## T

#### We meet- Nuclear is a subset of Air Force

Gale Group 13

(“The U.S. Armed Forces,” http://ic.galegroup.com/ic/ovic/ReferenceDetailsPage/ReferenceDetailsWindow?zid=4340464f1a188e44d93d0820d3aa2151&action=2&catId=GALE%7CAAA000008432&documentId=GALE%7CPC3010999001&userGroupName=centpenn\_itc1&jsid=3eb14c1ea53ebe29fcaddb2652a5e1bc)

While the overall aim of the U.S. Armed Forces is to protect the United States and its people, each of the service branches has a specific role. The role of the U.S. Army, for example, is to defend and protect the United States as well as its interests through use of ground troops, tactical nuclear weapons, tanks, artillery, and helicopters. As of 31 July 2010, there were 567,167 personnel in the U.S. Army.¶ The Air Force defends and protects the United States and any U.S. interests in space and air, often using tanker aircraft, bomber aircraft, transport aircraft, and helicopters. The U.S. Air Force is in charge of the nuclear ballistic missiles and military satellites, as well. As of 31 July 2010, there were 336,031 personnel in the U.S. Air Force.

#### Counterinterp:

#### Armed forces includes nuclear

Manuel 12

JD @ U San Diego Law, has practiced criminal defense, mainly before federal courts. His practice includes representing clients in all areas of criminal law, limited civil litigation, and civil rights violations

(Victor, “Is the Second Amendment outdated?,” http://www.victortorreslaw.com/blog/is-the-second-amendment-outdated.html)

The Second Amendment to the Constitution prevents the government from infringing individual rights to keep and bear arms. As a part of the Bill of Rights, the Second Amendment.is apart of the bulwark of individual rights protections that the Framers felt necessary to include in the Constitution. But where did the right originate and what was its purpose?¶ As with most of our laws, their origin was in England. For many years prior to the American Revolution the English folk were in conflict with the King and Parliament. Part of the conflict was over attempts by the King to disarm his subjects and whether there should be a standing army during peacetime. These were times in which the most lethal weapons were muskets and canon.¶ Times have changed. Today, no one questions the need for the government to maintain a standing army for the common defense, even in peacetime. Today’s modern armed forces include nuclear weapons, cruise missiles and smart bomb technology. In the event that a tyrannical government overcomes the will of the people is it realistic to believe that groups of citizens will be able to use armed revolt with assault weapons and other legally available firearms to successfully defeat the government? The result of such thinking is playing out today in Syria. Fighting in the streets, mass civilian slaughters and untold human suffering.

#### Neg definition is obsolete- should include tech

Dahinden 11 - Director, International Relations, Swiss Armed Forces, Bern; Council Member, International Institute of Humanitarian Law

(Erwin, “Impact on military strategy, capability development and doctrine,” p. 67)

2. Technology and military capability¶ Available technologies have always been used by the military to improve ¶ the performance of existing weapon components (superiority versus ¶ denial). Any technological advance has triggered efforts to deny military ¶ advantages. This technological arms race has been a continuous process ¶ since the beginning of civilization11¶ .¶ The potential of new technologies has seldom been identified from the ¶ beginning: e.g. tanks were used in ww i to enforce infantry, and aircraft ¶ was deployed to gather intelligence and support artillery. It was the Italian¶ General Giulio Douhet who transposed concepts of naval warfare to the air ¶ and in his work Domination of the Air of 1921 developed the role of the air ¶ force in claiming “to have command of the air is to have victory”. In ww ¶ ii, General Guderian used the speed and weaponry of tanks and aircraft to ¶ launch deep strikes and to develop them as independent branches (concept ¶ of tanks as shields and aircraft as swords).¶ Technology and sophisticated weaponry alone do not guarantee military ¶ success. Other key factors that must be present are leadership (General ¶ Patton), skills, resilience and logistics.¶ The motivation to replace soldiers by technology is understandable ¶ because of overall costs, vulnerability and political implications. Battle ¶ experience repeatedly corrected this aspiration, e.g. in the 2006 Lebanon ¶ war, where failures were provoked by the overestimation of technical ¶ intelligence and the lack of humint. The concept of relying mainly on air ¶ forces and Special Forces for intervention, the so-called Rumsfeld Doctrine, ¶ failed to meet expectations in enduring freedom in Afghanistan.¶ The technological sophistication of military means is also an important ¶ element that enhances the morale and self-control of a soldier. The more ¶ confidence soldiers have in the effectiveness of their kits, the better ¶ their discipline and, as a consequence, their observance of the Rules of ¶ Engagement (roe).¶ 3. New capabilities and force structure¶ “Revolution in Military Affairs” (rma) became a catchword at ¶ the end of the 20th century. The term was originally coined by the ¶ Soviet military establishment and subsequently adopted by Israel and ¶ the United States12. In essence, rma gave soldiers more information ¶ about battle space, more precise data on potential targets and ensured ¶ better concentration of fire power in time and space (see graph). These ¶ improved capabilities are often summarised with the term “network ¶ enabled operations” (neo).¶ neo was first tested on a larger scale in the 1st Gulf War with impressive ¶ results. neo requires optimum integration of the various systems and ¶ becomes what is called the “system of the systems”. This had important ¶ consequences on force planning, interoperability, upgrading and long-term ¶ financial obligations.¶ New technologies have fundamentally changed the planning process of ¶ armed forces, made the procurement process more challenging and extended ¶ the long-term consequences for budgeting. Given the complex and rapidly ¶ evolving nature of military technologies, maintenance and logistic support ¶ of armed forces are changing substantially: upgrades have to be realised in ¶ harmony with other users requiring international synchronisation too. Repair ¶ consists mostly of exchanging components and it is necessary to engage ¶ more civilian capabilities in the rear area or in operational logistics13¶ .¶ Procurement was always a long-term exercise from the definition of ¶ requirements to the development of prototypes, testing and finally fielding ¶ with training. This took 10-15 years plus 20-30 years of operational ¶ use. The military call this “long-term life cycle management”. As the ¶ following graphical representation illustrates, the main costs encompass ¶ not only the actual procurement costs of a new weapon system, but have ¶ to include those occurring during its operationalisation, maintenance, and ¶ upgrading. These important long-term investments demand that the legal ¶ and budgetary framework for armed forces is highly predictable.¶ 4. Doctrine¶ Forces have to be designed and trained for fundamentally different types ¶ of operations. This requires flexibility in their structure, their command ¶ and control and their training.¶ In this environment the political and military control of the use of force ¶ and escalation becomes critical and necessitates new instruments. The ¶ development of rules of engagement14 for the specific mission should be ¶ seen against this background.

#### Definition of hostility has changed- its not about being on the frontlines

Guillory 01 – Major in USAF

(Michael, ARTICLE: Civilianizing the Force: Is the United States Crossing the Rubicon?, 51 A.F. L. Rev. 111)

[133] At first glance, it would seem that any attempt to refine what is meant by "direct participation in hostilities" should focus on those civilians working with combatants at the frontlines. After all, the purpose behind distinguishing between combatants and noncombatants is to protect civilians, 142 and those nearest the fighting are at the greatest risk. Technology and resulting military advances have highlighted fundamental flaws with this reasoning. For starters, in an age where weapons of mass destruction, intercontinental missiles, long range aircraft and space-based platforms, and electronic warfare have made military force a global, omnipresent threat, no one is safe. 143 The bombing of civilian population centers such as London, Dresden, Tokyo, Nagasaki, and Hiroshima during the Second World War 144 and the subsequent Cold War policy of mutual assured destruction have proven this.¶ Furthermore, the law of armed conflict specifically recognizes that civilians will be accompanying the forces, so proximity to the battlefront and the dangers associated therein already are taken into account. Commentators who argue that otherwise noncombatant conduct, such as providing military transport or logistical support, becomes combatant activities if performed at the frontlines are mistaken in two areas. First, they are using the increased danger inherent with accompanying forces to graft a geographic element onto the law where none exists. The logical extension of their arguments would make merchant seamen and civilian aircrews like the United States Civil Reserve Air [134] Fleet 145 combatants, when under international law they are not. 146 Secondly, they fail to take into account the changing nature of technology and weapons delivery. A civilian need no longer be near the front lines to take a direct part in delivering destructive munitions or information.¶ Finally, as was discussed previously, no civilian can ever lawfully directly participate in hostilities. Whether they are accompanying the forces, manufacturing munitions in a factory, or farming land in Iowa, civilians are noncombatants. No matter the level of danger they face because of their location, participation in combatant activities is forbidden.¶ To be effective, a better description must take into account traditional civilian support roles while simultaneously encompassing the modern spectrum of civilian activities, wherever such activities occur. With this in mind, the following is proffered: civilians may support and participate in military activities as long as they are not integrated into combat operations. In this context, integration is becoming an uninterrupted, indispensable part of an activity such that the activity cannot function without that person's presence and combat operations are any military activities that are intended to disrupt enemy operations or destroy enemy forces or installations.¶ Under this criterion, civilians providing non-weapons systems logistics support would not be jeopardizing their noncombatant status. 147 This applies to LSE personnel, LOGCAP contractor employees, merchant seamen, CRAF aircrews, and maintenance personnel working on non-combat equipment such as transport aircraft and ships, generators, trucks, etc. For personnel performing weapons systems support, their situations will vary. Pilots, weapon loaders, and maintainers assigned to combat-positioned, combat-coded aircraft, tanks, and similar equipment, whether working at a deployed location or at a base in the United States, would be integrated into combat operations. 148 In a similar vein, weapons system technicians who have a "habitual relationship" with combat troops to the extent that they deploy with them to the "foxholes" or "downrange" would be performing combatant activities. 149 [135] However, technicians occasionally travelling to a missile silo in the continental United States 150 or to the frontline to perform maintenance or repairs on a weapons system would lack the requisite integration, and therefore remain lawful noncombatants.¶ As for intelligence gatherers, by collecting information they intend to disrupt enemy operations or destroy enemy forces or installations. Therefore, they would also be involved in duties restricted to combatants. This is particularly the case for aircrew members of surveillance aircraft and ground control operators of UAVs. The civilians retrieving data from satellites or listening posts while sitting at terminals in the National Security Agency or the National Reconnaissance Office are more problematic. From a legal standpoint, there is no difference between gathering intelligence from an aircraft or forward location and gathering such information from a headquarters building located in the United States. 151 However, historically, civilians have conducted much of this work. 152 Declaring this workforce to be [136] combatant-only would require a complete overhaul of the organizations. 153 The customary practice among nations would make such an overhaul unnecessary.¶ Finally, for the civilians working in information operations, their status would correlate to their duties. Personnel involved in offensive IO such as CNA, whether they located at Space Command headquarters 154 or in makeshift tents at the front, would be integrated into combat operations. 155 Those involved in defensive IO could be lawful noncombatants, assuming there is no crossover between functions. To the extent that defensive IO can cause disruption or harm to enemy operations, forces, or installations, the activities would require combatant manning.

Limits- we only allow nuclear weapons into the topic, no risk we explode ground

#### Indeterminancy should frame limits—no way to limit or precisely define the topic

Kinopf 06 – Associate Professor, Georgia State University College of Law

Neil, 10-1-06, “The Statutory Commander in Chief” Indiana Law Journal Vol 81 Issue 4

It will be the rare circumstance indeed where Congress has actually been silent. To¶ be sure, the array of statutes relating to military and foreign affairs is not so elaborate¶ as that covering domestic affairs. Nevertheless, that array is quite extensive. As Justice¶ Jackson's above-quoted caution indicates, it is very difficult to say much about these¶ statutes, and therefore about presidential power, in the abstract. Each statute will¶ potentially pull in different directions. An authorizing statute, by implication, prohibits¶ that which is left unauthorized.3¶ 1 A prohibitory statute, similarly, may imply authority¶ to do that which is not forbidden. Moreover, it will be common that a presidential¶ action implicates several statutes, which may point in different directions. 32¶ In addition to this type of complexity in the statutory regime relating to military and¶ foreign affairs, statutes in this area will often be critically ambiguous, and unavoidably¶ so. Especially where a statute means to authorize presidential action, the statute will be¶ effective only if it allows the President enough leeway to respond to future¶ contingencies and diplomatic or military developments as they evolve. For example,¶ Congress enacted the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to¶ allow the President to respond to threats that may arise in the future. The President is¶ authorized to undertake a broad array of economic sanctions, including the seizure of¶ property against foreign persons, organizations, or nations if the President finds that¶ there exists an "unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or¶ substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or¶ economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with¶ respect to such threat.,,33 While the statute uses modifiers-"unusual and¶ extraordinary"-to describe the degree of threat that must be found to invoke¶ presidential power, IEEPA does not define these terms and does not impose rigid¶ limitations on the President. Instead, the law is drafted so as to allow the President¶ flexibility in responding to actual circumstances. Similarly, Congress has authorized¶ the President to "use such means, not amounting to acts of war and not otherwise¶ prohibited by law, as he may think necessary and proper to obtain or effectuate the¶ release" of a United States citizen who is held hostage "by or under the authority of¶ any foreign government." 34 While this statute imposes some limits-the President may¶ not engage in war to win the release of a hostage-its evident concern is with¶ preserving the capacity of the President to respond effectively to the unforeseeable¶ exigencies of a particular hostage crisis.35

#### Lit checks- Stone evidence is about this debate since 1973

#### Kills technology affs- negative will always win by picing out of a particular technology

Syria debate proves- we were asking about introducing armed forces even though the Senate has said no boots on the ground

Neg interp kills Syria and Libya affs- the most pertinent war powers issues

CPs and Ks means aff flex outweighs their limits arguments. Their interp forces affs to find the smallest part of the topic

Competing interpretations is a race to the bottom to limit out the aff –reasonability is logical since we can’t win on T

* Neg must prove we aren’t T- not just they have a better interp

## Hegemony

### Overview :34

Voting affirmative shifts the military to conventional weapons over nuclear forces –allowing us to block out our combat weaknesses. This is key to reverse decline and maintain stability around the world in key hot spots.

1st China- High probability of war over Taiwan- China views it as an internal weakness and multiple indicators show they are preparing to fight. Conflict goes nuclear and the US will be drawn in

2nd Iran- Iran conflict will engulf the middle east and draw in great powers- this leads to millions dying and oil prices spiking

3rd Korea- conflict goes nuclear- this is a uniquely high risk of miscalculation because of the mistrust on the Peninsula

#### Longitudinal empirical analysis supports our impacts

Drezner 05

Daniel, Gregg Easterbrook, Associate Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, “War, and the dangers of extrapolation”

Daily explosions in Iraq, massacres in Sudan, the Koreas smakestaring at each other through artillery barrels, a Hobbesian war of all against all in eastern Congo--combat plagues human society as it has, perhaps, since our distant forebears realized that a tree limb could be used as a club. But here is something you would never guess from watching the news: War has entered a cycle of decline. Combat in Iraq and in a few other places is an exception to a significant global trend that has gone nearly unnoticed--namely that, for about 15 years, there have been **steadily fewer armed conflicts worldwide**. In fact, it is possible that a person's chance of dying because of war has, in the last decade or more, become the lowest in human history.  Is Easterbrook right? He has a few more paragraphs on the numbers:  The University of Maryland studies find the number of wars and armed conflicts worldwide peaked in 1991 at 51, which may represent the most wars happening simultaneously at any point in history. Since 1991, the number has fallen steadily. There were 26 armed conflicts in 2000 and 25 in 2002, even after the Al Qaeda attack on the United States and the U.S. counterattack against Afghanistan. By 2004, Marshall and Gurr's latest study shows, the number of armed conflicts in the world had declined to 20, even after the invasion of Iraq. All told, there were less than half as many wars in 2004 as there were in 1991.  Marshall and Gurr also have a second ranking, gauging the magnitude of fighting. This section of the report is more subjective. Everyone agrees that the worst moment for human conflict was World War II; but how to rank, say, the current separatist fighting in Indonesia versus, say, the Algerian war of independence is more speculative. Nevertheless, the Peace and Conflict studies name 1991 as the peak post-World War II year for totality of global fighting, giving that year a ranking of 179 on a scale that rates the extent and destructiveness of combat. By 2000, in spite of war in the Balkans and genocide in Rwanda, the number had fallen to 97; by 2002 to 81; and, at the end of 2004, it stood at 65. This suggests the **extent and intensity** of global combat is **now less than half** what it was 15 years ago.  Easterbrook spends the rest of the essay postulating the causes of this -- the decline in great power war, the spread of democracies, the growth of economic interdependence, and even the peacekeeping capabilities of the United Nations.  Easterbrook makes a lot of good points -- most people are genuinely shocked when they are told that even in a post-9/11 climate, there has been a steady and persistent decline in wars and deaths from wars. That said, what bothers me in the piece is what Easterbrook leaves out.  First, he neglects to mention the **biggest reason for why war is on the decline** -- there's a global hegemon called the United States right now. Easterbrook acknowledges that "the most powerful factor must be the end of the cold war" but he doesn't understand *why* it's the most powerful factor. Elsewhere in the piece he talks about the growing comity among the great powers, without discussing the elephant in the room: the reason the "great powers" get along is that the United States is much, much more powerful than anyone else. If you quantify power only by relative military capabilities, the U.S. is a great power, there are maybe ten or so middle powers, and then there are a lot of mosquitoes.[If the U.S. is so powerful, why can't it subdue the Iraqi insurgency?--ed. Power is a relative measure -- the U.S. might be having difficulties, but no other country in the world would have fewer problems.] Joshua Goldstein, who knows a thing or two about this phenomenon, made this clear in a Christian Science Monitor op-ed three years ago:  We probably owe this lull to the end of the cold war, and to a unipolar world order with a single superpower to impose its will in places like Kuwait, Serbia, and Afghanistan. The emerging world order is not exactly benign – Sept. 11 comes to mind – and Pax Americana delivers neither justice nor harmony to the corners of the earth. But a unipolar world is **inherently more peaceful** than the bipolar one where two superpowers fueled rival armies around the world. The long-delayed "peace dividend" has arrived, like a tax refund check long lost in the mail. The difference in language between Goldstein and Easterbrook highlights my second problem with "The End of War?" Goldstein rightly refers to the past fifteen years as a "lull" -- a temporary reduction in war and war-related death. The flip side of U.S. hegemony being responsible for the reduction of armed conflict is what would happen if U.S. hegemony **were to ever fade away**. Easterbrook focuses on the trends that suggest an ever-decreasing amount of armed conflict -- and I hope he's right. But I'm enough of a realist to know that if the U.S. should find its primacy challenged by, say, a really populous non-democratic country on the other side of the Pacific Ocean, all best about the utility of economic interdependence, U.N. peacekeeping, and the spread of democracy are right out the window.  UPDATE: To respond to a few thoughts posted by the commenters:  1) To spell things out a bit more clearly -- U.S. hegemony important to the reduction of conflict in two ways. First, U.S. power can act as a powerful if imperfect constraint on pairs of enduring rivals (Greece-Turkey, India-Pakistan) that contemplate war on a regular basis. It can't stop every conflict, but it can blunt a lot of them. Second, and more important to Easterbrook's thesis, U.S. supremacy in conventional military affairs prevents other middle-range states -- China, Russia, India, Great Britain, France, etc. -- from challenging the U.S. or each other in a war. It would be suicide for anyone to fight a war with the U.S., and if any of thesecountries waged a war with each other, the prospect of U.S. intervention would be equally daunting.

