rely even further on its** unprecedented global **military capabilities** to eliminate this threat. The global war on terror, even with tactical successes against al Qaeda, will likely result in an inconclusive ending marked by the fragmentation and proliferation of terrorist spoiler groups. The ‘‘Israelization’’ of the United States, in which ‘‘security trumps everything,’’ will be no temporary phenomenon. 40 Realism provides an insufﬁcient means for understanding the current post-9/11 strategic threat environment and underestimates the potential impact of the terrorist threat on the American sense of vulnerability. Globalized terrorism must be confronted by proactive measures to reduce the domestic vulnerability to attack and to eliminate these organizations in their external sanctuaries. Even then, these measures will never be able to ensure ‘‘perfect security.’’ As a result, **signiﬁcant public pressure for expanded security measures will arise** after any attack. **The United States will be consumed with** what Frank Harvey has termed security **addiction**: **‘‘As expectations for acceptable levels of pain decrease, billions** of dollars **will continue to be spent by both parties in a never-ending competition to convince the American public that their party’s programs are different and more likely to succeed.’’** 41 **This addiction has an important impact on the dramatically rising levels of homeland security spending**. Indeed, while **this increased spending** is an inevitable and prudent reaction to the terrorist threat, it also **creates high public expectations that will only amplify outrage** in a security failure. 42 Relatedly, American strategic preponderance plays an important role in facilitating a vigorous international response to globalized terrorism, including the use of coercive military options and interventions. A primacist strategy has the dual attraction of both maximizing U.S. strategic dominance and convincing the public of a party’s national security credentials. Indeed, **the Republicans had developed a strong advantage in electoral politics by its adherence to a strong military and aggressive strategy, and the Democrats in turn ‘‘learned the lesson of its vulnerability on the issue** and [...] explicitly declared its devotion to national security and support for the military.’’ 43 The 9/11 attacks may not have altered the distribution of power amongst major states, but it has directly created a domestic political situation marked by an addiction to expansive security measures that are needed to satisfy increasingly high public expectations. In such a climate, **it is easy to see why the neo-conservatives were so successful in selling their strategic vision. The fact that the United States has effectively settled on a grand strategy of primacy in the post-9/11 period should come as no surprise. It is simply inconceivable that a political party could successfully advocate a grand strategy that does not embrace military preeminence and interventionism, two factors that are seen to provide a deﬁnite advantage in the pursuit of a ‘‘global war on terror.’’ Political parties may disagree on the necessary tactics** to eliminate the terrorist threat. **But** with increased vulnerability and security addiction, **the United States will continue to embrace** strategies of **primacy**– rather than going ‘‘beyond primacy’’–**for much of the Long War.**

### Discourse

#### ---Reality shapes discourse --- Materiality is a prerequisite to discursive construction.

Roskoski & Peabody 1991

Matthew, Joe, “A Linguistic and Philosophical Critique of Language ‘Arguments,’” http://debate.uvm.edu/Library/ DebateTheoryLibrary/Roskoski&Peabody-LangCritiques

The first is that the hypothesis is phrased as a philosophical first principle and hence would not have an objective referent. The second is there would be intrinsic problems in any such test. The independent variable would be the language used by the subject. The dependent variable would be the subject's subjective reality. The problem is that the dependent variable can only be measured through self- reporting, which - naturally - entails the use of language. Hence, it is impossible to separate the dependent and independent variables. In other words, we have no way of knowing if the effects on "reality" are actual or merely artifacts of the language being used as a measuring tool. The second reason that the hypothesis is flawed is that there are problems with the causal relationship it describes. Simply put, it is just as plausible (in fact infinitely more so) that reality shapes language. Again we echo the words of Dr. Rosch, who says: {C}ovariation does not determine the direction of causality. On the simplest level, cultures are very likely to have names for physical objects which exist in their culture and not to have names for objects outside of their experience. Where television sets exists, there are words to refer to them. However, it would be difficult to argue that the objects are caused by the words. The same reasoning probably holds in the case of institutions and other, more abstract, entities and their names. (Rosch 264).

### Impact D

#### No risk of endless warfare

**Gray 7**—Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, graduate of the Universities of Manchester and Oxford, Founder and Senior Associate to the National Institute for Public Policy, formerly with the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hudson Institute (Colin, July, “The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration”, <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ssi10561/ssi10561.pdf>)

7. A policy that favors preventive warfare expresses a futile quest for absolute security. It could do so. Most controversial policies contain within them the possibility of misuse. **In the hands of a paranoid**or boundlessly ambitious **political leader, prevention could be a policy for endless warfare. However, the American political system, with its checks and balances, was designed explicitly for the purpose of constraining the executive from**excessive **folly. Both the Vietnam and the contemporary Iraq**i **experiences reveal clearly that** although **the conduct of war is** an executive prerogative, in practice that authority is **disciplined by public attitudes**. Clausewitz made this point superbly with his designation of the passion, the sentiments, of the people as a vital component of his trinitarian theory of war. 51 It is true to claim that power can be, and indeed is often, abused, both personally and nationally. It is possible that a state could acquire a taste for the apparent swift decisiveness of preventive warfare and overuse the option. One might argue that the easy success achieved against Taliban Afghanistan in 2001, provided fuel for the urge to seek a similarly rapid success against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. In other words, the delights of military success can be habit forming. On balance, claim seven is not persuasive, though it certainly contains a germ of truth. A country with unmatched wealth and power, unused to physical insecurity at home—notwithstanding 42 years of nuclear danger, and a high level of gun crime—is vulnerable to demands for policies that supposedly can restore security. But**we ought not to endorse the argument** that **the U**nited **S**tates **should eschew the preventive war option because it could lead to a futile, endless search for absolute security. One might as well argue that** the United States should adopt a defense policy and develop capabilities shaped strictly for homeland security approached in a narrowly geographical sense. **Since a president might misuse a military instrument that had a global reach, why not deny the White House even the possibility of such misuse? In other words, constrain policy ends by limiting policy’s military means.**This argument has circulated for many decades and, it must be admitted, it does have a certain elementary logic. It is the opinion of this enquiry, however, that **the claim that a policy which includes the preventive option might lead to a search for total security is not at all convincing**. Of course, folly in high places is always possible, which is one of the many reasons why popular democracy is the superior form of government**. It would be absurd to permit the fear of a futile and dangerous quest for absolute security to preclude prevention as a policy option. Despite its absurdity, this rhetorical charge against prevention is a stock favorite among prevention’s critics. It should be recognized and dismissed for what it is, a debating point with little pragmatic merit. And strategy**, though not always policy, **must be nothing if not pragmatic.**

#### Discursive othering doesn’t result in ‘uncontrollable violence’

**Rodwell 5**—PhD candidate, Manchester Met. (Jonathan, Trendy But Empty: A Response to Richard Jackson, http://www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/issue15/rodwell1.htm, AMiles)

In this response I wish to argue that the Post-Structural **analysis** put forward **by** Richard **Jackson is inadequate when trying to understand** **American** Politics and **Foreign Policy**. The key point is that this is an issue of methodology and theory. **I do** **not** wish to **argue** that **language is not important**, in the current political scene (or indeed any political era) that would be unrealistic. One cannot help but be convinced that **the creation of identity**, of defining ones self (or one nation, or societies self) **in opposition to an ‘other’ does** indeed **take place**. Masses of written and aural evidence collated by Jackson clearly demonstrates that there is a discursive pattern surrounding post 9/11 U.S. politics and society. [i] Moreover as expressed at the start of this paper it is a political pattern and logic that this language is useful for politicians, especially when able to marginalise other perspectives. Nothing illustrates this clearer than the fact George W. Bush won re-election, for whatever the reasons he did win, it is undeniable that at the very least the war in Iraq, though arguable far from a success, at the absolute minimum did not damage his campaign. Additionally it is surely not stretching credibility to argue Bush performance and rhetoric during the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks also strengthened his position. **However**, having said that, the problem is **Jackson’s** own theoretical underpinning, his own justification for the importance of language. If he was merely proposing that the understanding of language as one of many causal factors is important that would be fine. But he is not. The epistemological and theoretical **framework** of his argument **means the ONLY thing we should look at is language** **and this is the problem**.[ii] Rather than being a fairly simple, but nonetheless valid, argument, because of the theoretical justification it actually becomes an almost nonsensical. My response is roughly laid out in four parts. Firstly I will argue that such methodology, in isolation, is fundamentally reductionist with a theoretical underpinning that does not conceal this simplicity. Secondly, that a strict use of post-structural discourse analysis results in an epistemological cul-de-sac in which the writer cannot actually say anything. Moreover the reader has no reason to accept anything that has been written. The result is at best an explanation that remains as equally valid as any other possible interpretation and at worse a work that retains no critical force whatsoever. Thirdly, possible arguments in response to this charge; that such approaches provide a more acceptable explanation than others are, in effect, both a tacit acceptance of the poverty of force within the approach and of the complete lack of understanding of the identifiable effects of the real world around us; thus highlighting the contradictions within post-structural claims to be moving beyond traditional causality, re-affirming that rather than pursuing a post-structural approach we should continue to employ the traditional methodologies within History, Politics and International Relations. Finally as a consequence of these limitations I will argue that the post-structural call for ‘intertextuals’ must be practiced rather than merely preached and that an understanding and utilisation of all possible theoretical approaches must be maintained if academic writing is to remain useful rather than self-contained and narrative. Ultimately I conclude that whilst undeniably of some value post-structural approaches are at best a footnote in our understanding . The first major problem then is that historiographically discourse analysis is so capacious as to be largely of little use. The process of inscription identity, of discourse development is not given any political or historical context, it is argued that it just works, is simply a universal phenomenon. It is history that explains everything and therefore actually explains nothing. To be specific if the U.S. and every other nation is continually reproducing identities through ‘othering’ it is a constant and universal phenomenon that fails to help us understand at all why one result of the othering turned out one way and differently at another time. For example, how could one explain how the process resulted in the 2003 invasion of Iraq but didn’t produce a similar invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 when that country (and by the logic of the Regan administrations discourse) the West was threatened by the ‘Evil Empire’. By the logical of discourse analysis in both cases these policies were the result of politicians being able to discipline and control the political agenda to produce the outcomes. So why were the outcomes not the same? To reiterate the point how do we explain that the language of the War on Terror actually managed to result in the eventual Afghan invasion in 2002? Surely it is impossible to explain how George W. Bush was able to convince his people (and incidentally the U.N and Nato) to support a war in Afghanistan without referring to a simple fact outside of the discourse; the fact that a known terrorist in Afghanistan actually admitted to the murder of thousands of people on the 11h of Sepetember 2001. The point is that if the discursive ‘othering’ of an ‘alien’ people or group is what really gave the U.S. the opportunity to persue the war in Afghanistan one must surly wonder why Afghanistan. Why not North Korea? Or Scotland? If the discourse is so powerfully useful in it’s own right why could it not have happened anywhere at any time and more often? Why could the British government not have been able to justify an armed invasion and regime change in Northern Ireland throughout the terrorist violence of the 1980’s? Surely they could have just employed the same discursive trickery as George W. Bush? Jackson is absolutely right when he points out that the actuall threat posed by Afghanistan or Iraq today may have been thoroughly misguided and conflated and that there must be more to explain why those wars were enacted at that time. Unfortunately that explanation cannot simply come from the result of inscripting identity and discourse. On top of this there is the clear problem that the consequences of the discursive othering are not necessarily what Jackson would seem to identify. This is a problem consistent through David Campbell’s original work on which Jackson’s approach is based[iii]. David Campbell argued for a linguistic process that ‘always results in an other being marginalized’ or has the potential for ‘demonisation’[iv]. At the same time Jackson, building upon this, maintains without qualification that the systematic and institutionalised abuse of Iraqi prisoners first exposed in April 2004 “is a direct consequence of the language used by senior administration officials: conceiving of terrorist suspects as ‘evil’, ‘inhuman’ and ‘faceless enemies of freedom creates an atmosphere where abuses become normalised and tolerated”[v]. The only problem is that the process of differentiation does not actually necessarily produce dislike or antagonism. In the 1940’s and 50’s even subjected to the language of the ‘Red Scare’ it’s obvious not all Americans came to see the Soviets as an ‘other’ of their nightmares. And in Iraq the abuses of Iraqi prisoners are isolated cases, it is not the case that the U.S. militarily summarily abuses prisoners as a result of language. Surely the massive protest against the war, even in the U.S. itself, is also a self evident example that the language of ‘evil’ and ‘inhumanity’ does not necessarily produce an outcome that marginalises or demonises an ‘other’. Indeed one of the points of discourse is that we are continually differentiating ourselves from all others around us without this necessarily leading us to hate fear or abuse anyone.[vi] Consequently, the clear fear of the Soviet Union during the height of the Cold War, and the abuses at Abu Ghirab are unusual cases. To understand what is going on we must ask how far can the process of inscripting identity really go towards explaining them? As a result at best all discourse analysis provides us with is a set of universals and a heuristic model.

