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### Contention One-Endless War

#### The United States Government justifies its targeted killing operations with the theory of Just War, the idea that there can be moral justifications for conflict and moral ways of waging war. As the United States Government rationalizes its current wars, it has conversely opened a space for challenging the entire foundation of State killing. Interrogating the justifications for targeted killing operations exposes the inherent contradictions in just war theory.

Provost-Smith 13 (Patrick, former Assistant Professor of the History of Christianity at Harvard Divinity School, Ph.D. in history from Johns Hopkins; “A Drone’s Eye View: Global Anti-Terrorism and the Existential Crisis of Just War Theory,” in Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory vol. 12 no. 3, Spring 2013)

As drones become the new centerpiece of counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency warfare, questions regarding their usage have escalated in recent months, particularly in terms of military strategy, political oversight, international relations, and the host of by moral considerations over the inherent scope and scale of the lethal violence that comes with any war. The current administration has purported to take such concerns with seriousness proportionate to what is at stake in a systematic program of targeted killing, now increasingly undertaken through these new technologies.4 It remains unclear exactly how that moral seriousness shapes or delimits the range of possibilities and the kinds of decisions that are made, since authorizing the killing of a particular person suspected of terrorism is not morally significant because of the gravitas of the authorization or who is unable to sleep at night, but because of the reasons for it and their moral intelligibility. The most well-known exponent of that moral seriousness is John Brennan, former national security advisor to the Obama administration, who was entrusted for years by the President with oversight over the UAV program in the Yemen and Africa.5 These programs in their full scope have always been developed and deployed between the diverse armed services and what has become the frankly paramilitary nature of the Central Intelligence Agency. Oversight in Pakistan belonged to the CIA, while deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq fell to the Pentagon. Obama exercised immediate oversight only in the domains of the Yemen and the Sahel - and thus the difficulties of Obama’s assertions that his own moral seriousness in orchestrating the drone program was in some meaningful way illustrative of the level of moral gravitas that accompanied the development and deployment of the new UAVs in any context. Obama’s recent appointment of Brennan to the directorate of the CIA may have been the public occasion for venting the considerable controversies that do exist around the drone programs. But for Obama it provided the administration with the capacity to centralize the programs that did exist into a command structure that would actually control the paramilitary arm of the CIA, never otherwise subject to the Pentagon or the armed services, and to tie those forces together in a way that did at least provide for the potential level of moral scrutiny in the UAV programs that the President envisaged. The appointment was a candid move to place someone in a position of unprecedented power and influence over an incredibly sophisticated and powerful system of covert operations and targeted killings, who was also personally and visibly committed to a similar form of moral scrutiny over targeted killings, and who purportedly shared “the mind of the President” on such matters.6 Drone Warfare and Just War Theory Brennan credits his ethical formation to his Catholicism and his education by the Jesuits at Georgetown University - and that brings into focus a particular kind of moral approach broadly recognizable to many as just war theory. 7 The parameters and core commitments of just war theory have been around long enough and deployed consistently enough, to make explication unnecessary. Just war theory in different guises has been advocated by Catholics and Protestants alike for centuries, and forays into similar or comparable forms of thought in Jewish and Islamic contexts have also emerged. Volumes have streamed forth from academics, policy specialists, and pundits over the last few decades concerning just and unjust wars and the implications of those deliberations for American military deployments. Previous foreign policy “realists”, typified by Henry Kissinger and the architects of the Vietnam War and the Cold War, were less enthralled by this kind of moral scrutiny. Just war theorists after World War II, and especially after Vietnam, have consistently portrayed McNamara, Kissinger, and assorted allies as champions of a potentially vicious Realpolitik in which reasons of state trumped moral deliberation and constraint. The old adage held that all is fair in love and war. 8 Realism in foreign policy has been undoubtedly oversimplified by advocates of just war theory. But just war theory itself has been complicated by the use of modern weapons purportedly to save lives in intractable conflicts. The prevalence of obliteration bombing in Germany and Japan by the Allies during the Second World War, not to mention the decision to drop the newly-developed atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, brought to light the use of just war theory to challenge the propriety of certain kinds of actions on moral grounds in an otherwise justified war.9 But the potential for those new weapons was never recognized by presidents or military planners as an exceptional means of last resort, as the Truman administration frankly understood when it loaded B-52s with atomic bombs to face the standoff produced by the Soviet blockade of Berlin in June of 1948. The development of nuclear weapons by virtually all sides of the Cold War ended that monopoly over prospectively less costly ways to wage wars, and provided the most serious moral crisis for just war theorists since such discourse was invented. The failure of conventional weaponry in Vietnam also had a significant impact upon the moral framework of just war theory. The devastation wrought during that war provoked more moral objection and outrage than any American military campaign since the Philippines, and the heightened influence of just war theorists owes something to this fact.10 Brennan’s fealty to Catholic approaches to just war theory troubles some critics, and religious metaphors have been circulated at least since a Washington Post exposé on the drone program described him as almost a “priest” given his moral gravitas and the seriousness with which he takes the just war tradition.11 Just war theory became a staple of Roman Catholic social thought at least with the First Vatican Council, which canonized Thomas Aquinas as the exemplary theologian for the Church. Early fin de siècle neoThomism underwrote what became in 1944 John Ford’s excoriation of obliteration bombing as a morally defensible tactic for fighting an otherwise just war - and that along with the advocacy of John Courtney Murray served more than any other single instance to cement the perception among just war advocates that the whole program was about moral restraint in a time of conflict. Consequent, as well as controversial, statements issued decades later by Catholic bishops in the United States argued that the use nuclear weapons was never morally permissible under any circumstances because of the very weapons used, and the apparent impossibility of using them discriminately.12 Something deeply disturbing to just war advocates, and indicative of the anti-nuclear positions taken, continued to circulate in the threat postures of “mutually assured destruction” contained in the theory of nuclear deterrence.13 The slip of the nuclear trigger was dangerously close and only circumstantially avoided during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. Yet the annual national security reviews published by the United States continue to affirm the right to use nuclear weapons both as deterrence and defense - a point never lost upon the powers who have sought to develop a nuclear capacity as counter-deterrence to the United States or other nuclear powers. And so advocates of just war theory that rose to positions of prominence after Vietnam have nevertheless had to live with the persistent declaration of nuclear deterrence articulated by every presidential administration since the Soviet Union acquired its own weapons of mass destruction. Whatever just war advocacy Brennan brings to the moral perspective regarding drones finds it place in that complex and unsettled landscape of the last century, when entire cities have been leveled by astoundingly brutal military tactics, and the threat of using these tactics continues. The challenge of nuclear weapons exhibited the deep tensions and disagreements that often mark just war theory in any form. To speak of just war theory now as precariously situated in a state of existential crisis is to peel away the layers of intelligibility that come with the oversimplified and reductive understandings most often advocated in contemporary contexts, something Brennan’s own language often mirrors. Existential crises do imply that a particular approach to just war thinking has imploded in very real historical circumstances, and that the familiar ways of understanding the stakes of just war theory have been shaken. Most advocates would shun the description of just war theory as experiencing any form of crisis, especially considering its relative success in shaping public perception and military strategic doctrine. Yet it remains the case, notwithstanding the arguments of some contemporary advocates, that whatever just war theory is today remains quite unlike what it has been before. Weapons technologies have advanced, and the shape of the conceptual ground upon which the morality of wars and the means of waging them has been theorized has shifted substantially since the first Romans first began to speak of the iustum bellum nearly a millennium before St. Augustine’s own influential writings on the topic.14

#### Highlighting the violence of ongoing drone warfare challenges the status quo narrative of humanitarianism- there is no such thing as just war. The idea that modern warfare has become less violent has been used to silence opposition and legitimize war.

Terrell 13 (Brian Terrell is a co-coordinator of Voices for Creative Nonviolence, Drones and Gadflies, Sept 13, http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/09/13/drones-and-gadflies/)

My own anti-drone activism began with protests at Creech Air Force Base in the Nevada desert in April, 2009. Even some otherwise well informed people were skeptical, back then, that such things were even possible, much less happening daily. Many who were aware accepted the simple and happy narrative of drone warfare as a precise new high-tech system in which soldiers from a safe distance of thousands of miles can pin point those who mean us imminent harm with little or no collateral damage. Even some among our friends in the peace movement questioned the wisdom of focusing attention on drones. Must we protest every new advance in weaponry? Can’t we allow for methods that are at least improvements on indiscriminate carnage? Is not a precisely aimed and delivered drone attack preferable to carpet bombing? Is it not preferable to invasion? Does it make a difference to the victims, in any case, whether there is a pilot in the plane that bombs them or not? The fact that four years later on the day before my release from prison, the president of the United States was defending the use of drones before the country and the world is truly remarkable. This is not a discussion that he or anyone else in the government, politics or the military encouraged or one that the media was anxious to take on. The fact that the issue is up for discussion at all is due to considerable efforts of the few here in the US and the UK in solidarity with many in the streets in Pakistan, Yemen and Afghanistan protesting this foul weaponry. Communities of protest and resistance in Nevada, New York, California, Missouri, Wisconsin, England and Iowa thrust the issue into local forums, courts and media through creative actions and legal stratagems, effectively demanding that grievance over drone killing be heard. The president’s own speech was itself only rescued from being the cleverly constructed but empty litany of alibi, half-truth and obfuscation that it was intended to be by the interruption by our friend, Medea Benjamin. In his 1963 “Letter from a Birmingham Jail,” Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., noted that often a society like ours “bogged down in the tragic attempt to live in monologue rather than dialogue,” requires “nonviolent gadflies” in order to “create a tension in the mind so that individuals could rise from the bondage of myths and half-truths to the unfettered realm of creative analysis and objective appraisal.” As with the issue of segregation 50 years ago, so today the parameters of discussion allowed by politeness and good manners or sanctioned by the police and courts simply cannot abide the objective appraisal of drone warfare that the times require. The discussion such as it is, is made possible only by some who dare speak out of turn, as Medea, or who use their bodies to intrude on the orderly commission of criminalities in our midst. Before the president’s lecture drone warfare’s approval rating was at the top of the polls but a month later drone pilot Col. Bryan Davis of the Ohio Air National Guard noted a turn of the tide. “We are not popular among the American public, every other base has been protested,” he lamented to a local paper. “It doesn’t make you feel warm inside.” The narrative of humanitarian war via drone had begun to unravel in the public eye in the months leading up to the president’s speech and has since fallen further into disrepute. Months before the president made the assertion in his May 23 speech that “by narrowly targeting our action against those who want to kill us and not the people they hide among, we are choosing the course of action least likely to result in the loss of innocent life,” his administration had already revised earlier claims that the drone programs in Yemen and Pakistan had yielded zero known noncombatant deaths to one death to finally admitting to a death toll in “single digits.” By almost any accounting the noncombatant tolls in those countries have been at least in the hundreds. Just weeks after the president spoke at the National Defense University, a journal published by that institution published a study that debunked his assurance that “conventional airpower and missiles are far less precise than drones, and likely to cause more civilian casualties and local outrage.” Drone strikes in Afghanistan, the study found, were “an order of magnitude more likely to result in civilian casualties per engagement.” Another assurance given in this speech, that “America cannot take strikes wherever we choose; our actions are bound by consultations with partners, and respect for state sovereignty,” was discredited on June 8 when the US ambassador to Pakistan was summoned by the prime minister of that country angry over a US drone attack that killed nine people. “It was conveyed to the US chargé ď affaires that the government of Pakistan strongly condemns the drone strikes, which are a violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,” said Pakistan’s ministry of foreign affairs. “The importance of bringing an immediate end to drone strikes was emphasized.” “We act against terrorists who pose a continuing and imminent threat to the American people.” Formerly the word “imminent” referred to something about to happen at any moment and using the generally accepted definition of the word one might construe in the president’s words a guarantee that drone strikes are used only to stop “terrorists” engaged in acts that would cause immediate harm to Americans. John Brennan, now director of the CIA, suggested in September 2011 that “a more flexible understanding of ‘imminence’ may be appropriate when dealing with terrorist groups.” This more flexible understanding of imminence justifies the assassination not only of those caught in the act, but also of targets who are suspected of having written something or said something to make someone think that they might have something to do with an attack on the US someday. A person who is caught on the drones video feed from 7,000 miles away as acting in a manner consistent with someone who might harm one day may now be eliminated as an imminent threat. Referring to the killing of Anwar Awlaki, an American citizen in Yemen, the president assured us that “for the record, I do not believe it would be constitutional for the government to target and kill any US citizen — with a drone, or with a shotgun — without due process.” The general usage of the words “due process” would cause the misapprehension that the right of a citizen to have trial by jury before being executed is being reaffirmed here. “This is simply not accurate,” says Attorney General Eric Holder. “‘Due process’ and ‘judicial process’ are not one and the same, particularly when it comes to national security. The Constitution guarantees due process, not judicial process.” The burden of “due process” can now be met when the president decides based on secret evidence that a citizen should die. Drone technology is changing our language beyond redefining terms like “imminence” and “due process.” We have progressed, too, beyond Orwellian euphemisms such as naming an intercontinental nuclear missile “Peacekeeper.” These new “hunter-killer platforms” bear names like “Predators” and “Reapers” and may soon be supplanted by “Avengers” and “Stalkers.” The ordinance they deliver is a missile named “Hellfire.” In Iowa where I live, the Air National Guard unit based in Des Moines has replaced its F-16 fighter planes with a Reaper drone control center. This transformation was marked by changing the unit’s name from the “132nd Fighter Wing” to the “132nd Attack Wing.” This change is more than symbolic- a “fight” by definition has two sides and the word implies some kind of parity. There is such a thing as a fair fight (of course the 132nd’s F-16s were used only on all but disarmed populations in places like Iraq and Panama) and a fight usually has some kind of resolution. An “attack” however, is just that. An attack is one-sided, something that a perpetrator inflicts on a victim. A fighter might sometimes be justified, an attacker, never. There is no “just attack” theory. The parsing out of innocent and guilty drone victims is in a sense a waste of time. All alike are victims. George Kennan, might have seen this coming in a policy paper he wrote for the State Department in 1948. In order to preserve the global disparity of wealth post World War II (“We have about 50% of the world’s wealth, but only 6.3% of its population”) he suggested that “we should cease to talk about vague and unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of the living standards, and democratization. The day is not far off when we are going to have to deal in straight power concepts. The less we are then hampered by idealistic slogans, the better.” While the speech at the National Defense University was an embarrassment of idealistic slogans, it also used chilling pragmatism to deal with straight power concepts. “For me,” the president said on May 23, “and those in my chain of command, those deaths will haunt us as long as we live.” Those words had a truer ring a few days later spoken on NBC news by Brandon Bryant, an Air Force drone operator who confessed to being haunted by 1,600 deaths he took part in. Bryant admitted that his actions made him feel like a “heartless sociopath,” and he described one of his first kills, sitting in a chair at Creech Air Force Base in Nevada when his team fired on three men walking down a road in Afghanistan. It was night in Afghanistan, and he remembers watching the thermal image of one victim on his computer screen: “I watch this guy bleed out and, I mean, the blood is hot.” Bryant watched the man die and his image disappear as his body attained the ambient temperature of the ground. “I can see every little pixel, if I just close my eyes.” The remoteness of the drone warrior is no protection from the moral damage of war, and these people are victims as well, and it is on their behalf as well that we protest. We cannot know the hearts of President Obama and those in his inner circle but it is not hard to wonder whether they are truly haunted by the deaths of those killed by drones at their commands. If they may not be haunted by their own consciences, perhaps the responsibility of haunting them falls to us.