### AT: Hege Bad (Top Level) :22

**Empirically denied- hege leading to extinction is false- the US has been one for decades and we are still here**

#### No uniqueness for the turns- the US will be less effective but still act as hegemon

Gartzke 09

Erik Gartzke is an associate professor of political science at UC San Diego Power Shuffle: Will the Coming¶ Transition Be Peaceful? http://acme.highpoint.edu/~msetzler/IntlSec/NewReadings2add/RealismUncertSysIsWarCH1109.7. pdf

In particular, a power in decline relative to other¶ powers may be tempted to use its remaining capabilities¶ and influence to obscure power relations¶ in an attempt to maintain material and leadership¶ advantages. In the current global environment,¶ making power relations more transparent may¶ mean hastening America’s relative decline, something¶ that will be difficult for the United States¶ to accept gracefully. But encouraging uncertainty¶ about the nature of the transition would raise the¶ risk that war may be necessary to resolve different¶ estimates of the true balance of power.

#### We outweigh--The best empirical data says there is no risk of a global war under a unilateral world but its 50/50 in transition

Wohlforth 09

William C. Wohlforth is Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund A. Walsh School of. Foreign Service at Georgetown University¶ UNIPOLARITY, STATUS¶ COMPETITION, AND GREAT¶ POWER WAR World Politics 61, no. 1 ( January 2009), 28–57 http://www.polisci.wisc.edu/Uploads/Documents/IRC/Wohlforth%20(2009).pdf

**Empirical tests** by Organski and Kugler (1980) show that the insights of¶ the power transition are far more likely to be valid (see also Thompson¶ 1983a and Houweling and Siccama 1988). In Table 7'L, the analysis of¶ relations among great powers that comprises a small set of the possible¶ dyads over the last century and a half shows the power of this inference.¶ Table 7.1 makes two fundamental points. Preponderance by the¶ dominant power insures peace among great powers, while a balance of¶ power may lead to either conflict or peace. Clearly, the necessary but not¶ sufificient conditions for maior war emerge only in the rare instances when¶ power parity is accompanied by a challenger overtaking a dominant nation.¶ The odds of a war in this very reduced subset are 50 percent. No other¶ theoretical statement has, to our knowledge, reduced the number of cases to¶ such a small set, and no other is so parsimonious in its explanatory¶ requirements (for alternatives see Bueno de Mesquita 1981).¶ One should note that when power parity among major contenders is¶ present, war is avoided two thirds of the time. Major war, however, was¶ never waged in the past 100 years when the dominant power was¶ preponderant. Preponderance appears to provide the **most stable condition**¶ for the international order.

### Err Hege Good :12

#### You should err with heg being good—zero certainty of what a world of retrenchment looks like

Brooks, Ikenberry and Wohlforth 13

Stephen G., G. John, William C., “Don't Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment” *International Security*

Volume 37, Number 3, Winter 2012/2013 //mtc

In this article, we assess the case for retrenchment on its own terms. We argue that advocates of retrenchment radically overestimate the costs of the [End Page 9] current grand strategy and underestimate its benefits. The United States' globe-girdling grand strategy is the devil we know, and retrenchment advocates effectively identify some of its risks and costs. A world with a disengaged United States is the devil we don't know, and we provide strong reasons why it would present much greater risks and costs. Retrenchment would in essence entail a massive experiment: How would the world work without an engaged, liberal leading power? International relations scholarship cannot provide a certain answer. What we can say is that the balance of what scholars know about international politics suggests that sustaining the core commitments of the current grand strategy is a wholly reasonable approach to pursuing narrow U.S. national interests in security, prosperity, and the preservation of domestic liberty. At the same time, scholars and policymakers need to know a lot more to make rational grand strategic choices. For that research to begin, however, there needs to be two sides to the scholarly debate on U.S. grand strategy.

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### China- Taiwan Uniquely Likely

#### Current building projects in the Spratley Island’s threaten relations

Callick 9/7

Rown Callick is the Asia Pacific Editor from the Australian, “Region unsettled as China, Taiwan stir”, The Australian 9-7-2013 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/region-unsettled-as-china-taiwan-stir/story-e6frg6so-1226713588546>

TAIWAN has revealed plans to build a new wharf and China is laying concrete blocks on islands they claim in the South China Sea, at a time of confusingly mixed signals over Asia's most fiercely disputed area.¶ China has simultaneously signalled a shift towards a more accommodative policy on its islands and sea zones, and moved to consolidate its hold on territory it claims.¶ As a result of the Chinese block-laying on a shoal, The Philippines has recalled its ambassador from Beijing for consultations.¶ At the same time, Taiwan has budgeted $116.5 million over the next three years to build a wharf on Taiping, one of the hotly contested Spratly islands in the South China Sea, 1600km from Taiwan's southernmost city of Kaohsiung.¶ This risks stirring strong responses. The construction of the wharf will enable Taiwan to land heavy equipment to extend the runway there, so that large military transports, including Hercules, can land on the island.

#### Splits in Taiwan’s political party allow Nationalist’s to take hold and reverse relations with China

AP 9/11

Associated Press, “Taiwan ruling party suspends veteran speaker”, Marietta Times , 9/11/2013 <http://www.mariettatimes.com/page/content.detail/id/373178/Taiwan-ruling-party-suspends-veteran-speaker.html?isap=1&nav=5021>

TAIPEI, Taiwan (AP) — The disciplinary panel of Taiwan's ruling party suspended the speaker of the legislature Wednesday, a move that could fracture the party and threaten its efforts to develop closer ties with China.¶ Wang Jin-pyng was suspended for allegedly pressuring prosecutors not to appeal the acquittal of an opposition lawmaker. That removes him from the party for a year, after which he can apply for reinstatement.¶ Wang contends he did nothing improper. He has held the legislative speakership, one of Taiwan's most powerful positions, since 1999, and is known for having relatively good relations with the opposition. Though he and President Ma Ying-jeou both belong to the Nationalist Party, the two have been bitter rivals.¶ The fast-moving political drama could threaten the unity of the party, which under Ma has lowered tensions between Taiwan and China to their lowest level since the two sides split amid civil war 64 years ago.¶ Ma pressed hard for Wang's ouster, calling his alleged action "the most serious infringement in the history of Taiwan's judiciary." But in doing so, he has drawn criticism not only from the opposition, but also from many Nationalists who see his pursuit of Wang as a personal vendetta.¶ A Nationalist split would improve the prospects of the China-wary opposition in the 2016 elections. Ma is currently among the most unpopular presidents in Taiwan history, with an approval rating of just 15 percent.

### Korea

#### North Korea has both the capability and motivation

Kang and Cha 13

David Kang is professor of international relations and business at the University of Southern California and Victor Cha is a professor and author, as well as former Director for Asian Affairs in the White House's National Security Council "Think Again: North Korea", Foreign Policy 3/25/2013 <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/25/think_again_north_korea?page=full&wp_login_redirect=0>

"North Korea's not that dangerous."¶ Wrong. There is no threat of war on the Korean peninsula because the United States and South Korea have deterred the regime for over six decades, or so the thinking goes. And the occasional provocation from Pyongyang -- full of sound and fury -- usually ends with it blowing up in its face, signifying nothing. So why worry? Two reasons. First, North Korea has a penchant for testing new South Korean presidents. A new one was just inaugurated in February, and since 1992, the North has welcomed these five new leaders by disturbing the peace. Whether in the form of missile launches, submarine incursions, or naval clashes, these North Korean provocations were met by each newly elected South Korean president with patience rather than pique.¶ The difference today is that South Korea is no longer turning the other cheek. After the North blew up the South Korean navy ship the Cheonan, killing 46 sailors in 2010, Seoul re-wrote the rules of military engagement. It has lost patience and will respond kinetically to any provocation, which could escalateinto a larger conflict. Secondu, North Korea crossed a major technology threshold in December, when it successfully launched a satellite into orbit. Though the satellite later malfunctioned, the North managed to put the payload into orbit with ballistic missile launch technology that is clearly designed to reach the United States.¶ This development appears to validate former U.S. Defense Secretary Bob Gates's January 2011 claim that the regime was only five years away from fielding a missile that could threaten the continental **U**nited **S**tates. To make matters worse, Pyongyang conducted a third nuclear test in February, which appears to have been more successful than the previous two. Within President Barack Obama's second term in office, North Korea could well be the third nation (after Russia and China) to field a nuclear-tipped ballistic missile targeted at the United States. Moreover, the North has sold every weapons system it has developed to the likes of Iran, Pakistan, and Syria. That's worth losing sleep over.

## Econ Leadership

### Overview

Second scenario is economic leadership, maintaining this is key to prevent countries turning inward and causing war- and Garten says it doesn’t take much to make those go nuclear

## Proliferation

### Overview :35

The plan shores up US commitments to disarmament- this feeds the global nonproliferation regime from nonnuclear states which our Knopf evidence says is the key to stopping nuclear proliferation.

Absent the aff, prolif escalate out of hand allowing for terrorists to acquire nuclear materials and strike- this causes retaliation between the US at Russia culminating in extinction- highest risk and arsenals on hair trigger

#### New state prolif causes nuclear war and extinction – nuclear deterrence fails for three reasons

Kroenig 12

Matthew Kroenig, 5-26-2012, assistant professor in the Department of Government at Georgetown University and a research affiliate with The Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University, he served as a strategist on the policy planning staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense where he received the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Award for Outstanding Achievement. He is a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations and has held academic fellowships from the National Science Foundation, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, and the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at the University of California, “The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have A Future?,” http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1182andrtid=2

The spread of nuclear weapons poses a number of severe threats to international peace and U.S. national security including: nuclear war, nuclear terrorism, emboldened nuclear powers, constrained freedom of action, weakened alliances, and further nuclear proliferation. This section explores each of these threats in turn. Nuclear War. The greatest threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons is nuclear war. The more states in possession of nuclear weapons, the greater the probability that somewhere, someday, there is a catastrophic nuclear war. A nuclear exchange between the two superpowers during the Cold War could have arguably resulted in human extinction and a nuclear exchange between states with smaller nuclear arsenals, such as India and Pakistan, could still result in millions of deaths and casualties, billions of dollars of economic devastation, environmental degradation, and a parade of other horrors. To date, nuclear weapons have only been used in warfare once. In 1945, the United States used one nuclear weapon each on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing World War II to a close. Many analysts point to sixty-five-plus-year tradition of nuclear non-use as evidence that nuclear weapons are unusable, but it would be naïve to think that nuclear weapons will never be used again. After all, analysts in the 1990s argued that worldwide economic downturns like the great depression were a thing of the past, only to be surprised by the dot-com bubble bursting in the later 1990s and the Great Recession of the late Naughts. [53] This author, for one, would be surprised if nuclear weapons are not used in my lifetime. Before reaching a state of MAD, new nuclear states go through a transition period in which they lack a secure-second strike capability. In this context, one or both states might believe that it has an incentive to use nuclear weapons first. For example, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons neither Iran, nor its nuclear-armed rival, Israel, will have a secure, second-strike capability. Even though it is believed to have a large arsenal, given its small size and lack of strategic depth, Israel might not be confident that it could absorb a nuclear strike and respond with a devastating counterstrike. Similarly, Iran might eventually be able to build a large and survivable nuclear arsenal, but, when it first crosses the nuclear threshold, Tehran will have a small and vulnerable nuclear force. In these pre-MAD situations, there are at least three ways that nuclear war could occur. First, the state with the nuclear advantage might believe it has a splendid first strike capability. In a crisis, Israel might, therefore, decide to launch a preemptive nuclear strike to disarm Iran’s nuclear capabilities and eliminate the threat of nuclear war against Israel. Indeed, this incentive might be further increased by Israel’s aggressive strategic culture that emphasizes preemptive action. Second, the state with a small and vulnerable nuclear arsenal, in this case Iran, might feel use ‘em or loose ‘em pressures. That is, if Tehran believes that Israel might launch a preemptive strike, Iran might decide to strike first rather than risk having its entire nuclear arsenal destroyed. Third, as Thomas Schelling has argued, nuclear war could result due to the reciprocal fear of surprise attack.[54] If there are advantages to striking first, one state might start a nuclear war in the belief that war is inevitable and that it would be better to go first than to go second. In a future Israeli-Iranian crisis, for example, Israel and Iran might both prefer to avoid a nuclear war, but decide to strike first rather than suffer a devastating first attack from an opponent. Even in a world of MAD, there is a risk of nuclear war. Rational deterrence theory assumes nuclear-armed states are governed by rational leaders that would not intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war. This assumption appears to have applied to past and current nuclear powers, but there is no guarantee that it will continue to hold in the future. For example, Iran’s theocratic government, despite its inflammatory rhetoric, has followed a fairly pragmatic foreign policy since 1979, but it contains leaders who genuinely hold millenarian religious worldviews who could one day ascend to power and have their finger on the nuclear trigger. We cannot rule out the possibility that, as nuclear weapons continue to spread, one leader will choose to launch a nuclear war, knowing full well that it could result in self-destruction. One does not need to resort to irrationality, however, to imagine a nuclear war under MAD. Nuclear weapons may deter leaders from intentionally launching full-scale wars, but they do not mean the end of international politics. As was discussed above, nuclear-armed states still have conflicts of interest and leaders still seek to coerce nuclear-armed adversaries. This leads to the credibility problem that is at the heart of modern deterrence theory: how can you threaten to launch a suicidal nuclear war? Deterrence theorists have devised at least two answers to this question. First, as stated above, leaders can choose to launch a limited nuclear war.[55] This strategy might be especially attractive to states in a position of conventional military inferiority that might have an incentive to escalate a crisis quickly. During the Cold War, the United States was willing to use nuclear weapons first to stop a Soviet invasion of Western Europe given NATO’s conventional inferiority in continental Europe. As Russia’s conventional military power has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has come to rely more heavily on nuclear use in its strategic doctrine. Indeed, Russian strategy calls for the use of nuclear weapons early in a conflict (something that most Western strategists would consider to be escalatory) as a way to de-escalate a crisis. Similarly, Pakistan’s military plans for nuclear use in the event of an invasion from conventionally stronger India. And finally, Chinese generals openly talk about the possibility of nuclear use against a U.S. superpower in a possible East Asia contingency. Second, as was also discussed above leaders can make a “threat that leaves something to chance.”[56] They can initiate a nuclear crisis. By playing these risky games of nuclear brinkmanship, states can increases the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down. Historical crises have not resulted in nuclear war, but many of them, including the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, have come close. And scholars have documented historical incidents when accidents could have led to war.[57] When we think about future nuclear crisis dyads, such as India and Pakistan and Iran and Israel, there are fewer sources of stability that existed during the Cold War, meaning that there is a very real risk that a future Middle East crisis could result in a devastating nuclear exchange.