### Terrorism

#### Terrorists goals are ideological; not political; there is no negotiation---only regulated violence in a utilitarian framework can solve

Whitman 7 (Jeffery, Prof of Philosophy, Religion, and Classical Studies Susquehanna University, “Just War Theory and the War on Terrorism A Utilitarian Perspective,” http://www.mesharpe.com/PIN/05Whitman.pdf)

Nonetheless, there was something different about the 9/11 attacks that is troubling, and that difference is the nihilistic nature of the attackers. Most, but not all, terrorist activity has a political or religious goal of some sort as its aim—the liberation of a minority group, the establishment of a new state, the removal of a perceived oppressor. Al-Qaeda professes a political goal, but its actions belie its claims. It claims to be fighting for the cause of Palestinian freedom and for oppressed Muslims everywhere, but it has appropriated the Islamic religion and the concept of jihad in order to recruit suicide bombers with the promise of martyrdom and entry into Paradise. In so doing, the political goal, if it ever existed, has become subservient to eschatological concerns. Political failure has become an irrelevant distraction that is trumped by the reward of eternal life. As Michael Ignatieff notes concerning al-Qaeda, their goals are less political than apocalyptic, securing immortality for themselves MARKED HERE while calling down a mighty malediction on the Great Satan. Goals that are political can be engaged politically. Apocalyptic goals, on the other hand, are impossible to negotiate with. They can only be fought by force of arms. (2004, 125–126) This version of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, represented by such groups as Hamas, Hezbollah, and al-Qaeda, seems particularly intractable. These groups, especially insofar as they employ suicide-bomber tactics, have become death cults (Ignatieff 2004, 126–127). There can be no negotiated settlement, so the only solution seems to be a violent one aimed at the utter destruction of the terrorists. And yet, a purely violent and largely military response runs significant risks, both morally and pragmatically, for the counterterrorist forces. The risks are especially poignant for a liberal democracy like the United States, for the use of purely military means, particularly the brutal military means that may seem necessary to defeat terrorism, may run contrary to the very principles a liberal democracy represents (Ignatieff 2004, 133–136).6 Thus the terrorist threat represented by al-Qaeda–like groups presents a difficult and somewhat unique challenge for the United States. Nonetheless, I remain convinced that a utilitarian conceptualization of just war theory can help us to successfully navigate between the Scylla of losing the fight against terrorism and the Charybdis of abandoning the principles that define our liberal democracy.

# 2NC

## Warfighting

### 2NC Overview

#### Plan will force actions to be labeled as self-defense

**Daskal, Georgetown Center on National Security and the Law adjunct professor, 2013**

(Jennifer, “The Geography of the Battlefield: A Framework for Detention and Targeting Outside the 'Hot' Conflict Zone”, <http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1252&context=facsch_lawrev>, ldg)

Absent the existence of an armed conflict, the United States—supported by a number of scholars—will turn increasingly to a self-defense theory to justify actions that would otherwise be conducted under a law-of-war framework. The United States has already suggested that certain targeted killings that have taken place outside of Afghanistan and northwest Pakistan are legitimate under both an armed-conflict and a self-defense justification. 209 Statements by CIA General Counsel Stephen Preston suggest that self-defense is in fact the primary basis for the CIA’s targeted-killing operations, with law-of-war authorities acting as a backstop.210 Meanwhile, scholars and European allies who reject the idea that the United States is engaged in a transnational armed conflict with al Qaeda nonetheless agree that the United States may act in self-defense against those al Qaeda operatives who pose an imminent threat, regardless of where they are located.211

#### US norm will get modeled-gurantees escalation and turns the case.

**Barnes, Boston JD and Tufts law and diplomacy MA, 2012**

(Beau, “Reauthorizing the 'War on Terror': The Legal and Policy Implications of the AUMF's Coming Obsolescence”, 211 Military Law Review 57 (2012), <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2150874>, ldg)

The slippery slope problem, however, is not just limited to the United States’s military actions and the issue of domestic control. The creation of international norms is an iterative process, one to which the United States makes significant contributions. Because of this outsized influence, the United States should not claim international legal rights that it is not prepared to see proliferate around the globe. Scholars have observed that the Obama Administration’s “expansive and open-ended interpretation of the right to self-defence threatens to destroy the prohibition on the use of armed force . . . .”147 Indeed, “[i]f other states were to claim the broad-based authority that the United States does, to kill people anywhere, anytime, the result would be chaos.”148 Encouraging the proliferation of an expansive law of international self-defense would not only be harmful to U.S. national security and global stability, but it would also directly contravene the Obama Administration’s national security policy, sapping U.S. credibility. The Administration’s National Security Strategy emphasizes U.S. “moral leadership,” basing its approach to U.S. security in large part on “pursu[ing] a rules-based international system that can advance our own interests by serving mutual interests.”149 Defense Department General Counsel Jeh Johnson has argued that “[a]gainst an unconventional enemy that observes no borders and does not play by the rules, we must guard against aggressive interpretations of our authorities that will discredit our efforts, provoke controversy and invite challenge.”150 Cognizant of the risk of establishing unwise international legal norms, Johnson argued that the United States “must not make [legal authority] up to suit the moment.”151 The Obama Administration’s global counterterrorism strategy is to “adher[e] to a stricter interpretation of the rule of law as an essential part of the wider strategy” of “turning the page on the past [and rooting] counterterrorism efforts within a more durable, legal foundation.”152 Widely accepted legal arguments also facilitate cooperation from U.S. allies, especially from the United States’ European allies, who have been wary of expansive U.S. legal interpretations.153 Moreover, U.S. strategy vis-à-vis China focuses on binding that nation to international norms as it gains power in East Asia.154 The United States is an international “standard-bearer” that “sets norms that are mimicked by others,”155 and the Obama Administration acknowledges that its drone strikes act in a quasi-precedential fashion.156 Risking the obsolescence of the AUMF would force the United States into an “aggressive interpretation” of international legal authority,157 not just discrediting its own rationale, but facilitating that rationale’s destabilizing adoption by nations around the world.

#### Causes global hotspots to go nuclear

**Obayemi, East Bay law school professor, 2006**

(Olumide, “Article: Legal Standards Governing Pre-Emptive Strikes and Forcible Measures of Anticipatory Self-Defense Under the U.N. Charter and General International Law”, 12 Ann. Surv. Int'l & Comp. L. 19, lexis, ldg)

The United States must abide by the rigorous standards set out above that are meant to govern the use of preemptive strikes, because today's international system is characterized by a relative infrequency of interstate war. It has been noted that developing doctrines that lower the threshold for preemptive action could put that accomplishment at risk, and exacerbate regional crises already on the brink of open conflict. n100 This is important as O'Hanlon, Rice, and Steinberg have rightly noted: ...countries already on the brink of war, and leaning strongly towards war, might use the doctrine to justify an action they already wished to take, and the effect of the U.S. posture may make it harder for the international community in general, and the U.S. in particular, to counsel delay and diplomacy. Potential **examples abound**, ranging from Ethiopia and Eritrea, to China and Taiwan, to the Middle East. But perhaps the clearest case is the India-Pakistan crisis. n101 The world must be a safe place to live in. We cannot be ruled by bandits and rogue states. There must be law and order not only in the books but in enforcement as well. No nation is better suited to enforce international law than the United States. The Bush Doctrine will stand the test [\*42] of time and survive. Again, we submit that nothing more would protect the world and its citizens from nuclear weapons, terrorists and rogue states than an able and willing nation like the United States, acting as a policeman of the world within all legal boundaries. This is the essence of the preamble to the United Nations Charter.

### Anti-americanism

#### Their safi evidence isn’t responsive –

#### 1 – stimson, al qaeda will still wage war

#### Aff causes terrorism – only reason it hasn’t happened yet is aggressive posture.

Senik 2013 Troy, Senior Fellow at the Center for Individual Freedom, In the War on Terror, a Surrender, http://cfif.org/v/index.php/the-issues/45-foreign-policy/1864-in-the-war-on-terror-a-surrender

This was likely the motivation for Obama’s recent decision to give a major foreign policy address at the National Defense University in Washington D.C. Media coverage of the speech focused mostly on an extended exchange between Obama and a left-wing heckler over Guantanamo Bay, which buried the real story: Barack Obama has a plan for winning the War on Terror – he’ll simply say it’s over. During his remarks, Obama proposed repealing the authorization of military force that emerged from Congress in the aftermath of 9/11 – the document that provides the legal justification to pursue terrorists around the globe and, it should be noted, which allows for the drone strikes that the president spent much of his speech bending over backwards to defend. Now, Obama is far from the only person to take issue with the breadth of that authorization. Senator Rand Paul has also criticized the broad interpretation of the law, which has allowed the original post-9/11 mandate to extend to current conflicts with extremist groups (like those in Yemen and Somalia) that didn’t even exist at the time that Congress passed the bill. Fair enough. But apart from a vague assertion that “Our systematic effort to dismantle terrorist organizations must continue,” Obama didn’t offer any thoughts on what would replace the authorization of military force … which is important, because you can’t keep up that “systematic effort” without some legal authority. Instead, he offered a particularly listless bromide, noting that, “this war, like all wars, must end. That’s what history advises. That’s what our democracy demands.” Well, yes, but history also advises that wars don’t end because one side signs a piece of paper that the other ignores. It’s true, as Obama noted in his remarks, the scope of our war with Islamist terrorists has narrowed. We haven’t had anything remotely approaching another 9/11, thanks largely to the aggressive posture adopted in the wake of those attacks. But the threat has only been reduced because we’ve applied relentless pressure. Let up a little bit and you can be assured it will flare back up. That’s the thing about theocratic martyrs – they tend to define defeat differently than we do. A more sober president would have taken the reality as he found it – Al Qaeda weakened, but not defeated; Islamists still keen to strike the United States – and tailored a strategy accordingly. Obama, by contrast, believes that, since things are going our way, this is as good a time as any to call off the whole affair. This is what happens when a president is guided by that aforementioned hubris: He begins to believe that reality will take whatever form his speechwriters command. The task of combating radical Islam will be Obama’s for the rest of his term, whether he likes it or not. It will likely occupy several of his successors as well. The president can declare himself done with the War on Terror if he pleases. He just shouldn’t expect the War on Terror to return the favor.

