# 1NC

## ASPEC

#### Failure to specify their agent is illegitimate and a voting issue-the resolution was written to give you flexibility of choice but you need to pick one—it’s the core of all of our ground

Kurr et al 13 (Jeff Kurr—Baylor University Kevin D. Kuswa, PhD—Fresno State Paul E. Mabrey III—James Madison University “Agents Wording Paper: Passive Voice, the Judiciary, and Other Odds and Ends,” <http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php?action=dlattach;topic=4848.0;attach=1690>)

In short, this topic is all about the agent of action. The “object to be reduced” is the power possessed by a particular agent (the President) and the controversy is how the other governmental agents can restrict the authority held by the executive. Who should do the restraining? Congress? The Court? Other entities? The Executive herself? These are key questions. This topic literature is uniquely about the agent/actor question surrounding the restraint of presidential war powers. The fact that the literature is so divided and diverse on possible ways that certain agents should restrict PWP, may mean that we should privilege the agent by not specifying. Furthermore, the problem concerning the ability to generate good solvency (i.e., the president will ignore, congress doesn't act, courts fail etc.) means we should err on the side aff choice/flexibility in terms of being able to choose the means of defending the resolution through the agent the aff selects.

## KY RR – 1NC

#### Debt ceiling will be raised now but it’s not certain-Obama’s ironclad political capital is forcing the GOP to give in

**Beutler, Salon, 10-3-13**

(Brian, ““Republicans finally confronting reality: They’re trapped!”, <http://www.salon.com/2013/10/03/republicans_finally_confronting_reality_theyre_trapped/>, ldg)

After struggling for weeks and weeks in stages one through four, Republicans are finally entering the final stage of grief over the death of their belief that President Obama would begin offering concessions in exchange for an increase in the debt limit.¶ The catalyzing event appears to have been an hour-plus-long meeting between Obama and congressional leaders at the White House on Wednesday. Senior administration officials say that if the meeting accomplished only one thing it was to convey to Republican leaders the extent of Obama’s determination not to negotiate with them over the budget until after they fund the government and increase the debt limit. These officials say his will here is stronger than at any time since he decided to press ahead with healthcare reform after Scott Brown ended the Democrats’ Senate supermajority in 2010.¶ There’s evidence that it sunk in.¶ First, there’s this hot mic moment in which Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell tells Sen. Rand Paul, R-Ky., that the president’s position is ironclad.¶ Then we learn that House Speaker John Boehner has told at least one House Republican privately what he and McConnell have hinted at publicly for months, which is that they won’t execute their debt limit hostage. Boehner specifically said, according to a New York Times report, and obliquely confirmed by a House GOP aide, that he would increase the debt limit before defaulting even if he lost more than half his conference on a vote.¶ None of this is to say that Republicans have “folded” exactly, but they’ve pulled the curtain back before the stage has been fully set for the final act, and revealed who’s being fitted with the red dye packet.

#### Restrictions on authority are a loss that spills over to the debt ceiling

**Parsons, LA Times, 9-12-13**

(Christi, “Obama's team calls a timeout”, [http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-obama-congress-20130913,0,2959396.story](http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-obama-congress-20130913%2C0%2C2959396.story), ldg)

After a week in which President Obama narrowly averted a bruising defeat on Capitol Hill over a military strike on Syria, the decision had the feeling of a much-needed timeout. The messy debate over a resolution to authorize military force put a harsh light on the president's already rocky relationship with Congress. Despite a charm offensive earlier this year, complete with intimate dinners and phone calls, Obama faced contrary lawmakers in both parties, a climate that is certain to persist through the next round of legislative fights, if not to the end of his second term. In deciding to seek approval for military action, Obama banked on the long-standing deference to the commander in chief on matters of national defense. But by the time he pressed "pause" on the intense White House lobbying effort, he was finding as much defiance as deference. Although the White House cast the issue as a matter of national security and a crucial test of U.S. power, dozens of lawmakers from both parties were set to deliver a rare rebuke to a president on foreign policy. Even Democratic loyalists seemed unswayed by appeals to preserve the prestige of the presidency — and this president. Hawkish Republicans offering to reach across the aisle to support the president said they found the White House distant and uninterested. The canceled picnic punctuated a week of aggravated feelings. "We obviously have divided government. We have sometimes contentious, sometimes very effective relations with Congress. But we keep at it," said White House spokesman Jay Carney, who denied the picnic cancellation had anything to do with the state of relations between the two branches of government. On Capitol Hill, the week's episode strained Obama's traditional alliance with his fellow Democrats, many of whom were wary of another military involvement, unclear about the president's plans for a missile strike and surprised by his decision to ask them to vote on it. "Not only was it a hard ask, but it was not a well-prepared ask," said Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse (D-R.I.). "His willingness to back away from the ultimatum and pursue the disarmament proposal was extremely welcome, and I think that helped all of us in our relationship with him." Obama's relationship with his Republican critics was not helped. As lawmakers look ahead to the rest of the fall agenda, including the coming budget battles, the administration's performance this week will not be easy to forget, some said. "It's just more lack of confidence that they know what they're doing," said Sen. Tom Coburn (R-Okla.). "There's only so much political capital," said Sen. Rob Portman (R-Ohio). Democrats defended the president, blaming Republicans for a "knee-jerk" opposition to any initiative tied to this White House, a phenomenon that Obama aides regularly cite but that the president appears to have disregarded in his decision to put a use-of-force resolution before Congress. "Historically, when it comes to military force, Republicans and conservatives have led that. Now they're opposed to it," said Sen. Richard J. Durbin (D-Ill.). In a private meeting this week, Durbin said, Obama himself joked that "a lot of Republicans on Capitol Hill are discovering their inner doves on Syria." The next set of negotiations will be far more predictable and on familiar territory. By the end of the month, the president and Congress must agree on a plan to continue funding the government, or it will shut down. And by mid-October, they will have to agree to raise the debt limit, or risk a default. The White House has said it won't negotiate on the debt limit, as it did twice before, counting on the public and business groups to pressure Republicans. Democrats were hopeful the budget issues would put the White House back on more solid political footing. "I think the public has a heck of a lot more confidence in the president on economics and budget than [in] the House Republicans," said Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.). That may be wishful thinking, said Ross Baker, a political science professor at Rutgers University, who studies the Senate. "These things carry over. There's no firewall between issues," he said. "Failure in one area leads to problems in other areas." The debate over the war in Syria may be on an extended pause, although prospects of Obama returning to Congress to ask for a use-of-force authorization seem slim. A bipartisan group of senators is drafting an amended authorization, but the group is not expected to fully air its proposal until diplomatic talks conclude. There were some signs that the debate may have won the president some empathy, if not support. At a private lunch with Republican senators this week, Obama asked them not to undermine him on the world stage. Sen. Ron Johnson of Wisconsin, who is part of a group of GOP senators working with the White House on fiscal issues, said the appeal resonated.

#### Obama’s capital is key

**Allen, Politico, 9-19-13**

(Jonathan, “GOP battles boost President Obama”,

dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=17961849-5BE5-43CA-B1BC-ED8A12A534EB)

There’s a simple reason President Barack Obama is using his bully pulpit to focus the nation’s attention on the battle over the budget: In this fight, he’s watching Republicans take swings at each other. And that GOP fight is a lifeline for an administration that had been scrambling to gain control its message after battling congressional Democrats on the potential use of military force in Syria and the possible nomination of Larry Summers to run the Federal Reserve. If House Republicans and Obama can’t cut even a short-term deal for a continuing resolution, the government’s authority to spend money will run out on Oct. 1. Within weeks, the nation will default on its debt if an agreement isn’t reached to raise the federal debt limit. For some Republicans, those deadlines represent a leverage point that can be used to force Obama to slash his health care law. For others, they’re a zero hour at which the party will implode if it doesn’t cut a deal. Meanwhile, “on the looming fiscal issues, Democrats — both liberal and conservative, executive and congressional — are virtually 100 percent united,” said Sen. Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.). Just a few days ago, all that Obama and his aides could talk about were Syria and Summers. Now, they’re bringing their party together and shining a white hot light on Republican disunity over whether to shut down the government and plunge the nation into default in a vain effort to stop Obamacare from going into effect. The squabbling among Republicans has gotten so vicious that a Twitter hashtag — #GOPvsGOPugliness — has become a thick virtual data file for tracking the intraparty insults. Moderates, and even some conservatives, are slamming Texas Sen. Ted Cruz, a tea party favorite, for ramping up grassroots expectations that the GOP will shut down the government if it can’t win concessions from the president to “defund” his signature health care law. “I didn’t go to Harvard or Princeton, but I can count,” Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) tweeted, subtly mocking Cruz’s Ivy League education. “The defunding box canyon is a tactic that will fail and weaken our position.” While it is well-timed for the White House to interrupt a bad slide, Obama’s singular focus on the budget battle is hardly a last-minute shift. Instead, it is a return to the narrative arc that the White House was working to build before the Syria crisis intervened. And it’s so important to the president’s strategy that White House officials didn’t consider postponing Monday’s rollout of the most partisan and high-stakes phase even when a shooter murdered a dozen people at Washington’s Navy Yard that morning. The basic storyline, well under way over the summer, was to have the president point to parts of his agenda, including reducing the costs of college and housing, designed to strengthen the middle class; use them to make the case that he not only saved the country from economic disaster but is fighting to bolster the nation’s finances on both the macro and household level; and then argue that Republicans’ desire to lock in the sequester and leverage a debt-ceiling increase for Obamacare cuts would reverse progress made. The president is on firm ground, White House officials say, because he stands with the public in believing that the government shouldn’t shut down and that the country should pay its bills.

#### Failure to raise the debt ceiling ensures collapse of the global economy, U.S. economic leadership, and free trade

**Davidson, NPR’s Planet Money co-founder, 9-10-13**

(Adam, “Our Debt to Society”, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/magazine/our-debt-to-society.html?pagewanted=all&\_r=0, ldg)

If the debt ceiling isn’t lifted again this fall, some serious financial decisions will have to be made. Perhaps the government can skimp on its foreign aid or furlough all of NASA, but eventually the big-ticket items, like Social Security and Medicare, will have to be cut. At some point, the government won’t be able to pay interest on its bonds and will enter what’s known as sovereign default, the ultimate national financial disaster achieved by countries like Zimbabwe, Ecuador and Argentina (and now Greece). In the case of the United States, though, it won’t be an isolated national crisis. If the American government can’t stand behind the dollar, the world’s benchmark currency, then the global financial system will very likely enter a new era in which there is much less trade and much less economic growth. It would be, by most accounts, the largest self-imposed financial disaster in history. Nearly everyone involved predicts that someone will blink before this disaster occurs. Yet a small number of House Republicans (one political analyst told me it’s no more than 20) appear willing to see what happens if the debt ceiling isn’t raised — at least for a bit. This could be used as leverage to force Democrats to drastically cut government spending and eliminate President Obama’s signature health-care-reform plan. In fact, Representative Tom Price, a Georgia Republican, told me that the whole problem could be avoided if the president agreed to drastically cut spending and lower taxes. Still, it is hard to put this act of game theory into historic context. Plenty of countries — and some cities, like Detroit — have defaulted on their financial obligations, but only because their governments ran out of money to pay their bills. No wealthy country has ever voluntarily decided — in the middle of an economic recovery, no less — to default. And there’s certainly no record of that happening to the country that controls the global reserve currency. Like many, I assumed a self-imposed U.S. debt crisis might unfold like most involuntary ones. If the debt ceiling isn’t raised by X-Day, I figured, the world’s investors would begin to see America as an unstable investment and rush to sell their Treasury bonds. The U.S. government, desperate to hold on to investment, would then raise interest rates far higher, hurtling up rates on credit cards, student loans, mortgages and corporate borrowing — which would effectively put a clamp on all trade and spending. The U.S. economy would collapse far worse than anything we’ve seen in the past several years. Instead, Robert Auwaerter, head of bond investing for Vanguard, the world’s largest mutual-fund company, told me that the collapse might be more insidious. “You know what happens when the market gets upset?” he said. “There’s a flight to quality. Investors buy Treasury bonds. It’s a bit perverse.” In other words, if the U.S. comes within shouting distance of a default (which Auwaerter is confident won’t happen), the world’s investors — absent a safer alternative, given the recent fates of the euro and the yen — might actually buy even more Treasury bonds. Indeed, interest rates would fall and the bond markets would soar. While this possibility might not sound so bad, it’s really far more damaging than the apocalyptic one I imagined. Rather than resulting in a sudden crisis, failure to raise the debt ceiling would lead to a slow bleed. Scott Mather, head of the global portfolio at Pimco, the world’s largest private bond fund, explained that while governments and institutions might go on a U.S.-bond buying frenzy in the wake of a debt-ceiling panic, they would eventually recognize that the U.S. government was not going through an odd, temporary bit of insanity. They would eventually conclude that it had become permanently less reliable. Mather imagines institutional investors and governments turning to a basket of currencies, putting their savings in a mix of U.S., European, Canadian, Australian and Japanese bonds. Over the course of decades, the U.S. would lose its unique role in the global economy. The U.S. benefits enormously from its status as global reserve currency and safe haven. Our interest and mortgage rates are lower; companies are able to borrow money to finance their new products more cheaply. As a result, there is much more economic activity and more wealth in America than there would be otherwise. If that status erodes, the U.S. economy’s peaks will be lower and recessions deeper; future generations will have fewer job opportunities and suffer more when the economy falters. And, Mather points out, no other country would benefit from America’s diminished status. When you make the base risk-free asset more risky, the entire global economy becomes riskier and costlier.

#### Nuclear war

Kemp 2010

Geoffrey, Director of Regional Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center, served in the White House under Ronald Reagan, special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs on the National Security Council Staff, Former Director, Middle East Arms Control Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010, The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia’s Growing Presence in the Middle East, pg. 233-4

The second scenario, called Mayhem and Chaos, is the opposite of the first scenario; everything that can go wrong does go wrong. The world economic situation weakens rather than strengthens, and India, China, and Japan suffer a major reduction in their growth rates, further weakening the global economy. As a result, energy demand falls and the price of fossil fuels plummets, leading to a financial crisis for the energy-producing states, which are forced to cut back dramatically on expansion programs and social welfare. That in turn leads to political unrest: and nurtures different radical groups, including, but not limited to, Islamic extremists. The internal stability of some countries is challenged, and there are more “failed states.” Most serious is the collapse of the democratic government in Pakistan and its takeover by Muslim extremists, who then take possession of a large number of nuclear weapons. The danger of war between India and Pakistan increases significantly. Iran, always worried about an extremist Pakistan, expands and weaponizes its nuclear program. That further enhances nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt joining Israel and Iran as nuclear states. Under these circumstances, the potential for nuclear terrorism increases, and the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack in either the Western world or in the oil-producing states may lead to a further devastating collapse of the world economic market, with a tsunami-like impact on stability. In this scenario, major disruptions can be expected, with dire consequences for two-thirds of the planet’s population.

## 1NC

#### The United States Federal Judiciary should hold that United States’ targeted killing operations should be subject to judicial ex post review, including redress for family members.