### Terrorism

#### Nuke terror is likely – Consensus of 120 countries – Dismantling Al Qaeda capabilities is key

Dahl 7/1

(Fredrik, Reuters nuclear correspondent, “Governments warn about nuclear terrorism threat”, 7/1/13, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/01/us-nuclear-security-idUSBRE96010E20130701>)

A declaration adopted by more than 120 states at the meeting said "substantial progress" had been made in recent years to improve nuclear security globally, but it was not enough. Analysts say radical groups could theoretically build a crude but deadly nuclear bomb if they had the money, technical knowledge and materials needed. Ministers remained "concerned about the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism ... More needs to be done to further strengthen nuclear security worldwide", the statement said. The document "encouraged" states to take various measures such as minimizing the use of highly-enriched uranium, but some diplomats said they would have preferred firmer commitments. Many countries regard nuclear security as a sensitive political issue that should be handled primarily by national authorities. This was reflected in the statement's language. Still, Yukiya Amano, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which hosted the conference, said the agreement was "very robust" and represented a major step forward. RADICAL GROUPS' "NUCLEAR AMBITIONS" Amano earlier warned the IAEA-hosted conference against a "false sense of security" over the danger of nuclear terrorism. Holding up a small lead container that was used to try to traffic highly enriched uranium in Moldova two years ago, the U.N. nuclear chief said it showed a "worrying level of knowledge on the part of the smugglers". "This case ended well," he said, referring to the fact that the material was seized and arrests were made. But he added: "We cannot be sure if such cases are just the tip of the iceberg." Obtaining weapons-grade fissile material - highly enriched uranium or plutonium - poses the biggest challenge for militant groups, so it must be kept secure both at civilian and military facilities, experts say. An apple-sized amount of plutonium in a nuclear device and detonated in a highly populated area could instantly kill or wound hundreds of thousands of people, according to the Nuclear Security Governance Experts Group (NSGEG) lobby group. But experts say a so-called "dirty bomb" is a more likely threat than a nuclear bomb. In a dirty bomb, conventional explosives are used to disperse radiation from a radioactive source, which can be found in hospitals or other places that are generally not very well protected. More than a hundred incidents of thefts and other unauthorized activities involving nuclear and radioactive material are reported to the IAEA every year, Amano said. "Some material goes missing and is never found," he said. U.S. Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz said al Qaeda was still likely to be trying to obtain nuclear material for a weapon. "Despite the strides we have made in dismantling core al Qaeda we should expect its adherents ... to continue trying to achieve their nuclear ambitions,"

## Conditionality :12

Conditionality is bad and a voting issue- 1 advocacies solves their offense

1. Strategy skew- whatever we attack in this speech they kick- hurts 2AC and aff can lose debate in that speech
2. Justifies advocating the perm
3. Multiple worlds- different advocacies and the squo means aff must debate too many different worlds- its already time crunched
4. Time skew- any time spent on what they kick is irrelevant- they go for what we undercover

## Declaratory

Not credible- means it won’t change US grand strategy and solve hegemony

Perm- do both

#### Congress key to international credibility

Foust 11 – editor of the Space Review

(Jeff, The Space Review, “Debating a code of conduct for space,” 3/7, <http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1794/1>)

Even if the US was to sign on some version of the EU Code, both DeSutter and Pace believe it would desirable, if not necessary, to get the approval of the US Senate. DeSutter said it wasn’t clear if Senate “advise and consent” was strictly required for a document with less standing than a treaty, but that it would still be useful. “For me, it doesn’t matter if it’s required,” she said. “My general approach is, on something that is very significant, like this, for national security, go ahead and seek advise and consent. Go ahead and put it through those tests.”¶ A benefit of getting Senate support for the document is that it would make it clear to other countries that the US backed it. Other countries “look to see if the two ends [of Pennsylvania Avenue] are in sync,” Pace said. “And where they are in sync, in things like remote sensing and GPS, they know there’s policy stability and they can rely on it.”

#### Declaratory policy won’t provide credibility

Pollack 09

Joshua. Consultant to the US government. 10/30/9. <http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2517/n-fu>.

My [latest column](http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/joshua-pollack/reducing-the-role-of-nuclear-weapons) in the Bulletin takes a somewhat different tack. While I’m in favor of NFU, I don’t think it should be pigeonholed as “declaratory policy.” It should be treated as policy policy, laid down in an Executive Order. (Yeah, right there in the Federal Register.) As Commander-in-Chief, of course, the President can override his own standing orders in a pinch, but in the meantime, they should form the basis of guidance for planners. Why is this distinction important? For one thing, declarations enjoy greater credibility when something more than reputation stands behind them. And [President Obama](http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/) has promised – rather publicly, although no proper oath was sworn – to “reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy.” This is a good idea because, as I’ve sought to explain in the [column](http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/joshua-pollack/reducing-the-role-of-nuclear-weapons), the present role of nuclear weapons is rather broad and nebulous. And it’s just that much harder to persuade countries outside of the U.S. alliance system that nonproliferation is in their interest, too, if it enforces an oligopoly on weapons intended in part for what [Thomas Schelling](http://books.google.com/books?id=V25WWXMgte8C&dq) called “compellence” and [Alexander George](http://books.google.com/books?id=KR9CAAAAIAAJ&q) called “coercive diplomacy.” Call it [nuclear blackmail](http://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P3883/), if you like.

#### Credibility key to hegemony

APSA 09

(American Political Science Association, “U.S. Standing in the World: Causes, Consequences, and the Future”, Task Force Report, September 2009)

As at the regional level, U.S. standing on the global stage appears susceptible to both vicious and virtuous cycles resulting in valleys and peaks, declines and advances. As credibility and esteem decline, the United States may be less able to lead and accomplish its policy goals. Others will be less willing to follow a U.S. lead or defer to U.S. opinions because they no longer believe the United States will get the job done, honor promises, or offer a desirable model to emulate. This, in turn, may further diminish U.S. standing. We see some evidence of this in the most recent period of diminished U.S. standing in global institutions. Logically, however, the converse ought to be true as well. As the United States is perceived to honor promises and show interest in multilateral leadership, its standing may be expected to increase, which may make expanded leadership, increased authority and cooperation possible. We suspect, however, that is harder to recover standing than to lose it.

No teeth to the counterplan

Lackey 84

Douglas P. Lackey is professor of philosophy at Baruch College and the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. *Moral Principles and Nuclear Weapons* googlebooks

Given the technical difficulties surrounding pre-emption, we can be confident that, at least for the present, the United States has no plans for a preemptive strike against anyone. Our present policy probably is, as Weinberger claimed, purely “defensive.” But the notion of a “defensive” use of nuclear weapons is complex. Obviously nuclear weapons are not like shields or castle walls or other traditional modes of defense. They cannot stop a blow on its way to delivery: they can only discourage an opponent from launching a blow in the first place by promising a terrible retaliation in return. But what sort of blows should one seek to prevent with promises of nuclear retaliation? Blows of any kind? Or only nuclear blows? Notice that the nation that launches a nuclear counter-attack in response to a conventional attack will have broken the nuclear taboo, even if it did not start the war. To adopt a policy of never using nuclear weapons unless someone else does is to adopt a policy of “no first use.” The United States has never publically affirmed a “no first use” policy. Our implied declaratory policy, especially in the European theater, is to use nuclear weapons in response to conventional aggression. But declaratory policy does not matter as much as action policy. The United States could make a “no first use” declaration, and yet be prepared to use nuclear weapons first; it could refuse to make a “no first use” declaration, and yet be committed to not using nuclear weapons first. Which action policy serves the interests of the United States best?

Doesn’t change war planning- means the United States still relies on nuclear deterrence

Miller 02

Steven E. Miller Director of the International Security Program @ Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, “The Utility of Nuclear Weapons and the Strategy of No-First-Use,” Pugwash Meeting no. 279, London, UK, 15-17 November 2002, pg. http://www.pugwash.org/ reports/nw/miller.htm]

Eradicating the idea that nuclear first use is an option would have enormous implications. It would alter the expectations of politicians and commanders. It would (or should) influence military investment decisions - more conventional capability may be necessary, for example.26 It could affect public articulations of defense policy and military doctrine. In the Soviet period, Moscow's NFU pledge was undermined by a profusion of military writings that emphasized nuclear preemption and warfighting and otherwise were in tension with NFU. But a genuine NFU strategy would need to harmonize doctrinal expositions and political explanations of defense policy with the constraints of the NFU commitment. Changes in public rhetoric alone will not be sufficient to convince the world that a NFU strategy is firmly in place. But they could help send the message that NFU was being taken seriously. NATO presently proclaims at every occasion that nuclear weapons are essential and that nuclear first-use is an integral component of alliance military strategy. If NATO instead were to proclaim that nuclear weapons are irrelevant to most of the alliance's security needs and that it could not envision circumstances in which it would use nuclear weapons first, this would certainly set a very different tone.¶ War planning, of course, is not a public activity, though it has public outcroppings. So though this is a necessary step if NFU is to be real, it must be coupled with other, more visible steps, if others are to be convinced that NFU is more than declaratory policy.¶ Exercises and training. Militaries, goes the old aphorism, fight the way they train. Military organizations are honed through years training and exercises to operate in certain ways with certain expectations. If exercises sometimes or routinely involve scenarios that include nuclear first use, this will be visible to observers of the exercises and will be have impact on the way the military thinks and behaves. NFU cannot be real if militaries are practicing as if nuclear weapons will be used first. In the context of a strategy of NFU, exercises should ingrain the idea that first-use is entirely out of the picture and should not figure at all in the calculations of military commanders.¶ Force Composition and Disposition. A strategy of NFU would require or permit dramatic alterations in force posture. A purely deterrent force could be much smaller and simpler than the present arsenals of the larger nuclear powers. There would be no need for emphasis on speed or offensive readiness. (Readiness for survivability would, of course, remain desirable.) The force postures most compatible with NFU, and most convincing to other powers, would possess little or no capability for first-use.¶ This proposition - that states should seek to minimize the first-use capacities of their nuclear arsenals - has potentially profound implications for nuclear posture. It could lead far down a road toward latent, residual, undeployed nuclear capabilities. In effect, this would entail the aggressive pursuit of deep dealerting.27 In the context of a strategy of NFU, nuclear forces need only survive survive an attack and be capable of retaliation. No other demands are placed upon them. This means that all readiness measures associated with first use options are superfluous, unnecessary, and even undesirable. Some categories of nuclear weapons - nonstrategic nuclear forces, for example - would become expendable. Forward deployed weapons, such as the American nuclear capabilities deployed in Europe, would be neither necessary nor appropriate. With offensive readiness no longer important, there would be no reason to leave warheads routinely mated to delivery systems. There might be little reason, indeed, to possess actively deployed nuclear weapons. There might be no compelling reason to leave nuclear weapons in the custody of military organizations. So long as survivability could be assured, there might be an argument for keeping few, if any, fully assembled nuclear weapons in the arsenal. Following this logic still further, in this sort of nuclear environment, states might grow comfortable not only with NFU, but with the notion of no-early-second-use - retaliation does not need to be prompt in order to deter. The end point of this logic might be something like the capacities of present day Japan, which might be regarded as a massively dealerted nuclear power. It possesses nuclear expertise, delivery systems, and fissile material. In some weeks or months it could build nuclear weapons for retaliation if it needed to. But no one fears its first use options. Thus, the premise of NFU, if taken seriously, produces a logic that can lead in stunning directions.¶ In short, once nuclear arsenals are limited to purely deterrent purposes, it becomes possible to envision substantial alterations of force posture that would give considerable reality to NFU commitments. For the larger nuclear powers, one could imagine much smaller forces, deeply dealerted, incapable of rapid use, perhaps with warheads unmated from delivery systems, perhaps with warheads withdrawn from regular deployment. This is a very different nuclear force, far from anything presently in view, but one entirely compatible with a world dominated by deterrence and NFU.

#### Declaratory policy fails, won’t be genuine in a crisis and turns non-prolif efforts if seen as deceptive

Rovner 11

Joshua Rovner is Assistant Professor of Strategy and Policy at the U.S. Naval War College, and Adjunct Assistant Professor in the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, “H-Diplo | ISSF Article Review, Number 6 (2011) Michael S. Gerson, “No First Use: The Next Step for U.S. Nuclear Policy,” International Security 33:2 (2010)”, 2011 <http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/ISSF/PDF/ISSF-AR6.pdf>

To his credit, Gerson suggests the limits of his argument when he notes that during crises, U.S. leaders would need to “repeat and reinforce the commitment to NFU.” They would also need to calibrate public statements with tangible signs of U.S. intentions, such as changes to the alert status of nuclear forces, in order to convince adversaries that their promises were genuine. Standing declaratory policy will not do much to reduce crisis instability without these additional measures. In fact, as Gerson notes, it might actually make things worse if adversaries come to believe that NFU is part of a deception operation in advance of a first strike (46).

#### Declaratory policy costs PC- requires sustained presidential commitment to succeed

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 09

09 65: 1 “Its 5 minutes to midnight: a prescripton for US Nuclear policy” jan 1 Sage

It would be easy to be overly optimistic about the prospects for dramatic improvement in U.S. nuclear weapons policies when President-elect Barack Obama takes office on January 20. During the last eight years, the United States has laid out a series of destabilizing policies regarding the use of nuclear weapons and demonstrated an arrogant attitude toward resolving international conflicts. Correcting these missteps should be as easy as installing a new leader and resetting policies, right? Wrong. Many of the country’s nuclear weapon policies share a lineage with U.S. policies going back decades. Rerooting them will require more than just new leadership; it will require fundamental shifts in thinking and a sustained commitment to change. Early in 2008 the Bulletin published “The Bureaucracy of Deterrence,” by scholars Janne Nolan and James Holmes, which details the failures and foibles of President Bill Clinton’s attempt to remake the U.S. nuclear posture. As Obama prepares to take office, he and his national security team would be wise to review this account as a first step in revising U.S. nuclear policy. Nolan and Holmes refer to potential pitfalls facing presidents, none of which presents bigger challenges than the discrepancies between “declaratory” and “operational” doctrine—in other words, how U.S. leaders describe the role of U.S. nuclear weapons and how the weapons would actually be used.

Unilateral executive actions bad- need outside accountability for WPR enforcement- key to prevent violence abroad

Druck 12

Judah A. Druck has a J.D. from Cornell and is an article editor for the Cornell Law Review, “DRONING ON: THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION AND THE NUMBING EFFECT OF TECHNOLOGY-DRIVEN WARFARE”, [Cornell Law Review, Vol. 98, No. 1, pp. 209, 2012](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2185743##) December 6, 2012

As these situations become more and more common—where postwar assessments look at monetary, rather than human costs—the fear of unilateral presidential action similarly becomes more perti- nent. Unlike past larger-scale wars, whose traditional harms provided sufficient incentive for the populace to exert pressure on the Presi- dent (either directly or via Congress), technology-driven warfare has removed the triggers for checks on presidential action. And though the military actions that have raised WPR issues involved limited, small-scale operations, the volatile and unpredictable nature of war- fare itself could eventually put American lives in danger, a risk worth considering given the increased use of drones abroad. ¶ ¶ Thus, the same conditions are now in place as when the WPR was enacted, creating a need to revisit the importance of the WPR in light of the numbing effect of technology-driven warfare. Although it might be tempting to simply write off the WPR as a failed experiment in aggressive congressional maneuvering given its inability to prevent unilateral presidential action in the past, the new era of warfare and its effects on the populace has created a newfound sense of urgency, one that requires a strong statutory barrier between the President and military action abroad. Thus, we need stronger WPR enforcement as it becomes easier to enter into “hostilities.”¶ While others focus on the WPR itself,161 the emphasis of this Note is on the public’s role in preventing unilateral presidential action. In this respect, the simplest solution for the numbing effect of contem- porary warfare is an increased level of public attentiveness and scru- tiny concerning military actions abroad, regardless of the lack of visible costs at home. As we have seen, once the public becomes vigi- lant about our less-visible foreign actions, we can expect our politi- cians to become receptive to domestic law. But as this Note points out, the issues surrounding a toothless WPR will continue to grow and amplify as society enters a new age of technology-driven warfare. Thus, there is a pressing need for greater public awareness of the new, and perhaps less obvious, consequences of our actions abroad.162 Per- haps taking note of these unforeseen costs will improve the public’s inquiry into potential illegal action abroad and create real incentives to enforce the WPR.

## Politics

1. Obama does not push the affirmative- 1AC card says he did not choose to do NFU, why would he push it if he doesn’t need to
2. Plan text says Congress- means we only use that branch
3. It is our interp of fiat and normal means- resolved means immediate means no chance for Obama to be involved and the DA is around time which means we don’t link

James evidence concludes they don’t even have a specific plan for what the continuing resolution will look like- make the neg show you that first

#### Won’t pass or if it does too late – Will fight Obama Care to the end

Barrett et al 9/12

Wes, Nicholas Kalman and Chad Pergram, reporters, “House pulls spending bill amid backlash as government shutdown looms,” http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/09/12/house-leaders-pull-temporary-spending-bill-after-conservative-backlash/

House **Republican leaders pulled their plan** Wednesday **to temporarily fund the federal government after rank-and-file party members said it sidestepped “defunding” ObamaCare.**¶ The action further narrowed Congress’ time to strike a budget deal before an Oct. 1 government shutdown.¶ House Speaker John **Boehner** and his team **pulled the plan,** which could have gotten a full chamber vote as early as Thursday, **after a conservative backlash led by the Tea Party movement and Heritage Action for America**.¶ **The plan essentially called for the House to vote on defunding ObamaCare and the temporary spending bill,** then send the package to the Democrat-controlled Senate, **which** almost certainly **would have jettisoned the defund part and allowed the chambers to negotiate on a “clean” funding bill**.¶ “The Ruling Elite is up to it again,” the Tea Party Patriots group said Wednesday. “They want you to think they have voted for defunding ObamaCare. But it’s another shell game.”¶ Meanwhile, Congress must also work on several other pressing issues, especially agreeing to increase the debt ceiling, which the government could hit as soon as mid-October, according to a recent Treasury Department assessment.¶ **Boehner defended his defund-spending plan** Tuesday, **saying his chamber has** already **voted 40 times to “defund**, repeal and change” **ObamaCare,** so the Senate must now take up the fight.¶ Although Boehner pulled the bill because he didn’t have the votes, sources tell Fox News **the speaker has no intention of changing the plan and might revisit it next week -- after members realize its strengths.**

#### The HAA drives Republicans

NBC 2013

August, “Congress: Heritage Action argues shutdown wouldn’t hurt GOP,” http://firstread.nbcnews.com/\_news/2013/08/14/20022534-congress-heritage-action-argues-shutdown-wouldnt-hurt-gop?lite

[NBC's Michael O'Brien](http://firstread.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/08/14/20010200-conservative-activists-say-data-shows-gop-shouldnt-fear-shutdown-over-obamacare?lite) reports that "**a prominent conservative group marshaled new polling data** on Wednesday **to** try and **convince reluctant Republicans that forcing a government shutdown over 'Obamacare' wouldn’t** necessarily **harm the GOP, or cost the party control of the House** of Representatives. **Heritage Action for America** – one of the conservative groups **lead**ing **the charge to pressure Republican lawmakers** **against voting to continue government spending unless they can defund** President Barack **Obama’s health care law** – said its new poll of likely voters in 10 relatively competitive congressional districts showed that forcing such a shutdown would not be fatal for the GOP in 2014."

