## 1AC

### 1AC Allied Coop Adv

#### Adv 1- Allied terror cooperation:

#### Domestic and international support for the US drone program is collapsing, threatening to shut it down entirely. Reform is key.

Zenko, CFR Fellow, 13 (Micah, is the Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)., “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies,” http://www.cfr.org/wars-and-warfare/reforming-us-drone-strike-policies/p29736)

In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, President Obama declared: “Where force is necessary, we have a moral and strategic interest in binding ourselves to certain rules of conduct. Even as we confront a vicious adversary that abides by no rules, I believe the United States of America must remain a standard bearer in the conduct of war.”63 Under President Obama drone strikes have expanded and intensified, and they will remain a central component of U.S. counterterrorism operations for at least another decade, according to U.S. officials.64 But much as the Bush administration was compelled to reform its controversial counterterrorism practices, it is likely that the United States will ultimately be forced by domestic and international pressure to scale back its drone strike policies. The Obama administration can preempt this pressure by clearly articulating that the rules that govern its drone strikes, like all uses of military force, are based in the laws of armed conflict and international humanitarian law; by engaging with emerging drone powers; and, most important, by matching practice with its stated policy by limiting drone strikes to those individuals it claims are being targeted (which would reduce the likelihood of civilian casualties since the total number of strikes would significantly decrease). The choice the United States faces is not between unfettered drone use and sacrificing freedom of action, but between drone policy reforms by design or drone policy reforms by default. Recent history demonstrates that domestic political pressure could severely limit drone strikes in ways that the CIA or JSOC have not anticipated. In support of its counterterrorism strategy, the Bush administration engaged in the extraordinary rendition of terrorist suspects to third countries, the use of enhanced interrogation techniques, and warrantless wiretapping. Although the Bush administration defended its policies as critical to protecting the U.S. homeland against terrorist attacks, unprecedented domestic political pressure led to significant reforms or termination. Compared to Bush-era counterterrorism policies, drone strikes are vulnerable to similar—albeit still largely untapped—moral outrage, and they are even more susceptible to political constraints because they occur in plain sight. Indeed, a negative trend in U.S. public opinion on drones is already apparent. Between February and June 2012, U.S. support for drone strikes against suspected terrorists fell from 83 percent to 62 percent—which represents less U.S. support than enhanced interrogation techniques maintained in the mid-2000s.65 Finally, U.S. drone strikes are also widely opposed by the citizens of important allies, emerging powers, and the local populations in states where strikes occur.66 States polled reveal overwhelming opposition to U.S. drone strikes: Greece (90 percent), Egypt (89 percent), Turkey (81 percent), Spain (76 percent), Brazil (76 percent), Japan (75 percent), and Pakistan (83 percent).67 This is significant because the United States cannot conduct drone strikes in the most critical corners of the world by itself. Drone strikes require the tacit or overt support of host states or neighbors. If such states decided not to cooperate—or to actively resist—U.S. drone strikes, their effectiveness would be immediately and sharply reduced, and the likelihood of civilian casualties would increase. This danger is not hypothetical. In 2007, the Ethiopian government terminated its U.S. military presence after public revelations that U.S. AC-130 gunships were launching attacks from Ethiopia into Somalia. Similarly, in late 2011, Pakistan evicted all U.S. military and intelligence drones, forcing the United States to completely rely on Afghanistan to serve as a staging ground for drone strikes in Pakistan. The United States could attempt to lessen the need for tacit host-state support by making significant investments in armed drones that can be flown off U.S. Navy ships, conducting electronic warfare or missile attacks on air defenses, allowing downed drones to not be recovered and potentially transferred to China or Russia, and losing access to the human intelligence networks on the ground that are critical for identifying targets. According to U.S. diplomats and military officials, active resistance— such as the Pakistani army shooting down U.S. armed drones— is a legitimate concern. In this case, the United States would need to either end drone sorties or escalate U.S. military involvement by attacking Pakistani radar and antiaircraft sites, thus increasing the likelihood of civilian casualties.68 Beyond where drone strikes currently take place, political pressure could severely limit options for new U.S. drone bases. For example, the Obama administration is debating deploying armed drones to attack al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in North Africa, which would likely require access to a new airbase in the region. To some extent, anger at U.S. sovereignty violations is an inevitable and necessary trade-off when conducting drone strikes. Nevertheless, in each of these cases, domestic anger would partially or fully abate if the United States modified its drone policy in the ways suggested below.

#### Lack of legal oversight on targeted killing collapses allied cooperation on terrorism, which is critical to intelligence sharing.

Human Rights First 13 (How to Ensure that the U.S. Drone Program does not Undermine Human Rights BLUEPRINT FOR THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION, Updated April 13, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/blueprints2012/HRF\_Targeted\_Killing\_blueprint.pdf)

The Obama Administration has dramatically escalated targeted killing by drones as a central feature of its counterterrorism response. Over the past two years, the administration has begun to reveal more about the targeted killing program, including in a leaked Department of Justice White paper on targeted killing1 and in public remarks by several senior officials.2 While this information is welcome, it does not fully address our concerns. Experts and other governments have continued to raise serious concerns about: The precedent that the U.S. targeted killing policy is setting for the rest of the world, including countries that have acquired or are in the process of acquiring drones, yet have long failed to adhere to the rule of law and protect human rights; The impact of the drone program on other U.S. counterterrorism efforts, including whether U.S. allies and other security partners have reduced intelligence-sharing and other forms of counterterrorism cooperation because of the operational and legal concerns expressed by these countries; The impact of drone operations on other aspects of U.S. counterterrorism strategy, especially diplomatic and foreign assistance efforts designed to counter extremism, promote stability and provide economic aid; The number of civilian casualties, including a lack of clarity on who the United States considers a civilian in these situations; and Whether the legal framework for the program that has been publicly asserted so far by the administration comports with international legal requirements. The totality of these concerns, heightened by the lack of public information surrounding the program, require the administration to better explain the program and its legal basis, and to carefully review the policy in light of the global precedent it is setting and serious questions about the effectiveness of the program on the full range of U.S. counterterrorism efforts. While it is expected that elements of the U.S. government’s strategy for targeted killing will be classified, it is in the national interest that the government be more transparent about policy considerations governing its use as well as its legal justification, and that the program be subject to regular oversight. Furthermore, it is in U.S. national security interests to ensure that the rules of engagement are clear and that the program minimizes any unintended negative consequences. How the U.S. operates and publicly explains its targeted killing program will have far-reaching consequences. The manufacture and sale of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) is an increasingly global industry and drone technology is not prohibitively complicated. Some 70 countries already possess UAVs3 —including Russia, Syria and Libya4 —and others are in the process of acquiring them. As White House counterterrorism chief John Brennan stated: the United States is "establishing precedents that other nations may follow, and not all of them will be nations that share our interests or the premium we put on protecting human life, including innocent civilians."5 By declaring that it is in an armed conflict with al Qaeda’s “associated forces” (a term it has not defined) without articulating limits to that armed conflict, the United States is inviting other countries to similarly declare armed conflicts against groups they consider to be security threats for purposes of assuming lethal targeting authority. Moreover, by announcing that all “members” of such groups are legally targetable, the United States is establishing exceedingly broad precedent for who can be targeted, even if it is not utilizing the full scope of this claimed authority.6 As an alternative to armed conflict-based targeting, U.S. officials have claimed targeted killings are justified as self-defense responding to an imminent threat, but have referred to a “flexible” or “elongated” concept of imminence,7 without adequately explaining what that means or how that complies with the requirements of international law. In a white paper leaked to NBC news in February 2013, for example, the Department of Justice adopts what it calls a “broader concept of imminence” that has no basis in law. According to the white paper, an imminent threat need be neither immediate nor specific. This is a dangerous, unprecedented and unwarranted expansion of widely-accepted understandings of international law.8 It is also not clear that the current broad targeted killing policy serves U.S. long-term strategic interests in combating international terrorism. Although it has been reported that some high-level operational leaders of al Qaeda have been killed in drone attacks, studies show that the vast majority of victims are not high-level terrorist leaders.9 National security analysts and former U.S. military officials increasingly argue that such tactical gains are outweighed by the substantial costs of the targeted killing program, including growing antiAmerican sentiment and recruiting support for al Qaeda. 10 General Stanley McChrystal has said: “What scares me about drone strikes is how they are perceived around the world. The resentment created by American use of unmanned strikes ... is much greater than the average American appreciates.”11 The broad targeted killing program has already strained U.S. relations with its allies and thereby impeded the flow of critical intelligence about terrorist operations.12

#### Drone policy is more important than the spying and data scandal to European partners-threatens allied intelligence cooperation.

Dworkin 7/17/13 (Anthony, Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, “Actually, drones worry Europe more than spying” <http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2013/07/17/actually-drones-worry-europe-more-than-spying/>)

Relations between the United States and Europe hit a low point following revelations that Washington was spying on European Union buildings and harvesting foreign email messages. Behind the scenes, though, it is not data protection and surveillance that produces the most complications for the transatlantic intelligence relationship, but rather America's use of armed drones to kill terrorist suspects away from the battlefield. Incidents such as the recent killing of at least 17 people in Pakistan are therefore only likely to heighten European unease. In public, European governments have displayed a curiously passive approach to American drone strikes, even as their number has escalated under Barack Obama’s presidency. Many Europeans believe that the majority of these strikes are unlawful, but their governments have maintained an uneasy silence on the issue. This is partly because of the uncomfortable fact that information provided by European intelligence services may have been used to identify some targets. It is also because of a reluctance to accuse a close ally of having violated international law. And it is partly because European countries have not worked out exactly what they think about the use of drones and how far they agree within the European Union on the question. Now, however, Europe’s muted stance on drone strikes looks likely to change. Why? For one thing, many European countries are now trying to acquire armed drones themselves, and this gives them an incentive to spell out clearer rules for their use. More importantly, perhaps, Europeans have noticed that drones are proliferating rapidly, and that countries like China, Russia and Saudi Arabia are soon likely to possess them. There is a clear European interest in trying to establish some restrictive standards on drone use before it is too late. For all these reasons, many European countries are now conducting internal reviews of their policy on drones, and discussions are also likely to start at a pan-European level. But as Europeans begin to articulate their policy on the use of drones, a bigger question looms. Can Europe and the United States come together to agree on when drone strikes are permissible? Until now, that would have seemed impossible. Since the September 11 attacks, the United States has based its counterterrorism operations on the claim that it is engaged in a worldwide armed conflict with al Qaeda and associated forces — an idea that President Obama inherited from President George W. Bush and has been kept as the basis for an expanded drone strike campaign. European countries have generally rejected this claim. However, the changes to American policy that President Obama announced in May could open the way to at least the possibility of a dialogue. Obama suggested that he anticipated a time in the not-too-distant future when the armed conflict against al Qaeda might come to an end. More substantially, he made clear that his administration was in the process of switching its policy so that, outside zones of hostilities, it would only use drone strikes against individuals who posed a continuing and imminent threat to the U.S. That is a more restrictive standard than the claim that any member of al Qaeda or an associated force could lawfully be killed with a drone strike at any time. European countries might be more willing to accept an approach based on this kind of “self-defense” idea. However, there remain some big stumbling blocks. First, a good deal about Obama’s new standards is still unclear. How does he define a “zone of hostilities,” where the new rules will not apply? And what is his understanding of an “imminent” threat? European countries are likely to interpret these key terms in a much narrower way than the United States. Second, Obama’s new approach only applies as a policy choice. His more expansive legal claims remain in the background so that he is free to return to them if he wishes. But if the United States is serious about working toward international standards on drone strikes, as Obama and his officials have sometimes suggested, then Europe is the obvious place to start. And there are a number of steps the administration could take to make an agreement with European countries more likely. For a start, it should cut back the number of drone strikes and be much more open about the reasons for the attacks it conducts and the process for reviewing them after the fact. It should also elaborate its criteria for determining who poses an imminent threat in a way that keeps attacks within tight limits. And, as U.S. forces prepare to withdraw from Afghanistan in 2014, it should keep in mind the possibility of declaring the war against al Qaeda to be over. All this said, Europe also has some tough decisions to make, and it is unclear whether European countries are ready to take a hard look at their views about drone strikes, addressing any weaknesses or inconsistencies in their own position. If they are, the next few years could offer a breakthrough in developing international standards for the use of this new kind of weapon, before the regular use of drones spreads across the globe.

#### Allied cooperation on intelligence is critical to effective counterterrorism

McGill and Gray 12 (Anna-Katherine Staser McGill, David H. Gray, “Challenges to International Counterterrorism Intelligence Sharing,” Global Security Studies, Summer 2012, Volume 3, Issue 3, http://globalsecuritystudies.com/McGill%20Intel%20Share.pdf)

In his article “Old Allies and New Friends: Intelligence-Sharing in the War on Terror”, Derek Reveron states “the war on terror requires high levels of intelligence to identify a threat relative to the amount of force required to neutralize it” as opposed to the Cold War where the opposite was true (455). As a result, intelligence is the cornerstone of effective counterterrorism operations in the post 9/11 world. Though the United States has the most robust intelligence community in the world with immense capability, skills, and technology, its efficiency in counterterrorism issues depends on coalitions of both traditional allies and new allies. Traditional allies offer a certain degree of dependability through a tried and tested relationship based on similar values; however, newly cultivated allies in the war on terrorism offer invaluable insight into groups operating in their own back yard. The US can not act unilaterally in the global fight against terrorism. It doesn’t have the resources to monitor every potential terrorist hide-out nor does it have the time or capability to cultivate the cultural, linguistic, and CT knowledge that its new allies have readily available. The Department of Defense’s 2005 Quadrennial Review clearly states that the United States "cannot meet today's complex challenges alone. Success requires unified statecraft: the ability of the U.S. government to bring to, bear all elements of national power at home and to work in close cooperation with allies and partners abroad" (qtd in Reveron, 467). The importance of coalition building for the war on terrorism is not lost on US decision-makers as seen by efforts made in the post 9/11 climate to strengthen old relationships and build new ones; however, as seen in the following sections, the possible hindrances to effective, long term CT alliances must also be addressed in order to sustain current operations.

#### Terrorists have means and motive for nuclear attacks, now-expertise and materials are widespread and multiple attempts prove.

**Jaspal, Quaid-i-Azam University IR professor, 2012**

(Zafar, “Nuclear/Radiological Terrorism: Myth or Reality?”, Journal of Political Studies, <http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/pols/pdf-files/Nuclear%20Radiological%20terrorism%20Jaspa_Vol_19_Issue_1_2012.pdf>, ldg)

The misperception, miscalculation and above all ignorance of the ruling elite about security puzzles are perilous for the national security of a state. Indeed, in an age of transnational terrorism and unprecedented dissemination of dual-use nuclear technology, ignoring nuclear terrorism threat is an imprudent policy choice. The incapability of terrorist organizations to engineer fissile material does not eliminate completely the possibility of nuclear terrorism. At the same time, the absence of an example or precedent of a nuclear/ radiological terrorism does not qualify the assertion that the nuclear/radiological terrorism ought to be remained a myth.x Farsighted rationality obligates that one should not miscalculate transnational terrorist groups — whose behavior suggests that they have a death wish — of acquiring nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological material producing capabilities. In addition, one could be sensible about the published information that huge amount of nuclear material is spread around the globe. According to estimate it is enough to build more than 120,000 Hiroshima-sized nuclear bombs (Fissile Material Working Group, 2010, April 1). The alarming fact is that a few storage sites of nuclear/radiological materials are inadequately secured and continue to be accumulated in unstable regions (Sambaiew, 2010, February). Attempts at stealing fissile material had already been discovered (Din & Zhiwei, 2003: 18). Numerous evidences confirm that terrorist groups had aspired to acquire fissile material for their terrorist acts. Late Osama bin Laden, the founder of al Qaeda stated that acquiring nuclear weapons was a“religious duty” (Yusufzai, 1999, January 11). The IAEA also reported that “al-Qaeda was actively seeking an atomic bomb.” Jamal Ahmad al-Fadl, a dissenter of Al Qaeda, in his trial testimony had “revealed his extensive but unsuccessful efforts to acquire enriched uranium for al-Qaeda” (Allison, 2010, January: 11). On November 9, 2001, Osama bin Laden claimed that “we have chemical and nuclear weapons as a deterrent and if America used them against us we reserve the right to use them (Mir, 2001, November 10).” On May 28, 2010, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, a Pakistani nuclear scientist confessed that he met Osama bin Laden. He claimed that “I met Osama bin Laden before 9/11 not to give him nuclear know-how, but to seek funds for establishing a technical college in Kabul (Syed, 2010, May 29).” He was arrested in 2003 and after extensive interrogation by American and Pakistani intelligence agencies he was released (Syed, 2010, May 29). Agreed, Mr. Mahmood did not share nuclear know-how with Al Qaeda, but his meeting with Osama establishes the fact that the terrorist organization was in contact with nuclear scientists. Second, the terrorist group has sympathizers in the nuclear scientific bureaucracies. It also authenticates bin Laden’s Deputy Ayman Zawahiri’s claim which he made in December 2001: “If you have $30 million, go to the black market in the central Asia, contact any disgruntled Soviet scientist and a lot of dozens of smart briefcase bombs are available (Allison, 2010, January: 2).” The covert meetings between nuclear scientists and al Qaeda members could not be interpreted as idle threats and thereby the threat of nuclear/radiological terrorism is real. The 33Defense Secretary Robert Gates admitted in 2008 that “what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear (Mueller, 2011, August 2).” Indeed, the nuclear deterrence strategy cannot deter the transnational terrorist syndicate from nuclear/radiological terrorist attacks. Daniel Whiteneck pointed out: “Evidence suggests, for example, that al Qaeda might not only use WMD simply to demonstrate the magnitude of its capability but that it might actually welcome the escalation of a strong U.S. response, especially if it included catalytic effects on governments and societies in the Muslim world. An adversary that prefers escalation regardless of the consequences cannot be deterred” (Whiteneck, 2005, Summer: 187)

#### And, Nuclear terrorism attacks escalate and cause extinction.

**Morgan, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, 2009**

(Dennis, World on fire: two scenarios of the destruction of human civilization and possible extinction of the human race Futures, Volume 41, Issue 10, December, ldg)