#### Surrender won’t stop terrorist attacks.

Stein 2013 Ben, Ben Stein: Declaring end to War on Terror is surrender, June 2 2013, speechwriter for Nixon and Ford, JD from Yale

But I am puzzled by the overall theme of his speech, which I take to be that it is time to stop, or greatly wind down, the War on Terror. Of course, some of this was obvious. The war in Iraq -- a colossal mistake to start with -- is over for the U.S. The war in Afghanistan -- poorly conducted from Day One -- is winding down rapidly. In neither case can we say we are ending with a clear-cut (or even a rough-cut) victory. But how can we declare peace in the War on Terror, when the terrorists are still making war on us? There is no sign at all of any interest by the terrorists in stopping their attacks on us or our allies. There is no hint that al Qaeda is even remotely finished as an enemy. Very much to the contrary. Although al Qaeda wasn't necessarily involved, we saw vicious terrorism at the Boston Marathon, and a staggeringly cruel act of terror in London virtually hours before Mr. Obama spoke. Terrorists are bloodcurdlingly powerful in Africa, both in the Sahara region and in Sub-Saharan Africa. How can we possibly declare peace in a war in which the other side is waging war aggressively against freedom and dignity all over the world? The idea that we can unilaterally declare peace against an enemy on the attack is delusional, at best. Long ago, before the U.S. had entered WWII, an American asked Winston Churchill why the British were fighting so desperately against the Nazis. "If we stop, you'll find out," said Churchill. I hope Mr. Obama will ponder these words. Peace, while the other side is still attacking, is not peace. It is surrender.

#### Can’t change mindsets – Conservatives are really, really, really dumb.

Lee 2012

Timothy, adjunct scholar at the Cato Institute, Conservatives' Reality Problem http://www.forbes.com/sites/timothylee/2012/11/09/conservatives-reality-problem/

Two decades ago, conservatives liked to argue that the ivory tower had put academics out of touch with reality, and that conservatism had reason and science on its side. The recent collapse of communism seemed to confirm this view. Today the tables have turned. While academia certainly still has pockets of out-of-touch leftists, there has been a much more dramatic decline in intellectual standards on the political right. I don’t think it’s a coincidence that Team Romney’s polling cluelessness comes after years of conservatives demonizing pointy-headed academics, including scientists. On subjects like evolution, global warming, the biology of human conception, and even macroeconomics, conservatives have been increasingly bold about rejecting the consensus of scientific experts in favor of ideologically self-serving pronouncements. That attitude may have contributed to their loss of the White House in 2012. It will be much more costly for the country as a whole if it doesn’t change before the GOP next captures the White House. George W. Bush’s invasion of Iraq was a good example of the kind of damage that can be done when elected officials choose ideology over expertise. Bush didn’t just ignore the many experts who warned that invading Iraq was a bad idea. The ideologues were so convinced the war would go well that they massively underestimated the amount of preparation that would be required for the occupation to go reasonably smoothly. As a result, the aftermath of the war was much more chaotic than it would have been if experienced experts had been more involved in the planning process. Many more people died and much more property was destroyed than would have occurred with proper planning. I think global warming is a more complex issue than some people on the left acknowledge. But rather than accepting the basic scientific reality of climate change and making the case that the costs of action outweigh the benefits, many conservatives have taken the cruder tack of simply attacking the entire enterprise of mainstream climate science as a hoax. On macroeconomics, a broad spectrum of economists, ranging from John Maynard Keynes to Milton Friedman, supports the basic premise that recessions are caused by shortfalls in aggregate demand. Economists across the political spectrum agree that the government ought to take action counteract major aggregate demand shortfalls. There is, of course, a lot of disagreement about the details. Friedman argued that the Fed should be responsible for macroeconomic stabilization, while Keynes emphasized deficit spending. But rather than engaging this debate, a growing number of conservatives have rejected the mainstream economic framework altogether, arguing—against the views of libertarian economists like Friedman and F.A. Hayek—that neither Congress nor the Fed has a responsibility to counteract sharp falls in nominal incomes. The conservative movement seems to have adopted the same attitude toward Nate Silver. The world is messy and complicated, and understanding it often requires years of study and a willingness to consider evidence objectively regardless of where it comes from. Yet the conservative movement has increasingly become a hostile place for people who think for themselves, no matter how deeply they understand their subjects. While many aspects of public policy are the subject of genuine ideological disagreements, there are also many issues where experts really do know things the rest of the public does not. A party that systematically favors ideologically convenient arguments and marginalizes dissenting voices will inevitably make costly mistakes. Thankfully, in 2012 those mistakes merely helped Mitt Romney lose the White House. But sooner or later, a Republican is going to get elected president. We should all hope the conservative movement develops a greater respect for expertise in the meantime.

### Link – 2NC

#### The AUMF provides broad targeted killing authority now---new restrictions cause the Executive to shift justifications and accelerate strikes based on self-defense---that destroys solvency and triggers global instability

**Barnes, Boston JD and Tufts law and diplomacy MA, 2012**

(Beau, “Reauthorizing the 'War on Terror': The Legal and Policy Implications of the AUMF's Coming Obsolescence”, 211 Military Law Review 57 (2012), <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2150874>, ldg)

In a world without a valid AUMF, the United States could base its continued worldwide counterterrorism operations on various alternative domestic legal authorities. All of these alternative bases, however, carry with them significant costs—detrimental to U.S. security and democracy. The foreign and national security policy of the United States should rest on “a comprehensive legal regime to support its actions, one that [has] the blessings of Congress and to which a court would defer as the collective judgment of the American political system about a novel set of problems.”141 Only then can the President’s efforts be sustained and legitimate. 2. Effect on the International Law of Self-Defense A failure to reauthorize military force would lead to significant negative consequences on the international level as well. Denying the Executive Branch the authority to carry out military operations in the armed conflict against Al Qaeda would force the President to find authorization elsewhere, most likely in the international law of self-defense— the jus ad bellum.142 Finding sufficient legal authority for the United States’s ongoing counterterrorism operations in the international law of self-defense, however, is problematic for several reasons. As a preliminary matter, relying on this rationale usurps Congress’s role in regulating the contours of U.S. foreign and national security policy. If the Executive Branch can assert “self-defense against a continuing threat” to target and detain terrorists worldwide, it will almost always be able to find such a threat.143 Indeed, the Obama Administration’s broad understanding of the concept of “imminence” illustrates the danger of allowing the executive to rely on a self-defense authorization alone.144 This approach also would inevitably lead to dangerous “slippery slopes.” Once the President authorizes a targeted killing of an individual who does not pose an imminent threat in the strict law enforcement sense of “imminence,”145 there are few potential targets that would be off-limits to the Executive Branch. Overly malleable concepts are not the proper bases for the consistent use of military force in a democracy. Although the Obama Administration has disclaimed this manner of broad authority because the AUMF “does not authorize military force against anyone the Executive labels a ‘terrorist,’”146 relying solely on the international law of self defense would likely lead to precisely such a result. The slippery slope problem, however, is not just limited to the United States’s military actions and the issue of domestic control. The creation of international norms is an iterative process, one to which the United States makes significant contributions. Because of this outsized influence, the United States should not claim international legal rights that it is not prepared to see proliferate around the globe. Scholars have observed that the Obama Administration’s “expansive and open-ended interpretation of the right to self-defence threatens to destroy the prohibition on the use of armed force . . . .”147 Indeed, “[i]f other states were to claim the broad-based authority that the United States does, to kill people anywhere, anytime, the result would be chaos.”148 Encouraging the proliferation of an expansive law of international self-defense would not only be harmful to U.S. national security and global stability, but it would also directly contravene the Obama Administration’s national security policy, sapping U.S. credibility. The Administration’s National Security Strategy emphasizes U.S. “moral leadership,” basing its approach to U.S. security in large part on “pursu[ing] a rules-based international system that can advance our own interests by serving mutual interests.”149 Defense Department General Counsel Jeh Johnson has argued that “[a]gainst an unconventional enemy that observes no borders and does not play by the rules, we must guard against aggressive interpretations of our authorities that will discredit our efforts, provoke controversy and invite challenge.”150 Cognizant of the risk of establishing unwise international legal norms, Johnson argued that the United States “must not make [legal authority] up to suit the moment.”151 The Obama Administration’s global counterterrorism strategy is to “adher[e] to a stricter interpretation of the rule of law as an essential part of the wider strategy” of “turning the page on the past [and rooting] counterterrorism efforts within a more durable, legal foundation.”152

#### This is net offense---it makes the plan look like a disingenuous legal trick, and self-defense would justify a more expansive global battlefield than current doctrine because of the administration’s expansive definition of ‘imminent threat’

**Goldsmith, Harvard law professor, 2013**

(Jack, “Eight Thoughts on the Broad Reading of Article II Inherent in Bobby’s Conjecture”, 5-28, <http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/05/eight-thoughts-on-the-broad-reading-of-article-ii-inherent-in-bobbys-conjecture/>, ldg)

Third, Ben asks: “[H]ow do we feel about what we might term a militarily active peace—that is, a peace in which drone strikes and special forces operations take place regularly, a peace that is so minimally different from warfare that nobody (except Bobby) even noticed that we had transitioned from wartime to peacetime?” As Ben implies, if Bobby is right, the Obama administration’s post-AUMF “peace” or “no more war” trope should not be taken too seriously. It would be little more than a (domestic law) legalistic trick to say that we are not at “war” if we are regularly exercising the use of force around the globe, albeit in pinpoint fashion, just because the President would be acting in self-defense under Article II rather than pursuant to an AUMF. We are currently engaged in numerous and manifold military and paramilitary and intelligence operations in many countries outside Afghanistan (see Mark Mazzetti’s book for a recent description). The scale and persistence of the operations means that many of them would amount to “armed conflicts” even if they were justified as self-defense. And with some caveats about Obama administration practice below, they should (when conducted by DOD) at a minimum trigger at least the reporting provisions (and perhaps more) under the War Powers Resolution. Fourth, the stealth self-defensive war that Bobby describes and that I think the administration envisions in a post-AUMF world is even less bounded than the AUMF-war in this sense: force can be used wherever a threatening group meets the (slippery-at-best and auto-interpreted) “imminent threat” threshold, as long as the nation in question consents or is unwilling or unable to prevent the threat. The Article II war, unlike the AUMF war, requires no nexus to al Qaeda or its associates.

