## 1AC

Same as every other aff debate at Harvard

## 2AC

### WF

#### No link – no snowballing effects – the plan will be limited

Brooks, prof of Law @ Georgetown, 13 (Rosa, Senior Fellow at the New America Foundation, “The Constitutional and Counterterrorism Implications of Targeted Killing”, Testimony Before the Senate, April 23, 2013, http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/04-23-13BrooksTestimony.pdf)

It is also worth noting that the practical concerns militating against justiciability in the context of traditional wartime situations do not exist to the same degree here. On traditional battlefields, imposing due process or judicial review requirements on targeting decisions would be unduly burdensome, as many targeting decisions must be made in situations of extreme urgency. In the context of targeted killings outside traditional battlefields, this is rarely the case. While the window of opportunity in which to strike a given target may be brief and urgent, decisions about whether an individual may lawfully be targeted are generally made well in advance.

### 2AC Restriction

#### We meet-Due process rights are judicial restrictions on executive authority

Al-Aulaqi Motion to Dismiss Memo 2013 (PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS, files February 5, 2013)

Despite Defendants’ attempt to distinguish the habeas cases, Defs. Br. 12, claims alleging

unlawful deprivation of life under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause are as textually

committed to the courts as claims brought under the Suspension Clause. Both are fundamental

judicial checks on executive authority. Cf. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 993 (D.C. Cir.

1997) (rejecting distinction between the Suspension Clause and Bill of Rights amendments

because both are “restrictions on governmental power”), rev’d on other grounds by Boumediene,

553 U.S. 723.

#### C/I – Authority is what the president may do not what the president can do

Ellen Taylor 96, 21 Del. J. Corp. L. 870 (1996), Hein Online

The term authority is commonly thought of in the context of the law of agency, and the Restatement (Second) of Agency defines both power and authority.'89 Power refers to an agent's ability or capacity to produce a change in a legal relation (whether or not the principal approves of the change), and authority refers to the power given (permission granted) to the agent by the principal to affect the legal relations of the principal; the distinction is between what the agent can do and what the agent may do.

#### C/I --- Restriction is limitation, NOT prohibition

CAC 12,COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ALTERNATIVE MEDICINAL CANNABIS COLLECTIVE et al., Defendants and Appellants, DIVISION ONE, 207 Cal. App. 4th 601; 143 Cal. Rptr. 3d 716; 2012 Cal. App. LEXIS 772

We disagree with County that in using the phrases “further restrict the location or establishment” and “regulate the location or establishment” in [\*615] section 11362.768, subdivisions (f) and (g), the Legislature intended to authorize local governments to ban all medical marijuana dispensaries that are otherwise “authorized by law to possess, cultivate, or distribute medical marijuana” (§ 11362.768, subd. (e) [stating scope of section's application]); the Legislature did not use the words “ban” or “prohibit.” Yet County cites dictionary definitions of “regulate” (to govern or direct according to rule or law); “regulation” (controlling by rule or restriction; a rule or order that has legal force); “restriction” (a limitation or qualification, including on the use of property); “establishment” (the act of establishing or state or condition of being established); “ban” (to prohibit); and “prohibit” (to forbid by law; to prevent or hinder) to attempt to support its interpretation. County then concludes that “the ordinary meaning [\*\*\*23] of the terms, ‘restriction,’ ‘regulate,’ and ‘regulation’ are consistent with a ban or prohibition against the opening or starting up or continued operation of [a medical marijuana dispensary] storefront business.” We disagree.¶CA(9)(9) The ordinary meanings of “restrict” and “regulate” suggest a degree of control or restriction falling short of “banning,” “prohibiting,” “forbidding,” or “preventing.” Had the Legislature intended to include an outright ban or prohibition among the local regulatory powers authorized in section 11362.768, subdivisions (f) and (g), it would have said so. Attributing the usual and ordinary meanings to the words used in section 11362.768, subdivisions (f) and (g), construing the words in context, attempting to harmonize subdivisions (f) and (g) with section 11362.775 and with the purpose of California's medical marijuana [\*\*727] statutory program, and bearing in mind the intent of the electorate and the Legislature in enacting the CUA and the MMP, we conclude that HN21Go to this Headnote in the case.the phrases “further restrict the location or establishment” and “regulate the location or establishment” in section 11362.768, subdivisions (f) and (g) do not authorize a per se ban at the local level. The Legislature [\*\*\*24] decided in section 11362.775 to insulate medical marijuana collectives and cooperatives from nuisance prosecution “solely on the basis” that they engage in a dispensary function. To interpret the phrases “further restrict the location or establishment” and “regulate the location or establishment” to mean that local governments may impose a blanket nuisance prohibition against dispensaries would frustrate both the Legislature's intent to “[e]nhance the access of patients and caregivers to medical marijuana through collective, cooperative cultivation projects” and “[p]romote uniform and consistent application of the [CUA] among the counties within the state” and the electorate's intent to “ensure that seriously ill Californians have the right to obtain and use marijuana for medical purposes” and “encourage the federal and state governments to implement a plan to provide for the safe and affordable distribution of marijuana to all patients in medical need of marijuana.”

#### Their interpretation is flawed

#### A. Over limits-The core cases on the topic all revolve around regulating executive behavior not banning specific policies. Their interpretation would eliminate the role of most topic literature across the areas.

#### B. Affirmative Ground-Ban specific policies like drones are dead in the water to any type of agent counterplan. You should err affirmative because the range of good affirmatives is very small this year and the negative is strapped with an arsenal of generics.

#### ---Reasonability-competing interpretations causes substance crowd by encouraging debate over Topicality instead of war powers. Good is good enough when the topic is already limited by areas and our affirmative is squarely located in the literature over how to limit executive authority.

### 2AC – Counterplan

#### The only way anyone could sue is by suing the entire DOD – that’s impossible – sovereign immunity and lack of a remedial extension

Rehnquist 01 (Chief Justice Rehnquist, Opinion in: CORRECTIONAL SERVICES CORPORATION,

PETITIONER v. JOHN E. MALESKO, on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the second circuit, Nov 27, http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/534/61)

In sum, respondent is not a plaintiff in search of a remedy as in Bivens and Davis . Nor does he ~~[~~they] seek a cause of action against an individual officer, otherwise lacking, as in Carlson. Respondent instead seeks a marked extension of Bivens , to contexts that would not advance Bivens’ core purpose of deterring individual officers from engaging in unconstitutional wrongdoing. The caution toward extending Bivens remedies into any new context, a caution consistently and repeatedly recognized for three decades, forecloses such an extension here.