In a remarkable website on nuclear war, Carol Moore asks the question “Is Nuclear War Inevitable??” In Section , Moore points out what most terrorists obviously already know about the nuclear tensions between powerful countries. No doubt, they’ve figured out that the best way to escalate these tensions into nuclear war is to set off a nuclear exchange. As Moore points out, all that militant terrorists would have to do is get their hands on one small nuclear bomb and explode it on either Moscow or Israel. Because of the Russian “dead hand” system, “where regional nuclear commanders would be given full powers should Moscow be destroyed,” it is likely that any attack would be blamed on the United States” Israeli leaders and Zionist supporters have, likewise, stated for years that if Israel were to suffer a nuclear attack, whether from terrorists or a nation state, it would retaliate with the suicidal “Samson option” against all major Muslim cities in the Middle East. Furthermore, the Israeli Samson option would also include attacks on Russia and even “anti-Semitic” European cities In that case, of course, Russia would retaliate, and the U.S. would then retaliate against Russia. China would probably be involved as well, as thousands, if not tens of thousands, of nuclear warheads, many of them much more powerful than those used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would rain upon most of the major cities in the Northern Hemisphere. Afterwards, for years to come, massive radioactive clouds would drift throughout the Earth in the nuclear fallout, bringing death or else radiation disease that would be genetically transmitted to future generations in a nuclear winter that could last as long as a 100 years, taking a savage toll upon the environment and fragile ecosphere as well. And what many people fail to realize is what a precarious, hair-trigger basis the nuclear web rests on. Any accident, mistaken communication, false signal or “lone wolf’ act of sabotage or treason could, in a matter of a few minutes, unleash the use of nuclear weapons, and once a weapon is used, then the likelihood of a rapid escalation of nuclear attacks is quite high while the likelihood of a limited nuclear war is actually less probable since each country would act under the “use them or lose them” strategy and psychology; restraint by one power would be interpreted as a weakness by the other, which could be exploited as a window of opportunity to “win” the war. In other words, once Pandora's Box is opened, it will spread quickly, as it will be the signal for permission for anyone to use them. Moore compares swift nuclear escalation to a room full of people embarrassed to cough. Once one does, however, “everyone else feels free to do so. The bottom line is that as long as large nation states use internal and external war to keep their disparate factions glued together and to satisfy elites’ needs for power and plunder, these nations will attempt to obtain, keep, and inevitably use nuclear weapons. And as long as large nations oppress groups who seek self-determination, some of those groups will look for any means to fight their oppressors” In other words, as long as war and aggression are backed up by the implicit threat of nuclear arms, it is only a matter of time before the escalation of violent conflict leads to the actual use of nuclear weapons, and once even just one is used, it is very likely that many, if not all, will be used, leading to horrific scenarios of global death and the destruction of much of human civilization while condemning a mutant human remnant, if there is such a remnant, to a life of unimaginable misery and suffering in a nuclear winter. In “Scenarios,” Moore summarizes the various ways a nuclear war could begin: Such a war could start through a reaction to terrorist attacks, or through the need to protect against overwhelming military opposition, or through the use of small battle field tactical nuclear weapons meant to destroy hardened targets. It might quickly move on to the use of strategic nuclear weapons delivered by short-range or inter-continental missiles or long-range bombers. These could deliver high altitude bursts whose electromagnetic pulse knocks out electrical circuits for hundreds of square miles. Or they could deliver nuclear bombs to destroy nuclear and/or non-nuclear military facilities, nuclear power plants, important industrial sites and cities. Or it could skip all those steps and start through the accidental or reckless use of strategic weapons

#### Only judicial ex post review provides the accountability necessary to solve confidence in targeting—key to viability of the program

Corey, Army Colonel, 12 (Colonel Ian G. Corey, “Citizens in the Crosshairs: Ready, Aim, Hold Your Fire?,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA561582)

Alternatively, targeted killing decisions could be subjected to judicial review. 103 Attorney General Holder rejected ex ante judicial review out of hand, citing the Constitution’s allocation of national security operations to the executive branch and the need for timely action.104 Courts are indeed reluctant to stray into the realm of political questions, as evidenced by the district court’s dismissal of the ACLU and CCR lawsuit. On the other hand, a model for a special court that operates in secret already exists: the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) that oversees requests for surveillance warrants for suspected foreign agents. While ex ante judicial review would provide the most robust form of oversight, ex post review by a court like the FISC would nonetheless serve as a significant check on executive power.105 Regardless of the type of oversight implemented, some form of independent review is necessary to demonstrate accountability and bolster confidence in the targeted killing process. Conclusion The United States has increasingly relied on targeted killing as an important tactic in its war on terror and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.106 This is entirely reasonable given current budgetary constraints and the appeal of targeted killing, especially UAS strikes, as an alternative to the use of conventional forces. Moreover, the United States will likely again seek to employ the tactic against U.S. citizens assessed to be operational leaders of AQAM. As demonstrated above, one can make a good faith argument that doing so is entirely permissible under both international and domestic law as the Obama Administration claims, the opinions of some prominent legal scholars notwithstanding. The viability of future lethal targeting of U.S. citizens is questionable, however, if the government fails to address legitimate issues of transparency and accountability. While the administration has recently made progress on the transparency front, much more remains to be done, including the release in some form of the legal analysis contained in OLC’s 2010 opinion. Moreover, the administration must be able to articulate to the American people how it selects U.S. citizens for targeted killing and the safeguards in place to mitigate the risk of error and abuse. Finally, these targeting decisions must be subject to some form of independent review that will both satisfy due process and boost public confidence.

#### Accountability is impossible from executive internal measures- no one trusts Obama on drones—Court action is key.

Goldsmith 13 (Jack Goldsmith teaches at Harvard Law School and is a member of the Hoover Institution Task Force on National Security and Law, “How Obama Undermined the War on Terror,” http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112964/obamas-secrecy-destroying-american-support-counterterrorism)

For official secrecy abroad to work, the secrets must be kept at home as well. In speeches, interviews, and leaks, Obama's team has tried to explain why its operations abroad are lawful and prudent. But to comply with rules of classified information and covert action, the explanations are conveyed in limited, abstract, and often awkward terms. They usually raise more questions than they answer—and secrecy rules often preclude the administration from responding to follow-up questions, criticisms, and charges. ¶ As a result, much of what the administration says about its secret war—about civilian casualties, or the validity of its legal analysis, or the quality of its internal deliberations—seems incomplete, self-serving, and ultimately non-credible. These trust-destroying tendencies are exacerbated by its persistent resistance to transparency demands from Congress, from the press, and from organizations such as the aclu that have sought to know more about the way of the knife through Freedom of Information Act requests.¶ A related sin is the Obama administration's surprising failure to secure formal congressional support. Nearly every element of Obama's secret war rests on laws—especially the congressional authorization of force (2001) and the covert action statute (1991)—designed for different tasks. The administration could have worked with Congress to update these laws, thereby forcing members of Congress to accept responsibility and take a stand, and putting the secret war on a firmer political and legal foundation. But doing so would have required extended political efforts, public argument, and the possibility that Congress might not give the president precisely what he wants.¶ The administration that embraced the way of the knife in order to lower the political costs of counterterrorism abroad found it easier to avoid political costs at home as well. But this choice deprived it of the many benefits of public argumentation and congressional support. What Donald Rumsfeld said self-critically of Bush-era unilateralism applies to Obama's unilateralism as well: it fails to "take fully into account the broader picture—the complete set of strategic considerations of a president fighting a protracted, unprecedented and unfamiliar war for which he would need sustained domestic and international support." ¶ Instead of seeking contemporary congressional support, the administration has relied mostly on government lawyers' secret interpretive extensions of the old laws to authorize new operations against new enemies in more and more countries. The administration has great self-confidence in the quality of its stealth legal judgments. But as the Bush administration learned, secret legal interpretations are invariably more persuasive within the dark circle of executive branch secrecy than when exposed to public sunlight. On issues ranging from proper targeting standards, to the legality of killing American citizens, to what counts as an "imminent" attack warranting self-defensive measures, these secret legal interpretations—so reminiscent of the Bushian sin of unilateral legalism—have been less convincing in public, further contributing to presidential mistrust.¶ Feeling the heat from these developments, President Obama promised in his recent State of the Union address "to engage with Congress to ensure not only that our targeting, detention, and prosecution of terrorists remains consistent with our laws and system of checks and balances, but that our efforts are even more transparent to the American people and to the world." So far, this promise, like similar previous ones, remains unfulfilled. ¶ The administration has floated the idea of "[shifting] the CIA's lethal targeting program to the Defense Department," as The Daily Beast reported last month. Among other potential virtues, this move might allow greater public transparency about the way of the knife to the extent that it would eliminate the covert action bar to public discussion. But JSOC's non-covert targeted killing program is no less secretive than the CIA's, and its congressional oversight is, if anything, less robust. ¶ A bigger problem with this proposed fix is that it contemplates executive branch reorganization followed, in a best-case scenario, by more executive branch speeches and testimony about what it is doing in its stealth war. The proposal fails to grapple altogether with the growing mistrust of the administration's oblique representations about secret war. The president cannot establish trust in the way of the knife through internal moves and more words. Rather, he must take advantage of the separation of powers. Military detention, military commissions, and warrantless surveillance became more legitimate and less controversial during the Bush era because adversarial branches of government assessed the president's policies before altering and then approving them. President Obama should ask Congress to do the same with the way of the knife, even if it means that secret war abroad is harder to conduct.

### 1AC Imminence Adv

#### Advantage 2- Imminence:

#### The executive’s current definition of imminence is so vague and broad it makes overuse and abuse of the drone program inevitable.

Greenwald 13 (Glenn, J.D. from NYU, award-winning journalist, February 5th, 2013, "Chilling legal memo from Obama DOJ justifies assassination of US citizens," www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/feb/05/obama-kill-list-doj-memo)

4. Expanding the concept of "imminence" beyond recognition The memo claims that the president's assassination power applies to a senior al-Qaida member who "poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States". That is designed to convince citizens to accept this power by leading them to believe it's similar to common and familiar domestic uses of lethal force on US soil: if, for instance, an armed criminal is in the process of robbing a bank or is about to shoot hostages, then the "imminence" of the threat he poses justifies the use of lethal force against him by the police. But this rhetorical tactic is totally misleading. The memo is authorizing assassinations against citizens in circumstances far beyond this understanding of "imminence". Indeed, the memo expressly states that it is inventing "a broader concept of imminence" than is typically used in domestic law. Specifically, the president's assassination power "does not require that the US have clear evidence that a specific attack . . . will take place in the immediate future". The US routinely assassinates its targets not when they are engaged in or plotting attacks but when they are at home, with family members, riding in a car, at work, at funerals, rescuing other drone victims, etc. Many of the early objections to this new memo have focused on this warped and incredibly broad definition of "imminence". The ACLU's Jameel Jaffer told Isikoff that the memo "redefines the word imminence in a way that deprives the word of its ordinary meaning". Law Professor Kevin Jon Heller called Jaffer's objection "an understatement", noting that the memo's understanding of "imminence" is "wildly overbroad" under international law. Crucially, Heller points out what I noted above: once you accept the memo's reasoning - that the US is engaged in a global war, that the world is a battlefield, and the president has the power to assassinate any member of al-Qaida or associated forces - then there is no way coherent way to limit this power to places where capture is infeasible or to persons posing an "imminent" threat. The legal framework adopted by the memo means the president can kill anyone he claims is a member of al-Qaida regardless of where they are found or what they are doing. The only reason to add these limitations of "imminence" and "feasibility of capture" is, as Heller said, purely political: to make the theories more politically palatable. But the definitions for these terms are so vague and broad that they provide no real limits on the president's assassination power. As the ACLU's Jaffer says: "This is a chilling document" because "it argues that the government has the right to carry out the extrajudicial killing of an American citizen" and the purported limits "are elastic and vaguely defined, and it's easy to see how they could be manipulated."

#### 2 Impacts- first, Pakistan

#### This broad definition of imminence has increased the frequency of attacks and the scope of who can be targeted, which decreases the program’s effectiveness because it reduces the ratio of high-value decapitations to accidental kills

Hudson 11 (Leila Hudson is associate professor of anthropology and history in the School of Middle Eastern & North African Studies at the University of Arizona and director of the Southwest Initiative for the Study of Middle East Conflicts, “Drone Warfare: Blowback From the New American Way of War,” Middle East Policy, <http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/drone-warfare-blowback-new-american-way-war>)

The Bush administration's increased reliance on the program started in 2008; however, it is with the Obama administration that we see the most rapid proliferation of attacks. The final phase of the drone program is characterized by an even greater increase in attack frequency and an expansion of the target list to include targets of opportunity and unidentified militants of dubious rank — and funerals.12 As of May 2011, the CIA under the Obama administration has conducted nearly 200 drone strikes. This suggests that the drone target list now includes targets of opportunity, likely including some selected in consultation with the Pakistani authorities in order to facilitate the increasingly unpopular program. This development, in turn, has now decreased the effectiveness of the program when assessed in terms of the ratio of high-value to accidental kills. As Figure 2 shows, the steady increase in drone attacks conducted in Pakistan between 2004 and 2010 has resulted in a far higher number of deaths overall, but a lower rate of successful killings of high-value militant leaders who command, control and inspire organizations. If we define a high-value target as an organizational leader known to intelligence sources and the international media prior to attack and not someone whose death is justified with a posthumous militant status, we see fewer and fewer such hits — the alleged killing of al-Qaeda commander Ilyas al-Kashmiri in 2009 and again in June 2011 notwithstanding.13 Data analysis shows that at the beginning of the drone program (2002-04), five or six people were killed for each defined high-value target. As part of that high-value target's immediate entourage, they were much more likely to be militants than civilians. By 2010, one high-value target was killed per 147 total deaths. The increased lethality of each attack is due to larger payloads, broader target sets such as funeral processions, and probable new targeting guidelines (including targets of opportunity).14 Over time, these more deadly drone attacks have failed to effectively decapitate the leadership of anti-U.S. organizations but have killed hundreds of other people subsequently alleged to be militants; many were civilians.15 The rapidly growing population of survivors and witnesses of these brutal attacks have emotional and social needs and incentives to join the ranks of groups that access and attack U.S. targets in Afghanistan across the porous border. Drone attacks themselves deliver a politically satisfying short-term "bang for the buck" for U.S. constituencies ignorant of and indifferent to those affected by drone warfare or the phenomenon of blowback. In the Pakistani and Afghan contexts, they inflame the populations and destabilize the institutions that drive regional development. In addition to taking on an unacceptable and extrajudicial toll in human life, the drone strikes in unintended ways complicate the U.S. strategic mission in Afghanistan, as well as the fragile relationship with Pakistan. As a result, the U.S. military's counterinsurgency project in Afghanistan becomes a victim of the first two forms of blowback.

#### Overuse of drones in Pakistan empowers the military and makes a coup inevitable

Michael J Boyle 13, Assistant Professor of Political Science at La Salle University, former Lecturer in International Relations and Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St Andrews, PhD from Cambridge University, January 2013, “The costs and consequences of drone warfare,” International Affairs 89: 1 (2013) 1–29, <http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2013/89_1/89_1Boyle.pdf>

The escalation of drone strikes in Pakistan to its current tempo—one every few days—directly contradicts the long-term American strategic goal of boosting the capacity and legitimacy of the government in Islamabad. Drone attacks are more than just temporary incidents that erase all traces of an enemy. They have lasting political effects that can weaken existing governments, undermine their legitimacy and add to the ranks of their enemies. These political effects come about because drones provide a powerful signal to the population of a targeted state that the perpetrator considers the sovereignty of their government to be negligible. The popular perception that a government is powerless to stop drone attacks on its territory can be crippling to the incumbent regime, and can embolden its domestic rivals to challenge it through violence. Such continual violations of the territorial integrity of a state also have direct consequences for the legitimacy of its government. Following a meeting with General David Petraeus, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari described the political costs of drones succinctly, saying that ‘continuing drone attacks on our country, which result in loss of precious lives or property, are counterproductive and difficult to explain by a democratically elected government. It is creating a credibility gap.’75 Similarly, the Pakistani High Commissioner to London Wajid Shamsul Hasan said in August 2012 that¶ what has been the whole outcome of these drone attacks is that you have directly or indirectly contributed to destabilizing or undermining the democratic government. Because people really make fun of the democratic government—when you pass a resolution against drone attacks in the parliament and nothing happens. The Americans don’t listen to you, and they continue to violate your territory.76¶ The appearance of powerlessness in the face of drones is corrosive to the appearance of competence and legitimacy of the Pakistani government. The growing perception that the Pakistani civilian government is unable to stop drone attacks is particularly dangerous in a context where 87 per cent of all Pakistanis are dissatisfied with the direction of the country and where the military, which has launched coups before, remains a popular force.77

#### Pakistan collapse risks war with India and loose nukes

Twining 13 (Daniel Twining is Senior Fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund, Pakistan and the Nuclear Nightmare, Sept 4, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/09/04/pakistan\_and\_the\_nuclear\_nightmare)

The Washington Post has revealed the intense concern of the U.S. intelligence community about Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. In addition to gaps in U.S. information about nuclear weapons storage and safeguards, American analysts are worried about the risk of terrorist attacks against nuclear facilities in Pakistan as well as the risk that individual Pakistani nuclear weapons handlers could go rogue in ways that endanger unified national control over these weapons of mass destruction. These concerns raise a wider question for a U.S. national security establishment whose worst nightmares include the collapse of the Pakistani state -- with all its implications for empowerment of terrorists, a regional explosion of violent extremism, war with India, and loss of control over the country's nuclear weapons. That larger question is: Does Pakistan's nuclear arsenal promote the country's unity or its disaggregation? This is a complicated puzzle, in part because nuclear war in South Asia may be more likely as long as nuclear weapons help hold Pakistan together and embolden its military leaders to pursue foreign adventures under the nuclear umbrella. So if we argue that nuclear weapons help maintain Pakistan's integrity as a state -- by empowering and cohering the Pakistani Army -- they may at the same time undermine regional stability and security by making regional war more likely. As South Asia scholar Christine Fair of Georgetown University has argued, the Pakistani military's sponsorship of "jihad under the nuclear umbrella" has gravely undermined the security of Pakistan's neighborhood -- making possible war with India over Kargil in 1999, the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001, the terrorist attack on Mumbai in 2008, and Pakistan's ongoing support for the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani network, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and other violent extremists. Moreover, Pakistan's proliferation of nuclear technologies has seeded extra-regional instability by boosting "rogue state" nuclear weapons programs as far afield as North Korea, Libya, Iran, and Syria. Worryingly, rather than pursuing a policy of minimal deterrence along Indian lines, Pakistan's military leaders are banking on the future benefits of nuclear weapons by overseeing the proportionately biggest nuclear buildup of any power, developing tactical (battlefield) nuclear weapons, and dispersing the nuclear arsenal to ensure its survivability in the event of attack by either the United States or India. (Note that most Pakistanis identify the United States, not India, as their country's primary adversary, despite an alliance dating to 1954 and nearly $30 billion in American assistance since 2001.) The nuclear arsenal sustains Pakistan's unbalanced internal power structure, underwriting Army dominance over elected politicians and neutering civilian control of national security policy; civilian leaders have no practical authority over Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. Whether one believes the arsenal's governance implications generate stability or instability within Pakistan depends on whether one believes that Army domination of the country is a stabilizing or destabilizing factor. A similarly split opinion derives from whether one deems the Pakistan Army the country's most competent institution and therefore the best steward of weapons whose fall into the wrong hands could lead to global crisis -- or whether one views the Army's history of reckless risk-taking, from sponsoring terrorist attacks against the United States and India to launching multiple wars against India that it had no hope of winning, as a flashing "DANGER" sign suggesting that nuclear weapons are far more likely to be used "rationally" by the armed forces in pursuit of Pakistan's traditional policies of keeping its neighbors off balance. There is no question that the seizure of power by a radicalized group of generals with a revolutionary anti-Indian, anti-American, and social-transformation agenda within Pakistan becomes a far more dangerous scenario in the context of nuclear weapons. Similarly, the geographical dispersal of the country's nuclear arsenal and the relatively low level of authority a battlefield commander would require to employ tactical nuclear weapons raise the risk of their use outside the chain of command. This also raises the risk that the Pakistani Taliban, even if it cannot seize the commanding heights of state institutions, could seize either by force or through infiltration a nuclear warhead at an individual installation and use it to hold the country -- and the world -- to ransom. American intelligence analysts covering Pakistan will continue to lose sleep for a long time to come.