#### Just war theory is in the business of legitimizing violence-It controls the conversation and our imagination-Technology and strategy have combined to create a cycle of infinite targets and endless war.

Provost-Smith 13 (Patrick, former Assistant Professor of the History of Christianity at Harvard Divinity School, Ph.D. in history from Johns Hopkins; “A Drone’s Eye View: Global Anti-Terrorism and the Existential Crisis of Just War Theory,” in Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory vol. 12 no. 3, Spring 2013)

Swirling in the circularity of the justificans bellum, increasingly aided by developments in artificial intelligence and information technology, whoever is curious as to what just war theory is all about looks in vain for what jus is meant to do when it qualifies war in the first place, or for how it functions in the grammar of the jus ad bellum and jus in bello at all. Just war proponents have held positions in every major military academy, dominated think tanks and policy circles, and written as pundits on whether this or that war has met the appropriate criteria upheld by the tradition for more than a couple of decades. As a result, the moral framework has yielded unanticipated success in the public sphere. Yet it is one thing to weigh the causes and means for waging wars in the framework of just war theory, and another to be in the business of justifying wars, strategies, tactics, and new technologies. One may entertain informed suspicions, but evaluation of the huge outpouring of just war argumentation appearing in the last three or four decades might help decide the question of whether the enterprise has been fundamentally about the justification of wars, or about whatever it means to constrain violence by subjection of such things to moral scrutiny - ironically, a task for which data mining technologies might prove immensely helpful. Something is amiss when a moral tradition that understands itself to have been formed by an appeal to moral restraint in the declaring and waging of wars now finds itself in becoming an ethics panel writ large for politicians, policy makers, military strategists, and makers of military hardware. In reality, it seems to be about experts advancing a strategic objective as far as is possible before the just warriors intervene and stop them just short of crossing the line dividing morally permissible from morally culpable action. The boundary is sufficiently flexible to permit the ethics panelists to empower the soldier to approach that line more closely than might have otherwise been the case. Consequently, the circle of legitimate means for fighting a war just got enlarged, and the fighting of it just got escalated. The argument for restraint only works when a proposed very real, concrete action is contrasted with an imagined outcome weighed out as an inevitability. The upshot is that just warriors now find themselves more than ever in the business of establishing the outer moral limit of wars and means for waging them by imagining the boundaries for an imaginary war. Conceptual claims about what technology can and cannot do have not only been shallow and ill-conceived, they enable the next round of technology to scale up the range of possibilities for fighting wars dangerously close to crossing the moral border markers. Smart bombs are no more an innovation fostering moral discrimination any more than rifled barrels for firearms did in the century before the last. The question hardly needs to be raised whether more people have died from rifles and modern propellants than black powder muskets. The concentration of lethal power, along with new and transformative technologies for wielding it, in the hands of an intelligence-based regime appears to be not simply the brute necessity of waging a war on terror at the behest of humanitarian intervention, nor simply the extension of the analogy of self-defense to preposterous lengths. It is the formation of a new approach to foreign policy underwritten by a new way of fighting a potentially perpetual war against threats to the interests of the United States in which the use of covert and secretive lethal force is the new preferred means for sustaining it. Ironically, if just war theory has always been a theory of sovereignty, and its immediate history has been underwritten by notions of the sovereign nation-state, then it also becomes apparent that the new case for perpetual war for the sake of perpetual peace is much closer than realized to a frankly postmodern project predicated on the collapse of sovereignty invested in the modern nation state. Clandestine drone wars wreak havoc upon the legacy of Westphalia. They have ceased to be remotely related to Kant’s prescriptions for perpetual peace upon which just warriors have relied for over two centuries. A war without borders against persons with no national identity is not a modern war. It is a consequence of the failure of modern wars to deal with the problems that have haunted the modern project, and those are about religious more than national or ethnic identities. The drone program, according to Obama and his subordinates, is here to stay, and the technologies that have enabled it are likewise set to transform the American way of war into something that war has never before been. The reach of technologically enabled covert operations is now theoretically infinite when abstracted from the constraints of having intelligence or special operations forces on the ground. The range of targets is theoretically endless and how they are singled out and on what basis they are targeted will only a select few be privy to. New data and computational capacities may mean that no one really knows those bases at all. Hence the response to the perceived infinity of evil presenting as terrorism is the infinite reach of lethal force, and an infinite war posture to sustain it. The dilemma associated with contemporary wars, which frame religion in the modern world as collared and leashed by the demands of secularity and modernity, is that for a good many people of faith the notion of God’s sovereignty ultimately implies that only God is worth killing for. It is not evident that such a view furthers violence more than whatever is enabled by the natural right to self-defense and its legal analogs - especially in a time of war. At the very least it would prohibit the now accepted and legally justified practice of killing over theft or threats to private property, and it might make exclusive national control over global resources untenable. It may be that in wars in defense of national interests everything that has drawn geographical borders around the concept of sovereignty have proven to be the impultrix violentia of contemporary warfare in ways that belie the modern presumption to have solved endemic religious violence through politics. There is good historical evidence for the suspicion that religions may be better prepared to form wise men who love peace than the modern state. The suspicion itself cannot be contained in a context presumed to have been secularized long ago. It instead indicates that religion in the modern globalized world will find means of negotiation with the demands of all kinds of societies in all kinds of places other than those that enforce privatization of religious sensibilities and commitments, which is precisely the modern project. To the extent just war theory cannot freely concede that “religious extremism” - the conflict between global and globalizing religions and the shape of the nation-state - is in essence the primary moral and political problem it addresses , it betrays its own profound existential crisis, and ceases to become relevant any longer in today’s world. That world is now shaped by perpetual wars against infinite targets in infinite places with the hubris of infinite power relentlessly driven by the technological imagination. It is no longer difficult to imagine a future in which critics of a previous generation’s investment in the “archaic” theory of just and unjust wars are merely proclaiming the obvious.

#### Highlighting the issue of drone warfare is a useful starting point for a larger interrogation of State killing-Exposing the history of targeted killing is an important mechanism for challenging the secret global war on terrorism.

Noble 12 (Doug, activist with the Upstate Coalition to Ground the Drones, Assassination Nation, July 19, http://www.counterpunch.org/2012/07/19/assassination-nation/)