#### Continuing resolution won’t pass

Fecke 9/13

Jeff, Care2, Republicans Hold Their Breath, and the Country, Until Obamacare is Stopped, 9/13/13, http://www.care2.com/causes/republicans-would-rather-shut-the-government-down-than-get-over-obamacare.html

While the possibility of American intervention in Syria has been at the forefront of the national consciousness, another serious issue looms just around the corner. With less than three weeks (and only six working days) left to avert a government shutdown, and an October fight looming on the debt ceiling, House Republicans are finding it nearly impossible to craft a stopgap budget that can both pass muster with Tea Party loyalists and pass the House and Senate.¶ The hangup is, as it has so often been, Obamacare. Conservative Republicans, led by Sen. Ted Cruz, R-Texas, have demanded that Republicans make eliminating funding for the Affordable Care Act a non-negotiable part of budget negotiations. As there is no hope that Senate Democrats or President Barack Obama would agree to this demand, such a strategy essentially ensures a shutdown of all but basic government services. That could in turn jeopardize the fragile economic recovery and send the United States back into recession — not to mention a whole host of negative repercussions from stopping all but essential services.

#### College regulation thump

Nelson 9/9

Libby, Politico, Scrutiny again for for-profit colleges, 9/9/13, http://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/scrutiny-again-for-for-profit-colleges-96432.html?hp=l7

Unlike the last time around, though, the administration has to contend with congressional Republicans who oppose any attempt to regulate the for-profit sector. The Education Department is aware that any new rule is likely to face a legal challenge. But thanks to its earlier regulatory attempts, the department also now commands deeper and more detailed data than ever on for-profit graduates’ debt and job prospects — disclosures that some say have already forced changes at for-profit colleges.¶ The regulatory fireworks that begin Monday and continue into October will play out against a backdrop of Obama’s newly announced, ambitious plan for higher education. That proposal would apply some of the concepts tested on for-profits to the rest of higher education, such as trying to make sure colleges provide good value to students. And the timing has made some question why the administration is spending political capital on a tough fight with well-financed, well-connected opponents.

#### Won’t pass and Syria thumps

-bill is too long

-Congress never agrees on immigration

-dems and republicans can’t trust each other

-use Syria as an excuse to give up

CNN 9/12

Ruben Navarrette, Contributor, “It's not Syria holding up immigration reform”, http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/12/opinion/navarrette-immigration-stalled/

No, a proper autopsy would show that immigration reform is meeting its demise in this Congress for a variety of reasons. Here are three of them:¶ One: The major legislative offering -- the Border Security, Economic Opportunity and Immigration Modernization Act -- collapsed under its own weight.¶ When the Senate's bipartisan "Gang of Eight" unveiled its masterpiece in April, the bill was 844 pages long. The amendment process pushed it past 1,000 pages.¶ The folks who have helped pass immigration reform legislation -- i.e., the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act -- before will tell you that when you want to pass legislation, you want the bill to get smaller as time goes on, not the opposite.¶ Besides, there was too much pork. Many of the giveways have had nothing to do with immigration but were merely intended to get the support of senator so-and-so from such-and-such state. That's because, as California-based policy analyst Arnold Torres maintains, the debate was always about politics instead of what it should have been about: policy.¶ Torres knows this terrain well, having contributed to the debate over reform in 1986 as executive director of the League of United Latin American Citizens. Many advocates this time around were too busy worrying about passing something, anything, to give a thought to whether what they had on the table was worth passing or how it would be implemented.¶ Two: As broken as Washington is on most issues, when the subject is immigration, it is doubly dysfunctional.¶ That town is filled with people who use this issue to further their own agendas. If you interviewed illegal immigrants and asked them what they would have liked to have achieved in the immigration reform process -- and I've done just that -- they would ask for three things: a work permit, the ability to travel across borders and a driver's license.¶ What's not on that list? Citizenship and the voting privileges that come with it, which is a repeated deal-breaker for politicians.¶ Washington is also filled with people who think they know more than the folks on the frontlines. If you sat down with Border Patrol agents and supervisors and asked them what they need -- and I've done that, too -- they would ask for new roads on the border, surveillance equipment and tunnel detection capability.¶ Whatever you do, they'd say, don't give us more agents to train and more fencing that doesn't keep out anyone. So what did the Senate bill -- thanks to the Corker-Hoeven "border surge" amendment -- offer? More agents and more fencing.¶ Three: The debate has been inherently dishonest, with neither side able to trust the other.¶ Posturing and hot air to the contrary, neither party really wanted to have this debate. It divides their constituencies. Republicans have to referee a civil war between nativists who want less immigration because they fear that the country's complexion is changing, and business interests that want more immigration because they need workers.¶ Democrats have to keep the peace between Latinos who want illegal immigrants to have a pathway to citizenship because they feel their pain, and some members of organized labor, who--despite the fact that their leadership supports reform-- would like to give immigrants a one-way bus ticket to their home country because they fear the competition.¶ The solution? Fool everyone.¶ Republicans talk tough but go soft on employers by creating loopholes and delaying enforcement efforts. Democrats talk soft but pander to working-class Americans by ratcheting up deportations and building walls. Sometimes, it works. Still, it is one heck of a tough spot to be in.¶ Now thanks to the crisis in Syria, members of Congress in both parties have a way out. And, with the enthusiasm of a dying man in the desert reaching for a bottle of water, they're grabbing it.

#### Plan is incredibly popular

Callagher 08

Nancy Gallagher, The Acronym Institute, Disarmament Diplomacy, “US and Russian Public Opinion on Arms Control and Space Security,” Issue No. 87, Spring 2008

There was a strong consensus among both the American and Russian publics that nuclear weapons should play a very limited role in security strategy. When respondents were asked about the circumstances under which their country should use nuclear weapons, 20 percent of Americans and 14 percent of Russians chose "never", while 54 percent of Americans and 63 percent of Russians chose "only in response to a nuclear attack". Only 25 percent of Americans and 11 percent of Russians thought that there were circumstances under which their country should use nuclear weapons even if it had not suffered a nuclear attack. Hence, 71 percent of Americans favoured having an explicit "no first use" policy, while only 26 percent thought that this would be "a bad idea".

#### Republicans want Obama war powers restricted

France-Presse 11

Agence France-Passe, “Republicans question Obama’s right to intervene in Libya”, Raw Story <http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2011/05/25/republicans-question-obamas-right-to-intervene-in-libya/> 5/25/2011

WASHINGTON — US Republican lawmakers on Wednesday questioned President Barack Obama’s ability to conduct military action in Libya because his 60-day congressional authority expired last week.¶ “We are at war in Libya,” Republican Representative Justin Amash told a House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on the subject. “Either Congress must authorize our strikes against Libya, or Congress must withdraw the use of force.¶ “What Congress can not do is continue standing by idly as our constitutional war powers are disregarded,” said the congressman from the state of Michigan, who introduced a bill calling for the end of military action in Libya unless there is a specific law authorizing such an action.¶ His colleague, Republican Chris Gibson, a former officer who served in Iraq, introduced legislation to reform the 1973 War Powers Act, whose goal is to limit presidential power in the outbreak of war but has been ignored by several presidents. The bill restricts the use of funds for military operations without congressional authorization.¶ “It’s time to reform the War Powers Act,” said Gibson, adding that while his bill is based on the situation in Libya, “the broader intent is to restore balance to the executive-legislative branch relationship on matters of war power,” he said. “I want to bring clarity to the situation.”¶ Obama on Friday asked members of Congress for continued support of military operations in Libya, noting that the “limited” nature of the conflict is not what the drafters of the War Powers Act had in mind.¶ A number of elected officials — mostly Republican — spoke out in favor of their colleagues’ proposals.¶ “We’re supposed to be defending the US Constitution, not the UN Security Council,” said Representative Ron Paul, a Republican contender for the 2012 presidential election.¶ “But this is not new,” he added. “We did it in Korea. This is a mess.”¶ Republican Dan Burton noted that “the president is not a king and he shouldn’t be acting like a king.”

#### Ideology outweighs

Ornstein and Mann 12

PhD in political science from Michigan, resident scholar at AEI, \*\*senior fellow at the Brookings Institution (4/27, Norman and Thomas, Washington Post, “Let’s just say it: The Republicans are the problem.”, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/lets-just-say-it-the-republicans-are-the-problem/2012/04/27/gIQAxCVUlT\_print.html, WEA)

We have been studying Washington politics and Congress for more than 40 years, and never have we seen them this dysfunctional. In our past writings, we have criticized both parties when we believed it was warranted. Today, however, we have no choice but to acknowledge that the core of the problem lies with the Republican Party. The GOP has become an insurgent outlier in American politics. It is ideologically extreme; scornful of compromise; [unmoved by conventional understanding of facts, evidence and science](http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/liberals-and-conservatives-dont-just-vote-differently-they-think-differently/2012/04/12/gIQAzb1kDT_story.html); and dismissive of the legitimacy of its political opposition. When one party moves this far from the mainstream, it makes it nearly impossible for the political system to deal constructively with the country’s challenges. “Both sides do it” or “There is plenty of blame to go around” are the traditional refuges for an American news media intent on proving its lack of bias, while political scientists prefer generality and neutrality when discussing [partisan polarization](http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/turned-off-from-politics-thats-exactly-what-the-politicians-want/2012/04/20/gIQAffxKWT_story.html). Many self-styled bipartisan groups, in their search for common ground, propose solutions that move both sides to the center, a strategy that is simply untenable when one side is so far out of reach. It is clear that the center of gravity in the Republican Party has shifted sharply to the right. Its once-legendary moderate and center-right legislators in the House and the Senate — think Bob Michel, Mickey Edwards, John Danforth, Chuck Hagel — are virtually extinct. The post-McGovern Democratic Party, by contrast, while losing the bulk of its conservative Dixiecrat contingent in the decades after the civil rights revolution, has retained a more diverse base. Since the Clinton presidency, it has hewed to the center-left on issues from welfare reform to fiscal policy. While the Democrats may have moved from their 40-yard line to their 25, the Republicans have gone from their 40 to somewhere behind their goal post. What happened? Of course, there were larger forces at work beyond the realignment of the South. They included the mobilization of social conservatives after the 1973 Roe v. Wade decision, the anti-tax movement launched in 1978 by California’s Proposition 13, the rise of conservative talk radio after a congressional pay raise in 1989, and the emergence of Fox News and right-wing blogs. But the real move to the bedrock right starts with two names: [Newt Gingrich](http://www.washingtonpost.com/newt-gingrich-2012-presidential-campaign/gIQAGLQzcO_topic.html) and [Grover Norquist](http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/grover-norquist-the-anti-tax-enforcer-behind-the-scenes-of-the-debt-debate/2011/07/12/gIQAPGNSBI_story.html). From the day he entered Congress in 1979, Gingrich had a strategy to create a Republican majority in the House: convincing voters that the institution was so corrupt that anyone would be better than the incumbents, especially those in the Democratic majority. It took him 16 years, but by bringing ethics charges against Democratic leaders; provoking them into overreactions that enraged Republicans and united them to vote against Democratic initiatives; exploiting scandals to create even more public disgust with politicians; and then recruiting GOP candidates around the country to run against Washington, Democrats and Congress, Gingrich accomplished his goal. Ironically, after becoming speaker, Gingrich wanted to enhance Congress’s reputation and was content to compromise with President Bill Clinton when it served his interests. But the forces Gingrich unleashed destroyed whatever comity existed across party lines, activated an extreme and virulently anti-Washington base — most recently represented by tea party activists — and helped drive moderate Republicans out of Congress. (Some of his progeny, elected in the early 1990s, moved to the Senate and polarized its culture in the same way.) Norquist, meanwhile, founded Americans for Tax Reform in 1985 and rolled out his Taxpayer Protection Pledge the following year. The pledge, which [binds its signers to never support a tax increase](http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/why-grover-norquists-anti-tax-pledge-works--even-among-voters-who-support-taxes/2012/04/17/gIQAo6IDOT_blog.html) (that includes closing tax loopholes), had been signed as of last year by 238 of the 242 House Republicans and 41 of the 47 GOP senators, according to ATR. The Norquist tax pledge has led to other pledges, on issues such as climate change, that create additional litmus tests that box in moderates and make cross-party coalitions nearly impossible. For Republicans concerned about a primary challenge from the right, the failure to sign such pledges is simply too risky. Today, thanks to the GOP, compromise has gone out the window in Washington. In the first two years of the Obama administration, nearly every presidential initiative met with vehement, rancorous and unanimous Republican opposition in the House and the Senate, followed by efforts to delegitimize the results and repeal the policies. The filibuster, once relegated to a handful of major national issues in a given Congress, became a routine weapon of obstruction, applied even to widely supported bills or presidential nominations. And Republicans in the Senate have abused the confirmation process to block any and every nominee to posts such as the head of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, solely to keep laws that were legitimately enacted from being implemented. In the third and now fourth years of the Obama presidency, divided government has produced something closer to complete gridlock than we have ever seen in our time in Washington, with partisan divides even leading last year to [America’s first credit downgrade](http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/sandp-considering-first-downgrade-of-us-credit-rating/2011/08/05/gIQAqKeIxI_story.html). On financial stabilization and economic recovery, on deficits and debt, on climate change and [health-care reform](http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-the-roberts-court-could-save-health-care/2012/03/07/gIQALljXGS_story.html), Republicans have been the force behind the widening ideological gaps and the strategic use of partisanship. In [the presidential campaign](http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/campaigns) and in Congress, GOP leaders have embraced fanciful policies on taxes and spending, kowtowing to their party’s most strident voices. Republicans often dismiss nonpartisan analyses of the nature of problems and the impact of policies when those assessments don’t fit their ideology. In the face of the deepest economic downturn since the Great Depression, the party’s leaders and their outside acolytes insisted on obeisance to a supply-side view of economic growth — thus fulfilling Norquist’s pledge — while ignoring contrary considerations. The results can border on the absurd: In early 2009, several of the eight Republican co-sponsors of a bipartisan health-care reform plan dropped their support; by early 2010, the others had turned on their own proposal so that there would be zero GOP backing for any bill that came within a mile of Obama’s reform initiative. As one co-sponsor, Sen. Lamar Alexander (R-Tenn.), [told The Washington Post’s Ezra Klein](http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2010/02/alexander_draft.html): “I liked it because it was bipartisan. I wouldn’t have voted for it.” And seven Republican co-sponsors of a Senate resolution to create a debt-reduction panel voted in January 2010 against their own resolution, solely to keep it from getting to the 60-vote threshold Republicans demanded and thus denying the president a seeming victory. This attitude filters down far deeper than the party leadership. Rank-and-file GOP voters endorse the strategy that the party’s elites have adopted, eschewing compromise to solve problems and insisting on principle, even if it leads to gridlock. Democratic voters, by contrast, along with self-identified independents, are more likely to favor deal-making over deadlock. Democrats are hardly blameless, and they have their own extreme wing and their own predilection for hardball politics. But these tendencies do not routinely veer outside the normal bounds of robust politics. If anything, under the presidencies of Clinton and Obama, the Democrats have become more of a status-quo party. They are centrist protectors of government, reluctantly willing to revamp programs and trim retirement and health benefits to maintain its central commitments in the face of fiscal pressures. No doubt, Democrats were not exactly warm and fuzzy toward George W. Bush during his presidency. But recall that they worked hand in glove with the Republican president on the No Child Left Behind Act, provided crucial votes in the Senate for his tax cuts, joined with Republicans for all the steps taken after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks and supplied the key votes for the Bush administration’s financial bailout at the height of the economic crisis in 2008. The difference is striking. The GOP’s evolution has become too much for some longtime Republicans. Former senator Chuck Hagel of Nebraska [called his party “irresponsible”](http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/afternoon-fix-hagel-disgusted-by-republicans/2011/09/01/gIQAdiA3uJ_blog.html) in an interview with the Financial Times in August, at the height of the debt-ceiling battle. “I think the Republican Party is captive to political movements that are very ideological, that are very narrow,” he said. “I’ve never seen so much intolerance as I see today in American politics.” And Mike Lofgren, a veteran Republican congressional staffer, wrote [an anguished diatribe](http://truth-out.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=3079:goodbye-to-all-that-reflections-of-a-gop-operative-who-left-the-cult) last year about why he was ending his career on the Hill after nearly three decades. “The Republican Party is becoming less and less like a traditional political party in a representative democracy and becoming more like an apocalyptic cult, or one of the intensely ideological authoritarian parties of 20th century Europe,” he wrote on the Truthout Web site. Shortly before Rep. West went off the rails with his accusations of communism in the Democratic Party, political scientists Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal, who have long tracked historical trends in political polarization, said their studies of congressional votes found that Republicans are now more conservative than they have been in more than a century. The ir data show [a dramatic uptick in polarization](http://voteview.com/political_polarization.asp), mostly caused by the sharp rightward move of the GOP. If our democracy is to regain its health and vitality, the culture and ideological center of the Republican Party must change. In the short run, without a massive (and unlikely) across-the-board rejection of the GOP at the polls, that will not happen. If anything, Washington’s ideological divide will probably grow after the 2012 elections.