#### Miscalculation means this could escalate to nuclear winter and extinction

Hundley 12 (TOM HUNDLEY, Senior Editor-Pulitzer Center, “Pakistan and India: Race to the End,” http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/pakistan-nuclear-weapons-battlefield-india-arms-race-energy-cold-war)

Nevertheless, military analysts from both countries still say that a nuclear exchange triggered by miscalculation, miscommunication, or panic is far more likely than terrorists stealing a weapon -- and, significantly, that the odds of such an exchange increase with the deployment of battlefield nukes. As these ready-to-use weapons are maneuvered closer to enemy lines, the chain of command and control would be stretched and more authority necessarily delegated to field officers. And, if they have weapons designed to repel a conventional attack, there is obviously a reasonable chance they will use them for that purpose. "It lowers the threshold," said Hoodbhoy. "The idea that tactical nukes could be used against Indian tanks on Pakistan's territory creates the kind of atmosphere that greatly shortens the distance to apocalypse." Both sides speak of the possibility of a limited nuclear war. But even those who speak in these terms seem to understand that this is fantasy -- that once started, a nuclear exchange would be almost impossible to limit or contain. "The only move that you have control over is your first move; you have no control over the nth move in a nuclear exchange," said Carnegie's Tellis. The first launch would create hysteria; communication lines would break down, and events would rapidly cascade out of control. Some of the world's most densely populated cities could find themselves under nuclear attack, and an estimated 20 million people could die almost immediately. What's more, the resulting firestorms would put 5 million to 7 million metric tons of smoke into the upper atmosphere, according to a new model developed by climate scientists at Rutgers University and the University of Colorado. Within weeks, skies around the world would be permanently overcast, and the condition vividly described by Carl Sagan as "nuclear winter" would be upon us. The darkness would likely last about a decade. The Earth's temperature would drop, agriculture around the globe would collapse, and a billion or more humans who already live on the margins of subsistence could starve. This is the real nuclear threat that is festering in South Asia. It is a threat to all countries, including the United States, not just India and Pakistan. Both sides acknowledge it, but neither seems able to slow their dangerous race to annihilation.

#### Scenario 2- Yemen and Somalia:

#### Drone overuse wrecks stability in Yemen—errors and collateral damage are high now.

Greenfield and Kramer 13 (DANYA GREENFIELD & DAVID J KRAMER, Time to curb American drones, April 5,

http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/international/05-Apr-2013/time-to-curb-american-drones)

The US has played a significant role in Yemen’s transition, which ensured the exit of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, in exchange for immunity, and inaugurated a unity government and consensus president overseeing a national dialogue launched last month. The US has pledged support for the dialogue, which will lead to a constitutional referendum and new elections. To many Yemenis, however, Washington is narrowly focused on the short-term security concerns and the fight against terrorism. The US, they think, cares little about real political change. As Yemen’s transition enters a critical stage, Washington has an opportunity to change this image by redirecting its policy to greater emphasis on stability, prosperity and democracy, which will advance both US and Yemeni interests. Despite considerable US humanitarian aid and development support to their government, most Yemenis associate US engagement with the ongoing drone campaign to destroy Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and they see it as having little regard for its effect on civilians. A number of former US military and intelligence officials argue that the drone programme’s costs may exceed its benefits. Retired General Stanley McChrystal has articulated the hazards of overreliance on drones, and General James E Cartwright, former vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff, cautioned last month against unintended consequences, arguing that no matter how precise drone strikes may be, they breed animosity among targeted communities and threaten US efforts to curb extremism. With drone attacks breeding discontent and anti-American sentiment, the Barack Obama administration must rethink how the US can advance its objectives without letting tactics dictate strategy. Washington seeks to balance multiple priorities in Yemen: Supporting stability in the Arabian Peninsula, disrupting terrorist networks, securing waterways and aiding Yemen’s transition to democracy. By focusing primarily on acute, short-term threats, the US risks the long-term security that benefits both nations and can be achieved only through a sustained investment in the humanitarian, economic and political development of the Yemeni people. Thirty-one foreign policy experts and former diplomats sent a letter to President Obama last week that said the administration’s expansive use of unmanned drones in Yemen is proving counterproductive to US security objectives: As faulty intelligence leads to collateral damage, extremist groups ultimately win more support. The lack of transparency and accountability behind the drone policy set a dangerous global precedent and damage Washington’s ability to influence positive change in Yemen and the region. Drone strikes heighten animosity towards the US and Yemen President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi’s government for compromising Yemeni sovereignty. The US, the letter counselled, should reduce its reliance on drone strikes and instead invest in a long-term security agenda. This will include strengthening institutions that enhance the capacity and professionalism of Yemen’s security forces - not only counterterrorism units - to address threats to internal security. Washington already supports the restructuring of Yemen’s military, a step mandated by the transition agreement, but the Defence and State departments should ensure that America’s military assistance does not repeat the mistakes made during Saleh’s tenure - such as ignoring power concentrated in the hands of elites or not prosecuting human rights abuses. And building a capable police force recruited from residents in partnership with local communities is essential to securing this territory. Americans and Yemenis have a strong shared interest in combating extremism, as Al-Qaeda and its local affiliate, Ansar Al Sharia, spread out in the south and pledge acts of terrorism against both Yemeni and US targets. The US should not ignore this threat, but beyond the security portfolio, Yemenis need to feel that Washington is committed to supporting democratic institutions and the prosperity of the Yemeni people. Although the State Department and the US Agency for International Development are engaging Hadi’s government on development and humanitarian issues, most Yemenis feel only the negative effects of US counterterrorism policy. Rather than the steady stream of military delegations, a more robust economic assistance programme and public diplomacy strategy - including a visit by Secretary of State John Kerry and other high-level diplomats - will signal support for Yemen’s transition and its democratic aspirations. Yemen’s national dialogue is an ideal opportunity to break with a legacy of corrupt leaders who sought personal gain at the nation’s expense. The Obama administration can encourage this process by providing international cover for the difficult decisions delegates must make to craft a new political system based on equitable power-sharing, active citizenship and tolerance. This requires the administration to examine its own policies and shift course where the status quo undermines America’s shared interests. Despite negative attitudes towards US policy, Yemenis are eager to have an authentic partnership with the US - built on transparency, accountability and a demonstrated commitment to their future.

#### Executive overreliance causes blowback and instability in Yemen and Somalia- risks violent escalation.

Hudson 11 (Leila Hudson is associate professor of anthropology and history in the School of Middle Eastern & North African Studies at the University of Arizona and director of the Southwest Initiative for the Study of Middle East Conflicts, “Drone Warfare: Blowback From the New American Way of War,” Middle East Policy, <http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/drone-warfare-blowback-new-american-way-war>)

It is possible that the exchange of personnel among the military, the intelligence community and the Department of Defense will clear up the confusion over command and targeting, though this is far from given. The more serious forms of blowback stemming directly from the effects of extrajudicial killing, however, do not seem to have been addressed. If the Pakistani campaign spawned purposeful vengeance, like the Khost bombing, and opportunities for recruitment of noncombatants for retaliatory attacks, then the same purposeful and accidental escalation will most likely occur in the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa, compounding Yemen's and Somalia's volatility. In many ways, Yemen resembles both Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the undeclared drone war there will share the most dysfunctional characteristics of both sides of the Af/Pak theatre. Like Afghanistan, Yemen is a fragmented tribal society ideally suited for harboring pockets of militancy in a de-centered system with strong social ties.33 Like Pakistan, Yemen's military and the other institutions of a failing state may still function well enough to both channel counterterror funds from the United States and apply them according to its own interests and criteria.34 Another whisky-swilling military steeped in hypocrisy and addicted to counterterror as a way to make a living is hardly the ideal local spotter for U.S. attacks from the skies.35 Drone warfare as it has evolved in the Af/Pak theatre is not the answer to Yemen's unrest. The lessons of drone warfare in Pakistan are clear. First, if extrajudicial dispatching of high-value targets is a goal, such targets are best dealt with as Osama bin Laden was — through face-to-face assaults by crack JSOC troops based on reliable intelligence. Second, chronic testing of national sovereignty through an undeclared war of drone attacks puts fragile governing structures in the target country under enormous pressure while exacerbating social volatility, a recipe for unpredictable outcomes.36 Third, the complacency engendered in the American public, which is largely blind to the costs and consequences of, and anesthetized to, the legal and moral issues of drone warfare, precludes recognition, let alone discussion of this new form of warfare. Finally, a trend in increasing "collateral damage" ­— in which thousands of noncombatants may be extrajudicially killed, traumatized and materially damaged — fuels instability and escalates violent retaliation against convenient targets. With Yemen and Somalia as the east-west axis of a maritime system that unites South Asia with the Horn of Africa through one of the world's most sensitive and pirate-infested shipping channels, counterterror measures must be both precise and well-reasoned. The Pakistani model is neither. Drone strikes leave little scope for the civic reform that the Arab Spring in Yemen demands.37

#### Instability in Yemen and Somalia makes maritime terrorism in critical chokepoints around the Horn of Africa inevitable.

Ulrichsen 11 (Kristian Coates, The Geopolitics of Insecurity in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, Middle East Policy Council, http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/geopolitics-insecurity-horn-africa-and-arabian-peninsula?print)

Multiple fault lines have thus opened up, facilitated by (and accelerating) processes of state weakness and the relative empowerment of non-state actors. The result is more political violence and endemic criminality in and off the coast of Somalia and the Horn. Nevertheless, the new dimension to this nexus of terrorism, piracy, gun-running and people-smuggling is its growing transregional dimension. This defines the core challenge facing the regional and global security agenda, in addition to attempts at diplomatic mediation and conflict resolution throughout the area. Intensifying illicit networks and rent-seeking criminality are part of a broader pressure on fragile state structures. They are already struggling to control and adapt to pressures arising from the accelerated flows of information, communication and migration in a rapidly globalizing environment. The coincidence of these processes in Somalia and Yemen is changing the geopolitics of insecurity in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, as the following sections detail. MARITIME AND ENERGY SECURITY The problem of fragile and collapsed states on both sides of the Bab al-Mandab introduces potent new elements of maritime and energy security into the regional — and global — equation. The incidence of maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea more than doubled in 2008-09, and their operational reach steadily increased. Much of the piracy was launched from the semi-autonomous region of Puntland, on Somalia's tip of the Horn, where patterns of rent-seeking and gangsterism converge with the absence of effective state authority and licit sources of income. Moreover, at least one of the seven different groups of pirates operating off the Somali coast is believed to be based in the Socotra archipelago in Yemen, while at least some of the financial proceeds are believed to pass through money-laundering channels in Dubai and Kenya.44 This underlines the growing regional and international risk from both maritime piracy and maritime terrorism. Incidents such as the seizure of the Sirius Star by Somali-based pirates in November 2008 and the attack on the Japanese supertanker M Star in the Strait of Hormuz in July 2010 illustrate both phenomena. Maritime commerce and international shipping that link the oil-exporting Gulf states to Western economies must navigate two regional chokepoints, the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandab, in addition to the hazardous waters of the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. Pirates' growing aggressiveness has centered on this geostrategically and commercially vital region. It reflects the interlocking dangers stemming from a crisis of governance and spreading conflicts. In 2009, the International Maritime Board recorded a total of 406 actual and attempted attacks, the majority of which occurred in the Gulf of Aden and off the Somali coast.45 However, due to underreporting, often for fear of higher insurance premiums, the figures may be much higher. Numerous factors underlie the rise in maritime piracy off the Somali coast. These include opportunistic motivations, which are among the principal drivers of pirate groups, as well as the ready availability of targets (through high volumes of trade passing by) and means (including inadequate law enforcement and ready access to weaponry). It is contextualized by the impact of conflict, poverty and weak state capacity.46 Indeed, in the Somali case, state collapse is a major determinant of piracy. Piracy declined sharply during the short-lived projection of power and authority by the UIC in 2006 and subsequently resurged following their removal through the reappearance of pirate groups operating under warlord protection.47 With the TFG unable to control its territory, let alone its coastline and territorial waters, increased naval patrolling activity by external actors (including the EU, NATO, China, Russia, India and Iran) may offer a degree of protection to shipping but leaves untouched the root causes of piracy as a symptom of state collapse and lack of legitimate economic opportunities. Maritime terrorism presents the second major threat to international security at sea. It has similar causal facilitators to maritime piracy; the erosion of governance in littoral regions creates security gaps that may be exploited by terrorist organizations. The threat from maritime terrorism is low-level yet potentially high-impact. It encompasses subthreats ranging from maritime criminality to better-organized groupings of insurgents or militants who take advantage of the pressure on littoral states to exploit their maritime resources and the fuzzy margins between domestic and international governance of international waterways and shipping lanes. Although the number of maritime terrorist incidents has been relatively small, it does present a challenge to a global supply chain and logistical system increasingly predicated on "just-in-time" deliveries. It also encompasses the role of non-state actors with access to sophisticated weaponry operating in international waters where jurisdiction is unclear and the "seams of globalization" become vulnerable to exploitation.48

#### These attacks risk global economic collapse

Neubauer 13 (Sigurd, Defense and foreign affairs specialist, member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Somalia: A Terrorist-Piracy Nexus?, May 22, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sigurd-neubauer/somalia-piracy\_b\_3320406.html)

Piracy, like terrorism has been a scourge of mankind for centuries and, though its practitioners, real (Blackbeard, Anne Bonny and Henry Morgan) and mythical (Captain Jack Sparrow in the Pirates of the Caribean movie stories) have achieved heroic stature in popular culture, its contemporary manifestations represent a major threat to the global economy and to national security. Significant strides have been made in recent years towards combating piracy, especially off the coast of Somalia, but a robust international grand strategy is urgently needed in order to forestall an ever more dangerous global threat as pirates develop ever more sophisticated organizational structures, many of which are already linked to criminal gangs and even, in some cases to terrorist groups. Their activities already impose heavy financial and human costs not only on the maritime industry but also on the countries from which they operate. Heretofore, the area around Somalia has been the most dangerous area but significant progress has been made in reducing piracy there. Last year, pirates succeeded in capturing 13 vessels, compared to 49 in 2010 and 28 in 2011, according to the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Part of that success can at least be partially explained by the European Union's heavy naval presence around the Horn of Africa, in the Gulf of Aden while improving intelligence sharing with NATO, the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), the UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO), and the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) Piracy Reporting Center. Additional measures implemented by shipping companies such as providing more armed security aboard merchant vessels while securing the ship's perimeter with razor or barbed wire have also led to the significant decrease in the number of piracy attacks. Equally important, however, was the 2009 implementation of the Djibouti Code of Conduct, a code concerning the repression of piracy and armed robbery against ships. Under the code, aside from committing themselves to abiding by various counter-piracy United Nations Security Council Resolutions, the signatories also pledged to overhaul their domestic counter-piracy legislation. As a result, a record number of pirates were sentenced by local courts around the world last year. The significance of these developments should not, however, be overstated. First, the cost remains enormous -- in 2011, it is estimated that Somali piracy cost the global economy an estimated 7 billion USD through higher insurance premiums, security enhancements, and business disruption and earned the pirates some 160 million USD in ransoms. These figures do not include the psychological burdens borne by the captives or the costs imposed on Somalia. And, the actual costs are probably even higher due to widespread underreporting. Second, while piracy off the coast of Somalia has decreased, pirates are gradually focusing their efforts where patrols are not available for protection, now operating in the wider Indian Ocean. As pirates are extending their reach from Oman to the Maldives, they have also proven to be excellent entrepreneurs, building large well-financed organizations that are able to execute ever more sophisticated attacks such as hijacking oil tankers off the coast of Nigeria and stealing the valuable cargo. Moreover, pirate groups are becoming increasingly international and are extending their reach from national bases to neighbors -- from Nigeria, for example to Benin and the Ivory Coast, usually in cooperation with powerful local elements. Economically speaking, piracy already presents an enormous challenge and it is conceivable that as pirates face stiffer resistance on the high seas by an increasingly stronger international naval presence, their political and ideological motivations could radicalize over time. Currently, terrorist groups already cooperate with criminal gangs to raise funds and piracy could potentially become a lucrative source of income for radical groups. A second plausible scenario is that as pirates struggle to capture more ships, pirates could resort to attacking shipping directly as criminal motivations could subside to radical ideology propagated by al Qaeda and its splinter groups. Hence, it is easy to envision a nightmare scenario wherein terrorists, supported by a pirate group, hijack an oil tanker not just to steal the oil or collect the ransom but to blow it up in a major port with devastating economic consequences across the globe. A separate threat scenario that should not be underestimated entails terrorists capturing a liqueﬁed natural gas carrier that can be used as a ﬂoating bomb, which can either be detonated at a major port or near a flotilla of ships in the open seas. Piracy and terrorism can also be used as means to exert economic warfare against the United States and the international community as maritime attacks oﬀer terrorists an alternate means of causing mass economic destabilization. After all, terrorists have already attacked ships -- al Qaeda, the USS Cole (2000), Abu Sayyaf a ferryboat in the Philippines (2004) and the Mumbai attacks (2008).