#### Solves – comparatively better than ex ante review

Jaffer, Director-ACLU Center for Democracy, 13 (Jameel Jaffer, Director of the ACLU's Center for Democracy, “Judicial Review of Targeted Killings,” 126 Harv. L. Rev. F. 185 (2013), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/issues/126/april13/forum\_1002.php)

 The argument for some form of judicial review is compelling, not least because such review would clarify the scope of the government’s authority to use lethal force. The targeted killing program is predicated on sweeping constructions of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) and the President’s authority to use military force in national self-defense. The government contends, for example, that the AUMF authorizes it to use lethal force against groups that had nothing to do with the 9/11 attacks and that did not even exist when those attacks were carried out. It contends that the AUMF gives it authority to use lethal force against individuals located far from conventional battlefields. As the Justice Department’s recently leaked white paper makes clear, the government also contends that the President has authority to use lethal force against those deemed to present “continuing” rather than truly imminent threats.These claims are controversial. They have been rejected or questioned by human rights groups, legal scholars, federal judges, and U.N. special rapporteurs. Even enthusiasts of the drone program have become anxious about its legal soundness. (“People in Washington need to wake up and realize the legal foundations are crumbling by the day,” Professor Bobby Chesney, a supporter of the program, recently said.) Judicial review could clarify the limits on the government’s legal authority and supply a degree of legitimacy to actions taken within those limits. It could also encourage executive officials to observe these limits. Executive officials would be less likely to exceed or abuse their authority if they were required to defend their conduct to federal judges. Even Jeh Johnson, the Defense Department’s former general counsel and a vocal defender of the targeted killing program, acknowledged in a recent speech that judicial review could add “rigor” to the executive’s decisionmaking process. In explaining the function of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which oversees government surveillance in certain national security investigations, executive officials have often said that even the mere prospect of judicial review deters error and abuse. But to recognize that judicial review is indispensible in this context is not to say that Congress should establish a specialized court, still less that it should establish such a court to review contemplated killings before they are carried out. First, the establishment of such a court would almost certainly entrench the notion that the government has authority, even far away from conflict zones, to use lethal force against individuals who do not present imminent threats. When a threat is truly imminent, after all, the government will not have time to apply to a court for permission to carry out a strike. Exigency will make prior judicial review infeasible. To propose that a court should review contemplated strikes before they are carried out is to accept that the government should be contemplating strikes against people who do not present imminent threats. This is why the establishment of a specialized court would more likely institutionalize the existing program, with its elision of the imminence requirement, than narrow it. Second, judicial engagement with the targeted killing program does not actually require the establishment of a new court. In a case pending before Judge Rosemary Collyer of the District Court for the District of Columbia, the ACLU and the Center for Constitutional Rights represent the estates of the three U.S. citizens whom the CIA and JSOC killed in Yemen in 2011. The complaint, brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, seeks to hold senior executive officials liable for conduct that allegedly violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. It asks the court to articulate the limits of the government’s legal authority and to assess whether those limits were honored. In other words, the complaint asks the court to conduct the kind of review that many now seem to agree that courts should conduct. This kind of review—ex post review in the context of a Bivens action—could clarify the relevant legal framework in the same way that review by a specialized court could. But it also has many advantages over the kind of review that would likely take place in a specialized court. In a Bivens action, the proceedings are adversarial rather than ex parte, increasing their procedural legitimacy and improving their substantive accuracy. Hearings are open to the public, at least presumptively. The court can focus on events that have already transpired rather than events that might or might not transpire in the future. And a Bivens action can also provide a kind of accountability that could not be supplied by a specialized court reviewing contemplated strikes ex ante: redress for family members of people killed unlawfully, and civil liability for officials whose conduct in approving or carrying out the strike violated the Constitution. (Of course, in one profound sense a Bivens action will always come too late, because the strike alleged to be unlawful will already have been carried out. Again, though, if “imminence” is a requirement, ex ante judicial review is infeasible by definition.) Another advantage of the Bivens model is that the courts are already familiar with it. The courts quite commonly adjudicate wrongful death claims and “survival” claims brought by family members of individuals killed by law enforcement agents. In the national security context, federal courts are now accustomed to considering habeas petitions filed by individuals detained at Guantánamo. They opine on the scope of the government’s legal authority and they assess the sufficiency of the government’s evidence — the same tasks they would perform in the context of suits challenging the lawfulness of targeted killings. While Congress could of course affirm or strengthen the courts’ authority to review the lawfulness of targeted killings if it chose to do so, or legislatively narrow some of the judicially created doctrines that have precluded courts from reaching the merits in some Bivens suits, more than 40 years of Supreme Court precedent since Bivens makes clear that federal courts have not only the authority to hear after-the-fact claims brought by individuals whose constitutional rights have been infringed but also the obligation to do so.

## Executive CP

#### The president should direct that U.S. drone strikes be conducted as Department of Defense Title 10 operations. The executive branch should disclose the legal justifications under domestic and international law for targeted killing.

#### Executive order establishing transparency of targeting decisions resolves drone legitimacy and resentment

Jennifer Daskal, Fellow and Adjunct Professor, Georgetown Center on National Security and the Law, Georgetown University Law Center, April 2013, ARTICLE: THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE BATTLEFIELD: A FRAMEWORK FOR DETENTION AND TARGETING OUTSIDE THE "HOT" CONFLICT ZONE, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1165

4. Procedural Requirements Currently, officials in the executive branch carry out all such ex ante review of out-of-battlefield targeting and detention decisions, reportedly with the involvement of the President, but without any binding and publicly articulated standards governing the exercise of these authorities. n163 All ex post review of targeting is also done internally within the executive branch. There is no public accounting, or even acknowledgment, of most strikes, their success and error rates, or the extent of any collateral damage. Whereas the Department of Defense provides solatia or condolence payments to Afghan civilians who are killed or injured as a result of military actions in Afghanistan (and formerly did so in Iraq), there is no equivalent effort in areas outside the active conflict zone. n164 Meanwhile, the degree of ex post review of detention decisions depends on the location of detention as opposed to the location of capture. Thus, [\*1219] Guantanamo detainees are entitled to habeas review, but detainees held in Afghanistan are not, even if they were captured far away and brought to Afghanistan to be detained. n165 Enhanced ex ante and ex post procedural protections for both detention and targeting, coupled with transparency as to the standards and processes employed, serve several important functions: they can minimize error and abuse by creating time for advance reflection, correct erroneous deprivations of liberty, create endogenous incentives to avoid mistake or abuse, and increase the legitimacy of state action. a. Ex Ante Procedures Three key considerations should guide the development of ex ante procedures. First, any procedural requirements must reasonably respond to the need for secrecy in certain operations. Secrecy concerns cannot, for example, justify the lack of transparency as to the substantive targeting standards being employed. There is, however, a legitimate need for the state to protect its sources and methods and to maintain an element of surprise in an attack or capture operation. Second, contrary to oft-repeated rhetoric about the ticking time bomb, few, if any, capture or kill operations outside a zone of active conflict occur in situations of true exigency. n166 Rather, there is often the time and need for advance planning. In fact, advance planning is often necessary to minimize damage to one's own troops and nearby civilians. n167 Third, the procedures and standards employed must be transparent and sufficiently credible to achieve the desired legitimacy gains. These considerations suggest the value of an independent, formalized, ex ante review system. Possible models include the Foreign Intelligence [\*1220] Surveillance Court (FISC), n168 or a FISC-like entity composed of military and intelligence officials and military lawyers, in the mode of an executive branch review board. n169 Created by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) in 1978, n170 the FISC grants ex parte orders for electronic surveillance and physical searches, among other actions, based on a finding that a "significant purpose" of the surveillance is to collect "foreign intelligence information." n171 The Attorney General can grant emergency authorizations without court approval, subject to a requirement that he notify the court of the emergency authorization and seek subsequent judicial authorization within seven days. n172 The FISC also approves procedures related to the use and dissemination of collected information. By statute, heightened restrictions apply to the use and dissemination of information concerning U.S. persons. n173 Notably, the process has been extraordinarily successful in protecting extremely sensitive sources and methods. To date, there has never been an unauthorized disclosure of an application to or order from the FISC court. An ex parte review system for targeting and detention outside zones of active hostility could operate in a similar way. Judges or the review board would approve selected targets and general procedures and standards, while still giving operators wide rein to implement the orders according to the approved standards. Specifically, the court or review board would determine whether the targets meet the substantive requirements and would [\*1221] evaluate the overarching procedures for making least harmful means-determinations, but would leave target identification and time-sensitive decisionmaking to the operators. n174 Moreover, there should be a mechanism for emergency authorizations at the behest of the Secretary of Defense or the Director of National Intelligence. Such a mechanism already exists for electronic surveillance conducted pursuant to FISA. n175 These authorizations would respond to situations in which there is reason to believe that the targeted individual poses an imminent, specific threat, and in which there is insufficient time to seek and obtain approval by a court or review panel as will likely be the case in instances of true imminence justifying the targeting of persons who do not meet the standards applicable to operational leaders. As required under FISA, the reviewing court or executive branch review board should be notified that such an emergency authorization has been issued; it should be time-limited; and the operational decisionmakers should have to seek court or review board approval (or review, if the strike has already taken place) as soon as practicable but at most within seven days. n176 Finally, and critically, given the stakes in any application namely, the deprivation of life someone should be appointed to represent the potential target's interests and put together the most compelling case that the individual is not who he is assumed to be or does not meet the targeting criteria. The objections to such a proposal are many. In the context of proposed courts to review the targeting of U.S. citizens, for example, some have argued that such review would serve merely to institutionalize, legitimize, and expand the use of targeted drone strikes. n177 But this ignores the reality of their continued use and expansion and imagines a world in which targeted [\*1222] killings of operational leaders of an enemy organization outside a zone of active conflict is categorically prohibited (an approach I reject n178). If states are going to use this extraordinary power (and they will), there ought to be a clear and transparent set of applicable standards and mechanisms in place to ensure thorough and careful review of targeted-killing decisions. The formalization of review procedures along with clear, binding standards will help to avoid ad hoc decisionmaking and will ensure consistency across administrations and time. Some also condemn the ex parte nature of such reviews. n179 But again, this critique fails to consider the likely alternative: an equally secret process in which targeting decisions are made without any formalized or institutionalized review process and no clarity as to the standards being employed. Institutionalizing a court or review board will not solve the secrecy issue, but it will lead to enhanced scrutiny of decisionmaking, particularly if a quasi-adversarial model is adopted, in which an official is obligated to act as advocate for the potential target. That said, there is a reasonable fear that any such court or review board will simply defer. In this vein, FISC's high approval rate is cited as evidence that reviewing courts or review boards will do little more than rubber-stamp the Executive's targeting decisions. n180 But the high approval rates only tell part of the story. In many cases, the mere requirement of justifying an application before a court or other independent review board can serve as an internal check, creating endogenous incentives to comply with the statutory requirements and limit the breadth of executive action. n181 Even if this system does little more than increase the attention paid to the stated requirements and expand the circle of persons reviewing the factual basis for the application, those features in and of themselves can lead to increased reflection and restraint. Additional accountability mechanisms, such as civil or criminal sanctions in the event of material misrepresentations or omissions, the granting of far-reaching authority to the relevant Inspectors General, and meaningful ex post review by Article III courts, n182 are also needed to help further minimize abuse. Conversely, some object to the use of courts or court-like review as stymying executive power in wartime, and interfering with the President's Article II powers. n183 According to this view, it is dangerous and potentially unconstitutional to require the President's wartime targeting decisions to be subject to additional reviews. These concerns, however, can be dealt with through emergency authorization mechanisms, the possibility of a presidential override, and design details that protect against ex ante review of operational decisionmaking. The adoption of an Article II review board, rather than an Article III-FISC model, further addresses some of the constitutional concerns. Some also have warned that there may be no "case or controversy" for an Article III, FISC-like court to review, further suggesting a preference for an Article II review board. n184 That said, similar concerns have been raised with respect to FISA and rejected. n185 Drawing heavily on an analogy to courts' roles in issuing ordinary warrants, the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel concluded at the time of enactment that a case and controversy existed, even though the FISA applications are made ex parte. n186 [\*1224] Here, the judges would be issuing a warrant to kill rather than surveil. While this is significant, it should not fundamentally alter the legal analysis. n187 As the Supreme Court has ruled, killing is a type of seizure. n188 The judges would be issuing a warrant for the most extreme type of seizure. n189 It is also important to emphasize that a reviewing court or review board would not be "selecting" targets, but determining whether the targets chosen by executive branch officials met substantive requirements much as courts do all the time when applying the law to the facts. Press accounts indicate that the United States maintains lists of persons subject to capture or kill operations lists created in advance of specific targeting operations and reportedly subject to significant internal deliberation, including by the President himself. n190 A court or review board could be incorporated into the existing ex ante decisionmaking process in a manner that would avoid interference with the conduct of specific operations reviewing the target lists but leaving the operational details to the operators. As suggested above, emergency approval mechanisms could and should be available to deal with exceptional cases where ex ante approval is not possible. Additional details will need to be addressed, including the temporal limits of the court's or review board's authorizations. For some high-level operatives, inclusion on a target list would presumably be valid for some set period of [\*1225] time, subject to specific renewal requirements. Authorizations based on a specific, imminent threat, by comparison, would need to be strictly time-limited, and tailored to the specifics of the threat, consistent with what courts regularly do when they issue warrants. In the absence of such a system, the President ought to, at a minimum, issue an executive order establishing a transparent set of standards and procedures for identifying targets of lethal killing and detention operations outside a zone of active hostilities. n192 To enhance legitimacy, the procedures should include target list reviews and disposition plans by the top official in each of the agencies with a stake in the outcome the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the CIA, the Secretary of State, the Director of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence, with either the Secretary of Defense, Director of National Intelligence, or President himself, responsible for final sign-off. n193 In all cases, decisions should be unanimous, or, in the absence of consensus, elevated to the President of the United States. n194 Additional details will need to be worked out, including critical questions about the standard of proof that applies. Given the stakes, a clear and convincing evidentiary standard is warranted. n195 While this proposal is obviously geared toward the United States, the same principles should apply for all states engaged in targeting operations. n196 States would ideally subject such determinations to independent review or, alternatively, clearly articulate the standards and procedures for their decisionmaking, thus enhancing accountability. b. Ex Post Review For targeted-killing operations, ex post reviews serve only limited purposes. They obviously cannot restore the target's life. But retrospective review either by a FISC-like court or review board can serve to identify errors or overreaching and thereby help avoid future mistakes. This can, and ideally would, be supplemented by the adoption of an additional Article III damages mechanism. n197 At a minimum, the relevant Inspectors General should engage in regular and extensive reviews of targeted-killing operations. Such post hoc analysis helps to set standards and controls that then get incorporated into ex ante decisionmaking. In fact, post hoc review can often serve as a more meaningful and often more searching inquiry into the legitimacy of targeting decisions. Even the mere knowledge that an ex post review will occur can help to protect against rash ex ante decisionmaking, thereby providing a self-correcting mechanism. Ex post review should also be accompanied by the establishment of a solatia and condolence payment system for activities that occur outside the active zone of hostilities. Extension of such a system beyond Afghanistan and Iraq would help mitigate resentment caused by civilian deaths or injuries and would promote better accounting of the civilian costs of targeting operations. n198

## 1NC Restrictions

#### Restrictions are prohibitions on action

Schiedler-Brown ‘12

Jean, Attorney, Jean Schiedler-Brown & Associates, Appellant Brief of Randall Kinchloe v. States Dept of Health, Washington, The Court of Appeals of the State of Washington, Division 1, http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/Briefs/A01/686429%20Appellant%20Randall%20Kincheloe%27s.pdf

3. The ordinary definition of the term "restrictions" also does not include the reporting and monitoring or supervising terms and conditions that are included in the 2001 Stipulation. Black's Law Dictionary, 'fifth edition,(1979) defines "restriction" as; A limitation often imposed in a deed or lease respecting the use to which the property may be put. The term "restrict' is also cross referenced with the term "restrain." Restrain is defined as; To limit, confine, abridge, narrow down, restrict, obstruct, impede, hinder, stay, destroy. To prohibit from action; to put compulsion on; to restrict; to hold or press back. To keep in check; to hold back from acting, proceeding, or advancing, either by physical or moral force, or by interposing obstacle, to repress or suppress, to curb. In contrast, the terms "supervise" and "supervisor" are defined as; To have general oversight over, to superintend or to inspect. See Supervisor. A surveyor or overseer. . . In a broad sense, one having authority over others, to superintend and direct. The term "supervisor" means an individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but required the use of independent judgment. Comparing the above definitions, it is clear that the definition of "restriction" is very different from the definition of "supervision"-very few of the same words are used to explain or define the different terms. In his 2001 stipulation, Mr. Kincheloe essentially agreed to some supervision conditions, but he did not agree to restrict his license.

#### DOD shift doesn’t restrict authority

Spencer Ackerman, Wired DangerRoom, 3/20/13, Little Will Change If the Military Takes Over CIA’s Drone Strikes, www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/03/military-drones/

Nor does the change to military drone control restrict the relevant legal authorizations in place. The Obama administration relies on an expansive interpretation of a 2001 congressional authorization to run its global targeted-killing program. If that authorization constrains the military to the “hot” battlefield of Afghanistan, someone forgot to tell the Joint Special Operations Command to get out of Yemen.

