## 1AC

### 1AC Allied Coop Adv

#### Adv 1- Allied terror cooperation:

#### Domestic and international support for the US drone program is collapsing, threatening to shut it down entirely. Reform is key.

Zenko, CFR Fellow, 13 (Micah, is the Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)., “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies,” http://www.cfr.org/wars-and-warfare/reforming-us-drone-strike-policies/p29736)

In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, President Obama declared: “Where force is necessary, we have a moral and strategic interest in binding ourselves to certain rules of conduct. Even as we confront a vicious adversary that abides by no rules, I believe the United States of America must remain a standard bearer in the conduct of war.”63 Under President Obama drone strikes have expanded and intensified, and they will remain a central component of U.S. counterterrorism operations for at least another decade, according to U.S. officials.64 But much as the Bush administration was compelled to reform its controversial counterterrorism practices, it is likely that the United States will ultimately be forced by domestic and international pressure to scale back its drone strike policies. The Obama administration can preempt this pressure by clearly articulating that the rules that govern its drone strikes, like all uses of military force, are based in the laws of armed conflict and international humanitarian law; by engaging with emerging drone powers; and, most important, by matching practice with its stated policy by limiting drone strikes to those individuals it claims are being targeted (which would reduce the likelihood of civilian casualties since the total number of strikes would significantly decrease). The choice the United States faces is not between unfettered drone use and sacrificing freedom of action, but between drone policy reforms by design or drone policy reforms by default. Recent history demonstrates that domestic political pressure could severely limit drone strikes in ways that the CIA or JSOC have not anticipated. In support of its counterterrorism strategy, the Bush administration engaged in the extraordinary rendition of terrorist suspects to third countries, the use of enhanced interrogation techniques, and warrantless wiretapping. Although the Bush administration defended its policies as critical to protecting the U.S. homeland against terrorist attacks, unprecedented domestic political pressure led to significant reforms or termination. Compared to Bush-era counterterrorism policies, drone strikes are vulnerable to similar—albeit still largely untapped—moral outrage, and they are even more susceptible to political constraints because they occur in plain sight. Indeed, a negative trend in U.S. public opinion on drones is already apparent. Between February and June 2012, U.S. support for drone strikes against suspected terrorists fell from 83 percent to 62 percent—which represents less U.S. support than enhanced interrogation techniques maintained in the mid-2000s.65 Finally, U.S. drone strikes are also widely opposed by the citizens of important allies, emerging powers, and the local populations in states where strikes occur.66 States polled reveal overwhelming opposition to U.S. drone strikes: Greece (90 percent), Egypt (89 percent), Turkey (81 percent), Spain (76 percent), Brazil (76 percent), Japan (75 percent), and Pakistan (83 percent).67 This is significant because the United States cannot conduct drone strikes in the most critical corners of the world by itself. Drone strikes require the tacit or overt support of host states or neighbors. If such states decided not to cooperate—or to actively resist—U.S. drone strikes, their effectiveness would be immediately and sharply reduced, and the likelihood of civilian casualties would increase. This danger is not hypothetical. In 2007, the Ethiopian government terminated its U.S. military presence after public revelations that U.S. AC-130 gunships were launching attacks from Ethiopia into Somalia. Similarly, in late 2011, Pakistan evicted all U.S. military and intelligence drones, forcing the United States to completely rely on Afghanistan to serve as a staging ground for drone strikes in Pakistan. The United States could attempt to lessen the need for tacit host-state support by making significant investments in armed drones that can be flown off U.S. Navy ships, conducting electronic warfare or missile attacks on air defenses, allowing downed drones to not be recovered and potentially transferred to China or Russia, and losing access to the human intelligence networks on the ground that are critical for identifying targets. According to U.S. diplomats and military officials, active resistance— such as the Pakistani army shooting down U.S. armed drones— is a legitimate concern. In this case, the United States would need to either end drone sorties or escalate U.S. military involvement by attacking Pakistani radar and antiaircraft sites, thus increasing the likelihood of civilian casualties.68 Beyond where drone strikes currently take place, political pressure could severely limit options for new U.S. drone bases. For example, the Obama administration is debating deploying armed drones to attack al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in North Africa, which would likely require access to a new airbase in the region. To some extent, anger at U.S. sovereignty violations is an inevitable and necessary trade-off when conducting drone strikes. Nevertheless, in each of these cases, domestic anger would partially or fully abate if the United States modified its drone policy in the ways suggested below.

#### Lack of legal oversight on targeted killing collapses allied cooperation on terrorism, which is critical to intelligence sharing.

Human Rights First 13 (How to Ensure that the U.S. Drone Program does not Undermine Human Rights BLUEPRINT FOR THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION, Updated April 13, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/blueprints2012/HRF\_Targeted\_Killing\_blueprint.pdf)

The Obama Administration has dramatically escalated targeted killing by drones as a central feature of its counterterrorism response. Over the past two years, the administration has begun to reveal more about the targeted killing program, including in a leaked Department of Justice White paper on targeted killing1 and in public remarks by several senior officials.2 While this information is welcome, it does not fully address our concerns. Experts and other governments have continued to raise serious concerns about: The precedent that the U.S. targeted killing policy is setting for the rest of the world, including countries that have acquired or are in the process of acquiring drones, yet have long failed to adhere to the rule of law and protect human rights; The impact of the drone program on other U.S. counterterrorism efforts, including whether U.S. allies and other security partners have reduced intelligence-sharing and other forms of counterterrorism cooperation because of the operational and legal concerns expressed by these countries; The impact of drone operations on other aspects of U.S. counterterrorism strategy, especially diplomatic and foreign assistance efforts designed to counter extremism, promote stability and provide economic aid; The number of civilian casualties, including a lack of clarity on who the United States considers a civilian in these situations; and Whether the legal framework for the program that has been publicly asserted so far by the administration comports with international legal requirements. The totality of these concerns, heightened by the lack of public information surrounding the program, require the administration to better explain the program and its legal basis, and to carefully review the policy in light of the global precedent it is setting and serious questions about the effectiveness of the program on the full range of U.S. counterterrorism efforts. While it is expected that elements of the U.S. government’s strategy for targeted killing will be classified, it is in the national interest that the government be more transparent about policy considerations governing its use as well as its legal justification, and that the program be subject to regular oversight. Furthermore, it is in U.S. national security interests to ensure that the rules of engagement are clear and that the program minimizes any unintended negative consequences. How the U.S. operates and publicly explains its targeted killing program will have far-reaching consequences. The manufacture and sale of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) is an increasingly global industry and drone technology is not prohibitively complicated. Some 70 countries already possess UAVs3 —including Russia, Syria and Libya4 —and others are in the process of acquiring them. As White House counterterrorism chief John Brennan stated: the United States is "establishing precedents that other nations may follow, and not all of them will be nations that share our interests or the premium we put on protecting human life, including innocent civilians."5 By declaring that it is in an armed conflict with al Qaeda’s “associated forces” (a term it has not defined) without articulating limits to that armed conflict, the United States is inviting other countries to similarly declare armed conflicts against groups they consider to be security threats for purposes of assuming lethal targeting authority. Moreover, by announcing that all “members” of such groups are legally targetable, the United States is establishing exceedingly broad precedent for who can be targeted, even if it is not utilizing the full scope of this claimed authority.6 As an alternative to armed conflict-based targeting, U.S. officials have claimed targeted killings are justified as self-defense responding to an imminent threat, but have referred to a “flexible” or “elongated” concept of imminence,7 without adequately explaining what that means or how that complies with the requirements of international law. In a white paper leaked to NBC news in February 2013, for example, the Department of Justice adopts what it calls a “broader concept of imminence” that has no basis in law. According to the white paper, an imminent threat need be neither immediate nor specific. This is a dangerous, unprecedented and unwarranted expansion of widely-accepted understandings of international law.8 It is also not clear that the current broad targeted killing policy serves U.S. long-term strategic interests in combating international terrorism. Although it has been reported that some high-level operational leaders of al Qaeda have been killed in drone attacks, studies show that the vast majority of victims are not high-level terrorist leaders.9 National security analysts and former U.S. military officials increasingly argue that such tactical gains are outweighed by the substantial costs of the targeted killing program, including growing antiAmerican sentiment and recruiting support for al Qaeda. 10 General Stanley McChrystal has said: “What scares me about drone strikes is how they are perceived around the world. The resentment created by American use of unmanned strikes ... is much greater than the average American appreciates.”11 The broad targeted killing program has already strained U.S. relations with its allies and thereby impeded the flow of critical intelligence about terrorist operations.12

#### Drone policy is more important than the spying and data scandal to European partners-threatens allied intelligence cooperation.

Dworkin 7/17/13 (Anthony, Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, “Actually, drones worry Europe more than spying” <http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2013/07/17/actually-drones-worry-europe-more-than-spying/>)

Relations between the United States and Europe hit a low point following revelations that Washington was spying on European Union buildings and harvesting foreign email messages. Behind the scenes, though, it is not data protection and surveillance that produces the most complications for the transatlantic intelligence relationship, but rather America's use of armed drones to kill terrorist suspects away from the battlefield. Incidents such as the recent killing of at least 17 people in Pakistan are therefore only likely to heighten European unease. In public, European governments have displayed a curiously passive approach to American drone strikes, even as their number has escalated under Barack Obama’s presidency. Many Europeans believe that the majority of these strikes are unlawful, but their governments have maintained an uneasy silence on the issue. This is partly because of the uncomfortable fact that information provided by European intelligence services may have been used to identify some targets. It is also because of a reluctance to accuse a close ally of having violated international law. And it is partly because European countries have not worked out exactly what they think about the use of drones and how far they agree within the European Union on the question. Now, however, Europe’s muted stance on drone strikes looks likely to change. Why? For one thing, many European countries are now trying to acquire armed drones themselves, and this gives them an incentive to spell out clearer rules for their use. More importantly, perhaps, Europeans have noticed that drones are proliferating rapidly, and that countries like China, Russia and Saudi Arabia are soon likely to possess them. There is a clear European interest in trying to establish some restrictive standards on drone use before it is too late. For all these reasons, many European countries are now conducting internal reviews of their policy on drones, and discussions are also likely to start at a pan-European level. But as Europeans begin to articulate their policy on the use of drones, a bigger question looms. Can Europe and the United States come together to agree on when drone strikes are permissible? Until now, that would have seemed impossible. Since the September 11 attacks, the United States has based its counterterrorism operations on the claim that it is engaged in a worldwide armed conflict with al Qaeda and associated forces — an idea that President Obama inherited from President George W. Bush and has been kept as the basis for an expanded drone strike campaign. European countries have generally rejected this claim. However, the changes to American policy that President Obama announced in May could open the way to at least the possibility of a dialogue. Obama suggested that he anticipated a time in the not-too-distant future when the armed conflict against al Qaeda might come to an end. More substantially, he made clear that his administration was in the process of switching its policy so that, outside zones of hostilities, it would only use drone strikes against individuals who posed a continuing and imminent threat to the U.S. That is a more restrictive standard than the claim that any member of al Qaeda or an associated force could lawfully be killed with a drone strike at any time. European countries might be more willing to accept an approach based on this kind of “self-defense” idea. However, there remain some big stumbling blocks. First, a good deal about Obama’s new standards is still unclear. How does he define a “zone of hostilities,” where the new rules will not apply? And what is his understanding of an “imminent” threat? European countries are likely to interpret these key terms in a much narrower way than the United States. Second, Obama’s new approach only applies as a policy choice. His more expansive legal claims remain in the background so that he is free to return to them if he wishes. But if the United States is serious about working toward international standards on drone strikes, as Obama and his officials have sometimes suggested, then Europe is the obvious place to start. And there are a number of steps the administration could take to make an agreement with European countries more likely. For a start, it should cut back the number of drone strikes and be much more open about the reasons for the attacks it conducts and the process for reviewing them after the fact. It should also elaborate its criteria for determining who poses an imminent threat in a way that keeps attacks within tight limits. And, as U.S. forces prepare to withdraw from Afghanistan in 2014, it should keep in mind the possibility of declaring the war against al Qaeda to be over. All this said, Europe also has some tough decisions to make, and it is unclear whether European countries are ready to take a hard look at their views about drone strikes, addressing any weaknesses or inconsistencies in their own position. If they are, the next few years could offer a breakthrough in developing international standards for the use of this new kind of weapon, before the regular use of drones spreads across the globe.

#### Allied cooperation on intelligence is critical to effective counterterrorism

McGill and Gray 12 (Anna-Katherine Staser McGill, David H. Gray, “Challenges to International Counterterrorism Intelligence Sharing,” Global Security Studies, Summer 2012, Volume 3, Issue 3, http://globalsecuritystudies.com/McGill%20Intel%20Share.pdf)

In his article “Old Allies and New Friends: Intelligence-Sharing in the War on Terror”, Derek Reveron states “the war on terror requires high levels of intelligence to identify a threat relative to the amount of force required to neutralize it” as opposed to the Cold War where the opposite was true (455). As a result, intelligence is the cornerstone of effective counterterrorism operations in the post 9/11 world. Though the United States has the most robust intelligence community in the world with immense capability, skills, and technology, its efficiency in counterterrorism issues depends on coalitions of both traditional allies and new allies. Traditional allies offer a certain degree of dependability through a tried and tested relationship based on similar values; however, newly cultivated allies in the war on terrorism offer invaluable insight into groups operating in their own back yard. The US can not act unilaterally in the global fight against terrorism. It doesn’t have the resources to monitor every potential terrorist hide-out nor does it have the time or capability to cultivate the cultural, linguistic, and CT knowledge that its new allies have readily available. The Department of Defense’s 2005 Quadrennial Review clearly states that the United States "cannot meet today's complex challenges alone. Success requires unified statecraft: the ability of the U.S. government to bring to, bear all elements of national power at home and to work in close cooperation with allies and partners abroad" (qtd in Reveron, 467). The importance of coalition building for the war on terrorism is not lost on US decision-makers as seen by efforts made in the post 9/11 climate to strengthen old relationships and build new ones; however, as seen in the following sections, the possible hindrances to effective, long term CT alliances must also be addressed in order to sustain current operations.

#### Terrorists have means and motive for nuclear attacks, now-expertise and materials are widespread and multiple attempts prove.