### Broader Impacts

#### We control terminal impact uniqueness- war taboo strong and effective now. Norms matter- prevents miscalc and escalation

**Beehner, Truman National Security Project fellow, 2012**

(Lionel, “Is There An Emerging ‘Taboo’ Against Retaliation?”, 7-13, thesmokefilledroomblog.com/2012/07/13/is-there-an-emerging-taboo-against-retaliation/, ldg)

The biggest international news in the quiet months before 9/11 was the collision of a U.S. Navy spy aircraft and a PLA fighter jet in China, during which 24 American crew members were detained. Even though the incident was lampooned on SNL, there was real concern that the incident would blow up, damaging already-tense relations between the two countries. But it quickly faded and both sides reached an agreement. Quiet diplomacy prevailed. Flash-forward a decade later and we have a similar border incident of a spy plane being shot down between Turkey and Syria. Cue the familiar drumbeats for war on both sides. To save face, each side has ratcheted up its hostile rhetoric (even though Syria’s president did offer something of an admission of guilt). But, as in the spring of 2001, I wouldn’t get too worried. One of the least noted global norms to emerge in recent decades has been the persistence of state restraint in international relations. Retaliation has almost become an unstated taboo. Of course, interstate war is obviously not a relic of previous centuries, but nor is it as commonplace anymore, despite persistent flare-ups that have the potential to escalate to full-blown war. Consider the distinct cases of India and South Korea. Both have sustained serious attacks with mass casualties in recent years: South Korea saw 46 of its sailors killed after the Cheonan, a naval vessel, was sunk by North Korea; India saw 200 citizens killed by the Mumbai attacks, orchestrated by Islamist groups with links to Pakistani intelligence. Yet neither retaliated with military force. Why? The short answer might be: Because a response may have triggered a nuclear war (both Pakistan and North Korea are nuclear-armed states). So nukes in this case may have acted as a deterrent and prevented an escalation of hostilities. But I would argue that it was not the presence of nuclear weapons that led to restraint but rather normative considerations. South Korea and India are also both rising democratic powers with fast-growing economies, enemies along their peripheries, and the military and financial backing of the United States. Their leaders, subject to the whims of an electorate, may have faced domestic pressures to respond with force or suffer reputational costs. And yet no escalation occurred and war was averted. Again, I argue that this is because there is an emerging and under-reported norm of restraint in international politics. Even Russia’s invasion of Georgia in August 2008, which may at first appear to disprove this theory, actually upholds it: The Russians barely entered into Georgia proper and could easily have marched onto the capital. But they didn’t. The war was over in 5 days and Russian troops retreated to disputed provinces. Similarly, Turkey will not declare war on Syria, no matter how angry it is that Damascus shot down one of its spy planes. Quiet diplomacy will prevail. In 1999, Nina Tannenwald made waves by proclaiming the emergence of what she called a “nuclear taboo” – that is, the non-use of dangerous nukes had emerged as an important global norm. Are we witnessing the emergence of a similar norm for interstate war? Even as violence rages on in the form of civil war and internal political violence all across the global map, interstate conflict is increasingly rare. My point is not to echo Steven Pinker, whose latest book, The Better Angles of Our Nature, painstakingly details a “civilizing process” and “humanitarian revolution” that has brought war casualties and murder rates down over the centuries. I’m not fully convinced by his argument, but certainly agree with the observation that at the state level, a norm of non-retaliation has emerged. The question is why. Partly, war no longer makes as much sense as in the past because capturing territory is no longer as advantageous as it once was. We no longer live in a world where marauding throngs of Dothraki-like bandits – or what Mancur Olson politely called “non-stationary bandits” – seek to expand their writ over large unconquered areas. This goes on, of course, at the intrastate level, but the rationale for interstate war for conquest is no longer as strong. Interstate wars of recent memory — the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflicts of 1999 and 2005, the Russia-Georgia War of 2008 — upon closer inspection, actually look more like intrastate wars. The latter was fought over two secessionist provinces; the former between two former rebel leaders-turned-presidents who had a falling out. But if we have reached a norm of non-retaliation to threats or attacks, does that mean that deterrence is no longer valid? After all, if states know there will be no response, why not step up the level of attacks? I would argue that the mere threat of retaliation is enough, as evidenced by Turkish leaders’ harsh words toward Syria (there is now a de facto no-fly zone near their shared border). Still, doesn’t restraint send a signal of weakness and lack of resolve? After all, didn’t Seoul’s non-response to the Cheonan sinking only invite Pyongyang to escalate hostilities? Robert Jervis dismisses the notion that a tough response signals resolve as being overly simplified. The observers’ interpretation of the actor and the risks involved also matter. When Schelling writes about the importance of “saving face,” he describes it as the “interdependence of a country’s commitments; it is a country’s reputation for action, the expectations other countries have about its behavior.” Others note that the presence of nuclear weapons forces states, when attacked, to respond with restraint to avoid the risk of nuclear escalation. Hence, we get “limited wars” rather than full-blown conflicts, or what some deterrent theorists describe as the “stability-instability paradox.” This is not a new concept, of course: Thucydides quoted King Archimadus of Sparta: “And perhaps then they see that our actual strength is keeping pace with the language that we use, they will be more inclined to give way, since their land will still be untouched and, in making up their minds, they will be thinking of advantages which they still possess and which have not yet been destroyed.” There will be future wars between states, of course. But **the** days when an isolated incident, such as a spy plane being shot down or a cross-border incursion, can unleash a chain of events that lead to interstate wars I believe are largely over because of the emergence of restraint as a powerful nor**m**ative force in international politics, not unlike Tannenwald’s “nuclear taboo.” Turkey and Syria will only exchange a war of words, not actual hostilities. To do otherwise would be a violation of this existing norm.

#### India-Pakistan goes nuclear

Starr ’11 (Consequences of a Single Failure of Nuclear Deterrence by Steven Starr February 07, 2011 \* Associate member of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation \* Senior Scientist for PSR)

Only a single failure of nuclear deterrence is required to start a nuclear war, and the consequences of such a failure would be profound. **Peer-reviewed studies predict** that **less than 1% of** the **nuclear weapons** now deployed in the arsenals of the Nuclear Weapon States, if detonated in urban areas, would immediately kill tens of millions of people, and cause long-term, **catastrophic disruptions** of the global **climate and** massive destruction ofEarth’sprotective **ozone** layer. The result would be a global nuclear famine that could kill up to one billion people. A full-scale war, fought with the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia, would so utterly devastate Earth’s environment that most humans and other complex forms of life would not survive. Yet no Nuclear Weapon State has ever evaluated the environmental, ecological or agricultural consequences of the detonation of its nuclear arsenals in conflict. Military and political leaders in these nations thus remain dangerously unaware of the existential danger which their weapons present to the entire human race. Consequently, nuclear weapons remain as the cornerstone of the military arsenals in the Nuclear Weapon States, where nuclear deterrence guides political and military strategy. Those who actively support nuclear deterrence are trained to believe that deterrence cannot fail, so long as their doctrines are observed, and their weapons systems are maintained and continuously modernized. They insist that their nuclear forces will remain forever under their complete control, immune from cyberwarfare, sabotage, terrorism, human or technical error. They deny that the short 12-to-30 minute flight times of nuclear missiles would not leave a President enough time to make rational decisions following a tactical, electronic warning of nuclear attack. The U.S. and Russia continue to keep a total of 2000 strategic nuclear weapons at launch-ready status – ready to launch with only a few minutes warning. Yet both nations are remarkably unable to acknowledge that this high-alert status in any way increases the probability that these weapons will someday be used in conflict. How can strategic nuclear arsenals truly be “safe” from accidental or unauthorized use, when they can be launched literally at a moment’s notice? A cocked and loaded weapon is infinitely easier to fire than one which is unloaded and stored in a locked safe. The mere existence of immense nuclear arsenals, in whatever status they are maintained, makes possible their eventual use in a nuclear war. Our **best scientists** now **tell us** that **such a war would mean the end of human history**. We need to ask our leaders: Exactly what political or national goals could possibly justify risking a nuclear war that would likely cause the extinction of the human race? However, in order to pose this question, we must first make the fact known that existing nuclear arsenals – through their capacity to utterly devastate the Earth’s environment and ecosystems – threaten continued **human existence**. Otherwise, military and political leaders will continue to cling to their nuclear arsenals and will remain both unwilling and unable to discuss the real consequences of failure of deterrence. We can and must end the silence, and awaken the peoples of all nations to the realization that “nuclear war” means “global nuclear suicide”. A Single Failure of Nuclear Deterrence could lead to: \* A nuclear war **between India and Pakistan**; \* 50 Hiroshima-size (15 kiloton) weapons detonated in the mega-cities of both India and Pakistan (there are now 130-190 operational nuclear weapons which exist in the combined arsenals of these nations); \* The deaths of 20 to 50 million people as a result of the prompt effects of these nuclear detonations (blast, fire and radioactive fallout); \* Massive firestorms covering many hundreds of square miles/kilometers (created by nuclear detonations that produce temperatures hotter than those believed to exist at the center of the sun), that would engulf these cities and produce 6 to 7 million tons of thick, black smoke; \* About 5 million tons of smoke that would quickly rise above cloud level into the stratosphere, where strong winds would carry it around the Earth in 10 days; \* A stratospheric smoke layer surrounding the Earth, which would remain in place for 10 years; \* The dense smoke would heat the upper atmosphere, destroy Earth’s protective ozone layer, and block 7-10% of warming sunlight from reaching Earth’s surface; \* 25% to 40% of the protective ozone layer would be destroyed at the mid-latitudes, and 50-70% would be destroyed at northern and southern high latitudes; \* Ozone destruction would cause the average UV Index to increase to 16-22 in the U.S, Europe, Eurasia and China, with even higher readings towards the poles (readings of 11 or higher are classified as “extreme” by the U.S. EPA). It would take 7-8 minutes for a fair skinned person to receive a painful sunburn at mid-day; \* Loss of warming sunlight would quickly produce average surface temperatures in the Northern Hemisphere colder than any experienced in the last 1000 years; \* Hemispheric drops in temperature would be about twice as large and last ten times longer then those which followed the largest volcanic eruption in the last 500 years, Mt. Tambora in 1816. The following year, 1817, was called “The Year Without Summer”, which saw famine in Europe from massive crop failures; \* Growing seasons in the Northern Hemisphere would be significantly shortened. It would be too cold to grow wheat in most of Canada for at least several years; \* World grain stocks, which already are at historically low levels, would be completely depleted; grain exporting nations would likely cease exports in order to meet their own food needs; \* The one billion already hungry people, who currently depend upon grain imports, would likely starve to death in the years following this nuclear war; \* The total explosive power in these 100 Hiroshima-size weapons is less than 1% of the total explosive power contained in the currently operational and deployed U.S. and Russian nuclear forces.

#### So does China Taiwan

Straits Times 2k (6-25, Lexis, No one gains in war over Taiwan)

THE DOOMSDAY SCENARIO THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.

### 2NC – Islamophobia

#### They don’t change mindsets – psychological incentives mean that even post plan the gov gets pushed to the right and they don’t solve mindsets.

