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### Contention One-Endless War

#### The United States Government justifies its targeted killing operations with the theory of Just War, the idea that there can be moral justifications for conflict and moral ways of waging war. As the United States Government rationalizes its current wars, it has conversely opened a space for challenging the entire foundation of State killing. Interrogating the justifications for targeted killing operations exposes the inherent contradictions in just war theory.

Provost-Smith 13 (Patrick, former Assistant Professor of the History of Christianity at Harvard Divinity School, Ph.D. in history from Johns Hopkins; “A Drone’s Eye View: Global Anti-Terrorism and the Existential Crisis of Just War Theory,” in Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory vol. 12 no. 3, Spring 2013)

As drones become the new centerpiece of counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency warfare, questions regarding their usage have escalated in recent months, particularly in terms of military strategy, political oversight, international relations, and the host of by moral considerations over the inherent scope and scale of the lethal violence that comes with any war. The current administration has purported to take such concerns with seriousness proportionate to what is at stake in a systematic program of targeted killing, now increasingly undertaken through these new technologies.4 It remains unclear exactly how that moral seriousness shapes or delimits the range of possibilities and the kinds of decisions that are made, since authorizing the killing of a particular person suspected of terrorism is not morally significant because of the gravitas of the authorization or who is unable to sleep at night, but because of the reasons for it and their moral intelligibility. The most well-known exponent of that moral seriousness is John Brennan, former national security advisor to the Obama administration, who was entrusted for years by the President with oversight over the UAV program in the Yemen and Africa.5 These programs in their full scope have always been developed and deployed between the diverse armed services and what has become the frankly paramilitary nature of the Central Intelligence Agency. Oversight in Pakistan belonged to the CIA, while deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq fell to the Pentagon. Obama exercised immediate oversight only in the domains of the Yemen and the Sahel - and thus the difficulties of Obama’s assertions that his own moral seriousness in orchestrating the drone program was in some meaningful way illustrative of the level of moral gravitas that accompanied the development and deployment of the new UAVs in any context. Obama’s recent appointment of Brennan to the directorate of the CIA may have been the public occasion for venting the considerable controversies that do exist around the drone programs. But for Obama it provided the administration with the capacity to centralize the programs that did exist into a command structure that would actually control the paramilitary arm of the CIA, never otherwise subject to the Pentagon or the armed services, and to tie those forces together in a way that did at least provide for the potential level of moral scrutiny in the UAV programs that the President envisaged. The appointment was a candid move to place someone in a position of unprecedented power and influence over an incredibly sophisticated and powerful system of covert operations and targeted killings, who was also personally and visibly committed to a similar form of moral scrutiny over targeted killings, and who purportedly shared “the mind of the President” on such matters.6 Drone Warfare and Just War Theory Brennan credits his ethical formation to his Catholicism and his education by the Jesuits at Georgetown University - and that brings into focus a particular kind of moral approach broadly recognizable to many as just war theory. 7 The parameters and core commitments of just war theory have been around long enough and deployed consistently enough, to make explication unnecessary. Just war theory in different guises has been advocated by Catholics and Protestants alike for centuries, and forays into similar or comparable forms of thought in Jewish and Islamic contexts have also emerged. Volumes have streamed forth from academics, policy specialists, and pundits over the last few decades concerning just and unjust wars and the implications of those deliberations for American military deployments. Previous foreign policy “realists”, typified by Henry Kissinger and the architects of the Vietnam War and the Cold War, were less enthralled by this kind of moral scrutiny. Just war theorists after World War II, and especially after Vietnam, have consistently portrayed McNamara, Kissinger, and assorted allies as champions of a potentially vicious Realpolitik in which reasons of state trumped moral deliberation and constraint. The old adage held that all is fair in love and war. 8 Realism in foreign policy has been undoubtedly oversimplified by advocates of just war theory. But just war theory itself has been complicated by the use of modern weapons purportedly to save lives in intractable conflicts. The prevalence of obliteration bombing in Germany and Japan by the Allies during the Second World War, not to mention the decision to drop the newly-developed atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, brought to light the use of just war theory to challenge the propriety of certain kinds of actions on moral grounds in an otherwise justified war.9 But the potential for those new weapons was never recognized by presidents or military planners as an exceptional means of last resort, as the Truman administration frankly understood when it loaded B-52s with atomic bombs to face the standoff produced by the Soviet blockade of Berlin in June of 1948. The development of nuclear weapons by virtually all sides of the Cold War ended that monopoly over prospectively less costly ways to wage wars, and provided the most serious moral crisis for just war theorists since such discourse was invented. The failure of conventional weaponry in Vietnam also had a significant impact upon the moral framework of just war theory. The devastation wrought during that war provoked more moral objection and outrage than any American military campaign since the Philippines, and the heightened influence of just war theorists owes something to this fact.10 Brennan’s fealty to Catholic approaches to just war theory troubles some critics, and religious metaphors have been circulated at least since a Washington Post exposé on the drone program described him as almost a “priest” given his moral gravitas and the seriousness with which he takes the just war tradition.11 Just war theory became a staple of Roman Catholic social thought at least with the First Vatican Council, which canonized Thomas Aquinas as the exemplary theologian for the Church. Early fin de siècle neoThomism underwrote what became in 1944 John Ford’s excoriation of obliteration bombing as a morally defensible tactic for fighting an otherwise just war - and that along with the advocacy of John Courtney Murray served more than any other single instance to cement the perception among just war advocates that the whole program was about moral restraint in a time of conflict. Consequent, as well as controversial, statements issued decades later by Catholic bishops in the United States argued that the use nuclear weapons was never morally permissible under any circumstances because of the very weapons used, and the apparent impossibility of using them discriminately.12 Something deeply disturbing to just war advocates, and indicative of the anti-nuclear positions taken, continued to circulate in the threat postures of “mutually assured destruction” contained in the theory of nuclear deterrence.13 The slip of the nuclear trigger was dangerously close and only circumstantially avoided during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. Yet the annual national security reviews published by the United States continue to affirm the right to use nuclear weapons both as deterrence and defense - a point never lost upon the powers who have sought to develop a nuclear capacity as counter-deterrence to the United States or other nuclear powers. And so advocates of just war theory that rose to positions of prominence after Vietnam have nevertheless had to live with the persistent declaration of nuclear deterrence articulated by every presidential administration since the Soviet Union acquired its own weapons of mass destruction. Whatever just war advocacy Brennan brings to the moral perspective regarding drones finds it place in that complex and unsettled landscape of the last century, when entire cities have been leveled by astoundingly brutal military tactics, and the threat of using these tactics continues. The challenge of nuclear weapons exhibited the deep tensions and disagreements that often mark just war theory in any form. To speak of just war theory now as precariously situated in a state of existential crisis is to peel away the layers of intelligibility that come with the oversimplified and reductive understandings most often advocated in contemporary contexts, something Brennan’s own language often mirrors. Existential crises do imply that a particular approach to just war thinking has imploded in very real historical circumstances, and that the familiar ways of understanding the stakes of just war theory have been shaken. Most advocates would shun the description of just war theory as experiencing any form of crisis, especially considering its relative success in shaping public perception and military strategic doctrine. Yet it remains the case, notwithstanding the arguments of some contemporary advocates, that whatever just war theory is today remains quite unlike what it has been before. Weapons technologies have advanced, and the shape of the conceptual ground upon which the morality of wars and the means of waging them has been theorized has shifted substantially since the first Romans first began to speak of the iustum bellum nearly a millennium before St. Augustine’s own influential writings on the topic.14

#### Highlighting the violence of ongoing drone warfare challenges the status quo narrative of humanitarianism- there is no such thing as just war. The idea that modern warfare has become less violent has been used to silence opposition and legitimize war.

Terrell 13 (Brian Terrell is a co-coordinator of Voices for Creative Nonviolence, Drones and Gadflies, Sept 13, http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/09/13/drones-and-gadflies/)

My own anti-drone activism began with protests at Creech Air Force Base in the Nevada desert in April, 2009. Even some otherwise well informed people were skeptical, back then, that such things were even possible, much less happening daily. Many who were aware accepted the simple and happy narrative of drone warfare as a precise new high-tech system in which soldiers from a safe distance of thousands of miles can pin point those who mean us imminent harm with little or no collateral damage. Even some among our friends in the peace movement questioned the wisdom of focusing attention on drones. Must we protest every new advance in weaponry? Can’t we allow for methods that are at least improvements on indiscriminate carnage? Is not a precisely aimed and delivered drone attack preferable to carpet bombing? Is it not preferable to invasion? Does it make a difference to the victims, in any case, whether there is a pilot in the plane that bombs them or not? The fact that four years later on the day before my release from prison, the president of the United States was defending the use of drones before the country and the world is truly remarkable. This is not a discussion that he or anyone else in the government, politics or the military encouraged or one that the media was anxious to take on. The fact that the issue is up for discussion at all is due to considerable efforts of the few here in the US and the UK in solidarity with many in the streets in Pakistan, Yemen and Afghanistan protesting this foul weaponry. Communities of protest and resistance in Nevada, New York, California, Missouri, Wisconsin, England and Iowa thrust the issue into local forums, courts and media through creative actions and legal stratagems, effectively demanding that grievance over drone killing be heard. The president’s own speech was itself only rescued from being the cleverly constructed but empty litany of alibi, half-truth and obfuscation that it was intended to be by the interruption by our friend, Medea Benjamin. In his 1963 “Letter from a Birmingham Jail,” Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., noted that often a society like ours “bogged down in the tragic attempt to live in monologue rather than dialogue,” requires “nonviolent gadflies” in order to “create a tension in the mind so that individuals could rise from the bondage of myths and half-truths to the unfettered realm of creative analysis and objective appraisal.” As with the issue of segregation 50 years ago, so today the parameters of discussion allowed by politeness and good manners or sanctioned by the police and courts simply cannot abide the objective appraisal of drone warfare that the times require. The discussion such as it is, is made possible only by some who dare speak out of turn, as Medea, or who use their bodies to intrude on the orderly commission of criminalities in our midst. Before the president’s lecture drone warfare’s approval rating was at the top of the polls but a month later drone pilot Col. Bryan Davis of the Ohio Air National Guard noted a turn of the tide. “We are not popular among the American public, every other base has been protested,” he lamented to a local paper. “It doesn’t make you feel warm inside.” The narrative of humanitarian war via drone had begun to unravel in the public eye in the months leading up to the president’s speech and has since fallen further into disrepute. Months before the president made the assertion in his May 23 speech that “by narrowly targeting our action against those who want to kill us and not the people they hide among, we are choosing the course of action least likely to result in the loss of innocent life,” his administration had already revised earlier claims that the drone programs in Yemen and Pakistan had yielded zero known noncombatant deaths to one death to finally admitting to a death toll in “single digits.” By almost any accounting the noncombatant tolls in those countries have been at least in the hundreds. Just weeks after the president spoke at the National Defense University, a journal published by that institution published a study that debunked his assurance that “conventional airpower and missiles are far less precise than drones, and likely to cause more civilian casualties and local outrage.” Drone strikes in Afghanistan, the study found, were “an order of magnitude more likely to result in civilian casualties per engagement.” Another assurance given in this speech, that “America cannot take strikes wherever we choose; our actions are bound by consultations with partners, and respect for state sovereignty,” was discredited on June 8 when the US ambassador to Pakistan was summoned by the prime minister of that country angry over a US drone attack that killed nine people. “It was conveyed to the US chargé ď affaires that the government of Pakistan strongly condemns the drone strikes, which are a violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,” said Pakistan’s ministry of foreign affairs. “The importance of bringing an immediate end to drone strikes was emphasized.” “We act against terrorists who pose a continuing and imminent threat to the American people.” Formerly the word “imminent” referred to something about to happen at any moment and using the generally accepted definition of the word one might construe in the president’s words a guarantee that drone strikes are used only to stop “terrorists” engaged in acts that would cause immediate harm to Americans. John Brennan, now director of the CIA, suggested in September 2011 that “a more flexible understanding of ‘imminence’ may be appropriate when dealing with terrorist groups.” This more flexible understanding of imminence justifies the assassination not only of those caught in the act, but also of targets who are suspected of having written something or said something to make someone think that they might have something to do with an attack on the US someday. A person who is caught on the drones video feed from 7,000 miles away as acting in a manner consistent with someone who might harm one day may now be eliminated as an imminent threat. Referring to the killing of Anwar Awlaki, an American citizen in Yemen, the president assured us that “for the record, I do not believe it would be constitutional for the government to target and kill any US citizen — with a drone, or with a shotgun — without due process.” The general usage of the words “due process” would cause the misapprehension that the right of a citizen to have trial by jury before being executed is being reaffirmed here. “This is simply not accurate,” says Attorney General Eric Holder. “‘Due process’ and ‘judicial process’ are not one and the same, particularly when it comes to national security. The Constitution guarantees due process, not judicial process.” The burden of “due process” can now be met when the president decides based on secret evidence that a citizen should die. Drone technology is changing our language beyond redefining terms like “imminence” and “due process.” We have progressed, too, beyond Orwellian euphemisms such as naming an intercontinental nuclear missile “Peacekeeper.” These new “hunter-killer platforms” bear names like “Predators” and “Reapers” and may soon be supplanted by “Avengers” and “Stalkers.” The ordinance they deliver is a missile named “Hellfire.” In Iowa where I live, the Air National Guard unit based in Des Moines has replaced its F-16 fighter planes with a Reaper drone control center. This transformation was marked by changing the unit’s name from the “132nd Fighter Wing” to the “132nd Attack Wing.” This change is more than symbolic- a “fight” by definition has two sides and the word implies some kind of parity. There is such a thing as a fair fight (of course the 132nd’s F-16s were used only on all but disarmed populations in places like Iraq and Panama) and a fight usually has some kind of resolution. An “attack” however, is just that. An attack is one-sided, something that a perpetrator inflicts on a victim. A fighter might sometimes be justified, an attacker, never. There is no “just attack” theory. The parsing out of innocent and guilty drone victims is in a sense a waste of time. All alike are victims. George Kennan, might have seen this coming in a policy paper he wrote for the State Department in 1948. In order to preserve the global disparity of wealth post World War II (“We have about 50% of the world’s wealth, but only 6.3% of its population”) he suggested that “we should cease to talk about vague and unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of the living standards, and democratization. The day is not far off when we are going to have to deal in straight power concepts. The less we are then hampered by idealistic slogans, the better.” While the speech at the National Defense University was an embarrassment of idealistic slogans, it also used chilling pragmatism to deal with straight power concepts. “For me,” the president said on May 23, “and those in my chain of command, those deaths will haunt us as long as we live.” Those words had a truer ring a few days later spoken on NBC news by Brandon Bryant, an Air Force drone operator who confessed to being haunted by 1,600 deaths he took part in. Bryant admitted that his actions made him feel like a “heartless sociopath,” and he described one of his first kills, sitting in a chair at Creech Air Force Base in Nevada when his team fired on three men walking down a road in Afghanistan. It was night in Afghanistan, and he remembers watching the thermal image of one victim on his computer screen: “I watch this guy bleed out and, I mean, the blood is hot.” Bryant watched the man die and his image disappear as his body attained the ambient temperature of the ground. “I can see every little pixel, if I just close my eyes.” The remoteness of the drone warrior is no protection from the moral damage of war, and these people are victims as well, and it is on their behalf as well that we protest. We cannot know the hearts of President Obama and those in his inner circle but it is not hard to wonder whether they are truly haunted by the deaths of those killed by drones at their commands. If they may not be haunted by their own consciences, perhaps the responsibility of haunting them falls to us.