**Jaspal, Quaid-i-Azam University IR professor, 2012**

(Zafar, “Nuclear/Radiological Terrorism: Myth or Reality?”, Journal of Political Studies, <http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/pols/pdf-files/Nuclear%20Radiological%20terrorism%20Jaspa_Vol_19_Issue_1_2012.pdf>, ldg)

The misperception, miscalculation and above all ignorance of the ruling elite about security puzzles are perilous for the national security of a state. Indeed, in an age of transnational terrorism and unprecedented dissemination of dual-use nuclear technology, ignoring nuclear terrorism threat is an imprudent policy choice. The incapability of terrorist organizations to engineer fissile material does not eliminate completely the possibility of nuclear terrorism. At the same time, the absence of an example or precedent of a nuclear/ radiological terrorism does not qualify the assertion that the nuclear/radiological terrorism ought to be remained a myth.x Farsighted rationality obligates that one should not miscalculate transnational terrorist groups — whose behavior suggests that they have a death wish — of acquiring nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological material producing capabilities. In addition, one could be sensible about the published information that huge amount of nuclear material is spread around the globe. According to estimate it is enough to build more than 120,000 Hiroshima-sized nuclear bombs (Fissile Material Working Group, 2010, April 1). The alarming fact is that a few storage sites of nuclear/radiological materials are inadequately secured and continue to be accumulated in unstable regions (Sambaiew, 2010, February). Attempts at stealing fissile material had already been discovered (Din & Zhiwei, 2003: 18). Numerous evidences confirm that terrorist groups had aspired to acquire fissile material for their terrorist acts. Late Osama bin Laden, the founder of al Qaeda stated that acquiring nuclear weapons was a“religious duty” (Yusufzai, 1999, January 11). The IAEA also reported that “al-Qaeda was actively seeking an atomic bomb.” Jamal Ahmad al-Fadl, a dissenter of Al Qaeda, in his trial testimony had “revealed his extensive but unsuccessful efforts to acquire enriched uranium for al-Qaeda” (Allison, 2010, January: 11). On November 9, 2001, Osama bin Laden claimed that “we have chemical and nuclear weapons as a deterrent and if America used them against us we reserve the right to use them (Mir, 2001, November 10).” On May 28, 2010, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, a Pakistani nuclear scientist confessed that he met Osama bin Laden. He claimed that “I met Osama bin Laden before 9/11 not to give him nuclear know-how, but to seek funds for establishing a technical college in Kabul (Syed, 2010, May 29).” He was arrested in 2003 and after extensive interrogation by American and Pakistani intelligence agencies he was released (Syed, 2010, May 29). Agreed, Mr. Mahmood did not share nuclear know-how with Al Qaeda, but his meeting with Osama establishes the fact that the terrorist organization was in contact with nuclear scientists. Second, the terrorist group has sympathizers in the nuclear scientific bureaucracies. It also authenticates bin Laden’s Deputy Ayman Zawahiri’s claim which he made in December 2001: “If you have $30 million, go to the black market in the central Asia, contact any disgruntled Soviet scientist and a lot of dozens of smart briefcase bombs are available (Allison, 2010, January: 2).” The covert meetings between nuclear scientists and al Qaeda members could not be interpreted as idle threats and thereby the threat of nuclear/radiological terrorism is real. The 33Defense Secretary Robert Gates admitted in 2008 that “what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear (Mueller, 2011, August 2).” Indeed, the nuclear deterrence strategy cannot deter the transnational terrorist syndicate from nuclear/radiological terrorist attacks. Daniel Whiteneck pointed out: “Evidence suggests, for example, that al Qaeda might not only use WMD simply to demonstrate the magnitude of its capability but that it might actually welcome the escalation of a strong U.S. response, especially if it included catalytic effects on governments and societies in the Muslim world. An adversary that prefers escalation regardless of the consequences cannot be deterred” (Whiteneck, 2005, Summer: 187)

#### And, Nuclear terrorism attacks escalate and cause extinction.

**Morgan, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, 2009**

(Dennis, World on fire: two scenarios of the destruction of human civilization and possible extinction of the human race Futures, Volume 41, Issue 10, December, ldg)

In a remarkable website on nuclear war, Carol Moore asks the question “Is Nuclear War Inevitable??” In Section , Moore points out what most terrorists obviously already know about the nuclear tensions between powerful countries. No doubt, they’ve figured out that the best way to escalate these tensions into nuclear war is to set off a nuclear exchange. As Moore points out, all that militant terrorists would have to do is get their hands on one small nuclear bomb and explode it on either Moscow or Israel. Because of the Russian “dead hand” system, “where regional nuclear commanders would be given full powers should Moscow be destroyed,” it is likely that any attack would be blamed on the United States” Israeli leaders and Zionist supporters have, likewise, stated for years that if Israel were to suffer a nuclear attack, whether from terrorists or a nation state, it would retaliate with the suicidal “Samson option” against all major Muslim cities in the Middle East. Furthermore, the Israeli Samson option would also include attacks on Russia and even “anti-Semitic” European cities In that case, of course, Russia would retaliate, and the U.S. would then retaliate against Russia. China would probably be involved as well, as thousands, if not tens of thousands, of nuclear warheads, many of them much more powerful than those used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would rain upon most of the major cities in the Northern Hemisphere. Afterwards, for years to come, massive radioactive clouds would drift throughout the Earth in the nuclear fallout, bringing death or else radiation disease that would be genetically transmitted to future generations in a nuclear winter that could last as long as a 100 years, taking a savage toll upon the environment and fragile ecosphere as well. And what many people fail to realize is what a precarious, hair-trigger basis the nuclear web rests on. Any accident, mistaken communication, false signal or “lone wolf’ act of sabotage or treason could, in a matter of a few minutes, unleash the use of nuclear weapons, and once a weapon is used, then the likelihood of a rapid escalation of nuclear attacks is quite high while the likelihood of a limited nuclear war is actually less probable since each country would act under the “use them or lose them” strategy and psychology; restraint by one power would be interpreted as a weakness by the other, which could be exploited as a window of opportunity to “win” the war. In other words, once Pandora's Box is opened, it will spread quickly, as it will be the signal for permission for anyone to use them. Moore compares swift nuclear escalation to a room full of people embarrassed to cough. Once one does, however, “everyone else feels free to do so. The bottom line is that as long as large nation states use internal and external war to keep their disparate factions glued together and to satisfy elites’ needs for power and plunder, these nations will attempt to obtain, keep, and inevitably use nuclear weapons. And as long as large nations oppress groups who seek self-determination, some of those groups will look for any means to fight their oppressors” In other words, as long as war and aggression are backed up by the implicit threat of nuclear arms, it is only a matter of time before the escalation of violent conflict leads to the actual use of nuclear weapons, and once even just one is used, it is very likely that many, if not all, will be used, leading to horrific scenarios of global death and the destruction of much of human civilization while condemning a mutant human remnant, if there is such a remnant, to a life of unimaginable misery and suffering in a nuclear winter. In “Scenarios,” Moore summarizes the various ways a nuclear war could begin: Such a war could start through a reaction to terrorist attacks, or through the need to protect against overwhelming military opposition, or through the use of small battle field tactical nuclear weapons meant to destroy hardened targets. It might quickly move on to the use of strategic nuclear weapons delivered by short-range or inter-continental missiles or long-range bombers. These could deliver high altitude bursts whose electromagnetic pulse knocks out electrical circuits for hundreds of square miles. Or they could deliver nuclear bombs to destroy nuclear and/or non-nuclear military facilities, nuclear power plants, important industrial sites and cities. Or it could skip all those steps and start through the accidental or reckless use of strategic weapons

#### Only judicial ex post review provides the accountability necessary to solve confidence in targeting—key to viability of the program

Corey, Army Colonel, 12 (Colonel Ian G. Corey, “Citizens in the Crosshairs: Ready, Aim, Hold Your Fire?,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA561582)

Alternatively, targeted killing decisions could be subjected to judicial review. 103 Attorney General Holder rejected ex ante judicial review out of hand, citing the Constitution’s allocation of national security operations to the executive branch and the need for timely action.104 Courts are indeed reluctant to stray into the realm of political questions, as evidenced by the district court’s dismissal of the ACLU and CCR lawsuit. On the other hand, a model for a special court that operates in secret already exists: the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) that oversees requests for surveillance warrants for suspected foreign agents. While ex ante judicial review would provide the most robust form of oversight, ex post review by a court like the FISC would nonetheless serve as a significant check on executive power.105 Regardless of the type of oversight implemented, some form of independent review is necessary to demonstrate accountability and bolster confidence in the targeted killing process. Conclusion The United States has increasingly relied on targeted killing as an important tactic in its war on terror and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.106 This is entirely reasonable given current budgetary constraints and the appeal of targeted killing, especially UAS strikes, as an alternative to the use of conventional forces. Moreover, the United States will likely again seek to employ the tactic against U.S. citizens assessed to be operational leaders of AQAM. As demonstrated above, one can make a good faith argument that doing so is entirely permissible under both international and domestic law as the Obama Administration claims, the opinions of some prominent legal scholars notwithstanding. The viability of future lethal targeting of U.S. citizens is questionable, however, if the government fails to address legitimate issues of transparency and accountability. While the administration has recently made progress on the transparency front, much more remains to be done, including the release in some form of the legal analysis contained in OLC’s 2010 opinion. Moreover, the administration must be able to articulate to the American people how it selects U.S. citizens for targeted killing and the safeguards in place to mitigate the risk of error and abuse. Finally, these targeting decisions must be subject to some form of independent review that will both satisfy due process and boost public confidence.

#### Accountability is impossible from executive internal measures- no one trusts Obama on drones—Court action is key.

Goldsmith 13 (Jack Goldsmith teaches at Harvard Law School and is a member of the Hoover Institution Task Force on National Security and Law, “How Obama Undermined the War on Terror,” http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112964/obamas-secrecy-destroying-american-support-counterterrorism)

For official secrecy abroad to work, the secrets must be kept at home as well. In speeches, interviews, and leaks, Obama's team has tried to explain why its operations abroad are lawful and prudent. But to comply with rules of classified information and covert action, the explanations are conveyed in limited, abstract, and often awkward terms. They usually raise more questions than they answer—and secrecy rules often preclude the administration from responding to follow-up questions, criticisms, and charges. ¶ As a result, much of what the administration says about its secret war—about civilian casualties, or the validity of its legal analysis, or the quality of its internal deliberations—seems incomplete, self-serving, and ultimately non-credible. These trust-destroying tendencies are exacerbated by its persistent resistance to transparency demands from Congress, from the press, and from organizations such as the aclu that have sought to know more about the way of the knife through Freedom of Information Act requests.¶ A related sin is the Obama administration's surprising failure to secure formal congressional support. Nearly every element of Obama's secret war rests on laws—especially the congressional authorization of force (2001) and the covert action statute (1991)—designed for different tasks. The administration could have worked with Congress to update these laws, thereby forcing members of Congress to accept responsibility and take a stand, and putting the secret war on a firmer political and legal foundation. But doing so would have required extended political efforts, public argument, and the possibility that Congress might not give the president precisely what he wants.¶ The administration that embraced the way of the knife in order to lower the political costs of counterterrorism abroad found it easier to avoid political costs at home as well. But this choice deprived it of the many benefits of public argumentation and congressional support. What Donald Rumsfeld said self-critically of Bush-era unilateralism applies to Obama's unilateralism as well: it fails to "take fully into account the broader picture—the complete set of strategic considerations of a president fighting a protracted, unprecedented and unfamiliar war for which he would need sustained domestic and international support." ¶ Instead of seeking contemporary congressional support, the administration has relied mostly on government lawyers' secret interpretive extensions of the old laws to authorize new operations against new enemies in more and more countries. The administration has great self-confidence in the quality of its stealth legal judgments. But as the Bush administration learned, secret legal interpretations are invariably more persuasive within the dark circle of executive branch secrecy than when exposed to public sunlight. On issues ranging from proper targeting standards, to the legality of killing American citizens, to what counts as an "imminent" attack warranting self-defensive measures, these secret legal interpretations—so reminiscent of the Bushian sin of unilateral legalism—have been less convincing in public, further contributing to presidential mistrust.¶ Feeling the heat from these developments, President Obama promised in his recent State of the Union address "to engage with Congress to ensure not only that our targeting, detention, and prosecution of terrorists remains consistent with our laws and system of checks and balances, but that our efforts are even more transparent to the American people and to the world." So far, this promise, like similar previous ones, remains unfulfilled. ¶ The administration has floated the idea of "[shifting] the CIA's lethal targeting program to the Defense Department," as The Daily Beast reported last month. Among other potential virtues, this move might allow greater public transparency about the way of the knife to the extent that it would eliminate the covert action bar to public discussion. But JSOC's non-covert targeted killing program is no less secretive than the CIA's, and its congressional oversight is, if anything, less robust. ¶ A bigger problem with this proposed fix is that it contemplates executive branch reorganization followed, in a best-case scenario, by more executive branch speeches and testimony about what it is doing in its stealth war. The proposal fails to grapple altogether with the growing mistrust of the administration's oblique representations about secret war. The president cannot establish trust in the way of the knife through internal moves and more words. Rather, he must take advantage of the separation of powers. Military detention, military commissions, and warrantless surveillance became more legitimate and less controversial during the Bush era because adversarial branches of government assessed the president's policies before altering and then approving them. President Obama should ask Congress to do the same with the way of the knife, even if it means that secret war abroad is harder to conduct.

### 1AC Imminence Adv

#### Advantage 2- Imminence:

#### The executive’s current definition of imminence is so vague and broad it makes overuse and abuse of the drone program inevitable.