**Fettweis, Tulane political science professor, 2011**

(Christopher, “Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy”, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 52.2, ebsco, ldg)

At least three mental processes may help account for the overestimation of threat among US policymakers. Firstly, a number of scholars have proposed that the creation of enemies is a natural and inevitable part of human social interaction, for both individuals and groups.54 People need enemies for their own self-image; it is meaningless to be the good guy if there is no corresponding bad guy. Evil will always be found, even if none exists. In the absence of clear enemies foreign policy tends to flounder, as critics accused US foreign policy of doing in the 1990s. The attacks of 2001 merely confirmed what many already believed: our enemies are massing against us. But the psychological need to have a rival does not make a danger real. Secondly, there seems to be a tendency towards a correlation between power and insecurity, or even paranoia, in individual leaders.55 Time and again, people who have exhibited borderline deranged behaviour have attracted followers, solidified bases, come to power and remained there for extended periods across a wide variety of settings. It could be there are times when paranoia is advantageous for the would-be leader, since broad purges surely kill conspirators alongside innocents. US leaders are not autocrats, of course, but they do enjoy an unprecedented level of power, which is virtually uncheckable by the international system. Perhaps they too, like the dictator or the king, though not to the same degree, are affected by the destabilising effects of great power. Finally, security discourse itself may help explain the high level of threat perception in the United States. That we live in a dangerous world has become something of a truism, a shared belief in the foreign-policy community that is rarely subjected to rational analysis. Official discourse can not only affect popular perceptions but frame potential reactions and shape state behaviour. Constant repetition of the idea that we live in a dangerous world can, over time, easily lead to genuine belief, for leaders and followers alike.56 A more rational examination of threats could therefore be useful in altering the current conventional wisdom in both popular and strategic circles. US leaders have repeatedly decided to raise threat levels to encourage Americans to support otherwise unpopular policy choices. This is not new phenomenon; H.L. Mencken observed that in order to create support for America’s entry into the First World War, Woodrow Wilson and other US liberals realised that ‘the only way to make the mob fight was to scare it half to death’.57 More recently, the American public showed little enthusiasm for the first Gulf War until President George H.W. Bush began injecting the threat of Iraqi nuclear weapons into his speeches. Likewise, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and Vice President Dick Cheney were fond of arguing that a failure to attack Iraq could well result in a nuclear attack on the United States. When faced with such choices, the American people understandably go along. Manipulation of popular perceptions by individual leaders surely contributes to the national pathology. Stoking such fires not only has effects for the short term, raising support for otherwise unnecessary action, but tends to do long-term damage as well. Once lit, such fires are hard to extinguish. Fear and anxiety persist long after they are useful, and continue to drive decisions. It can prove beyond the power of more rational leaders to control them. President Barack Obama has repeatedly demonstrated an instinct toward restraint and moderation, but time and again has decided that the political situation requires hyperventilation, or at least that overreaction would not be costly. On a range of issues, including the Russian incursion into Georgia, the Iranian nuclear programme and the so-called ‘Underpants Bomber’, Obama’s instincts initially produced measured and calm reactions, but each time, criticism from the right, and comparisons with the perceived weaknesses of the Jimmy Carter administration, convinced him to change his reaction and become much more belligerent. Only in a deeply pathological society is reason a synonym for weakness.

### 2NC Terrorists Bad

#### They make the same error they criticize by painting terrorist as totally innocent and an object of US imperialism; they reduce complexity to simplify the matter when in reality terrorist are bad and good

English 9 (Richard, Professor, school of Politics, International Studies and Philosophy, Queen's University, “The future of terrorism studies,” http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~wwwir/research/cstpv/resources/Staff/The\_Future\_of\_Terrorism\_Studies.pdf)

Third, CTS must avoid the danger of merely swinging the research pendulum away from one set of myopic biases towards another set. Mostly, it seems to me that the authors in this volume evade this trap. But not always. Jeffrey Sluka is surely right to stress the importance of serious-minded analysis of non-state groups and their politics. But his own claims about his Irish case study on occasion replace one set of misrepresentations with another. It is right to question the claim that the IRA were merely criminal gangsters without any popular support; it is simply untrue to claim, as he does, that ‘most Catholics in Northern Ireland … were convinced that the IRA were “freedom fighters” or a legitimate armed national liberation group’ (p. 142). Sluka’s admirable scrutiny of the republican community within which he conducted his field research should not obscure the wider context of Irish popular opinion: if we are, as CTS scholars rightly suggest, to respect context, then we cannot simply interview ‘seventy-six families or households’ (p. 142) and conflate their views with the views of the wider population in the North of Ireland during the Troubles. Again, it is correct to point out that the IRA’s primary goal was not focused on causing civilian casualties; but Sluka’s claim that the IRA ‘did not purposely inflict civilian casualties’ (p. 143) is an extraordinary simplification. Serious scrutiny of the IRA’s record demonstrates a different and more complex picture, as is suggested even from brief consideration of events in Birmingham in 1974, the Bayardo Bar in Belfast in 1975, or Kingsmills in 1976. Again, the statement that the IRA ‘did not terrorize their own people’ (p. 143) cannot be taken seriously unless one ignores the well-documented experiences of many people who have been killed, maimed, or intimidated by the IRA within their own community. This does not negate the fact that many people within republican areas supported the IRA; but it does attend to the complexity of experience even in those communities rather than simplifying it in distorting ways. If, as Sluka rightly suggests, we should aim to ‘historicize and contextualize conflicts’ (p. 154), then we should take the trouble to do this properly, rather than opting for casual and misleading simplifications. If CTS scholars get this wrong, then their work will have a far less serious impact than they desire and deserve.

#### Terrorists goals are ideological; not political; there is no negotiation---only regulated violence in a utilitarian framework can solve

Whitman 7 (Jeffery, Prof of Philosophy, Religion, and Classical Studies Susquehanna University, “Just War Theory and the War on Terrorism A Utilitarian Perspective,” http://www.mesharpe.com/PIN/05Whitman.pdf)

Apocalyptic goals, on the other hand, are impossible to negotiate with. They can only be fought by force of arms. (2004, 125–126) This version of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism, represented by such groups as Hamas, Hezbollah, and al-Qaeda, seems particularly intractable. These groups, especially insofar as they employ suicide-bomber tactics, have become death cults (Ignatieff 2004, 126–127). There can be no negotiated settlement, so the only solution seems to be a violent one aimed at the utter destruction of the terrorists. And yet, a purely violent and largely military response runs significant risks, both morally and pragmatically, for the counterterrorist forces. The risks are especially poignant for a liberal democracy like the United States, for the use of purely military means, particularly the brutal military means that may seem necessary to defeat terrorism, may run contrary to the very principles a liberal democracy represents (Ignatieff 2004, 133–136).6 Thus the terrorist threat represented by al-Qaeda–like groups presents a difficult and somewhat unique challenge for the United States. Nonetheless, I remain convinced that a utilitarian conceptualization of just war theory can help us to successfully navigate between the Scylla of losing the fight against terrorism and the Charybdis of abandoning the principles that define our liberal democracy.

### 2NC Util Good

#### Maximizing all lives is the only way to affirm equality

Cummiskey 90 – Professor of Philosophy, Bates (David, Kantian Consequentialism, Ethics 100.3, p 601-2, p 606, jstor,)

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract "social entity." It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive "overall social good." Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Nozick, for example, argues that "to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has."30 Why, however, is this not equally true of all those that we do not save through our failure to act? By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, one fails to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? We have a duty to promote the conditions necessary for the existence of rational beings, but both choosing to act and choosing not to act will cost the life of a rational being. Since the basis of Kant's principle is "rational nature exists as an end-in-itself' (GMM, p. 429), the reasonable solution to such a dilemma involves promoting, insofar as one can, the conditions necessary for rational beings. If I sacrifice some for the sake of other rational beings, I do not use them arbitrarily and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. **Persons** may **have "dignity**, an unconditional and incomparable value" that transcends any market value (GMM, p. 436), **but**, as rational beings, persons **also** have **a fundamental equality which dictates that some must** sometimes **give way for the sake of others.** The formula of the end-in-itself thus does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. If one focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, then equal consideration dictates that one sacrifice some to save many. [continues] According to Kant, the objective end of moral action is the existence of rational beings. Respect for rational beings requires that, in deciding what to do, one give appropriate practical consideration to the unconditional value of rational beings and to the conditional value of happiness. Since agent-centered constraints require a non-value-based rationale, the most natural interpretation of the demand that one give equal respect to all rational beings lead to a consequentialist normative theory. We have seen that there is no sound Kantian reason for abandoning this natural consequentialist interpretation. In particular, a consequentialist interpretation does not require sacrifices which a Kantian ought to consider unreasonable, and it does not involve doing evil so that good may come of it. It simply requires an uncompromising commitment to the equal value and equal claims of all rational beings and a recognition that, in the moral consideration of conduct, one's own subjective concerns do not have overriding importance.

Util’s the only moral framework

**Murray 97** (Alastair, Professor of Politics at U. Of Wales-Swansea, *Reconstructing Realism*, p. 110)

Weber emphasised that, while the 'absolute ethic of the gospel' must be taken seriously, it is inadequate to the tasks of evaluation presented by politics. Against this 'ethic of ultimate ends' — Gesinnung — he therefore proposed the 'ethic of responsibility' — Verantwortung. First, whilst the former dictates only the purity of intentions and pays no attention to consequences, the ethic of responsibility commands acknowledgement of the divergence between intention and result. Its adherent 'does not feel in a position to burden others with the results of his [OR HER] own actions so far as he was able to foresee them; he [OR SHE] will say: these results are ascribed to my action'. Second, the 'ethic of ultimate ends' is incapable of dealing adequately with the moral dilemma presented by the necessity of using evil means to achieve moral ends: Everything that is striven for through political action operating with violent means and following an ethic of responsibility endangers the 'salvation of the soul.' If, however, one chases after the ultimate good in a war of beliefs, following a pure ethic of absolute ends, then the goals may be changed and discredited for generations, because responsibility for consequences is lacking. The 'ethic of responsibility', on the other hand, can accommodate this paradox and limit the employment of such means, because it accepts responsibility for the consequences which they imply. Thus, Weber maintains that only the ethic of responsibility can cope with the 'inner tension' between the 'demon of politics' and 'the god of love'. 9 The realists followed this conception closely in their formulation of a political ethic.10 This influence is particularly clear in Morgenthau.11 In terms of the first element of this conception, the rejection of a purely deontological ethic, Morgenthau echoed Weber's formulation, arguing tha/t:the political actor has, beyond the general moral duties, a special moral responsibility to act wisely ... The individual, acting on his own behalf, may act unwisely without moral reproach as long as the consequences of his inexpedient action concern only [HER OR] himself. What is done in the political sphere by its very nature concerns others who must suffer from unwise action. What is here done with good intentions but unwisely and hence with disastrous results is morally defective; for it violates the ethics of responsibility to which all action affecting others, and hence political action par excellence, is subject.12 This led Morgenthau to argue, in terms of the concern to reject doctrines which advocate that the end justifies the means, that the impossibility of the logic underlying this doctrine 'leads to the negation of absolute ethical judgements altogether'.13

# 1NR

## DA

### AT: Public Support

#### No predictable correlation between popularity, political capital, and agenda success

JOHN HARWOOD, NY Times, February 14, 2009, Obama, With a Pile of Chips, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/15/weekinreview/15harwood.html?pagewanted=1&\_r=1

Presidential mojo is an elusive and ephemeral force that flows from many sources. It derives largely from numbers: the size of the election victory, the poll ratings, the breadth of partisan support in Congress. By those measures, Mr. Obama’s 53 percent popular vote majority, mid-60 percent job approval ratings, and solid House and Senate majorities compare favorably at this stage with the profile of any new president post-World War II. But the sustainability of those power gauges can be inversely related to the scale of the political challenges a president faces — sometimes exhausting his capital in the first year of a White House term. The recession and two wars facing Mr. Obama easily match the stagflation and cold war challenges that confronted Ronald Reagan in 1981, and may exceed those of any predecessor since F.D.R. Moreover, presidential momentum can drain rapidly — or replenish — depending on unplanned events, often partly or entirely outside the president’s control. The belatedly disclosed tax problems that felled Mr. Daschle, and the about-face by Senator Gregg that ended his nomination for commerce secretary, only hint at the potential for off-script disruptions, which often come in the realm of foreign policy. The alchemy that translates those ingredients into presidential success defies consistent prediction. After John F. Kennedy narrowly defeated Richard Nixon in 1960, Americans rallied behind him; his initial 72 percent job approval rating was the highest Gallup has recorded for a new president, before or since. Mr. Kennedy retained that high standing through his first 100 days, despite the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in April 1961. Yet the victories he achieved from a Democratic Congress remained modest. The rap on Kennedy was “too much profile, not enough courage,” recalled the presidential scholar Fred Greenstein. Only after he was martyred in Dallas two years later did his proposals on civil rights sweep through Congress under his less-charismatic successor, Lyndon B. Johnson. Having lost the popular vote to Al Gore, George W. Bush entered the White House with far less political capital than Kennedy. And yet before summer he muscled through a closely divided Congress the income tax cuts that became the signature economic policy of his eight-year presidency. Four months later, the 9/11 attacks gave him enough standing eventually to take the nation to war against Iraq. By 2008, the difficulties of that endeavor had helped wipe out his influence with the public, Congress and both political parties. Entering office in 1993, Bill Clinton occupied a kind of middle ground in presidential sway. He ousted the incumbent, George H. W. Bush, in 1992, but split the “change” vote with Ross Perot. An early furor over gays in the military drained away some of his political energy, as did the upending of his first two choices for attorney general.