#### Just war theory is in the business of legitimizing violence-It controls the conversation and our imagination-Technology and strategy have combined to create a cycle of infinite targets and endless war.

Provost-Smith 13 (Patrick, former Assistant Professor of the History of Christianity at Harvard Divinity School, Ph.D. in history from Johns Hopkins; “A Drone’s Eye View: Global Anti-Terrorism and the Existential Crisis of Just War Theory,” in Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory vol. 12 no. 3, Spring 2013)

Swirling in the circularity of the justificans bellum, increasingly aided by developments in artificial intelligence and information technology, whoever is curious as to what just war theory is all about looks in vain for what jus is meant to do when it qualifies war in the first place, or for how it functions in the grammar of the jus ad bellum and jus in bello at all. Just war proponents have held positions in every major military academy, dominated think tanks and policy circles, and written as pundits on whether this or that war has met the appropriate criteria upheld by the tradition for more than a couple of decades. As a result, the moral framework has yielded unanticipated success in the public sphere. Yet it is one thing to weigh the causes and means for waging wars in the framework of just war theory, and another to be in the business of justifying wars, strategies, tactics, and new technologies. One may entertain informed suspicions, but evaluation of the huge outpouring of just war argumentation appearing in the last three or four decades might help decide the question of whether the enterprise has been fundamentally about the justification of wars, or about whatever it means to constrain violence by subjection of such things to moral scrutiny - ironically, a task for which data mining technologies might prove immensely helpful. Something is amiss when a moral tradition that understands itself to have been formed by an appeal to moral restraint in the declaring and waging of wars now finds itself in becoming an ethics panel writ large for politicians, policy makers, military strategists, and makers of military hardware. In reality, it seems to be about experts advancing a strategic objective as far as is possible before the just warriors intervene and stop them just short of crossing the line dividing morally permissible from morally culpable action. The boundary is sufficiently flexible to permit the ethics panelists to empower the soldier to approach that line more closely than might have otherwise been the case. Consequently, the circle of legitimate means for fighting a war just got enlarged, and the fighting of it just got escalated. The argument for restraint only works when a proposed very real, concrete action is contrasted with an imagined outcome weighed out as an inevitability. The upshot is that just warriors now find themselves more than ever in the business of establishing the outer moral limit of wars and means for waging them by imagining the boundaries for an imaginary war. Conceptual claims about what technology can and cannot do have not only been shallow and ill-conceived, they enable the next round of technology to scale up the range of possibilities for fighting wars dangerously close to crossing the moral border markers. Smart bombs are no more an innovation fostering moral discrimination any more than rifled barrels for firearms did in the century before the last. The question hardly needs to be raised whether more people have died from rifles and modern propellants than black powder muskets. The concentration of lethal power, along with new and transformative technologies for wielding it, in the hands of an intelligence-based regime appears to be not simply the brute necessity of waging a war on terror at the behest of humanitarian intervention, nor simply the extension of the analogy of self-defense to preposterous lengths. It is the formation of a new approach to foreign policy underwritten by a new way of fighting a potentially perpetual war against threats to the interests of the United States in which the use of covert and secretive lethal force is the new preferred means for sustaining it. Ironically, if just war theory has always been a theory of sovereignty, and its immediate history has been underwritten by notions of the sovereign nation-state, then it also becomes apparent that the new case for perpetual war for the sake of perpetual peace is much closer than realized to a frankly postmodern project predicated on the collapse of sovereignty invested in the modern nation state. Clandestine drone wars wreak havoc upon the legacy of Westphalia. They have ceased to be remotely related to Kant’s prescriptions for perpetual peace upon which just warriors have relied for over two centuries. A war without borders against persons with no national identity is not a modern war. It is a consequence of the failure of modern wars to deal with the problems that have haunted the modern project, and those are about religious more than national or ethnic identities. The drone program, according to Obama and his subordinates, is here to stay, and the technologies that have enabled it are likewise set to transform the American way of war into something that war has never before been. The reach of technologically enabled covert operations is now theoretically infinite when abstracted from the constraints of having intelligence or special operations forces on the ground. The range of targets is theoretically endless and how they are singled out and on what basis they are targeted will only a select few be privy to. New data and computational capacities may mean that no one really knows those bases at all. Hence the response to the perceived infinity of evil presenting as terrorism is the infinite reach of lethal force, and an infinite war posture to sustain it. The dilemma associated with contemporary wars, which frame religion in the modern world as collared and leashed by the demands of secularity and modernity, is that for a good many people of faith the notion of God’s sovereignty ultimately implies that only God is worth killing for. It is not evident that such a view furthers violence more than whatever is enabled by the natural right to self-defense and its legal analogs - especially in a time of war. At the very least it would prohibit the now accepted and legally justified practice of killing over theft or threats to private property, and it might make exclusive national control over global resources untenable. It may be that in wars in defense of national interests everything that has drawn geographical borders around the concept of sovereignty have proven to be the impultrix violentia of contemporary warfare in ways that belie the modern presumption to have solved endemic religious violence through politics. There is good historical evidence for the suspicion that religions may be better prepared to form wise men who love peace than the modern state. The suspicion itself cannot be contained in a context presumed to have been secularized long ago. It instead indicates that religion in the modern globalized world will find means of negotiation with the demands of all kinds of societies in all kinds of places other than those that enforce privatization of religious sensibilities and commitments, which is precisely the modern project. To the extent just war theory cannot freely concede that “religious extremism” - the conflict between global and globalizing religions and the shape of the nation-state - is in essence the primary moral and political problem it addresses , it betrays its own profound existential crisis, and ceases to become relevant any longer in today’s world. That world is now shaped by perpetual wars against infinite targets in infinite places with the hubris of infinite power relentlessly driven by the technological imagination. It is no longer difficult to imagine a future in which critics of a previous generation’s investment in the “archaic” theory of just and unjust wars are merely proclaiming the obvious.

#### Highlighting the issue of drone warfare is a useful starting point for a larger interrogation of State killing-Exposing the history of targeted killing is an important mechanism for challenging the secret global war on terrorism.

Noble 12 (Doug, activist with the Upstate Coalition to Ground the Drones, Assassination Nation, July 19, http://www.counterpunch.org/2012/07/19/assassination-nation/)