#### Non-intrinsic—a logical policy maker can pass the plan and the bill

#### Vote no triggers the link—this debate represents the bill being debated in Congress means Obama’s political capital has already been used

#### Winners-win – fights build capital

Creamer 11

12-23 [Robert, “Why GOP Collapse on the Payroll Tax Could Be a Turning Point Moment,”, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-creamer/gop-payroll-tax\_b\_1167491.hmtl]

The outcome of the battle was unambiguous. No one could doubt who stood up for the economic interests of the middle class and who did not. And no one could doubt who won and who lost. National Journal reported that, "House Republicans on Thursday crumpled under the weight of White House and public pressure and have agreed to pass a two-month extension of the two percent payroll-tax cut, Republican and Democratic sources told National Journal." In the end, Republican intransigence transformed a moment that would have been a modest win for President Obama into an iconic victory. 2) Strength and victory are enormous political assets. Going into the New Year, they now belong to the president and the Democrats. One of the reasons why the debt ceiling battle inflicted political damage on President Obama is that it made him appear ineffectual -- a powerful figure who had been ensnared and held hostage by the Lilliputian pettiness of hundreds of swarming Tea Party ideological zealots. In the last few months -- as he campaigned for the American Jobs Act -- he has shaken free of those bonds. Now voters have just watched James Bond or Indiana Jones escape and turn the tables on his adversary. Great stories are about a protagonist who meets and overcomes a challenge and is victorious. The capitulation of the House Tea Party Republicans is so important because it feels like the beginning of that kind of heroic narrative. Even today most Americans believe that George Bush and the big Wall Street banks -- not by President Obama -- caused the economic crisis. Swing voters have never lost their fondness for the President and don't doubt his sincerity. But they had begun to doubt his effectiveness. They have had increasing doubts that Obama was up to the challenge of leading them back to economic prosperity. The narrative set in motion by the events of the last several weeks could be a turning point in voter perception. It could well begin to convince skeptical voters that Obama is precisely the kind of leader they thought he was back in 2008 -- a guy with the ability to lead them out of adversity -- a leader with the strength, patience, skill, will and resoluteness to lead them to victory. That now contrasts with the sheer political incompetence of the House Republican leadership that allowed themselves to be cornered and now find themselves in political disarray. And it certainly contrasts with the political circus we have been watching in the Republican Presidential primary campaign. 3) This victory will inspire the dispirited Democratic base. Inspiration is the feeling of empowerment -- the feeling that you are part of something larger than yourself and can personally play a significant role in achieving that goal. It comes from feeling that together you can overcome challenges and win. Nothing will do more to inspire committed Democrats than the sight of their leader -- President Obama -- out-maneuvering the House Republicans and forcing them into complete capitulation. The events of the last several weeks will send a jolt of electricity through the progressive community. The right is counting on progressives to be demoralized and dispirited in the coming election. The president's victory on the payroll tax and unemployment will make it ever more likely that they will be wrong. 4) When you have them on the run, that's the time to chase them. The most important thing about the outcome of the battle over the payroll tax and unemployment is that it shifts the political momentum at a critical time. Momentum is an independent variable in any competitive activity -- including politics. In a football or basketball game you can feel the momentum shift. The tide of battle is all about momentum. The same is true in politics. And in politics it is even more important because the "spectators" are also the players -- the voters. People follow -- and vote -- for winners. The bandwagon effect is enormously important in political decision-making. Human beings like to travel in packs. They like to be at the center of the mainstream. Momentum shifts affect their perceptions of the mainstream. For the last two years, the right wing has been on the offensive. Its Tea Party shock troops took the battle to Democratic members of Congress. In the mid-terms Democrats were routed in district after district. Now the tide has turned. And when the tide turns -- when you have them on the run -- that's the time to chase them. We won't know for sure until next November whether this moment will take on the same iconic importance as Clinton's battle with Gingrich in 1995. But there is no doubt that the political wind has shifted. It's up to progressives to make the most of it.

### Impact

#### No econ impact

Jervis 11 – Professor of Political Science @ Columbia

Robert, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, “Force in Our Times,” Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403-425

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.

#### Austerity measures solve

LA Times 9-11-13 (“U.S. may hit debt ceiling Oct. 18; Report gives Congress time frame for taking action to avoid a government default.,” Lexis)

A more likely scenario, based on statements Treasury officials made in a 2012 inspector general's report, would be to delay payments, the analysis said.¶ The Treasury Department could wait until it received enough money to pay a specific day's bills. The delays would start out short but would build over time.¶ For example, if the Treasury hit its borrowing authority Oct. 18, payments to Medicare and Medicaid providers due that day would be delayed one business day, to Oct. 21.¶ But Social Security checks, veterans benefits and active-duty military pay due to be issued Nov. 1 would not go out until Nov. 13.¶ The government technically hit the debt limit in May. But the Treasury has been using what it calls "extraordinary measures" since then to juggle the nation's finances and continue paying its bills. Those measures included suspending investments in some federal pension funds and in a currency exchange rate fund.

#### US not key to global economy

Economist 10

(The odd decouple Theories about why some rich-world economies are doing better than America’s don’t stand up Sep 2nd 2010 | from the print edition http://www.economist.com/node/16943853

AMERICA is used to making the economic weather. It has the world's largest economy, its most influential central bank and it issues the main global reserve currency. In recent months, however, some rich-world **economies** (**notably Germany's**) **have basked in the sunshine even as the clouds gathered over America**. On August 27th America's second-quarter GDP growth was revised down to an annualised 1.6%. That looked moribund compared with the 9% rate confirmed in Germany a few days earlier. America's jobless rate was 9.5% in July (figures for August were released on September 3rd, after The Economist went to press). But in Germany the unemployment rate is lower even than before the downturn. **Other** rich **countries**, including Britain and Australia, **have enjoyed sprightlier recent GDP growth and lower unemployment** **than America**. This unusual divergence within the rich world has fostered many competing theories to explain it, including differences in fiscal policies, exchange rates and debt levels. Most of these do not quite fit the facts. On one account Germany and, to a lesser extent, Britain have been rewarded for taking a firm grip on their public finances. In this view, the promise to tackle budget deficits has had a liberating effect on private spending by reducing uncertainty. In America, by contrast, anxiety about public debt is making businesses and consumers tighten their purse strings. The theory is a little too neat. Although credible plans to curb deficits are helpful to medium-term growth, they are unlikely to explain sudden spurts. Britain's budget plans were announced towards the end of the quarter, on June 22nd. Germany's were set out two weeks earlier. They could scarcely explain why GDP growth was strong. Indeed for most of the second quarter, fiscal uncertainty hung over both countries: in Britain because of a close election, in Germany because of commitments to help Greece and other countries. And the immediate impact of austerity is to dampen growth: witness the slump in Greece. Perhaps the explanation is found in currency movements. One effect of the euro-area crisis was to push the euro down against the dollar in the early months of this year—helping German firms but harming American exporters. Much of Germany's second-quarter GDP growth came from trade, even as a wider trade gap sapped America's economy. A weak pound could also explain Britain's renewed economic strength, much as a surge in the yen has increased worries about Japan. On August 30th Japan's central bank said it would offer banks ¥10 trillion ($118 billion) of six-month secured loans at its benchmark interest rate of 0.1%, on top of the ¥20 trillion of three-month loans it had already pledged. It hopes that this flood of money will push down borrowing costs, cap the yen's rise and help exporters. The currency theory also has holes in it. The yen's surge is too recent to explain why Japan's GDP barely rose in the second quarter. Net trade added almost nothing to Britain's GDP growth in the last quarter. Indeed America's export growth has been much stronger (a sudden surge in imports was behind the second-quarter trade gap). And demand for the sort of exports Germany has done well with, mostly luxury cars and specialist capital goods, tends to be insensitive to shifts in the exchange rate. Britain is an awkward challenger to another theory: that a debt hangover is holding back consumers in countries that had housing booms. Consumer spending in Britain (and in America) rose at about the same rate as in thriftier Germany during the second quarter. Britain stands out in another respect, too: its unemployment rate has risen by far less than in other places that had also racked up big mortgage debts. Divergent trends in unemployment may be better explained by the sort of recession each country had than by variations in jobs-market flexibility, says Kevin Daly at Goldman Sachs. In America, Ireland and Spain, the collapse of labour-intensive construction swelled the dole queues. Britain also had a housing boom but its tight planning laws kept its construction industry small, so fewer jobs were lost when the bust came. The downturns in Japan and Germany, deeper than America's (see chart), were mainly caused by the collapse in world trade. That hurt capital-intensive export industries—which were also more likely to rebound quickly—so fewer jobs disappeared. Some think America's slowness to create new jobs is leading to **undue pessimism** **about the rest of the world's prospects. “**If US growth is not enough to give us a big payrolls figure, **it's deemed a disaster**,” says Marco Annunziata at UniCredit. **But fast-growing emerging markets, such as China, have kept the world economy ticking over.** Germany has done well because its exporters have made headway there. China's vibrancy also explains why Australia's GDP rose at its fastest rate for three years in the second quarter.

#### Won’t default

Prins 9/13

Nomi, Demos, The White House, the Fed, the Debt, Inequality and Larry Summers, 9/13/13, http://www.demos.org/blog/9/13/13/white-house-fed-debt-inequality-and-larry-summers

In the highly unlikely event that it doesn’t, the US is in no danger of defaulting on its debt. At its current credit rating, it’s many notches away from that, plus, it just won’t happen. S&P pre-empted even the potential of a downgrade in June, when it raised its outlook from ‘negative’ to ‘stable’ and left the rating at AA+, citing the Fed’s “timely and conservative actions” to mitigate the effects of the “great recession” of 2008 and 2009 and noted it expects the US economy to match or top other highly rated countries in the next few years.¶ And, even in a pinch, the Fed is holding about $2 trillion worth of Treasury securities in excess reserves. Technically, these could be returned or sold—which won’t occur because that would mean the end of Zero-Interest-Rate-Policy, an even tighter credit market and plummeting stock and bond market. Congress and Bernanke won’t let that happen. For the record, I’d retire that $2 trillion in debt, since it’s doing nothing productive anyway, which would alleviate the need to discuss raising the debt ceiling, or put it to some productive job-creating purpose, so we wouldn’t have to hear Bernanke talk about the need for more jobs to be created

, while presenting no concrete ideas as to how to do that. Oh gee, I have an extra $2 trillion lying around here, what to do?

#### No causality – economic decline doesn’t cause war

Ferguson 06 – prof of history @ Harvard

Niall Ferguson 2006, Professor of History @ Harvard, The Next War of the World, Foreign Affairs 85.5, Proquest

There are many unsatisfactory explanations for why the twentieth century was so destructive. One is the assertion that the availability of more powerful weapons caused bloodier conflicts. But there is no correlation between the sophistication of military technology and the lethality of conflict. Some of the worst violence of the century -- the genocides in Cambodia in the 1970s and central Africa in the 1990s, for instance -- was perpetrated with the crudest of weapons: rifles, axes, machetes, and knives. **Nor can economic crises explain** the **bloodshed.** What may be **the most familiar causal chain** in modern historiography **links** the **Great Depression to** the rise of fascism and the outbreak of **W**orld **W**ar **II.** But **that** simple story **leaves too much out**. **Nazi Germany started the war** in Europe only **after its economy** had **recovered.** **Not all** the countries **affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor** did all such regimes **start wars** of aggression. In fact, **no** general **relationship between economics and conflict is discernible** for the century as a whole. **Some** wars **came after** periods of **growth,** others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and **some** severe economic **crises were not followed by wars**.

#### Empirical studies show no causal relationship between economic decline and war – Growth is associated with conflicts turning case

Miller 01 – prof of economics

Morris Miller 2001, Professor of Economics, Poverty: A Cause of War?, http://archive.peacemagazine.org/v17n1p08.htm

Library shelves are heavy with studies focused on the correlates and causes of war. Some of the leading scholars in that field suggest that we drop the concept of causality, since it can rarely be demonstrated. Nevertheless, it may be helpful to look at the motives of war-prone political leaders and the ways they have gained and maintained power, even to the point of leading their nations to war. Poverty: The Prime Causal Factor? Poverty is most often named as the prime causal factor. Therefore we approach the question by asking whether poverty is characteristic of the nations or groups that have engaged in wars. As we shall see, **poverty has never been** as significant **a factor** as one would imagine. Largely this is **because** **of** the traits of the poor as a group - particularly **their tendency** **to tolerate their suffering** in silence and/or be deterred by the force of repressive regimes. Their voicelessness and powerlessness translate into passivity. Also, because of their illiteracy and ignorance of worldly affairs, the poor become susceptible to the messages of war-bent demagogues and often willing to become cannon fodder. The situations conductive to war involve political repression of dissidents, tight control over media that stir up chauvinism and ethnic prejudices, religious fervor, and sentiments of revenge. The poor succumb to leaders who have the power to create such conditions for their own self-serving purposes. Desperately poor people in **poor nations cannot organize wars**, which are exceptionally costly. The statistics speak eloquently on this point. In the last 40 years the global arms trade has been about $1500 billion, of which two-thirds were the purchases of developing countries. That is an amount roughly equal to the foreign capital they obtained through official development aid (ODA). Since ODA does not finance arms purchases (except insofar as money that is not spent by a government on aid-financed roads is available for other purposes such as military procurement) financing is also required to control the media and communicate with the populace to convince them to support the war. Large-scale armed conflict is so expensive that governments must resort to exceptional sources, such as drug dealing, diamond smuggling, brigandry, or deal-making with other countries. The reliance on illicit operations is well documented in a recent World Bank report that studied 47 civil wars that took place between 1960 and 1999, the main conclusion of which is that the key factor is the availability of commodities to plunder. **For greed to yield war, there must be financial opportunities. Only affluent political leaders and elites can amass such weaponry,** diverting funds to the military even when this runs contrary to the interests of the population. In most inter-state wars the antagonists were wealthy enough to build up their armaments and propagandize or repress to gain acceptance for their policies. Economic Crises? Some scholars have argued that it is not poverty, as such, that contributes to the support for armed conflict, but rather some catalyst, such as an economic crisis. However, **a study** by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik **shows that** this hypothesis lacks merit. After studying 93 episodes of economic crisis in 22 countries in Latin American and Asia since World War II, they concluded that much of the conventional thinking about the political impact of economic crisis is wrong: "The severity of **economic crisis** - as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - **bore no relationship** to the collapse of regimes ... or (in democratic states, rarely**) to** an outbreak of **violence.**.. In the cases of dictatorships and semi-democracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another)."

## Primacy

That’s key to deterrence and the de-escalation of conflict
O’Hanlon et al 12

Mackenzie Eaglen, American Enterprise Institute Rebecca Grant, IRIS Research Robert P. Haffa, Haffa Defense Consulting Michael O'Hanlon, The Brookings Institution Peter W. Singer, The Brookings Institution Martin Sullivan, Commonwealth Consulting Barry Watts, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

“The Arsenal of Democracy and How to Preserve It: Key Issues in Defense Industrial Policy January 2012,” Brookings January 2012 <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/1/26%20defense%20industrial%20base/0126_defense_industrial_base_ohanlon>

The current wave of defense cuts is also different than past defense budget reductions in their likely industrial impact, as the U.S. defense industrial base is in a much different place than it was in the past. Defense industrial issues are too often viewed through the lens of jobs and pet projects to protect in congressional districts. But the overall health of the firms that supply the technologies our armed forces utilize does have national security resonance. Qualitative superiority in weaponry and other key military technology has become an essential element of American military power in the modern era—not only for winning wars but for deterring them. That requires world-class scientific and manufacturing capabilities—which in turn can also generate civilian and military export opportunities for the United States in a globalized marketplace.

#### Conventional weapons allow for deterrence

Futter and Zala 13

Andrew Futter is a Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester, having completed his PhD at the University of Birmingham in 2011. Benjamin Zala is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science and International Studies at University of Birmingham. “ADVANCED US CONVENTIONAL

WEAPONS AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT”, Nonproliferation Review 20:1, 107-122

The Obama plan is also underpinned by a conscious attempt to placate domestic¶ audiences concerned that reducing US nuclear weapons will lead to a weakening of US¶ security, and undermine the US ability to project power across the globe. President Obama¶ has argued publicly that his administration’s efforts to reduce the US reliance on nuclear¶ weapons are specifically linked to efforts to ensure that ‘‘our conventional weapons¶ capability is an effective deterrent in all but the most extreme circumstances.’’13 In this¶ sense, the administration hopes to convince disarmament skeptics that advanced¶ conventional weaponry can provide an important addition\*if not substitute\*for some¶ strategic roles currently performed by the nuclear arsenal. As the 2010 Nuclear Posture¶ Review (NPR) puts it, ‘‘Fundamental changes in the international security environment in¶ recent years\*including the growth of unrivalled U.S. conventional military capabilities,¶ major improvements in missile defenses . . . enable us to fulfill . . . objectives at significantly¶ lower nuclear force levels and with reduced reliance on nuclear weapons . . . without¶ jeopardizing our traditional deterrence and reassurance goals.’’¶ Consequently, one of the main arguments from the Obama administration as to why¶ the time is right to put nuclear disarmament back on the international agenda is that¶ technological developments have created new conditions in which disarmament need not¶ equal a loss of security. Despite the administration’s apparent predisposition for building¶ trust with nuclear rivals such as Russia or China, it appears to dodge the most difficult¶ aspect creating of a trusting relationship\*accepting a high degree of mutual vulnerability¶ on both sides\*via advanced conventional weapons programs.14

#### Conventional forces key to preventing wars

Perkovich 09

George Perkovich, is vice president for studies and director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. May, 2009, “EXTENDED DETERRENCE ON THE WAY TO A NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD” is a paper commissioned by the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament. http://www.icnnd.org/research/Perkovich\_Deterrence.pdf

If removal of visible and vulnerable nuclear weapons could contribute to broader improvements in security relations, including arms control and confidencebuilding measures, relying on invulnerable U.S. strategic submarines for ongoing nuclear deterrence would seem wise. Broadening the framework of analysis and international dialogue this way deserves greater consideration. For Credible Deterrence, Focus on Non-Nuclear Capabilities The most credible and perhaps least dangerous way to assure allies of U.S. commitments to defend them is to station U.S. conventional forces on allied territories, as is already the case in original NATO states and in Japan and South Korea. With U.S. conventional forces in harm’s way, an adversary attacking a U.S. ally would draw the U.S. into the conflict with greater certainty than if nuclear weapons were directly and immediately implicated. Indeed, the greater credibility that U.S. conventional forces bring to extended deterrence is one reason why Poland has been keen to have U.S. missile defense personnel based on Polish soil. Were U.S. personnel attacked, the U.S. would respond forcefully.