Greenwald 13 (Glenn, J.D. from NYU, award-winning journalist, February 5th, 2013, "Chilling legal memo from Obama DOJ justifies assassination of US citizens," www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/feb/05/obama-kill-list-doj-memo)

4. Expanding the concept of "imminence" beyond recognition The memo claims that the president's assassination power applies to a senior al-Qaida member who "poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States". That is designed to convince citizens to accept this power by leading them to believe it's similar to common and familiar domestic uses of lethal force on US soil: if, for instance, an armed criminal is in the process of robbing a bank or is about to shoot hostages, then the "imminence" of the threat he poses justifies the use of lethal force against him by the police. But this rhetorical tactic is totally misleading. The memo is authorizing assassinations against citizens in circumstances far beyond this understanding of "imminence". Indeed, the memo expressly states that it is inventing "a broader concept of imminence" than is typically used in domestic law. Specifically, the president's assassination power "does not require that the US have clear evidence that a specific attack . . . will take place in the immediate future". The US routinely assassinates its targets not when they are engaged in or plotting attacks but when they are at home, with family members, riding in a car, at work, at funerals, rescuing other drone victims, etc. Many of the early objections to this new memo have focused on this warped and incredibly broad definition of "imminence". The ACLU's Jameel Jaffer told Isikoff that the memo "redefines the word imminence in a way that deprives the word of its ordinary meaning". Law Professor Kevin Jon Heller called Jaffer's objection "an understatement", noting that the memo's understanding of "imminence" is "wildly overbroad" under international law. Crucially, Heller points out what I noted above: once you accept the memo's reasoning - that the US is engaged in a global war, that the world is a battlefield, and the president has the power to assassinate any member of al-Qaida or associated forces - then there is no way coherent way to limit this power to places where capture is infeasible or to persons posing an "imminent" threat. The legal framework adopted by the memo means the president can kill anyone he claims is a member of al-Qaida regardless of where they are found or what they are doing. The only reason to add these limitations of "imminence" and "feasibility of capture" is, as Heller said, purely political: to make the theories more politically palatable. But the definitions for these terms are so vague and broad that they provide no real limits on the president's assassination power. As the ACLU's Jaffer says: "This is a chilling document" because "it argues that the government has the right to carry out the extrajudicial killing of an American citizen" and the purported limits "are elastic and vaguely defined, and it's easy to see how they could be manipulated."

#### 2 Impacts- first, Pakistan

#### This broad definition of imminence has increased the frequency of attacks and the scope of who can be targeted, which decreases the program’s effectiveness because it reduces the ratio of high-value decapitations to accidental kills

Hudson 11 (Leila Hudson is associate professor of anthropology and history in the School of Middle Eastern & North African Studies at the University of Arizona and director of the Southwest Initiative for the Study of Middle East Conflicts, “Drone Warfare: Blowback From the New American Way of War,” Middle East Policy, <http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/drone-warfare-blowback-new-american-way-war>)

The Bush administration's increased reliance on the program started in 2008; however, it is with the Obama administration that we see the most rapid proliferation of attacks. The final phase of the drone program is characterized by an even greater increase in attack frequency and an expansion of the target list to include targets of opportunity and unidentified militants of dubious rank — and funerals.12 As of May 2011, the CIA under the Obama administration has conducted nearly 200 drone strikes. This suggests that the drone target list now includes targets of opportunity, likely including some selected in consultation with the Pakistani authorities in order to facilitate the increasingly unpopular program. This development, in turn, has now decreased the effectiveness of the program when assessed in terms of the ratio of high-value to accidental kills. As Figure 2 shows, the steady increase in drone attacks conducted in Pakistan between 2004 and 2010 has resulted in a far higher number of deaths overall, but a lower rate of successful killings of high-value militant leaders who command, control and inspire organizations. If we define a high-value target as an organizational leader known to intelligence sources and the international media prior to attack and not someone whose death is justified with a posthumous militant status, we see fewer and fewer such hits — the alleged killing of al-Qaeda commander Ilyas al-Kashmiri in 2009 and again in June 2011 notwithstanding.13 Data analysis shows that at the beginning of the drone program (2002-04), five or six people were killed for each defined high-value target. As part of that high-value target's immediate entourage, they were much more likely to be militants than civilians. By 2010, one high-value target was killed per 147 total deaths. The increased lethality of each attack is due to larger payloads, broader target sets such as funeral processions, and probable new targeting guidelines (including targets of opportunity).14 Over time, these more deadly drone attacks have failed to effectively decapitate the leadership of anti-U.S. organizations but have killed hundreds of other people subsequently alleged to be militants; many were civilians.15 The rapidly growing population of survivors and witnesses of these brutal attacks have emotional and social needs and incentives to join the ranks of groups that access and attack U.S. targets in Afghanistan across the porous border. Drone attacks themselves deliver a politically satisfying short-term "bang for the buck" for U.S. constituencies ignorant of and indifferent to those affected by drone warfare or the phenomenon of blowback. In the Pakistani and Afghan contexts, they inflame the populations and destabilize the institutions that drive regional development. In addition to taking on an unacceptable and extrajudicial toll in human life, the drone strikes in unintended ways complicate the U.S. strategic mission in Afghanistan, as well as the fragile relationship with Pakistan. As a result, the U.S. military's counterinsurgency project in Afghanistan becomes a victim of the first two forms of blowback.

#### Overuse of drones in Pakistan empowers the military and makes a coup inevitable

Michael J Boyle 13, Assistant Professor of Political Science at La Salle University, former Lecturer in International Relations and Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St Andrews, PhD from Cambridge University, January 2013, “The costs and consequences of drone warfare,” International Affairs 89: 1 (2013) 1–29, <http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2013/89_1/89_1Boyle.pdf>

The escalation of drone strikes in Pakistan to its current tempo—one every few days—directly contradicts the long-term American strategic goal of boosting the capacity and legitimacy of the government in Islamabad. Drone attacks are more than just temporary incidents that erase all traces of an enemy. They have lasting political effects that can weaken existing governments, undermine their legitimacy and add to the ranks of their enemies. These political effects come about because drones provide a powerful signal to the population of a targeted state that the perpetrator considers the sovereignty of their government to be negligible. The popular perception that a government is powerless to stop drone attacks on its territory can be crippling to the incumbent regime, and can embolden its domestic rivals to challenge it through violence. Such continual violations of the territorial integrity of a state also have direct consequences for the legitimacy of its government. Following a meeting with General David Petraeus, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari described the political costs of drones succinctly, saying that ‘continuing drone attacks on our country, which result in loss of precious lives or property, are counterproductive and difficult to explain by a democratically elected government. It is creating a credibility gap.’75 Similarly, the Pakistani High Commissioner to London Wajid Shamsul Hasan said in August 2012 that¶ what has been the whole outcome of these drone attacks is that you have directly or indirectly contributed to destabilizing or undermining the democratic government. Because people really make fun of the democratic government—when you pass a resolution against drone attacks in the parliament and nothing happens. The Americans don’t listen to you, and they continue to violate your territory.76¶ The appearance of powerlessness in the face of drones is corrosive to the appearance of competence and legitimacy of the Pakistani government. The growing perception that the Pakistani civilian government is unable to stop drone attacks is particularly dangerous in a context where 87 per cent of all Pakistanis are dissatisfied with the direction of the country and where the military, which has launched coups before, remains a popular force.77

#### Pakistan collapse risks war with India and loose nukes

Twining 13 (Daniel Twining is Senior Fellow for Asia at the German Marshall Fund, Pakistan and the Nuclear Nightmare, Sept 4, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/09/04/pakistan\_and\_the\_nuclear\_nightmare)

The Washington Post has revealed the intense concern of the U.S. intelligence community about Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. In addition to gaps in U.S. information about nuclear weapons storage and safeguards, American analysts are worried about the risk of terrorist attacks against nuclear facilities in Pakistan as well as the risk that individual Pakistani nuclear weapons handlers could go rogue in ways that endanger unified national control over these weapons of mass destruction. These concerns raise a wider question for a U.S. national security establishment whose worst nightmares include the collapse of the Pakistani state -- with all its implications for empowerment of terrorists, a regional explosion of violent extremism, war with India, and loss of control over the country's nuclear weapons. That larger question is: Does Pakistan's nuclear arsenal promote the country's unity or its disaggregation? This is a complicated puzzle, in part because nuclear war in South Asia may be more likely as long as nuclear weapons help hold Pakistan together and embolden its military leaders to pursue foreign adventures under the nuclear umbrella. So if we argue that nuclear weapons help maintain Pakistan's integrity as a state -- by empowering and cohering the Pakistani Army -- they may at the same time undermine regional stability and security by making regional war more likely. As South Asia scholar Christine Fair of Georgetown University has argued, the Pakistani military's sponsorship of "jihad under the nuclear umbrella" has gravely undermined the security of Pakistan's neighborhood -- making possible war with India over Kargil in 1999, the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001, the terrorist attack on Mumbai in 2008, and Pakistan's ongoing support for the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani network, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and other violent extremists. Moreover, Pakistan's proliferation of nuclear technologies has seeded extra-regional instability by boosting "rogue state" nuclear weapons programs as far afield as North Korea, Libya, Iran, and Syria. Worryingly, rather than pursuing a policy of minimal deterrence along Indian lines, Pakistan's military leaders are banking on the future benefits of nuclear weapons by overseeing the proportionately biggest nuclear buildup of any power, developing tactical (battlefield) nuclear weapons, and dispersing the nuclear arsenal to ensure its survivability in the event of attack by either the United States or India. (Note that most Pakistanis identify the United States, not India, as their country's primary adversary, despite an alliance dating to 1954 and nearly $30 billion in American assistance since 2001.) The nuclear arsenal sustains Pakistan's unbalanced internal power structure, underwriting Army dominance over elected politicians and neutering civilian control of national security policy; civilian leaders have no practical authority over Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. Whether one believes the arsenal's governance implications generate stability or instability within Pakistan depends on whether one believes that Army domination of the country is a stabilizing or destabilizing factor. A similarly split opinion derives from whether one deems the Pakistan Army the country's most competent institution and therefore the best steward of weapons whose fall into the wrong hands could lead to global crisis -- or whether one views the Army's history of reckless risk-taking, from sponsoring terrorist attacks against the United States and India to launching multiple wars against India that it had no hope of winning, as a flashing "DANGER" sign suggesting that nuclear weapons are far more likely to be used "rationally" by the armed forces in pursuit of Pakistan's traditional policies of keeping its neighbors off balance. There is no question that the seizure of power by a radicalized group of generals with a revolutionary anti-Indian, anti-American, and social-transformation agenda within Pakistan becomes a far more dangerous scenario in the context of nuclear weapons. Similarly, the geographical dispersal of the country's nuclear arsenal and the relatively low level of authority a battlefield commander would require to employ tactical nuclear weapons raise the risk of their use outside the chain of command. This also raises the risk that the Pakistani Taliban, even if it cannot seize the commanding heights of state institutions, could seize either by force or through infiltration a nuclear warhead at an individual installation and use it to hold the country -- and the world -- to ransom. American intelligence analysts covering Pakistan will continue to lose sleep for a long time to come.

#### Miscalculation means this could escalate to nuclear winter and extinction

Hundley 12 (TOM HUNDLEY, Senior Editor-Pulitzer Center, “Pakistan and India: Race to the End,” http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/pakistan-nuclear-weapons-battlefield-india-arms-race-energy-cold-war)

Nevertheless, military analysts from both countries still say that a nuclear exchange triggered by miscalculation, miscommunication, or panic is far more likely than terrorists stealing a weapon -- and, significantly, that the odds of such an exchange increase with the deployment of battlefield nukes. As these ready-to-use weapons are maneuvered closer to enemy lines, the chain of command and control would be stretched and more authority necessarily delegated to field officers. And, if they have weapons designed to repel a conventional attack, there is obviously a reasonable chance they will use them for that purpose. "It lowers the threshold," said Hoodbhoy. "The idea that tactical nukes could be used against Indian tanks on Pakistan's territory creates the kind of atmosphere that greatly shortens the distance to apocalypse." Both sides speak of the possibility of a limited nuclear war. But even those who speak in these terms seem to understand that this is fantasy -- that once started, a nuclear exchange would be almost impossible to limit or contain. "The only move that you have control over is your first move; you have no control over the nth move in a nuclear exchange," said Carnegie's Tellis. The first launch would create hysteria; communication lines would break down, and events would rapidly cascade out of control. Some of the world's most densely populated cities could find themselves under nuclear attack, and an estimated 20 million people could die almost immediately. What's more, the resulting firestorms would put 5 million to 7 million metric tons of smoke into the upper atmosphere, according to a new model developed by climate scientists at Rutgers University and the University of Colorado. Within weeks, skies around the world would be permanently overcast, and the condition vividly described by Carl Sagan as "nuclear winter" would be upon us. The darkness would likely last about a decade. The Earth's temperature would drop, agriculture around the globe would collapse, and a billion or more humans who already live on the margins of subsistence could starve. This is the real nuclear threat that is festering in South Asia. It is a threat to all countries, including the United States, not just India and Pakistan. Both sides acknowledge it, but neither seems able to slow their dangerous race to annihilation.