#### Special ops fail – under-resourced

Robinson 13 (Linda, adjunct senior fellow for U.S. national security and foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) “The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces” Council of Foreign Relations Report - Council Special Report No. 66)

OPERATIONAL SHORTFALLS The most glaring and critical operational deficit is the fact that, accord- ing to doctrine, the theater special operations commands are supposed to be the principal node for planning and conducting special operations in a given theater—yet they are the most severely under resourced com- mands. Rather than world-class integrators of direct and indirect capa- bilities, theater special operations commands are egregiously short of sufficient quantity and quality of staff and intelligence, analytical, and planning resoruces. They are also supposed to be the principal advisers on special operations to their respective geographic combatant com- manders, but they rarely have received the respect and support of the four-star command. The latter often redirects resources and staff that are supposed to go to the theater special operations commands, which routinely receive about 20 percent fewer personnel than they have been formally assigned.'2 Furthermore, career promotions from TSOC staff jobs are rare, which makes those assignments unattractive and results in a generally lower-quality workforce. Finally, a high proportion of the personnel are on short-term assignment or are reservists with inade- quate training. Because of this lack of resources, theater special opera- tions commands have been unable to fulfill their role of planning and conducting special operations.

### 2AC – Peace K

#### The role of the ballot is to simulate a debate about the enactment of the plan versus the status quo or a competitive policy option; discussing the implications of applying the law to drones is key to predictability and a norms that restrict violence

Leahy 10 (Mary-Kate Leahy, Colonel, US military, “KEEPING UP WITH THE DRONES: IS JUST WAR THEORY OBSOLETE?,” http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a526187.pdf)

Failure to examine whether the laws of war remain relevant or should be modified is dangerous. If we delay or indefinitely defer this discussion the risks associated with this procrastination will continue to accumulate. Without broad agreement on the fundamental issue of who is a legal combatant, ordinary civilians who develop this technology and elected leaders who approve its employment potentially become targets at home and abroad. As the operators of weapon systems become more distant from the physical battlefield, the killing process is “sanitized”; UAS operators‟ exemption from physical danger creates a scenario in which “virtueless” war becomes the norm. In such an environment, the warrior ethos is potentially forever altered – and not for the good. Another risk we face if employment of this technology proceeds unchecked and its moral implications unexamined, is the arrival of the day when a “human in the loop” in UAS employment becomes unnecessary. If that day arrives, the principle of proportionality is irrelevant – because human assessment of the cost versus benefit decision regarding a military strike will have been eliminated. These are just a few of the eventualities which await us if we fail to adequately address how UAS changes the conduct of modern warfare. The seriousness of these issues makes this an issue of strategic importance for the United States, as well as both our friends and our adversaries around the globe.

#### That’s critical – political engagement in debate is critical for creating effective forms of public deliberation necessary to challenge illegitimate national security policy

Kurr-Ph.D. student Communication, Penn State-9/5/13

Bridging Competitive Debate and Public Deliberation on Presidential War Powers

http://public.cedadebate.org/node/14

The second major function concerns the specific nature of deliberation over war powers. Given the connectedness between presidential war powers and the preservation of national security, deliberation is often difficult. Mark Neocleous describes that when political issues become securitized; it “helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms.” (2008, p. 71). Collegiate debaters, through research and competitive debate, serve as a bulwark against this “short-circuiting” and help preserve democratic deliberation. This is especially true when considering national security issues. Eric English contends, “The success … in challenging the dominant dialogue on homeland security politics points to efficacy of academic debate as a training ground.” Part of this training requires a “robust understanding of the switch-side technique” which “helps prevent misappropriation of the technique to bolster suspect homeland security policies” (English et. al, 2007, p. 224). Hence, competitive debate training provides foundation for interrogating these policies in public. Alarmism on the issues of war powers is easily demonstrated by Obama’s repeated attempts to transfer detainees from Guantanamo Bay. Republicans were able to launch a campaign featuring the slogan, “not in my backyard” (Schor, 2009). By locating the nexus of insecurity as close as geographically possible, the GOP were able to instill a fear of national insecurity that made deliberation in the public sphere not possible. When collegiate debaters translate their knowledge of the policy wonkery on such issues into public deliberation, it serves to cut against the alarmist rhetoric purported by opponents. In addition to combating misperceptions concerning detainee transfers, the investigative capacity of collegiate debate provides a constant check on governmental policies. A new trend concerning national security policies has been for the government to provide “status updates” to the public. On March 28, 2011, Obama gave a speech concerning Operation Odyssey Dawn in Libya and the purpose of the bombings. Jeremy Engels and William Saas describe this “post facto discourse” as a “new norm” where “Americans are called to acquiesce to decisions already made” (2013, p. 230). Contra to the alarmist strategy that made policy deliberation impossible, this rhetorical strategy posits that deliberation is not necessary. Collegiate debaters researching war powers are able to interrogate whether deliberation is actually needed. Given the technical knowledge base needed to comprehend the mechanism of how war powers operate, debate programs serve as a constant investigation into whether deliberation is necessary not only for prior action but also future action. By raising public awareness, there is a greater potential that “the public’s inquiry into potential illegal action abroad” could “create real incentives to enforce the WPR” (Druck, 2010, p. 236). While this line of interrogation could be fulfilled by another organization, collegiate debaters who translate their competitive knowledge into public awareness create a “space for talk” where the public has “previously been content to remain silent” (Engels & Saas, 2013, p. 231). Given the importance of presidential war powers and the strategies used by both sides of the aisle to stifle deliberation, the import of competitive debate research into the public realm should provide an additional check of being subdued by alarmism or acquiescent rhetorics. After creating that space for deliberation, debaters are apt to influence the policies themselves. Mitchell furthers, “Intercollegiate debaters can play key roles in retrieving and amplifying positions that might otherwise remain sedimented in the policy process” (2010, p. 107). With the timeliness of the war powers controversy and the need for competitive debate to reorient publicly, the CEDA/Miller Center series represents a symbiotic relationship that ought to continue into the future. Not only will collegiate debaters become better public advocates by shifting from competition to collaboration, the public becomes more informed on a technical issue where deliberation was being stifled. As a result, debaters reinvigorate debate.