#### Prefer it:

#### 1. Topic coherence – the core controversy is what war powers the President has, not how he must use them – key to clash and literature

#### 2. Bidirectional – they allow the aff to endorse the status quo – Congressional oversight and approval become topical

#### 3. Limits – hundreds of insignificant conditions Congress could impose

## Yemen

#### Terrorists can’t sustain the operational focus necessary for WMD use

Mueller **et al., OSU political science professor,** 2012

(John, “The Terrorism Delusion”, International Security, 37.1, politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller//absisfin.pdf, ldg)

In 2009, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a lengthy report on protecting the homeland. Key to achieving such an objective should be a careful assessment of the character, capacities, and desires of potential terrorists targeting that homeland. Although the report contains a section dealing with what its authors call “the nature of the terrorist adversary,” the section devotes only two sentences to assessing that nature: “The number and high profile of international and domestic terrorist attacks and disrupted plots during the last two decades underscore the determination and persistence of terrorist organizations. Terrorists have proven to be relentless, patient, opportunistic, and flexible, learning from experience and modifying tactics and targets to exploit perceived vulnerabilities and avoid observed strengths.”8 This description may apply to some terrorists somewhere, including at least a few of those involved in the September 11 attacks. Yet, it scarcely describes the vast majority of those individuals picked up on terrorism charges in the United States since those attacks. The inability of the DHS to consider this fact even parenthetically in its fleeting discussion is not only amazing but perhaps delusional in its single-minded preoccupation with the extreme. In sharp contrast, the authors of the case studies, with remarkably few exceptions, describe their subjects with such words as incompetent, ineffective, unintelligent, idiotic, ignorant, inadequate, unorganized, misguided, muddled, amateurish, dopey, unrealistic, moronic, irrational, and foolish.9 And in nearly all of the cases where an operative from the police or from the Federal Bureau of Investigation was at work (almost half of the total), the most appropriate descriptor would be “gullible.” In all, as Shikha Dalmia has put it, would-be terrorists need to be “radicalized enough to die for their cause; Westernized enough to move around without raising red flags; ingenious enough to exploit loopholes in the security apparatus; meticulous enough to attend to the myriad logistical details that could torpedo the operation; self-sufficient enough to make all the preparations without enlisting outsiders who might give them away; disciplined enough to maintain complete secrecy; and—above all—psychologically tough enough to keep functioning at a high level without cracking in the face of their own impending death.”10 The case studies examined in this article certainly do not abound with people with such characteristics. In the eleven years since the September 11 attacks, no terrorist has been able to detonate even a primitive bomb in the United States, and except for the four explosions in the London transportation system in 2005, neither has any in the United Kingdom. Indeed, the only method by which Islamist terrorists have managed to kill anyone in the United States since September 11 has been with gunfire—inflicting a total of perhaps sixteen deaths over the period (cases 4, 26, 32).11 This limited capacity is impressive because, at one time, small-scale terrorists in the United States were quite successful in setting off bombs. Noting that the scale of the September 11 attacks has “tended to obliterate America’s memory of pre-9/11 terrorism,” Brian Jenkins reminds us (and we clearly do need reminding) that the 1970s witnessed sixty to seventy terrorist incidents, mostly bombings, on U.S. soil every year.12 The situation seems scarcely different in Europe and other Western locales. Michael Kenney, who has interviewed dozens of government officials and intelligence agents and analyzed court documents, has found that, in sharp contrast with the boilerplate characterizations favored by the DHS and with the imperatives listed by Dalmia, Islamist militants in those locations are operationally unsophisticated, short on know-how, prone to making mistakes, poor at planning, and limited in their capacity to learn.13 Another study documents the difficulties of network coordination that continually threaten the terrorists’ operational unity, trust, cohesion, and ability to act collectively.14 In addition, although some of the plotters in the cases targeting the United States harbored visions of toppling large buildings, destroying airports, setting off dirty bombs, or bringing down the Brooklyn Bridge (cases 2, 8, 12, 19, 23, 30, 42), all were nothing more than wild fantasies, far beyond the plotters’ capacities however much they may have been encouraged in some instances by FBI operatives. Indeed, in many of the cases, target selection is effectively a random process, lacking guile and careful planning. Often, it seems, targets have been chosen almost capriciously and simply for their convenience. For example, a would-be bomber targeted a mall in Rockford, Illinois, because it was nearby (case 21). Terrorist plotters in Los Angeles in 2005 drew up a list of targets that were all within a 20-mile radius of their shared apartment, some of which did not even exist (case 15). In Norway, a neo-Nazi terrorist on his way to bomb a synagogue took a tram going the wrong way and dynamited a mosque instead.15

#### No internal link to Yemen – the plan won’t prevent strikes, it will just shift the blame

#### No nuclear terrorism-even attempts under optimal conditions have failed.

Bergen**, New York University’s Center on Law and Security fellow,** 2010

(Peter, “Reevaluating Al-Qa`ida’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Capabilities,” CTC Sentinel, September, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=122242, ldg)

Bin Ladin’s and al-Zawahiri’s portrayal of al-Qa`ida’s nuclear and chemical weapons capabilities in their post-9/11 statements to Hamid Mir was not based in any reality, and it was instead meant to serve as psychological warfare against the West. There is no evidence that al-Qa`ida’s quest for nuclear weapons ever went beyond the talking stage. Moreover, al-Zawahiri’s comment about “missing” Russian nuclear suitcase bombs floating around for sale on the black market is a Hollywood construct that is greeted with great skepticism by nuclear proliferation experts. This article reviews al-Qa`ida’s WMD efforts, and then explains why it is unlikely the group will ever acquire a nuclear weapon. Al-Qa`ida’s WMD Efforts In 2002, former UN weapons inspector David Albright examined all the available evidence about al-Qa`ida’s nuclear weapons research program and concluded that it was virtually impossible for al-Qa`ida to have acquired any type of nuclear weapon.8 U.S. government analysts reached the same conclusion in 2002.9 There is evidence, however, that al-Qa`ida experimented with crude chemical weapons, explored the use of biological weapons such as botulinum, salmonella and anthrax, and also made multiple attempts to acquire radioactive materials suitable for a dirty bomb.10 After the group moved from Sudan to Afghanistan in 1996, al-Qa`ida members escalated their chemical and biological weapons program, innocuously code-naming it the “Yogurt Project,” but only earmarking a meager $2,000-4,000 for its budget.11 An al-Qa`ida videotape from this period, for example, shows a small white dog tied up inside a glass cage as a milky gas slowly filters in. An Arabic-speaking man with an Egyptian accent says: “Start counting the time.” Nervous, the dog barks and then moans. After struggling and flailing for a few minutes, it succumbs to the poisonous gas and stops moving. This experiment almost certainly occurred at the Darunta training camp near the eastern Afghan city of Jalalabad, conducted by the Egyptian Abu Khabab.12 Not only has al-Qa`ida’s research into WMD been strictly an amateur affair, but plots to use these types of weapons have been ineffective. One example is the 2003 “ricin” case in the United Kingdom. It was widely advertised as a serious WMD plot, yet the subsequent investigation showed otherwise. The case appeared in the months before the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, when media in the United States and the United Kingdom were awash in stories about a group of men arrested in London who possessed highly toxic ricin to be used in future terrorist attacks. Two years later, however, at the trial of the men accused of the ricin plot, a government scientist testified that the men never had ricin in their possession, a charge that had been first triggered by a false positive on a test. The men were cleared of the poison conspiracy except for an Algerian named Kamal Bourgass, who was convicted of conspiring to commit a public nuisance by using poisons or explosives.13 It is still not clear whether al-Qa`ida had any connection to the plot.14 In fact, the only post-9/11 cases where al-Qa`ida or any of its affiliates actually used a type of WMD was in Iraq, where al-Qa`ida’s Iraqi affiliate, al-Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI), laced more than a dozen of its bombs with the chemical chlorine in 2007. Those attacks sickened hundreds of Iraqis, but the victims who died in these assaults did so largely from the blast of the bombs, not because of inhaling chlorine. AQI stopped using chlorine in its bombs in Iraq in mid-2007, partly because the insurgents never understood how to make the chlorine attacks especially deadly and also because the Central Intelligence Agency and U.S. military hunted down the bomb makers responsible for the campaign, while simultaneously clamping down on the availability of chlorine.15 Indeed, a survey of the 172 individuals indicted or convicted in Islamist terrorism cases in the United States since 9/11 compiled by the Maxwell School at Syracuse University and the New America Foundation found that none of the cases involved the use of WMD of any kind. In the one case where a radiological plot was initially alleged—that of the Hispanic-American al-Qa`ida recruit Jose Padilla—that allegation was dropped when the case went to trial.16 Unlikely Al-Qa`ida Will Acquire a Nuclear Weapon Despite the difficulties associated with terrorist groups acquiring or deploying WMD and al-Qa`ida’s poor record in the matter, there was a great deal of hysterical discussion about this issue after 9/11. Clouding the discussion was the semantic problem of the ominous term “weapons of mass destruction,” which is really a misnomer as it suggests that chemical, biological, and nuclear devices are all equally lethal. In fact, there is only one realistic weapon of mass destruction that can kill tens or hundreds of thousands of people in a single attack: a nuclear bomb.17 The congressionally authorized Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism issued a report in 2008 that typified the muddled thinking about WMD when it concluded: “It is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013.”18 The report’s conclusion that WMD terrorism was likely to happen somewhere in the world in the next five years was simultaneously true but also somewhat trivial because terrorist groups and cults have already engaged in crude chemical and biological weapons attacks.19 Yet **the prospects of** al-Qa`ida or indeed **any** other **group having access to** a true WMD—**a nuclear device**—**is near zero** for the foreseeable future. If any organization should have developed a serious WMD capability it was the bizarre Japanese terrorist cult Aum Shinrikyo, which not only recruited 300 scientists—including chemists and molecular biologists—but also had hundreds of millions of dollars at its disposal.20 Aum embarked on a large-scale WMD research program in the early 1990s because members of the cult believed that Armageddon was fast-approaching and that they would need powerful weapons to survive. Aum acolytes experimented with anthrax and botulinum toxin and even hoped to mine uranium in Australia. Aum researchers also hacked into classified networks to find information about nuclear facilities in Russia, South Korea and Taiwan.21 Sensing an opportunity following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Aum recruited thousands of followers in Russia and sent multiple delegations to meet with leading Russian politicians and scientists in the early 1990s. The cult even tried to recruit staff from inside the Kurchatov Institute, a leading nuclear research center in Moscow. One of Aum’s leaders, Hayakawa Kiyohide, made eight trips to Russia in 1994, and in his diary he made a notation that Aum was willing to pay up to $15 million for a nuclear device.22 Despite its open checkbook, Aum was never able to acquire nuclear material or technology from Russia even in the chaotic circumstances following the implosion of the communist regime.23 In the end, Aum abandoned its investigations of nuclear and biological weapons after finding them too difficult to acquire and settled instead on a chemical weapons operation, which climaxed in the group releasing sarin gas in the Tokyo subway in 1995. It is hard to imagine an environment better suited to killing large numbers of people than the Tokyo subway, yet only a dozen died in the attack.24 Although Aum’s WMD program was much further advanced than anything al-Qa`ida developed, even they could not acquire a true WMD. It is also worth recalling that Iran, which has had an **aggressive and well-funded nuclear program for almost two decades**, is still some way from developing a functioning nuclear bomb. Terrorist groups simply do not have the resources of states. Even with access to nuclear technology, it is next to impossible for terrorist groups to acquire sufficient amounts of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to make a nuclear bomb. The total of all the known thefts of HEU around the world tracked by the International Atomic Energy Agency between 1993 and 2006 was just less than eight kilograms, well short of the 25 kilograms needed for the simplest bomb;25 moreover, none of the HEU thieves during this period were linked to al-Qa`ida. Therefore, even building, let alone detonating, the simple, gun-type nuclear device of the kind that was dropped on Hiroshima during World War II would be extraordinarily difficult for a terrorist group because of the problem of accumulating sufficient quantities of HEU. Building a radiological device, or “dirty bomb,” is far more plausible for a terrorist group because acquiring radioactive materials suitable for such a weapon is not as difficult, while the construction of such a device is orders of magnitude less complex than building a nuclear bomb. Detonating a radiological device, however, would likely result in a relatively small number of casualties and should not be considered a true WMD.

#### DOD shift now

Jack Goldsmith, Harvard Law School Professor, focus on national security law, presidential power, cybersecurity, and conflict of laws, Former Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, and Special Counsel to the Department of Defense, Hoover Institution Task Force on National Security and Law, 3/20/13, No More Drones For CIA, www.lawfareblog.com/2013/03/no-more-drones-for-cia/

That is the title of Dan Klaidman’s important story:

Three senior U.S. officials tell The Daily Beast that the White House is poised to sign off on a plan to shift the CIA’s lethal targeting program to the Defense Department. . . .The proposed plan would unify the command and control structure of targeted killings, and create a uniform set of rules and procedures. The CIA would maintain a role, but the military would have operational control over targeting. Lethal missions would take place under Title 10 of the U.S. Code, which governs military operations, rather than Title 50, which sets out the legal authorities for intelligence activities and covert operations.

Quick reactions:

(1) It is not clear what is at stake here, especially if, as Marc Ambinder reports, the Air Force currently operates and “presses the button that releases the missile” on CIA drones. At least two things appear to be involved in the shift: (a) CIA will no longer be determining who is killed, and (b) CIA might no longer “own” armed drones (Ambinder reports that CIA has 30 UAVs, but it is unclear how many are armed). Presumably CIA will still play a heavy role in the intelligence side of drone strikes – which, as I understand it, is 99% of the operation. In that light, it is unclear what Klaidman entails when he says that “a potential downside of the Agency relinquishing control of the program was the loss of a decade of expertise that the CIA has developed since it has been prosecuting its war in Pakistan and beyond,” and adds that “for a period of transition, CIA operators would likely work alongside their military counterparts to target suspected terrorists.”

#### Alternatives to drones are worse

Lewis 13 (JAMES LEWIS , Director of the Technology and Public Policy Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies “The Alternatives to Drone Strikes Are Worse,” http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/has-obama-gone-too-far-with-his-drone-policies/the-alternatives-to-drone-strikes-are-worse

America's drone policy makes everyone uncomfortable. The alternatives are worse. Attacking enemy combatants from the air is part of warfare. Combatants who wear civilian clothing or who operate from sanctuaries are not excused from risk. Compare drone strikes to the feckless 1998 cruise missile attack on bin Laden. Drone strikes work; that is why our opponents object to them. If the host governments are cognizant and accepting (even if this is not public), if the laws of armed conflict limiting egregious attacks on civilians are observed, drone strikes are an acceptable use of force.

#### No impact- market adaptation

**Gholz et al., Texas public affairs professor, 2010**

(Eugene, “Protecting “The Prize”: Oil and the U.S. National Interest”, Security Studies, Summer, ebsco, ldg)

Each day, twenty-four million barrels of crude are pumped from the Persian Gulf region, most of which are loaded onto supertankers to feed refineries around the world.8 The immediate effect of a major supply disruption in the Gulf would leave one or more consumers wondering where their next expected oil delivery will come from. But the oil market, like most others, adjusts to shocks via a variety of mechanisms. These adaptations do not require careful coordination, unusually wise stewardship, or benign motives. Individuals’ drive for profit triggers most of them. The details of each oil shock are unique, so each crisis triggers a different mix of adaptations. Some adjustments would begin within hours of a disruption; others would take weeks or longer to implement. Similarly, some could only supply the market for short periods of time, and others could be sustained indefinitely. But the net result of the adaptations softens the disruptions’ effects on consumers.

#### Domestic political fights over secession trigger instability that spreads-AFF can’t resolve it

**Carvajal, Exeter Islamic and Arab studies PhD candidate, 2013**

(Fernando, “Military Restructuring in Yemen Opens a Second Power Vacuum: Part 2”, 4-26, <http://www.fairobserver.com/article/military-restructuring-yemen-opens-second-power-vacuum-part-2>, ldg)

Infighting within the armed forces goes beyond negotiations leading to presidential decrees. Conflicts extend to clashes among military units occupying the same military base or streets. Turf wars directly affect ordinary soldiers who fear losing their job or place in the hierarchy as a result of changes in command. Army units under commanders with links to Ali Abdullah Saleh increase their animosity toward troops from the Ministry of Interior, perceived as being under the influence of al-Islah. Conflicts are erupting between army units or military and law enforcement units in areas like Rada and Taiz. In the south, where jihadists seem to benefit from ongoing calls for secession, as recently commented by The Economist, the situation is increasingly ripe for a protracted armed conflict that may engulf Yemen and spread to neighboring countries. While secessionist leaders deal with increasing pressure from the population to escalate beyond protest and sit-ins, people in Abyan are growing dissatisfied by the government’s inability to fill the vacuum created after Ansar al-Shaira militants were defeated in June 2012. Even though Ansar al-Sharia lacks a strategy to recall its fighters and engage the tribal Popular Committees now guarding most of southern Abyan province, journalist Abd al-Razeq al-Jamal says residents of cities like Jaar and Zinjibar reminisce over perceptions of stability and order under the authority of Ansar al-Sharia from March 2011 to June 2012. This is of concern as militants are now present outside al-Anad in Lahj province, outside Rada in al-Baydha and spreading throughout Hadhramawt in the east. Such widespread presence by Sunni Islamist militants in southern territories will present a second front for secessionists who already experienced the conflict once — as Arab-Afghans were recruited to fight southerners during the 1994 Civil War. In northern areas, government forces remain unable to exercise authority in the Houthi-controlled Sadah province, militias clash in Hajja and tribes have moved toward the Saudi border to put further pressure on Sana’a and its relations with Saudi Arabia. In December 2012, Yemen’s army moved into Surwah, the Mareb province, against Sheikh al-Mu’alli and known al-Qaeda operatives living in the area. The operation led to violent clashes, with houses being destroyed and a number of foreign fighters captured. As it is common with such operations against tribal elements in Mareb, allies of al-Mu’alli joined the fight and continue to disrupt security in the province. In the same month, the army also moved against elements of Ansar al-Sharia in southern al-Baydha province. The initial motive behind this operation was a rescue attempt of foreigners kidnapped in Sana’a who were believed to be held in the area. Militants have gained strength in al-Baydha once again as a result of an alliance with the al-Dhahab family, involved in the attempt to establish an Islamic Emirate in Rada in early 2012. Growing instability now plagues areas previously without a history of such armed militancy or banditry. The resurgence of tribal forces in the southern province of Taiz is now blamed for increasing insecurity. The provincial governor, Shawqi Ahmed Anam, has been unable to deal with resistance from political forces, which grew from the 2011 crisis. Universities continue to be closed, the economy continues on a downward spiral and people fear vigilantism and revenge conflicts. Sources also indicate that the neighboring province of Ibb, a green and otherwise highly productive region of central Yemen, is now a point of gravity for Islamist militants. Unconfirmed reports by observers indicate military units now include recruits from among such elements in various areas of Ibb. The authority vacuum in such areas grows from internal fighting in the armed forces and a broken chain of command. In Taiz, insiders admit orders from the governor are often ignored and officers refuse to answers phone calls. Tribal elements, believed to have ‘guarded the revolution’ in 2011, are now demanding rewards for their role and obstruct the work of civil authorities.