#### Scenario 2- Yemen and Somalia:

#### Drone overuse wrecks stability in Yemen—errors and collateral damage are high now.

Greenfield and Kramer 13 (DANYA GREENFIELD & DAVID J KRAMER, Time to curb American drones, April 5,

http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/international/05-Apr-2013/time-to-curb-american-drones)

The US has played a significant role in Yemen’s transition, which ensured the exit of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, in exchange for immunity, and inaugurated a unity government and consensus president overseeing a national dialogue launched last month. The US has pledged support for the dialogue, which will lead to a constitutional referendum and new elections. To many Yemenis, however, Washington is narrowly focused on the short-term security concerns and the fight against terrorism. The US, they think, cares little about real political change. As Yemen’s transition enters a critical stage, Washington has an opportunity to change this image by redirecting its policy to greater emphasis on stability, prosperity and democracy, which will advance both US and Yemeni interests. Despite considerable US humanitarian aid and development support to their government, most Yemenis associate US engagement with the ongoing drone campaign to destroy Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and they see it as having little regard for its effect on civilians. A number of former US military and intelligence officials argue that the drone programme’s costs may exceed its benefits. Retired General Stanley McChrystal has articulated the hazards of overreliance on drones, and General James E Cartwright, former vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff, cautioned last month against unintended consequences, arguing that no matter how precise drone strikes may be, they breed animosity among targeted communities and threaten US efforts to curb extremism. With drone attacks breeding discontent and anti-American sentiment, the Barack Obama administration must rethink how the US can advance its objectives without letting tactics dictate strategy. Washington seeks to balance multiple priorities in Yemen: Supporting stability in the Arabian Peninsula, disrupting terrorist networks, securing waterways and aiding Yemen’s transition to democracy. By focusing primarily on acute, short-term threats, the US risks the long-term security that benefits both nations and can be achieved only through a sustained investment in the humanitarian, economic and political development of the Yemeni people. Thirty-one foreign policy experts and former diplomats sent a letter to President Obama last week that said the administration’s expansive use of unmanned drones in Yemen is proving counterproductive to US security objectives: As faulty intelligence leads to collateral damage, extremist groups ultimately win more support. The lack of transparency and accountability behind the drone policy set a dangerous global precedent and damage Washington’s ability to influence positive change in Yemen and the region. Drone strikes heighten animosity towards the US and Yemen President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi’s government for compromising Yemeni sovereignty. The US, the letter counselled, should reduce its reliance on drone strikes and instead invest in a long-term security agenda. This will include strengthening institutions that enhance the capacity and professionalism of Yemen’s security forces - not only counterterrorism units - to address threats to internal security. Washington already supports the restructuring of Yemen’s military, a step mandated by the transition agreement, but the Defence and State departments should ensure that America’s military assistance does not repeat the mistakes made during Saleh’s tenure - such as ignoring power concentrated in the hands of elites or not prosecuting human rights abuses. And building a capable police force recruited from residents in partnership with local communities is essential to securing this territory. Americans and Yemenis have a strong shared interest in combating extremism, as Al-Qaeda and its local affiliate, Ansar Al Sharia, spread out in the south and pledge acts of terrorism against both Yemeni and US targets. The US should not ignore this threat, but beyond the security portfolio, Yemenis need to feel that Washington is committed to supporting democratic institutions and the prosperity of the Yemeni people. Although the State Department and the US Agency for International Development are engaging Hadi’s government on development and humanitarian issues, most Yemenis feel only the negative effects of US counterterrorism policy. Rather than the steady stream of military delegations, a more robust economic assistance programme and public diplomacy strategy - including a visit by Secretary of State John Kerry and other high-level diplomats - will signal support for Yemen’s transition and its democratic aspirations. Yemen’s national dialogue is an ideal opportunity to break with a legacy of corrupt leaders who sought personal gain at the nation’s expense. The Obama administration can encourage this process by providing international cover for the difficult decisions delegates must make to craft a new political system based on equitable power-sharing, active citizenship and tolerance. This requires the administration to examine its own policies and shift course where the status quo undermines America’s shared interests. Despite negative attitudes towards US policy, Yemenis are eager to have an authentic partnership with the US - built on transparency, accountability and a demonstrated commitment to their future.

#### Executive overreliance causes blowback and instability in Yemen and Somalia- risks violent escalation.

Hudson 11 (Leila Hudson is associate professor of anthropology and history in the School of Middle Eastern & North African Studies at the University of Arizona and director of the Southwest Initiative for the Study of Middle East Conflicts, “Drone Warfare: Blowback From the New American Way of War,” Middle East Policy, <http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/drone-warfare-blowback-new-american-way-war>)

It is possible that the exchange of personnel among the military, the intelligence community and the Department of Defense will clear up the confusion over command and targeting, though this is far from given. The more serious forms of blowback stemming directly from the effects of extrajudicial killing, however, do not seem to have been addressed. If the Pakistani campaign spawned purposeful vengeance, like the Khost bombing, and opportunities for recruitment of noncombatants for retaliatory attacks, then the same purposeful and accidental escalation will most likely occur in the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa, compounding Yemen's and Somalia's volatility. In many ways, Yemen resembles both Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the undeclared drone war there will share the most dysfunctional characteristics of both sides of the Af/Pak theatre. Like Afghanistan, Yemen is a fragmented tribal society ideally suited for harboring pockets of militancy in a de-centered system with strong social ties.33 Like Pakistan, Yemen's military and the other institutions of a failing state may still function well enough to both channel counterterror funds from the United States and apply them according to its own interests and criteria.34 Another whisky-swilling military steeped in hypocrisy and addicted to counterterror as a way to make a living is hardly the ideal local spotter for U.S. attacks from the skies.35 Drone warfare as it has evolved in the Af/Pak theatre is not the answer to Yemen's unrest. The lessons of drone warfare in Pakistan are clear. First, if extrajudicial dispatching of high-value targets is a goal, such targets are best dealt with as Osama bin Laden was — through face-to-face assaults by crack JSOC troops based on reliable intelligence. Second, chronic testing of national sovereignty through an undeclared war of drone attacks puts fragile governing structures in the target country under enormous pressure while exacerbating social volatility, a recipe for unpredictable outcomes.36 Third, the complacency engendered in the American public, which is largely blind to the costs and consequences of, and anesthetized to, the legal and moral issues of drone warfare, precludes recognition, let alone discussion of this new form of warfare. Finally, a trend in increasing "collateral damage" ­— in which thousands of noncombatants may be extrajudicially killed, traumatized and materially damaged — fuels instability and escalates violent retaliation against convenient targets. With Yemen and Somalia as the east-west axis of a maritime system that unites South Asia with the Horn of Africa through one of the world's most sensitive and pirate-infested shipping channels, counterterror measures must be both precise and well-reasoned. The Pakistani model is neither. Drone strikes leave little scope for the civic reform that the Arab Spring in Yemen demands.37

#### Instability in Yemen and Somalia makes maritime terrorism in critical chokepoints around the Horn of Africa inevitable.

Ulrichsen 11 (Kristian Coates, The Geopolitics of Insecurity in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, Middle East Policy Council, http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/geopolitics-insecurity-horn-africa-and-arabian-peninsula?print)

Multiple fault lines have thus opened up, facilitated by (and accelerating) processes of state weakness and the relative empowerment of non-state actors. The result is more political violence and endemic criminality in and off the coast of Somalia and the Horn. Nevertheless, the new dimension to this nexus of terrorism, piracy, gun-running and people-smuggling is its growing transregional dimension. This defines the core challenge facing the regional and global security agenda, in addition to attempts at diplomatic mediation and conflict resolution throughout the area. Intensifying illicit networks and rent-seeking criminality are part of a broader pressure on fragile state structures. They are already struggling to control and adapt to pressures arising from the accelerated flows of information, communication and migration in a rapidly globalizing environment. The coincidence of these processes in Somalia and Yemen is changing the geopolitics of insecurity in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, as the following sections detail. MARITIME AND ENERGY SECURITY The problem of fragile and collapsed states on both sides of the Bab al-Mandab introduces potent new elements of maritime and energy security into the regional — and global — equation. The incidence of maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea more than doubled in 2008-09, and their operational reach steadily increased. Much of the piracy was launched from the semi-autonomous region of Puntland, on Somalia's tip of the Horn, where patterns of rent-seeking and gangsterism converge with the absence of effective state authority and licit sources of income. Moreover, at least one of the seven different groups of pirates operating off the Somali coast is believed to be based in the Socotra archipelago in Yemen, while at least some of the financial proceeds are believed to pass through money-laundering channels in Dubai and Kenya.44 This underlines the growing regional and international risk from both maritime piracy and maritime terrorism. Incidents such as the seizure of the Sirius Star by Somali-based pirates in November 2008 and the attack on the Japanese supertanker M Star in the Strait of Hormuz in July 2010 illustrate both phenomena. Maritime commerce and international shipping that link the oil-exporting Gulf states to Western economies must navigate two regional chokepoints, the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandab, in addition to the hazardous waters of the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. Pirates' growing aggressiveness has centered on this geostrategically and commercially vital region. It reflects the interlocking dangers stemming from a crisis of governance and spreading conflicts. In 2009, the International Maritime Board recorded a total of 406 actual and attempted attacks, the majority of which occurred in the Gulf of Aden and off the Somali coast.45 However, due to underreporting, often for fear of higher insurance premiums, the figures may be much higher. Numerous factors underlie the rise in maritime piracy off the Somali coast. These include opportunistic motivations, which are among the principal drivers of pirate groups, as well as the ready availability of targets (through high volumes of trade passing by) and means (including inadequate law enforcement and ready access to weaponry). It is contextualized by the impact of conflict, poverty and weak state capacity.46 Indeed, in the Somali case, state collapse is a major determinant of piracy. Piracy declined sharply during the short-lived projection of power and authority by the UIC in 2006 and subsequently resurged following their removal through the reappearance of pirate groups operating under warlord protection.47 With the TFG unable to control its territory, let alone its coastline and territorial waters, increased naval patrolling activity by external actors (including the EU, NATO, China, Russia, India and Iran) may offer a degree of protection to shipping but leaves untouched the root causes of piracy as a symptom of state collapse and lack of legitimate economic opportunities. Maritime terrorism presents the second major threat to international security at sea. It has similar causal facilitators to maritime piracy; the erosion of governance in littoral regions creates security gaps that may be exploited by terrorist organizations. The threat from maritime terrorism is low-level yet potentially high-impact. It encompasses subthreats ranging from maritime criminality to better-organized groupings of insurgents or militants who take advantage of the pressure on littoral states to exploit their maritime resources and the fuzzy margins between domestic and international governance of international waterways and shipping lanes. Although the number of maritime terrorist incidents has been relatively small, it does present a challenge to a global supply chain and logistical system increasingly predicated on "just-in-time" deliveries. It also encompasses the role of non-state actors with access to sophisticated weaponry operating in international waters where jurisdiction is unclear and the "seams of globalization" become vulnerable to exploitation.48

#### These attacks risk global economic collapse

Neubauer 13 (Sigurd, Defense and foreign affairs specialist, member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Somalia: A Terrorist-Piracy Nexus?, May 22, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sigurd-neubauer/somalia-piracy\_b\_3320406.html)

Piracy, like terrorism has been a scourge of mankind for centuries and, though its practitioners, real (Blackbeard, Anne Bonny and Henry Morgan) and mythical (Captain Jack Sparrow in the Pirates of the Caribean movie stories) have achieved heroic stature in popular culture, its contemporary manifestations represent a major threat to the global economy and to national security. Significant strides have been made in recent years towards combating piracy, especially off the coast of Somalia, but a robust international grand strategy is urgently needed in order to forestall an ever more dangerous global threat as pirates develop ever more sophisticated organizational structures, many of which are already linked to criminal gangs and even, in some cases to terrorist groups. Their activities already impose heavy financial and human costs not only on the maritime industry but also on the countries from which they operate. Heretofore, the area around Somalia has been the most dangerous area but significant progress has been made in reducing piracy there. Last year, pirates succeeded in capturing 13 vessels, compared to 49 in 2010 and 28 in 2011, according to the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Part of that success can at least be partially explained by the European Union's heavy naval presence around the Horn of Africa, in the Gulf of Aden while improving intelligence sharing with NATO, the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), the UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO), and the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) Piracy Reporting Center. Additional measures implemented by shipping companies such as providing more armed security aboard merchant vessels while securing the ship's perimeter with razor or barbed wire have also led to the significant decrease in the number of piracy attacks. Equally important, however, was the 2009 implementation of the Djibouti Code of Conduct, a code concerning the repression of piracy and armed robbery against ships. Under the code, aside from committing themselves to abiding by various counter-piracy United Nations Security Council Resolutions, the signatories also pledged to overhaul their domestic counter-piracy legislation. As a result, a record number of pirates were sentenced by local courts around the world last year. The significance of these developments should not, however, be overstated. First, the cost remains enormous -- in 2011, it is estimated that Somali piracy cost the global economy an estimated 7 billion USD through higher insurance premiums, security enhancements, and business disruption and earned the pirates some 160 million USD in ransoms. These figures do not include the psychological burdens borne by the captives or the costs imposed on Somalia. And, the actual costs are probably even higher due to widespread underreporting. Second, while piracy off the coast of Somalia has decreased, pirates are gradually focusing their efforts where patrols are not available for protection, now operating in the wider Indian Ocean. As pirates are extending their reach from Oman to the Maldives, they have also proven to be excellent entrepreneurs, building large well-financed organizations that are able to execute ever more sophisticated attacks such as hijacking oil tankers off the coast of Nigeria and stealing the valuable cargo. Moreover, pirate groups are becoming increasingly international and are extending their reach from national bases to neighbors -- from Nigeria, for example to Benin and the Ivory Coast, usually in cooperation with powerful local elements. Economically speaking, piracy already presents an enormous challenge and it is conceivable that as pirates face stiffer resistance on the high seas by an increasingly stronger international naval presence, their political and ideological motivations could radicalize over time. Currently, terrorist groups already cooperate with criminal gangs to raise funds and piracy could potentially become a lucrative source of income for radical groups. A second plausible scenario is that as pirates struggle to capture more ships, pirates could resort to attacking shipping directly as criminal motivations could subside to radical ideology propagated by al Qaeda and its splinter groups. Hence, it is easy to envision a nightmare scenario wherein terrorists, supported by a pirate group, hijack an oil tanker not just to steal the oil or collect the ransom but to blow it up in a major port with devastating economic consequences across the globe. A separate threat scenario that should not be underestimated entails terrorists capturing a liqueﬁed natural gas carrier that can be used as a ﬂoating bomb, which can either be detonated at a major port or near a flotilla of ships in the open seas. Piracy and terrorism can also be used as means to exert economic warfare against the United States and the international community as maritime attacks oﬀer terrorists an alternate means of causing mass economic destabilization. After all, terrorists have already attacked ships -- al Qaeda, the USS Cole (2000), Abu Sayyaf a ferryboat in the Philippines (2004) and the Mumbai attacks (2008).

#### Nuclear war

Kemp 10 Geoffrey, Director of Regional Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center, served in the White House under Ronald Reagan, special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs on the National Security Council Staff, Former Director, Middle East Arms Control Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010, The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia’s Growing Presence in the Middle East, pg. 233-4

The second scenario, called Mayhem and Chaos, is the opposite of the first scenario; everything that can go wrong does go wrong. The world economic situation weakens rather than strengthens, and India, China, and Japan suffer a major reduction in their growth rates, further weakening the global economy. As a result, energy demand falls and the price of fossil fuels plummets, leading to a financial crisis for the energy-producing states, which are forced to cut back dramatically on expansion programs and social welfare. That in turn leads to political unrest: and nurtures different radical groups, including, but not limited to, Islamic extremists. The internal stability of some countries is challenged, and there are more “failed states.” Most serious is the collapse of the democratic government in Pakistan and its takeover by Muslim extremists, who then take possession of a large number of nuclear weapons. The danger of war between India and Pakistan increases significantly. Iran, always worried about an extremist Pakistan, expands and weaponizes its nuclear program. That further enhances nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt joining Israel and Iran as nuclear states. Under these circumstances, the potential for nuclear terrorism increases, and the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack in either the Western world or in the oil-producing states may lead to a further devastating collapse of the world economic market, with a tsunami-like impact on stability. In this scenario, major disruptions can be expected, with dire consequences for two-thirds of the planet’s population.

