# NFU 1AC (Policy)

### Advantage 1: Hegemony

#### American hegemony has declined but is unrivaled- maintaining leadership is a matter of internal choices

Olive 13

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<http://www.thestar.com/business/2013/06/07/american_decline_has_been_exaggerated_olive.html>

The timing could have been better for Madeleine Albright’s assertion that “We are the indispensable nation. We stand taller. We see further into the future.” That description of America by the Clinton-era secretary of state was followed, in the 2000s, by an epic foreign-policy blunder in Iraq; riotous greed culminating in a Wall Street meltdown and resulting Great Recession; and tragic incompetence by which New York and Washington were naked to their 9/11 enemies, and Hurricane Katrina destroyed a large portion of a great city, New Orleans. Add in America’s more recent flirtation with defaulting on its unprecedented, staggering debt, and the U.S. display of varied ineptitude for all the world to see was bound to raise doubts about the shelf life of Pax Americana. And that’s the context in which the superb American author Cullen Murphy, in his 2007 bestseller Are We Rome? The Fall of an Empire and the Fate of America, wrote ominously that “Whenever I see the space shuttle...I think back to the Rome of Hadrian’s day, and the gargantuan statue of the Sun-God, as tall as the shuttle, being dragged into place by 24 elephants.” In his recently published Flight of the Eagle: The Grand Strategies That Brought America from Colonial Dependence to World Leadership, a Conrad Black whose admiration for America once knew no bounds writes: “American exceptionality, which was always to a degree a fraud (because of the mistreatment of African Americans and the comparable rights of the British, Dutch, Swiss, and Scandinavians), is now only a matter of the country’s immense scale, and of the credulity and dedication of the American masses.” Neither Cullen nor Black make a case for irreversible American decline. But they each offer more than a little evidence for a fretful many who currently do. An empire can inflict upon itself only so much hubris before the way is made clear for the Visigoths. Yet we’re nowhere near that point, and America may never reach it, certainly not in this century. The myth of American decline is firmly rooted in what historians disparage as “presentism,” the tendency to base projections solely on current conditions, without regard to history or context. American history is marked by episodic declinist sentiment dating from the Revolution, which has served it well as a guard against complacency. And context finds that America, despite the harrowing fallout of a lost decade, remains far more likely to dominate this century, as it did much of the 20th, than any of its rivals. China, for instance, will struggle futilely to gain hegemony in its sphere of influence against Japan, Russia, South Korea and Taiwan which will try to block Beijing at every turn — with U.S. backing, of course. That assumes the centre holds in China, a sucker’s bet given the unsustainability both of its autocracy and suppression of diverse ethnicities. For the record: Since the Wall Street crash of 2008-09, the stock market has recovered to set new heights, as have the profits of Corporate America. The greenback’s status as the world’s reserve currency has not been challenged. Incredibly, foreign investors account for a higher percentage of U.S. equities ownership today than at any time in the 68 years that Goldman Sachs Group Inc. has measured that confidence indicator. The oft-cited decline in American manufacturing is a canard. The U.S. is producing more goods, and more exportable ones, than ever before – admittedly with far fewer workers. That’s called productivity, and America leads the world at it. And also in innovation. Unmatched in playing rapid catch-up, the U.S. has closed its once-yawning gap with a China that led the world in solar-energy technology, and in just three years. At roughly $15 trillion in size, even at this low point in American economic vitality, the U.S. economy is about twice the size of a quickly industrializing China. Chinese GDP is expected to match America’s, in nominal terms, by mid-century. But even then, the gap between the two countries’ GDP per capita — the chief measure of standard of living — will see Chinese affluence continuing to trail that of Americans by a wide margin. (The current numbers are about $48,000 and $5,000 for the U.S. and China, respectively.) By mid-century, it’s estimated by demographers that the U.S. will have added a stunning 40 million people to its population, while most of the industrialized world shrinks or, at best, stagnates in population growth. Canada will eke out a modest 2 per cent annual gain over that period, enviable in comparison with a Japan and Russia whose populations have already plateaued, with Western Europe to follow by decade’s end. Gridlock does define Washington. But immigration reform enjoys bipartisan support. Should that reform come about, a recent study by the Center for American Progress estimates a resulting $1-trillion boost to the U.S. economy. From a 1970s perspective of block-long lineups at the gasoline pumps, today’s American near self-sufficiency in energy is unimaginable. In the past four years alone, domestic U.S. oil and gas reserves have jumped 20 per cent. And fuel-efficiency improvements in the U.S. vehicle fleet have seen a deceleration of energy-consumption growth. Public finances are on the mend, notably at the state level, where a California that was fiscally crippled as recently as two years ago will end 2013 in the black. With joblessness on the mend, albeit gradually, and the prospect of as many as 12 million currently illegal, or undocumented, immigrants coming out of the shadows, state and federal treasuries will be bolstered by increased income-tax revenues even without tax hikes. The world’s largest internal economy is nonetheless zealously seeking ambitious trade pacts with both Europe and trading union of Pacific countries on both sides of the ocean. Should these come to fruition, the trade deals will generate high-skilled jobs at home and reinforce domestic government treasuries. Europe regards the Comprehensive Canada-Europe Trade Agreement (CETA) now under negotiation as a framework for a similar pact with the U.S., which already has talks underway for a Trans-Pacific Partnership among countries accounting for nearly 40 per cent of global GDP. Problems America obviously has, from lack of genuine universal healthcare to education and infrastructure deficits of awesome proportions. But these are fixable problems, as the example of Sputnik’s spur to a vastly upgraded U.S. public education system reminds us. Cullen’s Roman analogy is misleading. The U.S. space shuttle program has not been an act of aggrandizement, but of innovation. The time to go short on America will arrive only with exhaustion of limited public funds on elephantine statues of George Washington in America’s largest cities.

#### Improvements to conventional military forces are key to ensure leadership and managing conflicts with world powers

Harper 13

Daniel Harper is Weekly Standard’s online editor, “Has US Military Power Made it Unchallengeable?”, e-International Relations 6-14-2013

<http://www.e-ir.info/2013/06/14/has-us-military-power-made-it-unchallengeable/>

In this essay, I will explore US conventional military power, showing that America – despite conventional supremacy over its enemies – is challengeable. ‘New wars’ and asymmetric conflicts prevent it from playing to its strengths, but America continues to fight wars in the same way as in the past, due in part to misinterpreted military lessons from the Gulf War and the initial stages of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. I will begin by discussing America’s conventional power, before outlining the vulnerabilities that asymmetric fighters can exploit, and the weaknesses in America’s military mindset, concluding that conventional supremacy does not prevent the US from being challengeable. Today, it is virtually undisputed that US conventional military power far eclipses that of its rivals. Post-Cold War, there is no actor comparable in terms of military resources[1] – recent wars have shown that ‘the US cannot be challenged on an open battlefield’.[2] ‘Conventional military power’ concerns types of force used in traditional, interstate wars. This includes land, air and sea power[3] – but excludes weapons of mass destruction. Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons, whilst contributing to the power of an actor, are separate from conventional power.[4] The initial stages of the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq showed the superiority of this American conventional military power, when challenged on a like-for-like basis against another state. Other authors go further, claiming for example that America in fact has the largest ‘absolute and relative conventional power’ in all of history.[5] This supremacy is based heavily on the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’, which emerged in 1989.[6] The RMA harnessed new technology, such as GPS[7], UAVs[8] and Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs)[9], which revolutionised the way in which air power could be used. This led to a dramatic shift in use and investment from ground troops to air power, which was seen as a way to achieve excellent results at low costs to human life. The most important part, however, is the information systems that link this new technology together, creating the new paradigm of ‘network centric warfare’[10]. Within this type of warfare, information is key – central command systems can gather intelligence, process it, and respond with a precision strike[11] – often hundreds or even thousands of miles from the target. RMA technology effectively acts as a Clausewitzian ‘force multiplier’ for the United States, providing several advantages. Perhaps the most important is the dramatically reduced level of casualties – stand-off strikes replace close ground battles,[12] and aircraft equipped with PGMs have such high accuracy that they ‘can accomplish much more with fewer missions and thus greatly reduced risk’.[13] This precision is especially important, as it facilitates the target discrimination necessary for legitimate wars – reducing moral constraints on the use of force,[14] which allows the military to operate more effectively. All of this is facilitated by increasingly accurate and detailed intelligence, from sources such as UAVs and satellite imagery – giving advantages in terms of ‘situational awareness’[15]. This combination of accurate long-range weapons and intelligence means that enemies can be attacked from the air, inflicting great damage whilst sustaining minimal casualties. The 1991 Gulf War was seen as the first test for this new paradigm of warfare, and by many accounts, it was an unprecedented success. The US suffered far fewer casualties than predicted[16] and air strikes were used to great effect, disrupting Iraqi supply lines and wiping out infrastructure.[17] All of this was underlined by impressive accuracy of so-called ‘smart bombs’ – 80% landed within 10 feet of their target.[18] So America, then, is unchallengeable? The evidence above – despite outlining the strengths of the RMA that have contributed to US military supremacy – is but part of the bigger picture and there are important caveats to America’s strength. Conventional military power is designed for, and thus most useful in, conventional war. The nature and configuration of America’s military suggest that it has been designed with the purpose of fighting conventional, ‘old wars’. ‘Old wars’ take place solely between nation states[19] and their professional armies[20] according to defined rules of warfare.[21] In wars like these, the US assuredly has the upper hand, as victory is based on power[22] – the winner is whoever could inflict the most ‘precise and powerful damage’[23] using conventional force. However, post-Cold War[24], the emergence of ‘New War’ has undermined the position of conventional force as the key to victory. The rising importance of non-state actors[25] has meant that the intrastate wars have become more frequent than their interstate counterparts.[26] These wars are more complicated, and present a greater military challenge for states, as there is no clear military centre of gravity to attack.[27] They tend to have longer durations,[28] more complex goals[29] and involve urban conflict[30] – all of which present strategic challenges. The United States is the dominant world force in terms of conventional military power, outweighing other states and non-state actors. The Revolution in Military Affairs, whilst not eliminating friction or vulnerability, has allowed it to be better organised, more aware and able to respond quickly and precisely to threats, with minimal casualties. This, however, does not make it unchallengeable. American experience in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars illustrates the difficulties that even a formidable power faces when confronted with unconventional conflict. Both Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom began as interstate wars, against the Taliban and Ba’ath governments respectively. In the initial stages of both conflicts, coalition forces had little difficulty, using their superior military force to devastating effect[31]. However, once the initial battles had been won, both campaigns morphed into intrastate wars and insurgency,[32] which have been more difficult to combat. Insurgency is one style of fighting that is typical of these ‘new wars’. Along with terrorism and guerrilla warfare, it falls under the heading of ‘asymmetric warfare’ – currently one of the foremost challenges to America. Asymmetric warfare is a label for a variety of tactics that weaker actors (both state and sub-state) can employ against militarily stronger enemies. It can be described as ‘fighting an opponent by using forces, tactics or strategies that are dissimilar to his’.[33] The core strategy concerns maximising your own advantages, whilst simultaneously exploiting the vulnerabilities of your enemy, thus preventing them from using their strengths to their full potential.[34] Asymmetric warfare is therefore of particular concern to America – its great advantages in conventional power can be rendered useless, as these new wars prevent America from fighting in the style that suits it. The nature of asymmetric warfare means that no actor can ever be unchallengeable, because it targets their weaknesses[35], no matter how few or how obscure these may be. There are several strategies that asymmetric opponents can use. For the United States, and in fact any (democratic) state, a key weakness is public opinion. Public support is crucial for a democratic state to wage war, and by attacking the motivation behind the war effort, instead of attacking their military directly,[36] it is possible to bring down an enemy much more powerful than yourself. The asymmetric warrior relies on a triad of ‘protraction’, ‘attrition’ and ‘camouflage’ to achieve this.[37] The aim is to raise enemy casualties to such a level that the war is seen as unwinnable by their public. With a lack of popular support[38] it is difficult for a democratic government to pursue a war. By avoiding major confrontations[39], which are unwinnable against such a conventionally strong opponent, the war can be lengthened, increasing the number of enemy casualties and chipping away at the support underpinning their war effort. Western states are particularly sensitive to long wars with many casualties, now that their wars are often ‘wars of choice’, which provide no direct existential threat.[40] Asymmetric warriors are usually fighting a total war, due to the existential nature of their struggle. They are thus willing to absorb much more pain, casualties and costs than their Western, nation-state opponents, who are fighting a limited war, where the goals of the conflict are often peripheral to their national interest. An asymmetric actor is also able to exploit the moral and legal constraints[41] on the use of force by states. The West is compelled to abide by the legal norms of war that it created – even when its enemies are not.[42] Just War theory necessitates discrimination between civilian and military targets[43] and US military power can thus be rendered unusable. Asymmetric actors can render targets invulnerable, not through costly defence technology, but by making a strike morally unjustifiable. One such example was Serbia’s placement of civilians next to targets that were at risk of attack.[44] Tactics such as these can render missiles and bombs unusable, regardless of their accuracy, due to the civilian loss of life involved. In addition to limiting the opponent’s use of their military force, asymmetric actors can also limit the effectiveness of this force. New wars, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, involve urban combat, which presents serious challenges for conventional forces. Combat in cities favours defence, as there is ample cover and the possibility to spring ambushes. By exploiting local knowledge, hiding amongst civilians and inside buildings, and using roadblocks to channel the enemy, asymmetric fighters can inflict heavy casualties.[45] America suffered casualty rates of up to 40% in recent urban conflicts,[46] as camouflage has meant that insurgents can inflict high damage by using relatively weak weapons such as RPGs at close range.[47] Despite US military supremacy, asymmetric fighters can construct conflict situations that prevent effective use of conventional force, and create weaknesses that can be exploited. In addition to using urban warfare to limit the effectiveness of a US response, asymmetric fighters can undermine the foundation of America’s conventional military supremacy – the RMA. Any combatant force has weaknesses, in spite of the magnitude of strengths it also has. It is possible for enemies of the United States to exploit their reliance on this new high-tech form of warfare, in a variety of ways. Despite the increased power, organisation and situational awareness that the RMA brought, it also created new vulnerabilities.[48] It has been strongly argued by a number of authors[49] that the coalition success in the Gulf War was less to do with their RMA-based strengths, but rather a result of Iraqi failure to take advantages of these new weaknesses. For example, the increased US reliance on intelligence and information can be exploited in two ways. Firstly, through the obvious means of destroying the equipment that is used to gather intelligence – UAVs can be shot down[50], GPS signals jammed[51] and satellites attacked.[52] Attacks on information-based infrastructure, both on US soil[53] and in the field of combat with devices such as EMPs[54] can dramatically limit the effectiveness of a military that relies on instantaneous communications and intelligence. Secondly, deception can be used to implant false intelligence and undermine trust in the information that the US military relies on. Satellite imagery for example, can be successfully manipulated, a tactic that was used to great effect in Kosovo. Milošević’s forces created dummy artillery installations, false bridges, and wooden MiGs[55] – even going so far as to give them false heat signatures or place jugs of burning oil on top of functioning tanks to make them seem as though they had been destroyed.[56] By exploiting the US’ reliance on air-based intelligence, mistaken conclusions can be planted in the minds of their strategists – who may underestimate the power of the forces they are up against, believing them to be destroyed. These two tactics also have knock-on effects on the utility of the military’s strike force – PGMs and airstrikes can only be as accurate as the intelligence that guides them.[57] The post-RMA US’ reliance on air power can also be undermined by the asymmetric warrior. Anti-aircraft missiles such as MANPADS[58] are a relatively cheap and effective way to counter air dominance, as used by Iraqi insurgents.[59] Even if no aircraft are actually hit, the threat can be enough of a deterrent for a United States with an increasingly casualty-sensitive public. In Kosovo, for example, the persistent use of anti-aircraft missiles meant that coalition aircraft had to fly at higher altitudes, which limited their ability to hit targets accurately.[60] Shooting down just one US aeroplane can have important consequences, due to the high cost of such equipment – a B-2 bomber, for example, costs $1.3 billion[61] – as well as the fear and confidence crises that it can inspire.[62] This is particularly effective, as the RMA is based on the premise that technology can limit casualties in a war – and unravelling this assumption can weaken morale and public support. The challenges to the US military that I have outlined do not even include other asymmetric threats such as terrorism and the use of CBRN weapons – which will not be discussed in detail due to constraints of space. Taking asymmetric warfare to its logical conclusion, the ultimate response of a US enemy could be to use WMD.[63] Here, two concepts mentioned above – the lack of restraints on the use of force by asymmetric actors, and the US casualty-sensitivity – can be combined to devastating effect. Whilst nuclear strikes seem unlikely,[64] it is possible that weak states or non-state actors could target the American public with chemical, biological or radiological weapons. Against these types of attack, which circumvent the traditional battlefield, America’s conventional weapons have little utility. Asymmetric fighters can therefore undermine both the use and the effectiveness of America’s conventional military power. By attacking the public support underlying the war effort or exploiting ethical constraints on the use of force, it is possible to stop force being used. In addition, by forcing battles into urban settings or by undermining RMA equipment, the effectiveness of America’s military can be reduced. These two strategies together can make it possible to bring down an adversary far mightier than oneself. The failure of the US military thus lies in its mindset, planning and organisation. In a symmetric conflict, where both sides are fighting the same type of war and are bound by the same moral constraints, a US defeat would be highly surprising. But are such conflicts likely in the future? Democratic peace theory[65], commercial liberalism[66] and liberal institutionalism[67] all provide compelling arguments for the absence of major war between states in the future. It is almost impossible to imagine an interstate conflict on the scale of World War 2 – indeed, there have only been four interstate wars since 1945, and America has been directly involved in none of these.[68] Today, intrastate wars are the foremost threat, but the United States still appears configured to fight traditional wars. The recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan show its failure in this department, especially with regard to American public opinion, which urges for withdrawal of troops.[69] US military capabilities, whilst strong, are not designed to combat the primary threats facing America today. The forces were not designed for these ‘expeditionary’ missions, and are therefore being used in unsuitable ways – fighter aircraft, for example, providing close ground support, heavy armoured vehicles in urban and mountainous areas, and warships in littoral regions.[70] Post-RMA, the distribution of resources is skewed massively towards air power, rather than ground troops[71] – which is unsuitable for urban insurgency. These ground troops are necessary to occupy and hold areas[72] – the United States has entered into wars in the belief that they can be won through air power alone,[73] which is not the case. A lack of ground troops creates a military that is able to conquer territory, but not subsequently control it. This creates conditions conducive to insurgency, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan, which gives weak fighters the ability to defeat powerful militaries, as discussed above. The utility of air power can also never be guaranteed – indeed, it has been argued that the oft-cited success of RMA warfare in the Gulf War was contingent on luck and favourable conditions. The flat desert, lack of civilians and Iraqi’s ‘vulnerable supply routes’,[74] coupled with excellent weather conditions[75] allowed the coalition to play to its strengths. Other conflicts show the opposite – the problems of reliance on air power and intelligence. Atmospheric conditions can inhibit the use of air power and UAVs, as in the 1999 Kosovo conflict.[76] Intelligence can never be 100% accurate, as evidenced by the mistaken bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade,[77] and by friendly fire incidents in Afghanistan.[78] In addition to these weaknesses in military capabilities, there are further, strategic failures. America does not have the mindset suited to asymmetric combat, having a tendency to separate military and political operations,[79] which is disastrous when fighting ‘new wars’. It views these wars in purely military terms, expecting military dominance to produce surrender,[80] not realising that to fight insurgency requires political as well as military commitments. Indeed, overuse of military force can be counterproductive, creating more enemies amongst the population that the US seeks to win over.[81] The enemies of new wars – insurgents, terrorists, and ‘brands’ such as Al-Qaeda – cannot be fought by military means alone. It also is necessary to tackle the problem politically, to achieve the same goal that asymmetric warriors have – undermining the opponent’s public support and will for the fight.[82] By addressing ‘the causes of discontent upon which extremism feeds’[83] – poverty, lack of political participation and perceived Western neo-colonialism – it is possible to displace insurgents as the providers of ‘safety, stability and security’,[84] winning the war. In these types of conflicts, the goals are political, and thus cannot be achieved solely through military means. When the aim of the conflict is regime change, fighting terrorism, or nation building, it is necessary to win the ‘hearts and minds’[85] of the local population – which cannot be done through force alone. These goals are not as simplistic as those in old wars were – for example control of territory – and thus require socio-political solutions. In a conventional war, the US would be far more powerful than its rivals, but such wars are now unlikely. Intrastate war creates new threats that confront America, but America still attempts to fight traditional wars. Success in the initial, interstate stages of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq has been followed by drawn-out counterinsurgency campaigns, with which a casualty-sensitive public is losing patience. These campaigns and wars such as that in Kosovo show the effectiveness of asymmetric tactics. Public support for wars, moral constraints, urban warfare, and attacks on RMA-based intelligence structures and air power all present problems for the US and potential lines of attack for asymmetric opponents. America remains vulnerable both in its overseas campaigns, as well as at home in the face of terrorist and CBRN attacks. These vulnerabilities are exacerbated by its military mindset and organisation. America needs to recognise that it cannot continue to base its power around conventional conflicts, and address its failures. RMA warfare and air power have weaknesses, and cannot replace ground troops, which are required to combat insurgency. America needs to realign its forces to suit the arena in which today’s battles are fought. There are also strategic failures, because America separates political and military measures when facing conflicts. America needs to rethink the way that it engages asymmetric opponents, recognizing that asymmetry is a two-way process and its enemies also have vulnerabilities to exploit. By incorporating political measures, such as engaging with the local populations and attempting to erode support for insurgency, the US may be able to succeed in Afghanistan and Iraq.