#### Private inventories solve the impact

**Gholz et al., Texas public affairs professor, 2010**

(Eugene, “Protecting “The Prize”: Oil and the U.S. National Interest”, Security Studies, Summer, ebsco, ldg)

Commercial firms hold large private inventories of oil, which help shield global markets from supply shocks.20 The amount of oil in commercial stockpiles varies with market conditions, but commercial stocks in the United States alone often hold between one and two billion barrels—that is, they are roughly twice as large as U.S. government stockpiles (described below).21 In normal times, companies use their private stocks to smooth out the day-to-day fluctuation in oil deliveries and to account for routine delays caused by weather, small-scale accidents, labor unrest, or political disruptions. 22 But the private inventories, held by companies as part of their prudent normal operations, also provide a valuable buffer for the global economy. Much like oil exporters, inventory holders are potential suppliers in the market. They are just suppliers who pump oil out of storage tanks rather than out of geologically determined underground reservoirs. For example, a flare-up of violence in Nigeria could remove up to two million barrels a day from global markets. In such a contingency, prices would rise, and firms would have an incentive to tap their inventories. The inventory holders might consume oil directly from their own stocks, or they might sell oil from their stocks to other consumers. Either way, they would in essence put oil back on the market, compensating for the disruption. The existence of privately owned storage space does not always mitigate short-term disruptions. If buyers expect conditions to worsen after an initial shock, they may react by increasing their holdings or hoarding, rather than by selling from inventory.23 Consequently, global demand for oil may sometimes increase in the middle of a crisis, sharply driving up prices. Some of this hoarding behavior may be irrational, based on unfounded fears, but when buyers calculate that a shock presages a higher rate of disruptions in the future, some of that behavior is rational. Hoarding can even benefit consumers: if the hoarders are right and the supply shocks recur, that hoarded oil will be available, allowing those with large stocks to use them or sell them, putting oil back on the market. Overall, shortages and increased prices tend to draw stockpiled inventories into the market. As a result, the massive private inventories act as shock absorbers for the companies holding them, and they also smooth the ride for the global economy.

#### China won’t get in a naval conflict

**Holmes, Naval War College strategy professor, 2012**

(James, “The Sino-Japanese Naval War of 2012”, 8-20, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/08/20/the_sino_japanese_naval_war_of_2012?page=0,1>, DOA: 10-16-12, ldg)

Whoever forges sea, land, and air forces into the sharpest weapon of sea combat stands a good chance of prevailing. That could be Japan if its political and military leaders think creatively, procure the right hardware, and arrange it on the map for maximum effect. After all, Japan doesn’t need to defeat China’s military in order to win a showdown at sea, because it already holds the contested real estate; all it needs to do is deny China access. If Northeast Asian seas became a no-man’s land but Japanese forces hung on, the political victory would be Tokyo’s. Japan also enjoys the luxury of concentrating its forces at home, whereas the PLA Navy is dispersed into three fleets spread along China’s lengthy coastline. Chinese commanders face a dilemma: If they concentrate forces to amass numerical superiority during hostilities with Japan, they risk leaving other interests uncovered. It would hazardous for Beijing to leave, say, the South China Sea unguarded during a conflict in the northeast. And finally, Chinese leaders would be forced to consider how far a marine war would set back their sea-power project. China has staked its economic and diplomatic future in large part on a powerful oceangoing navy. In December 2006, President Hu Jintao ordered PLA commanders to construct “a powerful people’s navy” that could defend the nation’s maritime lifelines — in particular sea lanes that connect Indian Ocean energy exporters with users in China — “at any time.” That takes lots of ships. If it lost much of the fleet in a Sino-Japanese clash — even in a winning effort — Beijing could see its momentum toward world-power status reversed in an afternoon. Here’s hoping China’s political and military leaders understand all this. If so, the Great Sino-Japanese Naval War of 2012 won’t be happening outside these pages.

## Modeling

#### No tension escalation or it’s inevitable – drones are already being used and no aff evidence says they’ll use military drones, only surveillance

#### No South China conflict-engagement will check miscalc and mistrust

**Thayer, New South Wales emeritus professor, 2013**

(Carlyle, “Why China and the US won’t go to war over the South China Sea”, 5-13, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/05/13/why-china-and-the-us-wont-go-to-war-over-the-south-china-sea/>, ldg)

China’s increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea is challenging US primacy in the Asia Pacific. Even before Washington announced its official policy of rebalancing its force posture to the Asia Pacific, the United States had undertaken steps to strengthen its military posture by deploying more nuclear attack submarines to the region and negotiating arrangements with Australia to rotate Marines through Darwin.Since then, the United States has deployed Combat Littoral Ships to Singapore and is negotiating new arrangements for greater military access to the Philippines. But these developments do not presage armed conflict between China and the United States. The People’s Liberation Army Navy has been circumspect in its involvement in South China Sea territorial disputes, and the United States has been careful to avoid being entrapped by regional allies in their territorial disputes with China. Armed conflict between China and the United States in the South China Sea appears unlikely. Another, more probable, scenario is that both countries will find a modus vivendi enabling them to collaborate to maintain security in the South China Sea. The Obama administration has repeatedly emphasised that its policy of rebalancing to Asia is not directed at containing China. For example, Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III, Commander of the US Pacific Command, recently stated, ‘there has also been criticism that the Rebalance is a strategy of containment. This is not the case … it is a strategy of collaboration and cooperation’. However, a review of past US–China military-to-military interaction indicates that an agreement to jointly manage security in the South China Sea is unlikely because of continuing strategic mistrust between the two countries. This is also because the currents of regionalism are growing stronger. As such, a third scenario is more likely than the previous two: that China and the United States will maintain a relationship of cooperation and friction. In this scenario, both countries work separately to secure their interests through multilateral institutions such as the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus and the Enlarged ASEAN Maritime Forum. But they also continue to engage each other on points of mutual interest. The Pentagon has consistently sought to keep channels of communication open with China through three established bilateral mechanisms: Defense Consultative Talks, the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA), and the Defense Policy Coordination Talks. On the one hand, these multilateral mechanisms reveal very little about US–China military relations. Military-to-military contacts between the two countries have gone through repeated cycles of cooperation and suspension, meaning that it has not been possible to isolate purely military-to-military contacts from their political and strategic settings. On the other hand, the channels have accomplished the following: continuing exchange visits by high-level defence officials; regular Defense Consultation Talks; continuing working-level discussions under the MMCA; agreement on the ‘7-point consensus’; and no serious naval incidents since the 2009 USNS Impeccable affair. They have also helped to ensure continuing exchange visits by senior military officers; the initiation of a Strategic Security Dialogue as part of the ministerial-level Strategic & Economic Dialogue process; agreement to hold meetings between coast guards; and agreement on a new working group to draft principles to establish a framework for military-to-military cooperation. So the bottom line is that, despite ongoing frictions in their relationship, the United States and China will continue engaging with each other. Both sides understand that military-to-military contacts are a critical component of bilateral engagement. Without such interaction there is a risk that mistrust between the two militaries could spill over and have a major negative impact on bilateral relations in general. But strategic mistrust will probably persist in the absence of greater transparency in military-to-military relations. In sum, Sino-American relations in the South China Sea are more likely to be characterised by cooperation and friction than a modus vivendi of collaboration or, a worst-case scenario, armed conflict.

CP Text

#### Diplomatic and political costs constrain their use---deterrence still applies

Singh 12 (Joseph Singh is a researcher at the Center for a New American Security. “Betting Against a Drone Arms Race,” http://nation.time.com/2012/08/13/betting-against-a-drone-arms-race/)

Bold predictions of a coming drones arms race are all the rage since the uptake in their deployment under the Obama Administration. Noel Sharkey, for example, argues in an August 3 op-ed for the Guardian that rapidly developing drone technology — coupled with minimal military risk — portends an era in which states will become increasingly aggressive in their use of drones. As drones develop the ability to fly completely autonomously, Sharkey predicts a proliferation of their use that will set dangerous precedents, seemingly inviting hostile nations to use drones against one another. Yet, the narrow applications of current drone technology coupled with what we know about state behavior in the international system lend no credence to these ominous warnings. Indeed, critics seem overly-focused on the domestic implications of drone use. In a June piece for the Financial Times, Michael Ignatieff writes that “virtual technologies make it easier for democracies to wage war because they eliminate the risk of blood sacrifice that once forced democratic peoples to be prudent.” Significant public support for the Obama Administration’s increasing deployment of drones would also seem to legitimate this claim. Yet, there remain equally serious diplomatic and political costs that emanate from beyond a fickle electorate, which will prevent the likes of the increased drone aggression predicted by both Ignatieff and Sharkey. Most recently, the serious diplomatic scuffle instigated by Syria’s downing a Turkish reconnaissance plane in June illustrated the very serious risks of operating any aircraft in foreign territory. States launching drones must still weigh the diplomatic and political costs of their actions, which make the calculation surrounding their use no fundamentally different to any other aerial engagement. This recent bout also illustrated a salient point regarding drone technology: most states maintain at least minimal air defenses that can quickly detect and take down drones, as the U.S. discovered when it employed drones at the onset of the Iraq invasion, while Saddam Hussein’s surface-to-air missiles were still active. What the U.S. also learned, however, was that drones constitute an effective military tool in an extremely narrow strategic context. They are well-suited either in direct support of a broader military campaign, or to conduct targeted killing operations against a technologically unsophisticated enemy. In a nutshell, then, the very contexts in which we have seen drones deployed. Northern Pakistan, along with a few other regions in the world, remain conducive to drone usage given a lack of air defenses, poor media coverage, and difficulties in accessing the region. Non-state actors, on the other hand, have even more reasons to steer clear of drones: – First, they are wildly expensive. At $15 million, the average weaponized drone is less costly than an F-16 fighter jet, yet much pricier than the significantly cheaper, yet equally damaging options terrorist groups could pursue. – Those alternatives would also be relatively more difficult to trace back to an organization than an unmanned aerial vehicle, with all the technical and logistical planning its operation would pose. – Weaponized drones are not easily deployable. Most require runways in order to be launched, which means that any non-state actor would likely require state sponsorship to operate a drone. Such sponsorship is unlikely given the political and diplomatic consequences the sponsoring state would certainly face. – Finally, drones require an extensive team of on-the-ground experts to ensure their successful operation. According to the U.S. Air Force, 168 individuals are needed to operate a Predator drone, including a pilot, maintenance personnel and surveillance analysts. In short, the doomsday drone scenario Ignatieff and Sharkey predict results from an excessive focus on rapidly-evolving military technology. Instead, we must return to what we know about state behavior in an anarchistic international order. Nations will confront the same principles of deterrence, for example, when deciding to launch a targeted killing operation regardless of whether they conduct it through a drone or a covert amphibious assault team. Drones may make waging war more domestically palatable, but they don’t change the very serious risks of retaliation for an attacking state. Any state otherwise deterred from using force abroad will not significantly increase its power projection on account of acquiring drones. What’s more, the very states whose use of drones could threaten U.S. security – countries like China – are not democratic, which means that the possible political ramifications of the low risk of casualties resulting from drone use are irrelevant. For all their military benefits, putting drones into play requires an ability to meet the political and security risks associated with their use. Despite these realities, there remain a host of defensible arguments one could employ to discredit the Obama drone strategy. The legal justification for targeted killings in areas not internationally recognized as war zones is uncertain at best. Further, the short-term gains yielded by targeted killing operations in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, while debilitating to Al Qaeda leadership in the short-term, may serve to destroy already tenacious bilateral relations in the region and radicalize local populations. Yet, the past decade’s experience with drones bears no evidence of impending instability in the global strategic landscape. Conflict may not be any less likely in the era of drones, but the nature of 21st Century warfare remains fundamentally unaltered despite their arrival in large numbers.

#### Can’t solve Boyle impact – their evidence indicates traditional stabilizing factors have been underwritten and radically reshaped – means norms and international law won’t constrain the drones arms race

#### China won’t use drones irresponsible---they see it as short sited

Erickson and Strange 13 (ANDREW ERICKSON is an associate professor at the Naval War College and an Associate in Research at Harvard University’s Fairbank Center. Follow him on Twitter @andrewserickson. AUSTIN STRANGE is a researcher at the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute and a graduate student at Zhejiang University. “China Has Drones. Now What?,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139405/andrew-erickson-and-austin-strange/china-has-drones-now-what?page=show)

Beijing, however, is unlikely to use its drones lightly. It already faces tremendous criticism from much of the international community for its perceived brazenness in continental and maritime sovereignty disputes. With its leaders attempting to allay notions that China’s rise poses a threat to the region, injecting drones conspicuously into these disputes would prove counterproductive. China also fears setting a precedent for the use of drones in East Asian hotspots that the United States could eventually exploit. For now, Beijing is showing that it understands these risks, and to date it has limited its use of drones in these areas to surveillance, according to recent public statements from China’s Defense Ministry.

#### Tech isn’t the key---no one has the human capital or intel to conduct wide scale drone operations

Boyle 12 (Ashley, is an Adjunct Junior Fellow at the American Security Project, “The US and its UAVs: Addressing Legality and Overblown Scenarios,” http://americansecurityproject.org/blog/2012/the-us-and-its-uavs-addressing-legality-and-overblown-scenarios/)

While there is no question that the US has used drones, it is hardly alone in wielding the technology. Approximately fifty nations possess and use drones. However, Wikipedia informs us that of these nations, only twelve have lethal drones of which only three nations – China, Iran, and Russia – may be of concern. Possessing the technology is only one part of the picture. Nations must also have the capabilities to maintain and operate these aircraft, as well as an intelligence network that informs their surveillance or strike activities. The supporting systems required to operate drones is greatly underestimated, and it is difficult to see China, Iran, or Russia having the resources or desire to launch expansive drone programs in the short- to mid-term. While the long-term picture always requires discussion, alarmist messages about impending drone wars are just that: alarming and unfounded.

#### Norms fail---if countries really need to use drones they will regardless of US code

Lerner 13 (Ben, is Vice President for Government Relations at the Center for Security Policy in Washington, D.C. “Judging ‘Drones’ From Afar,” http://spectator.org/archives/2013/03/25/judging-drones-from-afar/1

Whatever the potential motivations for trying to codify international rules for using UAVs, such a move would be ill advised. While in theory, every nation that signs onto a treaty governing UAVs will be bound by its requirements, it is unlikely to play out this way in practice. It strains credulity to assume that China, Russia, Iran, and other non-democratic actors will not selectively apply (at best) such rules to themselves while using them as a cudgel with which to bash their rivals and score political points. The United States and its democratic allies, meanwhile, are more likely to adhere to the commitments for which they signed up. The net result: we are boxed in as far as our own self-defense, while other nations with less regard for the rule of law go use their UAVs to take out whomever, whenever, contorting said “rules” as they see fit. One need only look at China’s manipulation of the Law of the Sea Treaty to justify its vast territorial claims at the expense of its neighbors to see how this often plays out. And who would enforce the treaty’s rules — a third party tribunal? Would it be an apparatus of the United Nations, the same U.N. that assures us that it is not coming after the United States or its allies specifically, even as its investigation takes on as its “immediate focus” UAV operations recently conducted by those countries? The United States already conducts warfare under the norms of centuries of practice of customary international law in areas such as military necessity and proportionality, as well as the norms to which we committed ourselves when we became party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the United Nations Charter. These same rules can adequately cover the use of UAVs in the international context. But if the United States were to create or agree to a separate international regime for UAVs, we would subject ourselves to new, politicized “rules” that would needlessly hold back countries that already use UAVs responsibly, while empowering those that do not.