#### The plan is key- Ex post review resolves the broad definition of imminence- redress key to check the errors which cause blowback.

Hafetz, former ACLU National Security Project attorney, 13 (Jonathan Hafetz, former senior attorney at the ACLU’s National Security Project, a litigation director at NYU’s Brennan Center for Justice, and a John J. Gibbons Fellow in Public Interest and Constitutional Law at Gibbons, P.C, Reviewing Drones, March 8, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jonathan-hafetz/reviewing-drones\_b\_2815671.html)

The better course is to ensure meaningful review after the fact. To this end, Congress should authorize federal damages suits by the immediate family members of individuals killed in drone strikes. Such ex post review would serve two main functions: providing judicial scrutiny of the underlying legal basis for targeted killings and affording victims a remedy. It would also give judges more leeway to evaluate the facts without fear that an error on their part might leave a dangerous terrorist at large. For review to be meaningful, judges must not be restricted to deciding whether there is enough evidence in a particular case, as they would likely be under a FISA model. They must also be able to examine the government's legal arguments and, to paraphrase the great Supreme Court chief justice John Marshall, "to say what the law is" on targeted killings. Judicial review through a civil action can achieve that goal. It can thus help resolve the difficult questions raised by the Justice Department white paper, including the permissible scope of the armed conflict with al Qaeda and the legality of the government's broad definition of an "imminent" threat. Judges must also be able to afford a remedy to victims. Mistakes happen and, as a recent report by Columbia Law School and the Center for Civilians in Conflict suggests, they happen more than the U.S. government wants to acknowledge. Errors are not merely devastating for family members and their communities. They also increase radicalization in the affected region and beyond. Drone strikes -- if unchecked -- could ultimately create more terrorists than they eliminate.

#### The plan would result in a balanced definition of imminence. The court would apply a standard that still allows decapitation of high value targets and out-of-battlefield operations– Hamdi proves

Kwoka 11 (Lindsay, J.D. UPenn, “TRIAL BY SNIPER: THE LEGALITY OF TARGETED KILLING IN THE WAR ON TERROR” Accessed at HeinOnline)

But this is not the end of the inquiry. Even if a targeted individual is not located on a field of battle, he may still be a threat, and tar- geted killing may potentially be necessary and appropriate in some circumstances. Applying the reasoning of" Hamdi here, a court would likely find that the use of targeted killing is only "necessary and ap- propriate" if it is the only way to prevent someone like Al-Awlaki from engaging in terrorist activity or otherwise harming the United States. The Hamdi Court was concerned with assuring that the executive used the least intrusive means in achieving its objective of preventing the enemy combatant from returning to battle. The Court made clear that the means used to achieve this objective should be no more intrusive than necessary.7\* It is consistent with the Court's concern to allow targeted killing only when it is the only means available to pre- vent harm to the United States. If the executive can demonstrate that an individual outside of a warzone will harm the United States unless he is killed, targeted kill- ing may be authorized. This is consistent with Hamdi, in which the main concern was preventing future harm to the United States while using the least intrusive means available. This is also consistent with U.S. criminal law, in which the executive branch is permitted to kill an individual if there is no peaceful means left to apprehend him. Such an approach is also consistent with the approach of the Su- preme Court. Even the most stalwart protectors of constitutional rights of alleged terrorists recognize that immediate action by the executive is at times necessary to prevent attacks.7'' An approach that al- lows the executive to use deadly force when it is the only available means of preventing harm effectively balances the need to protect citizen's constitutional rights while affording sufficient deference to the executive.

### Navy Plan

#### The United States Federal Judiciary should subject United States’ targeted killing operations to judicial ex post review by allowing a cause of action against the government for damages arising directly out of the constitutional provision allegedly offended.

### 1AC Solvency

#### Ex post review makes our drone operations better—incentivizes better intel gathering and it doesn’t chill battlefield ops

Taylor, Senior Fellow-Center for Policy & Research, 13 (Paul, Senior Fellow at the Center for Policy & Research and an alumnus of Seton Hall Law School and the Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, and is veteran of the Army’s 82nd Airborne Division, with deployments to both Afghanistan and to Iraq, “Former DOD Lawyer Frowns on Drone Court,” March, http://transparentpolicy.org/2013/03/former-dod-lawyer-frowns-on-drone-court/)

Lastly, there is the concern of creating perverse incentives: whether a person’s name or identity is known has never been a factor in determining the legality of targeting an otherwise-lawful military target. But by creating a separate legal regime for known targets, we could create a disincentive to collect information about a target. We do not want a military or intelligence agency that keeps itself intentionally uninformed. Nor do we want to halt a military operation in progress simply because one of the targets is recognized late. Conducting the review ex post would not eliminate these issues, but it would substantially mitigate them. The military (or CIA, if it keeps its program), would not fear an interruption of its operations, and could even have an incentive to collect more information in order to later please a court that has plenty of time to look back at the past operations and question whether an individual was in fact targeted.

#### Courts don’t leak intel methods or classified information—this fear has been repeatedly dispelled by hundreds of successfully tried terrorism cases

Jaffer-director ACLU’s National Security Project-12/9/08 <http://www.salon.com/2008/12/09/guantanamo_3/> Don’t replace the old Guantánamo with a new one

The contention that the federal courts are incapable of protecting classified information — “intelligence sources and methods,” in the jargon of national security experts — is another canard. When classified information is at issue in federal criminal prosecutions, a federal statute — the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) — generally permits the government to substitute classified information at trial with an unclassified summary of that information. It is true that CIPA empowers the court to impose sanctions on the government if the substitution of the unclassified summary for the classified information is found to prejudice the defendant, and in theory such sanctions can include the dismissal of the indictment. In practice, however, sanctions are exceedingly rare, and of the hundreds of terrorism cases that have been prosecuted over the last decade, none has been dismissed for reasons relating to classified information. Proponents of new detention authority, including Waxman and Wittes, invoke the threat of exposing “intelligence sources and methods” as a danger inherent to terrorism prosecutions in U.S. courts, but the record of successful prosecutions provides the most effective rebuttal.

#### No over-deterrence of military operations- government liability is rooted in the FTCA and it avoids the chilling associated with individual liability.

Kent, Constitutional Law prof, 13 (Andrew, Faculty Advisor-Center on National Security at

Fordham Law School, prof @ Fordham University School of Law- constitutional law, foreign relations law, national security law, federal courts and procedure, “ARE DAMAGES DIFFERENT?: BIVENS AND NATIONAL SECURITY,” October 8, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2330476>) \*\* Evidence is gender paraphrased

Because of sovereign immunity, federal officials are sued under Bivens in their so-called personal rather than official capacities.43 In theory, persons injured by actions of a federal official could also seek compensation by suing the agent’s employer, the United States Government for damages, but the sovereign immunity of the federal government blocks this route.44 The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), originally enacted in 1946 and frequently amended since,45 effects a partial waiver of sovereign immunity by allowing suits directly against the federal government instead of officers (who might be judgment proof) and making the United States liable for injuries caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any federal employee acting within the scope of ~~his~~ employment, in accordance with the law of the state where the act or omission occurred.46 Under the Westfall Act of 1988, the FTCA is the exclusive remedy for torts committed by federal officials within the scope of their employment, except for suits brought for violations of the Constitution.47 In other words, state law tort claims against individual official defendants are now generally barred. The Supreme Court takes the prospect of individual liability in damages for officials very seriously and has crafted immunity doctrines to soften the blow. The Court’s rulings provide the President of the United States and certain classes of officials defined functionally—prosecutors doing prosecutorial work, legislators legislating, judges doing judicial work and certain persons performing “quasijudicial” functions—with absolute immunity from money damages suits, generally for the reason that such suits would be likely to be frequent, frequently meritless, and uniquely capable of disrupting job performance.48 All other government officials are entitled to only “qualified immunity” from money damages suits. Under the qualified immunity doctrine, officials are liable only when they violate “clearly established” federal rights, that is, when “[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what ~~he is~~ [they are] doing violates that right.”49 Because qualified immunity is not just a defense to liability but also “a limited entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation,”50 the Court’s doctrine encourages speedy resolution of immunity questions by judges. The policy reasons for the Court’s active protection of federal officials through a robust immunity doctrine, including fear of dampening the zeal with which officials perform their jobs because of fear of personal liability, are discussed below in Section V.A.

#### Subjecting targeted killing policy to judicial review turns their executive expertise arguments—empirical studies show judicial review has positive effect on executive policy expertise

Dragu 13 (Tiberiu Dragu, prof of politics at NYU, and Oliver Board, On Judicial Review in a Separation of Powers System, https://files.nyu.edu/tcd224/public/papers/judicial.pdf)

Whether judicial review should be limited for epistemic reasons has been particularly salient in recent years, as courts have been repeatedly called to determine the meaning of statutes and constitutional provisions on executive officials' powers to prevent terrorist attacks. Some scholars argue that terrorism prevention, just like other national security matters, is an area of questionable judicial competence where executive officials should be afforded considerable discretion to devise counterterrorism policies not only because the pres- ident is elected, but also because the president's agents have superior information about how best to address the terrorist threat (Sunstein 2005; Tushnet 2005; Posner 2006). Similar arguments for limiting judicial review because of asymmetric institutional competence are often voiced in the scholarship on administrative rulemaking (Sunstein 2006). Judicial in-tervention in rulemaking can he at odds, so the argument goes, with the very rationale of creating administrative agencies: to have an institutional repository of expertise in realms in which elected officials lack the necessary information required by complexity of the modern- day governance (Landis 1938). Such arguments approach the question of whether judicial review is desirable or not as a balancing exercise between the rule-of-law ideal of checking the legality of policies and the separat ion-of-powers principle of dispensing policy-making authority to those institutions with superior expertise. As such, the expertise rationale for limiting the scope of judicial review seems simple and intuitive: When questions of law are intertwined with matters of fact and policy choice and when the courts are unsure what consequences will follow from a particular decision, judicial second-guessing can throw governmental policies off course. And if the harm to public policy caused by potentially erroneous judicial decisions outweighs the rule-of-law benefits of assessing the legality of policies, it is allegedly desirable to limit judicial review on grounds of institutional competence, especially in technical and complex policy areas such as national security and administrative action. Notwithstanding the foregoing, restraining the exercise of judicial review for epistemic reasons, some argue, is bound to create a zone of legal unaccountability where governmental power can be deployed in an arbitrary and illegal manner, with potentially deleterious effects for the effectiveness of public law. Because even the most expert body can act unlawfully, foreclosing legal review in certain policy areas amounts to an abdication of the judicial duty to enforce relevant legal limits (Allan 2011). The pressing question then is this: Can we reconcile the review of expert policy decisions by non-expert courts in a manner that is consistent with both the rule-of-law ideal of checking the legality of policies and the separation-of-powers concern for policy expertise? To this end, we develop a game-theoretic analysis to illustrate how the exercise of judicial review can have a beneficial effect on expertise, even if the courts are relatively ill-equipped to evaluate the likely effects of various policies. That is, our analysis proposes a novel ratio-nale for the institution of judicial review. The conventional argument for such institutional arrangement is that it ensures consistency between the actions of governmental officials and preexisting legal provisions. Without disputing the importance of judicial review as a mech-anism of legal accountability, the analysis here underscores another, perhaps less intuitive virtue: judicial review by non-expert courts can foster policy expertise. Our analysis takes as its point of departure the fact that policymakers, those with for-mal power to make decisions, have to rely on expert agents for information regarding the likely consequences of various courses of action. Nothing about this argument is profound: that policymakers depend on experts for policy advice is an institutional fact of modern government. For example, the president relies on the White House staff, bureaucrats and non-governmental experts for policy advice; the House and the Senate depend on staff mem- bers, congressional committees, bureaucrats and lobbyists for valuable information when drafting legislation; the heads of administrative agencies depend on lower-level bureaucrats and the regulated industry, among others, for information regarding the consequences of various regulations; and so on. At the same time, this separation between policy-making and policy expertise implies that the amount of information available for decision-making is endogenous to the institutional structure under which policy-making takes place, observation which leads to, as we shall show, a novel assessment of judicial review expertise perspective. To illustrate the conditions under which judicial review fosters policy expertise, we com-pare a baseline model of an interaction between a policymaker and an expert in the absence of judicial review with an institutional setting in which a court can assess the legality of policies. This analysis shows that the judiciary can be better off without its review power if judicial checks dilute the amount of information available for policy-making, which implies that there are endogenous judicial incentives to limit the detrimental effect of judicial review on expertise. More importantly, the institutional analysis underscores that judicial review can enhance the amount of information available for policy-making, while, under those con- ditions, the judiciary prefers to exercise legal review, even though it lacks the knowledge to precisely assess the likely effects of various policies. In other words, not only that it can be desirable solely on expertise grounds to subject governmental policy to the muster of judi-cial review, but non-expert courts have endogenous incentives to employ judicial review in a manner consistent with both the principle of checking the legality of policies and institutional concern for policy expertise. These results have policy implications for public and scholarly debates regarding how to design the structure of liberal governments to fight terrorism (Cole 2003; Posner 2006). Whether counterterrorism policy should be subjected to the muster of judicial review has been a contentious matter, especially in the aftermath of 9/11 as various liberal democracies made terrorism prevention a pressing objective. The contending views on the appropriate- ness of judicial review of counterterrorism policy are sharply articulated in the recent debate on drone strikes. Some say that judicial review of targeted killings is necessary to put the policy on a better legal foundation, while others argue that it is inappropriate because judges lack the required expertise to review expert executive decisions.1 Our results suggest that non-expert judicial review has the potential to induce more informed policies, an observation that is missing from current discussions on judicial review of drone strikes and other coun- terterrorism policies. In section 7, we discuss in more detail the application of our theory and its policy implications, in the context of counterterrorism policy.