#### U.S. hegemony de-escalates all conflicts and protects US economic leadership—alternatives cause instability culminating in nuclear war

Brooks, Ikenberry and Wohlforth 13

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Of course, even if it is true that the costs of deep engagement fall far below what advocates of retrenchment claim, they would not be worth bearing unless they yielded greater benefits. In fact, they do. The most obvious benefit of the current strategy is that it reduces the risk of a dangerous conflict. The United States' security commitments deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and dissuade U.S. partners from trying to solve security problems on their own in ways that would end up threatening other states. Skeptics discount this benefit by arguing that U.S. security guarantees aren't necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries from erupting. They maintain that the high costs of territorial conquest and the many tools countries can use to signal their benign intentions are enough to prevent conflict. In other words, major powers could peacefully manage regional multipolarity without the American pacifier. But that outlook is too sanguine. If Washington got out of East Asia, Japan and South Korea would likely expand their military capabilities and go nuclear, which could provoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It's worth noting that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan tried to obtain nuclear weapons; the only thing that stopped them was the United States, which used its security commitments to restrain their nuclear temptations. Similarly, were the United States to leave the Middle East, the countries currently backed by Washington--notably, Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia--might act in ways that would intensify the region's security dilemmas. There would even be reason to worry about Europe. Although it's hard to imagine the return of great-power military competition in a post-American Europe, it's not difficult to foresee governments there refusing to pay the budgetary costs of higher military outlays and the political costs of increasing EU defense cooperation. The result might be a continent incapable of securing itself from threats on its periphery, unable to join foreign interventions on which U.S. leaders might want European help, and vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. Given how easily a U.S. withdrawal from key regions could lead to dangerous competition, advocates of retrenchment tend to put forth another argument: that such rivalries wouldn't actually hurt the United States. To be sure, few doubt that the United States could survive the return of conflict among powers in Asia or the Middle East--but at what cost? Were states in one or both of these regions to start competing against one another, they would likely boost their military budgets, arm client states, and perhaps even start regional proxy wars, all of which should concern the United States, in part because its lead in military capabilities would narrow. Greater regional insecurity could also produce cascades of nuclear proliferation as powers such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan built nuclear forces of their own. Those countries' regional competitors might then also seek nuclear arsenals. Although nuclear deterrence can promote stability between two states with the kinds of nuclear forces that the Soviet Union and the United States possessed, things get shakier when there are multiple nuclear rivals with less robust arsenals. As the number of nuclear powers increases, the probability of illicit transfers, irrational decisions, accidents, and unforeseen crises goes up. The case for abandoning the United States' global role misses the underlying security logic of the current approach. By reassuring allies and actively managing regional relations, Washington dampens competition in the world s key areas, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse in which countries would grow new military capabilities. For proof that this strategy is working, one need look no further than the defense budgets of the current great powers: on average, since 1991 they have kept their military expenditures as A percentage of GDP to historic lows, and they have not attempted to match the United States' top-end military capabilities. Moreover, all of the world's most modern militaries are U.S. allies, and the United States' military lead over its potential rivals .is by many measures growing. On top of all this, the current grand strategy acts as a hedge against the emergence regional hegemons. Some supporters of retrenchment argue that the U.S. military should keep its forces over the horizon and pass the buck to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing rising regional powers. Washington, they contend, should deploy forces abroad only when a truly credible contender for regional hegemony arises, as in the cases of Germany and Japan during World War II and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Yet there is already a potential contender for regional hegemony--China--and to balance it, the United States will need to maintain its key alliances in Asia and the military capacity to intervene there. The implication is that the United States should get out of Afghanistan and Iraq, reduce its military presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia. Yet that is exactly what the Obama administration is doing. MILITARY DOMINANCE, ECONOMIC PREEMINENCE Preoccupied with security issues, critics of the current grand strategy miss one of its most important benefits: sustaining an open global economy and a favorable place for the United States within it. To be sure, the sheer size of its output would guarantee the United States a major role in the global economy whatever grand strategy it adopted. Yet the country's military dominance undergirds its economic leadership. In addition to protecting the world economy from instability, its military commitments and naval superiority help secure the sea-lanes and other shipping corridors that allow trade to flow freely and cheaply. Were the United States to pull back from the world, the task of securing the global commons would get much harder. Washington would have less leverage with which it could convince countries to cooperate on economic matters and less access to the military bases throughout the world needed to keep the seas open. A global role also lets the United States structure the world economy in ways that serve its particular economic interests. During the Cold War, Washington used its overseas security commitments to get allies to embrace the economic policies it preferred--convincing West Germany in the 1960s, for example, to take costly steps to support the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency. U.S. defense agreements work the same way today. For example, when negotiating the 2011 free-trade agreement with South Korea, U.S. officials took advantage of Seoul's desire to use the agreement as a means of tightening its security relations with Washington. As one diplomat explained to us privately, "We asked for changes in labor and environment clauses, in auto clauses, and the Koreans took it all." Why? Because they feared a failed agreement would be "a setback to the political and security relationship." More broadly, the United States wields its security leverage to shape the overall structure of the global economy. Much of what the United States wants from the economic order is more of the same: for instance, it likes the current structure of the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund and prefers that free trade continue. Washington wins when U.S. allies favor this status quo, and one reason they are inclined to support the existing system is because they value their military alliances. Japan, to name one example, has shown interest in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Obama administration's most important free-trade initiative in the region, less because its economic interests compel it to do so than because Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda believes that his support will strengthen Japan's security ties with the United States. The United States' geopolitical dominance also helps keep the U.S. dollar in place as the world's reserve currency, which confers enormous benefits on the country, such as a greater ability to borrow money. This is perhaps clearest with Europe: the EU'S dependence on the United States for its security precludes the EU from having the kind of political leverage to support the euro that the United States has with the dollar. As with other aspects of the global economy, the United States does not provide its leadership for free: it extracts disproportionate gains. Shirking that responsibility would place those benefits at risk. CREATING COOPERATION What goes for the global economy goes for other forms of international cooperation. Here, too, American leadership benefits many countries but disproportionately helps the United States. In order to counter transnational threats, such as terrorism, piracy, organized crime, climate change, and pandemics, states have to work together and take collective action. But cooperation does not come about effortlessly, especially when national interests diverge. The United States' military efforts to promote stability and its broader leadership make it easier for Washington to launch joint initiatives and shape them in ways that reflect U.S. interests. After all, cooperation is hard to come by in regions where chaos reigns, and it flourishes where leaders can anticipate lasting stability. U.S. alliances are about security first, but they also provide the political framework and channels of communication for cooperation on nonmilitary issues. NATO, for example, has spawned new institutions, such as the Atlantic Council, a think tank, that make it easier for Americans and Europeans to talk to one another and do business. Likewise, consultations with allies in East Asia spill over into other policy issues; for example, when American diplomats travel to Seoul to manage the military alliance, they also end up discussing the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Thanks to conduits such as this, the United States can use bargaining chips in one issue area to make progress in others. The benefits of these communication channels are especially pronounced when it comes to fighting the kinds of threats that require new forms of cooperation, such as terrorism and pandemics. With its alliance system in place, the United States is in a stronger position than it would otherwise be to advance cooperation and share burdens. For example, the intelligence-sharing network within NATO, which was originally designed to gather information on the Soviet Union, has been adapted to deal with terrorism. Similarly, after a tsunami in the Indian Ocean devastated surrounding countries in 2004, Washington had a much easier time orchestrating a fast humanitarian response with Australia, India, and Japan, since their militaries were already comfortable working with one another. The operation did wonders for the United States' image in the region. The United States' global role also has the more direct effect of facilitating the bargains among governments that get cooperation going in the first place. As the scholar Joseph Nye has written, "The American military role in deterring threats to allies, or of assuring access to a crucial resource such as oil in the Persian Gulf, means that the provision of protective force can be used in bargaining situations. Sometimes the linkage may be direct; more often it is a factor not mentioned openly but present in the back of statesmen's minds." THE DEVIL WE KNOW Should America come home? For many prominent scholars of international relations, the answer is yes--a view that seems even wiser in the wake of the disaster in Iraq and the Great Recession. Yet their arguments simply don't hold up. There is little evidence that the United States would save much money switching to a smaller global posture. Nor is the current strategy self-defeating: it has not provoked the formation of counterbalancing coalitions or caused the country to spend itself into economic decline. Nor will it condemn the United States to foolhardy wars in the future. What the strategy does do is help prevent the outbreak of conflict in the world's most important regions, keep the global economy humming, and make international cooperation easier. Charting a different course would threaten all these benefits. This is not to say that the United States' current foreign policy can't be adapted to new circumstances and challenges. Washington does not need to retain every commitment at all costs, and there is nothing wrong with rejiggering its strategy in response to new opportunities or setbacks. That is what the Nixon administration did by winding down the Vietnam War and increasing the United States' reliance on regional partners to contain Soviet power, and it is what the Obama administration has been doing after the Iraq war by pivoting to Asia. These episodes of rebalancing belie the argument that a powerful and internationally engaged America cannot tailor its policies to a changing world. A grand strategy of actively managing global security and promoting the liberal economic order has served the United States exceptionally well for the past six decades, and there is no reason to give it up now. The country's globe-spanning posture is the devil we know, and a world with a disengaged America is the devil we don't know. Were American leaders to choose retrenchment, they would in essence be running a massive experiment to test how the world would work without an engaged and liberal leading power. The results could well be disastrous.

#### We control uniqueness—all forms of violence declined in the era of U.S. leadership

Fettweis 11

Christopher, Professor of Political Science @ Tulane, Dangerous Times?: The International Politics of Great Power Peace, pg. 85-86

The evidence supports the latter. Major wars tend to be rather memorable, so there is little need to demonstrate that there has been no such conflict since the end of the Cold War. But the data seem to support the 'trickle-down" theory of stability as well. Empirical analyses of warfare have consistently shown that the number of all types of wars-interstate, civil, ethnic, revolutionary, and so forth-declined throughout the 1990s and into the new century, after a brief surge of postcolonial conflicts in the first few years of that decade.' Overall levels of conflict tell only part of the story, however. Many other aspects of international behavior, including some that might he considered secondary effects of warfare, are on the decline as well. Some of the more important, if perhaps underreported, aggregate global trends include the following: • Ethnic conflict. Ethnonational wars for independence have declined to their lowest level since 1960, the first year for which we have data.' • Repression and poh twa! discrimination against ethnic minorities. The Minorities at Risk project at the University of Maryland has tracked a decline in the number of minority groups around the world that experience discrimination at the hands of states, from seventy-five in 1991 to forty-one in 2003.1 • War termination versus outbreak. War termination settlements have proven to be more stable over time, and the number of new conflicts is lower than ever before.' • Magnitude of conflict/battle deaths. The average number of battle deaths per conflict per year has been steadily declining."' The risk for the average person of dying in battle has been plummeting since World War II-and rather drastically so since the end of the Cold War.' • Genocide. Since war is usually a necessary condition for genocide,-9 perhaps it should be unsurprising that the incidence of genocide and other mass slaughters declined by 90 percent between 1989 and 2005, memorable tragedies notwithstanding.' • Coups. Armed overthrow of government is becoming increasingly rare, even as the number of national governments is expanding along with the number of states-"' Would-he coup plotters no longer garner the kind of automatic outside support that they could have expected during the Cold Ware or at virtually any time of great power tension. Third party intervention. Those conflicts that do persist have less support from outside actors, just as the constructivists expected. When the great powers have intervened in local conflicts, it has usually been in the attempt to bring a conflict to an end or, in the case of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, to punish aggression." • Human rights abuses, Though not completely gone, the number of large-scale abuses of human rights is also declining. Overall, there has been a clear, if uneven, decrease in what the Human Security Centre calls "one-sided violence against civilians" since 1989.1 • Global military spending. World military spending declined by one third in the first decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall.` Today that spending is less than 2.5 percent of global CliP; which is about twothirds of what it was during the Cold War. • Terrorist attacks. In perhaps the most counterintuitive trend, the number of worldwide terrorist incidents is far smaller than it was during the Cold War. if Iraq and South Asia were to he removed from the data, a clear, steady downward trend would become apparent. There were 300 terrorist incidents worldwide in 1991, for instance, and 58 in 2005:' International conflict and crises have steadily declined in number and intensity since the end of the Cold Var. By virtually all measures, the world is a far more peaceful place than it has been at any time in recorded history. Taken together, these trends seem to suggest that the rules by which international politics are run may indeed he changing.