#### Dismissing our reforms creates a precedent for future executives – rule of law is key

Cole 10 (David Cole is a professor at Georgetown University Law Center, “Breaking Away,” http://www.newrepublic.com/article/magazine/politics/79752/breaking-away-obama-bush-aclu-guantanamo-war-on-terror)

To dismiss the changes Obama has introduced as merely rhetorical, however, as Goldsmith and others have done, is to miss the critical difference between lawless and law-abiding exercises of state power. The Constitution, domestic law, and international law permit democracies to take aggressive action to defend themselves against attacks like the ones we suffered on September 11. But they insist that when the state employs coercion to achieve security, it must abide by rules designed to forestall government abuse and respect human rights. Bush blatantly disregarded this principle; Obama has embraced it. It is true that, by the end of his term, Bush had been compelled to curtail his most aggressive assertions of power. Waterboarding was out, many of the disappeared prisoners had been transferred to Guantánamo and identified, the military commissions had been improved, and courts were reviewing Guantánamo detentions. But Bush adopted these changes grudgingly, after losing before the courts, Congress, and public opinion. And as the declassified torture memos illustrate, his administration continued to obstinately reinterpret the laws against torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment in order to permit the CIA to do precisely what Congress, the courts, and international law had forbade. By contrast, Obama has willingly accepted the limits of law. Critics on all sides undermine their credibility if they fail to acknowledge the significant differences between Obama and Bush. Liberals risk sounding as if no national security policy short of ordinary criminal law enforcement will suffice, while conservatives and moderates appear tone-deaf to the difference that the rule of law makes to the legitimacy of state power. For both advocates of civil liberties and defenders of Bush, it is tempting to accuse the Obama administration of being no better than its predecessor. But if we fail to recognize the changes he has instituted, we run the risk of contributing to a misleading historical narrative that will support future presidents who might choose to repeat Bush’s errors. On issues of executive power, history can play an important role. Even if Obama himself is unlikely to unleash the tactics of the previous administration, a future president might justify doing so by pointing to the fact that observers from across the political spectrum agreed that both Bush and Obama had embraced the same policy. There are, however, two areas in which Obama has come up painfully short, and that is on issues of transparency and accountability. These failures threaten to undermine the good that Obama has otherwise done, because if U.S. counterterrorism policy is to succeed, it is critical to restore the trust that Bush’s policies so recklessly squandered.

Alt is unachievable and violence is inevitable – belief that it is unrealistic justifies preemptive, international aggression – credible norms are key

Joyner 8 (Daniel, is an Associate Professor, University of Alabama School of Law, “JUS AD BELLUM IN THE AGE OF WMD PROLIFERATION,” http://docs.law.gwu.edu/stdg/gwilr/PDFs/40-1/40-1-Joyner.pdf)

This, then, is the heart of the crisis: a significant number of states¶ now believe that their vital national security interests require them¶ to act in a manner that is in breach of the laws governing international uses of force laid down in the U.N. Charter. This is not a¶ temporary policy shift, nor are actions taken in pursuance of¶ counterproliferation policies isolated or extraordinary events. Policies of counterproliferation-oriented preemptive use of force are a¶ part of a systematic rethinking within a significant number of states¶ about the security environment in which states find themselves,¶ and the policy options those states feel they must maintain in order¶ to defend themselves against modern threats, and to pursue their¶ essential interests internationally.32 This is a revision of thought¶ that is likely to persist and mature within these states, and it is likely¶ that, as WMD proliferation inevitably spreads and becomes more¶ intimately a part of the security concerns of a growing number of¶ states, those states too will arrive at the conclusion that traditional non-proliferation efforts based in multilateralism and diplomacy,¶ and utilizing strategies such as deterrence and containment, are¶ not wholly sufficient to deal with these realities. They will likely¶ conclude, as others have done, that policies of preemptive use of¶ force against states and non-state actors that threaten them with¶ WMD, and who will not sufficiently respond to or be managed by¶ these classic strategies, are a necessary addition to the policy¶ options at their disposal.¶ Therefore, at the heart of the current crisis in international use¶ of force law is a continuing, and likely increasing gap between the¶ provisions of existing law and the perceptions of a significant number of important states of the realities of the international political¶ issue area that law is meant to regulate—a classic gap between law¶ and reality caused by the law simply lagging behind the dynamics¶ of technological and geo-political change.33 Such a situation, in¶ which the law is seen by its subjects to be out of touch with the “on¶ the ground” realities of the decisions and actions it is intended to¶ govern, in any area of the law, is simply unsustainable, and as in¶ any other area of law the result of this gap is decreasing confidence¶ in the law and its institutions of maintenance, a decreasing perception of the validity of the law, increasing antagonism toward the¶ law, and resultant non-compliance with the reason-offending¶ rules.34 This indeed was one of the fundamental reasons underlying the decision by Western powers to invade Iraq in 2003, and is¶ the reason that fears abound regarding future acts of force outside¶ of the U.N. Charter use of force system by counterproliferationoriented states, in places like Iran and North Korea.

#### Rejecting war collapses deterrence and risks nuclear war—ideological conflict assures escalation

Dipert 6 (Randall, PhD, Professor of Philosophy, University at Buffalo, Buffalo, “Preventive War and the Epistemological Dimension of the Morality of War,” https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1291-dipert-preventive-war)

One might think that this principle would give little guidance in recommending anticipatory wars. However, let us suppose that John Rawls, following Raymond Aron and others, is correct in claiming that democratic states (‘liberal constitutional democracies’) have very few except legitimate reasons to go to war, and consequently rarely do go to war for ‘bad’ reasons (Rawls 1999: 47).42 Some wars might still occur because of epistemic mistakes or from (legitimate) mutual fear and distrust trust\*/something Rawls seems not to consider. Let us further suppose that this general level of warfare in a region or in the world gradually decreases in those places where there exist nothing but constitutional democracies. Let us further suppose that democracy can be imposed, or the conditions for democracy can be created, by the correct application of military force. Then there are circumstances in which, if the conditions for the permissibility of preventive of war are met, then preventive war is further recommended by this second principle. There is an interesting question here, beyond philosophical considerations, about whether a nation should formulate and announce policies of exactly what conditions will, and what conditions will not, trigger preventive war. 43 But there is another and telling side of this coin: what if we should have and announce a policy of never engaging in any preemptive or preventive war? Here I think we are encouraging a hostile enemy to prepare an offensive, including weapons development, right up an actual attack. If there do exist, or can possibly exist, truly devastating weapons, this is to invite their development and one’s own annihilation. Even a small nuclear power with ballistic missiles (perhaps positioning missiles on ocean freighters on the high seas) would be free to inflict devastating attacks. While large, stable countries such as China and the former USSR, have historically been deterred by the policy of massive nuclear retaliation, it is unlikely that all nuclear nations with ballistic missiles (including terrorist organizations), will remain deterrable. I believe that such a policy of banning or foreswearing preventive war would almost certainly result in more, rather than fewer, wars and deaths, because it would embolden more state-like entities to believe that they could succeed in an unjust war, especially in ideological wars whose ‘success’ consists simply in inflicting harm on its enemy at all costs.44 To announce a policy of rejecting any preemptive or preventive war is thus almost certainly mistaken and violates my second principle insofar as it increases possible threats. The rare and careful use of restricted preemptive and preventive war, under unspecified conditions, in the world we are likely to have for centuries\*/without, for example, militarily dominant international organizations willing to punish with force the illegitimate use of force\*/is actually likely to make the world more safe. This is not a conclusion that I am especially happy with.45

#### And the alt fails, state action is key to solve. Policy makers and elites are responsive.

Kurki 2011 Milja, The Limitations of the Critical Edge: Reflections on Critical and Philosophical IR Scholarship Today, Principal Investigator of ‘Political Economies of Democratisation’, a European Research Council-funded project based at the International Politics Department, Aberystwyth University, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 40(1) 129–146 September 2011