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## Security/Psycho

### Method 1:25

We get to weigh the aff’s certainty of impacts vs the method of the alternative – k2 fairness, anything else moots the 1ac.

Role of the Ballot is to vote for the team that best instrumentalizes an affirmative or negative position in regards to the resolution.

#### Extinction comes first

Cummiskey 96

(David, Associate Philosophy Professor, Bates College, Kantian Consequentialism, p. 129-131)

It does, however, support the consequentialist interpretation. Since the moral demand to respect other persons is based on the equal moral status of all persons, Kant’s argument presupposes the equal value, or dignity, of all persons. Such beings are comparable, and the comparison demonstrates the equal objective value of all. The equal value of all rational being provides a clear basis for a requirement to maximally promote the flourishing of rational agency (chapter 5). Nonetheless, while the extreme interpretation must be rejected, the dignity- price distinction still accurately signifies the priority of rationality. If we refuse to sacrifice a person for the sake of the maximization of happiness or any other market value, then we have shown a “reverence” for such beings. But as we shall see more fully in chapter 9, this reverence is compatible with the sacrifice of some for the sake of other persons with dignity. It is mere dogmatic intuitionism or groundless deontology to insist that all such sacrifices are inconsistent with the equal dignity of all. At times the dignity principle seems to function like an inkblot where each sees whatever conclusions he or she is predisposed to accept. If one believes that a particular way of treating people is morally unacceptable, then such treatment is inconsistent with respect for the dignity of persons. Too often, when a deontologist uses the dignity principle as a normative principle, the cart is put before the horse: This reasoning presupposes that we have a standard of unacceptable conduct that is prior to the dignity principle. The dignity principle cannot then provide the reason why the conduct is unacceptable. The goal of the Kantian deontologist is to (directly) vindicate ordinary commonsense morality; but it is not at all clear how the dignity principle can even support the intuitive view that the negative duty not to kill is more stringent than the positive duty to save lives. How is the common view that we have only slight, if any, duties to aid those in desperate need consistent with the lexical priority of the dignity of persons over the price of the inclinations? Of course, on the one hand, it is commonly maintained that killing some persons to save many others fails to give due regard to the incomparable and absolute dignity of persons. On the other hand, it is maintained that respect for the dignity of persons does not require that one spend one’s discretionary income on saving lives rather than on one’s own personal projects. As long as one has done some minimum and indeterminate amount to help others, then one need not do any more. So the Kantian deontologist wants to use the dignity-price distinction to resolve conflicting grounds of obligation in an intuitively acceptable way, but it is far from obvious why allowing a loss of dignity for the sake of something with price is consistent with the dignity principle. In short, ordinary morality permits one to place the satisfaction of one’s inclinations above a concern for the dignity of all. Consequentialists have produced indirect justifications for many of these common intuitive judgments; it would seem that those appealing to the dignity principle must rely on similar arguments. Finally, even if one grants that saving two persons with dignity cannot outweigh and compensate for killing one—because dignity cannot be added and summed in this way—this point still does not justify deontological constraints. On the extreme interpretation, why would not killing one person be a stronger obligation than saving two persons? If I am concerned with the priceless dignity of each, it would seem that I may still save two; it is just that my reason cannot be that the two compensate for the loss of the one. Consider Hill’s example of a priceless object: If I can save two of three priceless statutes only by destroying one, then I cannot claim that saving two makes up for the loss of the one. But similarly, the loss of the two is not outweighed by the one that was not destroyed. Indeed, even if dignity cannot be simply summed up, how is the extreme interpretation inconsistent with the idea that I should save as many priceless objects as possible? Even if two do not simply outweigh and thus compensate for the loss of the one, each is priceless; thus, I have good reason to save as many as I can. In short, it is not clear how the.extreme interpretation justifies the ordinary killing/letting-die distinction or even how it conflicts with the conclusion that the more persons with dignity who are saved, the better.

#### An ethic of consequences enables political responsibility and freedom.

Williams 05

(Michael, Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales—Aberystwyth, The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations, p. 174-176)

A commitment to an ethic of consequences reflects a deeper ethic of criticism, of ‘self-clarification’, and thus of reflection upon the values adopted by an individual or a collectivity. It is part of an attempt to make critical evaluation an intrinsic element of responsibility. Responsibility to this more fundamental ethic gives the ethic of consequences meaning. Consequentialism and responsibility are here drawn into what Schluchter, in terms that will be familiar to anyone conversant with constructivism in International Relations, has called a ‘reflexive principle’. In the wilful Realist vision, scepticism and consequentialism are linked in an attempt to construct not just a more substantial vision of political responsibility, but also the kinds of actors who might adopt it, and the kinds of social structures that might support it. A consequentialist ethic is not simply a choice adopted by actors: it is a means of trying to foster particular kinds of selfcritical individuals and societies, and in so doing to encourage a means by which one can justify and foster a politics of responsibility. The ethic of responsibility in wilful Realism thus involves a commitment to both autonomy and limitation, to freedom and restraint, to an acceptance of limits and the criticism of limits. Responsibility clearly involves prudence and an accounting for current structures and their historical evolution; but it is not limited to this, for it seeks ultimately the creation of responsible subjects within a philosophy of limits. Seen in this light, the Realist commitment to objectivity appears quite differently. Objectivity in terms of consequentialist analysis does not simply take the actor or action as given, it is a political practice — an attempt to foster a responsible self, undertaken by an analyst with a commitment to objectivity which is itself based in a desire to foster a politics of responsibility. Objectivity in the sense of coming to terms with the ‘reality’ of contextual conditions and likely outcomes of action is not only necessary for success, it is vital for selfreflection, for sustained engagement with the practical and ethical adequacy of one’s views. The blithe, self-serving, and **uncritical stances of abstract moralism** or rationalist objectivism **avoid self-criticism by refusing to engage with the intractability of the world ‘as it is’**. Reducing the world to an expression of their theoretical models, political platforms, or ideological programmes, they fail to engage with this reality, and thus avoid the process of self-reflection at the heart of responsibility. By contrast, Realist objectivity takes an engagement with this intractable ‘object’ that is not reducible to one’s wishes or will as a necessary condition of ethical engagement, self-reflection, and self-creation.7 Objectivity is not a naïve naturalism in the sense of scientific laws or rationalist calculation; it is a necessary engagement with a world that eludes one’s will. A recognition of the limits imposed by ‘reality’ is a condition for a recognition of one’s own limits — that the world is not simply an extension of one’s own will. But it is also a challenge to use that intractability as a source of possibility, as providing a set of openings within which a suitably chastened and yet paradoxically energised will to action can responsibly be pursued. In the wilful Realist tradition, the essential opacity of both the self and the world are taken as limiting principles. **Limits upon understanding** provide chastening parameters for claims about the world and actions within it. But they also **provide** challenging and **creative openings** within which diverse forms of life can be developed: the limited unity of the self and the political order is the precondition for freedom. The ultimate opacity of the world is not to be despaired of: it is a condition of possibility for the wilful, creative construction of selves and social orders which embrace the diverse human potentialities which this lack of essential or intrinsic order makes possible.8 But it is also to be aware of the less salutary possibilities this involves. Indeterminacy is not synonymous with absolute freedom — it is both a condition of, and imperative toward, responsibility.

#### Link- The k methodology guts science- silencing its critics and thus maintaining the squo

Nanda 98

Meera Nanda is a microbiologist with Ph.D in science and tech studies at Rensselear Polytechnic Institue, “The Epistemic Charity of the Social Constructivist Critics of Science and Why the Third World Should Refuse the Offer,” A House Built on Sand: Exposing Postmodernist Myths about Science, ed. Noretta Koertga, New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, 300

Indeed, the constructivists could easily point to Donna Haraway’s opposition to nativism, relativism, and all myths of organic belongingness. Didn’t she openly urge a blurring of all dualities rooted in essential identities, including the duality of “us” and “them,” in favor of oppositional consciousness? Didn’t she assert that she would “rather be a cyborg than a goddess?” (Haraway 1991, 181). Or take Sandra Harding. Hasn’t she made it clear that she is not ruling out modern science for Third World people but is “only” urging that modern science give up the pretension of being the only game in town and take its place as one among equals in the “collage” of knowledges from all different cultures? (Harding 1996, 22). Furthermore, the gift givers may ask, don’t Haraway and Harding (and Vandana Shiva as well) argue for “situated knowledge” and “standpoint epistemologies” as offering not just contextually true, relativistic knowledge but as actually a stronger, more objective kind of knowledge? They contend that partial perspectives and standpoints don’t deny objectivity per se but only a certain kind of objectivity that claims to transcend the lived experiences of ordinary people and the cultural heritage of working scientists. A stronger objectivity emerges, both Haraway and Harding assure us, when different knowledge systems enter into a critical engagement with one another: new and unexpected connections emerge when reality is seen from different perspectives. Thus, those who favor a cognitive egalitarianism defend it in the name of better sciene and not in the name of traditional values.

It would be a tragedy indeed if we were to reject such a promise of more objectivity and more egalitarian science out of a misunderstanding. But there is no misunderstanding: the proponents of situated knowledges and standpoint epistemologies may want a better, stronger, truer, less biased science, but they cannot deliver it. They cannot deliver it because they have made a certain politics – what Haraway calls “oppositional consciousness” – rather than truth the goal of science. It is not the truth content of ideas but their location – geopolitical and class, gender and racial – that legitimates beliefs (for indeed, truth claims cannot be separated from location). This means that the outcome of the promised critical engagement of different partial perspectives is decided by political concerns rather than facts, which may well go against the preferred political outcome (Nanda, 1997b). In addition, a critical look at the world from different partial perspectives may be a good initial step, but in the end, a choice must be made regarding which perspective is closer to the facts. That this choice can even be made on nonpolitical and culturally neutral grounds is denied by constructivists.

It is precisely because of the devaluation of truth in favor of politics that situated knowledges won’t work for a critique of cultural values in non-Western societies. The facts with which we counter some of our oppressive cultural values are, in the constructivist account, inseparable from Western cultural values. The non-Western critics cannot use these facts without being accused of bringing in alien cultural values and thus being “comprador westernized elites,” an accusation that all enforcers of the status quo make against internal critics. This accusation blunts and disables the critique and silences the critics. In sum, when science is divorced from truth and all criteria of truth are made internal to the social context, we end up with ethnosciences that fail to give us a stronger, better science and society and instead end up legitimizing all kinds of ethnonationalism and nativisms.

#### Only accepting our epistemology can stave off extinction- without the scientific method the environment is doomed

Lewis 92

Martin W. Lewis, Assistant Professor in the George Washington University Department of Geography and Regional Science, 1992 (Green Delusions: An Environmentalist Critique of Radical Environmentalism)

The eco-radical attack on the reductionism and specialization inherent in science is environmentally threatening in its own right. If we were to abandon scientific methodology we would have to relinquish our hopes that environmentally benign technologies might be developed. Advances in solar power will not come about through holistic inquiries into the meaning of nature. The scientific method also must be applied in environmental monitoring. Had it not been for highly specialized measuring techniques, we would not have known about the CFC threat until it was too late. Moreover,the requisite devices would never have been made were it not for the organization of the scientific community into distinct specialties, each framing its inquiries in a reductionistic manner. To avoid environmental catastrophe we need as much specific knowledge of environmental processes as possible, although it is also true that we must improve our abilities to combine insights derived from separate specialties. Much greater emphasis must be placed on basic environmental science, in both its reductive and synthetic forms, a project that would be greatly hindered if we insist that only vague and spiritually oriented forms of holistic analysis are appropriate. Eco-radicals can be expected to counter that environmental monitoring is only necessary in the first place because of industrial poisoning; dismantle industry, and environmental science will cease to be useful. Although seemingly cogent, this argument fails on historical grounds. As discussed previously, toxins can be produced by nature as well as by humanity. For centuries Europeans attributed the delusions they suffered after eating ergot-infected bread to evil spirits. Thousands of women were burned at the stake because of the fearful reactions of a patriarchal, religiously fundamentalist society to the psychological effects of an unknown, natural, environmental toxin. Once scientists, using specialized techniques, isolated the agent, egotism and its associated social pathologies began to disappear ( Matossian 1989). In many different fields specialized scientific techniques are now proving invaluable for the efforts to control pollution and preserve natural diversity. For example, the development of biosensors--mechanisms that "combine biological membranes or cells with microelectronic sensors” (page 135)

Vote affirmative to ensure that the criticism is approached from an objective qualitative methodology

#### The only approach to knowledge is empirical falsification through the use of science – they can’t PROVE solvency, but we can

Fischer 98

Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University (Frank, “BEYOND EMPIRICISM: POLICY INQUIRY IN POSTPOSITIVIST PERSPECTIVE”, Published in Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 26. No.1 (Spring, 1998): 129-146)

Neopositivism (or logical empiricism) has supplied the epistemological ideals of the contemporary social and policy sciences (Hawkesworth 1988; A theory of knowledge put forth to explain the concepts and methods of the physical and natural sciences, neopositivism has given shape as well to a social science in pursuit quantitatively replicable causal generalizations (Fay 1975). Most easily recognized as the stuff of the research methodology textbook, neopositivist principles emphasize empirical research designs, the use of sampling techniques and data gathering procedures, the measurement of outcomes, and the development of causal models with predictive power (Miller 1993; Bobrow and Dryzek 1987). In the field of policy analysis, such an orientation is manifested in quasi-experimental research designs, multiple regression analysis, survey research, input-output studies, cost-benefit analysis, operations research, mathematical simulation models, and systems analysis (Putt and Springer, 1989; Sylvia, et al. 1991). The only reliable approach to knowledge accumulation, according to this epistemology, is empirical falsification through objective hypothesis-testing of rigorously formulated causal generalizations (Popper, 1959: Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1992:231; Hofferbert 1990). The goal is to generate a body of empirical generalizations capable of explaining behavior across social and historical contexts, whether communities, societies, or cultures, independently of specific times, places, or circumstances. Not only are such propositions essential to social and political explanation, they are seen to make possible effective solutions to societal problems. Such propositions are said to supply the cornerstones of theoretical progress. Underlying this effort is a fundamental positivist principle mandating a rigorous separation of facts and values, the principle of the "fact-value dichotomy" (Bernstein 1976; Proctor 1991). According to this principle, empirical research is to proceed independently of normative context or implications. Because only empirically based causal knowledge can qualify social science as a genuine "scientific" endeavor, social scientists are instructed to assume a "value-neutral" orientation and to limit their research investigations to empirical or "factual" phenomena. Even though adherence to this "fact-value dichotomy" varies in the conduct of actual research, especially at the methodological level, the separation still reigns in the social sciences. To be judged as methodologically valid, research must at least officially pay its respects to the principle (Fischer 1980). In the policy sciences the attempt to separate facts and values has facilitated a technocratic form of policy analysis that emphasizes the efficiency and effectiveness of means to achieve politically established goals. Much of policy analysis, in this respect, has sought to translate inherently normative political and social issues into technically defined ends to be pursued through administrative means. In an effort to sidestep goal-value conflicts typically associated with policy issues, economic and social problems are interpreted as issues in need of improved management and program design; their solutions are to be found in the technical applications of the policy sciences (Amy 1987). Often associated with this orientation has been a belief in the superiority of scientific decision-making. Reflecting a subtle antipathy toward democratic processes, terms such as "pressures" and "expedient adjustments" are used to denigrate pluralistic policymaking. If politics doesn't fit into the methodological scheme, then politics is the problem. Some have even argued that the political system itself must be changed to better accommodate policy analysis (Heineman et al. 1990). In the face of limited empirical successes, neopositivists have had to give some ground. Although they continue to stress rigorous empirical research as the long-run solution to their failures, they have retreated from their more ambitious efforts. Today their goal is to aim for propositions that are at least theoretically proveable at some future point in time. An argument propped up by the promise of computer advances, it serves to keep the original epistemology in tack. But the modification misses the point, as postpositivists are quick to point out. The problem is more fundamentally rooted in the empirical social scientists's misunderstanding of the nature of the social. As we shall see, it is a misunderstanding lodged in the very concept of a generalizable, value-free objectivity that neopositivists seek to reaffirm and more intensively apply.