This striking new transparency, the official acknowledgment for the first time of a broad-based US assassination and targeted killing program, has resulted from the unprecedented and controversial visibility of drone warfare. Drones now make news every day, and those of us who have been protesting their use for years have heightened their visibility in the public eye, forcing official acknowledgment and fostering worldwide scrutiny. This new scrutiny focuses not only on drone use but also, and perhaps more importantly, on the targeted killing itself – and the “kill lists” that make them possible. This new exposure has set off a firestorm of reaction around the globe. Chris Woods of the Bureau of Investigative Journalism told Democracy Now! “The kill list got really heavy coverage … newspapers have all expressed significant concern about the existence of the kill list, the idea of this level of executive power.” [5] A Washington Post editorial noted that “No president has ever relied so extensively on the secret killing of individuals to advance the nation’s security goals.” [6] Becker and Shane of the Times pronounced Obama’s role “without precedent in presidential history, of personally overseeing the shadow war …” [7] And former president Jimmy Carter insisted, in a recent editorial in The New York Times, “We don’t know how many hundreds of innocent civilians have been killed in these [drone] attacks, each one approved by the highest authorities in Washington. This would have been unthinkable in previous times.” [8] Really? In fact, US assassination and targeted killing, with presidential approval, has been going on covertly for at least half a century. Ironically, all this drone killing now offers us a new opportunity: to pry open the Pandora’s box hiding long-held secrets of covert US assassination and targeted killing, and to expose them to the light of day. What we would find is that the only things new in the latest, more publicized revelations about kill lists and assassinations are the use of drones, the president’s hands-on approach in vetting targets, and the global scope of the drone killing. Those of us in the Upstate Coalition to Ground the Drones, Code Pink and other groups protesting US drones for years have correctly focused on the use of drones as illegal, immoral and strategically counterproductive. We have abhorred the schizophrenic ease of remote killing, the uniquely frightening horror of a drone strike, and the unavoidable (even intentional) killing of countless civilian “terrorist suspects” in “signature strikes.” We have also warned of the proliferation of drones in countries around the globe and of their procurement by US police forces and border patrols, for surveillance and “non-lethal” targeting. But drones are not the only, or even the most important, concern. It’s the targeted killing itself, past and present. In this article I start to unravel what the latest demands for transparency should lead us to investigate fully: the fifty year history of US assassination and targeted killing that has resulted, quite directly, in the present moment. Those who are mortified by the latest revelations of Obama’s kill list have much to learn from a more comprehensive, historical perspective on US killing around the globe. Who knows: Perhaps someone in Congress might even be prodded to do what Senators Fulbright and Church did in years past: hold hearings on this continuing execration taking place in our name. Until then, what follows is an introduction to this ongoing horror story. Section 1 of this article briefly reviews the lethal history of the US Phoenix Program in Vietnam, the original source of subsequent US counter terrorist tactics and strategies. Section 2 revisits briefly the well-worn history of US kill lists and assassinations in Latin American countries, followed by the somewhat less-well-known history of US kill lists and assassinations in countries on other continents. Section 3 traces the direct legacy of Phoenix, even its explicit resurrection by the key architects of the US targeted killing programs in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in a growing number of “countries we are not at war with.” One point of clarification and definition. It is well known that in recent history the US has orchestrated assassination attempts, both successful and unsuccessful, on major world leaders. Examples include: Lumumba under Eisenhower, Castro and Diem under Kennedy, Gaddhafi under Reagan, Saddam Hussein under Bush, and Allende under Nixon. [9] The term “assassination” is typically restricted to such killings of political leaders, and President Ford’s executive order banning assassination applies only to the assassination of foreign heads of state. [10] The focus of this article is different. Here we discuss the US-generated kill lists used over the last half century, under direct presidential authority, for the targeted killing of thousands of civilians suspected of being or harboring terrorists/ insurgents, from Vietnam to Guatemala, from Indonesia to Iraq, right up to the present day. The Phoenix Program The US Phoenix Program was a secret, large scale counter terrorist effort in Vietnam. Developed in 1967 by the CIA, the Phoenix Program, called Phung Hoang by the Vietnamese, aimed a concerted effort to “neutralize” the Vietcong Infrastructure (VCI) consisting of South Vietnamese civilians suspected of supporting North Vietnamese or Viet Cong soldiers. The euphemism “neutralize” meant to kill or detain indefinitely. Then CIA Director William Colby, while insisting in 1971 Congressional hearings that “the Phoenix program is not a program of assassination,” nonetheless conceded that Phoenix operations killed over 20,000 people between 1967 and 1972. [11] Phoenix targeted civilians, not soldiers. Operations were carried out by “hunter-killer teams” consisting both of US Green Berets and Navy Seals and by South Vietnamese Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs), units of mercenaries set up for assassination and “counter terror.” A Newsweek article in January 1970 described Phoenix as “a highly secret and unconventional operation that counters VC terror with terror of its own.” [12] Robert Kaiser of the Washington Post reported Phoenix being called “an instrument of mass political murder…sort of Vietnamese Murder Inc.,” designed to terrorize the civilian population into submission.” [13] Until 1970 the computerized VCI blacklist was a unilateral American operation. After the devastating 1968 Tet offensive, South Vietnamese President Thieu declared: “The VCI must be eliminated…and will be defeated by the Phoenix program.” [14] Phoenix became a ruthless “bounty hunting” program to eliminate the opposition. [15] The US and South Vietnamese created a list of tens of thousands of suspects for assassination. These names were centralized and distributed to Phoenix coordinators. From 1965-68 U.S. and Saigon intelligence services maintained an active list of Viet Cong cadre marked for assassination. The program for 1969 called for “neutralizing” 1800 a month. The VCI blacklist became corrupted by officers inserting their personal enemies’ names to get even. Due process was nonexistent. Names supplied by anonymous informers showed up on blacklists. [16] CIA Director Colby admitted in 1971 that the blacklists had been “inaccurate.” [17] Few senior VCI leaders were caught in the Phoenix net. Instead its victims were typically innocent civilians. A Pentagon-contract study found that, between 1970 and 1971, ninety-seven per cent of the Vietcong targeted by the Phoenix Program were of negligible importance. [18] By 1973, Phoenix generated 300,000 political prisoners in South Vietnam. Military operations such as My Lai used Phoenix intelligence; in fact, the My Lai massacre, hardly an isolated incident, was itself a Phoenix operation. [19] Apologists have offered rationales for Phoenix that sound eerily similar to those used to defend current drone attacks. Phoenix was typically referred to as a “scalpel” replacing the “bludgeon” of search and destroy, aerial bombardment or artillery barrages. Alternatively, it was called a precision “rifle shot rather than a shotgun approach to target key political leaders … and activists in VCI.” [20] Military historian Dale Andrade explains, “Both SEALS and PRUs killed many VCI guerrillas – that was war. They also inevitably killed innocent civilians – that was regrettable….but [Phoenix] operations were much more discerning than the massive affairs launched by conventional …forces. That fact was often lost in the rhetoric of assassination and murder …”[21] Phoenix was created, organized, and funded by the CIA. Quotas were set by Americans. Informers were paid with US funds. The national system of identifying suspects, the elaboration of numerical goals and their use as measures of merit, was designed and funded by Americans. One former US Phoenix soldier conceded, “It was “heinous,” far worse than the things attributed to it.” [22] Kill Lists from Phoenix to Latin America The US intelligence community formalized the lessons of the Phoenix Program in Vietnam by commissioning Project X, the Army’s top-secret program for transmitting Vietnam’s lessons to South America. [23] By the mid-1970s, the Project X materials were going to armies all over the world. These were textbooks for global counterinsurgency and terror warfare. These included a murder manual, “Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare,” which openly instructed in the assassination of public officials, and was distributed to the Nicaraguan Contras. Another manual, “Human Resource Exploitation Training Manual,” was used widely in Honduran counterrorism efforts. Use of the Project X material was temporarily suspended by Congress and the Carter administration for probable human rights violations, but the program was restored by the Reagan administration in 1982. By the mid-1980s, according to one detailed history, “counterguerrilla operations in Colombia and Central America would thus bear an eerie but explicable resemblance to South Vietnam.” [24] What follows is a brief sketch of the widespread application of US-promulgated Phoenix-derived reigns of terror, kill lists, and death squads throughout Latin America and beyond. Much of this is familiar territory to many activists and scholars, and is merely the tip of the iceberg, but it merits review as a backdrop for the current context of kill lists and targeted assassination. [25] US KILL LISTS AND ASSASSINATION IN LATIN AMERICA The U.S. Army’s School of Americas (SOA), started in 1946, trained mass murderers and orchestrated coups in Peru, Panama, Argentina, Ecuador, Bolivia, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Mexico. The SOA trained more than 61,000 Latin American officers implicated in widespread slaughter of civilian populations across Latin America. From 1966-1976 the SOA trained hundreds of Latin American officers in Phoenix-derived methods. Between 1989-1991 the SOA issued almost 700 copies of Project X handbooks to at least ten Latin American countries, including Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, Guatemala, and Honduras. In 2001, SOA was renamed Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHISC), but peace activists know it as School of Assassins. [26] The CIA trained assassination groups such as Halcones in Mexico, the Mano Blanca in Guatemala, and the Escuadron de la Muerte in Brazil. In South America, in 1970-79, Operation Condor, the code-name for collection, exchange and storage of intelligence, was established among intelligence services in South America to eradicate Marxist activities. Operation Condor promoted joint operations including assassination against targets in member countries. In Central America, the CIA-supported death toll under the Reagan presidency alone exceeded 150,000. The CIA set up Ansesal and other networks of terror in El Salvador, Guatemala (Ansegat) and pre-Sandinista Nicaragua (Ansenic). Honduran death squads were active through the 1980s, the most infamous of which was Battalion 3–16, which assassinated hundreds of people, including teachers, politicians, and union leaders. Battalion 316 received substantial CIA support and training, and at least 19 members graduated from the School of the Americas. In Colombia, about 20,000 people were killed since 1986 and much of U.S. aid for counternarcotics was diverted to what Amnesty International labeled “one of the worst killing fields.” The US State Department also supported the Colombian army in creating a database of subversives, terrorists and drug dealers. In Bolivia, Amnesty International reported that from 1966-68 between 3,000 and 8,000 people were killed by death squads. The CIA supplied names of U.S. and other foreign missionaries and progressive priests. In Ecuador, the CIA maintained what was called the lynx list, aka the subversive control watch list of the most important left-wing activists to arrest. In Uruguay. Every CIA station maintained a subversive control watch list of most important left wing activists. From 1970-72 the CIA helped set up the Department of Information and Intelligence (DII), which served as a cover for death squads, and also co-ordinated meetings between Brazilian and Uruguayan death squads. In Nicaragua, the US provided illegal funds to the Contras, and Marine intelligence helped maintain a list of civilians marked for assassination when Contra forces entered the country. In Chile, 1970-73, CIA-created unions organized CIA-financed strikes leading to Allende’s overthrow and subsequent suicide. By late 1971 the CIA was involved in the preparation of lists of nearly 20,000 middle-level leaders of people’s organizations, scheduled to be assassinated after the Pinochet coup. In Haiti, U.S. officials with CIA backgrounds in Phoenix-like program activities coordinated with the Ton-Ton Macoute, “Baby Doc” Duvalier’s private death squad, responsible for killing at least 3,000 people. For over thirty years the US military and the CIA helped organize, train, and fund death squad activity in El Salvador. From 1980-93, at least 63,000 Salvadoran civilians were killed, mostly by the government directly supported by the U.S. The CIA routinely supplied ANSESAL, the security forces, and the general staff with electronic, photographic, and personal surveillance of suspected dissidents and Salvadorans abroad who were later assassinated by death squads. US militray involvement in El Salvador allowed “the lessons learned in Vietnam to be put into practice … assisting an allied country in counterinsurgency operations.” [27] In Guatemala, as early as 1954, the U.S. Ambassador, after the CIA-orchestrated overthrow of the Arbenz government, gave to the new Armas government lists of radical opponents to be assassinated. Years later, throughout Guatemala’s 36-year civil war, Washington continuously to supported the Guatemalan military’s excesses against civilians, which killed 200,000 people. US Assassination Programs Exported to Other Countries In Indonesia, 1965-66, the US embassy and the CIA provided the Indonesian military with lists of the names of PKI militants, which were used by Suharto to crush the PKI regime. This resulted in “one of the worst episodes of mass murder of the twentieth century,” with estimates as high as one million deaths. [28] In Thailand, in 1976, the new junta used CIA-trained forces to crush student demonstrators during coup; two right-wing terrorist squads suspected for assassinations tied directly to CIA operations. In Iran, the CIA launched a coup installing the shah in power and helped establish the lethal secret police unit SAVAK. [29] The CIA and SAVAK then exchanged intelligence, including information and arrest lists on the communist Tudeh party. Years later, in 1983, the CIA gave the Khomeni government a list of USSR KGB agents and collaborators operating in Iran, which the Khomeni regime used to execute 200 suspects and close down the communist Tudeh party. In the Philippines, in 1986, Reagan increased CIA involvement in Philippine counterinsurgency operations, carried out by more than 50 death squads. In 2001, before 9/11, the Bush administration sent a unit of SOF to the Philippines “to help train Philippine counter terrorist forces fighting against Muslim separatists” within groups like Abu Sayyaf. After 9/11 US-Filipino cooperation was stepped up and the ongoing separatist conflict was cast, to the benefit of both sides, as “the second front in the war on terror.”[30] In Feb, 2012, a US drone strike targeting leaders of Abu Sayyaf and other separatist groups killed 15 people, the first use of killer drones in Southeast Asia. [31] A “global Phoenix Program”: drone targets worldwide “A global Phoenix program … would provide a useful start point” for “a new strategic approach to the Global War on Terrorism.” –David Kilcullen [32] IRAQ Despite the US-perpetrated counter terrorist slaughter in Latin America and elsewhere in the 1970s-1990s, the US Special Forces debacle in Mogadishu in 1993, popularized in the film Black Hawk Down, severely impacted US willingness to use Special Forces in counter terrorist missions for the next decade. But then, after 9/11, things changed drastically. On September 17, 2001, President Bush signed a secret Presidential finding authorizing the C.I.A. to create paramilitary teams to hunt, capture, detain, or kill designated terrorists almost anywhere in the world. The pressure from the White House, in particular from Vice-President Dick Cheney, was intense, and in the scramble, a search of the C.I.A.’s archives turned up – the Phoenix Program. [33] In July , 2002, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld sent an order for a plan to make sure that special forces could be authorized to use lethal force ‘in minutes and hours, not days and weeks.’” [34] Rumsfeld prompted Bush to authorize the military to “find and finish” terrorist targets. Here he was referring to “the F3EA targeting cycle” used in anti-infrastructure operations by Special Operations Forces. F3EA, an abbreviation of find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, utilizes comprehensive intelligence to “find a target amidst civilian clutter and fix his exact location . . . . enabling surgical finish operations … to catch a fleeting target.” [35] Lt General William (Jerry) Boykin, Delta commander in Mogadishu, deputy undersecretary for Defense for Intelligence and a key planner of the Special Forces offensive in Iraq, announced, “We’re going after these people. Killing or capturing them … doing what the Phoenix program was designed to do, without all the secrecy.” [36] Back in 1963, the CIA had supplied lists of communists to the Baath party coup so that communists could be rounded up and eliminated. [37] Now, forty years later, it was the Baathists’ turn to be rounded up by Special Forces and CIA and executed. After the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the U.S. military notoriously developed a set of playing cards to help troops identify the most-wanted members of Saddam Hussein‘s government, mostly high-ranking Baath Party members. Less well-known was the secret targeted killing of thousands of Baathist civilians by US Special Forces. Seymour Hersh wrote in 2003 that “The Bush Administration authorized a major escalation of the Special Forces covert war in Iraq. … Its highest priority [being] the neutralization of the Baathist insurgents, by capture or assassination. [38] A former C.I.A. station chief described the strategy: “The only way we can win is to go unconventional. We’re going to have to play their game. Guerrilla versus guerrilla. Terrorism versus terrorism. We’ve got to scare the Iraqis into submission.” [39] The US even hired thousands of contract killers previously responsible for US-sponsored extra-judicial killings and death squad activity in Latin America. The operation—called “preëmptive manhunting” by one Pentagon adviser—had, according to Hersh, “the potential to turn into another Phoenix Program.” [40] Global Phoenix In 2009, the Office of the Secretary of Defense sponsored a paper by the National Defense Research Institute entitled “The Phoenix Program and Contemporary Counterinsurgency.” The paper notes, “The persistent insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan have generated fresh interest among military officers, policymakers, and civilian analysts in the history of counterinsurgency. The Phoenix Program in Vietnam—the U.S. effort to improve intelligence coordination and operations aimed at identifying and dismantling the communist underground—is the subject of much renewed attention.” [41] The paper continues, “As the United States and its allies shift their focus to Afghanistan and weigh counterinsurgency alternatives for that country, decisionmakers would be wise to consider how Phoenix-style approaches might serve to pry open Taliban and Al-Qaeda black boxes.” [42] Two key architects of the current Phoenix-style global counterinsurgency efforts by the US are David Kilcullen and Michael Vickers. David Kilcullen has been counterinsurgency advisor to two former Middle East commanders, General Stanley McChrystal (formerly head of Special Operations) and General David Petraeus, now CIA Director. Michael G. Vickers, made famous in the book and film Charlie Wilson’s War about the CIA’s anti-Soviet Afghan campaign of the 1980s, is currently Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, wielding such vast authority over the US war on terror that, according to a Washington Post profile, Pentagon colleagues refer to as his “take-over-the-world-plan.” [43] Kilcullen wrote in a much-quoted 2004 paper entitled “Countering Global Insurgency” that “Counterinsurgency campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq have reawakened official and analytical interest in the Phoenix Program.” He proposed that “a global Phoenix program … would provide a useful start point” for “a new strategic approach to the Global War on Terrorism,” one which would focus on “interdicting links … between jihad theatres, denying sanctuary areas, … isolating Islamists from local populations and … disrupting inputs” from others. [44] Vickers issued a Phoenix-style directive in December 2008 to “develop capabilities for extending U.S. reach into denied areas and uncertain environments by operating with and through indigenous foreign forces or by conducting low visibility operations.” “It’s not just the Middle East. It’s not just the developing world. It’s not just non-democratic countries – it’s a global problem. Threats can emanate from Denmark, the United Kingdom, you name it.” [45] According to a Washington Post profile, “the most critical aspect of Vicker’s plan targeting al-Qaeda-affiliated networks around the world involves US Special Forces working through foreign partners to uproot and fight terrorism.” [46] US military and Special Operations forces would “pay indigenous fighters and paramilitaries who work with them in gathering intelligence, hunting terrorists, fomenting guerrilla warfare or putting down an insurgency.” [47] Pentagon colleagues have said of Vickers, “he tends to think like a gangster.” [48] Pentagon press secretary Geoff Morrell revealed that getting Bin Laden in Pakistan was Vicker’s “baby,” and “more than anyone else in the department, he drove the issue.” [49] 2011 New York Times Vickers summarizes his strategy this: “You make a deal with the devil to defeat another devil.”[50] “I just want to kill those guys.” [51] A 2011 Such is the megalomaniacal mission underlying the US global war on terror, its kill lists and worldwide program of targeted assassination. Killer Drones Revisited “Engaging in any assassination blurs the line between the good guys and the bad.” It is also “a proclamation of weakness and an admission of failure.” –John Jacob Nutter, The CIA’s Black Ops [52] The purpose of this article is to reframe the current attention on killer drones and Obama’s “kill list” within an historical perspective. The goal here is not to discourage the escalating protest against killer drones or against Obama’s targeted assassination program around the globe. As stated at the outset, the unprecedented visibility of these nefarious activities and of the outraged public response to them is precisely what is needed at this time. This heightened awareness also affords a perfect opportunity to revisit the extraordinary history of US assassination and targeted killing that has led directly and explicitly to these activities. Focus on the drones alone will not be sufficient. For even the major counter terrorist mastermind David Kilcullen himself, an avid proponent of the global targeted killing program, has argued against the use of drones. In a 2009 New York Times editorial he argues that “The goal should be to isolate extremists from their communities; [they] must be defeated by indigenous forces…Drone strikes make this harder, not easier.” He adds, “The use of drones displays every characteristic of a tactic – or, more accurately, a piece of technology – substituting for a strategy, [with minimal understanding] of the tribal dynamics of the local population. This creates public outrage and a desire for revenge.” [53] Scholar Maria Ryan, in a 2011 article entitled “War in Countries We Are Not at War With,” writes: “In 2006 the Pentagon announced that it had sent small teams of Special Operations troops to US embassies to gather intelligence on terrorism in Africa, South East Asia and South America…There is, then, a covert side to the Global War on Terrorism that is not visible and not currently knowable in the absence of whistleblowers, leaks, or things gone wrong.” [54] The heightened public attention paid to drone killing might very well, in time, lead to some welcome success in curtailing their use. But too narrow a focus on the US deployment of Predator and Reaper drones might also distract us from other forms of Phoenix-derived targeted killing still being perpetrated globally – and covertly – by our Assassination Nation.