#### Nuclear war

Merlini, Senior Fellow – Brookings, 11

 [Cesare Merlini, nonresident senior fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe and chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Italian Institute for International Affairs (IAI) in Rome. He served as IAI president from 1979 to 2001. Until 2009, he also occupied the position of executive vice chairman of the Council for the United States and Italy, which he co-founded in 1983. His areas of expertise include transatlantic relations, European integration and nuclear non-proliferation, with particular focus on nuclear science and technology. A Post-Secular World? DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2011.571015 Article Requests: Order Reprints : Request Permissions Published in: journal Survival, Volume 53, Issue 2 April 2011 , pages 117 - 130 Publication Frequency: 6 issues per year Download PDF Download PDF (~357 KB) View Related Articles To cite this Article: Merlini, Cesare 'A Post-Secular World?', Survival, 53:2, 117 – 130]

Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system. One or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into an open and traditional conflict between states, perhaps even involving the use of nuclear weapons. The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of the global economic and financial system, the vulnerability of which we have just experienced, and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences for peace and democracy similar to those of the first. Whatever the trigger, the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection of outside interference would likely be amplified, emptying, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of multilateralism, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as those related to immigration might become unbearable. Familiar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated. One way or another, the secular rational approach would be sidestepped by a return to theocratic absolutes, competing or converging with secular absolutes such as unbridled nationalism.

#### Nuclear war

Kemp 10 Geoffrey, Director of Regional Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center, served in the White House under Ronald Reagan, special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs on the National Security Council Staff, Former Director, Middle East Arms Control Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010, The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia’s Growing Presence in the Middle East, pg. 233-4

The second scenario, called Mayhem and Chaos, is the opposite of the first scenario; everything that can go wrong does go wrong. The world economic situation weakens rather than strengthens, and India, China, and Japan suffer a major reduction in their growth rates, further weakening the global economy. As a result, energy demand falls and the price of fossil fuels plummets, leading to a financial crisis for the energy-producing states, which are forced to cut back dramatically on expansion programs and social welfare. That in turn leads to political unrest: and nurtures different radical groups, including, but not limited to, Islamic extremists. The internal stability of some countries is challenged, and there are more “failed states.” Most serious is the collapse of the democratic government in Pakistan and its takeover by Muslim extremists, who then take possession of a large number of nuclear weapons. The danger of war between India and Pakistan increases significantly. Iran, always worried about an extremist Pakistan, expands and weaponizes its nuclear program. That further enhances nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt joining Israel and Iran as nuclear states. Under these circumstances, the potential for nuclear terrorism increases, and the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack in either the Western world or in the oil-producing states may lead to a further devastating collapse of the world economic market, with a tsunami-like impact on stability. In this scenario, major disruptions can be expected, with dire consequences for two-thirds of the planet’s population.

#### The plan is key- Ex post review resolves the broad definition of imminence- redress key to check the errors which cause blowback.

Hafetz, former ACLU National Security Project attorney, 13 (Jonathan Hafetz, former senior attorney at the ACLU’s National Security Project, a litigation director at NYU’s Brennan Center for Justice, and a John J. Gibbons Fellow in Public Interest and Constitutional Law at Gibbons, P.C, Reviewing Drones, March 8, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jonathan-hafetz/reviewing-drones\_b\_2815671.html)

The better course is to ensure meaningful review after the fact. To this end, Congress should authorize federal damages suits by the immediate family members of individuals killed in drone strikes. Such ex post review would serve two main functions: providing judicial scrutiny of the underlying legal basis for targeted killings and affording victims a remedy. It would also give judges more leeway to evaluate the facts without fear that an error on their part might leave a dangerous terrorist at large. For review to be meaningful, judges must not be restricted to deciding whether there is enough evidence in a particular case, as they would likely be under a FISA model. They must also be able to examine the government's legal arguments and, to paraphrase the great Supreme Court chief justice John Marshall, "to say what the law is" on targeted killings. Judicial review through a civil action can achieve that goal. It can thus help resolve the difficult questions raised by the Justice Department white paper, including the permissible scope of the armed conflict with al Qaeda and the legality of the government's broad definition of an "imminent" threat. Judges must also be able to afford a remedy to victims. Mistakes happen and, as a recent report by Columbia Law School and the Center for Civilians in Conflict suggests, they happen more than the U.S. government wants to acknowledge. Errors are not merely devastating for family members and their communities. They also increase radicalization in the affected region and beyond. Drone strikes -- if unchecked -- could ultimately create more terrorists than they eliminate.

#### The plan would result in a balanced definition of imminence. The court would apply a standard that still allows decapitation of high value targets and out-of-battlefield operations– Hamdi proves

Kwoka 11 (Lindsay, J.D. UPenn, “TRIAL BY SNIPER: THE LEGALITY OF TARGETED KILLING IN THE WAR ON TERROR” Accessed at HeinOnline)

But this is not the end of the inquiry. Even if a targeted individual is not located on a field of battle, he may still be a threat, and tar- geted killing may potentially be necessary and appropriate in some circumstances. Applying the reasoning of" Hamdi here, a court would likely find that the use of targeted killing is only "necessary and ap- propriate" if it is the only way to prevent someone like Al-Awlaki from engaging in terrorist activity or otherwise harming the United States. The Hamdi Court was concerned with assuring that the executive used the least intrusive means in achieving its objective of preventing the enemy combatant from returning to battle. The Court made clear that the means used to achieve this objective should be no more intrusive than necessary.7\* It is consistent with the Court's concern to allow targeted killing only when it is the only means available to pre- vent harm to the United States. If the executive can demonstrate that an individual outside of a warzone will harm the United States unless he is killed, targeted kill- ing may be authorized. This is consistent with Hamdi, in which the main concern was preventing future harm to the United States while using the least intrusive means available. This is also consistent with U.S. criminal law, in which the executive branch is permitted to kill an individual if there is no peaceful means left to apprehend him. Such an approach is also consistent with the approach of the Su- preme Court. Even the most stalwart protectors of constitutional rights of alleged terrorists recognize that immediate action by the executive is at times necessary to prevent attacks.7'' An approach that al- lows the executive to use deadly force when it is the only available means of preventing harm effectively balances the need to protect citizen's constitutional rights while affording sufficient deference to the executive.

### Navy Plan

#### The United States Federal Judiciary should subject United States’ targeted killing operations to judicial ex post review by allowing a cause of action against the government for damages arising directly out of the constitutional provision allegedly offended.

### 1AC Solvency

#### Ex post review makes our drone operations better—incentivizes better intel gathering and it doesn’t chill battlefield ops

Taylor, Senior Fellow-Center for Policy & Research, 13 (Paul, Senior Fellow at the Center for Policy & Research and an alumnus of Seton Hall Law School and the Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, and is veteran of the Army’s 82nd Airborne Division, with deployments to both Afghanistan and to Iraq, “Former DOD Lawyer Frowns on Drone Court,” March, http://transparentpolicy.org/2013/03/former-dod-lawyer-frowns-on-drone-court/)

Lastly, there is the concern of creating perverse incentives: whether a person’s name or identity is known has never been a factor in determining the legality of targeting an otherwise-lawful military target. But by creating a separate legal regime for known targets, we could create a disincentive to collect information about a target. We do not want a military or intelligence agency that keeps itself intentionally uninformed. Nor do we want to halt a military operation in progress simply because one of the targets is recognized late. Conducting the review ex post would not eliminate these issues, but it would substantially mitigate them. The military (or CIA, if it keeps its program), would not fear an interruption of its operations, and could even have an incentive to collect more information in order to later please a court that has plenty of time to look back at the past operations and question whether an individual was in fact targeted.

#### Courts don’t leak intel methods or classified information—this fear has been repeatedly dispelled by hundreds of successfully tried terrorism cases

Jaffer-director ACLU’s National Security Project-12/9/08 <http://www.salon.com/2008/12/09/guantanamo_3/> Don’t replace the old Guantánamo with a new one

The contention that the federal courts are incapable of protecting classified information — “intelligence sources and methods,” in the jargon of national security experts — is another canard. When classified information is at issue in federal criminal prosecutions, a federal statute — the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) — generally permits the government to substitute classified information at trial with an unclassified summary of that information. It is true that CIPA empowers the court to impose sanctions on the government if the substitution of the unclassified summary for the classified information is found to prejudice the defendant, and in theory such sanctions can include the dismissal of the indictment. In practice, however, sanctions are exceedingly rare, and of the hundreds of terrorism cases that have been prosecuted over the last decade, none has been dismissed for reasons relating to classified information. Proponents of new detention authority, including Waxman and Wittes, invoke the threat of exposing “intelligence sources and methods” as a danger inherent to terrorism prosecutions in U.S. courts, but the record of successful prosecutions provides the most effective rebuttal.

#### No over-deterrence of military operations- government liability is rooted in the FTCA and it avoids the chilling associated with individual liability.

Kent, Constitutional Law prof, 13 (Andrew, Faculty Advisor-Center on National Security at

Fordham Law School, prof @ Fordham University School of Law- constitutional law, foreign relations law, national security law, federal courts and procedure, “ARE DAMAGES DIFFERENT?: BIVENS AND NATIONAL SECURITY,” October 8, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2330476>) \*\* Evidence is gender paraphrased

Because of sovereign immunity, federal officials are sued under Bivens in their so-called personal rather than official capacities.43 In theory, persons injured by actions of a federal official could also seek compensation by suing the agent’s employer, the United States Government for damages, but the sovereign immunity of the federal government blocks this route.44 The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), originally enacted in 1946 and frequently amended since,45 effects a partial waiver of sovereign immunity by allowing suits directly against the federal government instead of officers (who might be judgment proof) and making the United States liable for injuries caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any federal employee acting within the scope of ~~his~~ employment, in accordance with the law of the state where the act or omission occurred.46 Under the Westfall Act of 1988, the FTCA is the exclusive remedy for torts committed by federal officials within the scope of their employment, except for suits brought for violations of the Constitution.47 In other words, state law tort claims against individual official defendants are now generally barred. The Supreme Court takes the prospect of individual liability in damages for officials very seriously and has crafted immunity doctrines to soften the blow. The Court’s rulings provide the President of the United States and certain classes of officials defined functionally—prosecutors doing prosecutorial work, legislators legislating, judges doing judicial work and certain persons performing “quasijudicial” functions—with absolute immunity from money damages suits, generally for the reason that such suits would be likely to be frequent, frequently meritless, and uniquely capable of disrupting job performance.48 All other government officials are entitled to only “qualified immunity” from money damages suits. Under the qualified immunity doctrine, officials are liable only when they violate “clearly established” federal rights, that is, when “[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what ~~he is~~ [they are] doing violates that right.”49 Because qualified immunity is not just a defense to liability but also “a limited entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation,”50 the Court’s doctrine encourages speedy resolution of immunity questions by judges. The policy reasons for the Court’s active protection of federal officials through a robust immunity doctrine, including fear of dampening the zeal with which officials perform their jobs because of fear of personal liability, are discussed below in Section V.A.

## 2AC

### T – Sig Strikes

#### Targeted killing includes signature strikes- prefer Zenko, he’s one of the utmost drone experts

**Zenko, drone expert, 12** [Micah, Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously, he worked for five years at the Harvard Kennedy School and in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service, and State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, “Targeted Killings and Signature Strikes,” June 16, <http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2012/07/16/targeted-killings-and-signature-strikes/>]

No matter how U.S. officials (secretly) refer to the practice, signature strikes against military-age men have been part of U.S. targeted killings outside of battlefields from their beginning. In fact, the very first targeted killing was a signature strike.¶ After a year-long manhunt and several missed opportunities by Yemeni soldiers, on November 3, 2002, a fusion of human intelligence assets and signals intercepts pinpointed Abu Ali al-Harithi—an operational planner in the al-Qaeda cell that bombed the USS Cole in 2002—and his bodyguards living in the Marib region near the border with Saudi Arabia. Yemeni and U.S. forces on the ground, supported by a Predator drone circling above, were monitoring al-Harithi’s group when they left a compound in two Toyota SUVs. All of the men were in one vehicle and the women in the other. According to an unnamed U.S. official, “If the women hadn’t gotten into another car, we wouldn’t have fired.” (A member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence later wondered, “What do we do, next time, if the women get into the car?”)¶ Reportedly, the National Security Agency (NSA) intercepted a satellite phone call coming from the SUV filled with men. After an NSA analyst—who had listened to tapes of al-Harithi’s voice for years—heard confirming evidence, he shouted: “He’s in the backseat, and he’s giving the driver directions!” With that confirmation, a CIA-controlled Predator drone was authorized to fire a single Hellfire missile, which destroyed the SUV and killed al-Harithi, four unknown Yemenis, and Ahmed Hijazi (otherwise known as Kemal Derwish)—a naturalized U.S. citizen who recruited six men from Lackawanna, New York, to briefly attend an al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan. Ultimately, the Lackawanna Six pled guilty to providing material support to al-Qaeda and received sentences ranging from seven to nine years in federal prison.¶ As the Los Angeles Times reported the drone strike: “Even though the CIA wasn’t sure who else was in the car, the customary rules of armed conflict say that anyone sitting next to a legitimate target such as Harithi was, in effect, accepting the risk of imminent death.” (Many international legal scholars would dispute this interpretation.) At the same time, U.S. officials acknowledged that the CIA did not know Hijazi was in the vehicle before the CIA launched the missile, although one later claimed his death was justifiable “collateral damage” since “he was just in the wrong place at the wrong time.”¶ It is plausible that the military-age males who happened to get into al-Harithi’s SUV that day were involved with the suspected al-Qaeda operative in planning terrorist plots. However, there is no way to know this with any certainty, and the Bush administration never presented any supporting evidence to this effect. Moreover, we will never know what specific evidence was used to target al-Harithi, because some of it came from suspected al-Qaeda operative Abd al Rahim al-Nashiri. In 2008, CIA director Hayden testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that Nashiri was one of three detainees that the CIA waterboarded, and information obtained by torture is not admissible in a military commission trial.¶ Whether they are called signature strikes, crowd killing, or Terrorist Attack Disruption Strikes, all have been part of U.S. targeted killings from the start, and continue with the CIA’s tactic of staggered drone strikes to kill rescuers of initial victims. The Obama administration makes the false choice that kinetic counterterrorism options are either “large, intrusive military deployments” or drone strikes (although some signature strikes have been conducted with cruise missiles). Or, as former CIA official Henry Crumpton—who, according to his memoir, authorized the first U.S. drone strike on October 20, 2001, in Afghanistan—crudely described the dichotomy: “Look at the firebombing of Dresden, and compare what we’re doing today.” However, people have the right to disagree with the ethical and moral tradeoffs of how drone strikes are currently conducted, and the unwillingness of the Obama administration to discuss them, as well as Congress’ reticence to question them. After ten years of signature strikes, isn’t this a debate worth having?

### Security

#### Vote aff despite prior questions—impact timeframe means you gotta act on the best info available

Kratochwil, professor of international relations – European University Institute, 2008 (Friedrich, “The Puzzles of Politics,” pg. 200-213)

The lesson seems clear. Even at the danger of “fuzzy boundaries”, when we deal with “practice” ( just as with the “pragmatic turn”), we would be well advised to rely on the use of the term rather than on its reference (pointing to some property of the object under study), in order to draw the bounds of sense and understand the meaning of the concept. My argument for the fruitful character of a pragmatic approach in IR, therefore, does not depend on a comprehensive mapping of the varieties of research in this area, nor on an arbitrary appropriation or exegesis of any specific and self-absorbed theoretical orientation. For this reason, in what follows, I will not provide a rigidly specified definition, nor will I refer exclusively to some prepackaged theoretical approach. Instead, I will sketch out the reasons for which a pragmatic orientation in social analysis seems to hold particular promise. These reasons pertain both to the more general area of knowledge appropriate for praxis and to the more specific types of investigation in the field. The follow- ing ten points are – without a claim to completeness – intended to engender some critical reflection on both areas. Firstly, a pragmatic approach does not begin with objects or “things” (ontology), or with reason and method (epistemology), but with “acting” (prattein), thereby preventing some false starts. Since, **as historical beings placed in a** specific situations**, we do not have the luxury** of deferring decisions **until we have** found the “truth”, **we have to act and must do so always under time pressures and in the face of incomplete information.** Pre- cisely because the social world is characterised by strategic interactions, what a situation “is”, is hardly ever clear ex ante, because it is being “produced” by the actors and their interactions, and the multiple possibilities are rife with incentives for (dis)information. This puts a premium on quick diagnostic and cognitive shortcuts informing actors about the relevant features of the situ- ation, and on leaving an alternative open (“plan B”) in case of unexpected difficulties. Instead of relying on certainty and universal validity gained through abstraction and controlled experiments, we know that completeness and attentiveness to detail, rather than to generality, matter. To that extent, likening practical choices to simple “discoveries” of an already independently existing “reality” which discloses itself to an “observer” – or relying on optimal strategies – is somewhat heroic. These points have been made vividly by “realists” such as Clausewitz in his controversy with von Bülow, in which he criticised the latter’s obsession with a strategic “science” (Paret et al. 1986). While Clausewitz has become an icon for realists, only a few of them (usually dubbed “old” realists) have taken seriously his warnings against the misplaced belief in the reliability and use- fulness of a “scientific” study of strategy. Instead, most of them, especially “neorealists” of various stripes, have embraced the “theory”-building based on the epistemological project as the via regia to the creation of knowledge. A pragmatist orientation would most certainly not endorse such a position. Secondly, since acting in the social world often involves acting “for” someone, special responsibilities arise that aggravate both the incompleteness of knowledge as well as its generality problem. Since we owe special care to those entrusted to us, for example, as teachers, doctors or lawyers, we cannot just rely on what is generally true, but have to pay special attention to the particular case. Aside from avoiding the foreclosure of options, we cannot refuse to act on the basis of incomplete information or insufficient know- ledge, and the necessary diagnostic will involve typification and comparison, reasoning by analogy rather than generalization or deduction. Leaving out the particularities of a case, be it a legal or medical one, in a mistaken effort to become “scientific” would be a fatal flaw. Moreover, **there still remains the crucial element of “timing” –** of knowing when to act. Students of crises have always pointed out the importance of this factor but, in attempts at building a general “theory” of international politics analogously to the natural sci- ences, such elements are neglected on the basis of the “continuity of nature” and the “large number” assumptions. Besides, “timing” seems to be quite recalcitrant to analytical treatment.