# 2NC

## Topicality

### 2NC OV

#### Broad interpretations cause unmanageable research burdens

Taylor III, now a JD from William and Mary, 2005

(Jarred, “Searching for a More Perfect Union,” https://docs.google.com/document/d/1ypiOXjRVPWzNxDsFVJ0S1n-QfIGtXzp7Y59meEwd-bE/edit?hl=en\_US)

**It would take even the most seasoned scholar years of research and hundreds of pages to** adequately **analyze** the development of **any presidential power** over the course of American history; **war power is** certainly **no exception**. Every President since George Washington has interpreted the martial prerogatives of his office in different ways, and most have set some sort of precedent for succeeding officeholders. Nevertheless, some of the major changes in executive military power bear highlighting.

### Interpretation Cards – 2NC

There's a clear brightline---restrictions sets a ceiling--- not just process

USCA 77, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, 564 F.2d 292, 1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 10899,. 1978 Fire & Casualty Cases (CCH) P317

Continental argues that even if the Aetna and Continental policies provide coverage for the Cattuzzo accident, that coverage should [\*\*8] be limited to a total of $300,000 because Atlas agreed to procure "not less than" $300,000 coverage. The District Court properly found that the subcontract language does not support a restriction on the terms of Continental's policy because the subcontract only sets a floor, not a ceiling, for coverage.

Restrictions on authority are distinct from conditions

William Conner 78, former federal judge for the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York United States District Court, S. D. New York, CORPORACION VENEZOLANA de FOMENTO v. VINTERO SALES, http://www.leagle.com/decision/19781560452FSupp1108\_11379

Plaintiff next contends that Merban was charged with notice of the restrictions on the authority of plaintiff's officers to execute the guarantees. Properly interpreted, the "conditions" that had been imposed by plaintiff's Board of Directors and by the Venezuelan Cabinet were not "restrictions" or "limitations" upon the authority of plaintiff's agents but rather conditions precedent to the granting of authority. Essentially, then, plaintiff's argument is that Merban should have known that plaintiff's officers were not authorized to act except upon the fulfillment of the specified conditions.

### Increase – 2NC

Increase means from a baseline

Rogers 5 Judge, STATE OF NEW YORK, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RESPONDENT, NSR MANUFACTURERS ROUNDTABLE, ET AL., INTERVENORS, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 12378, \*\*; 60 ERC (BNA) 1791, 6/24, lexis

 [\*\*48]  Statutory Interpretation. [HN16](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=1fe428155fdfc9074f3623f0dae9d78a&docnum=14&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAW&_md5=0ebd338d6a7793de8561db53b915effd&focBudTerms=term%20increase&focBudSel=all#clscc16)While the CAA defines a "modification" as any physical or operational change that "increases" emissions, it is silent on how to calculate such "increases" in emissions. [42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4)](http://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=8541fbf7a7f5554ca588059b132acd17&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b367%20U.S.%20App.%20D.C.%203%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=4&_butStat=0&_butNum=103&_butInline=1&_butinfo=42%20U.S.C.%207411&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=14&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAW&_md5=1f89a0e47b1996a5400e8d865d8da08a). According to government petitioners, the lack of a statutory definition does not render the term "increases" ambiguous, but merely compels the court to give the term its "ordinary meaning." See [Engine Mfrs.Ass'nv.S.Coast AirQualityMgmt.Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 124 S. Ct. 1756, 1761, 158 L. Ed. 2d 529(2004)](http://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=8541fbf7a7f5554ca588059b132acd17&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b367%20U.S.%20App.%20D.C.%203%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_butNum=104&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b541%20U.S.%20246%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=14&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAW&_md5=48f016ea3eabfdb898b67b348b11662c); [Bluewater Network, 370 F.3d at 13](http://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=8541fbf7a7f5554ca588059b132acd17&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b367%20U.S.%20App.%20D.C.%203%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_butNum=105&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b370%20F.3d%201%2cat%2013%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=14&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAW&_md5=78fdfe9d48c7b91d7659b90c0198707e); [Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Glickman, 342 U.S. App. D.C. 7, 215 F.3d 7, 10 [\*23]  (D.C. Cir. 2000)](http://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=8541fbf7a7f5554ca588059b132acd17&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b367%20U.S.%20App.%20D.C.%203%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_butNum=106&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b342%20U.S.%20App.%20D.C.%207%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=14&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAW&_md5=fb18ff0b92931ac00621d88dae997e67). Relying on two "real world" analogies, government petitioners contend that the ordinary meaning of "increases" requires the baseline to be calculated from a period immediately preceding the change. They maintain, for example, that in determining whether a high-pressure weather system "increases" the local temperature, the relevant baseline is the temperature immediately preceding the arrival of the weather system, not the temperature five or ten years ago. Similarly,  [\*\*49]  in determining whether a new engine "increases" the value of a car, the relevant baseline is the value of the car immediately preceding the replacement of the engine, not the value of the car five or ten years ago when the engine was in perfect condition.

### AT: Reasonability

#### Reasonability is impossible – it’s arbitrary and undermines research and preparation

Resnick, assistant professor of political science – Yeshiva University, ‘1

(Evan, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, Iss. 2)

In matters of national security, establishing a clear definition of terms is a precondition for effective policymaking. Decisionmakers who invoke critical terms in an erratic, ad hoc fashion risk alienating their constituencies. They also risk exacerbating misperceptions and hostility among those the policies target. Scholars who commit the same error undercut their ability to conduct valuable empirical research. Hence, if scholars and policymakers fail rigorously to define "engagement," they undermine the ability to build an effective foreign policy.

## XO

### 2NC JMU-A2: Congress Key

**Plan makes strikes more accountable and prevents abuses**

**Zenko, 13**

(Micah Zenko is the Douglas Dillon Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). He currently serves as vice chair of the World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council on Terrorism. Previously, he worked for five years at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, and in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service, and State Department's Office of Policy Planning. “Transferring CIA Drone Strikes to the Pentagon.” Date made April 16, 2013. Date retrieved August 14, 2013. <http://www.cfr.org/drones/transferring-cia-drone-strikes-pentagon/p30434>)

U.S. targeted killings are needlessly made complex and opaque by their division between two separate entities: JSOC and the CIA. Although drone strikes carried out by the two organizations presumably target the same people, the organizations have different authorities, policies, accountability mechanisms, and oversight. Splitting the drone program between the JSOC and CIA is apparently intended to allow the plausible deniability of CIA strikes. Strikes by the CIA are classified as Title 50 covert actions, defined as "activities of the United States Government . . . where it is intended that the role . . . will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but does not include traditional . . . military activities." As covert operations, the government cannot legally provide any information about how the CIA conducts targeted killings, while JSOC operations are guided by Title 10 "armed forces" operations and a publicly available military doctrine. Joint Publication 3-60, Joint Targeting, details steps in the joint targeting cycle, including the processes, responsibilities, and collateral damage estimations intended to reduce the likelihood of civilian casualties. Unlike strikes carried out by the CIA, JSOC operations can be (and are) acknowledged by the U.S. government. The different reporting requirements of JSOC and the CIA mean that congressional oversight of U.S. targeted killings is similarly murky. Sometimes oversight is duplicated among the committees; at other times, there is confusion over who is mandated to oversee which operations. CIA drone strikes are reported to the intelligence committees. Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), has confirmed that the SSCI receives poststrike notifications, reviews video footage, and holds monthly meetings to "question every aspect of the program." Representative Mike Rogers (R-MI), chair of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), has said that he reviews both CIA and JSOC counterterrorism airstrikes. JSOC does not report to the HPSCI. As of March 2012, all JSOC counterterrorism operations are reported quarterly to the armed services committees. Meanwhile, the foreign relations committees—tasked with overseeing all U.S. foreign policy and counterterrorism strategies—have formally requested briefings on drone strikes that have been repeatedly denied by the White House. However, oversight should not be limited to ensuring compliance with the law and preventing abuses, but rather expanded to ensure that policies are consistent with strategic objectives and aligned with other ongoing military and diplomatic activities. This can only be accomplished by DOD operations because the foreign relations committees cannot hold hearings on covert CIA drone strikes.

#### And, their Zenko evidence is really really neg-

**Shift to DOD solves**

Zenko, 13

(Micah Zenko, the Douglas Dillon Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). He currently serves as vice chair of the World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council on Terrorism. Previously, he worked for five years at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, and in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service, and State Department's Office of Policy Planning, Council on Foreign Relations, Center for Preventive Care, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies,” January 2013, Council Special Report No. 65, 6/15/13, EGM)

**The president should direct that U.S. drone strikes be conducted as DOD Title 10 operations. That decision would enhance U.S. national security** in the following ways: **Improve the transparency and legitimacy of targeted killings,** including what methods are used to prevent civilian harm**. Focus the finite resources of the CIA on its original core missions** of intelligence collection, analysis, and early warning. (There is no reason for the CIA to maintain a redundant fleet of armed drones, or to conduct military operations that are inherently better suited to JSOC, the premier specialized military organization. As "traditional military activities" under U.S. law, these belong under Title 10 operations.) **Place all drone strikes under a single international legal framework, which would be clearly delineated for military operations and can therefore be articulated publicly. Unify congressional oversight** of specific operations under the armed services committee, which would end the current situation whereby there is confusion over who has oversight responsibility. **Allow U.S. government officials to counter myths and misinformation about targeted killings at home and abroad** **by acknowledging responsibility for its own strikes. Increase pressure on other states to be more transparent in their own conduct** of military and paramilitary operations in nonbattlefield settings **by establishing the precedent that the Obama administration claims can have a normative influence on how others use drones**

#### A. It severs congressional action

Kershner-JD Candidate, Cardoza-10 (Joshua, Articles Editor, Cardozo Law Review. J.D. Candidate (June 2011), Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, “Political Party Restrictions and the Appointments Clause: The Federal Election Commission's Appointments Process Is Constitutional” Cardozo Law Review de novo 2010 Cardozo L. Rev. De Novo 615)

n17 The phrase "statutory restrictions" is used hereinafter to mean statutory language that restricts the President's powers of nomination and appointment to those individuals meeting specific criteria. Examples include gender, state of residence, and most importantly political party. n18 Since 1980, more than one hundred Presidential signing statements have specifically mentioned the Appointments Clause. See The Public Papers of the Presidents, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws (search for "Appointments Clause"). n19 These signing statements typically invoke the authority of the Appointments Clause to argue that statutory restrictions on appointment or removal of Officers of the United States are merely advisory. For numerous examples, see id. See also infra note 175. n20 The phrase "hyper-partisan atmosphere" has been frequently used by the news media and commentators to describe the political gridlock in Washington during the first years of the Obama administration. See, e.g., Eric Moskowitz, Hundreds Brave Cold to Hear From Scott Brown, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 29, 2010, http://www.boston.com/news/local/breaking\_news/2010/01/scores\_wait\_for.html (reporting on then Senator-Elect Scott Brown explaining that "he felt the hyper-partisan atmosphere in Washington was already changing as a result of his election" ten days earlier); Editorial, Bayh Bailout No Cause to Mourn Moderation, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Feb. 17, 2010, at H, available at http://www.ocregister.com/opinion/bayh-234673-sen-one.html (describing Senator Bayh's verbal attacks on the operation of the Senate after announcing his decision not to run for reelection as "using the occasion to decry the hyperpartisan atmosphere in Washington"). n21 As political battles over delays in approving Presidential nominations continue to be the norm, it is progressively more likely that Presidents will seek to bypass the Senate in the nomination process. This could include recess appointments bypassing both the "advice and consent" of the Senate, as well as any statutory restrictions. See, e.g., Scott Wilson, Obama Considers Recess Appointments, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2010 ("President Obama is considering recess appointments to fill some or all of the nominations held up in the Senate. President Bush used a recess appointment to make John Bolton the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations bypassing Democrats."). n22 Statutory restrictions date back to the first Congress and continue today. See infra notes 116, 118, 122. n23 See discussion infra Part I.D and note 128. n24 The phrase "political party restrictions" is used hereinafter to mean statutory restrictions on the President's powers of nomination and appointment by political party.

### 2NC Legislation Spillover

#### Executive orders can give momentum to legislation, while avoiding spending capital fighting over policy – civil rights orders prove

NYT 7/5/2K Marc Lacey Blocked by Congress, Clinton Wields a Pen

Congress appears intent on denying President Clinton major legislative victories in his final months of office, but White House officials say they will continue drafting and carrying out policies, Congress or no Congress, until Mr. Clinton's final day. Through executive orders, memorandums, proclamations, regulations and other flexing of presidential power, Mr. Clinton has already put in effect a host of measures concerning the environment, health care and civil rights. And with the presidential campaign in high gear, and the Republican-controlled Congress not inclined to give Democrats any boost, Mr. Clinton's aides intend to continue making policy by decree -- putting federal land off limits to development, reorganizing government agencies, tightening pollution control rules and pushing other measures that would otherwise stand little chance of congressional passage. Mr. Clinton has been especially frustrated that many of his nominees for judgeships, ambassadorships and other posts have failed to be confirmed by the Senate. But he is not surrendering in that area either. If Congress fails to act on some of the nominations later this month, White House aides say they expect the president to make recess appointments in August that would require no Congressional approval. "This president will be signing executive orders right up until the morning of Jan. 20, 2001," said Bruce N. Reed, the president's domestic policy adviser. "In our experience, when the administration takes executive action, it not only leads to results while the political process is stuck in neutral, but it often spurs Congress to follow suit."

### 2NC Perception-International

#### Presidential action is perceived globally

Sunstein-prof law, Chicago- 95 [Cass, Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Chicago Law School and Department of Political Science, “An Eighteenth Century Presidency in a Twenty-First Century World” Arkansas Law Review, 48 Ark. L. Rev. 1, Lexis]

With the emergence of the United States as a world power, the President's foreign affairs authority has become far more capacious than was originally anticipated. For the most part this is because the powers originally conferred on the President have turned out - in light of the unanticipated position of the United States in the world - to mean much more than anyone would have thought. The constitutionally granted authorities have led to a great deal of unilateral authority, simply because the United States is so central an actor on the world scene. The posture of the President means a great deal even if the President acts clearly within the scope of his constitutionally-granted power. Indeed, mere words from the President, at a press conference or during an interview, can have enormous consequences for the international community.