#### Governments’ obey institutional logics that exist independently of individuals and constrain decisionmaking – that’s true regardless of this debate

Wight 06 – Professor of IR @ University of Sydney – 6

(Colin, Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology, pgs. 48-50

One important aspect of this relational ontology is that these relations constitute our identity as social actors. According to this relational model of societies, one is what one is, by virtue of the relations within which one is embedded. A worker is only a worker by virtue of his/her relationship to his/her employer and vice versa. ‘Our social being is constituted by relations and our social acts presuppose them.’ At any particular moment in time an individual may be implicated in all manner of relations, each exerting its own peculiar causal effects. This ‘lattice-work’ of relations constitutes the structure of particular societies and endures despite changes in the individuals occupying them. Thus, the relations, the structures, are ontologically distinct from the individuals who enter into them. At a minimum, the social sciences are concerned with two distinct, although mutually interdependent, strata. There is an ontological difference between people and structures: ‘people are not relations, societies are not conscious agents’. Any attempt to explain one in terms of the other should be rejected. If there is an ontological difference between society and people, however, we need to elaborate on the relationship between them. Bhaskar argues that we need a system of mediating concepts, encompassing both aspects of the duality of praxis into which active subjects must fit in order to reproduce it: that is, a system of concepts designating the ‘point of contact’ between human agency and social structures. This is known as a ‘positioned practice’ system. In many respects, the idea of ‘positioned practice’ is very similar to Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of *habitus*. Bourdieu is primarily concerned with what individuals do in their daily lives. He is keen to refute the idea that social activity can be understood solely in terms of individual decision-making, or as determined by surpa-individual objective structures. Bourdieu’s notion of the *habitus* can be viewed as a bridge-building exercise across the explanatory gap between two extremes. Importantly, the notion of a habitus can only be understood in relation to the concept of a ‘social field’. According to Bourdieu, a social field is ‘a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions objectively defined’. A social field, then, refers to a structured system of social positions occupied by individuals and/or institutions – the nature of which defines the situation for their occupants. This is a social field whose form is constituted in terms of the relations which define it as a field of a certain type. A *habitus* (positioned practices) is a mediating link between individuals’ subjective worlds and the socio-cultural world into which they are born and which they share with others. The power of the habitus derives from the thoughtlessness of habit and habituation, rather than consciously learned rules. The habitus is imprinted and encoded in a socializing process that commences during early childhood. It is inculcated more by experience than by explicit teaching. Socially competent performances are produced as a matter of routine, without explicit reference to a body of codified knowledge, and without the actors necessarily knowing what they are doing (in the sense of being able adequately to explain what they are doing). As such, the *habitus* can be seen as the site of ‘internalization of reality and the externalization of internality.’ Thus social practices are produced in, and by, the encounter between: (1) the *habitus* and its dispositions; (2) the constraints and demands of the socio-cultural field to which the habitus is appropriate or within; and (3) the dispositions of the individual agents located within both the socio-cultural field and the *habitus*. When placed within Bhaskar’s stratified complex social ontology the model we have is as depicted in Figure 1. The explanation of practices will require all three levels. Society, as field of relations, exists prior to, and is independent of, individual and collective understandings at any particular moment in time; that is, social action requires the conditions for action. Likewise, given that behavior is seemingly recurrent, patterned, ordered, institutionalised, and displays a degree of stability over time, there must be sets of relations and rules that govern it. Contrary to individualist theory, these relations, rules and roles are not dependent upon either knowledge of them by particular individuals, or the existence of actions by particular individuals; that is, their explanation cannot be reduced to consciousness or to the attributes of individuals. These emergent social forms must possess emergent powers. This leads on to arguments for the reality of society based on a causal criterion. Society, as opposed to the individuals that constitute it, is, as Foucault has put it, ‘a complex and independent reality that has its own laws and mechanisms of reaction, its regulations as well as its possibility of disturbance. This new reality is society…It becomes necessary to reflect upon it, upon its specific

characteristics, its constants and its variables’.

#### Epistemology and methodology don’t come first.

Wendt 2k

Alexander Wendt, Professor of Int’l Security, Dept of Political Science at Ohio State University. 2000. International Relations: Critical Concepts in Political Science. ed: Andrew Linklater, p. 640

An attempt to use a structurationist-symbolic interactionist discourse to bridge the two research traditions, neither of which subscribes to such a discourse, will probably please no one. But in part this is because the two "sides" have become hung up on differences over the epistemological status of social science. The state of the social sciences and, in particular, of international relations, is such that epistemological prescriptions and conclusions are at best premature. Different questions involve different standards of inference; to reject certain questions because their answers cannot conform to the standards of classical physics is to fall into the trap of method-driven rather than question-driven social science. By the same token, however, giving up the artificial restrictions of logical positivist conceptions of inquiry does not force us to give up on "Science." Beyond this, there is little reason to attach so much importance to epistemology. Neither positivism, nor scientific realism, nor poststructuralism tells us about the structure and dynamics of international life. Philosophies of science are not theories of international relations. The good news is that strong liberals and modern and postmodern constructivists are asking broadly similar questions about the substance of international relations that differentiate both groups from the neorealist-rationalist alliance. Strong liberals and constructivists have much to learn from each other if they can come to see this through the smoke and heat of epistemology.

Only acting through the government can solve first use policy- any reason the aff is good is a disad to their framework

### Security 2:13

Extend Garten- lack of securitzation against nationalism leads to ethnic conflicts and wars. The only way we can sustain leadership is through global power projection

#### Turn – traditional security studies *incorrectly deflate* threats –we are necessary to reverse this trend

Schweller 04

Randall L. Schweller, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at The Ohio State University, “Unanswered Threats A Neoclassical RealistTheory of Underbalancing,” International Security 29.2 (2004) 159-201, Muse

Despite the historical frequency of underbalancing, little has been written on the subject. Indeed, Geoffrey Blainey's memorable observation that for "every thousand pages published on the causes of wars there is less than one page directly on the causes of peace" could have been made with equal veracity about overreactions to threats as opposed to underreactions to them.92 Library shelves are filled with books on the causes and dangers of exaggerating threats, ranging from studies of domestic politics to bureaucratic politics, to political psychology, to organization theory. By comparison, there have been few studies at any level of analysis or from any theoretical perspective that directly explain why states have with some, if not equal, **regularity underestimated dangers to their survival**. There may be some cognitive or normative bias at work here. Consider, for instance, that there is a commonly used word, paranoia, for the unwarranted fear that people are, in some way, "out to get you" or are planning to do oneharm. I suspect that just as many people are afflicted with the opposite psychosis: the delusion that everyone loves you when, in fact, they do not even like you. Yet, we do not have a familiar word for this phenomenon. Indeed, I am unaware of any word that describes this pathology (hubris and overconfidence come close, but they plainly define something other than what I have described). That noted, international relations theory does have a frequently used phrase for the pathology of states' underestimation of threats to their survival, the so-called Munich analogy. The term is used, however, in a disparaging way by theorists to ridicule those who employ it. The central claim is that the naïveté associated with Munich and the outbreak of World War II has become an overused and inappropriate analogy because few leaders are as evil and unappeasable as Adolf Hitler. Thus, the analogy either mistakenly causes leaders [End Page 198] to adopt hawkish and overly competitive policies or is deliberately used by leaders to justify such policies and mislead the public. A more compelling explanation for the paucity of studies on underreactions to threats, however, is the tendency of theories to reflect contemporary issues as well as the desire of theorists and journals to provide society with policy- relevant theories that may help resolve or manage urgent security problems. Thus, born in the atomic age with its new balance of terror and an ongoing Cold War, the field of security studies has naturally produced theories of and prescriptions for national security that have had little to say about—and are, in fact, heavily biased against warnings of—the dangers of underreacting to or underestimating threats. After all, the nuclear revolution was not about overkill but, as Thomas Schelling pointed out, speed of kill and mutual kill.93 Given the apocalyptic consequences of miscalculation, accidents, or inadvertent nuclear war, small wonder that theorists were more concerned about overreacting to threats than underresponding to them. At a time when all of humankind could be wiped out in less than twenty-five minutes, theorists may be excused for stressing the benefits of caution under conditions of uncertainty and erring on the side of inferring from ambiguous actions overly benign assessments of the opponent's intentions. The overwhelming fear was that a crisis "might unleash forces of an essentially military nature that overwhelm the political process and bring on a war thatnobody wants. Many important conclusions about the risk of nuclear war, and thus about the political meaning of nuclear forces, rest on this fundamental idea."94 Now that the Cold War is over, we can begin to redress these biases in the literature. In that spirit, I have offered a domestic politics model to explain why threatened states often fail to adjust in a prudent and coherent way to dangerous changes in their strategic environment. The model fits nicely with recent realist studies on imperial under- and overstretch. Specifically, it is consistent with Fareed Zakaria's analysis of U.S. foreign policy from 1865 to 1889, when, he claims, the United States had the national power and opportunity to expand but failed to do so because it lacked sufficient state power (i.e., the state was weak relative to society).95 Zakaria claims that the United States did [End Page 199] not take advantage of opportunities in its environment to expand because it lacked the institutional state strength to harness resources from society that were needed to do so. I am making a similar argument with respect to balancing rather than expansion: incoherent, fragmented states are unwilling and unable to balance against potentially dangerous threats because elites view the domestic risks as too high, and they are unable to mobilize the required resources from a divided society. The arguments presented here also suggest that elite fragmentation and disagreement within a competitive political process, which Jack Snyder cites as an explanation for overexpansionist policies, are more likely to produce underbalancing than overbalancing behavior among threatened incoherent states.96 This is because a balancing strategy carries certain political costs and risks with few, if any, compensating short-term political gains, and because the strategic environment is always somewhat uncertain. Consequently, logrolling among fragmented elites within threatened states is more likely to generate overly cautious responses to threats than overreactions to them. This dynamic captures the underreaction of democratic states to the rise of Nazi Germany during the interwar period.97 In addition to elite fragmentation, I have suggested some basic domestic-level variables that regularly intervene to thwart balance of power predictions.

#### Self-fulfilling prophecy is backwards – failure to express our fears causes them to occur.

**Macy 95**

Joanna Macy, General Systems Scholar and Deep Ecologist, 1995, Ecopsychology.

There is also the superstition that negative thoughts are self-fulfilling. This is of a piece with the notion, popular in New Age circles, that we create our own reality I have had people tell me that “to speak of catastrophe will just make it more likely to happen.” Actually, the contrary is nearer to the truth. Psychoanalytic theory and personal experience show us that it is precisely what we repress that eludes our conscious control and tends to erupt into behavior. As Carl Jung observed, “When an inner situation is not made conscious, it happens outside as fate.” But ironically, in our current situation, the person who gives warning of a likely ecological holocaust is often made to fee l guilty of contributing to that very fate.

#### The perm solves - our vision of security and state creates a path between the criticism and the inevitability of working though institutional practices

Loader and Walker 07

Ian Loader And a professor of criminology at Oxford and Neil Walker a professor of European law European University Institute (Florence), 2007 Civilizing Security pg. 216

Our task in this section is to address this question and suggest an affirmative answer to it. In so doing, we are not seeking to offer a ready-made - still less utopian - blueprint for institutional design that call somehow be packaged, exported and transplanted into whatever national setting one might wish to embed it in. We have no option, in seeking to civilize security and to release its civilizing potential, other than to begin with actually existing institutional practices of state and civil society, with all their attendant vices, and to act through and upon them. One cannot, in other words, create a civilized security politics ex nihilo; one has to work, instead, with the institutional materials at hand along the lines suggested by the metaphor of 'rebuilding the ship at sea' (Elster et al. 1998; Shapiro 2003: 54). Conversely, however, we are not in the business of trying to specify in fine-grained detail- with the 'i's' dotted and 't's' crossed - the precise shape and modus operandi of the institutions of democratic security practice, or to work through the implications of our argument for contemporary debates in policing and security policy in their diverse national settings (d. Patten 1999). We are seeking, in short, to chart a course between, on the one hand, being unduly and conservatively hemmed in by the constraints that extant political realities impose upon our capacity to think imaginatively beyond the present and, on the other, writing what can rapidly be dismissed as a letter to Santa Claus. Our purpose is to set out the elements of an institutional matrix that seems capable of mobilizing and allocating the policing and other collective resources that security requires; democratically governing the demands, appetites, expectations, resentments and conflicts that attend contemporary struggles in the security field; and subjecting to scrutiny and account the coercive power that individual and collective security sometimes inescapably entails in ways that contribute towards a practical realization of the idea that security is a thick public good. We shall call these elements - whose beneficial effects are optimized only when they are combined together - the four Rs of civilizing security practice: resources, recognition, rights and reasons. Our task in what remains of this chapter is to describe each of them - and

Perm- do the plan and all non competitive parts of the alternative

#### Rejection of securitization leads to instability and international intervention – doesn’t enable radical democracy – turns their impact

**McCormack 10**

Tara McCormack, is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester and has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Westminster. 2010, Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to emancipatory approaches, pg. 127-129

The following section will briefly raise some questions about the rejection of the old security framework as it has been taken up by the most powerful institutions and states. Here we can begin to see the political limits to critical and emancipatory frameworks. In an international system which is marked by great power inequalities between states, the rejection of the old narrow national interest-based security framework by major international institutions, and the adoption of ostensibly emancipatory policies and policy rhetoric, has the consequence of problematising weak or unstable states and allowing international institutions or major states a more interventionary role, yet without establishing mechanisms by which the citizens of states being intervened in might have any control over the agents or agencies of their emancipation. Whatever the problems associated with the pluralist security framework there were at least formal and clear demarcations. This has the consequence of entrenching international power inequalities and allowing for a shift towards a hierarchical international order in which the citizens in weak or unstable states may arguably have even less freedom or power than before. Radical critics of contemporary security policies, such as human security and humanitarian intervention, argue that we see an assertion of Western power and the creation of liberal subjectivities in the developing world. For example, see Mark Duffield’s important and insightful contribution to the ongoing debates about contemporary international security and development. Duffield attempts to provide a coherent empirical engagement with, and theoretical explanation of, these shifts. Whilst these shifts, away from a focus on state security, and the so-called merging of security and development are often portrayed as positive and progressive shifts that have come about because of the end of the Cold War, Duffield argues convincingly that these shifts are highly problematic and unprogressive. For example, the rejection of sovereignty as formal international equality and a presumption of nonintervention has eroded the division between the international and domestic spheres and led to an international environment in which Western NGOs and powerful states have a major role in the governance of third world states. Whilst for supporters of humanitarian intervention this is a good development, Duffield points out the depoliticising implications, drawing on examples in Mozambique and Afghanistan. Duffield also draws out the problems of the retreat from modernisation that is represented by sustainable development. The Western world has moved away from the development policies of the Cold War, which aimed to develop third world states industrially. Duffield describes this in terms of a new division of human life into uninsured and insured life. Whilst we in the West are ‘insured’ – that is we no longer have to be entirely self-reliant, we have welfare systems, a modern division of labour and so on – sustainable development aims to teach populations in poor states how to survive in the absence of any of this. Third world populations must be taught to be self-reliant, they will remain uninsured. Self-reliance of course means the condemnation of millions to a barbarous life of inhuman bare survival. Ironically, although sustainable development is celebrated by many on the left today, by leaving people to fend for themselves rather than developing a society wide system which can support people, sustainable development actually leads to a less human and humane system than that developed in modern capitalist states. Duffield also describes how many of these problematic shifts are embodied in the contemporary concept of human security. For Duffield, we can understand these shifts in terms of Foucauldian biopolitical framework, which can be understood as a regulatory power that seeks to support life through intervening in the biological, social and economic processes that constitute a human population (2007: 16). Sustainable development and human security are for Duffield technologies of security which aim to create self-managing and self-reliant subjectivities in the third world, which can then survive in a situation of serious underdevelopment (or being uninsured as Duffield terms it) without causing security problems for the developed world. For Duffield this is all driven by a neoliberal project which seeks to control and manage uninsured populations globally. Radical critic Costas Douzinas (2007) also criticises new forms of cosmopolitanism such as human rights and interventions for human rights as a triumph of American hegemony. Whilst we are in agreement with critics such as Douzinas and Duffield that these new security frameworks cannot be empowering, and ultimately lead to more power for powerful states**,** we need to understand why these frameworks have the effect that they do. We can understand that these frameworks have political limitations without having to look for a specific plan on the part of current powerful states. In new security frameworks such as human security we can see the political limits of the framework proposed by critical and emancipatory theoretical approaches.