#### Threats aren’t psychological projections, but rather concrete realities -- political engagement key

Hoffman, 86 [Stanley, Center for European Studies at Harvard, “On the Political Psychology of Peace and War: A Critique and an Agenda,” Political Psychology 7.1 JSTOR]

The traditionalists, even when, in their own work, they try scrupulous-ly to transcend national prejudices and to seek scientific truth, believe that it is unrealistic to expect statesmen to stand above the fray: By definition, the statesmen are there to worry not only about planetary survival, but — first of all—about national survival and safety. To be sure, they ought to be able to see how certain policies, aimed at enhancing security, actually increase in-security all around. But there are sharp limits to how far they can go in their mutual empathy or in their acts (unlike intellectuals in their advice), as long as the states' antagonisms persist, as long as uncertainty about each other's intentions prevails, and as long as there is reason to fear that one side's wise restraint, or unilateral moves toward "sanity," will be met, not by the rival's similar restraint or moves, but either by swift or skillful political or military exploitation of the opportunity created for unilateral gain, or by a for-midable domestic backlash if national self-restraint appears to result in ex-ternal losses, humiliations or perceptions of weakness. There is little point in saying that the state of affairs which imposes such limits is "anachronistic" or "unrational." To traditionalists, the radicals' stance — condemnation from the top of Mount Olympus — can only impede understanding of the limits and possibilities of reform. To be sure, the fragmentation of mankind is a formidable obstacle to the solution of many problems that cannot be handled well in a national framework, and a deadly peril insofar as the use of force, the very distinctive feature of world politics, now entails the risk of nuclear war. But one can hardly call anachronistic a phenomenon—the assertion of national identity — that, to the bulk of [HU]mankind, appears not only as a necessity but also as a positive good, since humanity's fragmentation results from the very aspiration to self-determination. Many people have only recently emerged from foreign mastery, and have reason to fear that the alternative to national self-mastery is not a world government of assured fairness and efficiency, but alien domination. As for "unrationality," the drama lies in the contrast between the ra-tionality of the whole, which scholars are concerned about—the greatest good of the greatest number, in utilitarian terms — and the rationality or greatest good of the part, which is what statesmen worry about and are responsible for. What the radicals denounce as irrational and irresponsible from the viewpoint of mankind is what Weber called the statesman's ethic of responsibility. What keeps ordinary "competitive conflict processes" (Deutsch, 1983)— the very stuff of society — from becoming "unrational" or destructive, isprecisely what the nature of world politics excludes: the restraint of the partners either because of the ties of affection or responsibility that mitigate the conflict, or because of the existence of an outsider — marriage counselor, arbitrator, judge, policeman or legislator— capable of inducing or imposing restraints. Here we come to a third point of difference. The very absence of such safeguards of rationality, the obvious discrepancy between what each part intends, and what it (and the whole world) ends with, the crudeness of some of the psychological mechanisms at work in international affairs—as one can see from the statements of leaders, or from the media, or from inflamed publics—have led many radicals, especially among those whose training or profession is in psychoanalysis or mental health, to treat the age-old contests of states in terms, not of the psychology of politics, but of individual psychology and pathology. There are two manifestations of this. One is the tendency to look at nations or states as individuals writ large, stuck at an early stage of development (similarly, John Mack (1985) in a recent paper talks of political ideologies as carrying "forward the dichotomized structures of childhood"). One of my predecessors writes about "the correspondence between development of the individual self and that of the group or nation," and concludes "that intergroup or international conflict contains the basic elements of the conflict each individual experiences psychologically" (Volkan, 1985). Robert Holt, from the viewpoint of cognitive psychology, finds "the largest part of the American public" immature, in a "phase of development below the Conscientious" (Holt, 1984). The second related aspect is the tendency to look at the notions statesmen or publics have of "the enemy," not only as residues of childhood or adolescent phases of development, but as images that express "disavowed aspects of the self" (Stein, 1985), reveal truths about our own fears and hatreds, and amount to masks we put on the "enemy," because of our own psychological needs. Here is where the clash between traditionalists and radicals is strongest. Traditionalists do not accept a view of group life derived from the study of individual development or family relations, or a view of modern society derived from the simplistic Freudian model of regressed followers identifying with a leader. They don't see in ideologies just irra-tional constructs, but often rationally selected maps allowing individuals to cope with reality. They don't see national identification as pathological, as an appeal to the people's baser instincts, more aggressive impulses or un-sophisticated mental defenses; it is, as Jean-Jacques Rousseau so well understood, the competition of sovereign states that frequently pushes people from "sane" patriotism to "insane" nationalism (Rousseau's way of preventing the former from veering into the latter was, to say th/e least, im-practical: to remain poor in isolation). Nor do they see anything "primitive" in the nation's concern for survival: It is a moral and structural requirement. Traditionalists also believe that the "intra-psychic" approach distorts reality. Enemies are not mere projections of negative identities; they are often quite real. To be sure, the Nazis' view of the Jews fits the metaphor of the mask put on the enemy for one's own needs. But were, in return, those Jews who understood what enemies they had in the Nazis, doing the same? Is the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, is the Soviet regime's treatment of dissidents, was the Gulag merely a convenient projection of our intrapsychic battles? Clichés such as the one about how our enemy "understands only force" may tell us a great deal about ourselves; but sometimes they contain half-truths about him, and not just revelations about us. Our fears flow not only from our private fantasies but also from concrete realities and from the fantasies which the international state of nature generates. In other words, the psychology of politics which traditionalists deem adequate is not derived from theories of psychic development and health; it is derived from the logic of the international milieu, which breeds the kind of vocabulary found in the historians and theorists of the state of nature: fear and power, pride and honor, survival and security, self-interest and reputation, distrust and misunderstanding, commitment and credibility. It is also derived from the social psychology of small or large groups, which resorts to the standard psychological vocabulary that describes mental mechanisms or maneuvers and cognitive processes: denial, projection, guilt, repression, closure, rigidity, etc.... But using this vocabulary does not imply that a group whose style of politics is paranoid is therefore composed of people who, as private individuals, are paranoid. Nor does it relieve us of the duty to look at the objective reasons and functions of these mental moves, and of the duty to make explicit our assumptions about what constitutes a "healthy," wise, or proper social process. Altogether, traditionalists find the mental health approach to world affairs unhelpful. Decisions about war and peace are usually taken by small groups of people; the temptation of analyzing their behavior either, literal-ly, in terms of their personalities, or, metaphysically, in terms borrowed from the study of human development, rather than in those of group dynamics or principles of international politics is understandable. But it is misleading. What is pathological in couples, or in a well-ordered community, is, alas, frequent, indeed normal, among states, or in a troubled state. What is malignant or crazy is usually not the actors or the social process in which they are engaged: it is the possible results. The grammar of motives which the mental health approach brands as primitive or immature is actually rational for the actors. to the substitution of labels for explanations, to bad analysis and fanciful prescriptions. Bad analysis: the tendency to see in group coherence a regressive response to a threat, whereas it often is a rational response to the "existential" threats entailed by the very nature of the international milieu. Or the tendency to see in the effacement or minimization of individual differences in a group a release of unconscious instincts, rather than a phenomenon that can be perfectly adaptive—in response to stress or threats—or result from governmental manipulation or originate in the code of conduct inculcated by the educational system, etc.. . The habit of comparing the state, or modern society, with the Church or the army, and to analyze human relations in these institutions in ways that stress the libidinal more than the cognitive and superego factors, or equate libidinal bonds and the desire for a leader. The view that enemies are above all products of mental drives, rather than inevitable concomitants of social strife at every level. Or the view that the contest with the rival fulfills inter-nal needs, which may be true, but requires careful examination of the nature of these needs (psychological? bureaucratic? economic?), obscures the objective reasons of the contest, and risks confusing cause and function. Indeed, such analysis is particularly misleading in dealing with the pre-sent scene. The radicals are so (justifiably) concerned with the nuclear peril that the traditional ways in which statesmen and publics behave seem to vindicate the pathological approach. But this, in turn, incites radicals to overlook the fundamental ambiguity of contemporary world politics. On the one hand, there is a nuclear revolution—the capacity for total destruction. On the other hand, many states, without nuclear weapons, find that the use of force remains rational (in terms of a rationality of means) and beneficial at home or abroad—ask the Vietnamese, or the Egyptians after October 1973, or Mrs. Thatcher after the Falklands, or Ronald Reagan after Grenada. The superpowers themselves, whose contest has not been abolished by the nuclear revolution (it is the stakes, the costs of failure that have, of course, been transformed), find that much of their rivalry can be conducted in traditional ways — including limited uses of force —below the level of nuclear alarm. They also find that nuclear weapons, while—perhapsunusable rationally, can usefully strengthen the very process that has been so faulty in the prenuclear ages: deterrence (this is one of the reasons for nuclear proliferation). The pathological approach interprets deterrence as expressing the deterrer's belief that his country is good, the enemy's is bad. This is often the case, but it need not be; it can also reflect the conviction that one's country has interests that are not mere figments of the imagination, and need to be protected both because of the material costs of losing them, and because of the values embedded in them. As for war planning, it is not a case of "psychological denial of unwelcome reality" (Montville, 1985). but a — perhaps futile, perhaps dangerous—necessity in a world where deterrence may once more fail. The prescriptions that result from the radicals' psychological approach also run into traditionalist objections. Even if one accepts the metaphors of collective disease or pathology, one must understand that the "cure" can only be provided by politics. All too often, the radicals' cures consist of perfectly sensible recommendations for lowering tensions, but fail to tell us how to get them carried out —they only tell us how much better the world would be, if only "such rules could be established" (Deutsch, 1983). Sometimes, they express generous aspirations — for common or mutual security—without much awareness of the obstacles which conflict-ing interests, fears about allies or clients, and the nature of the weapons themselves, continue to erect. Sometimes, they too neglect the ambiguity of life in a nuclear world: The much lamented redundancy of weapons, a calamity if nuclear deterrence fails, can also be a cushion against failure. Finally, many of the remedies offered are based on an admirable liberal model of personality and politics: the ideal of the mature, well-adjusted, open-minded person (produced by liberal education and healthy family relations) transposed on the political level, and thus accompanied by the triumph of democracy in the community, by the elimination of militarism and the spread of functional cooperation abroad. But three obstacles remain unconquered: first, a major part of the world rejects this ideal and keeps itself closed to it (many of the radicals seem to deny it, or to ignore it, or to believe it doesn't matter). Second, the record shows that real democracies, in their behavior toward non-democratic or less "advanced" societies, do not conform to the happy model (think of the US in Central America). Third, the task of reform, both of the publics and of the statesmen, through consciousness raising and education is hopelessly huge, incapable of being pursued equally in all the important states, and — indeed — too slow if one accepts the idea of a mortal nuclear peril. These, then, are the dimensions of a split that should not be minimized or denied

#### One speech act doesn’t cause securitization – it’s an ongoing process

**Ghughunishvili 10**

Securitization of Migration in the United States after 9/11: Constructing Muslims and Arabs as Enemies Submitted to Central European University Department of International Relations European Studies In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Supervisor: Professor Paul Roe <http://www.etd.ceu.hu/2010/ghughunishvili_irina.pdf>

As provided by the Copenhagen School securitization theory is comprised by speech act, acceptance of the audience and facilitating conditions or other non-securitizing actors contribute to a successful securitization. The causality or a one-way relationship between the speech act, the audience and securitizing actor, where politicians use the speech act first to justify exceptional measures, has been criticized by scholars, such as Balzacq. According to him, the one-directional relationship between the three factors, or some of them, is not the best approach. To fully grasp the dynamics, it will be more beneficial to “rather than looking for a one-directional relationship between some or all of the three factors highlighted, it could be profitable to focus on the degree of congruence between them. 26 Among other aspects of the Copenhagen School’s theoretical framework, which he criticizes, the thesis will rely on the criticism of the lack of context and the rejection of a ‘one-way causal’ relationship between the audience and the actor. The process of threat construction, according to him, can be clearer if external context, which stands independently from use of language, can be considered. 27 Balzacq opts for more context-oriented approach when it comes down to securitization through the speech act, where a single speech does not create the discourse, but it is created through a long process, where context is vital. 28 He indicates: In reality, the speech act itself, i.e. literally a single security articulation at a particular point in time, will at best only very rarely explain the entire social process that follows from it. In most cases a security scholar will rather be confronted with a process of articulations creating sequentially a threat text which turns sequentially into a securitization. 29 This type of approach seems more plausible in an empirical study, as it is more likely that a single speech will not be able to securitize an issue, but it is a lengthy process, where a the audience speaks the same language as the securitizing actors and can relate to their speeches.

#### Legal reforms restrain the cycle of violence and prevent error replication

Colm O’Cinneide 8, Senior Lecturer in Law at University College London, “Strapped to the Mast: The Siren Song of Dreadful Necessity, the United Kingdom Human Rights Act and the Terrorist Threat,” Ch 15 in Fresh Perspectives on the ‘War on Terror,’ ed. Miriam Gani and Penelope Mathew, <http://epress.anu.edu.au/war_terror/mobile_devices/ch15s07.html>

This ‘symbiotic’ relationship between counter-terrorism measures and political violence, and the apparently inevitable negative impact of the use of emergency powers upon ‘target’ communities, would indicate that it makes sense to be very cautious in the use of such powers. However, the impact on individuals and ‘target’ communities can be too easily disregarded when set against the apparent demands of the greater good. Justice Jackson’s famous quote in Terminiello v Chicago [111] that the United States Bill of Rights should not be turned into a ‘suicide pact’ has considerable resonance in times of crisis, and often is used as a catch-all response to the ‘bleatings’ of civil libertarians.[112] The structural factors discussed above that appear to drive the response of successive UK governments to terrorist acts seem to invariably result in a depressing repetition of mistakes.¶ However, certain legal processes appear to have some capacity to slow down the excesses of the counter-terrorism cycle. What is becoming apparent in the UK context since 9/11 is that there are factors at play this time round that were not in play in the early years of the Northern Irish crisis. A series of parliamentary, judicial and transnational mechanisms are now in place that appear to have some moderate ‘dampening’ effect on the application of emergency powers.¶ This phrase ‘dampening’ is borrowed from Campbell and Connolly, who have recently suggested that law can play a ‘dampening’ role on the progression of the counter-terrorism cycle before it reaches its end. Legal processes can provide an avenue of political opportunity and mobilisation in their own right, whereby the ‘relatively autonomous’ framework of a legal system can be used to moderate the impact of the cycle of repression and backlash. They also suggest that this ‘dampening’ effect can ‘re-frame’ conflicts in a manner that shifts perceptions about the need for the use of violence or extreme state repression.[113] State responses that have been subject to this dampening effect may have more legitimacy and generate less repression: the need for mobilisation in response may therefore also be diluted.

#### Alt fails – cooption – political engagement key

McCormack, 10 [Tara, is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester and has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Westminster. 2010, (Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to emancipatory approaches, page 137-138]

In chapter 7 I engaged with the human security framework and some of the problematic implications of ‘emancipatory’ security policy frameworks. In this chapter I argued that the shift away from the pluralist security framework and the elevation of cosmopolitan and emancipatory goals **has served to** **enforce international power inequalities rather than lessen them**. Weak or unstable states are subjected to greater international scrutiny and international institutions and other states have greater freedom to intervene, but the citizens of these states have **no way of controlling or influencing** these international institutions or powerful states. This shift away from the pluralist security framework **has not challenged the status quo**, which may help to explain why major international institutions and states **can easily adopt** a more cosmopolitan rhetoric in their security policies. As we have seen, the shift away from the pluralist security framework has entailed a shift towards a more openly hierarchical international system, in which states are differentiated according to, for example, their ability to provide human security for their citizens or their supposed democratic commitments. In this shift, the old pluralist international norms of (formal) international sovereign equality, non-intervention and ‘blindness’ to the content of a state are overturned. Instead, international institutions and states have more freedom to intervene in weak or unstable states in order to ‘protect’ and emancipate individuals globally. Critical and emancipatory security theorists argue that the goal of the emancipation of the individual means that security must be reconceptualised away from the state. As the domestic sphere is understood to be the sphere of insecurity and disorder, the international sphere represents greater emancipatory possibilities, as Tickner argues, ‘if security is to start with the individual, its ties to state sovereignty must be severed’ (1995: 189). For critical and emancipatory theorists there must be a shift towards a ‘cosmopolitan’ legal framework, for example Mary Kaldor (2001: 10), Martin Shaw (2003: 104) and Andrew Linklater (2005). For critical theorists, one of the fundamental problems with Realism is that it is unrealistic. Because it prioritises order and the existing status quo, Realism attempts to impose a particular security framework onto a complex world, ignoring the myriad threats to people emerging from their own governments and societies. Moreover, traditional international theory serves to obscure power relations and omits a study of why the system is as it is: [O]mitting myriad strands of power amounts to exaggerating the simplicity of the entire political system. Today’s conventional portrait of international politics thus too often ends up looking like a Superman comic strip, whereas it probably should resemble a Jackson Pollock. (Enloe, 2002 [1996]: 189) Yet as I have argued, contemporary critical security theorists seem to show a marked lack of engagement with their problematic (whether the international security context, or the Yugoslav break-up and wars). **Without concrete engagement and analysis**, however, **the critical project is undermined and critical theory becomes nothing more than a request that people behave in a nicer way to each other**. Furthermore, whilst contemporary critical security theorists argue that they present a more realistic image of the world, through exposing power relations, for example, their lack of concrete analysis of the problematic considered **renders them actually unable to engage** with existing power structures and the way in which power is being exercised in the contemporary international system. For critical and emancipatory theorists the central place of the values of the theorist mean that it cannot fulfil its promise to critically engage with contemporary power relations and emancipatory possibilities. Values must be joined with engagement with the material circumstances of the time.