## 2AC

### Solvency

#### Ex Post review of drone strikes would effectively constrain executive action

Jaffer, Director-ACLU Center for Democracy, 13 **(**Jameel Jaffer, Director of the ACLU's Center for Democracy, “Judicial Review of Targeted Killings,” 126 Harv. L. Rev. F. 185 (2013), <http://www.harvardlawreview.org/issues/126/april13/forum_1002.php>)

**Since 9/11,** **the CIA and Joint Special Operations Command** (JSOC) **have used armed drones** to kill thousands of people **in places far removed from conventional battlefields**. Legislators, legal scholars, and human rights advocates have raised concerns about civilian casualties, the legal basis for the strikes, the process by which the executive selects its targets, and the actual or contemplated deployment of armed drones into additional countries. **Some have proposed that Congress establish a court to approve (or disapprove) strikes before the government carries them out. While judicial engagement with the targeted killing program is long overdue**, **those aiming to bring the program in line with our legal traditions** and moral intuitions **should think carefully before embracing this proposal. Creating a new court to issue death warrants is more likely to normalize the targeted killing program than to restrain it. The argument for some form of judicial review is compelling, not least because such review would clarify the scope of the government’s authority to use** lethal **force**. The targeted killing program is predicated on sweeping constructions of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) and the President’s authority to use military force in national self-defense. The government contends, for example, that the AUMF authorizes it to use lethal force against groups that had nothing to do with the 9/11 attacks and that did not even exist when those attacks were carried out. It contends that the AUMF gives it authority to use lethal force against individuals located far from conventional battlefields. As the Justice Department’s recently leaked white paper makes clear,**the government also contends that the President has authority to use lethal force against those deemed to present “continuing” rather than truly imminent threats.**These claims are controversial. They have been rejected or questioned by human rights groups, legal scholars, federal judges, and U.N. special rapporteurs. Even enthusiasts of the drone program have become anxious about its legal soundness. (“People in Washington need to wake up and realize the legal foundations are crumbling by the day,” Professor Bobby Chesney, a supporter of the program, recently said.) **Judicial review could clarify the limits on the government’s legal authority and supply a degree of legitimacy to actions taken within those limits. It could also** encourage executive officials to observe these limits**.** **Executive officials would be less likely to exceed or abuse their authority if they were required to defend their conduct to federal judges.** **Even** Jeh **Johnson, the Defense Department’s former general counsel and a vocal defender of the targeted killing program, acknowledged** in a recent **speech that** judicial review could add “rigor” **to the executive’s decisionmaking process**. **In explaining the function of** the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance **Court,**which oversees government surveillance in certain national security investigations, **executive officials have often said that** even the mere prospect of judicial review deters error and abuse.

### 2AC Restriction

#### We meet-Due process rights are judicial restrictions on executive authority

Al-Aulaqi Motion to Dismiss Memo 2013 (PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS, files February 5, 2013)

Despite Defendants’ attempt to distinguish the habeas cases, Defs. Br. 12, claims alleging

unlawful deprivation of life under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause are as textually

committed to the courts as claims brought under the Suspension Clause. Both are fundamental

judicial checks on executive authority. Cf. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 993 (D.C. Cir.

1997) (rejecting distinction between the Suspension Clause and Bill of Rights amendments

because both are “restrictions on governmental power”), rev’d on other grounds by Boumediene,

553 U.S. 723.

#### C/I – Authority is what the president may do not what the president can do

Ellen Taylor 96, 21 Del. J. Corp. L. 870 (1996), Hein Online

The term authority is commonly thought of in the context of the law of agency, and the Restatement (Second) of Agency defines both power and authority.'89 **Power refers to an agent's** ability or **capacity to produce a change** in a legal relation (whether or not the principal approves of the change), **and authority refers to the power given (permission granted) to the agent** by the principal to affect the legal relations of the principal; **the distinction is between what the agent can do and what the agent may do**.

#### C/I --- Restriction is limitation, NOT prohibition

CAC 12,COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ALTERNATIVE MEDICINAL CANNABIS COLLECTIVE et al., Defendants and Appellants, DIVISION ONE, 207 Cal. App. 4th 601; 143 Cal. Rptr. 3d 716; 2012 Cal. App. LEXIS 772

We disagree with County that in using the phrases “further restrict the location or establishment” and “regulate the location or establishment” in [\*615] section 11362.768, subdivisions (f) and (g), the Legislature intended to authorize local governments to ban all medical marijuana dispensaries that are otherwise “authorized by law to possess, cultivate, or distribute medical marijuana” (§ 11362.768, subd. (e) [stating scope of section's application]); the Legislature did not use the words “ban” or “prohibit.” Yet County cites dictionary definitions of “regulate” (to govern or direct according to rule or law); “regulation” (controlling by rule or restriction; a rule or order that has legal force); “restriction” (a limitation or qualification, including on the use of property); “establishment” (the act of establishing or state or condition of being established); “ban” (to prohibit); and “prohibit” (to forbid by law; to prevent or hinder) to attempt to support its interpretation. County then concludes that “the ordinary meaning [\*\*\*23] of the terms, ‘restriction,’ ‘regulate,’ and ‘regulation’ are consistent with a ban or prohibition against the opening or starting up or continued operation of [a medical marijuana dispensary] storefront business.” We disagree.¶CA(9)(9) The ordinary meanings of “restrict” and “regulate” suggest a degree of control or restriction falling short of “banning,” “prohibiting,” “forbidding,” or “preventing.” Had the Legislature intended to include an outright ban or prohibition among the local regulatory powers authorized in section 11362.768, subdivisions (f) and (g), it would have said so. Attributing the usual and ordinary meanings to the words used in section 11362.768, subdivisions (f) and (g), construing the words in context, attempting to harmonize subdivisions (f) and (g) with section 11362.775 and with the purpose of California's medical marijuana [\*\*727] statutory program, and bearing in mind the intent of the electorate and the Legislature in enacting the CUA and the MMP, we conclude that HN21Go to this Headnote in the case.the phrases “further restrict the location or establishment” and “regulate the location or establishment” in section 11362.768, subdivisions (f) and (g) do not authorize a per se ban at the local level. The Legislature [\*\*\*24] decided in section 11362.775 to insulate medical marijuana collectives and cooperatives from nuisance prosecution “solely on the basis” that they engage in a dispensary function. To interpret the phrases “further restrict the location or establishment” and “regulate the location or establishment” to mean that local governments may impose a blanket nuisance prohibition against dispensaries would frustrate both the Legislature's intent to “[e]nhance the access of patients and caregivers to medical marijuana through collective, cooperative cultivation projects” and “[p]romote uniform and consistent application of the [CUA] among the counties within the state” and the electorate's intent to “ensure that seriously ill Californians have the right to obtain and use marijuana for medical purposes” and “encourage the federal and state governments to implement a plan to provide for the safe and affordable distribution of marijuana to all patients in medical need of marijuana.”

#### Their interpretation is flawed

#### A. Over limits- core cases revolve around regulating behavior not banning policies. Their interp eliminates topic lit.

#### B. Affirmative Ground-Ban policies are dead against agent counterplans. Err aff because the range of good affs is small and the neg is strapped with generics.

#### ---Reasonability-competing interpretations causes substance crowd. Good is good enough when the topic is already limited and our aff is squarely in the lit

### Zones CP

#### Counterplan incentivizes the US to create hostilities so they can blow people up-takes out solvency.

**Daskal, Georgetown Center on National Security and the Law adjunct professor, 2013**

(Jennifer, “The Geography of the Battlefield: A Framework for Detention and Targeting Outside the 'Hot' Conflict Zone”, <http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1252&context=facsch_lawrev>, ldg)

Consistent with treaty and case law, overt and sustained fighting are key factors in identifying a zone of active hostilities. Specifically, the fighting must be of sufficient duration and intensity to create the exigent circumstances that justify application of extraordinary war authorities, to put civilians on notice, and to justify permissive evidentiary presumptions regarding the identification of the enemy.133 The presence of troops on the ground is a significant factor, although neither necessary nor sufficient to constitute a zone of active hostilities. Action by the Security Council or regional security bodies such as NATO, as well as the belligerent parties’ express recognition of the existence of a hot conflict zone, are also relevant. Linking the zone of active hostilities primarily to the duration and intensity of the fighting and to states’ own proclamations suffers, however, from an inherent circularity. A state can itself create a zone of active hostilities by ratcheting up violence or issuing a declaration of intent, thereby making previously unlawful actions lawful.134 It is impossible to fully address this concern. The problem can, however, be significantly reduced by insisting on strict compliance with the law-ofwar principles of distinction and proportionality and by vigorously punishing states for acts of aggression.135 There will, of course, be disagreement as to whether a state’s escalation of a certain conflict constitutes aggression, particularly given underlying disagreements about who qualifies as a lawful target. The zone approach is helpful in this regard as well: it narrows the range of disagreement by demanding heightened substantive standards as to who qualifies as a legitimate target outside the zones of active hostilities. Under the zone approach, the escalation of force must be aimed at a narrower set of possible military targets until the increased use of force is sufficiently intense and pervasive enough to create a new zone of active hostilities.

#### Judicial review of the military is critical to balanced civil-military relations- Congress and the Executive cannot check themselves

Gilbert, Lieutenant Colonel, 98 (Michael, Lieutenant Colonel Michael H. Gilbert, B.S., USAF Academy; MSBA, Boston University; J.D., McGeorge School of Law; LL.M., Harvard Law School. He is a member of the State Bars of Nebraska and California. “ARTICLE: The Military and the Federal Judiciary: an Unexplored Part of the Civil-Military Relations Triangle,” 8 USAFA J. Leg. Stud. 197, lexis)

The legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the federal government comprise and form a triangle surrounding the military, each branch occupying one side of the civil-military triangle. Commentators have written countless pages discussing, analyzing, and describing the civil-military relationship that the Congress and the President have with the armed forces they respectively regulate and command. Most commentators, however, have neglected to consider the crucial position and role of the federal judiciary. This article examines the relationship between the judiciary and the military in the interest of identifying the role that the judiciary, specifically the United States Supreme Court, plays in civil-military relations. Without an actual, meaningful presence of the judiciary as a leg of the civil-military triangle, the triangle is incomplete and collapses. In its current structure, the judiciary has adopted a non-role by deferring its responsibility to oversee the lawfulness of the other two branches to those branches themselves. This dereliction, which arguably is created by the malfeasance of the United States Supreme Court, has resulted in inherent inequities to the nation, in general, and to service members, in particular, as the federal courts are reluctant to protect even basic civil rights of military members. Judicial oversight is one form of civilian control over the military; abrogating this responsibility is to return power to the military hierarchy that is not meant to be theirs. [\*198] Under the United States Constitution, Congress has plenary authority over the maintenance and regulation of the armed forces, and the President is expressly made the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. The unwillingness of the Court to provide a check and balance on these two equal branches of the federal government creates an area virtually unchallengeable by the public. As a result, a large group of people, members of the military services, lack recourse to address wrongs perpetrated against them by their military and civilian superiors. Ironically, the very men and women dedicating their lives to protect the U.S. Constitution lack many of the basic protections the Constitution affords everyone else in this nation. The weakness in the present system is that the Supreme Court has taken a detour from the Constitution with regard to reviewing military issues under the normally recognized requirements of the Constitution. The federal judiciary, following the lead of the Supreme Court, has created de facto immunity from judicial interference by those who seek to challenge policy or procedure established by the other two branches and the military itself. When the "Thou Shalt Nots" of the Amendments to the Constitution compete with the necessities of the military, the conflict is resolved in favor of the military because it is seen as a separate society based upon the constitutionally granted authority of Congress to maintain and regulate the armed forces. 1 Essentially, the Court permits a separate world to be created for the military because of this regulation, distinguishing and separating the military from society. 2 The Court needs to reexamine their almost complete deference on military matters, which is tantamount to an exception to the Bill of Rights for matters concerning members of the military. Unless the Court begins to provide the oversight that is normally dedicated to many other areas of law fraught with complexity and national importance, judicial review of the military will continue to be relegated to a footnote in the annals of law. Combined with the downsizing and further consequent decline of interaction between the military and general society, 3 this exile from the protection of the Constitution could breed great injustices within the military. Perhaps even more importantly, the military might actually begin to believe that they are indeed second-class citizens, separate from the general [\*199] population, which could create dire problems with civil-military relations that are already the subject of concern by many observers. 4

#### Lack of civil control lets the military causes pandemics, piracy and failure to adapt to climate

Owens 12 (Dr. Owens is professor of national security affairs in the National Security Affairs Department of the Naval War College “WHAT MILITARY OFFICERS NEED TO KNOW ABOUT CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS,” Naval War College Review, Spring 2012, Vol. 65, No. 2 http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/1ef74daf-ebff-4aa4-866e-e1dd201d780e/What-Military-Officers-Need-to-Know-about-Civil-Mi.aspx)

The combination of civil-military relations patterns and service doctrines affect military effectiveness. In essence, the ultimate test of a civil-military relations pattern is how well it contributes to the effectiveness of a state’s military, especially at the level of strategic assessment and strategy making.50 However, Richard Kohn has explicitly called into question the effectiveness of the American military in this realm, especially with regard to the planning and conduct of operations other than those associated with large-scale conventional war. “Nearly twenty years after the end of the Cold War, the American military, financed by more money than the entire rest of the world spends on its armed forces, failed to defeat insurgencies or fully suppress sectarian civil wars in two crucial countries, each with less than a tenth of the U.S. population, after overthrowing those nations’ governments in a matter of weeks.”51 He attributes this lack of effectiveness to a decline in the military’s professional competence with regard to strategic planning. “In effect, in the most important area of professional expertise—the connecting of war to policy, of operations to achieving the objectives of the nation—the American military has been found wanting. The excellence of the American military in operations, logistics, tactics, weaponry, and battle has been manifest for a generation or more. Not so with strategy.”52 This phenomenon manifests itself, he argues, in recent failure to adapt to a changing security environment in which the challenges to global stability are “less from massed armies than from terrorism; economic and particularly financial instability; failed states; resource scarcity (particularly oil and potable water); pandemic disease; climate change; and international crime in the form of piracy, smuggling, narcotics trafficking, and other forms of organized lawlessness.” He observes that this decline in strategic competence has occurred during a time in which the U.S. military exercises enormous influence in the making of foreign and national security policies. He echoes the claim of Colin Gray: “All too often, there is a black hole where American strategy ought to reside.”53 Is there something inherent in current U.S. civil-military affairs that accounts for this failure of strategy? The failure of American civil-military relations to generate strategy can be attributed to the confluence of three factors. The first of these is the continued dominance within the American system of what Eliot Cohen has called the “normal” theory of civil-military relations, the belief that there is a clear line of demarcation between civilians who determine the goals of the war and the uniformed military who then conduct the actual fighting. Until President George W. Bush abandoned it when he overruled his commanders and embraced the “surge” in Iraq, the normal theory has been the default position of most presidents since the Vietnam War. Its longevity is based on the idea that the failure of Lyndon Johnson and Robert McNamara to defer to an autonomous military realm was the cause of American defeat in Vietnam.