We have yet another call to a new beginning, another meta-theoretical debate for the consumers of international relations theory. This is the easy part, and I support it as far as it goes. However, now it is time to move beyond introductions and openings to concrete applications, to the construction and illustration of viable alternatives. It is important that we proceed in this manner not because these alternatives are necessarily going to be ‘better’, closer to ‘truth’ or more ‘real’ in some sense than prevailing theoretical explanations; but in order to demonstrate the possibility of alternative – possibly, but not necessarily, superior – conceptualisations, that are otherwise widely held to be self-evident by the vast majority of scholars of IR.53 There have been many calls for more critical and philosophical debate in IR; yet, just how critical are all these debates and what effects do they have? What is the purpose of critical IR theory or philosophical reflection, and what is the purpose of the supposed theoretical diversity that the critical voices bring into IR? Many, in my view, misunderstand their purpose. Biersteker summarises my own view perfectly. The point of philosophical reflection and post-positivism, he argues, is not to provide ‘pluralism without purpose, but a critical pluralism, designed to reveal embedded power and authority structures, provoke critical scrutiny of dominant discourses, engage marginalised peoples and perspectives and provide a basis for alternative conceptualisations’.54 There is a purpose to critical theory that needs to be acknowledged, reflected upon and ‘practised’; both inside and outside academia. At present, it seems to me that relatively little such engagement takes place; not because critical theorists are ‘lazy’ or wrong-headed, but because the disciplinary environment and professional structures favour disassociation and depoliticisation even of these strands of thought. Strategic thinking of critical theorists is not missing, but it is oriented in such a way that does not facilitate real-world political changes. In the era of the expansion of the image of homo oeconomicus in academia too, much remains to be done in reinvigorating critical theoretical thought. At present, we have many theoretically sophisticated but practically disinvested scholars. This renders IR, and especially philosophical and critical theory within it, rather useless in challenging global structures and paradigms of domination. But what can we do about this? Arguably, revisions of conceptual categories and their political underpinnings, as well as spaces to think about alternatives, are needed more than ever. But how do we generate them, or, in Cox’s or Murphy’s words, how can IR academics help in generating such alternatives? We can do so in a few ways. We can do so by passing on the torch by continuing to teach critical theory: as Hoffman usefully reminds us, theorising itself (and passing it on through teaching) is a critical practice in itself.55 We can also do so today by continuing to fight the cuts to social science research in universities and the constriction of space for free thought within universities. We can also seek to obtain, but also seek to reshape, the kind of research funding that is provided by funding councils or states. This takes some perseverance, for it is not easy to argue for conceptual or philosophical engagement, let alone critical praxaeology, at a time of crisis or for reform within bureaucratic and conservative structures. Yet, this brings in another core aspect of the challenge faced by critical theorists, which is that we must also seek to engage with the world: to act in it as well as analyse it. We must engage the social groups and NGOs, but also the elites and bureaucrats. We can do so and we must try and do so; partly because these elites (and also NGO elites) are actually more well-meaning and even reflective than many academics give them credit for; and because, in my experience, they are very capable of understanding both the pros and cons, limits and possibilities, of alternative frameworks and actions when concretely presented with them. This is not to say that significant structural and ideological constraints do not exist to generating alternative political scenarios – they do – but the structures are only partly, and in many cases only secondarily, supported, even by governmental or intergovernmental elites. These elites may be a good ally, rather than an enemy, in re-shifting international political and economic paradigms. The result of a new kind of engagement with the empirical and the practical is not necessarily a victory of critical theory; critical theory rarely – indeed never, it would seem – ‘wins’, that much is a clear lesson of history. Yet, it can occasionally activate, motivate and, indeed, ‘enthral’ people, as well as giving them hope and impetus to achieve change. Despite its sceptical outlook, critical and philosophical theory is still valuable in reminding us that, while it does not seem so, we do not live in a world without any alternatives.

#### One speech act doesn’t cause securitization – it’s an ongoing process

**Ghughunishvili 10**

Securitization of Migration in the United States after 9/11: Constructing Muslims and Arabs as Enemies Submitted to Central European University Department of International Relations European Studies In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Supervisor: Professor Paul Roe <http://www.etd.ceu.hu/2010/ghughunishvili_irina.pdf>

As provided by the Copenhagen School securitization theory is comprised by speech act, acceptance of the audience and facilitating conditions or other non-securitizing actors contribute to a successful securitization. The causality or a one-way relationship between the speech act, the audience and securitizing actor, where politicians use the speech act first to justify exceptional measures, has been criticized by scholars, such as Balzacq. According to him, the one-directional relationship between the three factors, or some of them, is not the best approach. To fully grasp the dynamics, it will be more beneficial to “rather than looking for a one-directional relationship between some or all of the three factors highlighted, it could be profitable to focus on the degree of congruence between them. 26 Among other aspects of the Copenhagen School’s theoretical framework, which he criticizes, the thesis will rely on the criticism of the lack of context and the rejection of a ‘one-way causal’ relationship between the audience and the actor. The process of threat construction, according to him, can be clearer if external context, which stands independently from use of language, can be considered. 27 Balzacq opts for more context-oriented approach when it comes down to securitization through the speech act, where a single speech does not create the discourse, but it is created through a long process, where context is vital. 28 He indicates: In reality, the speech act itself, i.e. literally a single security articulation at a particular point in time, will at best only very rarely explain the entire social process that follows from it. In most cases a security scholar will rather be confronted with a process of articulations creating sequentially a threat text which turns sequentially into a securitization. 29 This type of approach seems more plausible in an empirical study, as it is more likely that a single speech will not be able to securitize an issue, but it is a lengthy process, where a the audience speaks the same language as the securitizing actors and can relate to their speeches.

### 2AC – Comprehensive Immigration Reform

#### No immigration vote – House GOP leadership won’t take it up

Palmer and Sherman 10/25/13 (Staffwriters for Politico, “House GOP plans no immigration vote in 2013” <http://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/house-gop-plans-no-immigration-vote-in-2013-98824_Page2.html>)