This striking new transparency, the official acknowledgment for the first time of a broad-based US assassination and targeted killing program, has resulted from the unprecedented and controversial visibility of drone warfare. Drones now make news every day, and those of us who have been protesting their use for years have heightened their visibility in the public eye, forcing official acknowledgment and fostering worldwide scrutiny. This new scrutiny focuses not only on drone use but also, and perhaps more importantly, on the targeted killing itself – and the “kill lists” that make them possible. This new exposure has set off a firestorm of reaction around the globe. Chris Woods of the Bureau of Investigative Journalism told Democracy Now! “The kill list got really heavy coverage … newspapers have all expressed significant concern about the existence of the kill list, the idea of this level of executive power.” [5] A Washington Post editorial noted that “No president has ever relied so extensively on the secret killing of individuals to advance the nation’s security goals.” [6] Becker and Shane of the Times pronounced Obama’s role “without precedent in presidential history, of personally overseeing the shadow war …” [7] And former president Jimmy Carter insisted, in a recent editorial in The New York Times, “We don’t know how many hundreds of innocent civilians have been killed in these [drone] attacks, each one approved by the highest authorities in Washington. This would have been unthinkable in previous times.” [8] Really? In fact, US assassination and targeted killing, with presidential approval, has been going on covertly for at least half a century. Ironically, all this drone killing now offers us a new opportunity: to pry open the Pandora’s box hiding long-held secrets of covert US assassination and targeted killing, and to expose them to the light of day. What we would find is that the only things new in the latest, more publicized revelations about kill lists and assassinations are the use of drones, the president’s hands-on approach in vetting targets, and the global scope of the drone killing. Those of us in the Upstate Coalition to Ground the Drones, Code Pink and other groups protesting US drones for years have correctly focused on the use of drones as illegal, immoral and strategically counterproductive. We have abhorred the schizophrenic ease of remote killing, the uniquely frightening horror of a drone strike, and the unavoidable (even intentional) killing of countless civilian “terrorist suspects” in “signature strikes.” We have also warned of the proliferation of drones in countries around the globe and of their procurement by US police forces and border patrols, for surveillance and “non-lethal” targeting. But drones are not the only, or even the most important, concern. It’s the targeted killing itself, past and present. In this article I start to unravel what the latest demands for transparency should lead us to investigate fully: the fifty year history of US assassination and targeted killing that has resulted, quite directly, in the present moment. Those who are mortified by the latest revelations of Obama’s kill list have much to learn from a more comprehensive, historical perspective on US killing around the globe. Who knows: Perhaps someone in Congress might even be prodded to do what Senators Fulbright and Church did in years past: hold hearings on this continuing execration taking place in our name. Until then, what follows is an introduction to this ongoing horror story. Section 1 of this article briefly reviews the lethal history of the US Phoenix Program in Vietnam, the original source of subsequent US counter terrorist tactics and strategies. Section 2 revisits briefly the well-worn history of US kill lists and assassinations in Latin American countries, followed by the somewhat less-well-known history of US kill lists and assassinations in countries on other continents. Section 3 traces the direct legacy of Phoenix, even its explicit resurrection by the key architects of the US targeted killing programs in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in a growing number of “countries we are not at war with.” One point of clarification and definition. It is well known that in recent history the US has orchestrated assassination attempts, both successful and unsuccessful, on major world leaders. Examples include: Lumumba under Eisenhower, Castro and Diem under Kennedy, Gaddhafi under Reagan, Saddam Hussein under Bush, and Allende under Nixon. [9] The term “assassination” is typically restricted to such killings of political leaders, and President Ford’s executive order banning assassination applies only to the assassination of foreign heads of state. [10] The focus of this article is different. Here we discuss the US-generated kill lists used over the last half century, under direct presidential authority, for the targeted killing of thousands of civilians suspected of being or harboring terrorists/ insurgents, from Vietnam to Guatemala, from Indonesia to Iraq, right up to the present day. The Phoenix Program The US Phoenix Program was a secret, large scale counter terrorist effort in Vietnam. Developed in 1967 by the CIA, the Phoenix Program, called Phung Hoang by the Vietnamese, aimed a concerted effort to “neutralize” the Vietcong Infrastructure (VCI) consisting of South Vietnamese civilians suspected of supporting North Vietnamese or Viet Cong soldiers. The euphemism “neutralize” meant to kill or detain indefinitely. Then CIA Director William Colby, while insisting in 1971 Congressional hearings that “the Phoenix program is not a program of assassination,” nonetheless conceded that Phoenix operations killed over 20,000 people between 1967 and 1972. [11] Phoenix targeted civilians, not soldiers. Operations were carried out by “hunter-killer teams” consisting both of US Green Berets and Navy Seals and by South Vietnamese Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs), units of mercenaries set up for assassination and “counter terror.” A Newsweek article in January 1970 described Phoenix as “a highly secret and unconventional operation that counters VC terror with terror of its own.” [12] Robert Kaiser of the Washington Post reported Phoenix being called “an instrument of mass political murder…sort of Vietnamese Murder Inc.,” designed to terrorize the civilian population into submission.” [13] Until 1970 the computerized VCI blacklist was a unilateral American operation. After the devastating 1968 Tet offensive, South Vietnamese President Thieu declared: “The VCI must be eliminated…and will be defeated by the Phoenix program.” [14] Phoenix became a ruthless “bounty hunting” program to eliminate the opposition. [15] The US and South Vietnamese created a list of tens of thousands of suspects for assassination. These names were centralized and distributed to Phoenix coordinators. From 1965-68 U.S. and Saigon intelligence services maintained an active list of Viet Cong cadre marked for assassination. The program for 1969 called for “neutralizing” 1800 a month. The VCI blacklist became corrupted by officers inserting their personal enemies’ names to get even. Due process was nonexistent. Names supplied by anonymous informers showed up on blacklists. [16] CIA Director Colby admitted in 1971 that the blacklists had been “inaccurate.” [17] Few senior VCI leaders were caught in the Phoenix net. Instead its victims were typically innocent civilians. A Pentagon-contract study found that, between 1970 and 1971, ninety-seven per cent of the Vietcong targeted by the Phoenix Program were of negligible importance. [18] By 1973, Phoenix generated 300,000 political prisoners in South Vietnam. Military operations such as My Lai used Phoenix intelligence; in fact, the My Lai massacre, hardly an isolated incident, was itself a Phoenix operation. [19] Apologists have offered rationales for Phoenix that sound eerily similar to those used to defend current drone attacks. Phoenix was typically referred to as a “scalpel” replacing the “bludgeon” of search and destroy, aerial bombardment or artillery barrages. Alternatively, it was called a precision “rifle shot rather than a shotgun approach to target key political leaders … and activists in VCI.” [20] Military historian Dale Andrade explains, “Both SEALS and PRUs killed many VCI guerrillas – that was war. They also inevitably killed innocent civilians – that was regrettable….but [Phoenix] operations were much more discerning than the massive affairs launched by conventional …forces. That fact was often lost in the rhetoric of assassination and murder …”[21] Phoenix was created, organized, and funded by the CIA. Quotas were set by Americans. Informers were paid with US funds. The national system of identifying suspects, the elaboration of numerical goals and their use as measures of merit, was designed and funded by Americans. One former US Phoenix soldier conceded, “It was “heinous,” far worse than the things attributed to it.” [22] Kill Lists from Phoenix to Latin America The US intelligence community formalized the lessons of the Phoenix Program in Vietnam by commissioning Project X, the Army’s top-secret program for transmitting Vietnam’s lessons to South America. [23] By the mid-1970s, the Project X materials were going to armies all over the world. These were textbooks for global counterinsurgency and terror warfare. These included a murder manual, “Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare,” which openly instructed in the assassination of public officials, and was distributed to the Nicaraguan Contras. Another manual, “Human Resource Exploitation Training Manual,” was used widely in Honduran counterrorism efforts. Use of the Project X material was temporarily suspended by Congress and the Carter administration for probable human rights violations, but the program was restored by the Reagan administration in 1982. By the mid-1980s, according to one detailed history, “counterguerrilla operations in Colombia and Central America would thus bear an eerie but explicable resemblance to South Vietnam.” [24] What follows is a brief sketch of the widespread application of US-promulgated Phoenix-derived reigns of terror, kill lists, and death squads throughout Latin America and beyond. Much of this is familiar territory to many activists and scholars, and is merely the tip of the iceberg, but it merits review as a backdrop for the current context of kill lists and targeted assassination. [25] US KILL LISTS AND ASSASSINATION IN LATIN AMERICA The U.S. Army’s School of Americas (SOA), started in 1946, trained mass murderers and orchestrated coups in Peru, Panama, Argentina, Ecuador, Bolivia, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Mexico. The SOA trained more than 61,000 Latin American officers implicated in widespread slaughter of civilian populations across Latin America. From 1966-1976 the SOA trained hundreds of Latin American officers in Phoenix-derived methods. Between 1989-1991 the SOA issued almost 700 copies of Project X handbooks to at least ten Latin American countries, including Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, Guatemala, and Honduras. In 2001, SOA was renamed Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHISC), but peace activists know it as School of Assassins. [26] The CIA trained assassination groups such as Halcones in Mexico, the Mano Blanca in Guatemala, and the Escuadron de la Muerte in Brazil. In South America, in 1970-79, Operation Condor, the code-name for collection, exchange and storage of intelligence, was established among intelligence services in South America to eradicate Marxist activities. Operation Condor promoted joint operations including assassination against targets in member countries. In Central America, the CIA-supported death toll under the Reagan presidency alone exceeded 150,000. The CIA set up Ansesal and other networks of terror in El Salvador, Guatemala (Ansegat) and pre-Sandinista Nicaragua (Ansenic). Honduran death squads were active through the 1980s, the most infamous of which was Battalion 3–16, which assassinated hundreds of people, including teachers, politicians, and union leaders. Battalion 316 received substantial CIA support and training, and at least 19 members graduated from the School of the Americas. In Colombia, about 20,000 people were killed since 1986 and much of U.S. aid for counternarcotics was diverted to what Amnesty International labeled “one of the worst killing fields.” The US State Department also supported the Colombian army in creating a database of subversives, terrorists and drug dealers. In Bolivia, Amnesty International reported that from 1966-68 between 3,000 and 8,000 people were killed by death squads. The CIA supplied names of U.S. and other foreign missionaries and progressive priests. In Ecuador, the CIA maintained what was called the lynx list, aka the subversive control watch list of the most important left-wing activists to arrest. In Uruguay. Every CIA station maintained a subversive control watch list of most important left wing activists. From 1970-72 the CIA helped set up the Department of Information and Intelligence (DII), which served as a cover for death squads, and also co-ordinated meetings between Brazilian and Uruguayan death squads. In Nicaragua, the US provided illegal funds to the Contras, and Marine intelligence helped maintain a list of civilians marked for assassination when Contra forces entered the country. In Chile, 1970-73, CIA-created unions organized CIA-financed strikes leading to Allende’s overthrow and subsequent suicide. By late 1971 the CIA was involved in the preparation of lists of nearly 20,000 middle-level leaders of people’s organizations, scheduled to be assassinated after the Pinochet coup. In Haiti, U.S. officials with CIA backgrounds in Phoenix-like program activities coordinated with the Ton-Ton Macoute, “Baby Doc” Duvalier’s private death squad, responsible for killing at least 3,000 people. For over thirty years the US military and the CIA helped organize, train, and fund death squad activity in El Salvador. From 1980-93, at least 63,000 Salvadoran civilians were killed, mostly by the government directly supported by the U.S. The CIA routinely supplied ANSESAL, the security forces, and the general staff with electronic, photographic, and personal surveillance of suspected dissidents and Salvadorans abroad who were later assassinated by death squads. US militray involvement in El Salvador allowed “the lessons learned in Vietnam to be put into practice … assisting an allied country in counterinsurgency operations.” [27] In Guatemala, as early as 1954, the U.S. Ambassador, after the CIA-orchestrated overthrow of the Arbenz government, gave to the new Armas government lists of radical opponents to be assassinated. Years later, throughout Guatemala’s 36-year civil war, Washington continuously to supported the Guatemalan military’s excesses against civilians, which killed 200,000 people. US Assassination Programs Exported to Other Countries In Indonesia, 1965-66, the US embassy and the CIA provided the Indonesian military with lists of the names of PKI militants, which were used by Suharto to crush the PKI regime. This resulted in “one of the worst episodes of mass murder of the twentieth century,” with estimates as high as one million deaths. [28] In Thailand, in 1976, the new junta used CIA-trained forces to crush student demonstrators during coup; two right-wing terrorist squads suspected for assassinations tied directly to CIA operations. In Iran, the CIA launched a coup installing the shah in power and helped establish the lethal secret police unit SAVAK. [29] The CIA and SAVAK then exchanged intelligence, including information and arrest lists on the communist Tudeh party. Years later, in 1983, the CIA gave the Khomeni government a list of USSR KGB agents and collaborators operating in Iran, which the Khomeni regime used to execute 200 suspects and close down the communist Tudeh party. In the Philippines, in 1986, Reagan increased CIA involvement in Philippine counterinsurgency operations, carried out by more than 50 death squads. In 2001, before 9/11, the Bush administration sent a unit of SOF to the Philippines “to help train Philippine counter terrorist forces fighting against Muslim separatists” within groups like Abu Sayyaf. After 9/11 US-Filipino cooperation was stepped up and the ongoing separatist conflict was cast, to the benefit of both sides, as “the second front in the war on terror.”[30] In Feb, 2012, a US drone strike targeting leaders of Abu Sayyaf and other separatist groups killed 15 people, the first use of killer drones in Southeast Asia. [31] A “global Phoenix Program”: drone targets worldwide “A global Phoenix program … would provide a useful start point” for “a new strategic approach to the Global War on Terrorism.” –David Kilcullen [32] IRAQ Despite the US-perpetrated counter terrorist slaughter in Latin America and elsewhere in the 1970s-1990s, the US Special Forces debacle in Mogadishu in 1993, popularized in the film Black Hawk Down, severely impacted US willingness to use Special Forces in counter terrorist missions for the next decade. But then, after 9/11, things changed drastically. On September 17, 2001, President Bush signed a secret Presidential finding authorizing the C.I.A. to create paramilitary teams to hunt, capture, detain, or kill designated terrorists almost anywhere in the world. The pressure from the White House, in particular from Vice-President Dick Cheney, was intense, and in the scramble, a search of the C.I.A.’s archives turned up – the Phoenix Program. [33] In July , 2002, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld sent an order for a plan to make sure that special forces could be authorized to use lethal force ‘in minutes and hours, not days and weeks.’” [34] Rumsfeld prompted Bush to authorize the military to “find and finish” terrorist targets. Here he was referring to “the F3EA targeting cycle” used in anti-infrastructure operations by Special Operations Forces. F3EA, an abbreviation of find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, utilizes comprehensive intelligence to “find a target amidst civilian clutter and fix his exact location . . . . enabling surgical finish operations … to catch a fleeting target.” [35] Lt General William (Jerry) Boykin, Delta commander in Mogadishu, deputy undersecretary for Defense for Intelligence and a key planner of the Special Forces offensive in Iraq, announced, “We’re going after these people. Killing or capturing them … doing what the Phoenix program was designed to do, without all the secrecy.” [36] Back in 1963, the CIA had supplied lists of communists to the Baath party coup so that communists could be rounded up and eliminated. [37] Now, forty years later, it was the Baathists’ turn to be rounded up by Special Forces and CIA and executed. After the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the U.S. military notoriously developed a set of playing cards to help troops identify the most-wanted members of Saddam Hussein‘s government, mostly high-ranking Baath Party members. Less well-known was the secret targeted killing of thousands of Baathist civilians by US Special Forces. Seymour Hersh wrote in 2003 that “The Bush Administration authorized a major escalation of the Special Forces covert war in Iraq. … Its highest priority [being] the neutralization of the Baathist insurgents, by capture or assassination. [38] A former C.I.A. station chief described the strategy: “The only way we can win is to go unconventional. We’re going to have to play their game. Guerrilla versus guerrilla. Terrorism versus terrorism. We’ve got to scare the Iraqis into submission.” [39] The US even hired thousands of contract killers previously responsible for US-sponsored extra-judicial killings and death squad activity in Latin America. The operation—called “preëmptive manhunting” by one Pentagon adviser—had, according to Hersh, “the potential to turn into another Phoenix Program.” [40] Global Phoenix In 2009, the Office of the Secretary of Defense sponsored a paper by the National Defense Research Institute entitled “The Phoenix Program and Contemporary Counterinsurgency.” The paper notes, “The persistent insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan have generated fresh interest among military officers, policymakers, and civilian analysts in the history of counterinsurgency. The Phoenix Program in Vietnam—the U.S. effort to improve intelligence coordination and operations aimed at identifying and dismantling the communist underground—is the subject of much renewed attention.” [41] The paper continues, “As the United States and its allies shift their focus to Afghanistan and weigh counterinsurgency alternatives for that country, decisionmakers would be wise to consider how Phoenix-style approaches might serve to pry open Taliban and Al-Qaeda black boxes.” [42] Two key architects of the current Phoenix-style global counterinsurgency efforts by the US are David Kilcullen and Michael Vickers. David Kilcullen has been counterinsurgency advisor to two former Middle East commanders, General Stanley McChrystal (formerly head of Special Operations) and General David Petraeus, now CIA Director. Michael G. Vickers, made famous in the book and film Charlie Wilson’s War about the CIA’s anti-Soviet Afghan campaign of the 1980s, is currently Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, wielding such vast authority over the US war on terror that, according to a Washington Post profile, Pentagon colleagues refer to as his “take-over-the-world-plan.” [43] Kilcullen wrote in a much-quoted 2004 paper entitled “Countering Global Insurgency” that “Counterinsurgency campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq have reawakened official and analytical interest in the Phoenix Program.” He proposed that “a global Phoenix program … would provide a useful start point” for “a new strategic approach to the Global War on Terrorism,” one which would focus on “interdicting links … between jihad theatres, denying sanctuary areas, … isolating Islamists from local populations and … disrupting inputs” from others. [44] Vickers issued a Phoenix-style directive in December 2008 to “develop capabilities for extending U.S. reach into denied areas and uncertain environments by operating with and through indigenous foreign forces or by conducting low visibility operations.” “It’s not just the Middle East. It’s not just the developing world. It’s not just non-democratic countries – it’s a global problem. Threats can emanate from Denmark, the United Kingdom, you name it.” [45] According to a Washington Post profile, “the most critical aspect of Vicker’s plan targeting al-Qaeda-affiliated networks around the world involves US Special Forces working through foreign partners to uproot and fight terrorism.” [46] US military and Special Operations forces would “pay indigenous fighters and paramilitaries who work with them in gathering intelligence, hunting terrorists, fomenting guerrilla warfare or putting down an insurgency.” [47] Pentagon colleagues have said of Vickers, “he tends to think like a gangster.” [48] Pentagon press secretary Geoff Morrell revealed that getting Bin Laden in Pakistan was Vicker’s “baby,” and “more than anyone else in the department, he drove the issue.” [49] 2011 New York Times Vickers summarizes his strategy this: “You make a deal with the devil to defeat another devil.”[50] “I just want to kill those guys.” [51] A 2011 Such is the megalomaniacal mission underlying the US global war on terror, its kill lists and worldwide program of targeted assassination. Killer Drones Revisited “Engaging in any assassination blurs the line between the good guys and the bad.” It is also “a proclamation of weakness and an admission of failure.” –John Jacob Nutter, The CIA’s Black Ops [52] The purpose of this article is to reframe the current attention on killer drones and Obama’s “kill list” within an historical perspective. The goal here is not to discourage the escalating protest against killer drones or against Obama’s targeted assassination program around the globe. As stated at the outset, the unprecedented visibility of these nefarious activities and of the outraged public response to them is precisely what is needed at this time. This heightened awareness also affords a perfect opportunity to revisit the extraordinary history of US assassination and targeted killing that has led directly and explicitly to these activities. Focus on the drones alone will not be sufficient. For even the major counter terrorist mastermind David Kilcullen himself, an avid proponent of the global targeted killing program, has argued against the use of drones. In a 2009 New York Times editorial he argues that “The goal should be to isolate extremists from their communities; [they] must be defeated by indigenous forces…Drone strikes make this harder, not easier.” He adds, “The use of drones displays every characteristic of a tactic – or, more accurately, a piece of technology – substituting for a strategy, [with minimal understanding] of the tribal dynamics of the local population. This creates public outrage and a desire for revenge.” [53] Scholar Maria Ryan, in a 2011 article entitled “War in Countries We Are Not at War With,” writes: “In 2006 the Pentagon announced that it had sent small teams of Special Operations troops to US embassies to gather intelligence on terrorism in Africa, South East Asia and South America…There is, then, a covert side to the Global War on Terrorism that is not visible and not currently knowable in the absence of whistleblowers, leaks, or things gone wrong.” [54] The heightened public attention paid to drone killing might very well, in time, lead to some welcome success in curtailing their use. But too narrow a focus on the US deployment of Predator and Reaper drones might also distract us from other forms of Phoenix-derived targeted killing still being perpetrated globally – and covertly – by our Assassination Nation.