### CIR

#### Won’t pass – Amnesty disagreement

Capital Press 1/18/13 (“Details, politics bedevil immigration reform” <http://www.capitalpress.com/article/20140118/ARTICLE/140119863>)

More and more members of the GOP are warming up to immigration reform, though they are leery of a large, comprehensive bill. Many favor, at least in broad terms, bits and pieces of the Senate’s bill. For the majority, however, providing anything more than legal residency for carefully vetted illegal immigrants is a non-starter. House Speaker John Boehner said last week that House Republicans will release a set of working principles for their measures later this month. The Los Angeles Times reported last week that Boehner favors a series of narrower bills that would fast-track legalization for undocumented farm laborers, offer residency for those brought into the country illegally as children and increase the number of visas available for immigrants with technical skills. Absent from these measures is a wholesale pathway to citizenship for the majority of the 12 million, or “amnesty” that is anathema to the conservative wing. These limited bills suit our purposes as well as the Senate’s comprehensive package. It seems unlikely, however, that they go far enough for Democrats who are actively courting the Hispanic vote. We’ve been here before. Even with so many people talking about reform, we have our doubts much will happen in the run up to this fall’s midterm election.

#### Link n/u – Obama’s handling of NSA sparks national security debates and makes him look like he’s ceding executive power

Martinez 1/15 (Pablo, AP, “Obama expected to turn to Congress to help decide fate of NSA phone data collection”, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-expected-to-turn-to-congress-to-help-decide-fate-of-nsa-phone-data-collection/2014/01/15/cddc83fa-7e0a-11e3-95c6-0a7aa80874bc\_story.html)

President Obama on Friday is expected to announce some new limits on the National Security Agency program that collects billions of Americans’ phone records, but he will call on Congress to help determine the program’s future, according to current and former officials familiar with the administration’s plans. Obama has concluded that the program has value as a counterterrorism tool, the officials said, but is also confronting difficult political realities. The program’s sweeping nature has prompted serious privacy concerns, and a divided Congress is unlikely to renew it when the law underpinning the program expires next year. “Congress has a responsibility to establish limits on government surveillance, so it’s entirely appropriate that Congress weigh in on the phone records program,’’ said Jeremy Bash, a former CIA and Pentagon chief of staff who said he was not briefed on Obama’s remarks. Officials have said Obama’s speech is part of an effort to restore confidence at home and abroad in the government’s surveillance policies. While the NSA program has perhaps raised the most significant concerns about privacy, a series of disclosures over the past eight months has generated controversy over U.S. intelligence activities. White House officials said Obama’s speech is still being crafted and declined to comment. He will deliver the address at the Justice Department in his first appearance there — a symbolic choice to signal the administration’s commitment to the rule of law even in the secret world of surveillance. One former official familiar with the internal deliberations said presidential aides considered sending Obama to Maryland’s Fort Meade, where the NSA is headquartered, for what would have been his first visit to the spy agency. But advisers decided against it. Two people familiar with the deliberations said the president is likely to emphasize that the NSA’s bulk collection of phone data — which includes numbers dialed but not call content — is not something that the government should rely on except in limited circumstances related to the agency’s mission. The program was begun after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and was placed under court supervision in 2006. Analysts are supposed to access the data only for the purpose of seeking leads in counterterrorism investigations. The White House has opted not to shift the job of holding the phone records for the NSA to phone companies, which a presidential advisory group recommended in a report last month. The idea provoked opposition from company executives, who met with White House officials and said it was unworkable, given that the companies hold data in different formats and for different lengths of time. “My guess is the more they looked at this the more complicated it got and they realized this isn’t the silver bullet,” said one company executive who was not authorized to speak on the record. Current and former officials had mixed views on the likely effect of any new limits on the program. “There’s going to be substantive changes,” said one U.S. official briefed on the deliberations who was not authorized to speak on the record. Other officials have said that the constraints would not be that significant. “It’s hard for the administration to totally disavow these intelligence collection programs, because it has always been for these programs prior to them being exposed in the press,” said Bash, who is managing director at Beacon Global Strategies, a consulting firm. “The Justice Department claimed strongly to the Senate Intelligence Committee that this program was lawful, effective and important.” The House probably will have the votes to block the program’s renewal next year — absent a major attack or other event that changes the political climate. That has colored the White House’s thinking about how to proceed, officials said. The decision to turn to Congress for guidance, first reported in the New York Times, has already drawn fire from disparate audiences, underscoring the challenge Obama faces in reconciling competing interests in his speech. Some former senior intelligence officials are drawing parallels to Obama’s decision in the fall to ask Congress to approve a military strike on Syria for its use of chemical weapons, even after he had said such use would be a “red line.” If the president turns to Congress to decide the fate of the NSA program, said one former senior official, “he’ll get criticized, historically, for ceding executive power.” This former official and others interviewed for this article spoke on the condition of anonymity to be candid in their assessments. Anthony D. Romero, the executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union, said: “President Obama’s speech will determine not only the direction of national security policy but his fundamental civil liberties legacy. If the president doesn’t put an end to the government’s bulk data collection, he will retain one of George W. Bush’s most controversial surveillance programs. The idea that you would pass the buck to Congress to fix a problem of this importance begs credibility.” Those in Congress who want to institute new limits on the program say they feel the last eight months or so have created an unprecedented opportunity, as Sen. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) said in a recent interview, “to produce reforms that show that security and liberty are not mutually exclusive.” In his speech, Obama also is expected to support greater privacy protections for non-U.S. citizens, a move geared toward restoring trust among Europeans, in particular, after news reports last year about the NSA’s collection of data from U.S. carriers overseas and about NSA eavesdropping on foreign leaders. That idea has stirred criticism in national-security circles. “The entire mission of our intelligence agencies is to collect foreign intelligence without regard to the civil liberties of the targets against whom we’re collecting,” said a second former senior intelligence official. “It’s a dangerous road to go down to start worrying about the civil liberties and constitutional rights of people like the president of Pakistan or the senior military commander in Libya.” Obama’s challenge is to satisfy several vastly different stakeholders at once: European audiences, tech companies with global markets that are feeling pressured because of their compliance with the NSA, a Democratic base that includes privacy and civil liberties groups, and the intelligence community and its supporters in Congress. “He’s got to be the educator in chief on this and start with why intelligence collection programs are important,” said Ben Chang, a former National Security Council official in the George W. Bush and Obama administrations. “That is a start to restoring confidence. From there, you can then move forward on reforms in a partnership with groups, inside and outside of government, that sometimes have competing interests.” A major portion of Obama’s speech is expected to address the privacy of foreigners and businesses overseas, which are worried about how well their data are protected by U.S. companies that cooperate with the government. “Addressing a lot of those concerns is going to be key to the speech,” one official said. In the past few weeks, Obama and senior White House advisers have met with lawmakers, tech and phone company executives, and privacy advocates to hear their views. Obama has spoken by phone with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, whose cellphone calls had been tapped, a revelation that triggered an outcry in Berlin. At the same time, intelligence and defense officials have pushed back hard against sweeping changes, arguing that the bulk collection of telephone data is necessary to keep the country safe from terrorism, even though the White House advisory group concluded in its report that the data had not been “essential” to preventing terrorist attacks.

#### And the courts are fighting him on it

RT 1/15 (Russia Today, “US judiciary rejects NSA reform proposals from Obama’s review group”, http://rt.com/usa/us-judges-nsa-reform-649/comments/page-1/)

US federal judges have strongly criticized proposals to reform the NSA from the Obama-appointed Review Group, saying some of them would “hamper the work” of federal courts. It comes three days before Obama will unveil NSA changes to be endorsed. Judge John Bates, director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, which represents the country’s federal judges, sent the objections in a letter to Sen. Dianne Feinstein, chairwoman of the Senate Intelligence Committee. Bates is well placed to offer an expert opinion, as he is also a former head of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance (FISA) Court. The Review Group’s proposals are not focused on “policy choices” but on “operational impact,” Bates wrote, adding comments and warnings about what will happen if the reforms proposed by the White House NSA review group and NSA critics in Congress are passed. Bates said that his comments were based on his consultations with the current presiding judges of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the Court of Review, as well as with some former judges. Obama’s panel of experts, the Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technology, presented its 46 recommendations regarding NSA activities in December following the wide-ranging revelations about NSA surveillance by whistleblower Edward Snowden. It also recommended several changes to the FISA court system, which authorized NSA broad eavesdropping operations, including massive collection of Americans’ and foreigners’ telephone metadata. Enacting those reforms, Bates said, would profoundly increase the workloads of federal courts. Some of the proposals may disrupt the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court's ability to fulfill its "responsibilities under (the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, under which the secret court operates) and the Constitution to ensure that the privacy interests of United States citizens and others are adequately protected." Bates strongly warned against a proposal to create a "Public Interest Advocate" to represent privacy and civil liberty concerns before the court, which usually operates behind closed doors.

#### Food won’t cause instability

**WFP 2012**

(World Food Program, “High Food Prices: Why This Is Different From 2008”, 9-4, <http://www.wfp.org/stories/high-food-prices-why-different-2008>, ldg)

1. Global stocks of rice and wheat are higher than they were in 2008. The price and supplies of rice, a staple food for many millions of people, are relatively stable in Asia. 2. In 2008, several major food-producing countries imposed export bans, which caused shortages on world markets. Meanwhile, in food-deficit countries, there was panic-buying, with governments paying very high prices, especially for rice. So far this time this has not happened. 3. In contrast to 2008, global economic growth is presently weak, so demand is not pushing prices further upwards. 4. Many countries are better prepared to face the current situation. Some have worked on establishing and improving social safety nets such as school meals, and public works programmes. 5. Better tools exist at the international level to coordinate the policy response. For example, in 2011 the G20 set up the Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS), hosted at FAO, which tracks food commodity markets and aims to improve transparency and act as an early warning system.

### Terror DA

#### Blowback splits US intel and military cohesion

Hudson 11 (Leila Hudson is associate professor of anthropology and history in the School of Middle Eastern & North African Studies at the University of Arizona and director of the Southwest Initiative for the Study of Middle East Conflicts, “Drone Warfare: Blowback From the New American Way of War,” Middle East Policy, <http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/drone-warfare-blowback-new-american-way-war>)

Between 2004 and 2009, our research and databases compiled by others document a dramatic spike in deaths by suicide bombings in Afghanistan and Pakistan.18 While it is impossible to prove direct causality from data analysis alone, it is probable that drone strikes provide motivation for retaliation, and that there is a substantive relationship between the increasing number of drone strikes and the increasing number of retaliation attacks.For every high-profile, purposeful attack like the Khost bombing, many more low-profile attacks take place. These types of attacks can be explained by what military strategist David Kilcullen calls the accidental-guerrilla phenomenon, a local rejection of external forces.19 By using drone warfare as the only policy tool in the FATA without any local political engagement, the United States is almost certainly creating accidental guerrillas. These new combatants, unable to retaliate against the United States within FATA, will likely cross the border into Afghanistan, where U.S. troops and NATO and Afghan security forces are concentrated and present easily identifiable targets. Or they may join the ranks of groups like the Pakistani Taliban, whose attacks within Pakistan destabilize the U.S.-Pakistani alliance. The last days of June 2011 illustrated the worst extremes of this phenomenon: a married couple carrying out a suicide attack in Pakistan, and an eight-year-old duped (not recruited) into an Afghan suicide attack.20It should be emphasized that only a small minority of those affected by drone attacks become the kinds of radicals envisioned by Kilcullen. However, with the average frequency of a drone strike every three days in 2010, this would be enough to provide a steady stream of new recruits and destabilize the region through direct violence. The less direct effect of steady drone attacks and militant counterattacks is a smoldering dissatisfaction with dead-end policy. On the U.S. military, intelligence and policy side, this results in division in the ranks, preventing a unified effort.21 In Afghanistan and Pakistan, this cycle results in anti-government agitation and anti-American sentiment, which may force sudden policy adjustments by political and military actors.

#### Turn – deference to the executive encourages whisteblowers, the media, and other countries to backlash – causes volatile restrictions of policy and worse intel leaks

Marguilies ‘10 Peter, Professor of Law, Roger Williams University, “Judging Myopia in Hindsight: Bivens Actions, National Security Decisions, and the Rule of Law” IOWA LAW REVIEW Vol. 96:195

The categorical-deference approach also fails to acknowledge that those stymied by the lack of formal redress can substitute for litigation other paths that pose greater danger. For example, consider the perspective of the official who leaks a document, not to advance a personal agenda, but to focus public attention on government policy.170 Whistleblowers of this kind, like Daniel Ellsberg, who leaked the Pentagon Papers to the New York Times, 171 are advancing a constitutional vision of their own in which senior officials have strayed from the limits of the original understanding.172 If the courts and Congress do not work to restore the balance, the whistleblower engages in self-help. Because leakers are risk-seekers who believe the status quo is unacceptable, they lack courts’ interest in safeguarding sensitive information. Policy shaped by blowback from leaks is far more volatile than policy reacting to judicial precedent.173 Similarly, the media has a constitutional role to play that includes investigative reporting. The media will step up its efforts if other institutions like courts take a more deferential stance.174 When government hides information, the media’s sense of its own role leads to greater distrust of government and a willingness to both uncover and publish more information. On some occasions, the First Amendment will oblige us to tolerate journalists’ disclosure of operational details of covert programs.175 Journalists will understandably view government’s claims that information is sensitive with greater skepticism when government has methodically locked down information in other settings. Similarly, shutting off damage suits regarding terrorism issues leaves other kinds of litigation, including litigation the government has initiated. Journalists and activists will seek to scrutinize and mobilize around these cases, even if the avenue of civil suits is closed. Indeed, activism may be distorted in these other venues when they are the only game in town. For example, journalists may be more inclined to credit even outlandish claims made by some lawyers on behalf of detainees when the government has a track record of concealing information.176 While some might argue that courts should not speculate about future conduct of third parties, a court that makes empirical predictions about the effect of liability should not selectively ignore major unintended consequences of its holding. There are parallel developments in international law. Some countries have prosecuted criminal cases against American agents who allegedly were complicit in extraordinary renditions. In Italy, a number of American government employees and personnel were convicted in absentia because of legal action generated by popular pressure.177 U.S. public-interest organizations, like the Center for Constitutional Rights, have encouraged these assertions of universal jurisdiction. These prosecutions occurred because of officials’ sense that they were above the law. Judicial remedies available in the United States can check these officials, thereby reducing the incidence and impact of universal-jurisdiction proceedings in the future.