#### Without security policy options the security sector will be dominated by the most conservative policymakers

Knudsen 01

Olav. F. Knudsen, Prof @ Södertörn Univ College, Security Dialogue 32.3, “Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing Securitization,” p. 366

A final danger in focusing on the state is that of building the illusion that states have impenetrable walls, that they have an inside and an outside, and that nothing ever passes through. Wolfers’s billiard balls have contributed to this misconception. But the state concepts we should use are in no need of such an illusion. Whoever criticizes the field for such sins in the past needs to go back to the literature. Of course, we must continue to be open to a frank and unbiased assessment of the transnational politics which significantly in- fluence almost every issue on the domestic political agenda. The first decade of my own research was spent studying these phenomena – and I disavow none of my conclusions about the state’s limitations. Yet I am not ashamed to talk of a domestic political agenda. Anyone with a little knowledge of Euro- pean politics knows that Danish politics is not Swedish politics is not German politics is not British politics. Nor would I hesitate for a moment to talk of the role of the state in transnational politics, where it is an important actor, though only one among many other competing ones. In the world of transnational relations, the exploitation of states by interest groups – by their assumption of roles as representatives of states or by convincing state representatives to argue their case and defend their narrow interests – is a significant class of phenomena, today as much as yesterday. Towards a Renewal of the Empirical Foundation for Security Studies Fundamentally, the sum of the foregoing list of sins blamed on the Copen- hagen school amounts to a lack of attention paid to just that ‘reality’ of security which Ole Wæver consciously chose to leave aside a decade ago in order to pursue the politics of securitization instead. I cannot claim that he is void of interest in the empirical aspects of security because much of the 1997 book is devoted to empirical concerns. However, the attention to agenda-setting – confirmed in his most recent work – draws attention away from the important issues we need to work on more closely if we want to contribute to a better understanding of European security as it iscurrently developing. That inevitably requires a more consistentinterest in security policy in the making – not just in the development of alternative security policies. The dan- ger here is that, as alternative policies are likely to fail grandly on the political arena, crucial decisions may be made in the ‘traditional’ sector of securitypolicymaking, unheeded by any but the most uncritical minds**.**

#### Merely wishing away security fails – doesn’t impact policy-makers absent a specific mechanism

Jones 99

Richard, professor of International Politics at the University of Wales, Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory, CIAO Net

Because emancipatory political practice is central to the claims of critical theory, one might expect that proponents of a critical approach to the study of international relations would be reflexive about the relationship between theory and practice. Yet their thinking on this issue thus far does not seem to have progressed much beyond grandiose statements of intent. There have been no systematic considerations of how critical international theory can help generate, support, or sustain emancipatory politics beyond the seminar room or conference hotel. Robert Cox, for example, has described the task of critical theorists as providing “a guide to strategic action for bringing about an alternative order” (R. Cox 1981: 130). Although he has also gone on to identify possible agents for change and has outlined the nature and structure of some feasible alternative orders, he has not explicitly indicated whom he regards as the addressee of critical theory (i.e., who is being guided) and thus how the theory can hope to become a part of the political process (see R. Cox 1981, 1983, 1996). Similarly, Andrew Linklater has argued that “a critical theory of international relations must regard the practical project of extending community beyond the nation–state as its most important problem” (Linklater 1990b: 171). However, he has little to say about the role of theory in the realization of this “practical project.” Indeed, his main point is to suggest that the role of critical theory “is not to offer instructions on how to act but to reveal the existence of unrealised possibilities” (Linklater 1990b: 172). But the question still remains, reveal to whom? Is the audience enlightened politicians? Particular social classes? Particular social movements? Or particular (and presumably particularized) communities? In light of Linklater’s primary concern with emancipation, one might expect more guidance as to whom he believes might do the emancipating and how critical theory can impinge upon the emancipatory process. There is, likewise, little enlightenment to be gleaned from Mark Hoffman’s otherwise important contribution. He argues that critical international theory seeks not simply to reproduce society via description, but to understand society and change it. It is both descriptive and constructive in its theoretical intent: it is both an intellectual and a social act. It is not merely an expression of the concrete realities of the historical situation, but also a force for change within those conditions. (M. Hoffman 1987: 233) Despite this very ambitious declaration, once again, Hoffman gives no suggestion as to how this “force for change” should be operationalized and what concrete role critical theorizing might play in changing society. Thus, although the critical international theorists’ critique of the role that more conventional approaches to the study of world politics play in reproducing the contemporary world order may be persuasive, their account of the relationship between their own work and emancipatory political practice is unconvincing. Given the centrality of practice to the claims of critical theory, this is a very significant weakness. Without some plausible **account of the mechanisms** by which they hope to aid in the achievement of their emancipatory goals, proponents of critical international theory are hardly in a position to justify the assertion that “it represents the next stage in the development of International Relations theory” (M. Hoffman 1987: 244). Indeed, without a more convincing conceptualization of the theory–practice nexus, one can argue that critical international theory, by its own terms, has no way of redeeming some of its central epistemological and methodological claims and thus that it **is a fatally flawed** **enterprise**.

#### Scenario construction is critical to policymaking—solves your error replication and serial policy failure arguments

Oppenheimer 12 – Prof of Global Affairs@NYU Graduate Global Affairs Program, lifetime member CFR

Michael F. Oppenheimer, “From Prediction to Recognition: Using Alternate Scenarios to Improve Foreign Policy Decisions”, in *SAIS Review*, v 32 n 1, 2012, MUSE

Considering alternate scenarios can be of value to policymakers confronting rapid change, uncertainty, and high risk. Alternate scenarios present plausible and distinctive futures that challenge embedded mindsets, suggest different paths by which events may unfold, and improve early recognition of emerging trends. By engaging the future, they avoid the equally hazardous extremes of infinite uncertainty (which can produce paralysis or willful disregard for what we do know) and excessive certainty (with the attendant risks of ill-conceived actions and unintended consequences). Promoting a continuous process of scenario construction and deconstruction and embedding such a process in policy formulation would improve the quality of foreign policy decisions taken, inevitably, in uncertainty.

### Psychoanalysis

#### Psychoanalysis can’t be scaled up – can’t explain impacts or solve

**Sharpe 10**

Sharpe, lecturer, philosophy and psychoanalytic studies, and Goucher, senior lecturer, literary and psychoanalytic studies – Deakin University, ‘10

(Matthew and Geoff, Žižek and Politics: An Introduction, p. 182 – 185, Figure 1.5 included)

Can we bring some order to this host of criticisms? It is remarkable that, for all the criticisms of Žižek’s political Romanticism, no one has argued that the ultra- extremism of Žižek’s political position might reflect his untenable attempt to shape his model for political action on the curative final moment in clinical psychoanalysis. The differences between these two realms, listed in Figure 5.1, are nearly too many and too great to restate **–** which has perhaps caused the theoretical oversight. The key thing is this. Lacan’s notion of traversing the fantasy involves the radical transformation of people’s subjective structure: a refounding of their most elementary beliefs about themselves, the world, and sexual difference. This is undertaken in the security of the clinic, on the basis of the analysands’ voluntary desire to overcome their inhibitions, symptoms and anxieties. As a clinical and existential process, it has its own independent importance and authenticity. The analysands, in transforming their subjective world, change the way they regard the objective, shared social reality outside the clinic. But they do not transform the world. The political relevance of the clinic can only be (a) as a supporting moment in ideology critique or (b) as a fully- fl edged model of politics, provided that the political subject and its social object are ultimately identical. Option (*b*), Žižek’s option, rests on the idea, not only of a subject who becomes who he is only through his (mis) recognition of the objective sociopolitical order, but whose ‘traversal of the fantasy’ is immediately identical with his transformation of the socio- political system or Other. Hence, according to Žižek, we can analyse the institutional embodiments of this Other using psychoanalytic categories. In Chapter 4, we saw Žižek’s resulting elision of the distinction between the (subjective) Ego Ideal and the (objective) Symbolic Order. This leads him to analyse our entire culture as a single subject–object**,** whose perverse (or perhaps even psychotic) structure is expressed in every manifestation of contemporary life. Žižek’s decisive political- theoretic errors, one substantive and the other methodological, are different (see Figure 5.1) The *substantive problem* is to equate any political change worth the name with the total change of the subject–object that is, today, global capitalism. This is a type of change that can only mean equating politics with violent regime change, and ultimately embracing dictatorial government, as Žižek now frankly avows (*IDLC* 412–19). We have seen that the ultra- political form of Žižek’s criticism of everyone else, the theoretical Left and the wider politics, is that no one is sufficiently radical for him – even, we will discover, Chairman Mao. We now see that this is because Žižek’s model of politics proper is modelled on a pre- critical analogy with the total transformation of a subject’s entire subjective structure, at the end of the talking cure. For what could the concrete consequences of this governing analogy be? We have seen that Žižek equates the individual fantasy with the collective identity of an entire people**.** The social fantasy, he says, structures the regime’s ‘inherent transgressions’: at once subjects’ habitual ways of living the letter of the law, and the regime’s myths of origin and of identity. If political action is modelled on the Lacanian cure, it must involve the complete ‘traversal’ – in Hegel’s terms, the abstract versus the determinate negation – of all these lived myths, practices and habits. Politics must involve the periodic founding of entire new subject–objects. Providing the model for this set of ideas, the fi rst Žižekian political subject was Schelling’s divided God, who gave birth to the entire Symbolic Order before the beginning of time (*IDLC* 153; *OB* 144–8). But can the political theorist reasonably hope or expect that subjects will simply give up on all their inherited ways, myths and beliefs, all in one world- creating moment? And can they be legitimately asked or expected to, on the basis of a set of ideals whose legitimacy they will only retrospectively see, after they have acceded to the Great Leap Forward? And if they do not – for Žižek laments that today subjects are politically disengaged in unprecedented ways – what means can the theorist and his allies use to move them to do so?

#### Psychoanalysis results in fatalism, passivity, and inaction

**Gordon 01—**Psychotherapist

Paul, Psychoanalysis and Racism: The Politics of Defeat, Race Class 2001 42: 17

The postmodernists' problem is that they cannot live with dis appointment. All the tragedies of the political project of emancipation ± the evils of Stalinism in particular ± are seen as the inevitable product of men and women trying to create a better society. But, rather than engage in a critical assessment of how, for instance, radical political movements go wrong, they discard the emancipatory project and impulse itself. The postmodernists, as Sivanandan puts it, blame modernity for having failed them: `the intellectuals and academics have fled into discourse and deconstruction and representation -- as though to interpret the world is more important than to change it, as though changing the interpretation is all we could do in a changing world'. 58 To justify their ¯ight from a politics holding out the prospect of radical change through self-activity, the disappointed intellectuals find abundant intellectual alibis for themselves in the very work they champion, including, in Cohen's case, psychoanalysis. What Marshall Berman says of Foucault seems true also of psychoanalysis; that it offers `a world-historical alibi' for the passivity and helplessness felt by many in the 1970s, and that it has nothing but contempt for those naive enough to imagine that it might be possible for modern human kind to be free. At every turn for such theorists, as Berman argues, whether in sexuality, politics, even our imagination, we are nothing but prisoners: there is no freedom in Foucault's world, because his language forms a seamless web, a cage far more airtight than anything Weber ever dreamed of, into which no life can break . . . There is no point in trying to resist the oppressions and injustices of modern life, since even our dreams of freedom only add more links to our chains; how ever, once we grasp the futility of it all, at least we can relax. 59 Cohen's political defeatism and his conviction in the explanatory power of his new faith of psychoanalysis lead him to be contemptuous and dismissive of any attempt at political solidarity or collective action. For him, `communities' are always `imagined', which, in his view, means based on fantasy, while different forms of working-class organisation, from the craft fraternity to the revolutionary group, are dismissed as `fantasies of self-suf®cient combination'. 60 In this scenario, the idea that people might come together, think together, analyse together and act together as rational beings is impossible. The idea of a genuine community of equals becomes a pure fantasy, a `symbolic retrieval' of something that never existed in the ®rst place: `Community is a magical device for conjuring something apparently solidary out of the thin air of modern times, a mechanism of re-enchantment.' As for history, it is always false, since `We are always dealing with invented traditions.' 61 Now, this is not only non sense, but dangerous nonsense at that. Is history `always false'? Did the Judeocide happen or did it not? And did not some people even try to resist it? Did slavery exist or did it not, and did not people resist that too and, ultimately, bring it to an end? And are communities always `imagined'? Or, as Sivanandan states, are they beaten out on the smithy of a people's collective struggle? Furthermore, all attempts to legislate against ideology are bound to fail because they have to adopt `technologies of surveillance and control identical to those used by the state'. Note here the Foucauldian language to set up the notion that all `surveillance' is bad. But is it? No society can function without surveillance of some kind. The point, surely, is that there should be a public conversation about such moves and that those responsible for implementing them be at all times accountable. To equate, as Cohen does, a council poster about `Stamping out racism' with Orwell's horrendous prophecy in 1984 of a boot stamping on a human face is ludicrous and insulting. (Orwell's image was intensely personal and destructive; the other is about the need to challenge not individuals, but a collective evil.) Cohen reveals himself to be deeply ambivalent about punitive action against racists, as though punishment or other ®rm action against them (or anyone else transgressing agreed social or legal norms) precluded `understand ing' or even help through psychotherapy. It is indeed a strange kind of `anti-racism' that portrays active racists as the `victims', those who are in need of `help'. But this is where Cohen's argument ends up. In their move from politics to the academy and the world of `discourse', the postmodernists may have simply exchanged one grand narrative, historical materialism, for another, psychoanalysis. 62 For psychoanalysis is a grand narrative, par excellence. It is a theory that seeks to account for the world and which recognises few limits on its explanatory potential. And the claimed radicalism of psycho analysis, in the hands of the postmodernists at least, is not a radicalism at all but a prescription for a politics of quietism, fatalism and defeat. Those wanting to change the world, not just to interpret it, need to look elsewhere.

#### Psychoanalysis only explains individual decisions—not applicable to social experiences

**Gordon 01**—Psychotherapist

Paul, Psychoanalysis and Racism: The Politics of Defeat, Race Class 2001 42: 17

The problem with the application of psychoanalysis to social institu tions is that there can be no testing of the claims made. If someone says, for instance, that nationalism is a form of looking for and seeking to replace the body of the mother one has lost, or that the popular appeal of a particular kind of story echoes the pattern of our earliest relationship to the maternal breast, how can this be proved? The pioneers of psychoanalysis, from Freud onwards, all derived their ideas in the context of their work with individual patients and their ideas can be examined in the everyday laboratory of the therapeutic encounter where the validity of an interpretation, for example, is a matter for dialogue between therapist and patient. Outside of the con sulting room, there can be no such verification process, and the further one moves from the individual patient, the less purchase psycho analytic ideas can have. Outside the therapeutic encounter, anything and everything can be true, psychoanalytically speaking. But if every thing is true, then nothing can be false and therefore nothing can be true.

#### The alternative is not liberatory or subversive—it retreats into a web of abstract theory at the expense of political activism

**Rorty 98—**Prof of Comparative Lit @ Stanford

Richard, Achieving Our Country, p. 92-4

Dewey was right to be exasperated by sociopolitical theory conducted at this level of abstraction. He was wrong when he went on to say that ascending to this level is typically a rightist maneuver, one which supplies “the apparatus for intellectual justifications of the established order.”9 For such ascents are now more common on the Left than on the Right. The contemporary academic Left seems to think that the higher your level of abstraction, the more subversive of the established order you can be. The more sweeping and novel your conceptual apparatus, the more radical your critique. When one of today’s academic leftists says that some topic has been “inadequately theorized,” you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of language, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist version of economic determinism. Theorists of the Left think that dissolving political agents into plays of differential subjectivity, or political initiatives into pursuits of Lacan’s impossible object of desire, helps to subvert the established order. Such subversion, they say, is accomplished by “problematizing familiar concepts.” Recent attempts to subvert social institutitons by problematizing concepts have produced a few very good books. They have also produced many thousands of books which represent scholastic philosophizing at its worts. The authors of these purportedly “subversive” books honestly believe that the are serving human liberty. But it is almost impossible to clamber back down from their books to a level of abstraction on which one might discuss the merits of a law, a treaty, a candidate or a political strategy. Even though what these authors “theorize” is often something very concrete and near at hand—a curent TV show, a media celebrity, a recent scandal—they offer the most absract and barren explanations imaginable. These futile attempts to philosophize one’s way into political relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left retreats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach to the problems of its country. Disengagement from practice produces theoretical hallucinations. These result in an intellec- tual environment which is, as Mark Edmundson says in his book Nightmare on Main Street, Gothic. The cultural Left is haunted by ubiquitous specters, the most frightening of which is called "power." This is the name of what Edmund- son calls Foucault's "haunting agency, which is everywhere and nowhere, as evanescent and insistent as a resourceful spook."10

#### Psychoanalysis is anti-political—blocks the possibility of social action

**Homer 96—**Lecturer in Psychoanalytic Studies @ U of Sheffield

Sean, PSYCHOANALYSIS, REPRESENTATION, POLITICS: ON THE (IM)POSSIBILITY OF A PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY OF IDEOLOGY?, The Letter, Summer 1996

Let me just pause here to raise some preliminary objections, or more precisely questions, to this kind of theorizing. Firstly, on a rather superficial level, I begin to get worried when radical politics can find itself in agreement with the Thatcherite right that there is no such thing as a society. This may make for good theory but, I would ask, does it make for good politics? Secondly, a moment ago I criticized a previous group of Marxist theorists for the ease with which they passed from social, political and cultural theory to psychoanalysis and back, at the cost of specificity of each discourse. But is not post-marxism, as well as Zizek, also in danger of falling into this trap, is there not a certain elision between Zizek’s utilization of the object a, for example, and Laclau and Mouffe conception of society as structurally incomplete and never able to fully constitute itself? Finally, as Elizabeth Bellamy pointed out in her article ‘Discourses of Impossibility’, what is eccluded in the elision between object a and the social as an impossible object is the possibility of politics itself. A situation, she observes, that begs a number of questions, not least as to whether or not political theory needs psychoanalysis in the first place. Indeed, ‘is it possible-indeed, is it desirable- to constitute a psychoanalytic politics?”9 The radical intentions of writers such as Laclau, Mouffe, and Zizek, tehn, would appear to come up against a certain theoretical and political impasse. Psychoanalysis originally served to estrange and undermine our complacent assumptions of subjectivity and at the same time it radically brought into question the status of the object itself but as a consequence the preconditions and possibility of political discourse as such would appear to be seriously in doubt.

#### The alternative’s failure to engage in the political process cedes the discussion to the elites- ultimately resulting in extinction

**Boggs 97**

(Carl, National University, Theory & Society 26, December, p. 773-4)

The decline of the public sphere in late twentieth-century America poses a series of great dilemmas and challenges. Many ideological currents scrutinized here ^ localism, metaphysics, spontaneism, post- modernism, Deep Ecology – intersect with and reinforce each other. While these currents have deep origins in popular movements of the 1960s and 1970s, they remain very much alive in the 1990s. Despite their different outlooks and trajectories, they all share one thing in common: a depoliticized expression of struggles to combat and overcome alienation. The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizing impulses is accompanied by a loss of public engagement, an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacity of individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved – perhaps even unrecognized – only to fester more ominously into the future. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay, spread of infectious diseases, technological displacement of workers) cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically, the widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendas that ignore or side- step these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence. In his commentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics, as larger numbers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life of common involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions.74 In the meantime**,** the fate of the world hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of anti-politics becomes more compelling and even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of political power that will continue to decide the fate of human societies. This last point demands further elaboration. The shrinkage of politics hardly means that corporate colonization will be less of a reality, that social hierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold over people's lives. Far from it: the space abdicated by a broad citizenry, well-informed and ready to participate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites – an already familiar dynamic in many lesser- developed countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not very far removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a part of the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in the face of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more virulent guise – or it might help further rationalize the existing power structure. In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society.75