#### This infinite war will culminate in planetary extinction.

Hanrahan 11 (Clare, Militarism and the "Economics of Extinction," http://warisacrime.org/content/militarism-and-economics-extinction

War is an all out assault on life. Every living being is in peril. The interrelated systems that sustain life are approaching total collapse from resource depletion, wanton killing and the environmental degradation of centuries of senseless war. The single most egregious and unrelenting source of ecocide is the Pentagon, an agency that consumes nearly 50 percent of each U.S. tax dollar extorted from the workers in the name of national defense. More than fifty years ago U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned that "the problem in defense is how far you can go without destroying from within what you are trying to defend from without." We have gone way too far—beyond the limits of law, morality and of sane self interest. With the Pentagon's practices of obfuscation and denial, it is a daunting task to uncover and document the staggering facts of just how severe—and in some instances irreversible—is the ecological damage brought on by militarism. What is known of the grim statistics is a stunning indictment of the woefully misnamed Department of Defense. How did this happen? What is the extent of the poisoning? Who will clean up the mess? Is it too late to turn this around? Warfare has never been easy on the earth, yet throughout thousands of years of recorded military history, this living planet has managed to recover and adjust to a succession of trampling armies encroaching with roads, leveling forests, damming rivers, polluting the air, the soil and water, digging entrenchments, bombarding and poisoning the lands, destroying habitat and crops, ~~raping~~, pillaging and eliminating uncounted species of plants and animals. The human cost in war has also been high but in past centuries was limited mostly to combatants. That is no longer the reality. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) estimated in the 1990s that civilian deaths constituted 90 percent of all deaths in war. In recent decades more children have been killed than soldiers and more deaths occur after the battlefield is abandoned than during combat. In almost every U.S. community where the Department of Defense and its corporate military contractors employ millions in the production, maintenance, and storage of "conventional," chemical, and nuclear weapons, the health of the workers and the natural environment is sacrificed. According to a 1989 US General Accounting Office report, the US Military produces more than 400,000 tons of hazardous waste each year. That figure is most certainly a low estimate. With astounding obedience, We the People have been willing to relinquish our lives, our children's lives, our values and the very survival of the earth in the name of national security. In 1942, the 3,000 residents of five rural Tennessee mountain communities were given just a few weeks' notice to vacate their homes and ancestral farms. Thus was the "secret city" of Oak Ridge established, and the 60,000 acres of Tennessee valleys and ridges expropriated for the war effort. The Manhattan Project was developed to enrich the uranium used for the Hiroshima bomb. In subsequent decades, and in the name of national security, officials knowingly subjected atomic industry workers, soldiers and nearby residents to deadly doses of radiation at nuclear sites throughout the country. "Some 300,000 people, or half of those who ever worked in the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, are believed to have been affected by exposure to radiation," asserts Michael Renner, of the World Watch Institute writing in the 1997 book War and Public Health. Every step of the nuclear bomb-making process involves severe environmental contamination that lingers for generations. "Of all the different ways in which military operations have an impact on human health and the environment, nuclear weapons production and testing is the most severe and enduring," Renner says. As a result of naval accidents there are at least 50 nuclear warheads and 11 nuclear reactors littering the ocean floor. Some researchers estimate that the radioactive fallout from atmospheric nuclear tests have already caused as many as 86,000 birth defects and 150,000 premature deaths. Two million more cancer deaths may yet ensue from the now-banned above ground explosions. Despite the horrific consequences of nuclear energy, in Oak Ridge today, the Obama administration has approved an additional 7.5 billion dollars for refurbishing the next generation of thermonuclear weapons, assuring a stockpile of death for generations to come. The unprecedented atomic devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, murdering hundreds of thousands, pales in comparison to the impact of modern weapons of mass destruction. Militarism in this atomic age has developed and used weapons so heinous as to extend the murderous reach to all future generations. After more than 60 years producing atomic weapons and nuclear energy, the Department of Defense and Department of Energy have accumulated over 500,000 tons of so-called depleted uranium, which it offers free of charge to weapons makers throughout the world. In Jonesborough, Tennessee, down a quiet country lane in the heart of the Southern Appalachian Mountains, Aerojet Ordnance employs a small workforce to produce weaponized uranium armaments. Bullets are coated with the radioactive waste from enriching U-235 to produce fuel for nuclear reactors and atomic bombs. According to investigative reporter Bob Nichols, writing in 2010 for the San Francisco Bay View, Iraq and virtually all the rest of the Middle East and Central Asia has been continually dosed for almost 20 years with thousands of tons of weaponized ceramic uranium oxide gas, also known as depleted uranium." These bullets, shells and bombs, when exploded, reach temperatures over 3,000 degrees centigrade and become a lethal uranium aerosol that "never stops indiscriminately maiming and killing." The contamination persists for billions of years, both on the battlefield and at US manufacturing and storage sites. Research has confirmed that uranium oxide (UO) particles, when inhaled, migrate up the olfactory nerve to the brain. They are so small they can even enter the body through the skindestroying cells in the brains, bones, and testicles or ovaries of anyone contaminated with the radioactive particles—friend, foe or noncombatant. In addition to the horrific crimes of authorizing, producing and deploying weaponized uranium, the U.S. military's lethal footprint around the globe includes toxins from heavy metals, dioxins, PCB's, asbestos, mustard, sarin and nerve gas, as well as other chemical and biological weapons. And scattered on battlefields throughout the world are as many as 100 million unexploded antipersonnel land mines. Eighty percent of landmine victims have been noncombatants. In Viet Nam, from 1962 to 1970, the US military engaged in chemical warfare dousing the country with 19 million gallons of herbicides, mostly Agent Orange produced by Monsanto, Dow Chemical and other U.S. manufacturers. The dioxin rich chemicals contaminated about five million acres of farmland, forest and waters. At least one million Vietnamese people and more than 100,000 Americans and allied troops were poisoned with deadly effects that have continued into the third generation. The human and environmental devastation in Central American during the US proxy wars of the 1980s is yet another horrific chapter in the tragedy of US militarism. In the United States alone, the Pentagon is responsible for at least 25,000 contaminated properties in all 50 states, according to a 2008 Washington Post report. Nine hundred abandoned military bases, weapons manufacturing and testing sites and other military-related industries are listed on the Environmental Protection Agency's list of 1,300 sites most hazardous to human and ecological health, and that is only a portion of the polluted sites. As many as 20 million Americans in 43 states drink water contaminated by cancer-causing perchlorate, a carcinogen found in missile and rocket fuel. According to a 1991 edition of Rachel's hazardous Waste news (#224), "… the military has exposed thousands (perhaps millions) of innocent Americans to deadly amounts of radioactivity and to a witch's brew of potent chemical toxins, has covered up these facts, has lied to the victims and their families, has lied to the press, has lied to Congress. It is a scandal and an outrage on such a scale that it takes your breath away." In 2011 it is still hard to catch one's breath in the face of this ongoing and intentional assault on the earth. And of course, it is not just the Pentagon with its lethal global reach, but the insidious corporate/government alliance that Dwight D. Eisenhower warned of over fifty years ago— a crime syndicate that colludes to profit from and deny responsibility for planetary ecocide. Gaia isn't bound by national borders, nor is this distressed planet protected by the false distinctions militarists make between combat zones and the lands they claim to defend. The militarists and the scientists in their employ have reached into the very heavens to harness the energies of the ionosphere in the service of war. Dr. Rosalie Bertell, a scientist and Roman Catholic nun confirms that "US military scientists are working on weather systems as a potential weapon. The methods include the enhancing of storms and the diverting of vapor rivers in the Earth's atmosphere to produce targeted droughts or floods." The US military practiced this so-called "geophysical warfare" in Viet Nam with Project Skyfire and Project Stormfury. Now the Pentagon is arrogantly pursuing what it calls "full spectrum" US military domination. Dr. Bertell has written of military experiments that may have played a part in earthquakes and unusual weather conditions and even accelerated global warming. Current military projects such as HAARP (High-frequency Active Auroral Research Program) are part of a "growing chain of astonishingly powerful, and potentially interactive, military installations, using varied types of electromagnetic fields or wavelengths, each with a different ability to affect the earth or its atmosphere," according to Dr. Bertell. Is there no end to the arrogance? We must intervene. We must put a stop to the militarism characterized by Academy of Natural Sciences writer Roland Wall as "a direct and relentless assault on human and natural ecosystems." The Department of Defense uses 360,000 barrels of oil each day. This amount makes the DoD the single largest oil consumer in the world. According to Sharon E. Burke, the Pentagon's director of operational energy plans and programs, the Defense Logistics Agency delivers more than 170,000 barrels of oil each day to the war theaters, at a cost of $9.6 billion in 2010. Climate change activists, rightly concerned about the continued use of fossil fuels to power our insatiable energy demands, have taken to the streets of Washington, DC to call for a halt to the tar sands oil pipeline, other resisters march in the hundreds to the sites of mountain top removal coal mining, or stand in resistance at the nuclear weapons and nuclear power complexes throughout the nation. Arrests, fines, jail and imprisonment is the lot of many who take a bold stand to call an end to the US military industrial choke hold on the planet. But a strategically disastrous divide persists between activists in the environmental sustainability movements and war resisters who challenge more directly the militarism that is the largest single cause of the Earth's imminent collapse. Have we blindly accepted the paradigm that war is inevitable, that violence is intrinsic to our nature, and that our security depends on a strong military? It is a lie—repeated again and again—but it is still a lie. "Challenging the destruction and damage to the environment and the massive exploitation of oil and metal resources for the military-industrial war machine must become paramount in the work for peace," scientist and author H. Patricia Hynes writes in a recent series of articles on the environmental impact of US militarism. Indeed, as the United Nations asserts, "there can be no durable peace if the natural resources that sustain livelihoods and ecosystems are destroyed." "We don't know how to extricate ourselves from our complicity very surely or very soon," Poet and social critic Wendell Berry asserts. "How could we live without the war economy and the holocaust of the fossil fuels?" We must find the answer to our deadly dilemma and put an end to our complicity in the desecration of the world and destruction of all creation. "To the offer of more abundant life," Berry writes, "we have chosen to respond with the economics of extinction." We cannot let this be the end.

### Plan

#### The United States Federal Government should abolish the authority to engage in targeted killing.

### Contention Two-Moving Past Just War

#### It is necessary to reimagine war as a continuation of colonial violence. Our plan is not naïve statism but rather an imagination of a world beyond warfare.

Moyn 2014

Samuel, Columbia University professor of History, Drones and Imagination: A Response to Paul Kahn, Eur J Int Law (2014) 24 (1): 227-233.