#### This infinite war will culminate in planetary extinction.

Hanrahan 11 (Clare, Militarism and the "Economics of Extinction," http://warisacrime.org/content/militarism-and-economics-extinction

War is an all out assault on life. Every living being is in peril. The interrelated systems that sustain life are approaching total collapse from resource depletion, wanton killing and the environmental degradation of centuries of senseless war. The single most egregious and unrelenting source of ecocide is the Pentagon, an agency that consumes nearly 50 percent of each U.S. tax dollar extorted from the workers in the name of national defense. More than fifty years ago U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned that "the problem in defense is how far you can go without destroying from within what you are trying to defend from without." We have gone way too far—beyond the limits of law, morality and of sane self interest. With the Pentagon's practices of obfuscation and denial, it is a daunting task to uncover and document the staggering facts of just how severe—and in some instances irreversible—is the ecological damage brought on by militarism. What is known of the grim statistics is a stunning indictment of the woefully misnamed Department of Defense. How did this happen? What is the extent of the poisoning? Who will clean up the mess? Is it too late to turn this around? Warfare has never been easy on the earth, yet throughout thousands of years of recorded military history, this living planet has managed to recover and adjust to a succession of trampling armies encroaching with roads, leveling forests, damming rivers, polluting the air, the soil and water, digging entrenchments, bombarding and poisoning the lands, destroying habitat and crops, ~~raping~~, pillaging and eliminating uncounted species of plants and animals. The human cost in war has also been high but in past centuries was limited mostly to combatants. That is no longer the reality. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) estimated in the 1990s that civilian deaths constituted 90 percent of all deaths in war. In recent decades more children have been killed than soldiers and more deaths occur after the battlefield is abandoned than during combat. In almost every U.S. community where the Department of Defense and its corporate military contractors employ millions in the production, maintenance, and storage of "conventional," chemical, and nuclear weapons, the health of the workers and the natural environment is sacrificed. According to a 1989 US General Accounting Office report, the US Military produces more than 400,000 tons of hazardous waste each year. That figure is most certainly a low estimate. With astounding obedience, We the People have been willing to relinquish our lives, our children's lives, our values and the very survival of the earth in the name of national security. In 1942, the 3,000 residents of five rural Tennessee mountain communities were given just a few weeks' notice to vacate their homes and ancestral farms. Thus was the "secret city" of Oak Ridge established, and the 60,000 acres of Tennessee valleys and ridges expropriated for the war effort. The Manhattan Project was developed to enrich the uranium used for the Hiroshima bomb. In subsequent decades, and in the name of national security, officials knowingly subjected atomic industry workers, soldiers and nearby residents to deadly doses of radiation at nuclear sites throughout the country. "Some 300,000 people, or half of those who ever worked in the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, are believed to have been affected by exposure to radiation," asserts Michael Renner, of the World Watch Institute writing in the 1997 book War and Public Health. Every step of the nuclear bomb-making process involves severe environmental contamination that lingers for generations. "Of all the different ways in which military operations have an impact on human health and the environment, nuclear weapons production and testing is the most severe and enduring," Renner says. As a result of naval accidents there are at least 50 nuclear warheads and 11 nuclear reactors littering the ocean floor. Some researchers estimate that the radioactive fallout from atmospheric nuclear tests have already caused as many as 86,000 birth defects and 150,000 premature deaths. Two million more cancer deaths may yet ensue from the now-banned above ground explosions. Despite the horrific consequences of nuclear energy, in Oak Ridge today, the Obama administration has approved an additional 7.5 billion dollars for refurbishing the next generation of thermonuclear weapons, assuring a stockpile of death for generations to come. The unprecedented atomic devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, murdering hundreds of thousands, pales in comparison to the impact of modern weapons of mass destruction. Militarism in this atomic age has developed and used weapons so heinous as to extend the murderous reach to all future generations. After more than 60 years producing atomic weapons and nuclear energy, the Department of Defense and Department of Energy have accumulated over 500,000 tons of so-called depleted uranium, which it offers free of charge to weapons makers throughout the world. In Jonesborough, Tennessee, down a quiet country lane in the heart of the Southern Appalachian Mountains, Aerojet Ordnance employs a small workforce to produce weaponized uranium armaments. Bullets are coated with the radioactive waste from enriching U-235 to produce fuel for nuclear reactors and atomic bombs. According to investigative reporter Bob Nichols, writing in 2010 for the San Francisco Bay View, Iraq and virtually all the rest of the Middle East and Central Asia has been continually dosed for almost 20 years with thousands of tons of weaponized ceramic uranium oxide gas, also known as depleted uranium." These bullets, shells and bombs, when exploded, reach temperatures over 3,000 degrees centigrade and become a lethal uranium aerosol that "never stops indiscriminately maiming and killing." The contamination persists for billions of years, both on the battlefield and at US manufacturing and storage sites. Research has confirmed that uranium oxide (UO) particles, when inhaled, migrate up the olfactory nerve to the brain. They are so small they can even enter the body through the skindestroying cells in the brains, bones, and testicles or ovaries of anyone contaminated with the radioactive particles—friend, foe or noncombatant. In addition to the horrific crimes of authorizing, producing and deploying weaponized uranium, the U.S. military's lethal footprint around the globe includes toxins from heavy metals, dioxins, PCB's, asbestos, mustard, sarin and nerve gas, as well as other chemical and biological weapons. And scattered on battlefields throughout the world are as many as 100 million unexploded antipersonnel land mines. Eighty percent of landmine victims have been noncombatants. In Viet Nam, from 1962 to 1970, the US military engaged in chemical warfare dousing the country with 19 million gallons of herbicides, mostly Agent Orange produced by Monsanto, Dow Chemical and other U.S. manufacturers. The dioxin rich chemicals contaminated about five million acres of farmland, forest and waters. At least one million Vietnamese people and more than 100,000 Americans and allied troops were poisoned with deadly effects that have continued into the third generation. The human and environmental devastation in Central American during the US proxy wars of the 1980s is yet another horrific chapter in the tragedy of US militarism. In the United States alone, the Pentagon is responsible for at least 25,000 contaminated properties in all 50 states, according to a 2008 Washington Post report. Nine hundred abandoned military bases, weapons manufacturing and testing sites and other military-related industries are listed on the Environmental Protection Agency's list of 1,300 sites most hazardous to human and ecological health, and that is only a portion of the polluted sites. As many as 20 million Americans in 43 states drink water contaminated by cancer-causing perchlorate, a carcinogen found in missile and rocket fuel. According to a 1991 edition of Rachel's hazardous Waste news (#224), "… the military has exposed thousands (perhaps millions) of innocent Americans to deadly amounts of radioactivity and to a witch's brew of potent chemical toxins, has covered up these facts, has lied to the victims and their families, has lied to the press, has lied to Congress. It is a scandal and an outrage on such a scale that it takes your breath away." In 2011 it is still hard to catch one's breath in the face of this ongoing and intentional assault on the earth. And of course, it is not just the Pentagon with its lethal global reach, but the insidious corporate/government alliance that Dwight D. Eisenhower warned of over fifty years ago— a crime syndicate that colludes to profit from and deny responsibility for planetary ecocide. Gaia isn't bound by national borders, nor is this distressed planet protected by the false distinctions militarists make between combat zones and the lands they claim to defend. The militarists and the scientists in their employ have reached into the very heavens to harness the energies of the ionosphere in the service of war. Dr. Rosalie Bertell, a scientist and Roman Catholic nun confirms that "US military scientists are working on weather systems as a potential weapon. The methods include the enhancing of storms and the diverting of vapor rivers in the Earth's atmosphere to produce targeted droughts or floods." The US military practiced this so-called "geophysical warfare" in Viet Nam with Project Skyfire and Project Stormfury. Now the Pentagon is arrogantly pursuing what it calls "full spectrum" US military domination. Dr. Bertell has written of military experiments that may have played a part in earthquakes and unusual weather conditions and even accelerated global warming. Current military projects such as HAARP (High-frequency Active Auroral Research Program) are part of a "growing chain of astonishingly powerful, and potentially interactive, military installations, using varied types of electromagnetic fields or wavelengths, each with a different ability to affect the earth or its atmosphere," according to Dr. Bertell. Is there no end to the arrogance? We must intervene. We must put a stop to the militarism characterized by Academy of Natural Sciences writer Roland Wall as "a direct and relentless assault on human and natural ecosystems." The Department of Defense uses 360,000 barrels of oil each day. This amount makes the DoD the single largest oil consumer in the world. According to Sharon E. Burke, the Pentagon's director of operational energy plans and programs, the Defense Logistics Agency delivers more than 170,000 barrels of oil each day to the war theaters, at a cost of $9.6 billion in 2010. Climate change activists, rightly concerned about the continued use of fossil fuels to power our insatiable energy demands, have taken to the streets of Washington, DC to call for a halt to the tar sands oil pipeline, other resisters march in the hundreds to the sites of mountain top removal coal mining, or stand in resistance at the nuclear weapons and nuclear power complexes throughout the nation. Arrests, fines, jail and imprisonment is the lot of many who take a bold stand to call an end to the US military industrial choke hold on the planet. But a strategically disastrous divide persists between activists in the environmental sustainability movements and war resisters who challenge more directly the militarism that is the largest single cause of the Earth's imminent collapse. Have we blindly accepted the paradigm that war is inevitable, that violence is intrinsic to our nature, and that our security depends on a strong military? It is a lie—repeated again and again—but it is still a lie. "Challenging the destruction and damage to the environment and the massive exploitation of oil and metal resources for the military-industrial war machine must become paramount in the work for peace," scientist and author H. Patricia Hynes writes in a recent series of articles on the environmental impact of US militarism. Indeed, as the United Nations asserts, "there can be no durable peace if the natural resources that sustain livelihoods and ecosystems are destroyed." "We don't know how to extricate ourselves from our complicity very surely or very soon," Poet and social critic Wendell Berry asserts. "How could we live without the war economy and the holocaust of the fossil fuels?" We must find the answer to our deadly dilemma and put an end to our complicity in the desecration of the world and destruction of all creation. "To the offer of more abundant life," Berry writes, "we have chosen to respond with the economics of extinction." We cannot let this be the end.