House Republican leadership has no plans to vote on any immigration reform legislation before the end the year. The House has just 19 days in session before the end of 2013, and there are a number of reasons why immigration reform is stalled this year. Following the fiscal battles last month, the internal political dynamics are tenuous within the House Republican Conference. A growing chorus of GOP lawmakers and aides are intensely skeptical that any of the party’s preferred piecemeal immigration bills can garner the support 217 Republicans — they would need that if Democrats didn’t lend their votes. Republican leadership doesn’t see anyone coalescing around a single plan, according to sources across GOP leadership. Leadership also says skepticism of President Barack Obama within the House Republican Conference is at a high, and that’s fueled a desire to stay out of a negotiating process with the Senate. Republicans fear getting jammed. Of course, the dynamics could change. Some, including Majority Leader Eric Cantor (R-Va.), are eager to pass something before the end of the year. Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) has signaled publicly that he would like to move forward in 2013 on an overhaul of the nation’s immigration laws. If Republicans win some Democratic support on piecemeal bills, they could move forward this year. But still, anything that makes its way to the floor needs to have significant House Republican support And Obama is also ramping up his messaging on immigration reform. “It’s good for our economy, it’s good for our national security, it’s good for our people, and we should do it this year,” Obama said Thursday. That same afternoon his chief of staff Denis McDonough met with business CEOs to strategize on immigration reform. Attendees included representatives from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers. Getting immigration through this deeply divided Congress in 2014 — an election year — would be incredibly difficult. That’s why immigration reform supporters are growing increasingly worried that the window for a bigger reform package could be slipping away since it would be even more difficult to try and forge ahead in an election year. “I think there are a lot of folks who are concerned about this issue not getting solved, and I think legitimately so,” Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart (R-Fla.) told POLITICO. “Because I do think that every day that goes by, it makes it more and more difficult.” Other prominent immigration supporters like Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) have also backed off any deal, saying the Obama administration has “undermined” negotiations by not defunding his signature health care law. Rep. Raul Labrador (R-Idaho) went further, saying Obama is trying to “destroy the Republican Party” and that GOP leaders would be “crazy” to enter into talks with Obama. That rhetoric combined with signals in private conversations with lawmakers and staff has led some immigration advocates to say they see the writing on the wall and they aren’t going to invest heavily until there’s more momentum. “After Obama poisoned the well in the fiscal showdown and [House Minority Leader Nancy] Pelosi now is actively trying to use immigration as a political weapon, the chances for substantive reforms, unfortunately, seem all but gone,” said one GOP operative involved in the conservative pro-immigration movement. Many of the groups that ran ads after the Senate passed its immigration bill — including the American Action Network and U.S. Chamber of Commerce — have gone silent on air. Several immigration reform proponents said that until House Republicans come up with legislation, there won’t be any television advertising campaigns. Liberals’ patience with House Republicans is also waning, as many argue that its time for the Obama administration to step in. National Day Laborer Organizing Network Executive Director Pablo Alvarado has been leading the charge, pressing the White House to use his “existing legal authority to alleviate the suffering of immigrants.” Frank Sharry of America’s Voice said there is a “strong preference” for action before the end of the year. “We’re either going to pass immigration reform or punish Republicans who block it,” Sharry said. “If they can’t convince their leadership then of course we want a Democratic majority that will … We’d much rather have a signing ceremony on immigration reform than a punishing electoral campaign where we’re trying to take people out.”

#### Link non-unique – Yucca mountain case ruled against Obama’s commander-in-chief powers

JudicialWatch 8/14 (“Fed Appeals Court Rules Obama is “Flouting the Law”” http://www.judicialwatch.org/blog/2013/08/fed-appeals-court-rules-obama-is-flouting-the-law/)

A federal appellate court has blasted President Obama for using executive authority to ignore the law, a talent that the commander-in-chief has become well known for in many areas especially immigration. This particular case involves a proposed nuclear waste dump in Yucca Mountain Nevada. President Obama and his pal, Nevada Senator Harry Reid, want to kill the project, which has already cost U.S. taxpayers an astounding $15 billion, according to various federal audits. So, Obama is using a federal agency with presidential appointees, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), to nix the dump site. As per the commander-in-chief, the NRC has declined to conduct the statutorily mandated Yucca Mountain licensing process. This essentially destroys the project, which the U.S. government has been working on since the early 1980s to be the nation’s sole repository for high-level nuclear waste. In 2010, the NRC, then led by Obama appointee Gregory Jaczko, ordered the licensing process terminated. Whether you are for or against the Nevada nuclear waste project is irrelevant. The issue here is a strong-armed commander-in-chief abusing his power to disregard the law. This creates a dangerous precedent and clearly threatens the separation of powers that keep government in check with balance. A federal appellate court confirms in a 29-page ruling issued this week. The administration “is simply flouting the law,” according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruling, which made clear in its decision that the order to halt the Yucca Mountain licensing process is not supported by the law. “It is no overstatement to say that our constitutional system of separation of powers would be significantly altered if we were to allow executive and independent agencies to disregard federal law in the manner asserted in this case by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,” the ruling says. President Obama received a similar spanking for his backdoor amnesty initiative from a different federal court just a few weeks ago. That case involves a lawsuit brought by 10 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents opposed to implementing Obama’s amnesty, known as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). Obama blew off Congress and issued DACA via executive order to allow illegal immigrants 30 and younger to remain in the U.S. and obtain work permits if they entered the country as children (“through no fault of their own,” as Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano loves to say). A federal court in Texas, where the agents’ case was heard, ruled that the policy is “contrary to congressional mandate.”

#### Obama asked to limit drones – means he’ll get credit from the plan and wont’ backlash

Baker, New York Times, 2013

(Peter, “Pivoting From a War Footing, Obama Acts to Curtail Drones”, 5-23, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/24/us/politics/pivoting-from-a-war-footing-obama-acts-to-curtail-drones.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>, ldg)