For, arguably, there is a continuum, not a break, between the aesthetics, subjectivity, and morality of colonial warfare and its successors today, including in drone campaigns. In colonial governance, war was not a matter of enemies met at the border; it frequently involved shadowy groups of rebels posing a nebulous threat to a territorially informal order. And surely the identification of individual leaders for targeted death, a familiar part of such engagements in European and later American history, is not new.12 Neither are so-called ‘signature strikes’. Most important, as historians of technology would emphasize, the drone is hardly the first ‘game changer’ that afforded insurmountable military asymmetry, which was rife in colonial history.13 At Omdurman outside Khartoum in 1898, the British took advantage of such asymmetry to kill 10,000 Africans and wound more than 10,000 more while suffering fewer than 50 combat deaths.14 And if this sort of military encounter was not a common feature of imperial rule, it is because insurmountable asymmetry generally led to rapid conquest, after which the line between policing due to criminals and pacification due to enemies was generally not established with a bright line. Even in places where the rule of law was established as an important feature of overseas governance, emergency provisions rapidly allowed the conversion of colonial pacification and policing into situations of asymmetrical warfare.15 This is not to suggest that there is nothing new under the sun. But it is to say that, if drone war ‘no longer looks like war’ to Kahn, much of global violence in modern times on the periphery of a rather small zone of interstate contest could not have looked much like war either.16 And the lessons learned by formal empires were portable to the American experience long ago, and especially once the Cold War dawned. Like the war on terror, the Cold War was also ‘global’ – perhaps more so. Its classic hot conflicts were displaced to the very sorts of zones where the United States deploys drones today (it remains tough to imagine a US drone strike in Europe, for example, to say nothing of domestic policing, at least in the foreseeable future). In its heyday, the Central Intelligence Agency operated globally far beyond the widely dispersed deployment of the US military.17 Both the military and the CIA, more notoriously, engaged in individualized killing. More generally, relying on often spectacular technologically-driven asymmetry, Americans deployed counterinsurgent techniques serially; indeed, many of them were actively revived after 9/11 from the American experience rather than generated afresh to deal with wholly novel realities.18 What exactly, one might therefore ask, is the fundamental departure involved in drone warfare compared with colonial engagements or their portable Cold War versions? No doubt the shifts in aesthetics, subjectivity, and morality in which Kahn is interested coincide with unprecedented perfection in the introduction of the drones. But individually and together they were already a major feature of modern history. I am not sure, then, that the most significant difference that the drone crystallizes is to be found in the aesthetics, subjectivity, and morality of conflict. The background of peripheral and often irregular warfare might help, in fact, to isolate better what exactly is new in the drone, and the larger reimagination of war underway today. The background of persistent irregular warfare is perhaps most revealing when the most controversial precedent for targeted killing and ‘signature strikes’ today – America’s Phoenix programme of the Vietnam era – is selected, since it is so recent and because Kahn alludes to its sequels in the American presidential ban on political assassinations.19 What makes Phoenix seem like part of another world, I think, is most of all that there is a greater legalization today of warfare. Put differently, it is not the factual circumstances of conflict introduced by technological superiority in counterinsurgent circumstances, so much as that human rights norms have got so far in rescripting these conflicts in a new normative framework.20 If so, it is not the loss of ‘classic interstate war’ as a real or imagined paradigm but the application of old and new humanitarian norms born in it to continuing irregular war that may mark the fundamental novelty. Where peripheral warfare was once placed below the threshold of law – before 1977, insurgent fighters were not even legitimate enemies subject to the modest requirements of the law of armed conflict – contemporary counterinsurgency finds itself newly and highly legalized. Its targets have been pushed not only into the category of legitimate subjects of the law of armed conflict but also into a rapidly evolving doctrinal area in which the law of war intersects or ‘interoperates’ with the law of human rights. If faraway enemies are afforded protections today partly undermining the distinction between them and domestic criminals, then, it is not because the scope of war is newly broad, the enemy is radically different, or even because technology introduces a novel asymmetry. It is because of a complex normative change in which a familiar form of warfare is waged under normative expectations that were once totally absent from it. This observation may hearten contemporary advocates of the ‘humanization’ of war. But there have been troubling outcomes of that process too. For along with the imposition of norms where they once had no place, there is a corresponding willingness to view political leadership of global insurgency as implying military functions and thus legitimate target status, a novelty the contemporary legalization of war may ironically have abetted. It was not Americans in the Cold War but our contemporaries who introduced the notion of ‘targeted killing’, hewing out a new category that our ancestors did not require. The chilling fact may be that targeted killing today, much of it similarly undertaken by the intelligence branches or complex amalgams of intelligence and military services, differs from the assassinations of the Phoenix programme primarily because no one at the time felt the need to claim that the latter’s targets were not civilians or close enough to the boundary between combatant and non-combatant to be legitimate targets. The legalization of war has thus gone along with a potential expansion of what an ‘active part’ in conflict (in the crucial phrase of the Geneva Conventions Common Article 3) means.21 Yet the point is not simply that the introduction of drones as part of counterinsurgent warfare in a globally conceived threat environment is not as practically new as many breathless commentators – and Kahn in a far more sophisticated way in his essay – suggest. For in fact a reverse set of considerations also needs to be recorded. It would be a serious mistake to generalize too hastily from the contemporary uses of still primitive drones to assume that ‘classic interstate war’ is passing from the world. It seems that the United States will imminently put the final nail in the coffin of the Al-Qaeda network, though it is another matter whether it will put its counterinsurgent traditions to rest for good. More hypothetically, the Israel/Palestine situation may be resolved, leading to the elimination of the other flagrant contemporary case of the asymmetrical use of force (including automated drones, targeted killings, and the use of the former to conduct the latter) that have featured so visibly in recent legal debates. Indeed, these two signature conflicts of the contemporary law of war may come to seem trivial as the geopolitics of America’s relative decline and the return of a multipolar world unfold – and not long from now. They may come to have pride of place mainly in explaining why, just as some romantics mistakenly believed the end of the Cold War ushered in eternal peace, a few people today prematurely suppose that some fundamental transformation of conflict is in the offing. Drones were the brainchildren of science fiction writers long before any actually existed, and from their imaginative beginnings it has been known that they could conceivably serve conventional interstate contests – robot wars – as much as they do contemporary counterterrorist operations.22 Much discussion of the drone in security circles as well as the popular press revolves obsessively round the anxious question that once crystallized round nuclear weaponry: what happens when the others get it?23 Military planners are surely not restricting their scenarios to the use of drones in targeted killings of non-state actors, and they would be foolish to do so. It is perfectly conceivable, in other words, that the rise of the drones may function to shore up both halves of the modern imagination of warfare, as much because of the continuing threat of classic interstate war as because of the spectacular presence today of counterinsurgent war that was its eternal – and therefore equally classic – companion. None of the above is meant to suggest that Kahn’s portrait of where things stand currently is mistaken. It is eminently plausible that the prominence of counterinsurgency in a unipolar world will continue beyond its current revival to define a wholly new era of imagining war. I am certainly inclined to be a bit more tentative about how new the drone is and how far it actually or symbolically unsettles traditional frameworks, let alone ushers in the full-scale departure of interstate war in favour of counterterrorist policing of the globe. Where I differ most from Kahn, however, is not with respect to his incisive and in many ways profound analysis of contemporary moves, but instead with the unusual normative turn at end of his article – especially for a theorist who in the past has resisted prescription as a matter of principle.24 In his closing pages, Kahn reacts to contemporary enterprises of providing a floor of norms for everyone around the world – notably those of the law of armed conflict to which once separate human rights norms have slowly but surely been added. Kahn suggests that the contribution of such enterprises has mainly been to generate unclarity, and he responds by calling for a new theory of administrative violence rather than a more defensible vision of humanizing the world through politics and law. In what sounds like a prescriptive and not merely descriptive moment, Kahn’s conclusion is that there will be a persisting ‘need’ for ‘a conception of a subject who is without rights’.25 Because terrorists are around to stay, Kahn surmises, it may be best to develop a regulated and well-theorized approach to ‘statecraft as the administration of death’.26 It is a chilling formulation. In response, I cannot help but note that administrative massacres were not simply the worst feature of the 20th century in Nazi hands but – it is now routinely emphasized by scholars – were pioneered as part of colonial governance.27 Kahn, in his conclusion, cites Niccolò Machiavelli as guide to the deterritorialized war on terror, rather than Immanuel Kant for his naïve cosmopolitanism or Carl von Clausewitz for his restrictive interstate vision. But Machiavelli’s realism is not the only kind to deploy in response to the unsatisfactory options Kahn is right to reject. A more radical version of ethics than is prominent today would react to statecraft as the administration of death with horror, but need not fall back on either a naïve moralism or a traditional statism.28 Of course, to say so is not to imply that some ‘next utopia’ is already available to put in place of departed radicalisms; it would have to be built. But if there is to be a prescriptive turn in response to the effect of drones on the imagination of warfare, perhaps the need is not simply to imagine warfare but also a world beyond it. Otherwise the drone – true to its name – will accompany the monotony of a violent history rather than spark the project of shifting it in a genuinely imaginative new direction.

## 2AC

### Case

#### Focusing on reforming the law is good- allows us to mitigate the harm done by ableist legal practices.

Kanter 11 (Arlene, Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law; Founder and Director. Disability Law and Policy Program; Co- Director, Syracuse University Center on Human Policy, Law, and Disability Studies, THE LAW: WHAT’S DISABILITY STUDIES GOT TO DO WITH IT OR AN INTRODUCTION TO DISABILITY LEGAL STUDIES, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=1822439)

Disability Studies has emerged within the academy as a new multi-disciplinary field. It requires us to consider how society excludes people with disabilities, not because of their own limitations, but because of the way in which society itself is structured and operates. From this viewpoint, it is not as if there are no differences among people who are Deaf, or blind, or have other impairments; nor does this view deny the suffering and pain that people with disabilities experience. Instead, Disability Studies allows us to explore how to mitigate or even eliminate the social outcomes of differences with an awareness of the role that power plays in shaping the development of laws and legal rights.

Disability Legal Studies, then, presents to the law and legal education both challenges and opportunities. It challenges legal scholars to critically view the place of disability within the legal system and the legal academy, as well as society generally. By viewing law through the lens of Disability Studies, it challenges us to examine disability, like race, gender, class, and sexuality, as a social and political construct, derived from a history of stigmatization and exclusion. It also challenges us to consider the complex ways in which our system of laws, government, social structures, institutions, culture, and customs contribute to the disablement of persons in our own society and in societies throughout the world. Disability Legal Studies also presents opportunities. As part of the larger field of Disability Studies, Disability Legal Studies, provides legal scholars the tools to develop a disability critique of the law and to explore the role and manifestations of ableism in social practices and institutions that “portray people with disabilities as useless, marginal, abnormal, a burden on society, and perhaps most offensively, as living a life that is not worth living.”240 It also provides the context in which to deconstruct and reconstruct the meaning of disability through investigating the social construction of disability as well as the power structure that supports and enhances ableism.

#### Single reps don’t determine subjectivity- identity formation is a life-long reflexive process

Devenney 04 (Michael, The Social Representations of Disability: Fears, Fantasies and Facts, http://disability-studies.leeds.ac.uk/files/library/devenney-PhD-Final-including-bibliography-.pdf)

The primary role of Social Representations is to enable individuals within different communities and differing groups within society to make familiar the unfamiliar (Moscovici 1981). The process by which this is possible is driven by the communication of knowledge. Moscovici and others (Moscovici 1988, Duveen and Lloyd 1990) have highlighted the important role that communication has in the development of any Social Representation. The processes of communication can be divided up into three types of transformation. First, sociogenesis; the means whereby Social Representations are produced by social groups about particular objects. Moscovici (1976) illustrated this point in his work on the dissemination of scientific knowledge by using the example of how psychoanalysis was understood and represented by different social groups. It is important to remember that sociogenesis is not static. It is dialectical in nature, because at any one time one Social Representation will be influenced and reconstructed in the context of past and present knowledge, and of other relevant Social Representations. The second type of transformation is ontogenesis, the acquisition and acceptance by individuals of Social Representations held by their social groups. This process occurs throughout an individual's life. It assumes that we are all born into what Moscovici calls a ‘thinking environment’ (cited in Duveen and Lloyd 1990:7) Duveen and Lloyd (1986) suggest that ontogenesis is the process through which individuals reinterpret their learnt Social Representations in order to create their own social identities. We will see later in this paper that ontogenesis has been a powerful tool for the disability movement in terms of reconstructing the images and language relating to disabled people. The third type of transformation, microgenesis, is the component of Social Representation which involves the social interaction between members of social groups, during which they will discuss any issues such as potential conflicts, controversies and everyday talk. It can be said that social identities are mediated by these social interactions, and the resulting social identities are functions of the Social Representations of that time.

### 2AC Internal K

#### And the net benefit is to accept impurity – their demand for a pure politics crushes the necessary political momentum and coalitions that are key to emancipatory change – this directly answers their first ‘internal contradiction’

Krishna 1993

Sankaran, Professor of political science at the University of Hawaii, The Importance of Being Ironic, Alternatives, pg 399-401

The dichotomous choice presented in this excerpt is straightforward: one either indulges in total critique, delegitimizing *all* sovereign truths, or one is committed to “nostalgic,” essentialist unities that have become obsolete and have been the grounds for all our oppressions. In offering this dichotomous choice, Der Derian replicates a move made by Chaloupka in his equally dismissive critique of the more mainstream nuclear opposition, the Nuclear Freeze movement of the early 1980s, that, according to him, was operating along obsolete lines, emphasizing “facts” and “realities” while a “postmodern” President Reagan easily outflanked them through an illusory Star Wars program. (See KN: chapter 4) Chaloupka centers this difference between his own supposedly total critique of all sovereign truths (which he describes as nuclear criticism in an echo of literary criticism) and the more partial (and issue-based) criticism of what he calls “nuclear opposition” or “antinuclearists” at the very outset of his book. (KN: xvi) Once again, the unhappy choice forced upon the reader is to join Chaloupka in his total critique of all sovereign truths or be trapped in obsolete essentialisms. This leads to a disasterous politics, bitting groups that have the most in common (and need to unite on some basis to be effective) against each other. Both Chaloupka and Der Derian thus reserve their most trenchant critique for political groups that should, in any analysis, be regarded as the closest to them in terms of an oppositional politics and their desired futures. Instead of finding ways to live with these differences and to (if fleetingly) coalesce against the New Right, this fratricidal critique is politically suicidal. It obliterates the space for a political activism based on provisional and contingent coalitions, for uniting behind a common cause even as one recognizes that the coalition is comprised of groups that have very differing (and possibly unresolvable) views of reality. Moreover, it fails to consider the possibility that there may have been other, more compelling reasons for the “failure” of the Nuclear Freeze movement or anti-Gulf War movement. Like many a worthwhile cause in our times, they failed to garner sufficient support to influence state policy. The response to that need not be a totalizing critique that delegitimizes all narratives. The blackmail inherent in the choice offered by Der Derian and Chaloupka, between total critique and “ineffective” partial critique, ought to be transparent. Among other things, it effectively militates against the construction of provisional or strategic essentialisms in our attempt to create space for an activist politics. In the next section, I focus more widely on the genre of critical international theory and its impact on such an activist politics.