#### The plan doesn’t reduce drone use – it just strengthens targeting capability

Adelsberg 12 (Samuel S., \* J.D. Candidate 2013, Yale Law School, “Bouncing the Executive's Blank Check: Judicial Review and the Targeting of Citizens” Harvard Law & Policy Review 6 Harv. L. & Pol'y Rev. 437, Lexis)

[\*445] Rather, as recognized by the Founders in the Fourth Amendment, balancing the needs of security against the imperatives of liberty is a traditional role for judges to play. Two scholars of national security law recently highlighted the value of judicial inclusion in targeting decisions: "Judicial control of targeted killing could increase the accuracy of target selection, reducing the danger of mistaken or illegal destruction of lives, limbs, and property. Independent judges who double-check targeting decisions could catch errors and cause executive officials to avoid making them in the first place." n47 Judges are both knowledgeable in the law and accustomed to dealing with sensitive security considerations. These qualifications make them ideal candidates to ensure that the executive exercises constitutional restraint when targeting citizens. Reforming the decision-making process for executing American citizens to allow for judicial oversight would restore the separation of powers framework envisioned by the Founders and increase democratic legitimacy by placing these determinations on steadier constitutional ground. For those fearful of judicial encroachment on executive war-making powers, there is a strong argument that this will actually strengthen the President and empower him to take decisive action without worrying about the judicial consequences. As Justice Kennedy put it, "the exercise of [executive] powers is vindicated, not eroded, when confirmed by the Judicial Branch." n48 Now, we will turn to what this judicial involvement would look like.

### State Secrets

#### No link – ex post review won’t impact the state secrets privilege – qualified immunity solves

Vladeck, editor- Journal of National Security Law & Policy, 12 (Steve Vladeck, professor of law and the associate dean for scholarship at American University Washington College of Law, senior editor of the Journal of National Security Law & Policy, “Bivens and/as Immunity: Richard Klingler Responds on Al-Aulaqi–and I Reply,” July 25, <http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/07/bivens-andas-immunity-richard-klingler-responds-on-al-aulaqi-and-i-reply/>)

To be clear, that doesn’t mean Aulaqi should win; it just means I don’t think these concerns go to the existence vel non of a cause of action under Bivens–the first of a veritable smorgasbord of procedural issues raised by the suit. Richard thinks that this understanding makes me naive. But a closer reading of both my original post and the forthcoming article by Carlos Vazquez and me to which it linked should make abundantly clear that I take these concerns very seriously–I just think they come into play in other places. Qualified immunity, for example, allows government officers to move to terminate suits like Aulaqi long before any discovery takes place, and the denial thereof is immediately appealable (case in point: Padilla v. Yoo). So in a case in which the defendant’s conduct did not violate “clearly established” law, the concerns Richard articulated will quickly and readily be disposed of at the motion-to-dismiss stage even with recognition of a Bivens cause of action, with minimal intrusion into sensitive military affairs. The same can be said for the amorphous separation-of-powers concerns Richard identified (which are usually handled through either qualified immunity or, in appropriate cases, the political question doctrine), and the state secrets privilege (and “potentially adverse security consequences”). Indeed, what’s wholly missing from Richard’s critique (and all of these lower-court opinions) is any explanation for why these other doctrines don’t adequately account for the government’s (and government officer’s) interests on a case-specific basis. If such arguments are out there, I’m all ears… Instead, what Richard is ultimately arguing in his response is that Bivens should effectively be understood as an absolute immunity doctrine in suits implicating military affairs. It’s not just that this isn’t what Stanley held (see above); it’s that this fundamentally misunderstands not just the Court’s original decision in Bivens itself, but the analytical approach it has taken even in the subsequent cases narrowing Justice Brennan’s original reasoning. 3. How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love [Damages Suits] Finally, although Richard limits his view of the limited judicial role that courts should play in military affairs to damages suits, he never explains why damages are more intrusive than situations in which courts have shown more of a willingness to intervene–e.g., detainee habeas cases. As Andrew Kent pointed out over at Slate, there’s more than a little tension in a body of law that embraces suits that interfere with ongoing governmental operations while disfavoring those that pursue liability after the allegedly unlawful conduct has ceased. And it wasn’t Justice Brennan, but rather Justice Harlan (the younger), who explained in Bivens that “the presumed availability of federal equitable relief against threatened invasions of constitutional interests appears entirely to negate the contention that the status of an interest as constitutionally protected divests federal courts of the power to grant damages absent express congressional authorization.” To be sure, Andrew and I come out differently on how that tension should be resolved, but it’s hard to disagree with his descriptive thesis. And if it’s the Constitution that requires a cause of action in those contexts (see, e.g., Boumediene), is the argument utterly implausible that the Constitution might also counsel in favor of relief in a case where a U.S. citizen’s constitutional rights are violated, no defenses are available, and no other remedies will make him (or his decedents) whole? Indeed, wouldn’t it make it easier to argue against such aggressive judicial intervention if the more moderate, retrospective review provided by damages suits were available ex post? Richard is absolutely right that the Supreme Court has shown increasing hostility toward Bivens suits, and that this hostility has included a departure from some of the analytical underpinnings of Justice Brennan’s opinion for the Court. But that doesn’t change the simple and ineluctable fact that Bivens is a cause of action the existence of which cannot be left to case-specific factual circumstances. The answer may be that Richard would disclaim Bivens remedies even for egregious governmental misconduct against innocent bystanders for which there is no viable defense so long as the subject-matter is “national security.” To be clear, those may not be the facts of Aulaqi. But on Richard’s view, the facts just don’t matter–and never will.

#### No unique link – the court has continuously broken state secrets

Adelsberg 12 (Samuel, JD Yale Law, “Bouncing the Executive's Blank Check: Judicial Review and the Targeting of Citizens,” Summer, 6 Harv. L. & Pol'y Rev. 437, lexis)

Far from giving the executive an unfettered national security mandate, the Supreme Court has continuously entered the fray and opined on the level of process due to enemy combatants by using a distinctly functional analysis. The cases of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Boumediene v. Bush epitomize this reasoned approach to assessing due process. In Hamdi, the Court was faced with a habeas corpus petition filed on behalf of a U.S. citizen detained while allegedly taking up arms with the Taliban in Afghanistan. 17 Justice O'Connor, writing for the plurality, explicitly rejected the notion that Hamdi's citizenship should preclude his detainment as an enemy combatant during wartime. 18 The opinion, however, laid the foundation for the use of a balancing test to determine the process due to citizens in national security decisions. 19 Specifically, the Court used a functional [\*441] due process balancing approach to determine which procedures were necessary in the case of the detainment of an American citizen. 20 Using this framework, Justice O'Connor held that due process required Hamdi to have a meaningful opportunity to challenge his enemy combatant status. 21 She forcefully asserted that Hamdi was entitled to "notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker." 22 But O'Connor also demonstrated significant flexibility by allowing a rebuttable presumption in favor of the government's evidence and allowing the government to admit hearsay in certain circumstances. 23 Similarly, in the landmark case of Boumediene v. Bush, the Court adopted a pragmatic and functional approach to safeguarding individual liberty while simultaneously recognizing legitimate security concerns. 24 In his opinion for the Court, Justice Kennedy rejected any formalistic understanding of the extraterritorial reach of the Constitution. 25 Instead, he applied a flexible balancing test approach to determine whether non-citizen detainees being held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, were entitled to habeas corpus relief. 26 According to Justice Kennedy, this pragmatic approach requires a broad, fact-intensive inquiry into the "practical difficulties" of enforcing a constitutional right outside the United States. 27 Justice Kennedy listed three criteria that he deemed most relevant in determining the reach of the Suspension Clause to Guantanamo detainees: (1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process through which that status determination was made; (2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner's entitlement to the writ. 28 Kennedy called for sensible rules that would allow the government to function within the rule of law while also acknowledging the national security concerns inherent in any habeas analysis. In establishing what Professor Gerald Neuman labeled the right to "global due process," 29 Justice Kennedy fashioned a contextual balancing test for wartime process determinations. The Hamdi and Boumediene opinions affirm the rejection of bright line formalism in favor of a functional constitutional approach to wartime extraterritorial due process analysis. While these cases dealt with the detention of a citizen, the argument for flexibility is even stronger in the context of the [\*442] targeted killing of a citizen. For in the latter situation, the damage is fatal, and thus irreversible. 30

#### Specifically broken for the targeted killing operation – ACLU v CIA

Savage, NYT 13 [Charlie, 3-15-13, New York Times, “Court Orders the C.I.A. to Disclose Drone Data,” Charlie Savage, March 15, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/16/us/court-says-cia-must-yield-some-data-on-drones.html?_r=0>, accessed 10-27-13, AFB]

WASHINGTON — A federal appeals court held Friday that the Central Intelligence Agency must disclose, at least to a judge, a description of its records on drone strikes in response to a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit filed by the American Civil Liberties Union. The 19-page opinion by Judge Merrick B. Garland rejected an effort by the Obama administration to keep secret any aspect of the C.I.A.’s interest in the use of drone strikes to kill terrorism suspects abroad. It does not necessarily mean the contents of any of those records will ever be made public, and it stopped short of ordering the government to acknowledge publicly that the C.I.A. actually uses drones to carry out “targeted killings” against specific terrorism suspects or groups of unknown people who appear to be militants in places like tribal Pakistan. The Obama administration continues to treat that fact as a classified secret, though it has been widely reported. But the ruling was a chink in that stone wall. Judge Garland, citing the C.I.A. role in analyzing intelligence, as well as public remarks by a former director and other top officials about what they asserted was the precision and minimal civilian casualties caused by drone strikes, said it was a step too far to ask the judicial branch to give its “imprimatur to a fiction of deniability that no reasonable person would regard as plausible.” He wrote that “as it is now clear that the agency does have an interest in drone strikes, it beggars belief that it does not also have documents relating to the subject.” The C.I.A., in urging a District Court judge to dismiss the lawsuit, had argued that it should not be required to produce even an index of the relevant documents in its possession — a normal step in such litigation — because it would harm national security even to confirm or deny whether it had an “interest” in such operations. The District Court judge, Rosemary Collyer, accepted that argument and rejected the A.C.L.U.’s case, and the ruling on Friday sends the case back to her. It remains to be seen how detailed and public she will require the agency to be now that it must at least describe its records. Judge Garland, the chief judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, is a former Justice Department official and an appointee of President Bill Clinton who is considered a potential nominee to the Supreme Court should a vacancy arise in President Obama’s second term. His opinion was joined by Judge David S. Tatel, another Clinton appointee, and Judge Thomas Griffith, an appointee of President George W. Bush. Judge Collyer, of the District Court, is also a Bush appointee. Dean Boyd, a Justice Department spokesman, would say only, “We’re reviewing the decision.” Jameel Jaffer, a lawyer for the A.C.L.U. who argued the case before the appeals court in September, called the ruling “an important victory” that “requires the government to retire the absurd claim that the C.I.A.’s interest in the targeted killing program is a secret.” Pressure has been mounting on the Obama administration to disclose more information to Congress and to the public about its use of drones generally, and its killing of three Americans in Yemen in the fall of 2011, including the radical Muslim cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, in particular. In recent weeks, the administration has provided several legal memorandums about the killing of American citizens to the Senate Intelligence Committee as part of its effort to get John O. Brennan confirmed as the director of the C.I.A. Last week, Senator Rand Paul, Republican of Kentucky, led a nearly 13-hour filibuster before the Brennan vote in which he denounced the administration’s drone policies and the secrecy surrounding its understanding of the scope and limits of its power to kill. The case stems from a 2010 request under the Freedom of Information Act by the A.C.L.U. for records held by the C.I.A. related to the use of drones to carry out targeted killings. The A.C.L.U. is also a litigant in a separate Freedom of Information Act case in New York that is seeking documents related to the killing of American citizens, including Mr. Awlaki, who was killed in a C.I.A. drone strike in Yemen in 2011. The New York Times is also part of that case, and is seeking legal memorandums related to the killing of both citizens and to targeted killings generally.

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#### Authority includes ability to act without judicial review

John C. Eastman 6, Prof of Law at Chapman University, PhD in Government from the Claremont Graduate University, served as the Director of Congressional & Public Affairs at the United States Commission on Civil Rights during the Reagan administration, “Be Very Wary of Restricting President's Power,” Feb 21 2006, http://www.claremont.org/publications/pubid.467/pub\_detail.asp]

Prof. Epstein challenges the president's claim of inherent power by noting that the word "power" does not appear in the Commander in Chief clause, but the word "command," fairly implied in the noun "Commander," is a more-than-adequate substitute for "power." Was it really necessary for the drafters of the Constitution to say that the president shall have the power to command? Moreover, Prof. Epstein ignores completely the first clause of Article II -- the Vesting clause, which provides quite clearly that "The executive Power shall be vested in a President." The relevant inquiry is whether those who ratified the Constitution understood these powers to include interception of enemy communications in time of war without the permission of a judge, and on this there is really no doubt; they clearly did, which means that Congress cannot restrict the president's authority by mere statute.¶ Prof. Epstein's own description of the Commander in Chief clause recognizes this. One of the "critical functions" performed by the clause, he notes, is that "Congress cannot circumvent the president's position as commander in chief by assigning any of his responsibilities to anyone else." Yet FISA does precisely that, assigning to the FISA court a core command authority, namely, the ability to authorize interception of enemy communications. This authority has been exercised by every wartime president since George Washington.