WASHINGTON — Nearly a dozen years after the hijackings that transformed America, President Obama said Thursday that it was time to narrow the scope of the grinding battle against terrorists and begin the transition to a day when the country will no longer be on a war footing. Declaring that “America is at a crossroads,” the president called for redefining what has been a global war into a more targeted assault on terrorist groups threatening the United States. As part of a realignment of counterterrorism policy, he said he would curtail the use of drones, recommit to closing the prison at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, and seek new limits on his own war power. In a much-anticipated speech at the National Defense University, Mr. Obama sought to turn the page on the era that began on Sept. 11, 2001, when the imperative of preventing terrorist attacks became both the priority and the preoccupation. Instead, the president suggested that the United States had returned to the state of affairs that existed before Al Qaeda toppled the World Trade Center, when terrorism was a persistent but not existential danger. With Al Qaeda’s core now “on the path to defeat,” he argued, the nation must adapt. “Our systematic effort to dismantle terrorist organizations must continue,” Mr. Obama said. “But this war, like all wars, must end. That’s what history advises. It’s what our democracy demands.” The president’s speech reignited a debate over how to respond to the threat of terrorism that has polarized the capital for years. Republicans contended that Mr. Obama was declaring victory prematurely and underestimating an enduring danger, while liberals complained that he had not gone far enough in ending what they see as the excesses of the Bush era. The precise ramifications of his shift were less clear than the lines of argument, however, because the new policy guidance he signed remains classified, and other changes he embraced require Congressional approval. Mr. Obama, for instance, did not directly mention in his speech that his new order would shift responsibility for drones more toward the military and away from the Central Intelligence Agency. But the combination of his words and deeds foreshadowed the course he hopes to take in the remaining three and a half years of his presidency so that he leaves his successor a profoundly different national security landscape than the one he inherited in 2009. While President George W. Bush saw the fight against terrorism as the defining mission of his presidency, Mr. Obama has always viewed it as one priority among many at a time of wrenching economic and domestic challenges. “Beyond Afghanistan, we must define our effort not as a boundless ‘global war on terror,’ ” he said, using Mr. Bush’s term, “but rather as a series of persistent, targeted efforts to dismantle specific networks of violent extremists that threaten America.” “Neither I, nor any president, can promise the total defeat of terror,” he added. “We will never erase the evil that lies in the hearts of some human beings, nor stamp out every danger to our open society. But what we can do — what we must do — is dismantle networks that pose a direct danger to us, and make it less likely for new groups to gain a foothold, all the while maintaining the freedoms and ideals that we defend.” Some Republicans expressed alarm about Mr. Obama’s shift, saying it was a mistake to go back to the days when terrorism was seen as a manageable law enforcement problem rather than a dire threat. “The president’s speech today will be viewed by terrorists as a victory,” said Senator Saxby Chambliss of Georgia, the top Republican on the Senate Intelligence Committee. “Rather than continuing successful counterterrorism activities, we are changing course with no clear operational benefit.” Senator John McCain, Republican of Arizona, said he still agreed with Mr. Obama about closing the Guantánamo prison, but he called the president’s assertion that Al Qaeda was on the run “a degree of unreality that to me is really incredible.” Mr. McCain said the president had been too passive in the Arab world, particularly in Syria’s civil war. “American leadership is absent in the Middle East,” he said. The liberal discontent with Mr. Obama was on display even before his speech ended. Medea Benjamin, a co-founder of the antiwar group Code Pink, who was in the audience, shouted at the president to release prisoners from Guantánamo, halt C.I.A. drone strikes and apologize to Muslims for killing so many of them. “Abide by the rule of law!” she yelled as security personnel removed her from the auditorium. “You’re a constitutional lawyer!” Col. Morris D. Davis, a former chief prosecutor at Guantánamo who has become a leading critic of the prison, waited until after the speech to express disappointment that Mr. Obama was not more proactive. “It’s great rhetoric,” he said. “But now is the reality going to live up to the rhetoric?” Still, some counterterrorism experts saw it as the natural evolution of the conflict after more than a decade. “This is both a promise to an end to the war on terror, while being a further declaration of war, constrained and proportional in its scope,” said Juan Carlos Zarate, a counterterrorism adviser to Mr. Bush. The new classified policy guidance imposes tougher standards for when drone strikes can be authorized, limiting them to targets who pose “a continuing, imminent threat to Americans” and cannot feasibly be captured, according to government officials. The guidance also begins a process of phasing the C.I.A. out of the drone war and shifting operations to the Pentagon. The guidance expresses the principle that the military should be in the lead and responsible for taking direct action even outside traditional war zones like Afghanistan, officials said. But Pakistan, where the C.I.A. has waged a robust campaign of air assaults on terrorism suspects in the tribal areas, will be grandfathered in for a transition period and remain under C.I.A. control. That exception will be reviewed every six months as the government decides whether Al Qaeda has been neutralized enough in Pakistan and whether troops in Afghanistan can be protected. Officials said they anticipated that the eventual transfer of the C.I.A. drone program in Pakistan to the military would probably coincide with the withdrawal of combat units from Afghanistan at the end of 2014. Even as he envisions scaling back the targeted killing, Mr. Obama embraced ideas to limit his own authority. He expressed openness to the idea of a secret court to oversee drone strikes, much like the intelligence court that authorizes secret wiretaps, or instead perhaps some sort of independent body within the executive branch. He did not outline a specific proposal, leaving it to Congress to consider something along those lines. He also called on Congress to “refine and ultimately repeal” the authorization of force it passed in the aftermath of Sept. 11. Aides said he wanted it limited more clearly to combating Al Qaeda and affiliated groups so it could not be used to justify action against other terrorist or extremist organizations. In renewing his vow to close the Guantánamo prison, Mr. Obama highlighted one of his most prominent unkept promises from the 2008 presidential campaign. He came into office vowing to shutter the prison, which has become a symbol around the world of American excesses, within a year, but Congress moved to block him, and then he largely dropped the effort. With 166 detainees still at the prison, Mr. Obama said he would reduce the population even without action by Congress. About half of the detainees have been cleared for return to their home countries, mostly Yemen. Mr. Obama said he was lifting a moratorium he imposed on sending detainees to Yemen, where a new president has inspired more faith in the White House that he would not allow recidivism. The policy changes have been in the works for months as Mr. Obama has sought to reorient his national security strategy. The speech was his most comprehensive public discussion of counterterrorism since he took office, and at times he was almost ruminative, articulating both sides of the argument and weighing trade-offs out loud in a way presidents rarely do. He said that the United States remained in danger from terrorists, as the attacks in Boston and Benghazi, Libya, have demonstrated, but that the nature of the threat “has shifted and evolved.” He noted that terrorists, including some radicalized at home, had carried out attacks, but less ambitious than the ones on Sept. 11. “We have to take these threats seriously and do all that we can to confront them,” he said. “But as we shape our response, we have to recognize that the scale of this threat closely resembles the types of attacks we faced before 9/11.”

#### Health care kills Obama’s political capital

DOVERE 10/25/13 (EDWARD-ISAAC, staffwriter, “Democrats' united front cracks” <http://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/the-democratic-crackup-98832.html?hp=t1>)

For weeks leading up to the shutdown — and over the 16 days it dragged on — President Barack Obama did the unthinkable: he held every Democrat in the House and Senate together. There weren’t any defectors. There wasn’t even anyone running to reporters to question his strategy. The man who’d disappointed them so many times was suddenly exciting them, with his newly apparent backbone and successful resistance to Republicans. They were rushing to do whatever they could to stand by him, next to him, with him. Like any fad, that’s gone the way of trucker hats and the macarena. The problems with the Obamacare website have transformed the president from a man who seemed to have gotten a sudden infusion of political capital to a man who’s been pushed back on his heels. He was firm, and he was setting the agenda. Now he’s back to trying to beating back the latest frame Republicans have forced on him, inadvertently providing evidence to support the doubts they’ve been trying to sow from the beginning. He spent last week against the backdrop of a shutdown that made people appreciate all the things government can do for them. Now he has a website which shows how little it can. And Democrats have scattered, raising the question of whether the president will be able to preserve any of the new cohesion he inspired earlier in the month, or whether the rift is going to widen again. With every day, there was more impatience and dismay with the botched rollout of the website. Meanwhile, the White House spent much of the week dealing with a bizarre episode with Sen. Dick Durbin (D-Ill.) over whether an unnamed Republican insulted the president, forced to support Speaker John Boehner’s denial over the insistent statement of one of its closest allies on the Hill. Privately, certain Republicans express concern with the party’s decision to focus so much attention on a website that could very well be fixed over the next few months, instead of calling attention to other potentially problematic aspects of the law. And polls show support for Republicans remains way down, while support for Obamacare is still ticking up. But instead of spending the week beating up on Republican overreach, or promoting all the aspects of the law that don’t involve uninsured people spending hours trying to sign up, Democrats have had to confront undeniable problems that have even core liberals worried. That’s led a growing number of people on the Hill to push the White House to change its current position that it can fix the problems with the website without changing the deadlines or time frame. “I can’t honestly say that we’ve tried our hardest to fix things,” said Sen. Joe Manchin (D-W.Va.), who chose Bill O’Reilly’s talk show as his venue to unveil a plan to delay the individual mandate penalty for a year. “You have to give me a reason I want to buy what you want to sell me. And until they get that in their minds, they’re going to have a lot of headwinds, if you will.” Manchin says he’s still hopeful the law can work, but that it’s going to take a lot more than what the administration’s done so far to convince him. So far, he said, he hasn’t heard back on the call he made to the White House to tell them about his announcement.