#### Scenario 1: Conflict Management

#### In a power transition the U.S. will be aggressive, belligerent and less cooperative making conflict more likely

Brzezinsky 12

Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security advisor under U.S. President Jimmy Carter, After America How does the world look in an age of U.S. decline? Dangerously unstable. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/03/after\_america

Not so long ago, a high-ranking Chinese official, who obviously had concluded that America's decline and China's rise were both inevitable, noted in a burst of candor to a senior U.S. official: "But, please, let America not decline too quickly." Although the inevitability of the Chinese leader's expectation is still far from certain, he was right to be cautious when looking forward to America's demise. ¶ For if America falters, the world is unlikely to be dominated by a single preeminent successor -- not even China. International uncertainty, increased tension among global competitors, and even **outright** chaos would be far more likely outcomes. The leaders of the world's second-rank powers, among them India, Japan, Russia, and some European countries, are already assessing the potential impact of U.S. decline on their respective national interests. The Japanese, fearful of an assertive China dominating the Asian mainland, may be thinking of closer links with Europe. Leaders in India and Japan may be considering closer political and even military cooperation in case America falters and China rises. Russia, while perhaps engaging in wishful thinking (even schadenfreude) about America's uncertain prospects, will almost certainly have its eye on the independent states of the former Soviet Union. Europe, not yet cohesive, would likely be pulled in several directions: Germany and Italy toward Russia because of commercial interests, France and insecure Central Europe in favor of a politically tighter European Union, and Britain toward manipulating a balance within the EU while preserving its special relationship with a declining United States. Others may move more rapidly to carve out their own regional spheres: Turkey in the area of the old Ottoman Empire, Brazil in the Southern Hemisphere, and so forth. None of these countries, however, will have the requisite combination of economic, financial, technological, and military power even to consider inheriting America's leading role.¶ China, invariably mentioned as America's prospective successor, has an impressive imperial lineage and a strategic tradition of carefully calibrated patience, both of which have been critical to its overwhelmingly successful, several-thousand-year-long history. China thus prudently accepts the existing international system, even if it does not view the prevailing hierarchy as permanent. It recognizes that success depends not on the system's dramatic collapse but on its evolution toward a gradual redistribution of power. Moreover, the basic reality is that China is not yet ready to assume in full America's role in the world. Beijing's leaders themselves have repeatedly emphasized that on every important measure of development, wealth, and power, China will still be a modernizing and developing state several decades from now, significantly behind not only the United States but also Europe and Japan in the major per capita indices of modernity and national power. Accordingly, Chinese leaders have been restrained in laying any overt claims to global leadership.¶ At some stage, however, a more assertive Chinese nationalism could arise and damage China's international interests. A swaggering, nationalistic Beijing would unintentionally mobilize a powerful regional coalition against itself. None of China's key neighbors -- India, Japan, and Russia -- is ready to acknowledge China's entitlement to America's place on the global totem pole. They might even seek support from a waning America to offset an overly assertive China. The resulting regional scramble could become intense, especially given the similar nationalistic tendencies among China's neighbors. A phase of acute international tension in Asia could ensue. Asia of the 21st century could then begin to resemble Europe of the 20th century -- violent and bloodthirsty. ¶ While a sudden, massive crisis of the American system -- for instance, another financial crisis -- would produce a fast-moving chain reaction leading to global political and economic disorder, a steady drift by America into increasingly pervasive decay or endlessly widening warfare with Islam would be unlikely to produce, even by 2025, an effective global successor. No single power will be ready by then to exercise the role that the world, upon the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, expected the United States to play: the leader of a new, globally cooperative world order. More probable would be a protracted phase of rather inconclusive realignments of both global and regional power, with no grand winners and many more losers, in a setting of international uncertainty and even of potentially **fatal risks to global** well-being. Rather than a world where dreams of democracy flourish, a Hobbesian world of enhanced national security based on varying fusions of authoritarianism, nationalism, and religion could ensue. ¶ At the same time, the security of a number of weaker states located geographically next to major regional powers also depends on the international status quo reinforced by America's global preeminence -- and would be made significantly more vulnerable in proportion to America's decline. The states in that exposed position -- including Georgia, Taiwan, South Korea, Belarus, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel, and the greater Middle East -- are today's geopolitical equivalents of nature's most endangered species. Their fates are closely tied to the nature of the international environment left behind by a waning America, be it ordered and restrained or, much more likely, self-serving and expansionist.¶ A faltering United States could also find its strategic partnership with Mexico in jeopardy. America's economic resilience and political stability have so far mitigated many of the challenges posed by such sensitive neighborhood issues as economic dependence, immigration, and the narcotics trade. A decline in American power, however, would likely undermine the health and **good judgment** of the U.S. economic and political systems. A waning United States would likely be more nationalistic, more defensive about its national identity, more paranoid about its homeland security, and less willing to sacrifice resources for the sake of others' development. The worsening of relations between a declining America and an internally troubled Mexico could even give rise to a particularly ominous phenomenon: the emergence, as a major issue in nationalistically aroused Mexican politics, of territorial claims justified by history and ignited by cross-border incidents.¶ Another consequence of American decline could be a corrosion of the generally cooperative management of the global commons -- shared interests such as sea lanes, space, cyberspace, and the environment, whose protection is imperative to the long-term growth of the global economy and the **continuation of** basic geopolitical stability. In almost every case, the potential absence of a **constructive** and influential U.S. role would **fatally** undermine the essential communality of the global commons because the superiority and ubiquity of American power creates order where there would normally be conflict.¶ None of this will necessarily come to pass. Nor is the concern that America's decline would generate global insecurity, endanger some vulnerable states, and produce a more troubled North American neighborhood an argument for U.S. global supremacy. In fact, the strategic complexities of the world in the 21st century make such supremacy unattainable. But those dreaming today of America's collapse would probably come to regret it. And as the world after America would be increasingly complicated and chaotic, it is imperative that the United States pursue a new, timely strategic vision for its foreign policy -- or start bracing itself for a dangerous slide into global turmoil.

#### U.S. decline causes war with China over Taiwan through miscalculation

Kagan 12

Robert Kagan is senior fellow at the Brookings Institution The Rise or Fall of the American Empire

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/14/the\_rise\_or\_fall\_of\_the\_american\_empire?page=0,4

 The main point of my book, in fact, is to examine what might happen in the world should the United States prove incapable of continuing as the predominant power and slip into a rough equality with other powers, like China. I'm afraid it is optimistic to believe that China will pose only an economic challenge to the United States under those circumstances. The effects of a new multipolar world will be far-reaching. I sometimes think we have forgotten how countries behave as their power increases. We have been living so long in a world where one power has been so much more powerful than all the others. The existence of the American hegemon has forced all other powers to exercise unusual restraint, curb normal ambitions, and avoid actions that might lead to the formation of a U.S.-led coalition of the kind that defeated Germany twice, Japan once, and the Soviet Union, more peacefully, in the Cold War.¶ The Chinese, as good historians, are acutely aware of the fate that befell these others and have worked hard to avoid a similar fate, following as best they can Deng Xiaoping's advice to "keep a low profile and never take the lead." As relative power shifts, however, that advice becomes harder and harder to follow. We saw some early signs of what the future might hold in China's increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea. The response of the United States, which swung in behind the nervous powers in the region, has possibly convinced the Chinese that their moves were premature. They may have themselves bought in too much to the widespread talk of America in decline. Were that decline to become real in the coming years, however, it is a certainty that Chinese pressures and probes will return. Greater relative power on China's part might also lead Beijing to become less patient with Taiwan's lack of movement toward acquiescing to the mainland's sovereignty. A situation in which U.S. power were declining, China's power were rising, and the Taiwan issue became fractious is practically a textbook instance of how wars start -- even if neither side wants war. That is why some have referred to Taiwan as East Asia's Sarajevo.

#### Recent modernization of Chinese military makes nuclear conflict over Taiwan seem rational

Glaser 11

Charles Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. “Will China's Rise Lead to War? Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism”. Foreign Affairs. Mar/Apr 2011. Vol. 90, Iss. 2; pg. 80. ProQuest.

The prospects for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but growth in China's power may nevertheless require some changes in U.S. foreign policy that Washington will find disagreeable- particularly regarding Taiwan. Although it lost control of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War more than six decades ago, China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and unification remains a key political goal for Beijing. China has made clear that it will use force if Taiwan declares independence, and much of China's conventional military buildup has been dedicated to increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan and reducing the United States' ability to intervene. Because China places such high value on Taiwan and because the United States and China-whatever they might formally agree to-have such different attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the status quo, the issue poses special dangers and challenges for the U.S.-Chinese relationship, placing it in a different category than Japan or South Korea. A crisis over Taiwan could fairly easily escalate to nuclear war, because each step along the way might well seem rational to the actors involved. Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan will declare independence and to make clear that the United States will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, the United States would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan against any sort of attack, no matter how it originated. Given the different interests and perceptions of the various parties and the limited control Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which the United States found itself following events rather than leading them. Such dangers have been around for decades, but ongoing improvements in China's military capabilities may make Beijing more willing to escalate a Taiwan crisis. In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S. attack. Standard deterrence theory holds that Washington's current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining position. China's nuclear modernization might remove that check on Chinese action, leading Beijing to behave more boldly in future crises than it has in past ones. A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan, meanwhile, could fuel a conventional and nuclear arms race. Enhancements to U.S. offensive targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile defenses might be interpreted by China as a signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations.

#### Maintaining a high level of readiness is key to manage North Korea and Iran escalation

Anderson 13

Ret. Lt. Gen. Edward G. Anderson III, “North Korea, Iran threats demand military readiness”, The Hill 5-22-2013 <http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/homeland-security/301227-north-korea-iran-threats-demand-military-readiness>

Many of the most tragic days in American history feature a common thread: a surprise attack for which the United States simply was not ready. This is true of the sinking of the USS Maine that began the Spanish-American War. So too of Pearl Harbor, and the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. Each was a watershed moment that changed America’s approach to national security and the defense of our homeland. The lesson learned was that reacting was wholly inadequate when faced with rogue enemies and determined foes. Our Armed Forces would need to be on the front foot, anticipating and preparing for the next assault on our way of life. It is with these painful reminders in hand that our military leaders must prepare to combat the ambitions of rogue nations such as North Korea and Iran. This concern is underscored by several complicating factors, including the recent disclosure that North Korea has reached out to Iran to trade weapons for oil; disclosure of a U.S. military intelligence report that North Korea could arm a ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead; and reports that Iran may be getting close to completing its effort to build a nuclear weapon. The good news is that Americans can be sure that this rising tide of threats is being taken seriously at the highest levels of the U.S. government and military. In the Pacific, the United States has positioned its Sea-Based X-Band Radar. The system, which resembles a giant golf ball atop a floating platform, is designed to track ballistic missiles and feed data to a separate command that can fire interceptors. Additionally, two anti-missile destroyers, the USS John McCain and the USS Decatur, have reportedly been sent to the region. In recent weeks, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel also realigned the United States’s missile defense funding priorities. The course change included adding 14 ground-based interceptors in Alaska and California, a rejection of President Obama’s previous plan to cut the number of interceptors from 44 to 30. Last week, the Pentagon announced it has revamped and redesigned its “bunker buster” bomb to reach Iran’s deep caverns and to evade its sophisticated electronic defenses. But additional measures should be considered. In the last year, North Korea has conducted three nuclear tests, displayed what appears to be a road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile, and used its Taepo Dong-2 missile to put a satellite in orbit, thereby crystallizing its progress toward a long-range missile that could hit America. Coupled with its capability to launch hundreds of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles on our U.S. forces in Korea and our South Korean partners, we absolutely must provide our commanders in the field with whatever assets are available to mitigate or eliminate these threats. The Army has had the lead to develop a program known as the Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System, or JLENS. JLENS utilizes surveillance and fire-control radar, seeing enemy aircraft and missiles from more than 340 miles away. In a highly publicized test in December, JLENS impressed defense experts when it successfully demonstrated an ability to track surrogate tactical ballistic missiles during their ascent phase. Importantly, the system’s long-range, over-the-horizon detection capability provides combatant commanders additional minutes – not seconds – to react to incoming threats. Those extra minutes to identify a target and react could be the difference between war and deterrence, life or death. Frank Kendall, under secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, wrote that this program is “essential to the national security ... there are no alternatives to the program that will provide acceptable capability to meet the joint military requirement at less cost.” Despite the ringing endorsement, two JLENS systems sit idle in New Mexico and Utah. While one is slated to be demonstrated in the Washington, D.C., area next year, the Department of Defense has no plans for the second system. Rather than collecting dust here in the United States, it would seem reasonable to deploy these proven systems at this time, providing commanders with greater time to react to threats. Our leaders in Washington would be well-served heed the famous words of Gen. George Patton: “A good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan executed next week.” Given North Korea’s growing belligerence, the United States must act now.

#### Iran war goes global – asymmetric capabilities and proxy wars cause draw in

Cochrane 12

Paul Cochrane, Middle-East analyst based in Beirut writing for Executive Magazine, 3-1-2012, “Flirting with death,” Executive Magazine, http://www.executive-magazine.com/getarticle.php?article=15225