### Plan

#### The United States Federal Government should abolish the authority to engage in targeted killing.

### Contention Two-Moving Past Just War

#### Imperialism is not something conducted elsewhere abroad. We must criticize the domestic manifestations of the military industrial complex. Pretending the wars abroad and at home are extinct plays into the hands of bureaucrats and elites.

McClintock 9 (Anne, is a Professor of English and Women’s and Gender Studies at the University of Wisconsin, “Paranoid Empire: Specters from Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib,” Project Muse)

By now it is fair to say that the United States has come to be dominated by two grand and dangerous hallucinations: the promise of benign US globalization and the permanent threat of the “war on terror.” I have come to feel that we cannot understand the extravagance of the violence to which the US government has committed itself after 9/11—two countries invaded, thousands of innocent people imprisoned, killed, and tortured—unless we grasp a defining feature of our moment, that is, a deep and disturbing doubleness with respect to power. Taking shape, as it now does, around fantasies of global omnipotence (Operation Infinite Justice, the War to End All Evil) coinciding with nightmares of impending attack, the United States has entered the domain of paranoia: dream world and catastrophe. For it is only in paranoia that one finds simultaneously and in such condensed form both deliriums of absolute power and forebodings of perpetual threat. Hence the spectral and nightmarish quality of the “war on terror,” a limitless war against a limitless threat, a war vaunted by the US administration to encompass all of space and persisting without end. But the war on terror is not a real war, for “terror” is not an identifiable enemy nor a strategic, real-world target. The war on terror is what William Gibson calls elsewhere “a consensual hallucination,” 4 and the US government can fling its military might against ghostly apparitions and hallucinate a victory over all evil only at the cost of catastrophic self-delusion and the infliction of great calamities elsewhere. I have come to feel that we urgently need to make visible (the better politically to challenge) those established but concealed circuits of imperial violence that now animate the war on terror. We need, as urgently, to illuminate the continuities that connect those circuits of imperial violence abroad with the vast, internal shadowlands of prisons and supermaxes—the modern “slave-ships on the middle passage to nowhere”—that have come to characterize the United States as a super-carceral state. 5 Can we, the uneasy heirs of empire, now speak only of national things? If a long-established but primarily covert US imperialism has, since 9/11, manifested itself more aggressively as an overt empire, does the terrain and object of intellectual inquiry, as well as the claims of political responsibility, not also extend beyond that useful fiction of the “exceptional nation” to embrace the shadowlands of empire? If so, how can we theorize the phantasmagoric, imperial violence that has come so dreadfully to constitute our kinship with the ordinary, but which also at the same moment renders extraordinary the ordinary bodies of ordinary people, an imperial violence which in collusion with a complicit corporate media would render itself invisible, casting states of emergency into fitful shadow and fleshly bodies into specters? For imperialism is not something that happens elsewhere, an offshore fact to be deplored but as easily ignored. Rather, the force of empire comes to reconfigure, from within, the nature and violence of the nation-state itself, giving rise to perplexing questions: Who under an empire are “we,” the people? And who are the ghosted, ordinary people beyond the nation-state who, in turn, constitute “us”? We now inhabit a crisis of violence and the visible. How do we insist on seeing the violence that the imperial state attempts to render invisible, while also seeing the ordinary people afflicted by that violence? For to allow the spectral, disfigured people (especially those under torture) obliged to inhabit the haunted no-places and penumbra of empire to be made visible as ordinary people is to forfeit the long-held US claim of moral and cultural exceptionalism, the traditional self-identity of the United States as the uniquely superior, universal standard-bearer of moral authority, a tenacious, national mythology of originary innocence now in tatters. The deeper question, however, is not only how to see but also how to theorize and oppose the violence without becoming beguiled by the seductions of spectacle alone. 6 Perhaps in the labyrinths of torture we must also find a way to speak with ghosts, for specters disturb the authority of vision and the hauntings of popular memory disrupt the great forgettings of official history. Paranoia Even the paranoid have enemies. —Donald Rumsfeld Why paranoia? Can we fully understand the proliferating circuits of imperial violence—the very eclipsing of which gives to our moment its uncanny, phantasmagoric cast—without understanding the pervasive presence of the paranoia that has come, quite violently, to manifest itself across the political and cultural spectrum as a defining feature of our time? By paranoia, I mean not simply Hofstadter’s famous identification of the US state’s tendency toward conspiracy theories. 7 Rather, I conceive of paranoia as an inherent contradiction with respect to power: a double-sided phantasm that oscillates precariously between deliriums of grandeur and nightmares of perpetual threat, a deep and dangerous doubleness with respect to power that is held in unstable tension, but which, if suddenly destabilized (as after 9/11), can produce pyrotechnic displays of violence. The pertinence of understanding paranoia, I argue, lies in its peculiarly intimate and peculiarly dangerous relation to violence. 8 Let me be clear: I do not see paranoia as a primary, structural cause of US imperialism nor as its structuring identity. Nor do I see the US war on terror as animated by some collective, psychic agency, submerged mind, or Hegelian “cunning of reason,” nor by what Susan Faludi calls a national “terror dream.” 9 Nor am I interested in evoking paranoia as a kind of psychological diagnosis of the imperial nation-state. Nations do not have “psyches” or an “unconscious”; only people do. Rather, a social entity such as an organization, state, or empire can be spoken of as “paranoid” if the dominant powers governing that entity cohere as a collective community around contradictory cultural narratives, self-mythologies, practices, and identities that oscillate between delusions of inherent superiority and omnipotence, and phantasms of threat and engulfment. The term paranoia is analytically useful here, then, not as a description of a collective national psyche, nor as a description of a universal pathology, but rather as an analytically strategic concept, a way of seeing and being attentive to contradictions within power, a way of making visible (the better politically to oppose) the contradictory flashpoints of violence that the state tries to conceal. Paranoia is in this sense what I call a hinge phenomenon, articulated between the ordinary person and society, between psychodynamics and socio-political history. Paranoia is in that sense dialectical rather than binary, for its violence erupts from the force of its multiple, cascading contradictions: the intimate memories of wounds, defeats, and humiliations condensing with cultural fantasies of aggrandizement and revenge, in such a way as to be productive at times of unspeakable violence. For how else can we understand such debauches of cruelty? A critical question still remains: does not something terrible have to happen to ordinary people (military police, soldiers, interrogators) to instill in them, as ordinary people, in the most intimate, fleshly ways, a paranoid cast that enables them to act compliantly with, and in obedience to, the paranoid visions of a paranoid state? Perhaps we need to take a long, hard look at the simultaneously humiliating and aggrandizing rituals of militarized institutions, whereby individuals are first broken down, then reintegrated (incorporated) into the larger corps as a unified, obedient fighting body, the methods by which schools, the military, training camps— not to mention the paranoid image-worlds of the corporate media—instill paranoia in ordinary people and fatally conjure up collective but unstable fantasies of omnipotence. 10 In what follows, I want to trace the flashpoints of imperial paranoia into the labyrinths of torture in order to illuminate three crises that animate our moment: the crisis of violence and the visible, the crisis of imperial legitimacy, and what I call “the enemy deficit.” I explore these flashpoints of imperial paranoia as they emerge in the torture at Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib. I argue that Guantánamo is the territorializing of paranoia and that torture itself is paranoia incarnate, in order to make visible, in keeping with Hazel Carby’s brilliant work, those contradictory sites where imperial racism, sexuality, and gender catastrophically collide. 11 The Enemy Deficit: Making the “Barbarians” Visible Because night is here but the barbarians have not come. Some people arrived from the frontiers, And they said that there are no longer any barbarians. And now what shall become of us without any barbarians? Those people were a kind of solution. —C. P. Cavafy, “Waiting for the Barbarians” The barbarians have declared war. —President George W. Bush C. P. Cavafy wrote “Waiting for the Barbarians” in 1927, but the poem haunts the aftermath of 9/11 with the force of an uncanny and prescient déjà vu. To what dilemma are the “barbarians” a kind of solution? Every modern empire faces an abiding crisis of legitimacy in that it flings its power over territories and peoples who have not consented to that power. Cavafy’s insight is that an imperial state claims legitimacy only by evoking the threat of the barbarians. It is only the threat of the barbarians that constitutes the silhouette of the empire’s borders in the first place. On the other hand, the hallucination of the barbarians disturbs the empire with perpetual nightmares of impending attack. The enemy is the abject of empire: the rejected from which we cannot part. And without the barbarians the legitimacy of empire vanishes like a disappearing phantom. Those people were a kind of solution.