#### And if the alternative is mutually exclusive, they footnote the point of the 1AC which is criticize the national security apparatus built in the name of just war which is increasingly violent and secretive

Ayers and Tarrow 11 (Jeffrey Ayres is professor and chair of the Department of Political Science at Saint Michael’s College, and Sidney Tarrow is Professor Emeritus of Government at Cornell , FROM GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY TO GLOBAL WAR: A DECADE OF DISEQUILIBRIUM, http://essays.ssrc.org/10yearsafter911/from-global-civil-society-to-global-war-a-decade-of-disequilibrium/)

Ten years after 9/11, we also are struck by the marked imbalance in state–civil society relations, as we have just experienced a massive growth in the powers of the US government. This decade has witnessed the growth of an invisibly expanding web of non-military but partially militarized industries around Washington, DC. In a series of investigative articles, the Washington Post in July 2010 described the vast national-security apparatus created since 9/11, one that “has become so large, so unwieldy, and so secretive” that it “amounts to an alternative geography of the United States, a Top Secret America hidden from public view and lacking in thorough oversight.”5 Seven decades ago, political scientist Harold Lasswell worried about the growth of what he called the “garrison state.”6 Lasswell’s worry was not only the growth of the military and its increasing intrusion on what had been civilian functions of government; he was also concerned at the militarization of sectors of civilian society. According to Lasswell, writes Samuel Fitch, “In the twentieth century the political elite of industrial societies has become increasingly dominated by specialists in violence. These are typically not traditional military elites, but modern military professionals with extensive expertise in management, technical operations, and public relations. . . . National security therefore requires a conscious effort to maintain domestic morale and legitimates symbolic manipulation and coercion as necessary instruments for internal control.”7 The momentum of global activism and the potential for political agency also have receded against a backdrop of both seemingly unrelenting global economic turbulence and a resurgent US state that has intensified to an unprecedented degree its preparation for and practice of warfare. Writing in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, we did not anticipate the extra-constitutional ramifications of the Bush Doctrine: the operationalization of preventive war, extraordinary rendition, warrantless domestic surveillance, “enhanced interrogation,” presidential signing statements, and the legacy of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo. When we suggested somewhat hopefully that there was little need for pessimism—that globally oriented activists always worked most effectively on native ground, supported by the opportunities and resources of their home societies—we could never have expected that a Democratic president elected with a platform that rejected the Bush administration’s policies would further expand US military spending and counterterrorist overseas activity. The costs of this decade of the global War on Terror go beyond revived debates over the separation of powers and the entrenchment of the “Imperial Presidency.” It truly has been an unprecedented decade in many respects for the military-industrial complex. It is remarkable, for example, that the Pentagon’s budget has risen for thirteen consecutive years. Overall spending on defense between 2001 and 2009 increased by 70 percent, US defense spending over this decade rose from 30 percent to 50 percent of total worldwide defense spending, and US spending on defense averaged $250 billion more annually than it did during the height of the Cold War.8 A new 2011 report issued by Brown University’s Costs of War project estimates that ten years after the declaration of the War on Terror, the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan have cost approximately 225,000 lives and between $3.2 trillion and $4 trillion.9 And perhaps it will come as no surprise to anyone concerned about growing US indebtedness that the costs of the wars have been financed almost entirely by borrowing, with $185 billion in interest already paid on war spending and another $1 trillion in interest possibly accruing by 2020.10 And yet, the targets of the War on Terror only continue to expand—from Pakistan, to Somalia, to the Arabian Peninsula, particularly in Yemen—while the means of delivering reprisals against purported terrorists undergo further modernization. Indeed, it is the Obama administration’s penchant for increased use of drone warfare in growing numbers of asymmetrical conflicts that further distinguishes this past decade from earlier eras, especially the Cold War. Without underemphasizing the threat posed by Al-Qaeda, the dramatic increase in defense spending and the burgeoning costs of war are unprecedented, and drone warfare marks a further radical turn in the history of war. With little public discussion, the United States has further erased the boundaries of war’s beginning and end, as unmanned drone aircraft have now been used in airstrikes to kill suspected militants in at least six countries: Somalia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Libya, Iraq, and Yemen.11 What we find especially troubling—beyond reports of increased loss of civilian lives along with those of the militants targeted in counterterrorist drone strikes—is the lack of sustained public debate over the many legal and moral questions surrounding drone warfare, as well as, more broadly, the major public-policy trade-offs associated with the construction of this national-security state. This escalating process of historically unprecedented spending, modernization, and expansion of US warfare, intelligence gathering, and surveillance capabilities is one of the more notable contributions to what we would call the “Great Disequilibrium.” By this term we refer to a palpable imbalance that has evolved in many different spheres of life today in the United States, a sense that we are missing counterbalancing forces that might respond correctively to trends and events that have destabilized the American regime and democratic process. The list is long (and herein not conclusive): the record length of and skyrocketing spending on warfare, including the unrestrained forays into extrajudicial killing via drone warfare; deepening inequality not seen since the 1920s, accompanied by growing poverty and increasing and near-record unemployment from the ongoing effects of the Great Recession; growing national indebtedness, crumbling infrastructure, decaying schools, spiraling higher-education costs, and declining public investment; and deteriorating federal and state government revenues at a time when the richest Americans (and multinationals) pay a considerably lower share of their incomes in taxes than at any time since World War II. Half a century ago, citizens looked to the state and to domestic actors and policies—political parties, the labor and civil rights movements, regulations supportive of social protections—as countervailing forces designed to limit national tendencies toward extreme economic or political disequilibrium. Today, in the midst of such visible deterioration in income, opportunity, and even national image, these countervailing forces are in retreat, with a surreal politics of theater playing out across the American political spectrum that exacerbates a growing democratic deficit. From the 2010 Supreme Court Citizens United ruling that removed barriers to massive corporate funding and manipulation of electoral campaigns, to cratering public confidence (especially toward Congress) in the capacity of our political parties and politicians to find meaningful solutions to the serious challenges facing the country, to the recent debate in Congress over raising the debt ceiling—where a tiny Tea Party minority provided cover to a Republican Party unwilling to compromise on any revenue increases despite widespread and significant public majority support—there is a gnawing sense that our political regime may no longer be up to the task of responding pragmatically to the myriad of challenges facing us in the twenty-first century. Is a New Transnational Politics Possible? On the eve of 9/11, while we remained somewhat skeptical, many observers held out great expectations that global democratic collective action would provide a new countervailing force to counter the inequities of globetrotting multinationals and fluid capital. In the age of neoliberal globalization, much faith was placed in an emerging constellation of global civil society forces as a new means for helping to recover citizen control over public life. We do recognize that there have been, over this past decade, remarkable changes in world politics as non-state actors, WikiLeaks networks, and communications technologies via Facebook and Twitter have challenged the primacy of the state in the international system. Yet, while arguably a more plural and differentiated international system is evolving, the developments in the United States since 9/11, the expanding War on Terror, and continued global economic turbulence have seemed to confirm our misgivings about the transformative potential of the global civil society project. For those who care about transnational activism, then, our reflections herein cannot hold out much hope. Yet here and there are stirrings from unexpected quarters that give us some hope for a possible renaissance of transnational activism. First, although the American wing of the global justice movement has been much weaker than advocates had expected, that movement is still lively in Western Europe and Latin America and shows signs of spreading to Africa, where two of the recent meetings of the World Social Forum have been held.12 Second, some observers have taken heart from the launching of an American wing of the World Social Forum, in Atlanta in 2007 and Detroit in 2010.13 Notably, the US Social Forum process in Detroit provided space for the organizational efforts of dozens of groups that formed the People’s Movement Assembly on Food Sovereignty—eventually evolving into the US Food Sovereignty Alliance—whose work today contributes to the transformative efforts of the transnational food movement to promote popular democratic control over the global food system.14Third, the extraordinary spread of digital media over the decade since we first wrote may have many—and contradictory—outcomes, but at a minimum, it is creating a new form of “connective action” alongside older forms of collective action based on social-movement organizations and NGOs.15 These may seem like thin reeds on which to build a new edifice of transnational organizing, but when we think of the surprisingly rapid transnational diffusion of the Middle Eastern and North African revolutions in early 2011, which have now toppled dictators from Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, we should be prepared for surprises.

#### We must use apocalyptic and infinite rhetoric to describe the misapplication of just war theory – it is the only way to incite action and de-legitimize justification of a constant state of warfare through targeted killing policy.

Paschalidis 1997

Gregory, of Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. “Images of War and the War of Images.” http://genesis.ee.auth.gr/dimakis/Gramma/7/06-paschalidis.htm

The choice, then, of the whole of the anti-war tradition of visual artists, photoreporters and activists of representing the suffering body as a way to expose the evils of war and establish a common ground of sensibility and understanding should seem now more clear and legitimate. If the beginnings of the modern humanistic tradition, in the Renaissance, were marked by the reinstatement of the dignity and the celebration of the beauty of the human body, it seems inevitable that the image of the degraded and defiled human body has since become the most potent symbol of everything that takes away from it and destroys its dignity and beauty, and thus, the most compelling incitation for ameliorative action. Ever since Leonardo and Goya, humanism is a quintessentially visual and at the same time embodied discourse, that constructs humanity as the most inclusive imagined community possible, through images that project a foundational, species identity centred on the human body. In the era of the generalized war of images brought about by the worldwide dissemination of the technical image, we are regularly confronted with images that instigate war and images that castigate war; images that legitimize war and images that reject and deny it; images that sublimate and glorify warfare and images that demystify and deglorify it; images that obscure its costs and obfuscate its grim reality, and images that expose the death, the destruction and the despair it causes; images that extoll the catastrophic potential of modern war technology, and images that focus on the insanity of it all; images that praise military virtue and patriotic duty, and images that testify to the courage of all those who oppose war, who resist violence and militarism. This war between war images is impossible to be won by restricting or avoiding them, or rejecting them all wholesale. This war can only be won by producing, by multiplying and by disseminating as much as possible, those images that castigate war, that expose its horror, that undermine the rhetoric and the ideologies that lead to it and legitimize it. The war against war involves, of course, much more than engaging in this war of images. We cannot possibly win the former, however, without having first prevailed in the latter.

### 2AC Affropessimism

#### A. MUTUAL PARATICISM – the alternative gives the executive the justification to engage in militaristic targeted killing strategies – by using the fear of violence at the hands of the black cyborg, the executive will prop up white supremacist institutions rooted in militarism – we must realize how the violence abroad shapes and effects the violence done at home

McClintock 9 (Anne, is a Professor of English and Women’s and Gender Studies at the University of Wisconsin, “Paranoid Empire: Specters from Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib,” Project Muse)

By now it is fair to say that the United States has come to be dominated by two grand and dangerous hallucinations: the promise of benign US globalization and the permanent threat of the “war on terror.” I have come to feel that we cannot understand the extravagance of the violence to which the US government has committed itself after 9/11—two countries invaded, thousands of innocent people imprisoned, killed, and tortured—unless we grasp a defining feature of our moment, that is, a deep and disturbing doubleness with respect to power. Taking shape, as it now does, around fantasies of global omnipotence (Operation Infinite Justice, the War to End All Evil) coinciding with nightmares of impending attack, the United States has entered the domain of paranoia: dream world and catastrophe. For it is only in paranoia that one finds simultaneously and in such condensed form both deliriums of absolute power and forebodings of perpetual threat. Hence the spectral and nightmarish quality of the “war on terror,” a limitless war against a limitless threat, a war vaunted by the US administration to encompass all of space and persisting without end. But the war on terror is not a real war, for “terror” is not an identifiable enemy nor a strategic, real-world target. The war on terror is what William Gibson calls elsewhere “a consensual hallucination,” 4 and the US government can fling its military might against ghostly apparitions and hallucinate a victory over all evil only at the cost of catastrophic self-delusion and the infliction of great calamities elsewhere. I have come to feel that we urgently need to make visible (the better politically to challenge) those established but concealed circuits of imperial violence that now animate the war on terror. We need, as urgently, to illuminate the continuities that connect those circuits of imperial violence abroad with the vast, internal shadowlands of prisons and supermaxes—the modern “slave-ships on the middle passage to nowhere”—that have come to characterize the United States as a super-carceral state. 5 Can we, the uneasy heirs of empire, now speak only of national things? If a long-established but primarily covert US imperialism has, since 9/11, manifested itself more aggressively as an overt empire, does the terrain and object of intellectual inquiry, as well as the claims of political responsibility, not also extend beyond that useful fiction of the “exceptional nation” to embrace the shadowlands of empire? If so, how can we theorize the phantasmagoric, imperial violence that has come so dreadfully to constitute our kinship with the ordinary, but which also at the same moment renders extraordinary the ordinary bodies of ordinary people, an imperial violence which in collusion with a complicit corporate media would render itself invisible, casting states of emergency into fitful shadow and fleshly bodies into specters? For imperialism is not something that happens elsewhere, an offshore fact to be deplored but as easily ignored. Rather, the force of empire comes to reconfigure, from within, the nature and violence of the nation-state itself, giving rise to perplexing questions: Who under an empire are “we,” the people? And who are the ghosted, ordinary people beyond the nation-state who, in turn, constitute “us”? We now inhabit a crisis of violence and the visible. How do we insist on seeing the violence that the imperial state attempts to render invisible, while also seeing the ordinary people afflicted by that violence? For to allow the spectral, disfigured people (especially those under torture) obliged to inhabit the haunted no-places and penumbra of empire to be made visible as ordinary people is to forfeit the long-held US claim of moral and cultural exceptionalism, the traditional self-identity of the United States as the uniquely superior, universal standard-bearer of moral authority, a tenacious, national mythology of originary innocence now in tatters. The deeper question, however, is not only how to see but also how to theorize and oppose the violence without becoming beguiled by the seductions of spectacle alone. 6 Perhaps in the labyrinths of torture we must also find a way to speak with ghosts, for specters disturb the authority of vision and the hauntings of popular memory disrupt the great forgettings of official history. Paranoia Even the paranoid have enemies. —Donald Rumsfeld Why paranoia? Can we fully understand the proliferating circuits of imperial violence—the very eclipsing of which gives to our moment its uncanny, phantasmagoric cast—without understanding the pervasive presence of the paranoia that has come, quite violently, to manifest itself across the political and cultural spectrum as a defining feature of our time? By paranoia, I mean not simply Hofstadter’s famous identification of the US state’s tendency toward conspiracy theories. 7 Rather, I conceive of paranoia as an inherent contradiction with respect to power: a double-sided phantasm that oscillates precariously between deliriums of grandeur and nightmares of perpetual threat, a deep and dangerous doubleness with respect to power that is held in unstable tension, but which, if suddenly destabilized (as after 9/11), can produce pyrotechnic displays of violence. The pertinence of understanding paranoia, I argue, lies in its peculiarly intimate and peculiarly dangerous relation to violence. 8 Let me be clear: I do not see paranoia as a primary, structural cause of US imperialism nor as its structuring identity. Nor do I see the US war on terror as animated by some collective, psychic agency, submerged mind, or Hegelian “cunning of reason,” nor by what Susan Faludi calls a national “terror dream.” 9 Nor am I interested in evoking paranoia as a kind of psychological diagnosis of the imperial nation-state. Nations do not have “psyches” or an “unconscious”; only people do. Rather, a social entity such as an organization, state, or empire can be spoken of as “paranoid” if the dominant powers governing that entity cohere as a collective community around contradictory cultural narratives, self-mythologies, practices, and identities that oscillate between delusions of inherent superiority and omnipotence, and phantasms of threat and engulfment. The term paranoia is analytically useful here, then, not as a description of a collective national psyche, nor as a description of a universal pathology, but rather as an analytically strategic concept, a way of seeing and being attentive to contradictions within power, a way of making visible (the better politically to oppose) the contradictory flashpoints of violence that the state tries to conceal. Paranoia is in this sense what I call a hinge phenomenon, articulated between the ordinary person and society, between psychodynamics and socio-political history. Paranoia is in that sense dialectical rather than binary, for its violence erupts from the force of its multiple, cascading contradictions: the intimate memories of wounds, defeats, and humiliations condensing with cultural fantasies of aggrandizement and revenge, in such a way as to be productive at times of unspeakable violence. For how else can we understand such debauches of cruelty? A critical question still remains: does not something terrible have to happen to ordinary people (military police, soldiers, interrogators) to instill in them, as ordinary people, in the most intimate, fleshly ways, a paranoid cast that enables them to act compliantly with, and in obedience to, the paranoid visions of a paranoid state? Perhaps we need to take a long, hard look at the simultaneously humiliating and aggrandizing rituals of militarized institutions, whereby individuals are first broken down, then reintegrated (incorporated) into the larger corps as a unified, obedient fighting body, the methods by which schools, the military, training camps— not to mention the paranoid image-worlds of the corporate media—instill paranoia in ordinary people and fatally conjure up collective but unstable fantasies of omnipotence. 10 In what follows, I want to trace the flashpoints of imperial paranoia into the labyrinths of torture in order to illuminate three crises that animate our moment: the crisis of violence and the visible, the crisis of imperial legitimacy, and what I call “the enemy deficit.” I explore these flashpoints of imperial paranoia as they emerge in the torture at Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib. I argue that Guantánamo is the territorializing of paranoia and that torture itself is paranoia incarnate, in order to make visible, in keeping with Hazel Carby’s brilliant work, those contradictory sites where imperial racism, sexuality, and gender catastrophically collide. 11 The Enemy Deficit: Making the “Barbarians” Visible Because night is here but the barbarians have not come. Some people arrived from the frontiers, And they said that there are no longer any barbarians. And now what shall become of us without any barbarians? Those people were a kind of solution. —C. P. Cavafy, “Waiting for the Barbarians” The barbarians have declared war. —President George W. Bush C. P. Cavafy wrote “Waiting for the Barbarians” in 1927, but the poem haunts the aftermath of 9/11 with the force of an uncanny and prescient déjà vu. To what dilemma are the “barbarians” a kind of solution? Every modern empire faces an abiding crisis of legitimacy in that it flings its power over territories and peoples who have not consented to that power. Cavafy’s insight is that an imperial state claims legitimacy only by evoking the threat of the barbarians. It is only the threat of the barbarians that constitutes the silhouette of the empire’s borders in the first place. On the other hand, the hallucination of the barbarians disturbs the empire with perpetual nightmares of impending attack. The enemy is the abject of empire: the rejected from which we cannot part. And without the barbarians the legitimacy of empire vanishes like a disappearing phantom. Those people were a kind of solution.