That said, President Barrack Obama has stated that Washington will work in “lockstep” with Israel to prevent Iran's nuclear aspirations, and that “all options are on the table.” But if Israel does instigate a war, it is expected that the US will have to get involved, as Iran would not sit back and do nothing, unlike the Iraqis when the Israelis bombed the Osirak nuclear facility in 1981 or the Syrians when Israel targeted the alleged nuclear facility in Al Kibar in 2007. The Islamic Republic Strikes Back “The attack would be so large it couldn't be ignored. I don’t think the Iranian regime would survive if they did nothing,” said Elleman. Iran would mobilize its 520,000 uniformed service members to respond to air assaults on nuclear facilities, air bases, missile sites and infrastructure. Given the Iranians' past threats to blockade the Strait of Hormuz, a naval campaign in the Gulf would be a major arena of conflict. “Iran can close the Strait of Hormuz at least temporarily, and may launch missiles against US forces and our allies in the region if it is attacked,” said Defense Intelligence Agency Director Lieutenant-General Ronald Burgess at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing in December. The US Institute for Peace has noted that Iran’s military is configured in a defensive posture, “specifically to counter the perceived US threat.” Lacking the same fire power and conventional military capabilities as the US, Iran would use asymmetric warfare instead. Iran has developed “a strong asymmetric capacity that focuses on the use of smart munitions, light attack craft, mines, swarm tactics and missile barrages to counteract U.S. naval power,” stated a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Such tactics could prove highly effective. In a war game conducted by the Pentagon in 2002, a large number of Iranian speedboats swarmed US warships, detonating explosives and attacking with fire arms and rockets. Within five to 10 minutes, the US Navy lost 16 warships, including an aircraft carrier, cruisers and amphibious vessels. While the US has developed its response to such swarm tactics over the past decade, the Iranians have equally improved their asymmetric capabilities. Stumbling into war? What is concerning analysts is that given the current tensions in the region and the build up of military forces, along with the Iranians and the US and its allies having conducted war games in the Gulf, there is the possibility of the world stumbling into a war. “My impression right now is rhetoric has been ramped up in the West to have effective sanctions. We’ve seen the EU agree on an oil export ban, and seeing more and more pressure put on countries in Asia to go along. It is part of human psychology to avoid war, but my worry is that if there is a mistake, a miscommunication or incident in the Persian Gulf, this could lead to a situation that spirals out of control,” said Elleman. “Iran is constantly doing war games and is quite careful when they do it, but what if they fire an anti-ship missile and it gets away from them? A pure accident results in the sinking of a Saudi tanker or casualties on a US or French frigate in the Gulf,” Elleman added. “It is not likely, but I don’t think any of us are smart enough to anticipate it. Frankly, that is what I worry about the most is someone making a poor decision and then it escalates, for do we have mechanisms in place with Iran to control it?” Gulf War Three If any of the above plays out, Gulf War Three, if not World War Three, would be underway. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries would be in the immediate line of fire from the Iranians, notably the countries hosting US military facilities, and ports. “If ever there was an inter-Gulf war, the ports would be the prime targets. It is not just cutting off Hormuz that can starve a country, as all countries are import dependent,” said Shahin Shamsabadi, Senior Associate of the Middle East & North Africa (MENA) Practice at The Risk Advisory Group in Dubai. If GCC countries were attacked in response to a US led attack on Iran, Elleman said the GCC militaries would coordinate with the US and the response would depend on which country was hit. “If it was Bahrain, what do they have to retaliate with? They have very limited capacity and that is why they asked the Fifth Fleet to be here. The UAE I suspect would take some action with their air force. I’m most impressed with their planners and intelligence people, they have their act together relative to the rest of the GCC,” he said. But the conflict would not solely focus around the Gulf in a US instigated war. The Iranians could use covert attacks against US interests globally as well as enlist proxy forces in neighboring Afghanistan to target US and NATO forces. In such a scenario, the US would get no support from Pakistan, a major player in Afghanistan. Islamabad, which is going through a low-point in relations with Washington, stated in February it will not support an attack on Iran or allow the US to use its local airbases for military operations, although whether it would actually do more for Iran is unclear. If Israel carried out the initial strikes, this would add another dimension to the conflict. “An Israeli element to the attack would unite Iranians and possibly other states against the attackers, although it obviously depends on the scale of the attack,” said Shamsabadi. Hezbollah could retaliate, raining rockets onto the “Zionist entity” from Lebanon, which would prompt a harsh Israeli military response. But this is where it gets complicated. With Syria descending into civil war, the response of Iran’s regional ally to a Gulf war is an unknown, but the West and Israel could capitalize on instability in the region to bolster the rebels in Syria to further destabilize the country. This could also drag the Russians in. It is a strategic ally of Syria, and the port of Tartous is the Russian navy’s only base in the Mediterranean. “For the Russians, it is of utmost importance to protect the Syrian regime as it provides intelligence, access to the Mediterranean and arms deals,” said Saif. If the conflict spread from the Gulf to the Levant, two fronts would be open in the Middle East, and with the uprisings that have swept the region over the past year still in various phases, compounded by the economic damage a conflict would entail, major instability throughout the MENA would ensue. As fault tree analysis shows, one event can have a top-down effect that leads to numerous other lower-level events. “All the branches that could be spun off if a war breaks out are incalculable,” concludes Elleman.

#### Korean war goes nuclear- high probability of miscalc

Metz 13

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Today, North Korea is the most dangerous country on earth and the greatest threat to U.S. security. For years, the bizarre regime in Pyongyang has issued an unending stream of claims that a U.S. and South Korean invasion is imminent, while declaring that it will defeat this offensive just as -- according to official propaganda -- it overcame the unprovoked American attack in 1950. Often the press releases from the official North Korean news agency are absurdly funny, and American policymakers tend to ignore them as a result. Continuing to do so, though, could be dangerous as events and rhetoric turn even more ominous. ¶ In response to North Korea's Feb. 12 nuclear test, the U.N. Security Council recently tightened existing sanctions against Pyongyang. Even China, North Korea's long-standing benefactor and protector, went along. Convulsed by anger, Pyongyang then threatened a pre-emptive nuclear strike against the United States and South Korea, abrogated the 1953 armistice that ended the Korean War and cut off the North-South hotline installed in 1971 to help avoid an escalation of tensions between the two neighbors. A spokesman for the North Korean Foreign Ministry asserted that a second Korean War is unavoidable. He might be right; for the first time, an official statement from the North Korean government may prove true. ¶ No American leader wants another war in Korea. The problem is that the North Koreans make so many threatening and bizarre official statements and sustain such a high level of military readiness that American policymakers might fail to recognize the signs of impending attack. After all, every recent U.S. war began with miscalculation; American policymakers misunderstood the intent of their opponents, who in turn underestimated American determination. The conflict with North Korea could repeat this pattern. ¶ Since the regime of Kim Jong Un has continued its predecessors’ tradition of responding hysterically to every action and statement it doesn't like, it's hard to assess exactly what might push Pyongyang over the edge and cause it to lash out. It could be something that the United States considers modest and reasonable, or it could be some sort of internal power struggle within the North Korean regime invisible to the outside world. While we cannot know whether the recent round of threats from Pyongyang is serious or simply more of the same old lathering, it would be prudent to think the unthinkable and reason through what a war instigated by a fearful and delusional North Korean regime might mean for U.S. security. ¶ The second Korean War could begin with missile strikes against South Korean, Japanese or U.S. targets, or with a combination of missile strikes and a major conventional invasion of the South -- something North Korea has prepared for many decades. Early attacks might include nuclear weapons, but even if they didn't, the United States would probably move quickly to destroy any existing North Korean nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. ¶ The war itself would be extremely costly and probably long. North Korea is the most militarized society on earth. Its armed forces are backward but huge. It's hard to tell whether the North Korean people, having been fed a steady diet of propaganda based on adulation of the Kim regime, would resist U.S. and South Korean forces that entered the North or be thankful for relief from their brutally parasitic rulers. As the conflict in Iraq showed, the United States and its allies should prepare for widespread, protracted resistance even while hoping it doesn't occur. Extended guerrilla operations and insurgency could potentially last for years following the defeat of North Korea's conventional military. North Korea would need massive relief, as would South Korea and Japan if Pyongyang used nuclear weapons. Stabilizing North Korea and developing an effective and peaceful regime would require a lengthy occupation, whether U.S.-dominated or with the United States as a major contributor. ¶ The second Korean War would force military mobilization in the United States. This would initially involve the military's existing reserve component, but it would probably ultimately require a major expansion of the U.S. military and hence a draft. The military's training infrastructure and the defense industrial base would have to grow. This would be a body blow to efforts to cut government spending in the United States and postpone serious deficit reduction for some time, even if Washington increased taxes to help fund the war. Moreover, a second Korean conflict would shock the global economy and potentially have destabilizing effects outside Northeast Asia. ¶ Eventually, though, the United States and its allies would defeat the North Korean military. At that point it would be impossible for the United States to simply re-establish the status quo ante bellum as it did after the first Korean War. The Kim regime is too unpredictable, desperate and dangerous to tolerate. Hence regime change and a permanent ending to the threat from North Korea would have to be America's strategic objective. ¶ China would pose the most pressing and serious challenge to such a transformation of North Korea. After all, Beijing's intervention saved North Korean dictator Kim Il Sung after he invaded South Korea in the 1950s, and Chinese assistance has kept the subsequent members of the Kim family dictatorship in power. Since the second Korean War would invariably begin like the first one -- with North Korean aggression -- hopefully China has matured enough as a great power to allow the world to remove its dangerous allies this time. If the war began with out-of-the-blue North Korean missile strikes, China could conceivably even contribute to a multinational operation to remove the Kim regime. ¶ Still, China would vehemently oppose a long-term U.S. military presence in North Korea or a unified Korea allied with the United States. One way around this might be a grand bargain leaving a unified but neutral Korea. However appealing this might be, Korea might hesitate to adopt neutrality as it sits just across the Yalu River from a China that tends to claim all territory that it controlled at any point in its history. ¶ If the aftermath of the second Korean War is not handled adroitly, the result could easily be heightened hostility between the United States and China, perhaps even a new cold war. After all, history shows that deep economic connections do not automatically prevent nations from hostility and war -- in 1914 Germany was heavily involved in the Russian economy and had extensive trade and financial ties with France and Great Britain. It is not inconceivable then, that after the second Korean War, U.S.-China relations would be antagonistic and hostile at the same time that the two continued mutual trade and investment. Stranger things have happened in statecraft.

#### Scenario 2: Economic Leadership

#### US economic model is key to interdependence and multilateral cooperation. The alternative is competitive mercantilism

Posen 09

Deputy director and senior fellow of the Peterson Institute for International Economics Adam, “Economic leadership beyond the crisis,” http://clients.squareeye.com/uploads/foresight/documents/PN%20USA\_FINAL\_LR\_1.pdf

In the postwar period, US power and prestige, beyond the nation’s military might, have been based largely on American relative economic size and success. These facts enabled the US to promote economic openness and buy-in to a set of economic institutions, formal and informal, that resulted in increasing international economic integration. With the exception of the immediate post-Bretton Woods oil-shock period (1974-85), this combination produced generally growing prosperity at home and abroad, and underpinned the idea that there were benefits to other countries of following the American model and playing by American rules. Initially this system was most influential and successful in those countries in tight military alliance with the US, such as Canada, West Germany, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom. With the collapse of Soviet communism in 1989, and the concomitant switch of important emerging economies, notably Brazil, China, India, and Mexico, to increasingly free-market capitalism, global integration on American terms through American leadership has been increasingly dominant for the last two decades. The global financial crisis of 2008-09, however, represents a challenge to that world order. While overt financial panic has been averted, and most economic forecasts are for recovery to begin in the US and the major emerging markets well before end of 2009 (a belief I share), there remain significant risks for the US and its leadership. The global financial system, including but not limited to US-based entities, has not yet been sustainably reformed. In fact, financial stability will come under strain again when the current government financial guarantees and public ownership of financial firms and assets are unwound over the next couple of years. The growth rate of the US economy and the ability of the US government to finance responses to future crises, both military and economic, will be meaningfully curtailed for several years to come. Furthermore, the crisis will accelerate at least temporarily two related long-term trends eroding the viability of the current international economic arrangements. First, perhaps inevitably, the economic size and importance of China, India, Brazil, and other emerging markets (including oil-exporters like Russia) has been catching up with the US, and even more so with demographically and productivity challenged Europe and northeast Asia. Second, pressure has been building over the past fifteen years or so of these developing countries’ economic rise to give their governments more voice and weight in international economic decision-making. Again, this implies a transfer of relative voting share from the US, but an even greater one from overrepresented Western Europe. The near certainty that Brazil, China, and India, are to be less harmed in real economic terms by the current crisis than either the US or most other advanced economies will only emphasise their growing strength, and their ability to claim a role in leadership. The need for capital transfers from China and oil-exporters to fund deficits and bank recapitalisation throughout the West, not just in the US, increases these rising countries’ leverage and legitimacy in international economic discussions. One aspect of this particular crisis is that American economic policymakers, both Democratic and Republican, became increasingly infatuated with financial services and innovation beginning in the mid-1990s. This reflected a number of factors, some ideological, some institutional, and some interest group driven. The key point here is that export of financial services and promotion of financial liberalisation on the US securitised model abroad came to dominate the US international economic policy agenda, and thus that of the IMF, the OECD, and the G8 as well. This came to be embodied by American multinational commercial and investment banks, in perception and in practice. That particular version of the American economic model has been widely discredited, because of the crisis’ apparent origins in US lax regulation and over-consumption, as well as in excessive faith in American-style financial markets. Thus, American global economic leadership has been eroded over the long-term by the rise of major emerging market economies, disrupted in the shortterm by the nature and scope of the financial crisis, and partially discredited by the excessive reliance upon and overselling of US-led financial capitalism. This crisis therefore presents the possibility of the US model for economic development being displaced, not only deservedly tarnished, and the US having limited resources in the near-term to try to respond to that challenge. Additionally, the US’ traditional allies and co-capitalists in Western Europe and Northeast Asia have been at least as damaged economically by the crisis (though less damaged reputationally). Is there an alternative economic model? The preceding description would seem to confirm the rise of the Rest over the West. That would be premature. The empirical record is that economic recovery from financial crises, while painful, is doable even by the poorest countries, and in advanced countries rarely leads to significant political dislocation. Even large fiscal debt burdens can be reined in over a few years where political will and institutions allow, and the US has historically fit in that category. A few years of slower growth will be costly, but also may put the US back on a sustainable growth path in terms of savings versus consumption. Though the relative rise of the major emerging markets will be accelerated by the crisis, that acceleration will be insufficient to rapidly close the gap with the US in size, let alone in technology and well-being. None of those countries, except perhaps for China, can think in terms of rivaling the US in all the aspects of national power. These would include: a large, dynamic and open economy; favorable demographic dynamics; monetary stability and a currency with a global role; an ability to project hard power abroad; and an attractive economic model to export for wide emulation. This last point is key. In the area of alternative economic models, one cannot beat something with nothing – communism fell not just because of its internal contradictions, or the costly military build-up, but because capitalism presented a clearly superior alternative. The Chinese model is in part the American capitalist (albeit not high church financial liberalisation) model, and is in part mercantilism. There has been concern that some developing or small countries could take the lesson from China that building up lots of hard currency reserves through undervaluation and export orientation is smart. That would erode globalisation, and lead to greater conflict with and criticism of the US-led system. While in the abstract that is a concern, most emerging markets – and notably Brazil, India, Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea – are not pursuing that extreme line. The recent victory of the incumbent Congress Party in India is one indication, and the statements about openness of Brazilian President Lula is another. Mexico’s continued orientation towards NAFTA while seeking other investment flows (outside petroleum sector, admittedly) to and from abroad is a particularly brave example. Germany’s and Japan’s obvious crisis-prompted difficulties emerging from their very high export dependence, despite their being wealthy, serve as cautionary examples on the other side. So unlike in the1970s, the last time that the US economic performance and leadership were seriously compromised, we will not see leading developing economies like Brazil and India going down the import substitution or other self-destructive and uncooperative paths. If this assessment is correct, the policy challenge is to deal with relative US economic decline, but not outright hostility to the US model or displacement of the current international economic system. That is reassuring, for it leaves us in the realm of normal economic diplomacy, perhaps to be pursued more multilaterally and less high-handedly than the US has done over the past 20 years. It also suggests that adjustment of current international economic institutions is all that is required, rather than desperately defending economic globalisation itself. For all of that reassurance, however, the need to get buy-in from the rising new players to the current system is more pressing on the economic front than it ever has been before. Due to the crisis, the ability of the US and the other advanced industrial democracies to put up money and markets for rewards and side-payments to those new players is also more limited than it has been in the past, and will remain so for at least the next few years. The need for the US to avoid excessive domestic self-absorption is a real concern as well, given the combination of foreign policy fatigue from the Bush foreign policy agenda and economic insecurity from the financial crisis. Managing the post-crisis global economy Thus, the US faces a challenging but not truly threatening global economic situation as a result of the crisis and longer-term financial trends. Failure to act affirmatively to manage the situation, however, bears two significant and related risks: first, that China and perhaps some other rising economic powers will opportunistically divert countries in US-oriented integrated relationships to their economic sphere(s); second, that a leadership vacuum will arise in international financial affairs and in multilateral trade efforts, which will over time erode support for a globally integrated economy. Both of these risks if realised would diminish US foreign policy influence, make the economic system less resilient in response to future shocks (to every country’s detriment), reduce economic growth and thus the rate of reduction in global poverty, and conflict with other foreign policy goals like controlling climate change or managing migration and demographic shifts. If the US is to rise to the challenge, it should concentrate on the following priority measures.