### Ban Drones CP

#### Executive orders invite strong partisan backlash

Wetzel-JD Candidate Valpo-7 42 Val. U.L. Rev. 385

NOTE: BEYOND THE ZONE OF TWILIGHT: HOW CONGRESS AND THE COURT CAN MINIMIZE THE DANGERS AND MAXIMIZE THE BENEFITS OF EXECUTIVE ORDERS

C. Framing the Debate: Congress Must Critique Executive Orders in Terms of the Power Itself, not the President Exercising the Power Executive orders are often debated in highly politicized atmospheres, with loyalty following party lines and attacks centering [\*429] less on the merits of an order and more on a specific President. 187 Rather than debating whether Presidents ought to have the power to issue binding orders at all, members of Congress simply attack the individual President who issued the order. 188 For this reason, abusive orders are more associated with the President who issued the order than with the institution of executive orders. 189 In the future, if Congress wishes to restrain the President's ability to issue executive orders, it should frame the debate in terms of the power itself, not the President exercising the power. By questioning the practice of issuing executive orders Congress would, in turn, focus the media and the public debate upon the great power that executive orders grant Presidents, resulting in increased oversight. Such increased oversight into executive orders would still allow the President the power to issue important and expedient orders, while making it less likely that an order will be used for Presidential abuse and tyranny.

#### --No solvency – XO isn’t binding – can be modified in secret

Dreyfuss 12 (Mike Dreyfuss is a Candidate for Doctor of Jurisprudence, “My Fellow Americans, We Are Going to Kill You: The Legality of Targeting and Killing U.S. Citizens Abroad,” http://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/content/articles/2012/01/Dreyfuss\_65\_Vand\_L\_Rev\_249.pdf)

Notwithstanding any of the above, the President can revoke or modify Executive Order 12,333 by issuing a new executive order. Executive orders do not bind executive practice any more than the President wants them to, and the President can keep executive orders secret if he so chooses.40 Typically, new executive orders have to be published in the Federal Register. 41 However, when the President determines that as a result of an attack or a threatened attack on the United States, publication would be impracticable or would not “give appropriate notice to the public,” the President can suspend this filing requirement.42 So while targeted killing is distinct from assassination and, under currently published laws, must be distinct to be legal, the distinction matters little. Even classifying all targeted killings as assassinations within the meaning of Executive Order 12,333 would be of little practical importance, as any President who wished to continue the programs could secretly modify the order to carve out an exception for whatever activities he wished to conduct.

#### --Delay – executive orders take years

Mayer-prof political science-1 Kenneth, “With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive Orders and Presidential Power”, p. 61, <http://www.questiaschool.com/read/103282967?title=With%20the%20Stroke%20of%20a%20Pen%3a%20Executive%20Orders%20and%20Presidential%20Power>)

In contemporary practice, executive orders typically either originate from the advisory structures within the Executive Office of the President or percolate up from executive agencies desirous of presidential action. For particularly complex or far-reaching orders, the White House will solicit comment and suggestions from affected agencies on wording and substantive content. Simple executive orders navigate this process in a few weeks; complex orders can take years, and can even be derailed over an inability to obtain the necessary consensus or clearances.

US judicial independence is modeled abroad- credibility of US rule of law promotion depends on its domestic application.

Smith-Third Circuit Judge-8 7 Ave Maria L. Rev. 1

PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW AND RESPECTING THE SEPARATION OF POWERS: THE LEGITIMATE ROLE OF THE AMERICAN JUDICIARY ABROAD

Introduction

The rule of law 1 is fundamental to the freedom enjoyed in the United States today. John Locke explained its essential nature well before the Revolutionary War: Freedom of men under government, is, to have a standing rule to live by, common to every one of that society ... a liberty to follow my own will in all things, where the rule prescribes not; and not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another man. 2 [\*2] Yet, the rule of law so central to American democracy today has deep historical roots, which long precede even Locke's lifetime. In ancient Greece, Aristotle considered a variety of constitutions before concluding that "it is more proper that the law should govern than any of the citizens." 3 During our nation's infancy, Thomas Paine wrote in Common Sense that "the world may know that, so far as we approve of monarchy, that in America the law is king. For as in absolute governments the king is law, so in free countries the law ought to be king; and there ought to be no other." 4 John Adams later memorialized this principle when drafting the Massachusetts State Constitution of 1780, declaring "to the end it may be a government of laws, and not of men." 5 While it was clear the rule of law would play a central role in the federal government following the Revolution, the Founding Fathers deliberated carefully for eleven years before incorporating it into the Constitution in a way that would thwart tyranny and best achieve a free, yet ordered, society. 6 The success and stability of our nation today flows, in large part, from our faithful adherence to the rule of law. [\*3] In addition to its central and vital role in any strong democracy, 7 the rule of law has been described as an "unqualified human good." 8 It stands alone in terms of its extensive international endorsement. 9 There is a wide consensus among the international community that democratic values, including the rule of law, should be universal - furthered in all nations - because these values preserve and protect human dignity, facilitate accountability in government, and allow access to the political process. 10 Reflecting its own growing commitment to fostering democracy abroad, the United States has formally incorporated rule-of-law promotion in its foreign assistance efforts in conjunction with traditional monetary aid. 11 The rule of law is increasingly considered one of the most valuable American exports to developing and transitioning nations. 12 Effective administration of the rule of law requires an independent, transparent, and accountable judiciary. 13 Because of the [\*4] experience and expertise our federal judges gain in their domestic role, they are well positioned to promote the rule of law abroad. 14 And indeed, federal judges have played a significant role in the effort to advance the rule of law and the democratic values essential to it in other parts of the world. Each year, dozens of federal judges assist in presenting seminars abroad that educate and train judges in other countries on a host of topics including how to oversee a case, how to write an opinion, and the importance of impartiality. I have had the privilege of participating in at least a dozen such programs. Beyond the exhilarating human experiences these programs have provided me, I have gained some background in their structure, objectives, and efficacy. My experience has also given me reason to pause and consider some of the tensions created by the participation of the federal judiciary in efforts to promote the rule of law abroad. One of the more sensitive concerns relates to the federal judiciary's involvement in matters that touch upon foreign policy, a province conferred by the Constitution to the politically accountable branches of government. 15 Judicial participation in these efforts may also raise questions concerning government funding and compliance with judicial ethical obligations. That said, clearly defined roles for participating judges coupled with cognizance of these tensions will allow these important efforts to continue in a manner that maintains the delicate separation-of-powers balance and comports with the Canons of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges. 16

And, Russia specifically models the US rule of law

Austein-IIP Digital-3/20/08 US EMBASSY

U.S. Legal System Serves as Model for Russian Courts

<http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/article/2008/03/20080320125020hmnietsua0.8971521.html#axzz2OiR7vBdr>

Washington – In the years since the end of the Soviet Union, Russia's judicial system continuously has incorporated new democratic reforms, thanks in part to the help of legal professionals in the United States. Since 1988, the Russian American Rule of Law Consortium (RAROLC,) a not-for-profit organization, has sought to help Russia transform its judiciary into a free and transparent system. By arranging partnerships between state judicial professionals in the United States and those working in local judiciaries in parts of Russia, RAROLC has helped Russian legal institutions implement reforms by using the American legal system as a model. These partnerships have encouraged Russian legal institutions to improve their courts and law schools by implementing democratic reforms. As participants in these partnerships, Russian judicial leaders have been able to visit the United States and watch the American judicial system in action and meet with U.S. judges.

#### Weak judicial enforcement of the rule of law deters foreign investment to Russia---that’s key to overall economic stability

BUREAU OF ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS AFFAIRS REPORT ‘12

2012 Investment Climate Statement – Russia

<http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2012/191223.htm>

Openness to, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment The Russian market presents many promising investment opportunities. Capitalizing on those opportunities, however, requires that firms navigate a complicated and fluid set of challenges ranging from corruption to a weak judiciary to excessive red tape. Russia recognizes foreign investment's critical role in the country's economic development and has encouraged foreign investment by removing administrative barriers and establishing special economic zones, high-technology parks, and investment promotion funds. At the same time, despite the Russian government's stated goals of combating corruption and improving the investment climate, independent organizations continue to rank Russia as one of the most difficult major economies in which to do business. Russia was one of the countries most adversely affected by the 2008-2009 financial crisis, with 2009 GDP dropping by 7.9%. Russia's economy grew 4.0% in 2010 and further picked up in 2011, with annual growth predicted to reach 4.2-4.5%. From 2004-2008, foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows picked up substantially, rising to $75 billion in 2008. In 2009, however, FDI inflows fell by almost half and have remained well below 2008 levels. According to Prime Minister Putin, FDI inflows for the first ten months of 2011 equaled $36 billion, an 11.8% increase from the same period of 2010. The last few years have also seen large amounts of capital leaving the country. Russia experienced a net capital outflow of $133.9 billion in 2008 and $56.9 billion in 2009. In 2010, capital outflow slowed to $33.6 billion, but has accelerated again in 2011, and is expected to reach about $85 billion for the year. These outflows can be attributed to external as well as Russia-specific factors. President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin have repeatedly emphasized the importance of improving Russia's business climate and attracting foreign capital, particularly in the high technology sector. The country's solid base of expertise in the scientific and mathematics fields, combined with a sizable market and an economy growing faster than most others in the region, have helped entice a series of U.S. firms to make headline acquisitions and investments in Russia. Roughly a dozen U.S. companies and organizations already have announced their intention to invest in the Skolkovo Innovation Center, Russia's initiative to create a high-tech cluster, modeled on the example of Silicon Valley, in Moscow's outskirts. Nevertheless, the investment climate has been undermined by the slow pace of structural reform and the government's leading role in certain sectors of the economy, notably energy. Additionally, past government actions have contributed to a sense of wariness among some foreign investors about the risks of the Russian market, such as the apparently politically-motivated investigations into businesses. Rule of law, corporate governance, transparency, and respect for property rights are gradually improving but remain key concerns for foreign investors. While Russia took significant steps in 2010 and 2011 to improve the legal framework for intellectual property protection, effective enforcement remains a challenge. Possible liabilities associated with existing operations (especially environmental cleanup) and still-developing bankruptcy procedures are additional factors affecting the investment climate. In short, while there is strong interest in the opportunities Russia presents, many U.S. companies, particularly small and medium-sized enterprises, remain cautious about investing. While a legal structure exists to support foreign investors, the laws are not always enforced in practice. The 1991 Investment Code and 1999 Law on Foreign Investment guarantee that foreign investors enjoy rights equal to those of Russian investors, although some industries have limits on foreign ownership (discussed below). Unfortunately, corruption plays a sizeable role in the judicial system (see the Dispute Settlement section). Russia has sought to enhance consultation mechanisms with international businesses, including through the Foreign Investment Advisory Council, regarding the impact of the country's legislation and regulations on the business and investment climate. Still, the country's investment dispute resolution mechanisms remain a work in progress, and at present can result in a non-transparent, unpredictable process. Russian government officials have repeatedly stressed that foreign investment and technology transfer are critical to Russia's economic modernization. At the same time, the government adopted new policies to more effectively control foreign investments in key sectors of the Russian economy. In May 2008, Russia enacted the Strategic Sectors Law – specifying 42 activities that have strategic significance for national defense and state security – and established an approval process for foreign investment in these areas. According to the law, investors wishing to increase or gain ownership above certain thresholds need to seek prior approval from a government commission headed by Russia's Prime Minister. Partly in response to investor criticism, in 2011 Russia amended the law to simplify the approval process and narrow the range of potential investments requiring formal review by the commission. With respect to the extractive industries, previously, government approval was required for foreign ownership above 10% of companies operating subsoil plots of "federal significance." The November reforms raised the threshold to 25%, a move that experts predict will greatly reduce the number of cases considered by the commission. Some foreign investors have raised concerns that the Strategic Sectors Law could be used to restrict foreign investors' access to certain sectors. Since 2008, however, the commission has approved 128 of 136 applications for foreign investment. Between 2004 and 2010, the share of Russia's private sector in GDP decreased from 70% to 65%, according to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The government also continues to hold significant blocks of shares in many privatized enterprises. In an effort to increase market forces in the economy and raise revenue for the federal budget, in 2009 the government began considering more ambitious privatization of strategic enterprises. In October 2010, the Russian Cabinet approved a major Privatization Plan, which Russia is now in the process of expanding, that paves the way for selling an estimated $60 billion of government stakes in about 1000 companies (out of a total of 6,467 companies with some government ownership). The government will retain controlling stakes, however, in major Russian companies such as Rosneft, Russian Railways, and banking giants Sberbank and VTB. The pace of privatization has been slow, however, and Russian officials have signaled that it is unlikely to accelerate in the near-term. To date, treatment of foreign investment in new privatizations has been inconsistent. As with the 2011-2013 Privatization Plan, foreign investors participating in Russian privatization sales are often confined to limited positions. As a result, many have faced problems with minority shareholder rights and corporate governance. Potential foreign investors are advised to work directly and closely with appropriate local, regional, and federal ministries and agencies that exercise ownership and other authority over companies whose shares they may want to acquire.

#### Russian economic decline results in nuclear conflict – political instability and loose nuclear weapons

Filger, 9 [Sheldon, correspondent for the Huffington Post, “Russian Economy Faces Disastrous Free Fall Contraction,” http://www.globaleconomiccrisis.com/blog/archives/356]

In Russia historically, economic health and political stability are intertwined to a degree that is rarely encountered in other major industrialized economies. It was the economic stagnation of the former Soviet Union that led to its political downfall. Similarly, Medvedev and Putin, both intimately acquainted with their nation’s history, are unquestionably alarmed at the prospect that Russia’s economic crisis will endanger the nation’s political stability, achieved at great cost after years of chaos following the demise of the Soviet Union. Already, strikes and protests are occurring among rank and file workers facing unemployment or non-payment of their salaries. Recent polling demonstrates that the once supreme popularity ratings of Putin and Medvedev are eroding rapidly. Beyond the political elites are the financial oligarchs, who have been forced to deleverage, even unloading their yachts and executive jets in a desperate attempt to raise cash. Should the Russian economy deteriorate to the point where economic collapse is not out of the question, the impact will go far beyond the obvious accelerant such an outcome would be for the Global Economic Crisis. There is a geopolitical dimension that is even more relevant then the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities and perceived decline from superpower status, Russia remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear arsenal of sufficient scope and capability to destroy the world as we know it. For that reason, it is not only President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect that a national economic crisis can transform itself into a virulent and destabilizing social and political upheaval. It just may be possible that U.S. President Barack Obama’s national security team has already briefed him about the consequences of a major economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the world. After all, the most recent national intelligence estimates put out by the U.S. intelligence community have already concluded that the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat to the United States, due to its facilitating political instability in the world. During the years Boris Yeltsin ruled Russia, security forces responsible for guarding the nation’s nuclear arsenal went without pay for months at a time, leading to fears that desperate personnel would illicitly sell nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations. If the current economic crisis in Russia were to deteriorate much further, how secure would the Russian nuclear arsenal remain? It may be that the financial impact of the Global Economic Crisis is its least dangerous consequence.