#### Public fears of terrorism are entrenched- reactivation is easy and inevitable – you can’t change their minds and the plan doesn’t make it popular

**USWI ’11** [U.S. in the World Initiative, online project aimed at studying American politics, public opinion, and communication strategies, “Managing the Fear Factor,” <http://usintheworld.org/?page_id=612>]

While Americans are not living in a constant state of fearfulness about terrorism, **fear continues to play a significant role in shaping the national discussion about counterterrorism** policy **and** approaches to **the terrorism threat**. Research commissioned by U.S. in the World confirmed that when unreasoning fear and a sense of being at war guide public thinking about security, many ill-advised policies seem intuitively “right” to most people. Short-sighted **us-vs.-them policy approaches gain traction**, and citizens may become predisposed to accept unquestioningly the authority of strong leaders. If we feel we are in a state of war or crisis, core values that are actually integral to our resilience and our security in an interconnected world may come to be seen as luxuries that a threatened nation cannot afford. If we are encouraged to believe that we face an existential emergency, exceptions to almost any rule become acceptable and we may overreact in ways that are dangerous and counterproductive – precisely the response that terrorists hope to provoke.¶ Fear also heightens fidelity to one’s own group and increases divisive stereotyping and suspicion of other groups, which we can ill afford at a time when diverse communities – at home and abroad – must work closely together to solve problems that no one can solve alone. **In the American public square, unreasoning fear exacerbates ideological polarization, incivility, and distrust, producing paralysis** when action is needed and making conditions ripe for the continued exploitation of fear and the channeling of strong public emotions in unconstructive directions.¶ Through briefings and roundtable discussions, research analyses and commissioned research, and the development of practical messaging advice, U.S. in the World’s Managing the Fear Factor project provided advocates and issue experts with new tools and strategies for calming public fears, countering the manipulation of fear, and promoting constructive public dialogue about security-related issues.¶ Now Available: Final Project Report and Communicators’ Toolkit¶ Although Americans today are no longer acutely afraid of terrorism, the fear generated by terrorist threats has proved to be easily reactivated, whether by actual events or by political rhetoric. The “war on terrorism” narrative remains deeply entrenched, prolonging Americans’ vulnerability to unreasoning fears about terrorism and constraining debate about policy alternatives. U.S. in the World’s work on Managing the Fear Factor showed how the logic of this narrative leads many people to conclude that progressive policy approaches are naïve or weak.

#### Popularity doesn’t boost support for policies

Paul Light, founder of the Brookings Institution Center for Public Service, 1999 (The President’s Agenda, p27)

Further, Presidents and staffs tend to view party support as critical in the day-to-day conduct of domestic affairs. Public approval can be used to sway congressional votes, but with only limited success. “Everyone has a poll,” one aide noted. “You can find any number of groups which can present a poll to support a given proposal. Depending upon how you word the questions and how you select the sample, you can get a positive result. Congress is fairly suspicious of polls as a bargaining tool, and public approval ratings are too general to be of much good.” Public opinion is important over the term; it affects both midterm losses and the President’s chances for reelection. Yet, public opinion is not easily converted into direct influence in the domestic policy process. Most often it is an indirect factor in the congressional struggle. Presidents cannot afford to ignore public opinion, but in the closed world of Washington politics, the party comes into play virtually every day of the term. Party support thereby becomes the central component of the President’s capital.

#### Clinton proves – popularity irrelevant

Paul Light, founder of the Brookings Institution Center for Public Service, 1999 (The President’s Agenda, p281)

The question is not whether Clinton was able to raise his approval ratings through sheer will alone. Absent a strong economy and growing public optimism about the future (see Pew Research Center, 1998b); no amount of going public would likely have made an impact. The economy made the 1997 budget and tax agreement possible, which in turn allowed Clinton to claim credit for having finally balanced the budget. Rather, the question is whether that approval translated into the kind of political capital that enhances legislative success. Here, the answer is more problematic. Clinton’s highly popular 1998 State of the Union message, which clearly lifted his approval rating, was pronounced dead on arrival by the Republican Congress. The White House sex scandal may not have mattered to the American public, but it most certainly mattered to a Republican Congress.

## Counterplan

## Case

### 1NC-Util

#### Consider the consequences of enacting the plan---otherwise you are shirking political responsibility which makes you complicit in injustice

**Issac 2**—Professor of Political Science at Indiana-Bloomington, Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life, PhD from Yale (Jeffery C., Dissent Magazine, Vol. 49, Iss. 2, “Ends, Means, and Politics,” p. Proquest)

As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of "aggression," but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime--the Taliban--that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most "peace" activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international law can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness **undercuts political responsibility**. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of **complicity in injustice**. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that **politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions**; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### Maximizing all lives is the only way to affirm equality

Cummiskey 90 – Professor of Philosophy, Bates (David, Kantian Consequentialism, Ethics 100.3, p 601-2, p 606, jstor,)

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract "social entity." It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive "overall social good." Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Nozick, for example, argues that "to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has."30 Why, however, is this not equally true of all those that we do not save through our failure to act? By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, one fails to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? We have a duty to promote the conditions necessary for the existence of rational beings, but both choosing to act and choosing not to act will cost the life of a rational being. Since the basis of Kant's principle is "rational nature exists as an end-in-itself' (GMM, p. 429), the reasonable solution to such a dilemma involves promoting, insofar as one can, the conditions necessary for rational beings. If I sacrifice some for the sake of other rational beings, I do not use them arbitrarily and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. **Persons** may **have "dignity**, an unconditional and incomparable value" that transcends any market value (GMM, p. 436), **but**, as rational beings, persons **also** have **a fundamental equality which dictates that some must** sometimes **give way for the sake of others.** The formula of the end-in-itself thus does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. If one focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, then equal consideration dictates that one sacrifice some to save many. [continues] According to Kant, the objective end of moral action is the existence of rational beings. Respect for rational beings requires that, in deciding what to do, one give appropriate practical consideration to the unconditional value of rational beings and to the conditional value of happiness. Since agent-centered constraints require a non-value-based rationale, the most natural interpretation of the demand that one give equal respect to all rational beings lead to a consequentialist normative theory. We have seen that there is no sound Kantian reason for abandoning this natural consequentialist interpretation. In particular, a consequentialist interpretation does not require sacrifices which a Kantian ought to consider unreasonable, and it does not involve doing evil so that good may come of it. It simply requires an uncompromising commitment to the equal value and equal claims of all rational beings and a recognition that, in the moral consideration of conduct, one's own subjective concerns do not have overriding importance.

#### Ethical policymaking requires calculation of consequences

Gvosdev 5 – Rhodes scholar, PhD from St. Antony’s College, executive editor of The National Interest (Nikolas, The Value(s) of Realism, SAIS Review 25.1, pmuse)

As the name implies, realists focus on promoting policies that are achievable and sustainable. In turn, the morality of a foreign policy action is judged by its results, not by the intentions of its framers. A foreign policymaker must weigh the consequences of any course of action and assess the resources at hand to carry out the proposed task. As Lippmann warned, Without the controlling principle that the nation must maintain its objectives and its power in equilibrium, its purposes within its means and its means equal to its purposes, its commitments related to its resources and its resources adequate to its commitments, it is impossible to think at all about foreign affairs.8 Commenting on this maxim, Owen Harries, founding editor of The National Interest, noted, "This is a truth of which Americans—more apt to focus on ends rather than means when it comes to dealing with the rest of the world—need always to be reminded."9 In fact, Morgenthau noted that "there can be no political morality without prudence."10 This virtue of prudence—which Morgenthau identified as the cornerstone of realism—should not be confused with expediency. Rather, it takes as its starting point that it is more moral to fulfill one's commitments than to make "empty" promises, and to seek solutions that minimize harm and produce sustainable results. Morgenthau concluded: [End Page 18] Political realism does not require, nor does it condone, indifference to political ideals and moral principles, but it requires indeed a sharp distinction between the desirable and the possible, between what is desirable everywhere and at all times and what is possible under the concrete circumstances of time and place.11 This is why, prior to the outbreak of fighting in the former Yugoslavia, U.S. and European realists urged that Bosnia be decentralized and partitioned into ethnically based cantons as a way to head off a destructive civil war. Realists felt this would be the best course of action, especially after the country's first free and fair elections had brought nationalist candidates to power at the expense of those calling for inter-ethnic cooperation. They had concluded—correctly, as it turned out—that the United States and Western Europe would be unwilling to invest the blood and treasure that would be required to craft a unitary Bosnian state and give it the wherewithal to function. Indeed, at a diplomatic conference in Lisbon in March 1992, the various factions in Bosnia had, reluctantly, endorsed the broad outlines of such a settlement. For the purveyors of moralpolitik, this was unacceptable. After all, for this plan to work, populations on the "wrong side" of the line would have to be transferred and resettled. Such a plan struck directly at the heart of the concept of multi-ethnicity—that different ethnic and religious groups could find a common political identity and work in common institutions. When the United States signaled it would not accept such a settlement, the fragile consensus collapsed. The United States, of course, cannot be held responsible for the war; this lies squarely on the shoulders of Bosnia's political leaders. Yet Washington fell victim to what Jonathan Clarke called "faux Wilsonianism," the belief that "high-flown words matter more than rational calculation" in formulating effective policy, which led U.S. policymakers to dispense with the equation of "balancing commitments and resources."12 Indeed, as he notes, the Clinton administration had criticized peace plans calling for decentralized partition in Bosnia "with lofty rhetoric without proposing a practical alternative." The subsequent war led to the deaths of tens of thousands and left more than a million people homeless. After three years of war, the Dayton Accords—hailed as a triumph of American diplomacy—created a complicated arrangement by which the federal union of two ethnic units, the Muslim-Croat Federation, was itself federated to a Bosnian Serb republic. Today, Bosnia requires thousands of foreign troops to patrol its internal borders and billions of dollars in foreign aid to keep its government and economy functioning. Was the aim of U.S. policymakers, academics and journalists—creating a multi-ethnic democracy in Bosnia—not worth pursuing? No, not at all, and this is not what the argument suggests. But aspirations were not matched with capabilities. As a result of holding out for the "most moral" outcome and encouraging the Muslim-led government in Sarajevo to pursue maximalist aims rather than finding a workable compromise that could have avoided bloodshed and produced more stable conditions, the peoples of Bosnia suffered greatly. In the end, the final settlement was very close [End Page 19] to the one that realists had initially proposed—and the one that had also been roundly condemned on moral grounds.