#### Results in economic nationalism and war

Garten 09

Jeffrey Garten, professor at the Yale School of Management. “The Dangers of Turning Inward”. March 5, 2009. Wall Street Journal. http://www.business.illinois.edu/aguilera/Teaching/WSJ09\_Dangers\_of\_Turning\_Inward.pdf

The last time we saw sustained economic nationalism was in the 1930s, when capital flows and trade among countries collapsed, and every country went its own way. World growth went into a ditch, political ties among nations deteriorated, nationalism and populism combined to create fascist governments in Europe and Asia, . It took at least a generation for globalization to get back on track. There have been some bouts of inward- looking governmental action since then, such as the early 1970s when the U.S. cut the dollar from its gold base and imposed export embargoes on soybeans and steel scrap. However, the economic conditions were not sufficiently bad for the trend to sustain itself. The kind of economic nationalism we are seeing today is not yet extreme. It is also understandable. The political pressures could hardly be worse. Over the last decade, the global economy grew on average about 4% to 5%, and this year it will come to a grinding halt: 0.5% according to the International Monetary Fund, where projections usually err on the optimistic side. World trade, which has grown much faster than global gross domestic product for many years, is projected to decline this year for the first time since 1982. Foreign direct investment last year slumped by 10% from 2007. Most dramatically, capital flows into emerging market nations are projected to drop this year by nearly 80% compared to 2007. The aggregate figures don't tell the story of what is unraveling in individual countries. In the last quarter of 2008, U.S. GDP dropped by 6.2% at an annual rate, the U.K. by 5.9%, Germany by 8.2%, Japan by 12.7% and South Korea by 20.8%. Mexico, Thailand and Singapore and most of Eastern Europe are also in deep trouble. In every case, employment has been plummeting. So far popular demonstrations against government policies have taken place in the U.K., France, Greece, Russia and throughout Eastern Europe. And the governments of Iceland and Latvia have fallen over the crisis. Governments could therefore be forgiven if they are preoccupied above all with the workers and companies within their own borders. Most officials don't know what to do because they haven't seen this level of distress before. They are living from day to day, desperately improvising and trying to hold off political pressure to take severe measures they know could be satisfying right now but cause bigger damage later. Thinking about how their policies might affect other countries is not their main focus, let alone taking the time to try to coordinate them internationally. Besides, whether it's in Washington, Brussels, Paris, Beijing, Brazilia or Tokyo, it is hard to find many top officials who wouldn't say that whatever measures they are taking that may undermine global commerce are strictly temporary. They all profess that when the crisis is over, they will resume their support for globalization. They underestimate, however, how hard it could be to reverse course. Political figures take comfort, too, from the global institutions that were not present in the 1930s -- the IMF, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization, all of which are assumed to be keeping globalization alive. This is a false sense of security, since these institutions are guided by sovereign countries. Government officials often feel that because they are going to endless crisis summit meetings -- the next big one is in London on April 2, when the world's top 20 nations will be assembling -- that some international coordination is actually taking place. This is mostly an illusion. With a few exceptions, such as the so-called Plaza Agreements of 1984 when currencies were realigned, it is difficult to point to a meeting where anything major has been said and subsequently implemented. But as the pressure on politicians mounts, decisions are being made on an incremental and ad hoc basis that amounts to a disturbing trend. Classic trade protectionism is on the rise. In the first half of 2008, the number of investigations in the World Trade Organization relating to antidumping cases -- selling below cost -- was up 30% from the year before. Washington has recently expanded sanctions against European food products in retaliation for Europe's boycott against hormone- treated American beef -- an old dispute, to be sure, but one that is escalating. In the last several months, the E.U. reintroduced export subsidies on butter and cheese. India raised tariffs on steel products, as did Russia on imported cars. Indonesia ingenuously designated that just a few of its ports could be used to import toys, creating a trade-blocking bottleneck. Brazil and Argentina have been pressing for a higher external tariff on imports into a South American bloc of countries called Mercosur. Just this week, the E.U. agreed to levy tariffs on American exports of biodiesel fuel, possibly a first shot in what may become a gigantic trade war fought over different environmental policies -- some based on taxes, some on regulation, some on cap and trade -- being embraced by individual countries. Much bigger problems have arisen in more non-traditional areas and derive from recent direct intervention of governments. The much-publicized "Buy America" provision of the U.S. stimulus package restricts purchases of construction-related goods to many U.S. manufacturers, and although it is riddled with exceptions, it does reveal Washington's state of mind. The bailout of GM and Chrysler is a purely national deal. Such exclusion against foreign firms is a violation of so-called "national treatment" clauses in trade agreements, and the E.U. has already put Washington on notice that it will pursue legal trade remedies if the final bailout package is discriminatory. Uncle Sam is not the only economic nationalist. The Japanese government is offering to help a broad array of its corporations -- but certainly not subsidiaries of foreign companies in Japan -- by purchasing the stock of these firms directly, thereby not just saving them but providing an advantage over competition from non-Japanese sources. The French government has created a sovereign wealth fund to make sure that certain "national champions," such as car- parts manufacturer Valeo and aeronautics component maker Daher, aren't bought by foreign investors. Government involvement in financial institutions has taken on an anti-globalization tone. British regulators are pushing their global banks to redirect foreign lending to the U.K. when credit is sorely needed and where it can be monitored. Just this past week, the Royal Bank of Scotland announced it was closing shop in 60 foreign countries. Western European banks that were heavily invested in countries such as Hungary, the Czech Republic and the Baltics have pulled back their credits, causing a devastating deflation throughout Eastern Europe. The Swiss are reportedly considering more lenient accounting policies for loans their banks make domestically as opposed to abroad. This de-globalizing trend could well be amplified by Washington's effort to exercise tight oversight of several big financial institutions. Already AIG's prime Asian asset, American International Assurance Company, is on the block. As the feds take an ever bigger stake in Citigroup, they may well force it to divest itself of many of its prized global holdings, such as Banamex in Mexico and Citi Handlowy in Poland. It appears that new legislation under the Troubled Asset Relief Program will also restrict the employment of foreign nationals in hundreds of American banks in which the government has a stake. Whether or not it goes into bankruptcy, General Motors will be pressed to sell many of its foreign subsidiaries, too. Even Chinese multinationals such as Haier and Lenovo are beating a retreat to their own shores where the risks seem lower than operating in an uncertain global economy. The government in Beijing is never far away from such fundamental strategic decisions. Then there is the currency issue. Economic nationalists are mercantilists. They are willing to keep their currency cheap in order to make their exports more competitive. China is doing just that. A big question is whether other Asian exporters that have been badly hurt from the crisis -- Taiwan, South Korea and Thailand, for example -- will follow suit. Competitive devaluations were a major feature of the 1930s. It's no accident that the European Union has called an emergency summit for this Sunday to consider what to do with rising protectionism of all kinds. There are a number of reasons why economic nationalism could escalate. The recession could last well beyond this year. It is also worrisome that the forces of economic nationalism were gathering even before the crisis hit, and have deeper roots than most people know. Congress denied President Bush authority to negotiate trade agreements two years ago, fearing that America was not benefiting enough from open trade, and an effort to reform immigration was paralyzed for years. Globally, international trade negotiations called the Doha Round collapsed well before Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers did. Concerns that trade was worsening income distribution were growing in every major industrial nation since the late 1990s. Whenever countries turned inward over the past half-century, Washington was a powerful countervailing force, preaching the gospel of globalization and open markets for goods, services and capital. As the Obama administration works feverishly to fire up America's growth engines, patch up its financial system and keep its housing market from collapsing further, and as its major long-term objectives center on health, education and reducing energy dependence on foreign sources, the country's preoccupations are more purely domestic than at any time since the 1930s. In the past, American business leaders from companies such as IBM, GE, Goldman Sachs and, yes, Citigroup and Merrill Lynch beat the drum for open global markets. As their share prices collapse, some voices are muted, some silenced. It is not easy to find anyone in America who has the stature and courage to press for a more open global economy in the midst of the current economic and political crosswinds. And given that the global rot started in the U.S. with egregiously irresponsible lending, borrowing and regulation, America's brand of capitalism is in serious disrepute around the world. Even if President Obama had the mental bandwidth to become a cheerleader for globalization, America's do-as-I-say-and-not-as-I-do leadership has been badly compromised. If economic nationalism puts a monkey wrench in the wheels of global commerce, the damage could be severe. The U.S. is a good example. It is inconceivable that Uncle Sam could mount a serious recovery without a massive expansion of exports -- the very activity that was responsible for so much of America's economic growth during the middle of this decade. But that won't be possible if other nations block imports. For generations, the deficits that we have run this past decade and the trillions of dollars we are spending now mean we will be highly dependent on foreign loans from China, Japan and other parts of the world. But these will not be forthcoming at prices we can afford without a global financial system built on deep collaboration between debtors and creditors -- including keeping our market open to foreign goods and services. The Obama administration talks about a super-competitive economy, based on high-quality jobs -- which means knowledge-intensive jobs. This won't happen if we are not able to continue to bring in the brightest people from all over the world to work and live here. Silicon Valley, to take one example, would be a pale shadow of itself without Indian, Chinese and Israeli brain power in its midst. More generally, without an open global economy, worldwide industries such as autos, steel, banking and telecommunications cannot be rationalized and restructured efficiently, and we'll be doomed to have excessive capacity and booms and busts forever. The big emerging markets such as China, India, Brazil, Turkey and South Africa will never be fully integrated into the world economy, depriving them and us of future economic growth. The productivity of billions of men and women entering the global workforce will be stunted to everyone's detriment. Of course, no one would say that globalization is without its problems. Trade surges and products made by low-priced labor can lead to job displacement and increasing income inequality. Proud national cultures can be undermined. But these challenges can be met by reasonable regulation and by domestic policies that provide a strong social safety net and the kind of education that helps people acquire new skills for a competitive world. With the right responses of governments, the benefits should far outweigh the disadvantages. For thousands of years, globalization has increased global wealth, individual choice and human freedom. The point is, economic nationalism, with its implicit autarchic and save-yourself character, embodies exactly the wrong spirit and runs in precisely the wrong direction from the global system that will be necessary to create the future we all want. As happened in the 1930s, economic nationalism is also sure to poison geopolitics. Governments under economic pressure have far fewer resources to take care of their citizens and to deal with rising anger and social tensions. Whether or not they are democracies, their tenure can be threatened by popular resentment. The temptation for governments to whip up enthusiasm for something that distracts citizens from their economic woes -- a war or a jihad against unpopular minorities, for example -- is great. That's not all. As an economically enfeebled South Korea withdraws foreign aid from North Korea, could we see an even more irrational activity from Pyongyang? As the Pakistani economy goes into the tank, will the government be more likely to compromise with terrorists to alleviate at least one source of pressure? As Ukraine strains under the weight of an IMF bailout, is a civil war with Cold War overtones between Europe and Russia be in the cards? And beyond all that, how will economically embattled and inward-looking governments be able to deal with the critical issues that need global resolution such as control of nuclear weapons, or a treaty to manage climate change, or help to the hundreds of millions of people who are now falling back into poverty?

#### No First Use boosts conventional military forces

Gerson 10

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Third, NFU places primary emphasis on U.S. conventional forces. By relegating nuclear weapons to the sole mission of retaliation for nuclear attacks, the United States would make conventional forces the sole instrument of war fighting absent an opponent’s nuclear escalation. Given U.S. advantages in conventional power, this is precisely the level where it should want to fight. NFU would place a necessary and important burden on the Defense Department to maintain superior conventional forces and power-projection capabilities against any conceivable threat. This responsibility would ensure that political and military leaders would not again be tempted, as they were in the early period of the Cold War, to rely on the threat of nuclear escalation as a cost-efficient alternative to expending the effort and resources to maintain conventional superiority

### Advantage 2: Non-Proliferation

#### No first use strengthens disarmament efforts

Romaniuk 13

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Sagan (2009) argues that the term “nuclear umbrella” should be rethought in order to be a more helpful tool of analysis. Although it is usually equated with extended deterrence, he argues that two different kinds of US extended deterrence mechanisms should be used: (1) “a US commitment to use nuclear weapons first, if necessary, to defend an ally if it is attacked by an enemy who uses conventional forces, biological or chemical weapons, or nuclear weapons; and [2] a more tailored US commitment to use US nuclear weapons in retaliation against only a nuclear attack or an ally” (p. 163). Indeed, although many allies would prefer the first form of extended deterrence, that would not make disarmament possible. If the US were to adopt a policy of “no first use,” its intentions would be more helpful for the disarmament movement. Additionally, it would mean that the US accepts negative security assurances as central to its policy, which is then more likely to foster trust among other nuclear-capable states.

#### Credibility with regard to disarmament leads to stronger non-proliferation regime

Knopf 12

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Four hypotheses envision a potential direct link between nuclear weapon state behavior and new cases of proliferation. A perceived lack of commitment to nuclear disarmament could stimulate new nuclear weapon programs due to a security threat posed by a nuclear weapon state, a demonstration effect that suggests nuclear weapons have military utility, a demonstration that nuclear weapons confer status, or a reaction against ongoing discrimination and inequality.

Seven pathways might indirectly link disarmament and nonproliferation. First, a nuclear program started by one state as a direct response to a threat from a nuclear weapon state could trigger secondary proliferation in that state's neighbors. Rather than focus on the possibility that a state could launch a new nuclear program, the other six indirect pathways involve state decisions to refrain from participating in new nonproliferation measures. Nonnuclear states might choose to withhold cooperation on nonproliferation strengthening measures for three distinct reasons: as a rational incentive to elicit greater nuclear weapon state compliance with Article 6, out of a belief in a norm of enforcing other norms, or as an emotional response to the perceived failure of nuclear weapon states to uphold their end of the NPT bargain. Lack of progress on disarmament could also call into question the credibility of nuclear weapon state commitments to other parts of the NPT bargain, making nonnuclear states think that they are less likely to benefit from investing in the regime. Lack of progress could also lead to charges of hypocrisy, undermining the nonproliferation norm associated with the regime. Conversely, in the seventh indirect pathway, movement on disarmament could change bargaining dynamics and increase the space for reciprocal concessions on nonproliferation. In addition, most of the direct and indirect pathways could be affected by the intervening variable of domestic politics. Where internal debates exist, the pathways summarized above could help tilt the balance in the direction of policies that are unfavorable for nonproliferation.

#### New proliferation in North East Asia will be rapid- threshold states will cross over, sparking new cascades

Moltz 06

James Clay, deputy director and research professor at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Nonproliferation Review, “Future Nuclear Proliferation Scenarios in Northeast Asia”, Nov.

Over the next 10 years, Northeast Asia could become one of the most volatile regions of the world when it comes to nuclear weapons. Compared to other areas, it has a higher percentage of states with not only the capability to develop nuclear weapons quickly, but also the potential motivation.1 With the exception of Mongolia, all the countries in the region\*Russia, China, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan\*already have civilian nuclear power infrastructures. They also have experience with nuclear weapons. Northeast Asia has two established nuclear weapon states\*Russia and China\*and North Korea is a presumed nuclear power. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are considered ‘‘threshold’’ states\*all have had nuclear weapons development programs and could resume them in the future. Adding potential volatility to the mix, Northeast Asia suffers from underlying political and security fault lines: the legacy of the Cold War on the Korean Peninsula; enduring Korean and Chinese enmity over Japanese atrocities committed before and during World War II; Russo-Japanese disputes over the Kuril Islands; and the tensions created by China’s growing effort to rein Taiwan into its governance. For these and other reasons, regional security institutions in Northeast Asia are weak and tend to be based around bilateral commitments (Sino-North Korean, U.S.-Japanese, U.S.-South Korean, and U.S.-Taiwanese). The nuclear character of Northeast Asia is further defined by the fact that the United States used nuclear weapons twice against Japan in August 1945 and eventually stationed 3,200 nuclear weapons in South Korea, Guam, the Philippines, Taiwan, and the formerly U.S.-held islands of Chichi Jima, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa.2 Major and minor wars involving regional powers were fought in the years from 1945 to 1991: the Chinese Civil War, the Taiwan Strait crisis, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, border skirmishes between China and the Soviet Union, and the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War. Given this violent history, it is remarkable that further nuclear proliferation did not occur. The role of U.S. security guarantees with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan clearly played a major role in this sometimes less-than-willing restraint. In recent years, however, there has been a gradual erosion of political support for U.S. forces in both South Korea and Japan. North Korea’s withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 2003 also has caused both states to reevaluate their decisions to halt nuclear weapons programs. Moreover, the views of some top officials in the George W. Bush administration regarding the acceptability of nuclear weapons may be eroding national restraint and increasing the willingness of countries to go the final step, using their nuclear capabilities to make up for any conventional defense gaps. This essay examines potential nuclear proliferation trends among the states of Northeast Asia to 2016 from the context of early post-Cold War predictions, current capabilities, and possible future ‘‘trigger’’ events. It offers the unfortunate conclusion that several realistic scenarios could stimulate horizontal or vertical nuclear proliferation.3 Indeed, if left unattended, existing political and security tensions could cause Northeast Asia to become the world’s most nuclearized area by 2016, with six nuclear weapon states. Such a scenario would greatly exacerbate U.S. security challenges and probably spark nuclear proliferation elsewhere in the world.

#### Northeast Asian proliferation risks nuclear war and terrorism

Blechman 08

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The world has been spared the detonation of a nuclear device in anger for more than 60 years. It’s not clear that this remarkable restraint can be sustained indefinitely, particularly in the event of wide-spread proliferation. The East-West conflict during the Cold War was an abstract, ideological struggle. Even then, we came perilously close to nuclear exchanges during the Berlin Crises in the 1950s, the Cuba Crisis in 1962, and at several other times. If nuclear weapons come into the hands of nations with histories of hatred and warfare and on-going disputes, deterrence becomes a far more risky proposition and the likelihood of nuclear warfare far greater. Just think of nuclear weapons in the hands of Israel and Iran in the context of a war between Israel and Hezbollah and Syria in Lebanon. Alternatively, think how unstable Northeast Asia might become if China, Japan, Korea, and Russia all have nuclear weapons. Moreover, every additional nuclear weapon state means a greater risk that nuclear devices come into the hands of terrorist organizations. America’s security depends on the next administration placing the highest priority on reining in the nuclear danger.