### Do both

#### Don’t link

#### Only Congressional moves to reclaim war power authority triggers the DA

**Howell, Chicago American politics professor, 9-3-13**

(William, “All Syria Policy Is Local”, [www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/09/03/all\_syria\_policy\_is\_local\_obama\_congress?page=full](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/09/03/all_syria_policy_is_local_obama_congress?page=full), ldg)

From a political standpoint, seeking congressional approval for a limited military strike against the Syrian regime, as President Barack Obama on Saturday announced he would do, made lots of sense. And let's be clear, this call has everything to do with political considerations, and close to nothing to do with a newfound commitment to constitutional fidelity. The first reason is eminently local. Obama has proved perfectly willing to exercise military force without an express authorization, as he did in Libya -just as he has expanded and drawn down military forces in Afghanistan, withdrawn from Iraq, significantly expanded the use of drone strikes, and waged a largely clandestine war on terrorism with little congressional involvement. The totality of Obama's record, which future presidents may selectively cite as precedent, hardly aligns with a plain reading of the war powers described in the first two articles of the constitution. Obama isn't new in this regard. Not since World War II has Congress declared a formal war. And since at least the Korean War, which President Harry Truman conveniently called a "police action," commanders-in-chief have waged all sorts of wars -small and large -without Congress's prior approval. Contemporary debates about Congress's constitutional obligations on matters involving war have lost a good deal of their luster. Constitutional law professors continue to rail against the gross imbalances of power that characterize our politics, and members of whichever party happens to be in opposition can be counted on to decry the abuses of war powers propagated by the president. But these criticisms -no matter their interpretative validity -rarely gain serious political traction. Too often they appear as arguments of convenience, duly cited in the lead-up to war, but serving primarily as footnotes rather than banner headlines in the larger case against military action. Obama's recent decision to seek congressional approval is not going to upend a half-century of practice that has shifted the grounds of military decision-making decisively in the president's favor, any more than it is going to imbue the ample war powers outlined in Article I with newfound relevance and meaning. For that to happen, Congress itself must claim for itself its constitutional powers regarding war. Obama did not seek Congress's approval because on that Friday stroll on the White House lawn he suddenly remembered his Con Law teaching notes from his University of Chicago days. He did so for political reasons. Or more exactly, he did so to force members of Congress to go on the record today in order to mute their criticisms tomorrow. And let's be clear, Congress -for all its dysfunction and gridlock -still has the capacity to kick up a good dust storm over the human and financial costs of military operations. Constitutional musings from Capitol Hill -of the sort a handful of Democrats and Republicans engaged in this past week -rarely back the president into a political corner. The mere prospect of members of Congress casting a bright light on the human tolls of war, however, will catch any president's attention. Through hearings, public speeches, investigations, and floor debates, members of Congress can fix the media's attention -and with it, the public's -on the costs of war, which can have political repercussions both at home and abroad. Think, then, about the stated reasons for some kind of military action in Syria. No one is under the illusion that a short, targeted strike is going to overturn the Assad regime and promptly restore some semblance of peace in the region. In the short term, the strike might actually exacerbate and prolong the conflict, making the eventual outcome even more uncertain. And even the best-planned, most-considered military action won't go exactly according to plan. Mishaps can occur, innocent lives may be lost, terrorists may be emboldened, and anti-American protests in the region will likely flare even hotter than they currently are. The core argument for a military strike, however, centers on the importance of strengthening international norms and laws on chemical and biological weapons, with the hope of deterring their future deployment. The Assad regime must be punished for having used chemical weapons, the argument goes, lest the next autocrat in power considering a similar course of action think he can do so with impunity. But herein lies the quandary. The most significant reasons for military action are abstract, largely hidden, and temporally distant. The potential downsides, though, are tangible, visible, and immediate. And in a domestic political world driven by visual imagery and the shortest of time horizons, it is reckless to pursue this sort of military action without some kind of political cover. Were Obama to proceed without congressional authorization, he would invite House Republicans to make all sorts of hay about his misguided, reckless foreign policy. But by putting the issue before Congress, these same Republicans either must explain why the use of chemical weapons against one's people does not warrant some kind of military intervention; or they must concede that some form of exacting punishment is needed. Both options present many of the same risks for members of Congress as they do for the president. But crucially, if they come around to supporting some form of military action -and they just might -members of Congress will have an awfully difficult time criticizing the president for the fallout. Will the decision on Saturday hamstring the president in the final few years of his term? I doubt it. Having gone to Congress on this crisis, must he do so on every future one? No. Consistency is hardly the hallmark of modern presidents in any policy domain, and certainly not military affairs. Sometimes presidents seek Congress's approval for military action, other times they request support for a military action that is already up and running, and occasionally they reject the need for any congressional consent at all. And for good or ill, it is virtually impossible to discern any clear principle that justifies their choices. The particulars of every specific crisis -its urgency, perceived threat to national interests, connection to related foreign policy developments, and what not -can be expected to furnish the president with ample justification for pursuing whichever route he would like. Like jurists who find in the facts of a particular dispute all the reasons they need for ignoring inconvenient prior case law, presidents can characterize contemporary military challenges in ways that render past ones largely irrelevant. Partisans and political commentators will point out the inconsistencies, but their objections are likely to be drowned out in rush to war. Obama's decision does not usher in a new era of presidential power, nor does it permanently remake the way we as a nation go to war. It reflects a temporary political calculation -and in my view, the right one -of a president in a particularly tough spot. Faced with a larger war he doesn't want, an immediate crisis with few good options, and yet a moral responsibility to act, he is justifiably expanding the circle of decision-makers. But don't count on it to remain open for especially long.

### 2NC Future Presidents Rollback

#### ---Political barriers check – new, stronger constituencies

Branum-Associate Fulbright and Jaworski- 2

Tara L, Associate, Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P, “President or King? The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders in Modern Day America” Journal of Legislation 28 J. Legis. 1

Congressmen and private citizens besiege the President with demands  [\*58]  that action be taken on various issues. [n273](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.689002.875983458&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220903297496&returnToKey=20_T4511783216&parent=docview" \l "n273) To make matters worse, once a president has signed an executive order, he often makes it impossible for a subsequent administration to undo his action without enduring the political fallout of such a reversal. For instance, President Clinton issued a slew of executive orders on environmental issues in the weeks before he left office. [n274](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.689002.875983458&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220903297496&returnToKey=20_T4511783216&parent=docview" \l "n274) Many were controversial and the need for the policies he instituted was debatable. [n275](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.689002.875983458&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220903297496&returnToKey=20_T4511783216&parent=docview" \l "n275) Nevertheless, President Bush found himself unable to reverse the orders without invoking the ire of environmentalists across the country. [n276](http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.689002.875983458&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220903297496&returnToKey=20_T4511783216&parent=docview" \l "n276) A policy became law by the action of one man without the healthy debate and discussion in Congress intended by the Framers. Subsequent presidents undo this policy and send the matter to Congress for such debate only at their own peril. This is not the way it is supposed to be.

### Oversight Fails

#### Oversight of drones is a joke – they don’t understand. Aff article.

Zenko 13 (Micah, is the Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)., “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies,” http://www.cfr.org/wars-and-warfare/reforming-us-drone-strike-policies/p29736)

Congressional oversight of drone strikes varies depending on whether the CIA or the U.S. military is the lead executive authority. The CIA, according to the chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senator Dianne Feinstein, meets its “fully and currently informed” legal obligations through “monthly in-depth oversight meetings to review strike records and question every aspect of the program.” 38 Individual JSOC strikes are not reported to the relevant armed services committees, but are covered under the broad special access program biannual reporting to Congress. According to senior staff members on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee, many of their peers have little understanding of how drone strikes are conducted within the countries for which they are responsible for exercising oversight. Even serving White House officials and members of Congress repeatedly make inaccurate statements about U.S. targeted killings and appear to be unaware of how policies have changed over the past decade.39 At the same time, the judiciary committees have been repeatedly denied access to the June 2010 Office of Legal Counsel memorandum that presented the legal basis for the drone strike that killed U.S. citizen and alleged leader of AQAP Anwar al-Awlaki in September 2011.40 Finally, despite nearly ten years of nonbattlefield targeted killings, no congressional committee has conducted a hearing on any aspect of them.

## Yemen

### Terror

#### Terrorists will use conventional weapons-overwhelming empirics.

**Mauroni, Air Force senior policy analyst, 2012**

(Al, “Nuclear Terrorism: Are We Prepared?”, Homeland Security Affairs, <http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=8.1.9>, ldg)

The popular assumption is that terrorists are actively working with “rogue nations” to exploit WMD materials and technology, or bidding for materials and technology on some nebulous global black market. They might be buying access to scientists and engineers who used to work on state WMD programs. The historical record doesn’t demonstrate that. An examination of any of the past annual reports of the National Counterterrorism Center reveals that the basic modus operandi of terrorists and insurgents is to use conventional military weapons, easily acquired commercial (or improvised) explosives, and knives and machetes.8 It is relatively easy to train laypersons to use military firearms, such as the AK-47 automatic rifle and the RPG-7 rocket launcher. These groups have technical experts who develop improvised explosive devices using available and accessible materials from the local economy. Conventional weapons have known weapon effects and minimal challenges in handling and storing. Terrorists get their material and technology where they can. They don’t have the time, funds, or interests to get exotic. It’s what we see, over and over again.

#### No threat now-no capacity and focusing on local concerns

**Dilanian, Los Angeles Times, 2013**

(Ken, “With Al Qaeda shattered, U.S. counter-terrorism's future unclear”, 4-14, <http://articles.latimes.com/2013/apr/14/nation/la-na-al-qaeda-20130415>, ldg)

U.S. intelligence officials note that the most active Al Qaeda franchise still publicly aspires to attack the U.S. homeland. In 2009, the Yemen-based Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula failed in an effort to bomb a passenger jet over Detroit, and in 2010, it sought to send bomb-laden packages to two Jewish institutions in Chicago. Since then, however, a new Yemeni government and scores of U.S. drone strikes have gutted the group. Last year, Western intelligence agencies penetrated the Yemeni franchise with a double agent who helped thwart another plot to blow up an aircraft. A growing group of analysts and former government officials say the threat from Al Qaeda affiliates is overblown. Most terrorist groups are focused on local concerns, not on America, and have little or no ability to organize a broader plot. "To the best of our information, there is nobody out there with both the desire and the capabilities to cause any serious damage to the U.S. in any way at this moment," said Rosa Brooks, a former deputy assistant secretary of Defense. As Al Qaeda recedes as a direct threat, the CIA and special military forces appear to have throttled back on targeted killings. They have launched 16 drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen this year, according to the Long War Journal, which tracks reports of the attacks. That pace is much slower than in 2012, which saw 88 strikes over the course of the year.

## Modeling

### No Drone Prolif

#### US drone use can’t be used to justify illegal wars and their impact arguments are either inevitable or empirically denied due to other stealth aircraft

Leuck 13 (Paul, is a 2010 graduate of the University of Notre Dame“Drones: Why Americans Shouldn't Worry About Them,” http://www.policymic.com/articles/21556/drones-why-americans-shouldn-t-worry-about-them)

One commonly expressed concern about drones is that America is setting a dangerous standard by which other countries will conduct warfare. What if China decides to use drones to eliminate dissidents in neighboring countries? This sort of speculation falls flat for two reasons. First, in countries like Yemen and Pakistan, the United States has permission from those governments to use drones. Unless China secured similar agreements, such an action would be an act of war. Second, China already has manned aircraft that are perfectly capable of targeting dissidents if China so chose. Fear that a foreign power would use drones to attack American soil are even more far-fetched. Foreign drones, just like any other foreign military aircraft, would never be able to enter American airspace without being intercepted or shot down by U.S. air defenses.

#### Lerner – I’ll finish the card

The net result: we are boxed in as far as our own self-defense, while other nations with less regard for the rule of law go use their UAVs to take out whomever, whenever, contorting said “rules” as they see fit. One need only look at China’s manipulation of the Law of the Sea Treaty to justify its vast territorial claims at the expense of its neighbors to see how this often plays out. And who would enforce the treaty’s rules — a third party tribunal? Would it be an apparatus of the United Nations, the same U.N. that assures us that it is not coming after the United States or its allies specifically, even as its investigation takes on as its “immediate focus” UAV operations recently conducted by those countries? The United States already conducts warfare under the norms of centuries of practice of customary international law in areas such as military necessity and proportionality, as well as the norms to which we committed ourselves when we became party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the United Nations Charter. These same rules can adequately cover the use of UAVs in the international context. But if the United States were to create or agree to a separate international regime for UAVs, we would subject ourselves to new, politicized “rules” that would needlessly hold back countries that already use UAVs responsibly, while empowering those that do not.

#### Contrives decisions to acquire drones are totally separate from what the US does---it’s a security measure

Anderson 11 (Kenneth Anderson is a professor of international law at Washington College of Law, American University, Washington, DC, and a visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution, “What Kind of Drones Arms Race Is Coming?,” http://www.volokh.com/2011/10/09/what-kind-of-drones-arms-race-is-coming/)

New York Times national security correspondent Scott Shane has an opinion piece in today’s Sunday Times predicting an “arms race” in military drones. The methodology essentially looks at the US as the leader, followed by Israel – countries that have built, deployed and used drones in both surveillance and as weapons platforms. It then looks at the list of other countries that are following fast in US footsteps to both build and deploy, as well as purchase or sell the technology – noting, correctly, that the list is a long one, starting with China. The predicament is put this way: Eventually, the United States will face a military adversary or terrorist group armed with drones, military analysts say. But what the short-run hazard experts foresee is not an attack on the United States, which faces no enemies with significant combat drone capabilities, but the political and legal challenges posed when another country follows the American example. The Bush administration, and even more aggressively the Obama administration, embraced an extraordinary principle: that the United States can send this robotic weapon over borders to kill perceived enemies, even American citizens, who are viewed as a threat. “Is this the world we want to live in?” asks Micah Zenko, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. “Because we’re creating it.” By asserting that “we’re” creating it, this is a claim that there is an arms race among states over military drones, and that it is a consequence of the US creating the technology and deploying it – and then, beyond the technology, changing the normative legal and moral rules in the international community about using it across borders. In effect, the combination of those two, technological and normative, forces other countries in strategic competition with the US to follow suit. (The other unstated premise underlying the whole opinion piece is a studiously neutral moral relativism signaled by that otherwise unexamined phrase “perceived enemies.” Does it matter if they are not merely our “perceived” but are our actual enemies? Irrespective of what one might be entitled to do to them, is it so very difficult to conclude, even in the New York Times, that Anwar al-Awlaki was, in objective terms, our enemy?) It sounds like it must be true. But is it? There are a number of reasons to doubt that moves by other countries are an arms race in the sense that the US “created” it or could have stopped it, or that something different would have happened had the US not pursued the technology or not used it in the ways it has against non-state terrorist actors. Here are a couple of quick reasons why I don’t find this thesis very persuasive, and what I think the real “arms race” surrounding drones will be. Unmanned aerial vehicles have clearly got a big push from the US military in the way of research, development, and deployment. But the reality today is that the technology will transform civil aviation, in many of the same ways and for the same reasons that another robotic technology, driverless cars (which Google is busily plying up and down the streets of San Francisco, but which started as a DARPA project). UAVs will eventually move into many roles in ordinary aviation, because it is cheaper, relatively safer, more reliable – and it will eventually include cargo planes, crop dusting, border patrol, forest fire patrols, and many other tasks. There is a reason for this – the avionics involved are simply not so complicated as to be beyond the abilities of many, many states. Military applications will carry drones many different directions, from next-generation unmanned fighter aircraft able to operate against other craft at much higher G stresses to tiny surveillance drones. But the flying-around technology for aircraft that are generally sizes flown today is not that difficult, and any substantial state that feels like developing them will be able to do so. But the point is that this was happening anyway, and the technology was already available. The US might have been first, but it hasn’t sparked an arms race in any sense that absent the US push, no one would have done this. That’s just a fantasy reading of where the technology in general aviation was already going; Zenko’s ‘original sin’ attribution of this to the US opening Pandora’s box is not a credible understanding of the development and applications of the technology. Had the US not moved on this, the result would have been a US playing catch-up to someone else. For that matter, the off-the-shelf technology for small, hobbyist UAVs is simple enough and available enough that terrorists will eventually try to do their own amateur version, putting some kind of bomb on it. Moving on from the avionics, weaponizing the craft is also not difficult. The US stuck an anti-tank missile on a Predator; this is also not rocket science. Many states can build drones, many states can operate them, and crudely weaponizing them is also not rocket science. The US didn’t spark an arms race; this would occur to any state with a drone. To the extent that there is real development here, it lies in the development of specialized weapons that enable vastly more discriminating targeting. The details are sketchy, but there are indications from DangerRoom and other observers (including some comments from military officials off the record) that US military budgets include amounts for much smaller missiles designed not as anti-tank weapons, but to penetrate and kill persons inside a car without blowing it to bits, for example. This is genuinely harder to do – but still not all that difficult for a major state, whether leading NATO states, China, Russia, or India. The question is whether it would be a bad thing to have states competing to come up with weapons technologies that are ... more discriminating. The real place where states divide in their technological abilities with respect to drones is not about avionics or weapons – but the third, crucial conceptual element of a drone: sensor capabilities. Those are capabilities in both hardware, the kinds of signals that can be taken in from the real world (video, radar, infrared, etc.), and software, the kinds of analytic integration that can be achieved, coupled with other streams from outside the drone, such as general telecomm monitoring. That is an area in which the US has a significant edge – the Chinese, Russians, India, or for that matter, Germany or France, could do it if desired, though everyone will find it easier to steal it and reverse engineer. Worth noting, as well, something that is rarely noted: today’s sensor technologies work well over deserts and largely bare mountains. They have not been developed for seeing through forest or jungle cover. Moreover, none of this takes account of a central reason why the US is successful with drones in Pakistan – the investment over years in an on-the-ground intelligence network that permits targeting in the first place: the focus on drones as technology in the Shane piece doesn’t not pay enough attention to this crucial, non-technological element. The recent Reuters piece on the ground-level intelligence piece makes it clear that purely focusing on the technology gives a profoundly misleading picture of drones and their capabilities. But again, let’s ask, why does a state want more advanced sensor technology? Yes, better sensor technology does provide greater intelligence in targeting. And China will certainly want that, because it will find that it has reasons for wanting to engage in targeted assassination against non-state actors or, for that matter, state targets. But an awful lot of countries that want drones are not really that picky, because they don’t fundamentally care much about greater discrimination in targeting; they are not that worried about indiscriminate attack, either because, as in the case of Hamas targeting Israel, indiscriminate attack is the point or because they don’t care about collateral damage so long as the target is destroyed. So why invest in greater discrimination achieved through expensive and perhaps inaccessible sensor technologies? If there were going to be an arms race in drones, it would take place here, where the technology is not already widely available – but the parties who want it are limited. The real arms race in drones will take place, not around drones themselves, but in counters to drones. Drones are effective, in their current form, against non-state actors, terrorists, low tech insurgents, because they have no air-defense systems. The game changer in Afghanistan against Soviet helicopters was American-supplied Stinger missiles. When some state designs and starts handing out some form of air-defense system to non-state actors, then the arms race in drones actually begins. It begins with re-designs of slow, noisy surveillance craft designed to operate at high altitude over long periods of time. It takes into account one of the most likely forms of counter to drones – viruses or other malware that interferes with the communications links that control the drones – shades of the malware discovered in drone systems recently. It is indeed likely that the future will see more instances of uses of force at a much smaller, often less attributable, more discrete level than conventional war. Those uses will be most easily undertaken against non-state actors, rather than states, though the difference is likely to erode. The idea that it would not have occurred to China or Russia that drones could be used to target non-state actors across borders in safe havens, or that they would not do so because the United States had not done so is far-fetched. That is so not least because the United States has long held that it, or other states threatened by terrorist non-state actors in safe havens across sovereign borders, can be targeted if the sovereign is unable or unwilling to deal with them. There’s nothing new in this as a US view of international law; it goes back decades, and the US has not thought it some special rule benefiting the US alone. So the idea that the US has somehow developed this technology and then changed the rules regarding cross-border attack on terrorists is just wrong; the US has believed this for a long time and thinks it is legally and morally right. Then there a further idea that drones make it “too easy” to reach across borders and that is the difference today; a long-standing legal doctrine suddenly made far too powerful by reason of new technology. I am not convinced. That drones – precisely because they are accepted as both more sparing of civilians and more sparing of one’s own forces – makes it “too easy” to use force, reduces the disincentive against using force, has proven irresistible to many as a criticism of drones and targeted killing. I address some of the questions in this draft article. Still, one consideration is simply that the number of “resorts to force” is not enough to damn drones and targeted killing. One must also consider the intensity of the fighting that ensues by comparison to conventional war, as well as the question of whether they increase or diminish the damage that might otherwise arise from conventional wars that take place in lieu of these more discrete uses of force. The moral or legal case against drones and targeted killing, because their jus in bello virtues supposedly increase the propensity to use force, is not obvious, at least not to me. But in any case, this is almost certainly the future direction of uses of force. Shane is falling into a trap here not dissimilar to the advocates who believed that they could forestall the militarization of airplanes and aerial bombardment in the early 20th century. Today’s targeted killing technologies aboard drones is finally providing a technological advance – not a solution, certainly, but an advance – on the problem of indiscriminate aerial bombardment that begin with airplanes in the 20th century. It’s not just that this technology is coming, in other words – it is that, seen over the whole course of the history of military aviation, this is a good thing, not a bad thing. It’s a pity that the Times article doesn’t see this – and given what Scott Shane and Mark Mazzetti wrote in their last, outstanding piece on drones (correctly observing that drones are about non-state actors, not interstate conflict, because drones are simply too vulnerable today), surprising to me. There are indeed important ways in which state practice needs to evolve to deal with the legal and moral implications of new technologies and their strategic implications. One is the development of a sort of “state practice” of “intelligence-driven, discrete uses of force” – a clumsy term for what amounts to evolving “covert,” but often not covert, action. That’s where the US needs to lead the way – in the development of state practice to assert that even these emerging forms of using force are, in the first place, subject to the basic customary obligations for any use of force: necessity, distinction, proportionality. I have said a couple of times, mostly to amusement or incredulity, that the beginning that the United States under both the Bush and Obama administrations is making toward developing state practice that can be asserted as standards for the United States and other actors might well turn out to be Harold Koh’s most important contribution to international law as legal adviser to the State Department. The Barron-Lederman memo on the targeting of Al-Awlaki is an important domestic law homologue to that. But return to the Scott Shane article. It is simply implausible to think that countries would not have been developing UAVs for military uses, just as they are being developed and deployed for civilian uses. The US might have been first, but this is where civilian aviation, and a lot of other robotic technologies, have been going even if only now becoming visible to the broader public. The deployment of weaponized drones by the US is even less the morality fable that Zenko suggests and Shane endorses as a moralizing rebuke to the United States in the Times piece. The real struggle begins over counter-technologies to drones, and counters to the counters – and that, ad infinitum