#### Just war theory is an obstacle to new ways of understanding and relating to the world-The focus on asking WHICH WARS, forecloses the possibility of asking IF WAR? The 1AC encourages us to move beyond the narrow debates over morality and legality and onto a broader focus that can start to challenge structural violence.

CMSM 13 (CMSM is an association of the leadership of men in religious and apostolic institutes in the United States, Armed Drones: Do They Make us Better People?, May 30, http://www.cmsm.org/documents/05-30-13\_CMSM\_Statement\_Armed\_Drones.pdf)

Focusing on the “just war” theory as the key frame of moral analysis for armed drones also fails to adequately engage our imagination for practices of nonviolent peacemaking. This focus also lowers our capacity to sustain peacemaking practices, and offers little insight into envisioning the justpeace which “just war” theory purports to intend. “Just war” theory also depends on, but doesn't develop the "just people" needed to interpret, apply, and revise the criteria. But even more significant, “just war” theory doesn't prioritize or illuminate a more important moral question about human habits. Therefore, by taking a longer-term view of building a justpeace, we recommend we shift the primary analysis of armed drones from law, “just war” theory, and rights to the question, "what kind of people are we becoming by using armed drones?" The following discussion provides an example of where this ethical approach, i.e. virtue ethics, might draw us. Increasing fear in communities With drones killing people, we become the kind of people who cultivate fear in communities as they wonder when a drone is hovering and if they may be attacked just by being in the wrong place at the wrong time. Drones provoke high anxiety in communities and children become especially afraid. Parents often fear sending their children to school or going to the market. This anxiety and fear is incredibly destructive to trust in communities, and as many have pointed out, drone killing also leads increasing numbers of people to turn to other fearbased strategies, which includes acts we often describe as "terrorism." Increasing impersonal ways of engaging conflict Armed drones are an impersonal means of engaging conflicts. By increasingly relying on the latest destructive machine to settle conflict and destroy the other, we become increasingly less capable and willing to engage various conflicts in humanizing ways that are in accord with our human dignity. For instance, we become less likely to create conditions to defuse the hostility, such as using development programs, restorative justice practices, nonviolent civilian resistance training, or unarmed civilian peacekeeping. Further, we also become less likely to speak face-to-face with our opponents, less empathetic for the other, less prone to healing and more apt to ignoring, excluding, de-faming, and even destroying in our various relationships. The capacity for empathy is a core virtue of human flourishing as President Obama has even promoted in the past. But armed drones significantly damage this capacity in ourselves as well as lowering the empathy that others may have for us. This impersonal way of engaging conflict is also manifested in the video-game mentality of the drone controllers and thus exacerbates the objectification of others. Such objectification contributes to the habits in our culture of relating to others primarily as instruments for economic gain, political power, sexual gratification, etc. One of the more direct manifestations of this habit is the development of higher rates of post-traumatic stress syndrome in military drone operators compared to soldiers in combat zones. Avoiding the roots of conflicts Using armed drones also lowers our engagement and effectiveness in addressing the roots of conflicts. Hence, although they may appear to be immediate or short-term resolutions, i.e. “x” leader is killed, we soon end up facing the same conflict re-surfacing in new ways. Then we wonder why we seem to lurch from hostility to hostility. We must develop practices and habits that get closer to the roots of conflict to transform them into opportunities for growth and human flourishing. President Obama is wise to raise the issue of addressing “underlying grievances,” but when coupled with ongoing armed drone attacks, we will largely obstruct any social gains and create more "grievances." In our culture, this habit of avoiding root causes shows up too often in our criminal justice system with its high recidivism rates; school disciplinary systems that too often focuses on exclusion; immigration debate that overemphasizes border security without attention to the drivers of migration; and even friends who too often are unwilling to offer constructive critique to each other. Using armed drones will likely exacerbate this habit and some cultural problems that arise from it. Diminishing key virtues Using armed drones diminishes other key virtues besides empathy. For instance, the virtue of hope in others, particularly regarding the capacity to change will falter. We see this showing up in the ways we too often disconnect, avoid, or give up on people who think differently than us in our families, in the criminal justice system, and in our political wrangling. The virtue of solidarity with all people, especially the poor and marginalized will become less active. We damage solidarity not only by increasing fear and cultivating fear-based strategies of violence in poor and marginalized communities, but also by instigating an arms race in drones, which diverts funds away from those in urgent need. The virtue of courage that risks one's life to lift up the dignity of all people will also be diminished. This is incredibly damaging to our capacity to imagine, enact, and sustain the practices of nonviolent civilian resistance, which has driven our greatest social movements and overthrown dictators across the globe in much more sustainable ways than any violent approach. The virtue of justice also suffers in our culture as we ramp up armed drones. A preoccupation with technical legal issues regarding the use of lethal force, risks diverting attention from the deeper and more significant form of justice that focuses on the harms done to relationships and how to heal them in ways that address human needs, i.e., restorative justice. Using armed drones damages our capacity to see the harm done to relationships and to imagine how to heal that harm in a sustainable way. Perpetuating this destructive habit will likely increase patterns in our culture such as our high recidivism, divorce and suicide rates, etc. The virtue of nonviolent peacemaking which realizes the good of conciliatory love that draws enemies toward friendship, and the good of our ultimate unity and equal dignity of all people is also diminished by continued reliance on armed drones. To recognize this virtue is not to deny that violence is presently part of our experience, but to acknowledge that the habit of nonviolent peacemaking is an expression or basic component of human flourishing. For those professing Christianity, which many of our leaders do, Jesus’ example clarifies that nonviolent peacemaking is a central virtue. The strategies and tactics we engage become practices, which cultivate the character habits of human persons and societiess. Although President Obama asserts that his “high threshold” for the “lethal action” of drones respects the “inherent dignity of every human life,” and John Brennan claims that armed drones satisfy the "principle of humanity," the analysis above indicates some deeper concerns and a fuller vision of "humanity" we should attend to.

# 2AC

## Case

### Case Overview

### Global Citizen

#### Assumes that we call upon the state and sit back passively for them

#### --We solve their kritik- the 1ac is a call for individuals to reclaim their voice in the public sphere and to speak out against war.

#### --Permute- do the plan and \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

#### --Our examination of our collective silence on drones IS taking individual responsibility- we internal link turn this

Judith Butler 04, Professor of Rhetoric at UC Berkeley, 2004, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence, pg 15-18

So, is there a way, in Roy's terms, to understand bin Laden as "born" from the rib of U.S. imperialism (allowing that he is born from several possible historical sources, one of which is, crucially, U.S. imperialism), without claiming that U.S. imperialism is solely responsible for his actions, or those of his ostensible network? To answer this question, we need to distinguish, provisionally, between individual and collective responsibility. But, then we need to situate individual responsibility in light of its collective conditions. Those who commit acts of violence are surely responsible for them; they are not dupes or mechanisms of an impersonal social force, but agents with responsibility. On the other hand, these individuals are formed, and we would be making a mistake if we reduced their actions to purely self-generated acts of will or symptoms of individual pathology or "evil." Both the discourse of individualism and of moralism (understood as the moment in which morality exhausts itself in public acts of denunciation) assume that the individual is the first link in a causal chain that forms the meaning of accountability. But to take the self-generated acts of the individual as our point of departure in moral reasoning is precisely to foreclose the possibility of questioning what kind of world gives rise to such individuals. And what is this process of "giving rise"? What social conditions help to form the very ways that choice and deliberation proceed? Where and how can such subject-formations be contravened? How is it that radical violence becomes an option, comes to appear as the only viable option for some, under some global conditions? And against what conditions of violation do they respond? And with what resources?

To ask these questions is not to say that the conditions are at fault rather than the individual. But it is to rethink the relation between conditions and acts. Our acts are not self-generated, but conditioned. But we are acted upon and acting, and our "responsibility" lies in the juncture between the two. What can I do with the conditions that form me? What do they constrain me to do? What can I do to transform them? Being acted upon is not fully continuous with acting, and in this way the forces that act upon us are not finally responsible for what we do. In a certain way, and paradoxically, our responsibility is heightened once we have been subjected to the violence of others. We are acted upon, violently, and it appears that our capacity to set our own course at such instances is fully undermined. But only once we have suffered that violence are we compelled, ethically, to ask how we will respond to violent injury. What role will we assume in the historical relay of violence, who will we become in the response, and will we be furthering or impeding violence by virtue of the response that we make? To respond to violence with violence may well seem "justified," but is it finally a responsible solution? Similarly, moralistic denunciation provides immediate gratification, and even has the effect of temporarily cleansing the speaker of all proximity to guilt through the act of self-righteous denunciation itself. But is this the same as responsibility, understood as taking stock of our world, and participating in its social transformation in such a way that nonviolent, cooperative, egalitarian international relations remain the guiding ideal? We ask these latter questions not to exonerate the individuals who commit violence, but to take a different sort of responsibility for the global conditions of justice. As a result, it makes sense to follow two courses of action at once: it is surely important to find those who planned and implemented the violence, and to hold them accountable according to international war crimes standards and in international courts of law, regardless of our skepticism about such institutions (skepticism can furnish grounds for reform). In pursuing a wayward military solution, the United States now perpetrates and displays its own violence, offering a breeding ground for new waves of young Muslims to join terrorist organizations. This is poor thinking, strategically and morally. Ignoring its image as the hated enemy for many in the region, the United States has effectively responded to the violence done against it by consolidating its reputation as a militaristic power with no respect for lives outside of the First World. That we now respond with more violence is taken as "further proof" that the United States has violent and antisovereign designs on the region. To remember the lessons of Aeschylus, and to refuse this cycle of revenge in the name of justice, means not only to seek legal redress for wrongs done, but to take stock of how the world has become formed in this way precisely in order to form it anew, and in the direction of nonviolence.

Our collective responsibility not merely as a nation, but as part of an international community based on a commitment to equality and nonviolent cooperation, requires that we ask how these conditions came about, and endeavor to re-create social and political conditions on more sustaining grounds. This means, in part, hearing beyond what we are able to hear. And it means as well being open to narration that decenters us from our supremacy, in both its right- and left-wing forms. Can we hear at once that there were precedents for these events, and know that it is urgent that we know them, learn from them, alter them, and that the events are not justified by virtue of this history and that the events are not understandable without this history? Only then do we reach the disposition to get to the "root" of violence, and begin to offer another vision of the future than that which perpetuates violence in the name of denying it, offering instead names for things that restrain us from thinking and acting radically and well about global options.

## 1

### Alt Solvency

#### A. Coalitions – Antiwar activism is a critical starting point for leftist activists- war’s ubiquity makes it the biggest entry point into social justice, comparatively more than other issues.

Heaney and Rojas-prof organizational studies and sociology, Indiana-12 (Antiwar Politics and Paths of Activist Participation on the Left, <http://www.indiana.edu/~workshop/papers/rojas_working%20paper.pdf>)

Charles Tilly (1985) famously argued that war making facilitated state building because wars allow states to expand their tax collecting capacity, which resulted in an expansion of the state itself. The US Social Forum data shows that Tilly's observation can be further developed. In modern America, wars increase movement capacity. Wars touch many sectors of society and are highly emotional events. They disproportionately attract people who are interested in movement activism. Thus, antiwar politics is often the starting point for many activism careers. The aggregate result is that other movements of the left are populated with activists who began as antiwar demonstrators. If the US Social Forum is an indicator of broader trends among progressives, American wars have successfully shifted the left. The lives of activists are now intertwined with antiwar activism.