#### ---The position of human subjectivity makes consequentialism is inevitable.

Ratner 1984

Leonard G. Ratner, professor of law at USC, Hofstra Law Journal, 12 Hofstra L. Rev. 723, spring, 1984

All systems of morality, however transcendental, rest ultimately on utilitarian self interest (i.e., on personal need/want fulfillment), because those who fashion such systems, like those who accept or reject them, cannot escape their own humanness. The physically controllable acts of each individual 221 are the choice of that individual, though all of the consequences may not be foreseen or desired. 222 Behavior choices are necessarily determined by the experience, feelings, habits, and attitudes; the concerns and beliefs; the needs and wants -- in short, by the ultimate self interest -- of the individual.

#### ---Means/ends distinctions are a moral cop out --- There are no absolutes beyond the evaluation of comparative risk.

Alinsky 1971

Saul D., Activist, Professor, and Social Organizer with International Fame, Founder of the Industrial Areas Foundation, Rules for Radicals, pg. 24-27

We cannot think first and act afterwards. From the moment of birth we are immersed in action and can only fitfully guide it by taking thought. Alfred North Whitehead That perennial question, “Does the end justify the means?” is meaningless as it stands; the real and only question regarding the ethics of means and ends is, and always has been, “Does this particular end justify this particular means?” Life and how you live it is the story of means and ends. The end is what you want, and the means is how you get it. Whenever we think about social change, the question of means and ends arises. The man of action views the issue of means and ends arises. The man of action views the issue of means and ends in pragmatic and strategic terms. He has no other problem; he thinks only of his actual resources and the possibilities of various choices of action. He asks of ends only whether they are achievable and worth the cost; of means, only whether they will work. To say that corrupt means corrupt the ends is to believe in the immaculate conception of ends and principles. The real arena is corrupt and bloody. Life is a corrupting process from the time a child learns to play his mother off against his father in the politics of when to go to bed; he who fears corruption fears life. The practical revolutionary will understand Geothe’s “conscience is the virtue of observers and not of agents of action”; in action, one does not always enjoy the luxury of a decision that is consistent both with one’s individual conscience and the good of [hu]mankind. The choice must always be for the latter. Action is for mass salvation and not for the individual’s personal salvation. He who sacrifices the mass good for his personal conscience has peculiar conception of “personal salvation”; he doesn’t care enough for people to be “corrupted” for them. The men [people] who pile up the heaps of discussion and literature on the ethics of means and ends—which with rare exception is conspicuous for its sterility—rarely write about their won experiences in the perpetual struggle of life and change. They are strangers, moreover, to the burdens and problems of operational responsibility and the unceasing pressure for immediate decisions. They are passionately committed to a mystical objectivity where passions are suspect. They assume a nonexistent situation where man suspect. They assume a nonexistent situation where men dispassionately and with reason draw and devise means and ends as if studying a navigational chart on land. They can be recognized by one of two verbal brands; “We agree with the ends but not the means,” or “This is not the time.” The means-and-end moralists or non-doers always wind up on their ends without any means. The means-and-ends moralists, constantly obsessed with the ethics of the means used by the Have-Nots against the Haves, should search themselves as to their real political position. In fact, they are passive—but real—allies of the Haves. They are the ones Jacques Maritain referred to in his statement, “The fear of soiling ourselves by entering the context of history is not virtue, but a way of escaping virtue.” These non-doers were the ones who chose not to fight the Nazis in the only way they could have been fought; they were the ones who drew their window blinds to shut out the shameful spectacle of Jews and political prisoners being dragged through the streets; they were the ones who privately deplored the horror of it all—and did nothing. This is the nadir of immorality. The most unethical of all means is the nonuse of any means. It is this species of man how so vehemently and militantly participated in that classically idealistic debate at the old League of Nations on the ethical differences between defensive and offensive weapons. Their fears of action drive them to refuge in an ethics so divorced from the politics of life that it can apply only to angels, not to men. The standards of judgment must be rooted in the whys and wherefores of life as it is lived, the world as it is, not our wished-for fantasy of the world as it should be. I present here a series of rules pertaining to the ethics of means and ends: first, that one’s concern with the ethics of means and ends varies inversely with one’s personal interest in the issue. When we are not directly concerned our morality overflows; as La Rochefoucauld put it, “We all have strength enough to endure the misfortunes of others.” Accompanying this rule is the parallel one that one’s concern with the ethics of means and ends varies inversely with one’s distance from the scene of conflict. The second rule of the ethics of means and ends is that the judgment of the ethics of means is dependent upon the political position of those sitting in judgment. If you actively opposed the Nazi occupation and joined the underground Resistance, then you adopted the means of assassination, terror, properly destruction, the bombing of tunnels and trains, kidnapping, and the willingness to sacrifice innocent hostages to the end of defeating the Nazis. Those who opposed the Nazi conquerors regarded the Resistance as a secret army of selfless, patriotic idealists, courageous beyond expectation and willing to sacrifice their lives to their moral convictions. To the occupation authorities, however, these people were lawless terrorists, murders, saboteurs, assassins, who believed that the end justified the means, and were utterly unethical according to the mystical rules of war. Any foreign occupation would so ethically judge its opposition. However, in such conflict, neither protagonist is concerned with any value except victory. It is life or death.

### Discourse

#### Extend Roskoski – reality shapes discourse not the other way around – the fact that Islamaphobia and the discursive othering they critique occurred after the material actions of the 9/11 attacks proves that they have causality flipped – we react to actions or objects, we do not create words and then create objects.

#### There’s a question of uniqueness – if they win that discourse shapes the actions of our enemies, then they have already been shaped – the impact is inevitable unless we take military actions

#### Changing representational practices won’t alter policy—looking to structures and politics is more vital

Tuathail, Professor of Geography at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, 96 (Gearoid, Political Geography, Vol 15 No 6-7, p. 664, Science Direct)

While theoretical debates at academic conferences are important to academics, the discourse and concerns of foreign-policy decision- makers are quite different, so different that they constitute a distinctive problem- solving, theory-averse, policy-making subculture. There is a danger that academics assume that the discourses they engage are more significant in the practice of foreign policy and the exercise of power than they really are. This is not, however, to minimize the obvious importance of academia as a general institutional structure among many that sustain certain epistemic communities in particular states. In general, I do not disagree with Dalby’s fourth point about politics and discourse except to note that his statement-‘Precisely because reality could be represented in particular ways political decisions could be taken, troops and material moved and war fought’-evades the important question of agency that I noted in my review essay. The assumption that it is representations that make action possible is inadequate by itself. Political, military and economic structures, institutions, discursive networks and leadership are all crucial in explaining social action and should be theorized together with representational practices. Both here and earlier, Dalby’s reasoning inclines towards a form of idealism. In response to Dalby’s fifth point (with its three subpoints), it is worth noting, first, that his book is about the CPD, not the Reagan administration. He analyzes certain CPD discourses, root the geographical reasoning practices of the Reagan administration nor its public-policy reasoning on national security. Dalby’s book is narrowly textual; the general contextuality of the Reagan administration is not dealt with. Second, let me simply note that I find that the distinction between critical theorists and post- structuralists is a little too rigidly and heroically drawn by Dalby and others. Third, Dalby’s interpretation of the reconceptualization of national security in Moscow as heavily influenced by dissident peace researchers in Europe is highly idealist, an interpretation that ignores the structural and ideological crises facing the Soviet elite at that time. Gorbachev’s reforms and his new security discourse were also strongly self- interested, an ultimately futile attempt to save the Communist Party and a discredited regime of power from disintegration. The issues raised by Simon Dalby in his comment are important ones for all those interested in the practice of critical geopolitics. While I agree with Dalby that questions of discourse are extremely important ones for political geographers to engage, there is a danger of fetishizing this concern with discourse so that we neglect the institutional and the sociological, the materialist and the cultural, the political and the geographical contexts within which particular discursive strategies become significant. Critical geopolitics, in other words, should not be a prisoner of the sweeping ahistorical cant that sometimes accompanies ‘poststructuralism nor convenient reading strategies like the identity politics narrative; it needs to always be open to the patterned mess that is human history.

### No Endless War

#### Extend the Gray evidence – there’s no risk of a state of endless warfare – means none of their impacts escalate – the American system creates a institutional check on the executive – public backlash keeps war in check and keeps it from escalating – both Vietnam and Iraq prove

#### We have learned the lessons of failed intervention- political and economic incentives means we will avoid starting protracted wars

Mandelbaum, 11 – John Hopkins University International Studies professor

[Michael, "CFR 90th Anniversary Series on Renewing America: American Power and Profligacy," CFR, 1-18-11, www.cfr.org/united-states/cfr-90th-anniversary-series-renewing-america-american-power-profligacy/p23828?cid=rss-fullfeed-cfr\_90th\_anniversary\_series\_on-011811&utm\_source=feedburner&utm\_medium=feed&utm\_campaign=Feed:+cfr\_main+(CFR.org+-+Main+Site+Feed)

HAASS: Michael, I think I know the answer to this question, but let me ask you anyhow, which is, the last 10 years of American foreign policy has been dominated by two extremely expensive interventions, one in Iraq, one now in Afghanistan. Will this sort of pressure both accelerate the end, particularly of Afghanistan? But, more important, will this now -- is this the end of that phase of what we might call "discretionary American interventions?" Is this basically over? MANDELBAUM: Let's call them wars of choice. (Laughter.) HAASS: I was trying to be uncharacteristically self-effacing here. But clearly it didn't hold. Okay. MANDELBAUM: I think it is, Richard. And I think that this period really goes back two decades. I think the wars or the interventions in Somalia, in Bosnia, in Kosovo, in Haiti belong with the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, although they were undertaken by different administrations for different reasons, and had different costs. But all of them ended up in the protracted, unexpected, unwanted and expensive task of nation building. Nation building has never been popular. The country has never liked it. It likes it even less now. And I think **we're not going to do it again**. We're not going to do it because there won't be enough money. We're not going to do it because there will be other demands on the public purse. We won't do it because we'll be busy enough doing the things that I think ought to be done in foreign policy. And we won't do it because it will be clear to politicians that the range of legitimate choices that they have in foreign policy will have narrowed and will exclude interventions of that kind. So I believe and I say in the book that the last -- the first two post-Cold War decades can be seen as a single unit. And that unit has come to an end.

#### They reduce the complexity of executive decision-making- Syria proves Obama is preserving the flexibility to accomplish war-fighting objectives but not abandoning the political process

Savage, 13 -- NYT reporter

[Charlie, master's degree in 2003 from Yale Law School,, recipient of the 2007 Pulitzer Prize for national reporting on the issue of Presidential Signing Statements, specifically the use of such statements by the Bush administration, "Obama Tests Limits of Power in Syrian Conflict," NYT, 9-8-13, www.nytimes.com/2013/09/09/world/middleeast/obama-tests-limits-of-power-in-syrian-conflict.html?pagewanted=all&\_r=1&)

In asking Congress to authorize an attack on Syria over claims it used chemical weapons, President Obama has chosen to involve lawmakers in deciding whether to undertake a military intervention that in some respects resembles the limited types that many presidents — Ronald Reagan in Grenada, Bill Clinton in Kosovo and even Mr. Obama in Libya — have launched on their own. On another level, the proposed strike is unlike anything that has come before — an attack inside the territory of a sovereign country, without its consent, without a self-defense rationale and without the authorization of the United Nations Security Council or even the participation of a multilateral treaty alliance like NATO, and for the purpose of punishing an alleged war crime that has already occurred rather than preventing an imminent disaster. The contrasting moves, ceding more of a political role to Congress domestically while expanding national war powers on the international stage, **underscore the complexity of** Mr. **Obama’s** **approach** to the Syrian crisis. His administration pressed its case on Sunday, saying it had won Saudi backing for a strike, even as the Syrian president warned he would retaliate. Mr. Obama’s strategy ensures that no matter what happens, the crisis is likely to create an important precedent in the often murky legal question of when presidents or nations may lawfully use military force.