### SCS War

#### They respect sovereignty way to much

Erickson and Strange 13 (ANDREW ERICKSON is an associate professor at the Naval War College and an Associate in Research at Harvard University’s Fairbank Center. Follow him on Twitter @andrewserickson. AUSTIN STRANGE is a researcher at the Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute and a graduate student at Zhejiang University. “China Has Drones. Now What?,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139405/andrew-erickson-and-austin-strange/china-has-drones-now-what?page=show)

The restrictive position that Beijing takes on sovereignty in international forums will further constrain its use of drones. China is not likely to publicly deploy drones for precision strikes or in other military assignments

without first having been granted a credible mandate to do so. The gold standard of such an authorization is a resolution passed by the UN Security Council, the stamp of approval that has permitted Chinese humanitarian interventions in Africa and antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. China might consider using drones abroad with some sort of regional authorization, such as a country giving Beijing explicit permission to launch a drone strike within its territory. But even with the endorsement of the international community or specific states, China would have to weigh any benefits of a drone strike abroad against the potential for mishaps and perceptions that it was infringing on other countries’ sovereignty -- something Beijing regularly decries when others do it.

#### Erickson

#### Xtnd Thayer – tensions don’t escalate

#### No south china sea conflict-china would never engage

**Carlson, Cornell government professor, 2013**

(Allen, “China Keeps the Peace at Sea”, 2-21, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139024/allen-carlson/china-keeps-the-peace-at-sea?page=show>, ldg)

The fundamentals of Deng's grand economic strategy are still revered in Beijing. But any war in the region would erode the hard-won, and precariously held, political capital that China has gained in the last several decades. It would also disrupt trade relations, complicate efforts to promote the yuan as an international currency, and send shock waves through the country's economic system at a time when it can ill afford them. There is thus little reason to think that China is readying for war with Japan. At the same time, the specter of rising Chinese nationalism, although often seen as a promoter of conflict, further limits the prospects for armed engagement. This is because Beijing will try to discourage nationalism if it fears it may lose control or be forced by popular sentiment to take an action it deems unwise. Ever since the Tiananmen Square massacre put questions about the Chinese Communist Party's right to govern before the population, successive generations of Chinese leaders have carefully negotiated a balance between promoting nationalist sentiment and preventing it from boiling over. In the process, they cemented the legitimacy of their rule. A war with Japan could easily upset that balance by inflaming nationalism that could blow back against China's leaders. Consider a hypothetical scenario in which a uniformed Chinese military member is killed during a firefight with Japanese soldiers. Regardless of the specific circumstances, the casualty would create a new martyr in China and, almost as quickly, catalyze popular protests against Japan. Demonstrators would call for blood, and if the government (fearing economic instability) did not extract enough, citizens would agitate against Beijing itself. Those in Zhongnanhai, the Chinese leadership compound in Beijing, would find themselves between a rock and a hard place. It is possible that Xi lost track of these basic facts during the fanfare of his rise to power and in the face of renewed Japanese assertiveness. It is also possible that the Chinese state is more rotten at the core than is understood. That is, party elites believe that a diversionary war is the only way to hold on to power -- damn the economic and social consequences. But Xi does not seem blind to the principles that have served Beijing so well over the last few decades. Indeed, although he recently warned unnamed others about infringing upon China's "national core interests" during a foreign policy speech to members of the Politburo, he also underscored China's commitment to "never pursue development at the cost of sacrificing other country's interests" and to never "benefit ourselves at others' expense or do harm to any neighbor." Of course, wars do happen -- and still could in the East China Sea. Should either side draw first blood through accident or an unexpected move, Sino-Japanese relations would be pushed into terrain that has not been charted since the middle of the last century. However, understanding that war would be a no-win situation, China has avoided rushing over the brink. This relative restraint seems to have surprised everyone. But it shouldn't. Beijing will continue to disagree with Tokyo over the sovereign status of the islands, and will not budge in its negotiating position over disputed territory. However, it cannot take the risk of going to war over a few rocks in the sea. On the contrary, in the coming months it will quietly seek a way to shelve the dispute in return for securing regional stability, facilitating economic development, and keeping a lid on the Pandora's box of rising nationalist sentiment. The ensuing peace, while unlikely to be deep, or especially conducive to improving Sino-Japanese relations, will be enduring.

# 1NR

## Overview

#### Turns terror – increases motivation and recruitment

Fandl, Adjunct Law Professor @ Washington College of Law, ‘4

(Kevin J, 19 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 587)

In his final speech in the United Kingdom as President of the United States, Bill Clinton stressed: "we have seen how abject poverty accelerates conflict, how it creates recruits for terrorists and those who incite ethnic and religious hatred, [and] how it fuels a violent rejection of the economic and social order on which our future depends." 50 His words carried more significance than he could have known at that moment. 51

The terrorist networks that have come about in recent history are a significant threat to world security not only because of the suicidal methods they employ, but also because of the status of the countries [\*598] where these networks recruit new members, engage in training exercises and where the leadership seeks refuge. These countries are not equipped politically or economically to design proactive plans to uproot such organizations in their own countries, despite their expressed efforts to do so. 52 They are developing countries with weak, or no, democratic political structure with which to coordinate such efforts. They do not have the resources that European countries, for instance, have in place to take preventative measures in order to sustain peace. 53

The George W. Bush Administration indicated that it "is aware of the link between desperate economic circumstances and terrorism." 54 Yet, rather than working to develop sustainable economies capable of both directly (through increased political pressure and rule of law programs) and indirectly (through increased employment opportunities and social stability) eradicating terrorism, President Bush has chosen to dedicate significant resources to a military conquest against the elusive concept of terrorism itself. 55 Many Americans and, to a much lesser extent, other Western citizens, support the view that terrorism can be fought with tanks and [\*599] bombs. 56 They obstinately believe that military technology is capable of uncovering each potentially threatening terrorist cell and keeping the West safe. 57 This conventional method of warfare, while effective in pinpointing targets in complete darkness, will be useless in eliminating the ideology that fuels terrorism. Terrorists are non-conventional actors using non-conventional means through amorphous concepts that cannot be identified, contained, or labeled. These are actors whose most potent weapon is the communication of ideas among masses of people awaiting an opportunity for a better life. Many of us watch in excited anticipation for Osama bin Laden's capture and/or death. However, we should rest assured that whether he is still alive will have no bearing on the control that his ideas, and the ideas of those like him, have on the impoverished and desperate in the Middle East, South Asia, and perhaps beyond. No military technology will be able to destroy the prevalence and furtherance of those ideas. 58

#### Turns China

Yang, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Auckland, Associate Editor of The Australasian Journal of Human Security, and Chair of the NZIIA’s Auckland Branch, ’06 (Jian, September 1, “China’s Rise: The Security Implications” New Zealand International Review, Vol 31 No 5, p 12, lexis)

Policy implications It is important for the rest of the world to appreciate Chinas desire for a peaceful international environment. It has profound implications for the making of policy toward China. Chinas desire for peace means incentives for it to integrate with the international society and this provides a solid basis for engaging China. Some argue that China is simply waiting for the time when it is strong enough to challenge other great powers. Indeed, no one can guarantee that China will not follow this path. However, this is by no means inevitable. There is a good chance that China continues to integrate with the international society, keeps learning the rules of the game and eventually graduates as a good international citizen. Masaru Tamamoto has a vision for China, that is vastly different from that ofrealists: It is hard to imagine how an economically successful China so enmeshed in global capitalism will threaten the very system that made it rich and middle class. Bourgeois success tends to diminish military efficacy in international relations. In the long run, the Chinese threat to the United States, Japan and the world comes from an economically faltering China, not a prosperous, self-confident China. (18) Chinas rise often reminds us of the rise of Japan and Germany in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Both resulted in major military clashes. Realists often argue that history repeats itself. This argument neglects the fact that the rise of the United States was peaceful. The United States rose rapidly from 1820 to 1913, which benefitedother great powers. To be more specific, American GDP per capita rose at an average rate of about 1.5 per cent per year, while that of Britain, France, and Germany rose at roughly 1.1-to-1.3 per cent annually. (19) China's rise can be a great opportunity, too. Increasing influenceChina should learn the rules of the game. At the same time, other great powers, especially the United States, should make efforts to accommodate the rise of China. Although China will not be able to substantially challenge the United States strategically in the coming years, its influence is likely to increase. One important reason why the rise of the United States was peaceful was the accommodation of GreatBritain to America's rise. Despite the differences between Anglo-American relations in those years and Sino-American relations today, theUnited States needs to accept China playing a greater role in world affairs and give China due respect.

### Food

#### **The impact is economy collapse and food price spikes**

Min 10 (David, writer @ American Progress, “The Big Freeze,” http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/10/pdf/big\_freeze.pdf

A freeze on the debt ceiling could erode confidence in U.S. Treasury bonds in a number of ways, creating further and wider panic in financial markets. First, by causing a disruption in the issuance of Treasury debt, as happened in 1995-96. a freeze would cause investors to seek alternative financial investments, even per\* haps causing a run on Treasurys. Such a run would cause the cost of U.S. debt to soar, putting even more stress on our budget, and the resulting enormous capital flows would likely be highly destabilizing to global financial markets, potentially creating more asset bubbles and busts throughout the world. Second, the massive withdrawal of public spending that would occur would cause significant concern among institutional investors worldwide that the U.S. would swiftly enter a second, very deep, recession, raising concerns about the ability of the United States to repay its debt. Finally, the sheer recklessness of a debt freeze during these tenuous times would signal to already nervous investors that there was a significant amount of political risk, which could cause them to shy away from investing in the United States generally. Taken together, these factors would almost certainly result in a significant increase in the interest rates we currently pay on our national debt, currently just above 2.5 percent for a 10-year Treasury note. If in the near term these rates moved even to 5.9 percent, the long-term rate predicted by the Congressional Budget Office, then our interest payments would increase by more than double, to nearly S600 billion a year. These rates could climb even higher, if investors began to price in a "default risk" into Treasurys—something that reckless actions by Congress could potentially spark—thus greatly exacerbating our budget problems. The U.S. dollar, of course, is the world's reserve currency in large part because of the depth and liquidity of the U.S. Treasury bond market. If this market is severely disrupted, and investors lost confidence in U.S. Treasurys, then it is unclear where nervous investors might go next. A sharp and swift move by investors out of U.S. Treasury bonds could be highly destabilizing, straining the already delicate global economy Imagine, for example, if investors moved from sovereign debt into commodities, most of which are priced and traded in dollars. This could have the catastrophic impact of weakening the worlds largest economies while also raising the prices of the basic inputs (such as metals or food) that are necessary for economic growth. In short, a freeze on the debt ceiling would cause our interest payments to spike, making our budget situation even more problematic, while potentially triggering greater global instability—perhaps even a global economic depression.

#### **Kills millions and causes global instability**

Brown 7 (Lester R., Director – Earth Policy Institute, 3-21, http://www.earth-policy.org/Updates/2007/Update65 .htm)

Urban food protests in response to rising food prices in low and middle income countries, such as Mexico, could lead to political instability that would add to the growing list of failing states. At some point, spreading political instability could disrupt global economic progress. Against this backdrop, Washington is consumed with "ethanol euphoria." President Bush in his State of the Union address set a production goal for 2017 of 35 billion gallons of alternative fuels, including grain-based and cellulosic ethanol, and fuel from coal. Given the current difficulties in producing cellulosic ethanol at a competitive cost and given the mounting public opposition to coal fuels, which are far more carbon-intensive than gasoline, most of the fuel to meet this goal might well have to come from grain. This could take most of the U.S. grain harvest, leaving little grain to meet U.S. needs, much less those of the hundred or so countries that import grain. The stage is now set for direct competition for grain between the 800 million people who own automobiles, and the world's 2 billion poorest people. The risk is that millions of those on the lower rungs of the global economic ladder will start falling off as rising food prices drop their consumption below the survival level.