We do not argue non-peace issues are no longer an important element of the American left. Rather, war making has resulted in a fundamental re-articulation of the relationship between the different social movements that are found in American society. Early in the 20th century, activism was often dominated by "old left" issues, such as labor. In the mid-20th century, the 31 new and old left developed a complex relationship, which at time was competitive and at other times supportive. One strand of civil rights movement scholarship, for example, argues that labor and civil rights were in conflict (Foner 1981; Quadagno 1992). Other scholars have argued that the civil rights movement had a rejuvenating effect on labor unions (Isaac and Chistiansen 2002; Isaac, McDonald and Lukasik 2006). Taken together, this scholarship suggests that old and new social movements co-existed on the same political stage. Major American wars and the post-WWII defense build-up have brought antiwar activism to the forefront of activism. Major wars and other national security issues, such as the deployment of nuclear weapons in the 1980s, created a consistent point of contention, which commanded substantial resources from activists. The persistent effort to combat war has resulted in a situation where the peace movement is ubiquitous and highly connected to other movements. The relationship is asymmetric. The antiwar movement is much more likely to send it recruits to other movements.

#### B. Drones starting point – drones offer an entry point to a larger critique of militarism- the aff is not about tinkering with technology, but rather to serve as a jumping off point for criticizing killing.

Noble 12 (Doug, activist with the Upstate Coalition to Ground the Drones, Is It the Drones or the Killings We Oppose?, Aug 29, http://www.counterpunch.org/2012/08/29/is-it-the-drones-or-the-killings-we-oppose/)

US drone strikes make news every day, fostering worldwide outrage and public scrutiny. The drone has become an icon of US lethality and dominance, and it has understandably become a principal focus of our antiwar effort. But recent controversial revelations about presidential-approved “kill lists,” used to identify targets for drone assassinations, suggest a broader scope for our opposition. US assassination and targeted killing, with presidential approval, has been going on covertly for at least half a century, and continues to this day, both with and without drones. Drone strikes may be merely the most visible portion of a wider, global program of US targeted killing, “a covert side to the Global War on Terrorism that is not visible and not currently knowable.”[1] Perhaps a limited focus on remote-controlled murder by drone technology blinds us to a broader US enterprise of targeted assassination around the globe. Shouldn’t we, then, turn more of our attention to this wider canvas of US killing, repositioning our drone protest within a larger context, rather than limiting ourselves by our focused opposition to drone technology? In a recent article, “Assassination Nation,”[2] I trace the history of US targeted assassination to the US Phoenix Program in Vietnam, in which the CIA and Special Forces targeted and assassinated over 20,000 “suspect” civilians in a reign of terror from 1967 and 1972. Phoenix was the direct source of US counterterrorist kill lists and civilian assassinations in Latin American countries throughout the 1980s and, more recently, in both Iraq and Afghanistan.In Iraq, from 2003, a large-scale Special Forces covert war targeting Ba’athist insurgents for capture or assassination was called “preëmptive manhunting,” with all the earmarks of the Phoenix Program. [3] In Afghanistan, starting in 2009, a campaign of targeted night “kill/capture raids” against insurgents, up to 40 raids a night, were carried out by Joint Special Operations Command commandos killing 2,000Afghans in 2010 alone, mostly innocent civilians. One officer called the campaign an “industrial strength counterterrorism killing machine.”[4]Meanwhile, top military advisors such as David Kilcullen have recommended “a global Phoenix program” for “a new strategic approach to the Global War on Terrorism.” [5] The Obama administration uses a six-point program for such “light-footprint warfare,” relying on raids by special forces, drone strikes, and proxy fighters, and also spies, cyber warfare, and civilian partnerships. [6] Worldwide, there is now a US special antiterrorism force of about 60,000 operating in as many as 120 countries, according to former US intelligence officials. [7] The Pentagon also develops “proxy” clandestine militias called “Counterterror Pursuit Teams” in many countries, for “remote killing” of a different sort, run by the CIA and U.S. Special Forces. [8] And the Pentagon now conducts joint military and counterterrorist exercises with countries in Africa, Central and South America, and the Asia-Pacific region. According to Andrew Bacevich, US Special Forces assets today go to more places and undertake more missions … than ever before.” [9]There are, of course, very good reasons for the antiwar movement to focus its opposition on drones. There is a heightened media awareness of drone technology, with daily articles about their use in war and surveillance, and about the lives of their remote pilots, scattered on military bases throughout the country, fast replacing airborne pilots. Policymakers are currently on the defensive, forced to reveal hitherto top secret activities and policies behind the use of drones. The growing use of drones for domestic surveillance, by police departments and border control agencies, offers a powerful opportunity to raise public opposition to drones. Also, US protest against drones offers solidarity with the multitude of civilian victims of drone strikes throughout the world, and it capitalizes on this peculiarly menacing icon, reviled by the rest of the world.There are, however, equally good reasons not to focus our opposition on drones. The wizardry of drone technology has great popular appeal in the US. According to Pew Research’s latest polling, 62% of the US public enthusiastically approve of drone use for remote-controlled killing in the war on terror. The New York State Fair now has a popular exhibit providing children the simulated thrill of piloting a drone mission. The burgeoning drone manufacturing industry appears unstoppable, with nearly 50 companies developing some 150 different systems, ranging from miniature models to those with wingspans comparable to airliners. Law enforcement and security agencies will have $6 billion in U.S. sales by 2016, for domestic surveillance. Altogether, the drone industry’s lobbying group, Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International, claims 507 corporate members in 55 countries. There is virtually no Congressional opposition to the drone fever that has gripped the military, which is spending $4.2 billion on drones this year alone; one large bipartisan congressional committee is solely committed to promoting drone technology.Furthermore, as the technology develops, drones will have many positive uses beyond war and surveillance, diluting potential opposition to the technology itself. So a continued focus on drones carries the danger of distracting our attention from the horrific, illegal and immoral, targeted killing of civilians, including women and children, which is the original motivation for our years of opposition and protest.Instead, then, we should perhaps return our attention to the killing itself. This would move us beyond the public fascination with technology and would expose the criminality of targeted assassination of civilians as not merely “collateral” but instead as an intentional counterterrorist strategy aimed at preemptive elimination of suspected enemies. It could also offer an unprecedented opportunity to expose the long sordid history of US counterinsurgency policy that set the stage for Obama’s current use of kill lists against suspected militants in al Qaeda, the Taliban and other groups. It could also open up a broader investigation of the covert killing now allegedly being conducted by CIA and Special Forces, or their indigenous proxies, throughout many countries in the world.

### 2AC Top Level

#### A. Virtuous Violence – the manipulation of just war theory facilitates the mass murder of racialized bodies at home and abroad – it becomes easier to justify killing others when it is supposedly in the name of self-defense and within an ethical framework. Calling for restrictions on targeted killing is important because it is seen as a technological innovation that sanitizes the killing and creates hierarchies of who gets to live or die– that’s Nobel – this also turns their ethics arguments more than they can solve. Virtuous violence will cement the sovereign power that they are attempting to dismantle

Campos 07 (Joseph H. Campos, The State and Terrorism: National Security and the Mobilization of Power, google books pg 101)

Later it was discovered that the U.S.' strikes against terrorist facilities in Sudanwere in fact attacks on pharmaceutical facilities. As long as the state maintains and successfully promotes its virtuous violence, it is able to name any action as justified in defense of the state and the security of its citizenry. Terrorist violence, not statist violence, is portrayed as the outlaw component of the international world order. Everything within the control of the state - from vast bodies of water, to borders, and ultimately to the complex working of the individual body - becomes a national security site that must be secured against the violence of terrorism. The state frames terrorists as inhumane individuals who corrupt the battlefields of statist control as it turns the "war" from actual fields of battle with physical space to fields of battle that are indeterminate, unstructured, and malleable. "The enemies of peace cannot defeat us with traditional military means" (Clinton, 1999: 86) and thus they warp time and space "realities" of the state in their production of fear and terror. The "civilized" order is then solidified and enacted by the state in the face of terrorism's "uncivilized" nature.

#### B. Presidential Preemption – as long as the executive has the authority to kill whoever they want at their will, it becomes impossible for the 1NC advocacy to mount an effective revolutionary understanding of the current state of affairs. The war against non-white communities doesn’t just stop abroad, it can be contextualized to a war against black communities – the black body will always be in the cross-hairs and their ignorance of the war abroad means the 1NC advocacy always fails

Bloice et al 13 (Carl Bloice is a BlackCommentator.com Editorial Board member, writer and senior activist in San Francisco, a member of the National Coordinating Committee of the Committees of Correspondence for Democracy and Socialism, a moderator at portside.org and formerly worked for a healthcare union. Bill Fletcher, Jr. is a long-time racial justice, labor and international activist and writer. He is a Senior Scholar with the Institute for Policy Studies and the immediate past president of TransAfrica Forum. He is the co-author of Solidarity Divided. Jamala is a long-time organizer and writer. She is a 2011 Alston-Bannerman Fellow and author of The Best of The Way I See It & Other Political Writings. She is the co-founder of the Organization for Black Struggle. “Black America and Obama’s Foreign Policy,” http://www.zcommunications.org/black-america-and-obama-s-foreign-policy-by-bill-fletcher-jr.html)

Well, this is a partial list, but the point here is that there is something very wrong in Obama’s foreign policy, yet you would not know that from Black America’s response. Foreign policy is not being debated on most African American talk radio programs and very rarely do we hear African American commentators in the mainstream media address the limitations of US foreign policy under Obama. While the Congressional Black Caucus has increasingly criticized the President around domestic policies, particularly the need by the administration to address the economic depression-like conditions of Black America, there is relative silence on foreign policy. This relative silence appears to be rooted in the same general problem that has afflicted Black America since the election of Obama: a belief that criticism and pressure is somehow destructive and disloyal. One can only conclude this in light of the fact that on most foreign policy matters Black America has shown an historic identification with the struggles for liberation and independence, especially in Asia, Africa and Latin America. African Americans were the most critical demographic segment of the USA when it came to the US invasion of Iraq, for instance, and we regularly criticize and openly oppose interventionist activities by the USA…except when they are carried out by the Obama Administration. We are not waving our fingers at anyone. Rather we are suggesting that this is a dangerous course of action because it represents a failure to recognize that the Obama administration is not about one individual named Barack Obama. It is an administration overseeing policies, many historically rooted, in the objective of building and sustaining global domination. In other words, this goes way beyond a question of Obama’s personal views and beliefs and speaks to the sort of administration that he constructed, including who were named top officials and who were excluded. By remaining silent in the face of US aggression (and law violations, such as the murder of Awlaki and drone attacks that take the lives of many civilian noncombatants) we are making several mistakes. For one, we are ignoring the precedent that is being set. Kill one US citizen without even an indictment (let alone a trial) and where does it end? Wave our swords at Iran and promote destabilization, and does this result in an all-out war? Send troops to Uganda, and does this become another Vietnam? Cajole military forces in one African country to invade another? None of this benefits Black America—not to mention the rest of the world—in the slightest and under other circumstances many African Americans would be protesting. Paradoxically, it is probably time for us to rethink Obama’s remarks at the Congressional Black Caucus banquet in September. When he said African Americans needed to stop complaining and put on our marching boots, many people became upset and felt insulted. But let’s think about this for a moment. Too many of us have been content to complain—sometimes bitterly—in private about what we fail to see from the Obama administration. So, maybe it is time to put on those marching boots, indeed, and march in protest not only against the demonic activities of the Republicans but as well against US aggression carried out by the first African American President of the United States of America? If not now, when? If not you (us), who?

### AT: Violence over there

### AT: State bad

#### We cannot criticize racial violence without also acknowledging war waged by the state in our name—you cannot cherrypick opposition to violence.