#### Judicial review of the military is critical to balanced civil-military relations- Congress and the Executive cannot check themselves

Gilbert, Lieutenant Colonel, 98 (Michael, Lieutenant Colonel Michael H. Gilbert, B.S., USAF Academy; MSBA, Boston University; J.D., McGeorge School of Law; LL.M., Harvard Law School. He is a member of the State Bars of Nebraska and California. “ARTICLE: The Military and the Federal Judiciary: an Unexplored Part of the Civil-Military Relations Triangle,” 8 USAFA J. Leg. Stud. 197, lexis)

The legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the federal government comprise and form a triangle surrounding the military, each branch occupying one side of the civil-military triangle. Commentators have written countless pages discussing, analyzing, and describing the civil-military relationship that the Congress and the President have with the armed forces they respectively regulate and command. Most commentators, however, have neglected to consider the crucial position and role of the federal judiciary. This article examines the relationship between the judiciary and the military in the interest of identifying the role that the judiciary, specifically the United States Supreme Court, plays in civil-military relations. Without an actual, meaningful presence of the judiciary as a leg of the civil-military triangle, the triangle is incomplete and collapses. In its current structure, the judiciary has adopted a non-role by deferring its responsibility to oversee the lawfulness of the other two branches to those branches themselves. This dereliction, which arguably is created by the malfeasance of the United States Supreme Court, has resulted in inherent inequities to the nation, in general, and to service members, in particular, as the federal courts are reluctant to protect even basic civil rights of military members. Judicial oversight is one form of civilian control over the military; abrogating this responsibility is to return power to the military hierarchy that is not meant to be theirs. [\*198] Under the United States Constitution, Congress has plenary authority over the maintenance and regulation of the armed forces, and the President is expressly made the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. The unwillingness of the Court to provide a check and balance on these two equal branches of the federal government creates an area virtually unchallengeable by the public. As a result, a large group of people, members of the military services, lack recourse to address wrongs perpetrated against them by their military and civilian superiors. Ironically, the very men and women dedicating their lives to protect the U.S. Constitution lack many of the basic protections the Constitution affords everyone else in this nation. The weakness in the present system is that the Supreme Court has taken a detour from the Constitution with regard to reviewing military issues under the normally recognized requirements of the Constitution. The federal judiciary, following the lead of the Supreme Court, has created de facto immunity from judicial interference by those who seek to challenge policy or procedure established by the other two branches and the military itself. When the "Thou Shalt Nots" of the Amendments to the Constitution compete with the necessities of the military, the conflict is resolved in favor of the military because it is seen as a separate society based upon the constitutionally granted authority of Congress to maintain and regulate the armed forces. 1 Essentially, the Court permits a separate world to be created for the military because of this regulation, distinguishing and separating the military from society. 2 The Court needs to reexamine their almost complete deference on military matters, which is tantamount to an exception to the Bill of Rights for matters concerning members of the military. Unless the Court begins to provide the oversight that is normally dedicated to many other areas of law fraught with complexity and national importance, judicial review of the military will continue to be relegated to a footnote in the annals of law. Combined with the downsizing and further consequent decline of interaction between the military and general society, 3 this exile from the protection of the Constitution could breed great injustices within the military. Perhaps even more importantly, the military might actually begin to believe that they are indeed second-class citizens, separate from the general [\*199] population, which could create dire problems with civil-military relations that are already the subject of concern by many observers. 4

#### Lack of civil control lets the military causes pandemics, piracy and failure to adapt to climate

Owens 12 (Dr. Owens is professor of national security affairs in the National Security Affairs Department of the Naval War College “WHAT MILITARY OFFICERS NEED TO KNOW ABOUT CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS,” Naval War College Review, Spring 2012, Vol. 65, No. 2 http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/1ef74daf-ebff-4aa4-866e-e1dd201d780e/What-Military-Officers-Need-to-Know-about-Civil-Mi.aspx)

The combination of civil-military relations patterns and service doctrines affect military effectiveness. In essence, the ultimate test of a civil-military relations pattern is how well it contributes to the effectiveness of a state’s military, especially at the level of strategic assessment and strategy making.50 However, Richard Kohn has explicitly called into question the effectiveness of the American military in this realm, especially with regard to the planning and conduct of operations other than those associated with large-scale conventional war. “Nearly twenty years after the end of the Cold War, the American military, financed by more money than the entire rest of the world spends on its armed forces, failed to defeat insurgencies or fully suppress sectarian civil wars in two crucial countries, each with less than a tenth of the U.S. population, after overthrowing those nations’ governments in a matter of weeks.”51 He attributes this lack of effectiveness to a decline in the military’s professional competence with regard to strategic planning. “In effect, in the most important area of professional expertise—the connecting of war to policy, of operations to achieving the objectives of the nation—the American military has been found wanting. The excellence of the American military in operations, logistics, tactics, weaponry, and battle has been manifest for a generation or more. Not so with strategy.”52 This phenomenon manifests itself, he argues, in recent failure to adapt to a changing security environment in which the challenges to global stability are “less from massed armies than from terrorism; economic and particularly financial instability; failed states; resource scarcity (particularly oil and potable water); pandemic disease; climate change; and international crime in the form of piracy, smuggling, narcotics trafficking, and other forms of organized lawlessness.” He observes that this decline in strategic competence has occurred during a time in which the U.S. military exercises enormous influence in the making of foreign and national security policies. He echoes the claim of Colin Gray: “All too often, there is a black hole where American strategy ought to reside.”53 Is there something inherent in current U.S. civil-military affairs that accounts for this failure of strategy? The failure of American civil-military relations to generate strategy can be attributed to the confluence of three factors. The first of these is the continued dominance within the American system of what Eliot Cohen has called the “normal” theory of civil-military relations, the belief that there is a clear line of demarcation between civilians who determine the goals of the war and the uniformed military who then conduct the actual fighting. Until President George W. Bush abandoned it when he overruled his commanders and embraced the “surge” in Iraq, the normal theory has been the default position of most presidents since the Vietnam War. Its longevity is based on the idea that the failure of Lyndon Johnson and Robert McNamara to defer to an autonomous military realm was the cause of American defeat in Vietnam.

### CIR

#### No deal on CIR

Rogers 1/16 (Alex, “Don’t Be Fooled, it’s Gridlock Time in Washington”, http://swampland.time.com/2014/01/16/dont-be-fooled-its-gridlock-time-in-washington/#ixzz2qcFQYu2I)

Despite the passage Thursday of a massive budget bill to fund the government, Congress is unlikely to pass any other major piece of legislation this year—with the possible exception of a long overdue farm bill. Reforms to immigration policy, the National Security Agency and the health care reform law have been, and will remain, under the purview of the White House. President Barack Obama‘s so-called “year of action” will take place, if anywhere, solely in the realm of the executive branch. Run down the list of issues, and the cause for pessimism is clear. The Senate last year passed comprehensive immigration reform with the support of 14 Republicans, establishing a 13-year pathway to citizenship for millions for immigrants in the country illegally. But the measure remains dead in the House—the GOP majority will release a set of principles this year, but as National Journal reports, “it will not include any concrete proposal.” A Republican member from Texas spoke up at the party’s weekly luncheon Tuesday only to declare that it was his favorite meeting yet because no one mentioned immigration, a House aide present told TIME. The immigration reform effort has turned from policy to politics, with Republicans feeling little urgency to pass anything before the midterm[s] elections, even as party leaders fret about another presidential race with Hispanics voting in droves against their party. “There is no good time to do it,” Rep. Mike Simpson (R-Idaho) says. “It’s tough no matter when you do it.”

#### Link n/u – Obama’s handling of NSA sparks national security debates and makes him look like he’s ceding executive power

Martinez 1/15 (Pablo, AP, “Obama expected to turn to Congress to help decide fate of NSA phone data collection”, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-expected-to-turn-to-congress-to-help-decide-fate-of-nsa-phone-data-collection/2014/01/15/cddc83fa-7e0a-11e3-95c6-0a7aa80874bc\_story.html)

President Obama on Friday is expected to announce some new limits on the National Security Agency program that collects billions of Americans’ phone records, but he will call on Congress to help determine the program’s future, according to current and former officials familiar with the administration’s plans. Obama has concluded that the program has value as a counterterrorism tool, the officials said, but is also confronting difficult political realities. The program’s sweeping nature has prompted serious privacy concerns, and a divided Congress is unlikely to renew it when the law underpinning the program expires next year. “Congress has a responsibility to establish limits on government surveillance, so it’s entirely appropriate that Congress weigh in on the phone records program,’’ said Jeremy Bash, a former CIA and Pentagon chief of staff who said he was not briefed on Obama’s remarks. Officials have said Obama’s speech is part of an effort to restore confidence at home and abroad in the government’s surveillance policies. While the NSA program has perhaps raised the most significant concerns about privacy, a series of disclosures over the past eight months has generated controversy over U.S. intelligence activities. White House officials said Obama’s speech is still being crafted and declined to comment. He will deliver the address at the Justice Department in his first appearance there — a symbolic choice to signal the administration’s commitment to the rule of law even in the secret world of surveillance. One former official familiar with the internal deliberations said presidential aides considered sending Obama to Maryland’s Fort Meade, where the NSA is headquartered, for what would have been his first visit to the spy agency. But advisers decided against it. Two people familiar with the deliberations said the president is likely to emphasize that the NSA’s bulk collection of phone data — which includes numbers dialed but not call content — is not something that the government should rely on except in limited circumstances related to the agency’s mission. The program was begun after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and was placed under court supervision in 2006. Analysts are supposed to access the data only for the purpose of seeking leads in counterterrorism investigations. The White House has opted not to shift the job of holding the phone records for the NSA to phone companies, which a presidential advisory group recommended in a report last month. The idea provoked opposition from company executives, who met with White House officials and said it was unworkable, given that the companies hold data in different formats and for different lengths of time. “My guess is the more they looked at this the more complicated it got and they realized this isn’t the silver bullet,” said one company executive who was not authorized to speak on the record. Current and former officials had mixed views on the likely effect of any new limits on the program. “There’s going to be substantive changes,” said one U.S. official briefed on the deliberations who was not authorized to speak on the record. Other officials have said that the constraints would not be that significant. “It’s hard for the administration to totally disavow these intelligence collection programs, because it has always been for these programs prior to them being exposed in the press,” said Bash, who is managing director at Beacon Global Strategies, a consulting firm. “The Justice Department claimed strongly to the Senate Intelligence Committee that this program was lawful, effective and important.” The House probably will have the votes to block the program’s renewal next year — absent a major attack or other event that changes the political climate. That has colored the White House’s thinking about how to proceed, officials said. The decision to turn to Congress for guidance, first reported in the New York Times, has already drawn fire from disparate audiences, underscoring the challenge Obama faces in reconciling competing interests in his speech. Some former senior intelligence officials are drawing parallels to Obama’s decision in the fall to ask Congress to approve a military strike on Syria for its use of chemical weapons, even after he had said such use would be a “red line.” If the president turns to Congress to decide the fate of the NSA program, said one former senior official, “he’ll get criticized, historically, for ceding executive power.” This former official and others interviewed for this article spoke on the condition of anonymity to be candid in their assessments. Anthony D. Romero, the executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union, said: “President Obama’s speech will determine not only the direction of national security policy but his fundamental civil liberties legacy. If the president doesn’t put an end to the government’s bulk data collection, he will retain one of George W. Bush’s most controversial surveillance programs. The idea that you would pass the buck to Congress to fix a problem of this importance begs credibility.” Those in Congress who want to institute new limits on the program say they feel the last eight months or so have created an unprecedented opportunity, as Sen. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) said in a recent interview, “to produce reforms that show that security and liberty are not mutually exclusive.” In his speech, Obama also is expected to support greater privacy protections for non-U.S. citizens, a move geared toward restoring trust among Europeans, in particular, after news reports last year about the NSA’s collection of data from U.S. carriers overseas and about NSA eavesdropping on foreign leaders. That idea has stirred criticism in national-security circles. “The entire mission of our intelligence agencies is to collect foreign intelligence without regard to the civil liberties of the targets against whom we’re collecting,” said a second former senior intelligence official. “It’s a dangerous road to go down to start worrying about the civil liberties and constitutional rights of people like the president of Pakistan or the senior military commander in Libya.” Obama’s challenge is to satisfy several vastly different stakeholders at once: European audiences, tech companies with global markets that are feeling pressured because of their compliance with the NSA, a Democratic base that includes privacy and civil liberties groups, and the intelligence community and its supporters in Congress. “He’s got to be the educator in chief on this and start with why intelligence collection programs are important,” said Ben Chang, a former National Security Council official in the George W. Bush and Obama administrations. “That is a start to restoring confidence. From there, you can then move forward on reforms in a partnership with groups, inside and outside of government, that sometimes have competing interests.” A major portion of Obama’s speech is expected to address the privacy of foreigners and businesses overseas, which are worried about how well their data are protected by U.S. companies that cooperate with the government. “Addressing a lot of those concerns is going to be key to the speech,” one official said. In the past few weeks, Obama and senior White House advisers have met with lawmakers, tech and phone company executives, and privacy advocates to hear their views. Obama has spoken by phone with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, whose cellphone calls had been tapped, a revelation that triggered an outcry in Berlin. At the same time, intelligence and defense officials have pushed back hard against sweeping changes, arguing that the bulk collection of telephone data is necessary to keep the country safe from terrorism, even though the White House advisory group concluded in its report that the data had not been “essential” to preventing terrorist attacks.

#### And the courts are fighting him on it

RT 1/15 (Russia Today, “US judiciary rejects NSA reform proposals from Obama’s review group”, http://rt.com/usa/us-judges-nsa-reform-649/comments/page-1/)

US federal judges have strongly criticized proposals to reform the NSA from the Obama-appointed Review Group, saying some of them would “hamper the work” of federal courts. It comes three days before Obama will unveil NSA changes to be endorsed. Judge John Bates, director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, which represents the country’s federal judges, sent the objections in a letter to Sen. Dianne Feinstein, chairwoman of the Senate Intelligence Committee. Bates is well placed to offer an expert opinion, as he is also a former head of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance (FISA) Court. The Review Group’s proposals are not focused on “policy choices” but on “operational impact,” Bates wrote, adding comments and warnings about what will happen if the reforms proposed by the White House NSA review group and NSA critics in Congress are passed. Bates said that his comments were based on his consultations with the current presiding judges of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the Court of Review, as well as with some former judges. Obama’s panel of experts, the Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technology, presented its 46 recommendations regarding NSA activities in December following the wide-ranging revelations about NSA surveillance by whistleblower Edward Snowden. It also recommended several changes to the FISA court system, which authorized NSA broad eavesdropping operations, including massive collection of Americans’ and foreigners’ telephone metadata. Enacting those reforms, Bates said, would profoundly increase the workloads of federal courts. Some of the proposals may disrupt the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court's ability to fulfill its "responsibilities under (the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, under which the secret court operates) and the Constitution to ensure that the privacy interests of United States citizens and others are adequately protected." Bates strongly warned against a proposal to create a "Public Interest Advocate" to represent privacy and civil liberty concerns before the court, which usually operates behind closed doors.

#### Obama will just XO it if no legislation

Reuters 1-14 (http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/14/us-usa-obama-priorities-idUSBREA0D11620140114)

Obama, speaking to reporters during a cabinet meeting at the White House, foreshadowed his upcoming State of the Union address and what appeared to be a new messaging strategy by emphasizing his ability to take executive actions without approval from lawmakers. "We are not just going to be waiting for legislation in order to make sure that we're providing Americans the kind of help that they need," he said. "I've got a pen, and I've got a phone. And I can use that pen to sign executive orders and take executive actions ... and I've got a phone that allows me to convene Americans from every walk of life," he said. Obama began last year with high hopes of making progress on gun control, immigration reform, and other issues after giving an inaugural address that rallied his base and set an aggressive tone for his second term. But the year concluded with few legislative achievements. His gun control efforts largely failed and an immigration reform bill passed in the Senate but stalled in the House of Representatives. White House officials, while referring to 2014 as a "year of action," have already played down the prospect of getting a lot of laws passed and told reporters that they would not measure the year's success by the administration's list of legislative victories. Obama again listed immigration reform as a priority for the year. He will need Congress to turn his goals on that issue into law. The president also emphasized his goal of getting the U.S. economy to recover faster.

## 1AR

### Extinction

#### Attempts to foresee existential risks is the best approach to policy-making

Bostrom 02, Professor of Philosophy at Oxford University and Director of the Future of Humanity Institute, ’2 (Nick, March, “Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards” Journal of Evolution and Technology, Vol 9, http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html

I shall use the following definition of existential risks: Existential risk – One where an adverse outcome would either annihilate Earth-originating intelligent life or permanently and drastically curtail its potential. An existential risk is one where humankind as a whole is imperiled. Existential disasters have major adverse consequences for the course of human civilization for all time to come. 2 The unique challenge of existential risks Risks in this sixth category are a recent phenomenon. This is part of the reason why it is useful to distinguish them from other risks. We have not evolved mechanisms, either biologically or culturally, for managing such risks. Our intuitions and coping strategies have been shaped by our long experience with risks such as dangerous animals, hostile individuals or tribes, poisonous foods, automobile accidents, Chernobyl, Bhopal, volcano eruptions, earthquakes, draughts, World War I, World War II, epidemics of influenza, smallpox, black plague, and AIDS. These types of disasters have occurred many times and our cultural attitudes towards risk have been shaped by trial-and-error in managing such hazards. But tragic as such events are to the people immediately affected, in the big picture of things – from the perspective of humankind as a whole – even the worst of these catastrophes are mere ripples on the surface of the great sea of life. They haven’t significantly affected the total amount of human suffering or happiness or determined the long-term fate of our species. With the exception of a species-destroying comet or asteroid impact (an extremely rare occurrence), there were probably no significant existential risks in human history until the mid-twentieth century, and certainly none that it was within our power to do something about. The first manmade existential risk was the inaugural detonation of an atomic bomb. At the time, there was some concern that the explosion might start a runaway chain-reaction by “igniting” the atmosphere. Although we now know that such an outcome was physically impossible, it qualifies as an existential risk that was present at the time. For there to be a risk, given the knowledge and understanding available, it suffices that there is some subjective probability of an adverse outcome, even if it later turns out that objectively there was no chance of something bad happening. If we don’t know whether something is objectively risky or not, then it is risky in the subjective sense. The subjective sense is of course what we must base our decisions on.[2] At any given time we must use our best current subjective estimate of what the objective risk factors are.[3] A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[4] Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century. The special nature of the challenges posed by existential risks is illustrated by the following points: · Our approach to existential risks cannot be one of trial-and-error. There is no opportunity to learn from errors. The reactive approach – see what happens, limit damages, and learn from experience – is unworkable. Rather, we must take a proactive approach. This requires foresight to anticipate new types of threats and a willingness to take decisive preventive action and to bear the costs (moral and economic) of such actions. · We cannot necessarily rely on the institutions, moral norms, social attitudes or national security policies that developed from our experience with managing other sorts of risks. Existential risks are a different kind of beast. We might find it hard to take them as seriously as we should simply because we have never yet witnessed such disasters.[5] Our collective fear-response is likely ill calibrated to the magnitude of threat. · Reductions in existential risks are global public goods [13] and may therefore be undersupplied by the market [14]. Existential risks are a menace for everybody and may require acting on the international plane. Respect for national sovereignty is not a legitimate excuse for failing to take countermeasures against a major existential risk.