#### Nuclear terrorism is an existential threat—it escalates to nuclear war with Russia

Ayson 10

Robert Ayson is Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July 2010, Informaworld

But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from

#### Russia war outweighs – largest arsenals and most probable because of hair-trigger alert

Helfand and Pastore 09

Presidents of Physicians for Social Responsibility (Ira and John, MD’s and Past Presidents of the Physicians for Social Responsbility, "US-Russia nuclear war still a threat," 3/31)

President Obama and Russian President Dimitri Medvedev are scheduled to Wednesday in London during the G-20 summit. They must not let the current economic crisis keep them from focusing on one of the greatest threats confronting humanity: the danger of nuclear war. Since the end of the Cold War, many have acted as though the danger of nuclear war has ended. It has not. There remain in the world more than 20,000 nuclear weapons. Alarmingly, more than 2,000 of these weapons in the U.S. and Russian arsenals remain on ready-alert status, commonly known as hair-trigger alert. They can be fired within five minutes and reach targets in the other country 30 minutes later. Just one of these weapons can destroy a city. A war involving a substantial number would cause devastation on a scale unprecedented in human history. A study conducted by Physicians for Social Responsibility in 2002 showed that if only 500 of the Russian weapons on high alert exploded over our cities, 100 million Americans would die in the first 30 minutes. An attack of this magnitude also would destroy the entire economic, communications and transportation infrastructure on which we all depend. Those who survived the initial attack would inhabit a nightmare landscape with huge swaths of the country blanketed with radioactive fallout and epidemic diseases rampant. They would have no food, no fuel, no electricity, no medicine, and certainly no organized health care. In the following months it is likely the vast majority of the U.S. population would die. Recent studies by the eminent climatologists Toon and Robock have shown that such a war would have a huge and immediate impact on climate world wide. If all of the warheads in the U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals were drawn into the conflict, the firestorms they caused would loft 180 million tons of soot and debris into the upper atmosphere — blotting out the sun. Temperatures across the globe would fall an average of 18 degrees Fahrenheit to levels not seen on earth since the depth of the last ice age, 18,000 years ago. Agriculture would stop, eco-systems would collapse, and many species, including perhaps our own, would become extinct. It is common to discuss nuclear war as a low-probabillity event. But is this true? We know of five occcasions during the last 30 years when either the U.S. or Russia believed it was under attack and prepared a counter-attack. The most recent of these near misses occurred after the end of the Cold War on Jan. 25, 1995, when the Russians mistook a U.S. weather rocket launched from Norway for a possible attack. Jan. 25, 1995, was an ordinary day with no major crisis involving the U.S. and Russia. But, unknown to almost every inhabitant on the planet, a misunderstanding led to the potential for a nuclear war. The ready alert status of nuclear weapons that existed in 1995 remains in place today.

#### Nuclear deterrence fails- causes arms race and is no longer credible

Gärtner 13

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Deterrence¶ Obama wants to be on the safe side: he wants to retain a deterrent capability as long as ¶ nuclear weapons exist even though no one knows whether deterrence actually works. ¶ Realists like Kenneth Waltz strongly believe it does work because there was no nuclear war ¶ between the United States and the Soviet Union. But in reality we do not know if this is true ¶ since you can’t prove the negative – why something did not happen. The avoidance of ¶ nuclear war between the two Cold War superpowers probably resulted from a combination ¶ of political and military factors, such as arms control negotiations, confidence-building ¶ measures and cooperation in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) ¶ and in other regimes and institutions.¶ Deterrence is a combination of two strategies: avoiding war and winning a war in the case ¶ the first option fails (Betts, 2013).¶ 4¶ In order to be credible as a “peace-keeping strategy” it ¶ also has to be a “war-fighting strategy”. This contradiction is in many ways not reconcilable. ¶ Therefore, the lessons of mutual nuclear deterrence, in both theory and practice, ¶ demonstrate that deterrence has several problems (Green, 2011; Wickersham, 2011; ¶ Krieger, 2011):¶  Nuclear deterrence is only credible if the adversaries permanently demonstrate that ¶ they are serious about using nuclear weapons. This in turn threatens them with selfdestruction.¶  Deterrence does not prevent conventional wars. Nuclear powers were involved in ¶ conventional wars. In Korea the Chinese, in Vietnam the Vietcong, and the insurgents ¶ in Afghanistan and Iraq did not care about the American nuclear bomb. In the ¶ Falkland war Argentina was not afraid of the British one. Arab states attacked Israel¶ 1973 that had already nuclear weapons. Two nuclear powers, India and Pakistan, ¶ went to war in 1999 and Pakistan probably was behind the terrorist attacks on the ¶ Parliament of the nuclear armed India in 2001. Moreover, possession of nuclear ¶ weapons could encourage conventional provocation or backing for terrorist groups.¶ The concept of deterrence only works with rational actors. It requires adversaries to ¶ rely on each other to respect deterrence and adhere to its principles. Furthermore, ¶ they have to communicate with each other and understand each other’s signals.¶  Deterrence promotes hostility and mistrust when adversaries permanently threaten ¶ each other.¶  Reliance on mutual deterrence causes nuclear proliferation and arms races. This was ¶ evident during the Cold War, but it is also true for regional conflicts, such as IndiaPakistan. Deterrence is North Korea’s rationale for possessing nuclear weapons, and ¶ it could lead to an arms race in the Middle East. Indeed, mutual deterrence and ¶ disarmament are opposing concepts.¶  Deterrence can create instability and dangerous situations through miscalculations, ¶ miscommunication and technical accidents. The film classic “Dr. Strangelove” shows ¶ how just such a possibility could occur. The dissolution of the bipolar world and the ¶ potential emergence of new nuclear powers might lead to a “multinuclear world” ¶ that would multiply such risks and uncertainties.¶  The threat of nuclear retaliation is useless against terrorists.¶  Deterrence is a weak tool against cyber-attacks, because it is extremely difficult to ¶ identify the attacker (Betts, 2013).¶  The United States and NATO want to build a missile defense system against missiles ¶ from the Middle East, but Russia opposes it. As a result, missile defense has become ¶ the major stumbling block to further arms reductions. However, missile defense ¶ below the strategic level should not be a threat to Russia. Yet if the United States and ¶ NATO keep open the option to upgrade missile defense, they can no longer rely on ¶ effective deterrence. Missile defense only works properly outside a system of ¶ deterrence.¶  The announced intention to annihilate large parts of humanity is both unlawful and ¶ immoral. The International Court of Justice ruled that “the threat or use of nuclear ¶ weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in ¶ armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law” (ICJ, ¶ 1996, 44).5¶ The pope regularly encourages the international community to work ¶ toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.¶ Mutual deterrence is expensive because it requires continuous modernization and ¶ the development and production of new weapons to close real and assumed ¶ loopholes in the system.¶  If deterrence failed, it would be a global disaster.6¶ Beyond mutual nuclear deterrence¶ What can be done to reverse the negative trends caused by nuclear deterrence? ¶  A true “no first use” doctrine would remove conventional, chemical and biological ¶ weapons from the target list. Nuclear weapons should be seen as strictly for ¶ retaliation against a nuclear attack. They are not necessary for any offensive or ¶ preventive purpose, nor are they useful for defense, except as a deterrent to an ¶ intentional nuclear attack. The notion that nuclear arms are essentially no different ¶ than conventional weapons should be abandoned. Nuclear weapons should be ¶ retained only for a second strike.¶  An unconditional commitment by nuclear weapon states to “negative security ¶ assurances” would remove all non-nuclear weapon states from the target list.¶ Nuclear weapon states should commit themselves to “negative security assurances.” ¶ This is the guarantee not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states. ¶  The creation of “Nuclear Weapon Free Zones” must be combined with “negative ¶ security assurances”.¶  The list of countries that are targeted for US nuclear strikes is outdated and can be ¶ reduced. Bush’s classified NPR and OPLAN 8010 both target China, Russia, North ¶ Korea, Iran, Syria, Cuba (only in the NPR) and an unnamed country that hosts ¶ terrorists (supposedly Pakistan).¶  General target categories like WMD, non-state actors, war supporting infrastructure ¶ and military-political leadership are too sweeping and should be redefined and ¶ minimized.¶ Counter-force planning associated with preemption, launch on warning and all kinds ¶ of military targets should be abandoned.7¶  The use of small nuclear weapons to control and limit damage is not feasible and ¶ produces unrealistic expectations.¶  Likewise expectations that damage can be regulated and making distinctions ¶ between 100 percent, 80 percent, “light,” “moderate” or “severe” destruction are ¶ absurd. There is no difference between rubble, gravel or dust after a bombardment.8¶ Conclusion¶ Nuclear deterrence is the main cause of arms races. As long as deterrence goes ¶ unaddressed, global zero will be impossible to achieve. Arms control and non-proliferation ¶ can create a more stable situation, but they are not sufficient for disarmament. Deterrence ¶ of states of concern is more credible and effective using conventional weapons. The ¶ suggestions outlined above would not abolish nuclear deterrence right away, but they are ¶ steps toward a minimal deterrence. They would mitigate the worst consequences of the ¶ concept of deterrence and create the preconditions for nuclear disarmament.¶ Comprehensive deterrence is based not only on one category of nuclear weapons but on a ¶ mix of nuclear and conventional arms. Arms control and disarmament efforts should cover ¶ all or most of them. This can be done be best by a combination of legally binding treaties, ¶ political commitments, and enlightened self-interest.

#### If states proliferate, accidents are likely - rational leaders will lose control of the escalation ladder- causing accidental nuclear war

Kroenig 12

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The proliferation optimist position, while having a distinguished pedigree, has several major problems. Many of these weaknesses have been chronicled in brilliant detail by Scott Sagan and other contemporary proliferation pessimists.[34] Rather than repeat these substantial efforts, I will use this section to offer some original critiques of the recent incarnations of proliferation optimism. First and foremost, proliferation optimists do not appear to understand contemporary deterrence theory. I do not say this lightly in an effort to marginalize or discredit my intellectual opponents. Rather, I make this claim with all due caution and with complete sincerity. A careful review of the contemporary proliferation optimism literature does not reflect an understanding of, or engagement with, the developments in academic deterrence theory in top scholarly journals such as the American Political Science Review and International Organization over the past few decades.[35] While early optimists like Viner and Brodie can be excused for not knowing better, the writings of contemporary proliferation optimists ignore the past fifty years of academic research on nuclear deterrence theory. In the 1940s, Viner, Brodie, and others argued that the advent of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) rendered war among major powers obsolete, but nuclear deterrence theory soon advanced beyond that simple understanding.[36] After all, great power political competition does not end with nuclear weapons. And nuclear-armed states still seek to threaten nuclear-armed adversaries. States cannot credibly threaten to launch a suicidal nuclear war, but they still want to coerce their adversaries. This leads to a credibility problem: how can states credibly threaten a nuclear-armed opponent? Since the 1960s academic nuclear deterrence theory has been devoted almost exclusively to answering this question.[37] And, unfortunately for proliferation optimists, the answers do not give us reasons to be optimistic. Thomas Schelling was the first to devise a rational means by which states can threaten nuclear-armed opponents.[38] He argued that leaders cannot credibly threaten to intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war, but they can make a “threat that leaves something to chance.”[39] They can engage in a process, the nuclear crisis, which increases the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down. As states escalate a nuclear crisis there is an increasing probability that the conflict will spiral out of control and result in an inadvertent or accidental nuclear exchange. As long as the benefit of winning the crisis is greater than the incremental increase in the risk of nuclear war, threats to escalate nuclear crises are inherently credible. In these games of nuclear brinkmanship, the state that is willing to run the greatest risk of nuclear war before back down will win the crisis as long as it does not end in catastrophe. It is for this reason that Thomas Schelling called great power politics in the nuclear era a “competition in risk taking.”[40] This does not mean that states eagerly bid up the risk of nuclear war. Rather, they face gut-wrenching decisions at each stage of the crisis. They can quit the crisis to avoid nuclear war, but only by ceding an important geopolitical issue to an opponent. Or they can the escalate the crisis in an attempt to prevail, but only at the risk of suffering a possible nuclear exchange. Since 1945 there were have been many high stakes nuclear crises (by my count, there have been twenty) in which “rational” states like the United States run a risk of nuclear war and inch very close to the brink of nuclear war.[41] By asking whether states can be deterred or not, therefore, proliferation optimists are asking the wrong question. The right question to ask is: what risk of nuclear war is a specific state willing to run against a particular opponent in a given crisis? Optimists are likely correct when they assert that Iran will not intentionally commit national suicide by launching a bolt-from-the-blue nuclear attack on the United States or Israel. This does not mean that Iran will never use nuclear weapons, however. Indeed, it is almost inconceivable to think that a nuclear-armed Iran would not, at some point, find itself in a crisis with another nuclear-armed power and that it would not be willing to run any risk of nuclear war in order to achieve its objectives. If a nuclear-armed Iran and the United States or Israel have a geopolitical conflict in the future, over say the internal politics of Syria, an Israeli conflict with Iran’s client Hezbollah, the U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf, passage through the Strait of Hormuz, or some other issue, do we believe that Iran would immediately capitulate? Or is it possible that Iran would push back, possibly even brandishing nuclear weapons in an attempt to deter its adversaries? If the latter, there is a real risk that proliferation to Iran could result in nuclear war. An optimist might counter that nuclear weapons will never be used, even in a crisis situation, because states have such a strong incentive, namely national survival, to ensure that nuclear weapons are not used. But, this objection ignores the fact that leaders operate under competing pressures. Leaders in nuclear-armed states also have very strong incentives to convince their adversaries that nuclear weapons could very well be used. Historically we have seen that in crises, leaders purposely do things like put nuclear weapons on high alert and delegate nuclear launch authority to low level commanders, purposely increasing the risk of accidental nuclear war in an attempt to force less-resolved opponents to back down.

### Plan

The United States Congress should pass a law restricting the President of the United States’ authority to introduce nuclear weapons forces first into hostilities.

### Contention 3: Solvency

#### The US is reducing their arsenal, but not changing their use policy

Rizvi 13

Haider Rizvi is been elected for his first term as MNA. He is politically affiliated with MQM. He completed his M.Sc. degree in applied Chemistry in 1992 from the University of Karachi and M.Sc. Chemical Engineering in 1998 from University of Detroit, “US, Russia: no more cuts in nuclear arsenals”, Daily Times 6-21

<http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2013%5C06%5C21%5Cstory_21-6-2013_pg4_9>

On Wednesday, Obama said he intended to move beyond Cold War nuclear postures and that he would like to see greater efforts to be made to reduce US and Russian nuclear arsenals. During his visit to Berlin, he said he was confident the US could maintain its security while reducing its nuclear capacity by a third. The US president also called for cuts in the number of tactical warheads in Europe. However, Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin said Moscow “cannot take these assurances seriously”. The US and Russia signed a bilateral agreement in 2010 to cut their stockpiles of nuclear weapons to 1,550 warheads. Currently, both countries possess no less than 90 percent of the total number of nuclear weapons. Among others, China has 400 warheads, France 348, and Israel and Britain about 200 each. India is believed to have more than 80 and Pakistan about 40 nuclear weapons. Critics see the United States as the most irresponsible member of the nuclear club, for it not only failed to meet the NPT obligations, but also contributed, at great length, to block, and even derail, the international discourse on nuclear disarmament. Observers say it may be hard to make headway in reaching an agreement over cuts because the US has not given up on building its controversial missile defence system, which is perceived by Russia as a potential source of danger to its security. In Germany, Obama said the US was “on track” to cutting its warheads to pre-Cold War levels, but “we have more work to do”. He said he had determined that the US could ensure its own and its allies security and maintain a credible deterrent “while reducing our deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up to one third”. He said he intended to seek negotiated cuts with Russia to move beyond Cold War nuclear postures, “We may no longer live in fear of global annihilation but so long as nuclear weapons exist, we are not truly safe,” he added. The US president indicated that his country would work with its European allies closely to seek “bold reductions” in the use of tactical weapons in Europe, saying the US wanted to forge a new international framework for the use of peaceful nuclear power. But, in the same breath, he criticised the pursuit of nuclear power by North Korea and Iran. While North Korea does not deny the military component of its nuclear program, Iran has been consistent in asserting its right to develop nuclear power in accordance with the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Observers say Obama’s initiative on cuts failed to get a desirable response from Putin, not only because of Russian objections to the US missile defence system, but also because there are reports that Washington plans to modernise its existing stockpiles. On Wednesday, Rogozin, a former Russian ambassador to Nato, said his nation “cannot take these assurances seriously” while the US is taking steps to build up its missile defence systems. “The offence arms race leads to a defense arms race and vice versa,” he said in comments quoted in Itar-Tass. A senior adviser to Putin reportedly said this week that other nuclear-armed nations would have to reduce their stockpiles for any plan to work. “The situation now is not like in the 1960s and 1970s when only the United States and the Soviet Union held talks on reducing nuclear arms,” Yury Ushakov told a briefing in Moscow. For their part, peace activists, however, hold a different view. “This is an important opportunity for the leaders of the US and Russia,” said Krieger. “Past US-Russia nuclear talks have centred around treaties for modest reductions in deployed strategic nuclear weapons, such as the New START treaty in 2010. “While such treaties are important, they sometimes struggle to achieve ratification and often take years to fully implement,” said Krieger. “Obama and Putin can take immediate action to drastically reduce the threat posed by nuclear weapons.” This week several groups in the United States called for Obama and Putin to make a mutual pledge of “no first use” of nuclear weapons, which would mean that each country promises not to use nuclear weapons first under any circumstances. “They can back up this promise with a plan for de-alerting their nuclear arsenals,” said Krieger. “A ‘no first use’ pledge is not the ultimate solution to the problem of nuclear weapons. A treaty that eliminates all nuclear weapons and ensures ongoing global compliance is the only way to solve the problem.” In his view, however, a mutual “no first use” pledge will show good faith from both parties and will help to create the conditions under which the complete abolition of nuclear weapons can be negotiated.