Ransby-professor African American Studies University of Illinois at Chicago-7 Celebrate King not just for civil rights but also for antiwar activism

http://progressive.org/media\_mpransby010907

This Martin Luther King Jr. Day, as American deaths in Iraq exceed 3,000 and Iraqi casualties climb into the hundreds of thousands, we need to remember King's words of wisdom about the perils of war. King was not only an advocate of desegregation and civil rights, but also an internationalist, who in 1967 took a principled but controversial stand against the escalating war in Vietnam. But many Americans seem more comfortable remembering the early years of his political career than the later ones. In fact, King was smarter, stronger and surer in the last years of his life than he was in 1955, when he first gained national attention. He opposed the war in Vietnam for some of the same reasons that a majority of Americans now oppose the war in Iraq. In April 1967, the Nobel Peace Prize recipient delivered an eloquent antiwar speech at Riverside Church in New York City. It was one of his most powerful orations. "I could never again raise my voice against the violence of the oppressed in the ghettos without having first spoken clearly to the greatest purveyor of violence in the world today -- my own government," he said. King not only advocated nonviolence for the poor, oppressed and subjugated black people of the South, but also for the presidents, the power brokers and profiteers. In King's view, it is self-serving and duplicitous to tell protesters and people without much power to be calm, dignified and non-aggressive, but at the same time allow governments to perpetuate even greater violence against innocent civilians for the sake of economic and political interests. In January 2007, it's crucial to understand King's message about the dangers of war and imperialism. "Somehow this madness must cease," he said. "We must stop now. I speak as a child of God and brother to the suffering poor of Vietnam. I speak for those whose land is being laid waste, whose homes are being destroyed, whose culture is being subverted. I speak for the poor in America who are paying the double price of smashed hopes at home and death and corruption in Vietnam. I speak as a citizen of the world, for the world as it stands aghast at the path we have taken. I speak as an American to the \_leaders of my own nation. The great initiative in this war is ours. The initiative to stop it must be ours." King is known widely, but he is not known deeply. As theological and scholar/activist Vincent Harding once wrote, King has been sanitized and made safe for mass consumption. King was not simply a dreamer but a doer, and some of his most admirable actions were the controversial ones. When he spoke out against the war in Southeast Asia he was criticized as overstepping the bounds of a civil rights leader. King's response was that issues of injustice all over the world were of concern to him. The richness of King's message about nonviolence is in its breadth and its depth. So as schools, churches, temples and synagogues honor King this year, let's not simply remember the King that stood on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial and called for racial unity in 1963, but also the King that stood at the pulpit of Riverside Church and called for an end to wars of aggression in 1967. Its relevance to the moral challenges of 2007 should be readily apparent.

## 2

#### No counterplan text

#### Their evidence doesn’t indict “abolish” and cx proves that their only link this is that it is indicative of a state action – that’s not bad – that was above

#### And our criticism is already a critique of the conditions that this Sexton evidence lays out – that was also above. Our starting point is crucial.

#### Sev good

#### Permutaiton – do the counterplan – no offense on the flow

#### ---Perm do both --- Advance the plan both with & without the term “\_\_\_” simultaneously --- Only the permutation can solve --- Using the term self-critically enables it’s re-appropriation while simply rejecting the term reifies it’s oppressive structure.

Kidner 2000

David W, Nature and Psyche: Radical Environmentalism and the Politics of Subjectivity, pg 26-27

In the absence of a language that is sufficiently **resonant with the natural world**, **we will have to make do with what we have** available; and **this requires that we use words in a way that is self-critical, inconsistent, and sometimes ironic**. This will not be the postmodernist use of language that problematizes *any* nondiscursive structure; but rather one that uncovers the naturalizing and legitimizing function of words so as to reveal the organic structures that they occlude. For example, in the sentence “the thug offered to rearrange my teeth,” the denial of structure is obvious; but in the Easterbrook statement above, the word “reposition” is all to easily accepted as an “objective” description of what happened, or at least as one of many equally valid descriptions. Similarly, words such as “pests,” “weeds,” or “development” also carry their own particular ideological baggage; and by pointing out their hidden implications we challenge the industrialist structures that they are part of, and so uncover the indigenous forms that lie beneath them. But **in pointing out that language has practical implications for the ecological fate of the world, we should not ignore the other side of this dialectic**, for **language is itself affected by what frames it ideologically and physically**. Just as those characteristics of nature that are difficult to name tend to disappear physically from the world when we restructure it, it is equally true that what has been post physically tends to disappear linguistically and conceptually. While the first part of this dialectic is accomplished through technological power, academia plays an important role in the second part. It is no coincidence, for example, that claims that nature is socially constructed are usually made by writers who inhabit “overdeveloped” parts of the world such as Britain where wilderness has already been virtually eliminated; and the effect of such claims is to deny the possibility of nature that transcends its current domesticated state. **By making language consistent with this** impoverished ecological **reality and denying the possibility that is** “**beyond the text**,” **constructionism undermines any possible role of language in pointing to and formulating states of** ecosystemic **health that are potential rather than actual**. In this case, the industrialist worldview becomes the *only possible* worldview; and the major task of environmental theory is to keep alive those ecological scenarios that *do* exceed such industrialized views of nature.

#### ---Word PICs are a voting issue.

#### (A.) Unpredictable --- Justifies infinite amount of unpredictable counterplans that detract from topic specific education --- Everything from read the plan in pictures to the ‘the pic’ becomes fair game.

#### (C.) Reading the net benefit alone solves their offense --- Still allows for effective comparison while preserving competitive equity.

# 1AR

### Fiat

#### Generalities are not enough; Debating specific policies is critical to make us better advocates against government violence—criticizing war without being willing to discuss actual policy details is a bankrupt strategy for social resistance.

Mellor 13 (Ewan E. Mellor – European University Institute, Why policy relevance is a moral necessity: Just war theory, impact, and UAVs, Paper Prepared for BISA Conference 2013, accessed: http://www.academia.edu/Documents/in/Drones\_Targeted\_Killing\_Ethics\_of\_War)

This section of the paper considers more generally the need for just war theorists to engage with policy debate about the use of force, as well as to engage with the more fundamental moral and philosophical principles of the just war tradition. It draws on John Kelsay’s conception of just war thinking as being a social practice,35 as well as on Michael Walzer’s understanding of the role of the social critic in society.36 It argues that the just war tradition is a form of “practical discourse” which is concerned with questions of “how we should act.”37 Kelsay argues that: [T]he criteria of jus ad bellum and jus in bello provide a framework for structured participation in a public conversation about the use of military force . . . citizens who choose to speak in just war terms express commitments . . . [i]n the process of giving and asking for reasons for going to war, those who argue in just war terms seek to influence policy by persuading others that their analysis provides a way to express and fulfil the desire that military actions be both wise and just.38 He also argues that “good just war thinking involves continuous and complete deliberation, in the sense that one attends to all the standard criteria at war’s inception, at its end, and throughout the course of the conflict.”39 This is important as it highlights the need for just war scholars to engage with the ongoing operations in war and the specific policies that are involved. The question of whether a particular war is just or unjust, and the question of whether a particular weapon (like drones) can be used in accordance with the jus in bello criteria, only cover a part of the overall justice of the war. Without an engagement with the reality of war, in terms of the policies used in waging it, it is impossible to engage with the “moral reality of war,”40 in terms of being able to discuss it and judge it in moral terms. Kelsay’s description of just war thinking as a social practice is similar to Walzer’s more general description of social criticism. The just war theorist, as a social critic, must be involved with his or her own society and its practices. In the same way that the social critic’s distance from his or her society is measured in inches and not miles,41 the just war theorist must be close to and must understand the language through which war is constituted, interpreted and reinterpreted.42 It is only by understanding the values and language that their own society purports to live by that the social critic can hold up a mirror to that society to demonstrate its hypocrisy and to show the gap that exists between its practice and its values.43 The tradition itself provides a set of values and principles and, as argued by Cian O’Driscoll, constitutes a “language of engagement” to spur participation in public and political debate.44 This language is part of “our common heritage, the product of many centuries of arguing about war.”45 These principles and this language provide the terms through which people understand and come to interpret war, not in a deterministic way but by providing the categories necessary for moral understanding and moral argument about the legitimate and illegitimate uses of force.46 By spurring and providing the basis for political engagement the just war tradition ensures that the acts that occur within war are considered according to just war criteria and allows policy-makers to be held to account on this basis. Engaging with the reality of war requires recognising that war is, as Clausewitz stated, a continuation of policy. War, according to Clausewitz, is subordinate to politics and to political choices and these political choices can, and must, be judged and critiqued.47 Engagement and political debate are morally necessary as the alternative is disengagement and moral quietude, which is a sacrifice of the obligations of citizenship.48 This engagement must bring just war theorists into contact with the policy makers and will require work that is accessible and relevant to policy makers, however this does not mean a sacrifice of critical distance or an abdication of truth in the face of power. By engaging in detail with the policies being pursued and their concordance or otherwise with the principles of the just war tradition the policy-makers will be forced to account for their decisions and justify them in just war language. In contrast to the view, suggested by Kenneth Anderson, that “the public cannot be made part of the debate” and that “[w]e are necessarily committed into the hands of our political leadership”,49 it is incumbent upon just war theorists to ensure that the public are informed and are capable of holding their political leaders to account. To accept the idea that the political leadership are stewards and that accountability will not benefit the public, on whose behalf action is undertaken, but will only benefit al Qaeda,50 is a grotesque act of intellectual irresponsibility. As Walzer has argued, it is precisely because it is “our country” that we are “especially obligated to criticise its policies.”51 Conclusion This paper has discussed the empirics of the policies of drone strikes in the ongoing conflict with those associate with al Qaeda. It has demonstrated that there are significant moral questions raised by the just war tradition regarding some aspects of these policies and it has argued that, thus far, just war scholars have not paid sufficient attention or engaged in sufficient detail with the policy implications of drone use. As such it has been argued that it is necessary for just war theorists to engage more directly with these issues and to ensure that their work is policy relevant, not in a utilitarian sense of abdicating from speaking the truth in the face of power, but by forcing policy makers to justify their actions according to the principles of the just war tradition, principles which they invoke themselves in formulating policy. By highlighting hypocrisy and providing the tools and language for the interpretation of action, the just war tradition provides the basis for the public engagement and political activism that are necessary for democratic politics.52

### AT: Can’t Solve—Coopted

#### 1. Allied pessimism-

#### A. The nearly automatic assumption that we’re co-opting them poisons the environment and makes productive politics impossible. Fear of co-optation contributes to a zero-sum mindset that makes cooperation and coalitions impossible.

Johnson 3 (Kevin, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of California at Davis, "The Struggle for Civil Rights: The Need for, and Impediments to, Political Coalitions Among and Within Minority Groups," lexis)

In zero sum games, groups fear conflict and betrayal; **in that mindset, cooperation, by definition a prerequisite for successful coalitions, is unlikely.** n91 Unfortunately, that is how some minorities have viewed civil rights. Not surprisingly, conflict has resulted. Consequently, the struggle for civil rights must work to both expand the conception of civil rights to comport with modern realities facing minority communities and view the struggle for civil rights not as a zero sum game, but an instance in which the civil rights of all groups can be recognized circumstances. However, we have not - nor should we - view "equality" and "racial justice" as limited resources. No one views First Amendment rights of free expression and religious freedom in that way, for example. Racial equality is no different. Rights of membership in society for all groups should not be viewed as a scarce resource to be allocated among groups.

#### B. Coalitions are necessary to understand and attack racism- our evidence is comparative- it’s worth the risk of co-option

Johnson 3 (Kevin, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of California at Davis, "The Struggle for Civil Rights: The Need for, and Impediments to, Political Coalitions Among and Within Minority Groups," lexis)

In recent works, prominent commentators, such as Lani Guinier, Gerald Torres, Robert Williams, and Eric Yamamoto, n43 have expressed optimism about the potential for multiracial coalitions. Coalition is a fundamental tenet of the growing body of critical Latina/o theory scholarship. n44 This is a politically pragmatic approach based on the old maxim that "**there is power in numbers**." Others, including Richard Delgado and Haunani-Kay Trask, n45 are more pessimistic. Fears of coalitions run the gamut from diluting a group's particular message and goals to co-optation, with the bottom line being that the costs of collective action outweigh any benefits. In my estimation, **coalitions are necessary to fully understand and attack racial hierarchy and white supremacy** in the United States. n46 [\*768] Racism against minority groups is related in direct and indirect ways. n47 Indeed, the relationships of many different sorts of subordinations give rise to the potential for coalition. n48 Coalitions between diverse communities, however, require much care and attention. As Angela Harris has emphasized, "solidarity is the product of struggle, not wishful thinking; and struggle means not only political struggle, but moral and ethical struggle as well." n49