### State thing

#### Positivism is not violent and just because something is arbitrary constructed does not mean it can be wished away

Jarvis 2000 (Darryl, Senior Lecturer in International Relations – University of Sydney, International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism, p. 128-130)

Inculpating modernity, positivism, technical rationality, or realism with violence, racism, war, and countless other crimes not only smacks of anthropomorphism but, as demonstrated by Ashley's torturous prose and reasoning, requires a dubious logic to make such connections in the first place. Are we really to believe that ethereal entities like positivism, mod­ernism, or realism emanate a "violence" that marginalizes dissidents? Indeed, where is this violence, repression, and marginalization? As self- professed dissidents supposedly exiled from the discipline, Ashley and Walker appear remarkably well integrated into the academy—vocal, pub­lished, and at the center of the Third Debate and the forefront of theo­retical research. Likewise, is Ashley seriously suggesting that, on the basis of this largely imagined violence, global transformation (perhaps even rev­olutionary violence) is a necessary, let alone desirable, response? Has the rationale for emancipation or the fight for justice been reduced to such vacuous revolutionary slogans as "Down with positivism and rationality"? The point is surely trite. Apart from members of the academy, who has heard of positivism and who for a moment imagines that they need to be emancipated from it, or from modernity, rationality, or realism for that matter? In an era of unprecedented change and turmoil, of new political and military configurations, of war in the Balkans and ethnic cleansing, is Ashley really suggesting that some of the greatest threats facing humankind or some of the great moments of history rest on such innocu­ous and largely unknown nonrealities like positivism and realism? These are imagined and fictitious enemies, theoretical fabrications that represent arcane, self-serving debates superfluous to the lives of most people and, arguably, to most issues of importance in international relations. More is the pity that such irrational and obviously abstruse debate should so occupy us at a time of great global turmoil. That it does and continues to do so reflects our lack of judicious criteria for evaluating the­ory and, more importantly, the lack of attachment theorists have to the real world. Certainly it is right and proper that we ponder the depths of our theoretical imaginations, engage in epistemological and ontological debate, and analyze the sociology of our knowledge." But to suppose that this is the only task of international theory, let alone the most important one, smacks of intellectual elitism and displays a certain contempt for those who search for guidance in their daily struggles as actors in international politics. What does Ashley's project, his deconstructive efforts, or valiant fight against positivism say to the truly marginalized, oppressed, and des­titute? How does it help solve the plight of the poor, the displaced refugees, the casualties of war, or the emigres of death squads? Does it in any way speak to those whose actions and thoughts comprise the policy and practice of international relations? On all these questions one must answer no. This is not to say, of course, that all theory should be judged by its technical rationality and problem-solving capacity as Ashley forcefully argues. But to suppose that problem-solving technical theory is not necessary—or is in some way bad—is a contemptuous position that abrogates any hope of solving some of the nightmarish realities that millions confront daily. As Holsti argues, we need ask of these theorists and their theories the ultimate question, "So what?" To what purpose do they deconstruct, problematize, destabilize, undermine, ridicule, and belittle modernist and rationalist approaches? Does this get us any further, make the world any better, or enhance the human condition? In what sense can this "debate toward [a] bottomless pit of epistemology and metaphysics" be judged pertinent, relevant, help­ful, or cogent to anyone other than those foolish enough to be scholasti­cally excited by abstract and recondite debate." Contrary to Ashley's assertions, then, a poststructural approach fails to empower the marginalized and, in fact, abandons them. Rather than ana­lyze the political economy of power, wealth, oppression, production, or international relations and render an intelligible understanding of these processes, Ashley succeeds in ostracizing those he portends to represent by delivering an obscure and highly convoluted discourse. If Ashley wishes to chastise structural realism for its abstractness and detachment, he must be prepared also to face similar criticism, especially when he so adamantly intends his work to address the real life plight of those who struggle at marginal places. If the relevance of Ashley's project is questionable, so too is its logic and cogency. First, we might ask to what extent the postmodern "empha­sis on the textual, constructed nature of the world" represents "an unwar­ranted extension of approaches appropriate for literature to other areas of human practice that are more constrained by an objective reality."" All theory is socially constructed and realities like the nation-state, domestic and international politics, regimes, or transnational agencies are obviously social fabrications. But to what extent is this observation of any real use? Just because we acknowledge that the state is a socially fabricated entity, or that the division between domestic and international society is arbitrar­ily inscribed does not make the reality of the state disappear or render invisible international politics. Whether socially constructed or objectively given, the argument over the ontological status of the state is of no par­ticular moment. Does this change our experience of the state or somehow diminish the political-economic-juridical-military functions of the state? To recognize that states are not naturally inscribed but dynamic entities continually in the process of being made and reimposed and are therefore culturally dissimilar, economically different, and politically atypical, while perspicacious to our historical and theoretical understanding of the state, in no way detracts from its reality, practices, and consequences. Similarly, few would object to Ashley's hermeneutic interpretivist understanding of the international sphere as an artificially inscribed demarcation. But, to paraphrase Holsti again, so what? This does not make its effects any less real, diminish its importance in our lives, or excuse us from paying serious attention to it. That international politics and states would not exist with­out subjectivities is a banal tautology. The point, surely, is to move beyond this and study these processes. Thus, while intellectually interesting, con­structivist theory is not an end point as Ashley seems to think, where we all throw up our hands and announce there are no foundations and all real­ity is an arbitrary social construction. Rather, it should be a means of rec­ognizing the structurated nature of our being and the reciprocity between subjects and structures through history. Ashley, however, seems not to want to do this, but only to deconstruct the state, international politics, and international theory on the basis that none of these is objectively given but fictitious entities that arise out of modernist practices of representa­tion. While an interesting theoretical enterprise, it is of no great conse­quence to the study of international politics. Indeed, structuration theory has long taken care of these ontological dilemmas that otherwise seem to preoccupy Ashley."

### FW

#### Simulation is effective in developing knowledge and decision making-no other technique creates the exploration of possible alternative futures

**Eijkman, New South Wales visiting fellow, 2012**

(Henk, “The role of simulations in the authentic learning for national security policy development Implications for practice”, May, <http://nsc.anu.edu.au/documents/occasional-4-eijkman.pdf>)

However, whether as an approach to learning, innovation, persuasion or culture shift, policy simulations derive their power from two central features: their combination of simulation and gaming (Geurts et al. 2007). 1. The simulation element: the unique combination of simulation with role-playing.The unique simulation/role-play mix enables participants to create possible futures relevant to the topic being studied. This is diametrically opposed to the more traditional, teacher-centric approaches in which a future is produced for them. In policy simulations, possible futures are much more than an object of tabletop discussion and verbal speculation. ‘No other technique allows a group of participants to engage in collective action in a safe environment to create and analyse the futures they want to explore’ (Geurts et al. 2007: 536). 2. The game element: the interactive and tailor-made modelling and design of the policy game. The actual run of the policy simulation is only one step, though a most important and visible one, in a collective process of investigation, communication, and evaluation of performance. In the context of a post-graduate course in public policy development, for example, a policy simulation is a dedicated game constructed in collaboration with practitioners to achieve a high level of proficiency in relevant aspects of the policy development process. To drill down to a level of finer detail, policy development simulations—as forms of interactive or participatory modelling— are particularly effective in developing participant knowledge and skills in the five key areas of the policy development process (and success criteria), namely: Complexity, Communication, Creativity, Consensus, and Commitment to action (‘the five Cs’). The capacity to provide effective learning support in these five categories has proved to be particularly helpful in strategic decision-making (Geurts et al. 2007). Annexure 2.5 contains a detailed description, in table format, of the synopsis below.

#### Debate should be centered on the material implications of the plan – key to create effective norms that solve conflict

Leahy 10 (Mary-Kate Leahy, Colonel, US military, “KEEPING UP WITH THE DRONES: IS JUST WAR THEORY OBSOLETE?,” http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a526187.pdf)

Failure to examine whether the laws of war remain relevant or should be modified is dangerous. If we delay or indefinitely defer this discussion the risks associated with this procrastination will continue to accumulate. Without broad agreement on the fundamental issue of who is a legal combatant, ordinary civilians who develop this technology and elected leaders who approve its employment potentially become targets at home and abroad. As the operators of weapon systems become more distant from the physical battlefield, the killing process is “sanitized”; UAS operators‟ exemption from physical danger creates a scenario in which “virtueless” war becomes the norm. In such an environment, the warrior ethos is potentially forever altered – and not for the good. Another risk we face if employment of this technology proceeds unchecked and its moral implications unexamined, is the arrival of the day when a “human in the loop” in UAS employment becomes unnecessary. If that day arrives, the principle of proportionality is irrelevant – because human assessment of the cost versus benefit decision regarding a military strike will have been eliminated. These are just a few of the eventualities which await us if we fail to adequately address how UAS changes the conduct of modern warfare. The seriousness of these issues makes this an issue of strategic importance for the United States, as well as both our friends and our adversaries around the globe.

### Terror

#### Terrorists think they have a religious duty to destroy us—force is the only option

Jones 8—religion, psychology and terrorism, Rutgers. Snr Research Fellow, Center on Terrorism, John Jay College. ThD, Uppasala U. Psy.D, dept of clinical psychology, Rutgers. PhD in religious studies, Brown. (James, Blood That Cries Out From the Earth, 42-3, AMiles)

One of the most widespread beliefs of violent religious movements is their apocalyptic vision of a cosmic struggle of the forces of the all-good against the forces of the all-evil ( Juergensmeyer, 2000; Kimball, 2002; Wessinger, 2000). Osama bin Laden says it clearly: there are “two adversaries; the Islamic nation, on the one hand, and the United States and its allies on the other. It is either victory and glory or defeat and humiliation” (quoted in Moghadam, 2006: 717). Virtually all religious terrorists agree that they are locked in an apocalyptic battle with demonic forces, that is, usually with the forces of secularism. We have seen how Sayyid Qutb denoted secularism and the concomitant values of individual rights and the separation of religion and law as demonic and the source of most of the misery of the modern world and demanded a jihad against it (Berman, 2003). Continuing Qutb’s diatribe, the founder of Hamas told a reporter, “There’s a war going on” not just against Israeli occupation but against all secular governments including the Palestinian authority because there “is no such thing as a secular state in Islam” ( Juergensmeyer, 2000: 76). Hamas’s arch enemy, Rabbi Meir Kahane, whose Jewish Defense League was responsible for numerous attacks on Muslims in the United States and Israel, said bluntly “secular government is the enemy” ( Juergensmeyer, 2000: 55). Asahara, the founder of the Aum Shinrikyo, is reported to have shouted again and again at his followers, “Don’t you realize that this is war” (Lifton, 2000: 56) and to have insisted that his group existed “on a war footing” (Lifton, 2000: 60). The Reverend Paul Hill, who shot and killed a physician in front of a family planning clinic in the United States, wrote “The battle over abortion is primarily spiritual. The confl ict is between God’s will and kingdom and Satan’s opposing will and kingdom” (Hill, 2003: 8). Hill’s actions were justifi ed to an interviewer by his brother-in-arms, the Reverend Michael Bray, who wrote the bible of the violent anti-choice movement, entitled tellingly A Time to Kill, as the product of a Christian subculture in America that considers itself at war with the larger society, and to some extent victimized by it. . . . This subculture sees itself justifi ed in its violent responses to a vast and violent repression waged by secular . . . agents of a satanic force . . . a great defensive Christian struggle against the secular state, a contest between the forces of spiritual truth and heathen darkness, in which the moral character of America as a righteous nation hangs in the balance.( Juergensmeyer, 2000: 36) Juergensmeyer concludes in his investigation of religiously sponsored terrorism around the globe, Terror in the Mind of God, that “what is strikingly similar about the cultures of which they [religious terrorists] are a part is their view of the contemporary world at war” ( Juergensmeyer, 2000: 151). Qutb and the jihadists are not alone in declaring war on the secular state.

### Impact

#### ---Envisioning the dystopic world of our harms is politically enabling – it’s a catalyst for public debate and socio-political action.

Kurasawa 2004

Fuyuki, Constellation, v. 11, no. 4, “Cautionary Tales,” Blackwell

Returning to the point I made at the beginning of this paper, the significance of foresight is a direct outcome of the transition toward a dystopian imaginary (or what Sontag has called “the imagination of disaster”).11 Huxley’s Brave New World and Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, two groundbreaking dystopian novels of the first half of the twentieth century, remain as influential as ever in framing public discourse and understanding current techno-scientific dangers, while recent paradigmatic cultural artifacts – films like The Matrix and novels like Atwood’s Oryx and Crake – reflect and give shape to this catastrophic sensibility.12 And yet dystopianism need not imply despondency, paralysis, or fear. Quite the opposite, in fact, since the pervasiveness of a dystopian imaginary can help notions of historical contingency and fallibilism gain traction against their determinist and absolutist counterparts.13 Once we recognize that the future is uncertain and that any course of action produces both unintended and unexpected consequences, the responsibility to face up to potential disasters and intervene before they strike becomes compelling. From another angle, dystopianism lies at the core of politics in a global civil society where groups mobilize their own nightmare scenarios (‘Frankenfoods’ and a lifeless planet for environmentalists, totalitarian patriarchy of the sort depicted in Atwood’s Handmaid’s Tale for Western feminism, McWorld and a global neoliberal oligarchy for the alternative globalization movement, etc.). Such scenarios can act as catalysts for public debate and socio-political action, spurring citizens’ involvement in the work of preventive foresight.

#### Specificity and empirics of our scenario mean you prefer it.

Dipert 6 (Randall, PhD, Professor of Philosophy, University at Buffalo, Buffalo, “Preventive War and the Epistemological Dimension of the Morality of War,” https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1291-dipert-preventive-war)

We have seen a number of reasons why some preventive wars are morally justified. Nevertheless, this justification hinges on what I have called an epistemic threshold. This threshold is the minimum amount of ‘objective certainty’ about the enemy’s intentions, bellicosity, and present and future military resources necessary to justify preemptive or preventive war. It is not merely a subjective certainty in feeling strongly about the extent of evidence for these factors. To be morally justified, one must have, and appreciate, extensive evidence for these factors and the other usual criteria for Just War except Just Cause; one must lack substantial evidence that goes against one of these factors, after a reasonable effort to acquire such evidence. A ‘second order’ objective certainty is also necessary: one must be justified in believing that one’s past record of judging intentions, resources and so on, from the information sources one is now using (e.g., satellite imagery), has usually been correct. It may be instructive here to reflect on the 2003 Iraq War.27 The fact that Iraq turned out not to have weapons of mass destruction, and did not even have quickly constructable facilities to produce them, shows that the Bush administration did not have knowledge of the weapons or facilities. It does not, however, alone entail that it was not objectively certain to the extent required by the epistemic threshold criterion for preventive war. In fact I believe that it was highly rational to believe, and in Grotius’ words was ‘morally certain’, that Iraq had chemical weapons despite what would prove to be its falsehood. (This is a consequence of permitting defeasible or nonabsolutely-certain justification or warrant for knowledge that is now almost universally accepted by epistemologists.) This is debatable, to be sure. However, I am not totally convinced that having chemical weapons of the kind Iraq was reasonably believed to possess alone posed a sufficient threat to justify preventive war. The case for morally justifying preventive war with regard to biological or nuclear weapons almost certainly did not meet the epistemic threshold. This is not to suggest that there were not other morally sufficient reasons, or that there might be some accumulative effect of arguments that are separately, in various respects, weak. Grotius, for one, diminishes the importance of intent, and allows one to change intents in midwar, while retaining its morally justified character. Especially in the recent 2003 Iraq War, there was a constant refrain about the need to acquire international moral approval of the coalition efforts.28 Intuitively, some international assent, especially by sympathetic nations if not the Security Council of the UN, is desirable. Yet it is very difficult to see how this fits into the moral theory of the permissibility of war. However, this reasoning, contrary to our intuitions, seems to leave no place at all for ‘internationalism’ in the moral justification of war (at least as regards its moral permissibility). I would propose that considering the epistemological dimension of morally justified war does give a proper place to our internationalistic inclinations. As is now all too well known, political discussions of the conditions of just war are prone to being blinded by already firm geopolitical worldviews, as well as by past political rhetoric that tend to chain politicians to certain views for the sake of ‘consistency’. The facts of the case, such as intelligence on WMDs, are likewise prone to a certain institutional conformist tendencies\*/and this tendency was well known long before the supposed influences of neoconservatives on the US, and apparently also on foreign intelligence services. For example, when critical policy decisions rest on intelligence, the legendary Sherman Kent,29 proposes that we critically examine existing intelligence, and apply in my terminology ‘second order’ principles, explicitly attaching the probability that various truths are mistaken, based on past incidents of the type of information from such sources. International approval, plays a role in the moral justification of war primarily in this epistemological dimension. I do not think approval of the oddly chosen UN Security Council30 is necessary for a morally justified war, even if it is desirable and should often be sought (for various prudential reasons). The moral criteria must be independent of the Security Council, since they have to reason by some principles and presumably these are the pure moral principles\*/they cannot appeal to a still higher authority. But now suppose that these pure moral principles that the Security Council should use, applied to a single nation’s situation, permits it to go to war. However, the Security Council does not agree to this (perhaps because of a veto) or even prohibits the nation’s action. Rather, the underlying principle is something like this: a failure to persuade numerous like-minded nations of both the relevant facts (e.g., the existence of WMDs), when these nations preferably have some independent intelligence capability, or failure to persuade them of the relevant moral principle embodied in a policy (e.g., that if a nation is as chronically belligerent as Iraq, and has such a WMD capacity, then it can be attacked in advance of its attack), is strong evidence against one’s having met the epistemological threshold for anticipatory war. In the recent situation, the opposition of Russia and France, especially Germany and Mexico, and the unenthusiastic acquiescence of China gave prima facie evidence against having met this threshold; the support of the UK, Italy, Spain, and Poland were, however, probably sufficient to meet my condition. In any case, it is in this epistemological dimension of the philosophy of war, and not anywhere else, that international or international-organization approval plays a role in moral justification.31 It might appear difficult to say much about what precisely this epistemic threshold is. It need not be ‘warrant’ as it is used by epistemologists when discussing conditions for knowledge. 32 Roughly, I think that the evidence at hand both for bellicosity and for the enemy’s possession of military resources constituting, or soon to constitute, a threat (and of their probable offensive nature) must be overwhelming and ‘all but certain’. I do not think that ‘manifest preparations’ for an attack (in Walzer’s terms) are necessary, whatever this means.33 Additionally, our second-order assessment of this evidence must be such that we have good reason to believe that it constitutes good evidence: this source has not mislead us in the past, etc. A second-order assessment is our reasonable estimate of the probability of evidence for our first-order assessment of harm, bellicosity, etc., being correct. The military resources must be such that they are likely, if used in a first-strike, to endanger our nation itself or to pose a severe threat of incapacitating our own military resources. It seems to me\*/although I have not studied this matter at all thoroughly\*/that chemical and biological weapons are indeed terrifying, but are unlikely to be serious in this precise sense. Their dispersal problems as well as the existence of countermeasures tend to lessen their military danger. Nuclear weapons, including dirty bombs, are almost certainly in the ‘severe threat’ category. Several factors raise and lower this threshold. One is the seriousness of the threat. Another is the amount of time until these military resources pose this threat. Still another is a kind of proportionality: minimizing civilian and even military deaths. The epistemic threshold never gets so low that, for example, one may launch a preventive war based on evidence of a nation’s bellicosity or resources that is ‘somewhat likely’.