#### Legislation solves President’s war power, causes no first use, and will be followed

Stone 87

Jeremy J. Stone is president of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS). “Presidential Fist Use is Unlawful”, *First Use of Nuclear Weapons: Under the Constitution, Who Decides?,* 1987 pg 7-8

Is the first use of nuclear weapons something appropriate for a first general or admiral or for that matter a chief executive to decide? Or is this decision something so fundamental in its risks for the nation that it would seem to exceed their authority? And in any case, could Congress pass legislation controlling that use as it limited the use of funds for hostilities in Southeast Asia? During and after the war powers debate, a number of scholars addressed the issue of whether Congress could, by affirmative legislation, control presidential actions in the field of war. Former national security adviser McGeorge Bundy observed that Congress has “every right to assert itself on broad questions of place, time, and the size of forces committed.” An eminent authority on the commander in chief clause, Columbia University Law Professor Louis Henkin, wrote: “In my view, he would be bound to follow congressional directives not only as to whether to continue the war, but whether to extend it to other countries and other belligerents, whether to fight a limited or unlimited war, today, perhaps, even whether to fight a ‘conventional’ or a nuclear war.” Professor John Norton Moore ventured that Congress could prevent a President at war in Vietnam from bombing Beijing or from employing biological weapons in conventional war. Much of this authority stems from the right of Congress, as stated in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, “to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” Referring to the clause, George Washington University Professor W. T. Mallison, Jr., observed: It is appropriate to emphasize that the judgment as to what is “necessary and proper” is that of the Congress, and not of the Supreme Court. The aggregate of the war powers of the Congress are, therefore, sufficiently comprehensive to enable the Congress to have a large role in the conduct of the war. Based upon its expressed war powers combined with the “necessary and proper” clause, the Congress has power to conduct the war insofar as the war may be conducted under statutory authority as contrasted with the President’s authority as Commander in Chief. This was recognized in the famous case of *McCulloch v. Maryland* – 4 Wheaton 316, 1819- where Chief Justice Marshall referred to the powers of the Congress to “declare and conduct a war” is among its enumerated powers. Accordingly, most legal scholars would seem to admit the argument that the first use of nuclear weapons was so much more momentous than a tactical decision that Congress had the right to control that decision- if it wished to do so- and that it could control the decision by legislation. Congress could, for example, legislate that under no circumstances was the President authorized to use nuclear weapons of any kind in any conflict in which they had not already been used by others. By passing a law- over the President’s veto if necessary- it could simply remove nuclear weapons from the arsenal available in undeclared conventional wars abroad. If necessary, Congress could use the power to purse to assert that no funds could be sent to use nuclear weapons except in specified contingencies. Some will argue that such constraints will be meaningless in war, especially in issues involving nuclear war. But a closer examination of the situation suggests otherwise. No President is going to use nuclear weapons first, if he believes that it will lead to the destruction of the nation. On the contrary, he will be hoping and expecting that escalation will not result. Accordingly, he will ponder being held accountable to the nation for the risks to be taken and for the extent these actions would be in violation of law. If legislation exists precluding the contemplated actions, the President will be to that extent discouraged, deterred, and dissuaded from going forward. Indeed, in that event subordinates might not follow the President’s orders; the secretary of defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and all the others in the chain of command are sworn to uphold the Constitution and the law, not merely to obey the President.

#### There is no reason to keep first use on the table- conventional forces can deter, and using nukes first escalates conflicts