#### No chance of a military dictator in the US---culture and empirics

Posner and Vermeule 9 (Eric, Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law, The University of Chicago and Adrian, John H. Watson Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. “TYRANNOPHOBIA,” http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/276-eap-tyrannophobia.pdf)

But if American presidents have gained more legal and political power over time, they remain vastly more constrained, at least politically, than the Caesars and the Cromwells that the founders feared. Indeed, the United States—unlike many other countries, including Germany, of course—has never had a dictator, nor has it come close. Every president has humbly submitted to an election after four years and stepped down (except for FDR) after eight. George Washington, in many respects a model of the constrained executive, devoted much of his Farewell Address to warning his fellow citizens about the risks and evils of tyranny.35 Lincoln violated the law at the start of the Civil War but felt that he needed to obtain congressional ratification of his actions after the fact, and stood for election at the end of his first term. Wilson and Roosevelt also had tremendous power to conduct war, but presidential power has always contracted with the return to peace—or, put differently, while presidents are understood to have broad warmaking powers, these powers have not resulted in peacetime dictatorships. The peculiar danger reflected by Caesar and Cromwell, and later Napoleon, was that a charismatic military leader would become a dictator by popular acclimation. This never happened in the United States. The closest example is Andrew Jackson, and while he used his powers aggressively—notably, by ignoring a supreme court ruling and by refusing to comply with a statute that required the Treasury to deposit funds with the Bank of the United States—no historian considers him a dictator. Although Jackson’s impact on the presidency was large in the long term—he was the first charismatic, populist president, and helped establish the modern party system—like so many other strong presidents, he provoked a backlash36 and was followed by a string of mediocrities. A few historians think that Douglas MacArthur could have staged a coup d’état after being fired by Truman. This judgment is questionable, to say the least; MacArthur quickly became a figure of ridicule.37 Eisenhower, while arguably a strong president, used his powers moderately. Americans admire the military but the culture is not militaristic; aside from Washington, Eisenhower, and Jackson, no great military leader has had any success as a politician.38 The worst decade for democracy was the 1930s, when global economic upheaval produced dictatorships around the world. Conditions were worse in the United States than in many of these countries. For a very brief period, some Americans admired Mussolini, who seemed to be able to get things done. In 1927, Studebaker even named one of its cars the “Dictator.”39 But the rise of dictatorship in Europe and elsewhere, especially when it took an ugly turn in the 1930s, did not lead to imitation in the United States. The only serious American politician who could even remotely seem to fit the fascist mold was Huey Long, the governor of Louisiana from 1928 to 1932, and senator from 1932 to 1935. As governor and leader of a political party, Long advanced a populist platform of redistribution and public works. He was a charismatic leader who some believe sought to create a cult of personality and to obtain dictatorial powers.40 Whether or not he had this goal, he never came close to achieving it. He obtained power in Louisiana through democratic means; maintained power by cooperating with the political establishment; and was assassinated before he had any serious prospect of running for president and obtaining national power.

### No Solvency – Mindset

#### They’ve conceded rollback of legislation alone doesn’t solve their impacts- means they have to win that they change the mindset of the American public and congress – that’s impossible – Americans have an inherent fear of terrorism which the plan cannot overcome – this is proven by small resistance movements

#### Extend 1NC McDonough – the public and party structures are committed to aggressive foreign policy – societal vulnerability to terrorism makes all of our defensive reactions over-compensate and focus on the military – these and embedded in society and the affirmative can’t overcome that

#### Realism is inevitable not because inevitability of aggression but uncertainty of intentions

Copeland 2k [Dale C., Professor of Political Science, University of Virginia, author The Origins of Major War, “The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism.(Review)” *International Security*, September 22, 2000, <http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-67320178/constructivist-challenge-structural-realism.html>]

Wendt's critique of structural realist theory suffers from problems of misspecification and incompleteness. Although it is true that states trained to think aggressively are more likely to be aggressive, Wendt's point that realism cannot explain behavior and outcomes without implicitly relying on a hidden variable--the distribution of interests--goes too far. It is based on a misunderstanding of how structural realist arguments are set up to make predictions. Structural realists are not naive. Like all theorists--whether liberal, constructivist, or classical realist--they recognize that states may exist that, because of domestic- or individual-level pathologies, have interests extending far beyond mere security Such states tend to destabilize a system, because they are constantly seeking opportunities to expand through force. Yet structural realists build their theories from the starting assumption that all states in the system are presently only security seekers, that they have no nonsecurity motives for war. The reason for beginning with this assumption is straightforward. It is easy to show that states with pathological unit-level characteristics are often aggressive. But if realists can explain why systems may move from cooperation to conflict, depending on the material conditions, even when all states are security seekers, then the paradigm offers a powerful baseline for theory development. By withstanding the hardest possible deductive test, realism shows the tragedy of world politics--that good states may do bad things, even against other good states. The initial assumption of a system of security seekers can then be relaxed to demonstrate how systems will be even more conflictual once states with unit-level pathologies are introduced. To show how purely security-seeking states can still conflict, structural realists point to prudent leaders' uncertainty about two temporal dimensions- **first, the present intentions of the other, and second, and even more critical, the future intentions of the other**. [19] Both of these dimensions are at the heart of the realist understanding of the security dilemma. In a two-actor security dilemma, states A and B are both seeking only their own survival. But given the difficulty of seeing the other's motives (the "problem of other minds"), state A worries that B currently harbors nonsecurity motives for war. Hence, if B takes steps only for its own security, these steps may be misinterpreted by A as preparations for aggression. State A's counterefforts, in turn, will likely be misinterpreted by B as moves to aggression, sparking a spiral of mistrust and hostility. [20] Even more intractable for systemic realists is the problem of future intentions. Even when states A and B are both fairly certain that the other is presently a security seeker, they have reason to worry that the other might change its spots some years later as a result of a change of leadership, a revolution, or simply a change of heart resulting from an increase in its power. [21] The fear here is not that the present "distribution of interests" contains states with innately aggressive intentions, but that the future system will contain such states. In short, systemic realists understand that inherently aggressive states are possible. But they do not require the system in the present moment to contain such states for it to still fall into conflict. Contrary to Wendt's claim, therefore, anarchy and distributions of power can have effects that do not depend on assumptions about the real, current distribution of interests (even if the possibility of evil states down the road is important). Realism only needs states to be uncertain about the present and future interests of the other, and in anarchies of great powers, such uncertainty may often be profound.

#### Uncertainty-inspired realism isn’t a self-fulfilling prophecy – it’s inevitable for three reasons – lack of shared knowledge, misinterpretation of public knowledge and fear of deception by other states

Copeland 2k [Dale C., Professor of Political Science, University of Virginia, author The Origins of Major War, “The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism.(Review)” *International Security*, September 22, 2000, <http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-67320178/constructivist-challenge-structural-realism.html>]

The question of uncertainty is critical to understanding the differences between structural realism and constructivism, and where Wendt's analysis misses the mark. Consider first uncertainty regarding the other's present intentions. Wendt is aware that this kind of uncertainty challenges his point that the current distribution of interests drives the way anarchy plays itself out. He counters that, at least in the modern environment, the "problem of other minds" is not much of a problem. States today can indeed learn a great deal about what the other is doing and thinking. That knowledge may not be "100 percent certain," Wendt argues, "but no knowledge is that" (p. 281, emphasis in original). To assume a worst-case scenario and to treat the other as hostile may be more dangerous than adopting a conciliatory policy, because it creates a self-fulfilling prophecy of mutual mistrust (pp. 281, 107-109, 360). This counterargument has serious flaws. In essence, it is an effort to assume away the problem--that there really is no problem of other minds--and it is weak on three grounds. First, Wendt's view that states typically know a lot about the other's motives is an unsupported empirical statement based only on a reading of the contemporary situation. Even if it were true for the majority of states today--and it certainly does not capture the reality between the states that count, such as the United States and China--his point cannot be retrofitted into the previous five centuries that constitute the focus of Wendt's analysis. In sum, if uncertainty about present intentions was rampant during these five hundred years, it (along with shifts in relative power) may explain a great deal about changes in conflict and cooperation over time. Second, Wendt's view is inconsistent with his recognition that states often do have difficulty learning about the other. The very problem Ego and Alter have in first communicating is that "behavior does not speak for itself." It must be interpreted, and "many interpretations are possible" (p. 330). This point is reinforced by Wendt's epistemological point of departure: that the ideas held by actors are "unobservable" (chap. 2). Because leaders cannot observe directly what the other is thinking, they are resigned to making inferences from its behavior. Yet in security affairs, as Wendt acknowledges, mistakes in inferences--assuming the other is peaceful when in fact it has malevolent intentions--could prove "fatal" (p. 360). Wendt accepts that the problem facing rational states "is making sure that they perceive other actors, and other actors' perception of them, correctly" (p. 334, emphasis in original). Yet the book provides no mechanism through which Ego and Alter can increase their confidence in the correctness of their estimates of the other's type. Simply describing how Ego and Alter shape each other's sense of self and other is not enough. [22] Rational choice models, using assumptions consistent with structural realism, do much better here. In games of incomplete information, where states are unsure about the other's type, actions by security-seeking actors that would be too costly for greedy actors to adopt can help states reduce their uncertainty about present intentions, thus moderating the security dilemma. [23] Wendt cannot simply argue that over time states can learn a great deal about other states. It is what is not "shared," at least in the area of intentions, that remains the core stumbling block to cooperation. Third, Wendt's position that the problem of other minds is not much of a problem ignores a fundamental issue in all social relations, but especially in those between states, namely, the problem of deception. In making estimates of the other's present type, states have reason to be suspicious of its diplomatic gestures--the other may be trying to deceive them. Wendt's analysis is rooted in the theory of symbolic interactionism, but he does not discuss one critical aspect of that tradition: the idea of "impression management." Actors in their relations exploit the problem of other minds for their own ends. On the public stage, they present images and play roles that often have little to do with their true beliefs and interests backstage. [24] In laying out his dramaturgical view of Ego and Alter co-constituting each other's interests and identities, Wendt assumes that both Ego and Alter are making genuine efforts to express their true views and to "cast" the other in roles that they believe in. But deceptive actors will stage-manage the situation to create impressions that serve their narrow ends, and other actors, especially in world politics, will understand this. [25] Thus a prudent security-seeking Ego will have difficulty distinguishing between two scenarios: whether it and Alter do indeed share a view of each other as peaceful, or whether Alter is just pretending to be peaceful in order to make Ego think that they share a certain conception of the world, when in fact they do not. [26] Wendt's analysis offers no basis for saying when peaceful gestures should be taken at face value, and when they should be discounted as deceptions. [27] When we consider the implications of a Hitlerite state deceiving others to achieve a position of military superiority, we understand why great powers in history have tended to adopt postures of prudent mistrust.