#### Turns the critique more than they can solve; this becomes virtuous violence that cements the sovereign power they attempt to ward off

Campos 07 (Joseph H. Campos, The State and Terrorism: National Security and the Mobilization of Power, google books pg 101)

Later it was discovered that the U.S.' strikes against terrorist facilities in Sudanwere in fact attacks on pharmaceutical facilities. As long as the state maintains and successfully promotes its virtuous violence, it is able to name any action as justified in defense of the state and the security of its citizenry. Terrorist violence, not statist violence, is portrayed as the outlaw component of the international world order. Everything within the control of the state - from vast bodies of water, to borders, and ultimately to the complex working of the individual body - becomes a national security site that must be secured against the violence of terrorism. The state frames terrorists as inhumane individuals who corrupt the battlefields of statist control as it turns the "war" from actual fields of battle with physical space to fields of battle that are indeterminate, unstructured, and malleable. "The enemies of peace cannot defeat us with traditional military means" (Clinton, 1999: 86) and thus they warp time and space "realities" of the state in their production of fear and terror. The "civilized" order is then solidified and enacted by the state in the face of terrorism's "uncivilized" nature.

#### C. PRESIDENTIAL PRE-EMPTION – as long as the executive has the authority to kill at their will, it becomes impossible for the black cyborg to mount an effective revolution, the war doesn’t stop abroad, it can be contextualized to a war against black communities – the black body will be in the cross-hairs and their ignorance of the war abroad means the Black Cyborg’s revolution always fails

Bloice et al 13 (Carl Bloice is a BlackCommentator.com Editorial Board member, writer and senior activist in San Francisco, a member of the National Coordinating Committee of the Committees of Correspondence for Democracy and Socialism, a moderator at portside.org and formerly worked for a healthcare union. Bill Fletcher, Jr. is a long-time racial justice, labor and international activist and writer. He is a Senior Scholar with the Institute for Policy Studies and the immediate past president of TransAfrica Forum. He is the co-author of Solidarity Divided. Jamala is a long-time organizer and writer. She is a 2011 Alston-Bannerman Fellow and author of The Best of The Way I See It & Other Political Writings. She is the co-founder of the Organization for Black Struggle. “Black America and Obama’s Foreign Policy,” http://www.zcommunications.org/black-america-and-obama-s-foreign-policy-by-bill-fletcher-jr.html)

Well, this is a partial list, but the point here is that there is something very wrong in Obama’s foreign policy, yet you would not know that from Black America’s response. Foreign policy is not being debated on most African American talk radio programs and very rarely do we hear African American commentators in the mainstream media address the limitations of US foreign policy under Obama. While the Congressional Black Caucus has increasingly criticized the President around domestic policies, particularly the need by the administration to address the economic depression-like conditions of Black America, there is relative silence on foreign policy. This relative silence appears to be rooted in the same general problem that has afflicted Black America since the election of Obama: a belief that criticism and pressure is somehow destructive and disloyal. One can only conclude this in light of the fact that on most foreign policy matters Black America has shown an historic identification with the struggles for liberation and independence, especially in Asia, Africa and Latin America. African Americans were the most critical demographic segment of the USA when it came to the US invasion of Iraq, for instance, and we regularly criticize and openly oppose interventionist activities by the USA…except when they are carried out by the Obama Administration. We are not waving our fingers at anyone. Rather we are suggesting that this is a dangerous course of action because it represents a failure to recognize that the Obama administration is not about one individual named Barack Obama. It is an administration overseeing policies, many historically rooted, in the objective of building and sustaining global domination. In other words, this goes way beyond a question of Obama’s personal views and beliefs and speaks to the sort of administration that he constructed, including who were named top officials and who were excluded. By remaining silent in the face of US aggression (and law violations, such as the murder of Awlaki and drone attacks that take the lives of many civilian noncombatants) we are making several mistakes. For one, we are ignoring the precedent that is being set. Kill one US citizen without even an indictment (let alone a trial) and where does it end? Wave our swords at Iran and promote destabilization, and does this result in an all-out war? Send troops to Uganda, and does this become another Vietnam? Cajole military forces in one African country to invade another? None of this benefits Black America—not to mention the rest of the world—in the slightest and under other circumstances many African Americans would be protesting. Paradoxically, it is probably time for us to rethink Obama’s remarks at the Congressional Black Caucus banquet in September. When he said African Americans needed to stop complaining and put on our marching boots, many people became upset and felt insulted. But let’s think about this for a moment. Too many of us have been content to complain—sometimes bitterly—in private about what we fail to see from the Obama administration. So, maybe it is time to put on those marching boots, indeed, and march in protest not only against the demonic activities of the Republicans but as well against US aggression carried out by the first African American President of the United States of America? If not now, when? If not you (us), who?

#### Second, the permutation encapsulates the genealogical mapping of violence through the middle passage – there is no trade-off between our mapping of targeted killing and their mapping of the middle passage – their attempt to make our methodologies diametrically opposed partakes in a violent form of knowledge production that only voting aff can prevent – this is an independent reason to vote affirmative

Allen 7 (Douglas Allen Department of Philosophy, University of Maine “Mahatma Gandhi on Violence and Peace Education,” Project Muse)

Gandhi, of course, is very concerned with violence in the more usual sense of overt physical violence. He devotes considerable attention to identifying such violence, trying diverse approaches to conflict resolution, and providing nonviolent alternatives. This is evident in his many writings and struggles directed at war, overt terrorism, outbreaks of class and caste violence, and Hindu-Muslim communal violence. 6 However, for Gandhi, such serious overt violence constitutes only a small part of the violence that must be addressed by peace education. Gandhi’s approach to education emphasizes both the multidimensional nature of violence and the structural violence of the status quo. Educational violence cannot be separated from linguistic, economic, psychological, cultural, political, religious, and other forms of violence. These many dimensions of violence interact, mutually reinforce each other, and provide the subject matter and challenge for peace education. For example, language, inside or outside the classroom, can serve as a violent weapon used to control, manipulate, humiliate, intimidate, terrorize, oppress, exploit, and dominate other human beings. ‘‘Peaceful’’ situations, free from overt violent conflict, may be defined by deep psychological violence. If I am filled with ego-driven hatred, manifested as self-hatred and hatred for others, I am a very violent person. This will be manifested in how I relate to myself and to others, even if I repress or control my desire to strike out violently at the targets of my hatred. In his analysis of ‘‘normal’’ British colonial education in India, Gandhi frequently analyzes how the structures, values, and goals of such educational models inflicted great psychological and cultural violence on colonized Indians. Unlike most philosophers and others who adopt ethical and spiritual approaches, Gandhi places a primary emphasis on basic material needs and the ‘‘normal’’ state of economic violence. Repeatedly, he uses ‘‘violence’’ as synonymous with exploitation. He is attentive to unequal, asymmetrical, violent power relations in which some, who possess wealth, capital, and other material resources, are able to exploit and dominate those lacking such economic power. Gandhi identifies with the plight of starving and impoverished human beings and with the plight of peasants, workers, and others who are disempowered and dominated. He emphasizes that such economic violence is not the result of supernatural design or an immutable law of nature. It involves human-caused oppression, exploitation, domination, injustice, and suffering, and, hence, we as human beings are responsible. If I could change conditions and alleviate suffering, but I choose either to profit from such structural violence or not to get involved, I perpetuate, am complicit in, and am responsible for the economic violence of the status quo. Obviously, incorporating such concerns of economic violence broadens and radically changes the nature of peace education. In pointing to Gandhi’s radical challenges and to his value as a catalyst, we may touch briefly on a few aspects of educational violence in typical modern university settings. While focusing on universities, we must keep in mind that Gandhi submits that peace education must emphasize the formative training and socialization of young children. Most people do not think of universities and classroom teaching as violent, but Gandhi argues that ‘‘normal’’ university education is very violent, in terms of both multidimensional violence and the violence of the status quo. From Gandhi’s perspective, the ‘‘peaceful,’’ seemingly nonviolent classroom can be a very violent place, even when there are no actual outbursts of violence. A professor may use the grade as a weapon to threaten, intimidate, terrorize, and control students, including those who raise legitimate concerns questioning the analysis of the teacher who has institutional power over their futures. A teacher may use language, or even facial expressions and other body-language communication, in a violent way as when ignoring, humiliating, or ridiculing students who ask questions. Most often, these students will become silenced and will not subject themselves to the dangers of any further such terrifying humiliation. In more general terms, Gandhi would emphasize that universities educate students and do research in violent ways. Modern universities have increasingly become commodified and corporatized. Education is a good investment. Commodified students, as a means to some corporate end, are our most important ‘‘product.’’ Through education we increase their market-driven exchange value. Central Gandhian ethical, cultural, spiritual, social, and humanistic priorities regarding peace and nonviolence are usually ignored, occasionally attacked as unrealistic, and sometimes acknowledged but then unfunded and marginalized. Gandhi views many courses, departments, and colleges as violent even if this is taken as the status quo in no need of justification. Economic and business courses assume a framework and orientation in which students are educated to calculate how to maximize their narrow, ego-defined self-interests and how to defeat opponents and win economically in a world of adversarial, win-lose relations. For Gandhi, we are ‘‘educating’’ our students to such dominant economic models, models in which economic success is synonymous with maximizing economic exploitation, and exploitation is always violent. Similarly, Gandhi’s peace education would analyze most political science or government courses as inherently violent since they claim to be value-free but actually assume, as an immutable given, a status quo framework in which we live in a violent world of antagonistic adversarial relations. The goal is to win by amassing greater power and dominating those challenging one’s power interests. Similarly, public relations and communications courses usually adopt a violent framework in which the goal is to use language, images, and media to manipulate and control others, to get one’s way, and to maximize one’s narrow interests in winning in a world of violent relations. In terms of his own professional background, Gandhi was a barrister, and he makes the same kinds of criticisms of the violent adversarial legal system in which the goal is not cooperation, reconciliation, and peaceful relations, but exacerbating and exploiting multidimensional violence and winning at any cost by defeating the other. To provide one other, disciplinary illustration, Gandhi’s peace education points to the normal violence of the status quo reflected in most disciplines of the sciences, engineering, and technology. Scholars uncritically adopt models of instrumental rationality in which they provide the means allowing for the ends of control, domination, and exploitation of other human beings and of nature. Gandhi is not focusing on individual professors or students who are rewarded for acquiring and applying such scientific and technological means. His more fundamental and radical critique is of the unacknowledged structural violence that defines such disciplines and has devastating violent economic, military, political, and environmental effects on most of humanity and on nature. One of the most valuable contributions of Gandhi’s approach to violence is to broaden our focus so that we are able to situate our peace-education concerns in terms of the larger dominant, multidimensional structures of the violence of the status quo. For example, we uncritically accept the existence of a permanent war economy as just the way things are. We do not critique how the permanent war economy was created, is maintained, and flourishes best under conditions of insecurity, terror, violence, and war. We do not critique how it removes resources that could be provided to meet vital human needs and to provide alternative nonviolent ways of relating. Instead we accept a view of jobs and economic security dependent on a permanent war economy of insecurity, and we train students to become functionaries and contributors to a more effective war economy based on the perpetuation and domination of structural violence. Similarly, Gandhian peace education raises an awareness of how universities have increasingly become integral parts of what President Eisenhower called the military-industrial complex and what Senator J. William Fulbright reformulated as the military-industrial-academic complex.7 Universities increasingly approach transnational corporations, the military, the government, and other funding sources and promote themselves as valuable places to invest. Universities, as institutions of educational violence, provide the means, in terms of applied research and the education of students, to further the ends of the structural violence of the military-industrial complex based on the hierarchical, multidimensional, and violent relations of control, exploitation, and domination.