## Uniqueness

#### Obama is staying on message-GOP will cave

**Dovere, Politico, 10-1-13**

(Edward, “Government shutdown: President Obama holds the line”

<http://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/government-shutdown-president-obama-holds-the-line-97646.html?hp=f3>, ldg)

President Barack Obama started September in an agonizing, extended display of how little sway he had in Congress. He ended the month with a display of resolve and strength that could redefine his presidency. All it took was a government shutdown. This was less a White House strategy than simply staying in the corner the House GOP had painted them into — to the White House’s surprise, Obama was forced to do what he so rarely has as president: he said no, and he didn’t stop saying no. For two weeks ahead of Monday night’s deadline, Obama and aides rebuffed the efforts to kill Obamacare with the kind of firm, narrow sales pitch they struggled with in three years of trying to convince people the law should exist in the first place. There was no litany of doomsday scenarios that didn’t quite come true, like in the run-up to the fiscal cliff and the sequester. No leaked plans or musings in front of the cameras about Democratic priorities he might sacrifice to score a deal. After five years of what’s often seen as Obama’s desperation to negotiate — to the fury of his liberal base and the frustration of party leaders who argue that he negotiates against himself. Even his signature health care law came with significant compromises in Congress. Instead, over and over and over again, Obama delivered the simple line: Republicans want to repeal a law that was passed and upheld by the Supreme Court — to give people health insurance — or they’ll do something that everyone outside the GOP caucus meetings, including Wall Street bankers, seems to agree would be a ridiculous risk. “If we lock these Americans out of affordable health care for one more year,” Obama said Monday afternoon as he listed examples of people who would enjoy better treatment under Obamacare, “if we sacrifice the health care of millions of Americans — then they’ll fund the government for a couple more months. Does anybody truly believe that we won’t have this fight again in a couple more months? Even at Christmas?” The president and his advisers weren’t expecting this level of Republican melee, a White House official said. Only during Sen. Ted Cruz’s (R-Texas) 21-hour floor speech last week did the realization roll through the West Wing that they wouldn’t be negotiating because they couldn’t figure out anymore whom to negotiate with. And even then, they didn’t believe the shutdown was really going to happen until Saturday night, when the House voted again to strip Obamacare funding. This wasn’t a credible position, Obama said again Monday afternoon, but rather, bowing to “extraneous and controversial demands” which are “all to save face after making some impossible promises to the extreme right wing of their political party.” Obama and aides have said repeatedly that they’re not thinking about the shutdown in terms of political gain, but the situation’s is taking shape for them. Congress’s approval on dealing with the shutdown was at 10 percent even before the shutters started coming down on Monday according to a new CNN/ORC poll, with 69 percent of people saying the House Republicans are acting like “spoiled children.” “The Republicans are making themselves so radioactive that the president and Democrats can win this debate in the court of public opinion” by waiting them out, said Jim Manley, a Democratic strategist and former aide to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid who has previously been critical of Obama’s tactics. Democratic pollster Stan Greenberg said the Obama White House learned from the 2011 debt ceiling standoff, when it demoralized fellow Democrats, deflated Obama’s approval ratings and got nothing substantive from the negotiations. “They didn’t gain anything from that approach,” Greenberg said. “I think that there’s a lot they learned from what happened the last time they ran up against the debt ceiling.” While the Republicans have been at war with each other, the White House has proceeded calmly — a breakthrough phone call with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani Friday that showed him getting things done (with the conveniently implied juxtaposition that Tehran is easier to negotiate with than the GOP conference), his regular golf game Saturday and a cordial meeting Monday with his old sparring partner Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. White House press secretary Jay Carney said Monday that the shutdown wasn’t really affecting much of anything. “It’s busy, but it’s always busy here,” Carney said. “It’s busy for most of you covering this White House, any White House. We’re very much focused on making sure that the implementation of the Affordable Care Act continues.” Obama called all four congressional leaders Monday evening — including Boehner, whose staff spent Friday needling reporters to point out that the president hadn’t called for a week. According to both the White House and Boehner’s office, the call was an exchange of well-worn talking points, and changed nothing. Manley advised Obama to make sure people continue to see Boehner and the House Republicans as the problem and not rush into any more negotiations until public outrage forces them to bend. “He may want to do a little outreach, but not until the House drives the country over the cliff,” Manley said Monday, before the shutdown. “Once the House has driven the country over the cliff and failed to fund the government, then it might be time to make a move.” The White House believes Obama will take less than half the blame for a shutdown – with the rest heaped on congressional Republicans. The divide is clear in a Gallup poll also out Monday: over 70 percent of self-identifying Republicans and Democrats each say their guys are the ones acting responsibly, while just 9 percent for both say the other side is. If Obama is able to turn public opinion against Republicans, the GOP won’t be able to turn the blame back on Obama, Greenberg said. “Things only get worse once things begin to move in a particular direction,” he said. “They don’t suddenly start going the other way as people rethink this.”

#### Obama’s singular focus on the debt ceiling will cause GOP capitulation-the plan ruins his fine balance

Julie Pace, AP White House Correspondent, 10/3/13, Obama seeks to strike a balance during shutdown, Lexis

Attend a black-tie gala? No. Meet with business leaders who oppose a government shutdown? Yes. Jet off to Asia for a four-country tour? Maybe, but shorten the trip and keep the option to cancel. President Barack Obama's strategy during the partial shutdown of the federal government is aimed at keeping up the appearance of a leader focused on the public's priorities and avoiding looking tone deaf to the hundreds of thousands of Americans forced off the job. He's also trying to maintain what the White House sees as a political advantage over Republicans, with nearly all the president's events providing him a platform to blast House GOP lawmakers for opposing a Senate bill to keep the government running. Republicans have sharply criticized the president's approach, saying that if he were serious about ending the shutdown, he would be negotiating a solution. Obama did summon congressional lawmakers to the White House to discuss the shutdown Wednesday evening, but the leaders emerged to say no progress had been made. "The meeting was cordial but unproductive," said Senate Republican leader Mitch McConnell of Kentucky. The president's allies say Obama is best served by staying away from the negotiating table and letting Republicans argue among themselves. "I think if you're the White House, you just sit back and watch," said Robert Gibbs, former White House press secretary and a longtime Obama adviser. "I don't think there's anything for you to do. I don't think there's anything you should do." The government shut down after Congress failed to pass a spending bill by Monday's midnight deadline, forcing about 800,000 federal workers off the job, shuttering national parks, and halting a range of government services. House Republicans are demanding changes to Obama's health care law in exchange for funding the government, a tactic the White House opposes. Most polling ahead of the shutdown shows Republicans taking more of the heat than Obama for the political impasse. No polling on the shutdown itself has been completed. The power of the presidential bully pulpit does give Obama one distinct advantage over Republicans. He can streamline the message coming from the White House, while GOP leaders must contend with the different factions of their party airing competing and sometimes contradictory views. In the opening days of the shutdown, Obama's message has been squarely focused on the economic impact of the shutdown and the benefits of the health care law Republicans are seeking to curtail. On Tuesday, he met with Americans who say they're being helped by the new health law. On Wednesday, he met with business executives traditionally a core Republican constituency to discuss the impact of the shutdown and the upcoming debt-ceiling debate on the economy. And on Thursday, he plans to visit a construction company in nearby Maryland to highlight how small businesses are affected by the shutdown. But Obama canceled an appearance Wednesday night at the glitzy Congressional Hispanic Caucus gala, an event he has attended every year since winning the White House. The White House also announced that the president was scaling back his upcoming trip to Asia, canceling stops in Malaysia and the Philippines two of the four countries he had planned to visit. The White House also left open the possibility that the whole trip might be canceled. Obama is scheduled to depart Saturday night for economic summits in Indonesia and Brunei. National Security Council spokeswoman Caitlin Hayden said the White House "will continue to evaluate those trips based on how events develop throughout the course of the week." Even a shortened trip abroad could be risky for Obama. Presidential travel is a high-dollar endeavor that may not sit well with Americans facing financial burdens because of the shutdown. A trip to Asia would also require Obama to spend long stretches on an airplane, limiting the amount of time he can be making his case to the public for restarting the government. And the time difference would mean that nearly all of his events would take place when most Americans are sleeping. Chris Lehane, a Democratic consultant who worked for President Bill Clinton during the 1995 government shutdown, said Obama needs to strike "a very fine balance" between overseeing the shutdown and his other obligations as president. "You're the president of the United States, you have a thousand things you need to do and you need to continue to be in position to do those things," Lehane said. "But the optics of being in Washington, D.C., ready to move the government forward are important."

#### That subsumes their non-uniques – Obama’s pressure changes Boehner’s strategic calculus resolving the debt ceiling

Aamer Madhani, USA Today, 10/4/13, How much pressure to put on Boehner?, Lexis

President Obama continued to hammer House Speaker John Boehner on Thursday as no new signs of a resolution to a federal government shutdown emerged and the country teetered closer to the $16.7 trillion debt ceiling due to be reached in two weeks. In a speech at a construction company in the nearby Maryland suburbs, Obama placed the blame for the shutdown crisis squarely on Boehner, offering no shelter to the Republican congressional leader who he has had a hot-and-cold relationship since the Ohio lawmaker won the speakership in 2010. "Speaker John Boehner won't even let the bill get a yes-or-no vote, because he doesn't want to anger the extremists in his party," Obama said. "That's all. That's what this whole thing is about." As the government shutdown crisis enters its fourth day, Obama and White House officials will have to carefully weigh just how hard they want to push Boehner, who is under intense pressure from the most conservative lawmakers in his party to not capitulate to a president who says he will not negotiate over either a short-term continuing resolution to keep the government open or the looming debt limit. In the end, political analysts say, it is in the interest of the White House of finding a way for Boehner to emerge out of the crisis with some credibility with his rank-and-file, as the alternative to the Ohio lawmaker that could emerge from the Republican caucus may be far less tolerable "There is an old Spanish saying," said Steve Bell, a former Senate Republican aide and political analyst at the Bipartisan Policy Center in Washington. "When you go to dig a grave for your enemy, dig two -- one for him and one for you." In perhaps a small sign of progress in the impasse, Boehner signaled on Thursday that he may be willing to hold a vote to raise the debt ceiling even if Obama refuses to agree to the Republican demand of delaying implementation of the president's signature health care law by a year. Jared Bernstein, who served as top economic adviser to Vice President Biden in the first term, said that by taking the debt-ceiling debate off the table, Boehner could potentially gain some negotiating leverage in the budget fight, but he does it at the risk of the Republican base "throwing him under the bus." Bernstein said the best way forward for the White House is continuing to be "very explicit" with Boehner that it remains open on long-term budget issues while standing pat on the condition that a short-term budget and debt limit vote is passed without conditions. Even as Boehner showed signs of flexibility on a debt-limit vote, House Republicans continued to pursue a piecemeal shutdown strategy to pass targeted funding bills for popular government services. House Majority Leader Eric Cantor, R-Va., wrote to rank-and-file Republicans in a memo Thursday that he was confident Obama and congressional Democrats would eventually bow to negotiations if Republicans hold the line. "While no one can predict with certainty how the current shutdown will be resolved, I am confident that if we keep advancing common-sense solutions to the problems created by the shutdown that Senate Democrats and President Obama will eventually agree to meaningful discussions that would allow us to ultimately resolve this impasse," Cantor wrote. Obama, meanwhile, made clear, at least for now, he is going to use the bully pulpit to keep the pressure on Boehner.

## Link

### AT: Thornberry

#### Your evidence is about a piece of legislation in congress now and it’s from the Congressman that proposed the legislation’s website – obviously it’s biased and it doesn’t prove bipartisanship – the bill will be shot down by Hawkish republicans

Williamson 13 (Kevin D., “A Question of Oversight: Thornberry’s bill would help limit presidential military overreach.”, http://www.nationalreview.com/article/349413/question-oversight)

Thornberry’s bill would give members of Congress a scalpel to replace the legislative meat ax currently in their hands. “It lets Congress push back,” Thornberry says. It probably will not be enough to satisfy Senator Paul and those who share his concerns, and it does nothing to address the specific question of the administration’s targeting U.S. citizens outside of combat. But it does move the action into the congressional theater, where it belongs, rather than the judicial one, where it does not.

#### If you’re right that this is popular, this legislation will be passed and it solves your entire aff

Williamson 13 (Kevin D., “A Question of Oversight: Thornberry’s bill would help limit presidential military overreach.”, http://www.nationalreview.com/article/349413/question-oversight)

Mac Thornberry’s is not a name that generally sets the political world abuzz. The diffident rancher and lawyer from the Texas panhandle represents a congressional district with a bigger geographic footprint than 13 states. His district is a very conservative one, as evidenced by two facts: First, the Democrats didn’t even bother running anybody against him last time around, though a Libertarian and a Green-party candidate managed to keep him down to 91 percent of the vote; second, my family are constituents, and though they are not unusually conservative compared with their neighbors, they are not quite convinced that Thornberry — ACU rating 96 percent — is entirely reliable. During a conversation in his Washington office last week, Thornberry offered a slightly rueful smile when presented with that second datum — it’s clearly not the first time he has heard it. He is not a bomb-thrower, but Thornberry, widely considered to be the chairman-in-waiting of the House Armed Services Committee, has just stepped into the middle of one of the most bitter and most important debates of our time: the legal basis of what we are still calling (inaccurately) the “war” on terror, the limits of presidential power in that project, and the need for meaningful, formal oversight of the enterprise by Congress. If it were to become law, Thornberry’s Oversight of Sensitive Military Operations Act would create something for which there is a crying need in the war on terror: an opportunity for Congress to say “No” to the president. The bill has been characterized as a response to the controversy surrounding the use of armed drones, but the legislation in fact makes no mention of unmanned aircraft. It is considerably broader than that. Setting aside Afghanistan (and other future war zones for which the use of military force has been specifically authorized), Thornberry’s bill would require the military not only to formally brief Congress in writing on all kill or capture operations overseas but also would demand that the military come forward with specific legal justification for those operations, including the legal basis for the selection of targets. The question of legal justification is a sticking point: The preferred method of the Obama administration thus far has been to keep its legal reasoning secret and the memos outlining it classified, a particularly worrisome habit for an administration that has claimed for itself the power to kill American citizens not engaged in anything that could reasonably be described as combat. The bill, Thornberry says, is an opportunity for Congress to “push back” against an overreaching presidential administration — now, or in the future. Thornberry manages a neat political trick, being more hawkish than the president while standing with one foot in the camp of Senator Rand Paul and others concerned about the implications of the argument that in the war on terror the battlefield is everywhere, from Yemen to Yonkers. Immediately after the president’s overhyped national-security speech last week, Thornberry shared some critical observations: Most disturbing to me in the president’s speech today was the idea that we can simply declare al-Qaeda beaten and go back to the pre-9/11 era. When he said that these issues of national security are serious ones, which we should not gloss over, I agree. Wishing the defeat of terrorists does not make it so. But the president seems to gloss over what it takes to truly defeat al-Qaeda. Under what legal authority would he take action to prevent terrorist attacks in the future without an authorization for the use of military force? Is he asking for a free hand to do whatever he thinks best, or does he think law enforcement can handle the entire threat? Thornberry advocates revising the Authorization for the Use of Military Force, which has been stretched to the point of absurdity. He describes himself as “concerned” about, among other things, the fact “that the administration took military action in Libya without congressional approval.” While the secretary of defense would be required to notify Congress in writing of particular missions only after the fact, the legal reasoning behind those missions and the selection of their targets — arguably the more important question — would have to be disclosed within 60 days of the bill’s passage. If Congress is not persuaded by the case put before it, then it would have the opportunity to respond in a specific way to specific military practices. As things stand, if Congress is displeased with the conduct of the war on terror, its options are basically limited to repealing the AUMF or defunding the entire thing.

### Link Ext

#### **The plan sparks Congressional turf battles over oversight**

Munoz 13 (Carlo, The Hill, “Turf battle builds quietly in Congress over control of armed drone program”, 04/09/13, <http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/292501-turf-battle-builds-quietly-over-control-of-armed-drone-program->, ZBurdette)

A turf war is quietly building between congressional defense and intelligence committees over who will oversee the Obama administration’s controversial armed drone program. Lawmakers are scrambling to make their case for or against a White House proposal that would hand control of the drones to the Pentagon. Gordon Adams, a senior defense analyst at the Stimson Center, called the looming battle a “turf fight in the [disguise] of a policy debate.” The Pentagon and CIA operate their own armed drone programs, which are both geared toward eliminating senior al Qaeda leaders and other high-level terror targets around the world. Under the Obama administration’s proposal, the CIA would continue to supply intelligence on possible targets, but actual control over the drone strikes would fall to the Pentagon. Senate Intelligence Committee Chairwoman Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) publicly questioned whether the Defense Department (DOD) would be able to shoulder the program alone. “We’ve watched the intelligence aspect of the drone program, how they function, the quality of the intelligence, watching the agency exercise patience and discretion,” Feinstein told reporters in March. “The military [armed drone] program has not done that nearly as well.” Sen. John McCain and other defense lawmakers say the drone program would be better off being run by the Pentagon. “It’s not the job of the Central Intelligence Agency. ... It’s the military’s job,” the Arizona Republican said in March. The fight is a typical battle over who on Capitol Hill will retain power over the program, according to several analysts, who described it as predictable. **“There is** always going to be a turf battle**” when dealing with congressional oversight**, said Lawrence Korb, a former DOD official and defense analyst at the liberal-leaning Center for American Progress. But that battle could become particularly heated, given the high-profile nature of the drone program, which since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks has become a huge factor in shaping counterterrorism policy, given its success, Korb said.