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### 1AR – T: We Meet

#### Constitutional rights are restrictions

Boumediene Appellete Brief 2005 (Boumediene v. Bush 476 F.3d 981, 993, 375 U.S.App.D.C. 48, 60 (C.A.D.C.,2007)- Appellate brief)

\*993 \*\*60 As against this line of authority, the dissent offers the distinction that the Suspension Clause is a limitation on congressional power rather than a constitutional right. But this is no distinction at all. Constitutional rights are rights against the gov-ernment and, as such, are restrictions on governmental power. See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 534, 69 S.Ct. 657, 93 L.Ed. 865 (1949) (“Even the Bill of Rights amendments were framed only as a limitation upon the powers of Congress.”). FN12 Consider the First Amendment. (In contrasting the Suspension Clause with provisions in the Bill of Rights, see Dissent at 995-96, the dissent is careful to ignore the First Amendment.) Like the Suspension Clause, the First Amendment is framed as a limitation on Congress: “Congress shall make no law ....” Yet no one would deny that the First Amendment protects the rights to free speech and religion and assembly.

#### Enforcement still restricts

Steele 76 (Sr. Dist. Judge Steel, Kovach v. Middendorf 424 F.Supp. 72, 76 -77 (D.C.Del. 1976)), from a 1976 case from a federal trial court in Delaware)

Defendants argue that in both its two year and four year aspects this case presents a political and not a judicial question within the constitutional power of the Court to decide. Defendants point out that Congress alone has the power under the Constitution “(T)o provide and maintain a Navy”, Art. I, s 8, Cl. 13 and “(T)o make \*77 Rules for the Government and Regulation of the . . . naval Forces”. Art. I, s 8, Cl. 14. Defendants argue that the Constitution has placed the power exclusively in Congress to legislate and in the President to execute in all areas relating to the conduct of the Navy, and that decisional responsibilities in those areas are beyond the constitutional limits of judicial power. Defendants rely primarily upon Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93-94, 73 S.Ct. 534, 97 L.Ed. 842 (1953) and Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 2440, 37 L.Ed.2d 407 (1973) to support this view. Neither of these cases nor the others referred to by plaintiffdiscuss the issue whether courts, under the power constitutionally conferred upon them, may impose restrictions upon legislative or executive decisions made in the exercise of their war powers if those decisions infringe upon constitutionally protected rights. That courts have the power to do so is settled. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 164-165, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963). See United States v. MacIntosh, 283 U.S. 605, 622, 51 S.Ct. 570, 75 L.Ed. 1302 (1931)

### Vladeck

#### Their evidence which cuts off before the paragraph ends shockingly concludes aff on the restriction, imminence, and ground question.

Vladeck 13 (Steve, Professor of Law and the Associate Dean for Scholarship – American University Washington College of Law, JD – Yale Law School, Senior Editor – Journal of National Security Law & Policy, “Why a “Drone Court” Won’t Work–But (Nominal) Damages Might…,” Lawfare Blog, 2-10, http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/02/why-a-drone-court-wont-work/)

II. Drone Courts and the Separation of Powers

In my view, the adversity issue is the deepest legal flaw in “drone court” proposals. But the idea of an ex ante judicial process for signing off on targeted killing operations may also raise some serious separation of powers concerns insofar as such review could directly interfere with the Executive’s ability to carry out ongoing military operations… First, and most significantly, even though I am not a particularly strong defender of unilateral (and indefeasible) presidential war powers, I do think that, if the Constitution protects any such authority on the part of the President (another big “if”), it includes at least some discretion when it comes to the “defensive” war power, i.e., the President’s power to use military force to defend U.S. persons and territory, whether as part of an ongoing international or non-international armed conflict or not. And although the Constitution certainly constrains how the President may use that power, it’s a different issue altogether to suggest that the Constitution might forbid him for acting at all without prior judicial approval–especially in cases where the President otherwise would have the power to use lethal force. This ties together with the related point of just how difficult it would be to actually have meaningful ex ante review in a context in which time is so often of the essence. If, as I have to think is true, many of the opportunities for these kinds of operations are fleeting–and often open and close within a short window–then a requirement of judicial review in all cases might actually prevent the government from otherwise carrying out authority that most would agree it has (at least in the appropriate circumstances). This possibility is exactly why FISA itself was enacted with a pair of emergency provisions (one for specific emergencies; one for the beginning of a declared war), and comparable emergency exceptions in this context would almost necessarily swallow the rule. Indeed, the narrower a definition of imminence that we accept, the more this becomes a problem, since the time frame in which the government could simultaneously demonstrate that a target (1) poses such a threat to the United States; and (2) cannot be captured through less lethal measures will necessarily be a vanishing one. Even if judicial review were possible in that context, it’s hard to imagine that it would produce wise, just, or remotely reliable decisions.