#### **C. COALITIONAL POLITICS – the alternative cannot solve the affirmative – insurgency in the American homeland cannot access our movement – only through mobilizing the outraged public can we check the violence of the executive and the state – and that spills over to other movements**

Heaney and Rojas-prof organizational studies and sociology, Indiana-12 (Antiwar Politics and Paths of Activist Participation on the Left, <http://www.indiana.edu/~workshop/papers/rojas_working%20paper.pdf>)

Charles Tilly (1985) famously argued that war making facilitated state building because wars allow states to expand their tax collecting capacity, which resulted in an expansion of the state itself. The US Social Forum data shows that Tilly's observation can be further developed. In modern America, wars increase movement capacity. Wars touch many sectors of society and are highly emotional events. They disproportionately attract people who are interested in movement activism. Thus, antiwar politics is often the starting point for many activism careers. The aggregate result is that other movements of the left are populated with activists who began as antiwar demonstrators. If the US Social Forum is an indicator of broader trends among progressives, American wars have successfully shifted the left. The lives of activists are now intertwined with antiwar activism.

We do not argue non-peace issues are no longer an important element of the American left. Rather, war making has resulted in a fundamental re-articulation of the relationship between the different social movements that are found in American society. Early in the 20th century, activism was often dominated by "old left" issues, such as labor. In the mid-20th century, the 31 new and old left developed a complex relationship, which at time was competitive and at other times supportive. One strand of civil rights movement scholarship, for example, argues that labor and civil rights were in conflict (Foner 1981; Quadagno 1992). Other scholars have argued that the civil rights movement had a rejuvenating effect on labor unions (Isaac and Chistiansen 2002; Isaac, McDonald and Lukasik 2006). Taken together, this scholarship suggests that old and new social movements co-existed on the same political stage. Major American wars and the post-WWII defense build-up have brought antiwar activism to the forefront of activism. Major wars and other national security issues, such as the deployment of nuclear weapons in the 1980s, created a consistent point of contention, which commanded substantial resources from activists. The persistent effort to combat war has resulted in a situation where the peace movement is ubiquitous and highly connected to other movements. The relationship is asymmetric. The antiwar movement is much more likely to send it recruits to other movements.

#### Their pessimism creates the conditions for a self-fulfilling prophecy of violence and can’t transform the structures it attempts to criticize – the black cyborg will never be able to transcend institutions of domestic militarism and will be pigeon-holed into a status of social death

Chernus last updated 13 (Ira Chernus PROFESSOR OF RELIGIOUS STUDIES UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO AT BOULDER “REINHOLD NIEBUHR'S CRITIQUE OF NONVIOLENCE” http://www.colorado.edu/ReligiousStudies/chernus/Niebuhr.htm)

Their theological mentor soon began to complain that they had missed his point. He protested that his ideas were being used to justify the kind of self-righteousness that he most opposed. He pointed out that the U.S., in its effort to protect the "free world," sometimes accepted injustices as bad as those it was opposing. In the last years of his life, he criticized the Vietnam War as the most egregious example of U.S. good intentions gone awry. But it was too late. His words had helped to set in motion political changes that he could not control. Ironically, his own theories could explain why this would happen and why it would be inevitable. Niebuhr always appreciated the ironies of human life. For him, they were the clearest evidence that we are all finite, fallible creatures whose best efforts for good are always mixed with evil, beyond our control. Yet he could never accept the irony that his Christian "realism" and his rejection of nonviolence, however well-intentioned, had helped to bring the U.S. to moral disasters like the Vietnam War, and the world to the brink of nuclear destruction. However, this outcome may be less ironic than it appears. There is a clear logical line leading from Niebuhr's initial premises to the horrors of the cold war and the nuclear age. Niebuhr's thinking starts out from a world divided between one transcendent, infinite Creator and many lowly, finite creatures. It is a hierarchical world, with an inevitable tension between the ruler and the ruled. The same kinds of divisions and tensions mark the relationships among the creatures. They experience themselves as essentially separate from each other. They are like the separate pots produced by the potter, all lined up one by one on the shelf. They have no pre-existing connections as part of their essential being. So they must struggle to make connections. But precisely because they feel so small and isolated, each creature tries to aggrandize itself at the expense of others. So the struggle to make connections becomes an arena of conflict and domination. The hierarchical structure of the cosmos is replicated in every human society, from the nuclear family on up to the family of nations. The ruler dominates, hoping to preserve at least a minimal degree of order. The ruled resist domination. The cycle of conflict and violence has no end. What is to prevent such a world from degenerating into all-out chaos? The only answer Niebuhr could offer is some combination of a bit of reason and a bit of humility, as preached by religious leaders like himself. But his own theory predicts that reason and humility will always be overwhelmed by human passions. The only real limit to the destructiveness of social conflict is the limit set by the state of destructive technology. Unfortunately for Niebuhr, during his lifetime technology surpassed all limits in its ability to destroy. The specter of nations threatening each other with total obliteration, using weapons on hair-trigger alert, was actually Niebuhr's own picture of human society as a jungle, taken to its extreme. From the viewpoint of the nonviolence tradition, this tragedy flows inexorably from Niebuhr's premises. If the basic fact of reality is not connectedness but separation, if the basic structure of reality is not freedom but subjection to hierarchical authority, then there is no way to escape from conflict, violence, and destruction. Niebuhr often described the human condition as "tragic." The nonviolence tradition would suggest that the tragedy is not in some unalterable human condition, but in a description of human life that makes tragedy the only possible outcome. The fate of Niebuhr's writings, leading to results he neither expected nor approved, shows that every view of human life can become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Any words that describe human life and human society help to create the kind of life and the kind of society that they describe. The nonviolence tradition is based on descriptions of human life quite different from Niebuhr's. They allow the possibility of escaping from tragedy into a more cooperative, harmonious, and peaceful life. And precisely because they allow for that possibility, they may make it more possible.

## 1AR

### Ableism

#### Our representations, even if imperfect, don’t devalue peoples lives

Vehmas and Watson 13—Disability Studies at the Universities of Helsinki and Glasgow respectively

(Simo and Nick, “Moral wrongs, disadvantages, and disability: a critique of critical disability studies”, Disability & Society (2013))

Further, deconstructing differences will not in and of itself produce respect and equality between all people with various characteristics. Neither will it result in a social order free from a sense of difference. It is simply unrealistic to assume that a society could exist were people would not see some other people as different, and their lives or characteristics as representing a deviation from some norm considered important regarding good human life. This is because some of the individual characteristics that define disabled people are, sometimes with good reason, undesirable, even in a utopia where all differences would have been queered. Disability is not the same as many other group identities and we need to explore both morally and socially disability and difference rather than simply use difference as a concept through which to critique the disability identity. There are no rational reasons to consider homosexuality or gender undesirable characteristics whatever the social context, but there are many impairments that can reasonably be seen as undesirable (Shakespeare 2006). Motor neuron disease, depression or spinal cord injury are the kinds of conditions that we would prefer not to have, and this is not merely because of the cultural representations attached to them but because these conditions are the kinds of predicaments that cause suffering irrespective of one’s cultural environment. In acknowledging that impairments can include an undesirable dimension does not imply devaluing people with impairments nor their positive group identity (Shakespeare and Watson 2010). As long as people are genuinely free to decide for themselves and feel about themselves however they wish to feel, we are pretty close to relational justice, free from hierarchical evils. Imposing on people ableist or disablist assumptions is certainly wrong, but so would be the denial of the personal experiences of fearing the loss of one’s physical and mental capacities, or the fear of dying (Carel 2008). To explain the psychological anguish related to conditions such as motor neurone disease or depression merely in terms of internalized oppression and ableism would be insensitive, disrespectful and simply nonsensical.

### LoO

#### No link---it’s just a link of omission

Rorty ‘2 (Professor of Comparative Literature @ Stanford, `02 (Richard, Peace Review, vol. 14, no. 2, p. 152-153)

I have no quarrel with Cornell's and Spivak's claim that "what is missing in a literary text or historical narrative leaves its mark through the traces of its expulsion." For that seems simply to say that any text will presuppose the existence of people, things, and institutions that it hardly mentions. So the readers of a literary text will always be able to ask themselves questions such as: "Who prepared the sumptuous dinner the lovers enjoyed?" "How did they get the money to afford that meal?" The reader of a historical narrative will always be able to wonder about where the money to finance the war came from and about who got to decide whether the war would take place. "Expulsion," however, seems too pejorative a term for the fact that no text can answer all possible questions about its own background and its own presuppositions. Consider Captain Birch, the agent of the East Indian Company charged with persuading the Rani of Sirmur not to commit suicide. Spivak is not exactly "expelling" Captain Birch from her narrative by zeroing in on the Rani, even though she does not try to find out much about Birch's early days as a subaltern, nor about the feelings of pride or shame or exasperation he may have experienced in the course of his conversations with the Rani. In the case of Birch, Spivak does not try to "gently blow precarious ashes into their ghostly shape," nor does she speculate about the possible sublimity of his career. Nor should she. S.ivak has her own fish to and her own witness to bear just as Kipling had his when he spun tales of the humiliations to which newly arrived subalterns were subjected in the regimental messes of the Raj. So do all authors of literary texts and historical narratives, and such texts and narratives should not always be read as disingenuous exercises in repression. They should be read as one version of a story that could have been told, and should be told, in many other ways.

### Nonviolence good

#### Only nonviolent ethics can ensure the equality of all beings- violence inevitably begets political failure.

May 7 (Todd May is Professor of Philosophy at Clemson University. He is the author of seven books of philosophy, most recently Gilles Deleuze: An Introduction (Cambridge, 2005) and The Philosophy of Foucault (Acumen, 2006), “Jacques Rancière and the Ethics of Equality,” Project Muse)

In political action, the tapestry of this weaving together of cognitive and affective elements around the presupposition of equality has a name, although that name is rarely reflected upon. It is solidarity. Political solidarity is nothing other than the operation of the presupposition of equality internal to the collective subject of political action. It arises in the ethical character of that collective subject, a subject that itself arises only on the basis of its action. When one joins a picket line, or speaks publicly about the oppression of the Palestinians or the Tibetans or the Chechnyans, or attends a meeting whose goal is to organize around issues of fair housing, or brings one's bicycle to a ride with Critical Mass, one is not—if one is engaged in what Rancière calls politics—doing so from a position above or outside those alongside whom one struggles. Rather, one joins the creation of a political subject (which does not mean sacrificing one's own being to it). One acts, in concert with others, on the presupposition of the equality of any and every speaking being. And here is where the justificatory character of the ethics of political action lies. It cannot lie, as we have seen, in an ethical framework that possesses an ultimate foundation. It lies instead in a principle—the presupposition of equality—that can ground and justify political action only to the extent to which it is accepted by those alongside whom and [End Page 33] against whom one struggles. It is, in that sense, an optional ethical principle. But, as we have also seen, this does not mean that it is an arbitrary one. In our world, the presupposition of equality is embedded deep within the ethical framework of most societies. Even when it is honored in the breach, it remains honored. Political action consists in narrowing the breach. There remain two questions to ask about this ethics. The first one is interpretive and can be answered quickly: What is the relationship of this ethics to a vision of contemporary anarchism? The second is normative, and can only be responded to, at least at this moment, with a theoretical gesture: What, if any, implications for the specifics of political action does this ethical framework have? The interpretive question concerns the relation of the ethics of Rancière's politics to anarchism. I hope that the bond between the two will be obvious to those who have either studied or acted within the framework of anarchism. Anarchism's rejection of an avant-garde politics, its concern with the process of political action, its sensitivity to various forms of domination both in society at large and in political communities themselves, and its orientation toward radical equality, are all accounted for in the ethics and politics of the presupposition of equality. What Rancière's work does politically and implies ethically is of a piece with the deepest concerns of much of contemporary anarchism. Moreover, he offers a coherent way to frame those concerns and to bring them forward theoretically. Unlike traditional Marxism, anarchism, in its concern for equality, has often been reluctant to engage in theoretical reflection. If what has been said here is correct, that reluctance is unwarranted. There is much to be understood in politics, and many who can contribute to that understanding. Among what is to be understood is the second question alluded to above: what, if anything, do the ethics of political action imply for the character of political action itself? I would suggest that the pre-supposition of equality among those who act cannot remain limited to those alongside whom one acts. It must also apply to one's adversaries. If those who have no part are to see themselves as equal to those who have a part, then they must also see those who have a part as equal to them. This has implications for political action. I would suggest that such a presupposition of equality among all parties must orient political action toward non-violent means. One must, insofar as possible, refrain from treating those against whom one struggles as beneath consideration, as open game, or as what Kant would call solely a means to one's own ends. This requires political action to be more than just a struggle for [End Page 34] suppression of the adversary, even where the adversary engages in cynical domination. It must be creative in its expression of the presupposition of equality. Nonviolence in politics is often confused with passivity. This is not the place to explain the nature and possibilities of nonviolent action,7 however it must be understood that nonviolence often lies at the opposite pole from political passivity, further away from it than violent resistance. Violent resistance remains in many cases the norm. One is dominated, so one dominates; one is oppressed, so one oppresses. In that sense, violence is always the easy political option. It reverses the power in a relationship. What nonviolence can achieve is something else: not a reversal of power, but an effacing of the terms in which a context of power has been conceived. In the framework of a political orientation whose task is to declassify, nonviolent action carries with it more radical possibilities for declassification than the simple inversion that is the standard consequence of violent resistance. If this line of thinking is right, or even if it is wrong in a fruitful way, then the perspective that Rancière has opened for us is not so much a framework within which we can fit our political thinking as it is a door through which we must walk in order better to reflect upon that thinking. The presupposition of equality opens political thought to new vistas—vistas that, given the history of the last century, should appear more attractive to us now than they might once have done. In this sense, anarchism lies before us rather than behind us, as a political task to be thought and engaged rather than as a historical footnote to be buried alongside other challenges to the pervasive and multifarious dominations of our world.