<Their card ends> before the paragraph ends by the way

That’s why, even though [I disagree](http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/02/whats-really-wrong-with-the-targeted-killing-white-paper/) with the [DOJ white paper](http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf) that ex ante review would present a nonjusticiable political question, I actually agree that courts are ill-suited to hear such cases–not because, as the white paper suggests, they lack the power to do so, but because, in most such cases, they would lack the competence to do so. **III. Drone Courts and the Legitimacy Problem** That brings me to perhaps the biggest problem we should all have with a “drone court”–the extent to which, even if one could design a legally and practically workable regime in which such a tribunals could operate, its existence would put irresistible pressure on federal judges to sign off even on those cases in which they have doubts. As a purely practical matter, it would be next to impossible meaningfully to assess imminence, the existence of less lethal alternatives, or the true nature of a threat that an individual suspect poses ex ante. Indeed, it would be akin to asking law enforcement officers to obtain judicial review before they use lethal force in defense of themselves or third persons–when the entire legal question turns on what was actually true in the moment, as opposed to what might have been predicted to be true in advance. At its core, that’s why the analogy to search warrants utterly breaks down–and why it would hardly be surprising if judges in those circumstances approved a far greater percentage of applications than they might have on a complete after-the-fact record. Judges, after all, are humans. In the process, the result would be that such ex ante review would do little other than to add legitimacy to operations the legality of which might have otherwise been questioned ex post. Put another way, ex ante revew in this context would most likely lead to a more expansive legal framework within which the targeted killing program could operate, one sanctioned by judges asked to decide these cases behind closed doors; without the benefit of adversary parties, briefing, or presentation of the facts; and with the very real possibility that the wrong decision could directly lead to the deaths of countless Americans. Thus, even if it were legally and practically possible, a drone court would be a very dangerous idea. **IV. Why Damages Actions Don’t Raise the Same Legal Concerns** At first blush, it may seem like many of these issues would be equally salient in the context of after-the-fact damages suits. But as long as such a regime was designed carefully and conscientiously, I actually think virtually all of these concerns could be mitigated. For starters, retrospective review doesn’t raise anywhere near the same concerns with regard to adversity or judicial competence. Re: adversity, presumably those who are targeted in an individual strike could be represented as plaintiffs in a post-hoc proceeding, whether through their next friend or their heirs. And as long as they could state a viable claim for relief (more on that below), it’s hard to see any pure Article III problem with such a suit for retrospective relief. As for competence, judges routinely review whether government officers acted in lawful self-defense under exigent circumstances (this is exactly what [Tennessee v. Garner](http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=471&invol=1) contemplates, after all). And if the Guantánamo litigation of the past five years has shown nothing else, [it demonstrates that](http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2011/05/guantanamo-wittes) judges are also more than competent to resolve not just whether individual terrorism suspects are who the government says they are (and thus members of al Qaeda or one of its affiliates), but to do so using highly classified information in a manner that balances–albeit not always ideally–the government’s interest in secrecy with the detainee’s ability to contest the evidence against him. Just as Guantánamo detainees are represented in their habeas proceedings by security-cleared counsel who must comply with court-imposed protective orders and security procedures, so too, the subjects of targeted killing operations could have their estates represented by security-cleared counsel, who would be in a far better position to challenge the government’s evidence and to offer potentially exculpatory evidence / arguments of their own. More to the point, it should also follow that courts would be far more able to review the questions that will necessary be at the core of these cases after the fact. Although the pure membership question can probably be decided in the abstract, it should stand to reason that the imminence and infeasibility-of-capture issues will be much easier to assess in hindsight–removed from the pressures of the moment and with the benefit of the dispassionate distance on which judicial review must rely. To similar effect, whether the government used excessive force in relation to the object of the attack is also something that can only reasonably be assessed post hoc. And in addition to the substantive questions, it will also be much easier for courts to review the government’s own procedures after they are employed, especially if the government itself is already conducting after-action reviews that could be made part of the (classified) record in such cases. Indeed, the government’s own analysis could, in many cases, go along way toward proving the lawfulness vel non of an individual strike… To be sure, there are a host of legal doctrines that would get in the way of such suits–foremost among them, [the present judicial hostility](http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=471&invol=1) to causes of action under [*Bivens*](http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/403/388/case.html); the state secrets privilege; and official immunity doctrine. But I am a firm believer that, except where the President himself is concerned (where there’s a stronger argument that [immunity is constitutionally grounded](http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0457_0731_ZS.html)), each of these concerns can be overcome by statute–so long as Congress creates an express cause of action for nominal damages, and so long as the statute both (1) expressly overrides state secrets and official immunity doctrine; and (2) replaces them with carefully considered procedures for balancing the secrecy concerns that would arise in many–if not most–of these cases, these legal issues would be overcome. **V. Why Damages Actions Aren’t Perfect–But Might Be the Least-Worst Alternative** Perhaps counterintuitively, I also believe that after-the-fact judicial review wouldn’t raise anywhere near the same prudential concerns as those noted above. Leaving aside how much less pressure judges would be under in such cases, it’s also generally true that damages regimes don’t have nearly the same validating effect on government action that ex ante approval does. Otherwise, one would expect to have seen a dramatic upsurge in lethal actions by law enforcement officers after each judicial decision refusing to impose individual liability arising out of a prior use of deadly force. So far as I know, no such evidence exists. Of course, damages actions aren’t a perfect solution here. It’s obvious, but should be said anyway, that in a case in which the government does act unlawfully, no amount of damages will make the victim (or his heirs) whole. It’s also inevitable that, like much of the Guantánamo litigation, most of these suits would be resolved under extraordinary secrecy, and so there would be far less public accountability for targeted killings than, ideally, we might want. That said, there are two enormous upsides to damages actions that, in my mind, make them worth it–even if they are deeply, fundamentally flawed: First, if nothing else, the specter of damages, even nominal damages, should have a deterrent effect on future government officers, such that, if a targeted killing operation ever was carried out in a way that violated the relevant legal rules, there would be liability–and, as importantly, precedent–such that the next government official in a similar context might think twice, and might make sure that he’s that much more convinced that the individual in question is who the government claims, and that there’s no alternative to the use of lethal force. Second, at least where the targets of such force are U.S. citizens, I believe that there is a non-frivolous argument that the Constitution requires at least some form of judicial process–and, compared to the alternatives, nominal damages actions litigated under carefully circumscribed rules of secrecy may be the only way to get all of the relevant constituencies to the table. That’s a very long way of reiterating what I wrote in [my initial response](http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/02/whats-really-wrong-with-the-targeted-killing-white-paper/) to the DOJ white paper, but I end up in the same place: If folks really want to provide a judicial process to serve as a check on the U.S. government’s conduct of targeted killing operations, this kind of regime, and not an ex ante “drone court,” is where such endeavors should focus.

### K

#### War turns structural violence but not the other way around

Joshua Goldstein, Int’l Rel Prof @ American U, 2001, War and Gender, p. 412

First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, “if you want peace, work for justice.” Then, if one believes that sexism contributes to war one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influence wars’ outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices.9 So,”if you want peace, work for peace.” Indeed, if you want justice (gender and others), work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis, from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes towards war and the military may be the most important way to “reverse women’s oppression.” The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies, and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book’s evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate.

#### Extinction first

Bostrum, Philosophy prof at Oxford, 02 (Nick, Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards, Published in the Journal of Evolution and Technology, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2002), http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html)

In combination, these indirect arguments add important constraints to those we can glean from the direct consideration of various technological risks, although there is not room here to elaborate on the details. But the balance of evidence is such that it would appear unreasonable not to assign a substantial probability to the hypothesis that an existential disaster will do us in. My subjective opinion is that setting this probability lower than 25% would be misguided, and the best estimate may be considerably higher. But even if the probability were much smaller (say, ~1%) the subject matter would still merit very serious attention because of how much is at stake.