Gerson 10

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Evaluating Nuclear First-Use Options Do any of these rationales for the threat of nuclear first use continue to provide U.S. policymakers and defense officials with significant strategic advantages? Is there good evidence or strategic logic to suggest that holding out the option for the first use of nuclear weapons increases the security of the United States and U.S. allies? deterrence of/responses to conventional attacks For the United States, deterrence of conventional aggression—the original justification for the threat of first use—is a Cold War relic. Whereas in the Cold War strong arguments could be made that NATO’s threat of nuclear escalation was necessary to bolster deterrence because of the perceived conventional imbalance in Europe, the situation today is reversed. Since the end of the Cold, the United States is the dominant conventional power. The United States rightly places great importance on maintaining conventional superiority and global power projection, and despite the ongoing development of anti-access and area-denial capabilities—especially China’s development of an antiship ballistic missile35—U.S. conventional military capabilities and defense spending vastly outstrip those of every other nation. Consequently, the threat of nuclear first use is unnecessary to deter conventional aggression, and, if deterrence fails, unnecessary to help win the conºict because there is no country that can defeat the United States in a major conventional war.36 In an interesting and perhaps ironic twist, the threat of nuclear use to deter a conventionally superior opponent is one of the reasons why the United States has been so concerned with nuclear proliferation to regional rogue states. In a crisis with a nuclear-armed rogue state, the possibility of nuclear escalation might constrain the range of military options available to U.S. leaders. In this context, the threat from nuclear-armed adversaries has less to do with the threat of a surprise nuclear strike (although this cannot be ruled out), but rather from the potential that rogues might use the threat of nuclear first use to prohibitively raise the stakes and potential costs to the United States of project ing conventional power in a regional crisis.37 Thus, the use of nuclear threats to deter conventional aggression—a concept so central to NATO security policy during the Cold War—might now be used by others to deter, or at least complicate, U.S. intervention in a regional conºict. Rogue states, it would appear, have unwittingly taken a page out of the NATO’s Cold War playbook. deterence of/responses to chemical and biological attacks In recent years, the strongest argument for retaining the first-use option has been that nuclear weapons are necessary to help deter, and possibly respond to, CW and especially BW attacks on the United States and its allies. The NPR rules out the use of nuclear weapons to deter or respond to CW or BW use by nonnuclear NPT member states in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations, but deliberately reserves the right to use nuclear weapons to deter and respond to CW or BW attacks by nuclear states and nonnuclear states in violation of their nonproliferation commitments. In the event of a CW or BW attack by a nonnuclear state in compliance with its nonproliferation obligations, the perpetrator would “face the prospect of a devastating conventional military response” and “any individuals responsible for the attack, whether national leaders or military commanders, would be held fully accountable.” 38 The NPR does not explain why a large-scale conventional response is deemed sufficient to deter one category of states but is insufficient to deter the others. If anything, the threat to use nuclear weapons to deter CW or BW attacks by a nuclear-armed state is less credible and more dangerous than a conventional response, given that the use of U.S. nuclear weapons in retaliation could result in a nuclear reply. At least before entering office, several highranking members of the Obama administration appeared to agree. According to a 2007 report by the National Security Advisory Group, which included Kurt Campbell, Ashton Carter, Robert Einhorn, Michele Flournoy, Susan Rice, and James Steinberg, “Nuclear weapons are much less credible in deterring conventional, biological, or chemical weapon attacks. A more effective way of deterring and defending against such nonnuclear attacks—and giving the President a wider range of credible response options—would be to rely on a robust array of conventional strike capabilities and strong declaratory policies.”39 The necessity of retaining the first-use option for some CW and BW threats is grounded in part on the supposed success of nuclear deterrence in the 1990– 91 Gulf War, where the United States deliberately implied that it might consider a nuclear response if Saddam Hussein used CW or BW. The details of this episode are now well known. On January 9, 1991, Secretary of State James Baker delivered to Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz a letter from President George H.W. Bush to Saddam in which the president warned, “The United States will not tolerate the use of chemical or biological weapons, support of any kind for terrorist actions, or the destruction of Kuwait’s oilfields and installations. The American people would demand the strongest possible response. You and your country will pay a terrible price if you order unconscionable actions of this sort.”40 Similarly, Baker told Aziz, “If there is any use of weapons like that, our objective won’t be the liberation of Kuwait, but the elimination of the current Iraqi regime, and anyone responsible for using those weapons would be held accountable.”41 As Baker later wrote in his memoirs, at that meeting he “deliberately left the impression that the use of chemical or biological agents by Iraq could invite tactical nuclear retaliation.”42 New evidence contained in captured Iraqi documents demonstrates that Saddam was determined to have CW and BW weapons prepared to launch. In a January 1991 meeting with senior Iraqi officials, Saddam said, “I want to make sure that . . . the germ and chemical warheads, as well as the chemical and germ bombs, are available to [those concerned], so that in case we ordered an attack, they can do it without missing any of their targets.” Saddam said that if the order to launch is given, “you should launch them all against their targets.” He concluded the meeting by stating, “We will never lower our heads as long as we are alive, even if we have to destroy everybody.”43 In the aftermath of the Gulf War, several observers argued that the ambiguous threat of a nuclear reprisal effectively deterred Saddam from using his unconventional weapons.44 This view is based largely on postwar interviews with former high-level Iraqi officials, some of whom contended that Saddam did not order chemical or biological attacks because he believed that the United States would respond with nuclear weapons. For example, Gen. Wafic al-Samarrai, the former head of Iraqi Military Intelligence, said in an interview after the war, “I do not think that Saddam was capable of taking a decision to use chemical weapons or biological weapons, or any other type of weapons against the allied troops, because the warning was quite severe, and quite effective. The allied troops were certain to use nuclear arms and the price will be too dear and too high.”45 Although it may be correct that something effectively deterred Saddam from using CW or BW,46 the argument that nuclear threats were the causal factor remains open to debate. President Bush and Secretary Baker made two threats against the Hussein regime—an ambiguous threat to use nuclear weapons and an explicit threat of regime change. Opponents of NFU focus on the former threat while ignoring or downplaying the latter. As Scott Sagan has argued, there are several reasons to be skeptical of the claim that ambiguous nuclear threats, rather than the unequivocal threat of regime change, deterred Saddam. Most important, the Hussein regime had good international and domestic political reasons to claim after the war that the threat of nuclear retaliation, rather than the possibility of being removed from power, prevented the use of CW and BW. From an international perspective, claiming that U.S. nuclear threats were the primary deterrent helped portray Iraq as the victim of a militant and hegemonic United States bent on interfering in regional affairs, undermining the Iraqi regime, and willing to do anything—including using nuclear weapons—to ensure access to the region’s oil. By arguing that nuclear threats were the reason, the regime could claim that it did not use chemical and biological weapons because the United States would have used even more destructive weapons that Iraq did not possess in response, and this explana tion might create international sympathy and support for Iraq.47 Moreover, if Saddam were interested in garnering international support, the use of unconventional weapons would likely have shattered any hope he had of portraying Iraq as a victim. From a domestic standpoint, pointing to the U.S. nuclear threat was useful for Saddam in explaining to the Iraqi military why it was not ordered to unleash chemical or biological weapons. It was more politically palatable for the Hussein regime to claim that it did not order the use of unconventional weapons because it wanted to spare Iraq from a nuclear holocaust, rather than because it was worried about maintaining its grip on power.48 Moreover, the regime might have also wanted to claim that nuclear threats prevented it from using chemical or biological weapons because admitting that it was fearful of regime change would make the government look weak, which might encourage future uprisings from the minority Kurdish or Shiite populations in Iraq or perhaps encourage future provocations by Iran. In addition, an explanation that focused on nuclear intimidation as the reason for inaction could be used by domestic proponents of Iraq’s indigenous nuclear program as further evidence of the necessity of a nuclear arsenal. In sum, if Iraq had to give some explanation for why it did not use unconventional weapons, the threat of U.S. nuclear retaliation provided a convenient, beneficial, and face-saving rationale. Even if nuclear threats did play a role in Iraqi decisionmaking, postwar statements by senior U.S. officials involved in the conºict have likely undermined the credibility of similar threats in future scenarios. In memoirs published after the war, Brent Scowcroft, Colin Powell, and James Baker admitted that they never intended to use nuclear weapons even in response to a CW or BW attack. According to Scowcroft, “No one advanced the notion of using nuclear weapons, and the President rejected it even in retaliation for chemical or biological attacks.”49 Beyond this oft-cited empirical case for maintaining the first-use option, some specialists nevertheless maintain that the threat of a conventional-only response might not be sufficient for deterring CW or BW attacks. Conventional weapons, some argue, might not be powerful enough to induce caution and restraint.50 These authors fail to appreciate, however, that among the many reasons why states might want nuclear weapons, one of the most important motivations vis-à-vis the United States is to deter U.S. conventional strength. The fact that the threat of U.S. conventional capabilities is powerful enough to motivate some states to expend the financial and political capital to seek nuclear weapons suggests that states have a healthy respect for U.S. conventional power, and therefore the threat of an overwhelming conventional response to nonnuclear aggression is likely to be a potent deterrent. NFU opponents also contend that the nuclear option might be necessary to respond to a catastrophic BW or, less likely, CW attack that inºicted significant casualties. There are four reasons why a state might use nuclear weapons in response to a CW or BW attack: to inºict high costs (either because the initial CW or BW attack caused high casualties requiring an equally high cost exacted in response, or because the state wishes to purposefully inºict disproportionate costs); to prevent defeat; to avoid the potentially high fiscal and human costs of continuing to fight a conventional war against an adversary employing unconventional weapons; or to destroy the opponent’s remaining CW or BW weapons, stockpiles, and production facilities.51 Compared to conventional alternatives, nuclear weapons do not provide additional military utility toward achieving these objectives, and in all cases the use of nuclear weapons would have political and military drawbacks. The United States should not want to respond to the breaking of the taboo against the use of CW and BW by shattering an even bigger and longer-running taboo. A vigorous conventional bombing campaign provides the necessary means to impose severe costs without resorting to nuclear weapons, and sustained efforts to maintain conventional dominance should ensure that the United States would not be forced to accept defeat.52 Although an adversary’s use of CW or BW might compel U.S. leaders to seek a quick end to the war, the motivation for war termination would be because cost-benefit calculations had been tipped in an unfavorable direction, rather than because all military options had been exhausted and the United States was on the verge of defeat. Nuclear retaliation would not change this political calculation. With regard to the potential costs of fighting in a CW or BW environment, nuclear use would likely only complicate the battlespace by creating risks of nuclear contamination, radioactive fallout, and fire. Moreover, the mass hysteria and confusion caused in the immediate area of the nuclear detonation, as well as in other parts of the country as people fear that they might be the next target of a follow-on nuclear strike, could destabilize the country and increase the complexity of prosecuting the war and, ultimately, winning the peace. A nuclear attack intended to destroy CW or BW weapons, stockpiles, and production facilities is an extremely difficult task, and there is little reason to believe that it could be done, if at all, without causing significant collateral damage. Such a strike would require exquisite real-time intelligence, given that a leader who chooses to escalate with CW or BW will likely disperse remaining weapons and stockpiles to avoid attack. If CW or BW assets can be located, a nuclear strike risks potentially high levels of civilian casualties by dispersing, rather than destroying, chemicals or pathogens, and by the prompt and long-term effects of a nuclear blast.53 For CW and BW assets stored in underground bunkers, a nuclear weapon would have to detonate in the same room as the agents to completely destroy them; otherwise, chemicals and pathogens will be vented and dispersed into the atmosphere.54 If weapons, stockpiles, or production laboratories are located in above-ground structures, a nuclear weapon detonated nearby could destroy them, but not without also causing collateral damage that in many instances would be disproportionate to the initial attack. For example, a 10-kiloton (kt) weapon can eliminate biological agents within a radius of about 50 meters,55 but not without also destroying reinforced concrete structures within approximately a half-mile from the detonation, as well as demolishing ordinary homes out to distances of about 1 mile. Even if a CWor BWattack on the United States or its allies inºicted substantial civilian casualties, why would the United States inºict severe costs on innocent civilians for the actions of their government? And why would imposing such costs be a punishment—or a deterrent—for the adversary regime? A state that is willing to deliberately kill U.S. or allied civilians with chemical or biological weapons is unlikely to care much about large segments of its own population. In the event of a CW or BW attack, it is more likely that the United States would focus the brunt of its retaliatory campaign against the adversary’s military and leadership—which the United States explicitly threatened in the Gulf War—and for this objective there is little, if any, added military value from responding with nuclear weapons. In future crises involving CW- or BW-armed adversaries, a more credible and potent threat would be for the United States to employ a combination of conventional denial and punishment strategies. First, the United States should forcefully communicate that its deployed forces are equipped with appropriate defenses that will deny any potential benefits of the battlefield use of CW and BW.56 Second, similar to the explicit threats to Iraq in the Gulf War, U.S. decisionmakers should threaten an overwhelming conventional response to the use of unconventional weapons, coupled with the threat that CW or BW use runs the risk of forceful regime change. Potential adversaries should be made to understand that the United States and the international community will not tolerate the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); that CW or BW use will strengthen, not weaken, U.S. resolve; and that the full force of U.S. (and perhaps allied) conventional power will be brought to bear if these weapons are used. The message should be that CW or BW use not only will be ineffective, but will undoubtedly cost those who employ such weapons against the United States or its allies dearly and might even be an act of regime suicide.57 preemption of a nuclear attack The third rationale for retaining the nuclear first-use option revolves around the concept of a “splendid” nuclear first strike—a nuclear counterforce attack intended to destroy or disable the adversary’s nuclear capabilities. In the recent discourse on U.S. nuclear policy and force structure, NFU opponents typically make two arguments for keeping open the option for nuclear preemption. First, analysts contend that the threat of nuclear preemption would contribute to deterrence. This argument rests on a rather expanded conception of what deterrence is and how it works. Whereas the standard view of deterrence is that it is based on threats that will be imposed if an opponent acts— a response to an unwanted action that promises the inºiction of prohibitively high costs, a low probability of success, or both—this conception posits that deterrence can be achieved by threatening to strike before the opponent attacks. The idea is that, by threatening to take preemptive action to thwart an attack, the United States can deter the opponent from even attempting it. Preemption, according to this logic, is a form of deterrence by denial. The second argument rests on a more traditional view of preemption, which posits that the option to use nuclear weapons first is necessary to prevent—or at least limit— damage if the United States believes that an opponent is about to launch a nuclear attack. Proponents contend that, if it appears that an adversary is preparing to launch nuclear weapons, the United States should have the option to strike first.58 A nuclear first strike is fraught with risk and uncertainty. Could a U.S. president, the only person with the power to authorize nuclear use and a political official concerned with re-election, his or her political party, and their historical legacy, ever be entirely confident that the mission would be a complete success? What if the strike failed to destroy all of the weapons, or what if weapons were hidden in unknown areas, and the remaining weapons were used in retaliation? A successful first strike would require near-perfect intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) to detect, identify, and track all of the adversary’s nuclear forces; recent events surrounding U.S. assessments of Iraq’s suspected WMD capabilities forcefully demonstrate the challenges of reliable, accurate, and unbiased information.59 Intelligence regarding where an adversary’s nuclear weapons are located and if the state is actually planning to attack could be wrong or incomplete, and an attempted first strike based on inaccurate or incomplete information could have far-reaching negative consequences. The United States could never be absolutely confident in its ability to fully neutralize the nuclear threat in a disarming first strike, and the possibility that even just one or two nuclear weapons survive and are used in retaliation against the U.S. homeland or U.S. allies should be enough to induce extreme caution.60 The uncertainty of complete success, coupled with the possibility that an unsuccessful strike could bring costs that would outweigh the potential gains by way of nuclear retaliation, should cast serious doubt on first-strike options. Even if a surviving nuclear warhead were unable to reach the U.S. homeland, nuclear weapons could be used on an ally as a way of punishing the United States, and no president should want to risk being responsible for a nuclear detonation on another country in retaliation for U.S. actions.61 In the end, if an attempted disarming first strike leaves some of the adversary’s weapons intact, the United States may have started the nuclear war that it had hoped to prevent. The problem of successfully executing a nuclear first strike becomes even more challenging as current and potential adversaries develop and deploy mobile and relocatable ballistic missiles—a measure designed to enhance survivability and ensure a minimum second-strike capability. The ability to disperse nuclear-tipped missiles, and to quickly relocate them in the field, significantly increases the chances that some weapons will survive a preemptive attack and could be used in retaliation. Past experiences with targeting mobile (and fixed) ballistic missiles should temper contentions that the United States could launch a successful first strike. During the GulfWar, U.S. efforts to locate and attack both fixed and mobile Iraqi Scud missile launchers presented enormous intelligence and targeting challenges. “Scud hunting,” as the effort came to be called, proved remarkably difficult, and, as if locating targets was not difficult enough, Iraq employed terrain concealment tactics and decoys to ensure survivability. Coalition air forces launched approximately 1,500 sorties against Iraq’s fixed and mobile Scud missile launchers, and there was not a single confirmed kill of a mobile Scud launcher.62 According to the Gulf War Air Power Survey, “[E]ven in the face of intense efforts to find and destroy them, the mobile launchers proved remarkably elusive and survivable.”63 A declassified assessment of the Scud hunt by the Defense Intelligence Agency states, “[T]he inherently mobile nature of these targets will probably not support the translation of mobile missile targeting to a ‘fixed target’ type solution.” 64 Similar challenges occurred in the 1999 campaign against Yugoslavia. In Operation Allied Force, components of Serbian air defense systems were routinely relocated to avoid destruction, and the Serbs employed decoys and camouºage tactics. According to NATO estimates, only three of the known twenty-five mobile SA-6 surface-to-air missile batteries were destroyed in the campaign.65 Notwithstanding improvements in mobile target detection and tracking capabilities and changes in operational procedures since the Gulf War66 (including advances in ISR capabilities such as the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System and the Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle)67 the nature of the target—relatively small, mobile equipment traveling on an uncertain trajectory—will present significant targeting challenges for the foreseeable future. If U.S. military planners were unsure of the exact location of the adversary’s nuclear weapons, a preemptive attack would require the use of many relatively high-yield nuclear weapons to cover a wide area of terrain. Such an attack would still not guarantee destruction of the weapons, and the large number of high-yield warheads used in the attack might justify a more powerful response from the adversary with any remaining nuclear forces. If U.S. intelligence regarding the location of the opponent’s mobile nuclear capabilities is robust, the use of nuclear weapons is unnecessary because conventional forces would be sufficient to destroy (or at least disable) mobile missile launchers. In sum, if intelligence were uncertain or incomplete, the United States would have to use so many high-yield nuclear weapons as to make the potential benefits prohibitively risky and costly; and if intelligence is believed to be accurate and complete, nuclear weapons are unnecessary for attacking mobile targets.68 Despite the challenges of executing a completely successful disarming first strike, some advocates contend that even a partially successful strike, if combined with a missile defense system, could mitigate many of the risks and uncertainties associated with the first-strike option. According to this view, an effective missile defense system could be used to “mop up” any remaining adversary weapons that were used in retaliation. In addition, some proponents contend that the United States could deter nuclear retaliation with any remaining weapons by threatening additional nuclear strikes. These arguments are incorrect for three reasons. First, like the uncertainty inherent in a disarming first strike, U.S. leaders could never be entirely confident that a missile defense system would be completely effective. A warhead or two could get through, and the costs might severely offset the potential gains. Moreover, an adversary could either choose to attack a U.S. ally that was not protected by the missile shield or attempt to sneak a bomb into the United States by other means, such as on a cargo ship.69 Second, the argument that the United States could deter a retaliatory strike with any remaining weapons suffers from an important logical ºaw: if a U.S. president were willing to authorize a nuclear first strike and effectively break the long record of nuclear nonuse, there would have already been strong indications that the adversary was seriously preparing to use nuclear weapons. In this case, U.S. nuclear superiority would have already appeared to have failed in deterring an attack. Consequently, if a nation were perceived to be willing to initiate a nuclear strike on the U.S. homeland or U.S allies at a time when the United States already possessed a substantial nuclear advantage, there is little reason to believe that the United States could then deter the opponent from retaliating with any remaining weapons after it was attacked and the nuclear balance was further shifted in the United States’ favor. Third, a country that had just suffered a nuclear first strike might want to respond, if it could, for domestic and international political reasons. A leader whose country had just suffered a nuclear strike might fear that a failure to respond would weaken his or her domestic political position and potentially lead to an overthrow. From an international perspective, a country that did not retaliate (again, assuming it had workable weapons that survived the strike) would show the world that it could be coerced by the threat or actual use of nuclear weapons. If there were no response, then other countries might assume that all of the state’s weapons were destroyed, and then attempt to coerce or invade the country for profit. Even if the state had just one workable weapon remaining, there may be incentives to use it. If the state could demonstrate that it had at least one weapon that it were willing to use in retaliation, it could easily claim—and it would be virtually impossible to reliably refute— that it had more weapons left in reserve. Such a demonstration might restore deterrence and buy time for the state to reconstitute its arsenal. holding of hdbts at risk The proliferation of underground facilities—including command and control bunkers, leadership sanctuaries, and weapons stockpiles and weapons production programs—has been a cause of concern in recent years.70 This trend toward underground bunkers has a clear logic: as the United States has increased its ability to successfully attack above-ground targets, current and potential adversaries have sought new ways to protect their prized assets. Iran, for example, appears to be increasingly going underground to protect its nuclear program. It has purchased tunneling equipment from European firms through companies owned by the elite Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps; its formerly secret nuclear facility near Qom is buried inside a mountain; and the head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization recently announced that Iran is planning to begin construction of two new nuclear facilities that “will be built inside mountains.”71 Although the ability to attack HDBTs might contribute to deterrence, there are two reasons why nuclear weapons do not provide a militarily effective or politically feasible solution. First, there are sharp physical limits on the penetration depth of any nuclear earth-penetrating weapon (EPW). EPWs simply cannot get deep enough to destroy HDBTs. The maximum penetration depth an EPW can reach is approximately 10–20 meters, which, even with a highyield warhead, limits the depths at which an underground facility can be reli ably destroyed.72 The existing nuclear EPW in the U.S. arsenal—the B-61 Mod 11, an air-dropped gravity bomb reported to have a variable yield between 0.3–300 kt and a penetration capability of 2–3 meters—cannot reliably destroy underground facilities beyond approximately 235 meters.73 Although this is sufficient to hold some HDBTs at risk, others reside at much lower depths (500–700 meters), and digging even deeper is not an especially complicated process. In fact, states concerned about the possibility of a U.S. attack on their underground facilities are likely to respond by digging to depths well below where even megaton-yield weapons could be effective, or by adopting different methods of protecting highly valued assets, such as using mobile facilities.74 Second, the use of any nuclear EPW risks causing significant collateral damage, particularly from radioactive fallout. EPWs cannot penetrate deep enough underground to contain the blast and prevent fallout.75 For example, to avoid fallout a 300 kt weapon would have to be detonated at 800 meters below ground, a depth 267 times greater than the reported penetration capability of the B-61 Mod 11.76 If detonated in a highly populated area, even a 10 kt EPW could cause 100,000 casualties, and detonations in less populous areas could still cause substantial casualties if a high-yield weapon is used in unfavorable winds.77 Given that the U.S. desire to avoid civilian casualties is well known, current and potential adversaries could attempt to increase the disincentives of a nuclear EPW attack, such as purposefully locating strategic underground facilities in highly populated areas to ensure that a nuclear strike against an HDBT would cause maximum collateral damage. With all of the problems associated with nuclear EPWs, the United States should place primary reliance on other weapons and tactics to defeat HDBTs. Conventional EPWs are sufficient to reliably destroy relatively shallow targets, and the capabilities of conventional EPWs are increasing. The laser-guided GBU-28, for example, can penetrate 100 feet of earth or 20 feet of concrete, and the BLU 118/B contains a thermobaric explosive that generates a higher sustained blast pressure in confined spaces such as underground facilities.78 The U.S. military is currently developing the Massive Ordnance Penetrator, a 30,000-pound air-dropped bomb with 5,300 pounds of explosives that is believed to be able to penetrate 200 feet of earth.79 Furthermore, beyond direct attack weapons, the United States can employ other tactics to deal with HDBTs. If an underground facility is beyond the reach of conventional (or nuclear) EPWs, the United States can employ “functional defeat” tactics, such as targeting the facility’s power sources, communications lines, and entrances and exits. 80 In some cases, this approach might even be preferable to destroying the facility because the United States could potentially collect valuable intelligence should it be able to examine the bunker’s contents.81 Another option is to capitalize on the accuracy of laser-guided conventional EPWs by using multiple weapons to repeatedly strike the same spot, thereby “burrowing” down to the desired depth.82 The Strategic Consequences of Retaining the First-Use Option Beyond speciªc military rationales, opponents of NFU also contend that the United States should retain the ªrst-use option simply because keeping it on the table will make adversaries cautious. The ever-present possibility of nuclear escalation, the argument goes, will induce restraint and discourage military adventurism. In promulgating these kinds of arguments, however, analysts overstate the beneªts for the United States and downplay the risks. A core element of U.S. nuclear declaratory and operational policy is that it must be both credible and stable. Current and potential adversaries (and allies) must believe that the United States has both the necessary military capabilities and political resolve to act on its threats, and, equally important, U.S. nuclear pol- icy and posture must not unnecessarily frighten or provoke states such that they undertake measures that increase the possibility of nuclear use. Crafting U.S. nuclear policy and force posture has always required striking a delicate balance between credibility and stability, because efforts to increase one might simultaneously decrease the other.83 With regard to credibility and stability, a U.S. nuclear declaratory policy that includes the option to use nuclear weapons ªrst is either not credible, in which case it adds nothing to the security of the United States or its allies; or, if it is credible, it is potentially dangerous against nuclear-armed states because it risks creating instabilities in an intense crisis that increase the chances of nuclear use.

#### In fact without an NFU policy, nuclear war is inevitable

Huntley 06

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However, the Bush Administration’s approach does break dramatically from US Cold War policy by casting off deterrence as the central justification for US nucleararmament. The break becomes apparent by contrasting the 2002 NPR’s logic to the ‘ war-fighting’ nuclear policy initiatives of the Reagan Administration. While at the time similarly criticised for increasing the danger of nuclear war, Reagan Administration officials emphasised the priority of avoiding nuclear weapons use, underscored that the purpose of US strategic nuclear weapons was ‘ only retaliatory’, and justified tactical nuclear weapons development and threats of nuclear first use only to gird ‘ the effectiveness of deterrence’.7 Cold War era arguments as to the dangers of maintaining such ‘ war-fighting’ capabilities and strategies were well established: capabilities for ‘ escalation dominance’ and ‘first use’ nuclear threats erode the ‘ firebreak’ between conventional and nuclear war long seen as a key psychological impediment to nuclear engagement. The countervailing argument was also well established: escalation dominance actually bolsters deterrence more than it weakens the psychological ‘ firebreak’. Weinberger’s defence of Reagan Administration nuclear policies evinces this latter logic. But both positions converge on the principle that the only legitimate purpose of all nuclear weapons is deterrence of the use of any nuclear weapons. However, in the post-Cold War context, in which there no longer exists a ‘ balance of terror’ shadowing every conflict with the risk of escalation to higher levels of nuclear war, the deterrence logic offered by Weinberger as the only justification for US development of ‘ war-fighting’ capabilities and planning cannot apply.8 The absence of this logic also undermines the argument that a ‘ war-fighting’ posture reduces the prospects of nuclear weapons use. Whether or not that argument ever was persuasive, the Bush administration’s embrace of a wide range of tactical capabilities and first use options cannot serve the deterrence functions (minimal or otherwise) envisioned by Cold War era strategists, simply because that era’s threats no longer exist. Although maintaining the language of deterrence, the 2002 NPR implicitly acknowledges this new post-Cold War logic by positing important non-deterrence roles for US nuclear weapons, including possible first-use of low-yield nuclear weapons for counter-proliferation purposes. This posture constitutes a qualitatively unprecedented erosion of the nuclear ‘ firebreak’.9 Plans to complement broadened tactical nuclear weapons use options with increased non-nuclear ‘ strategic strike’ capabilities within a single integrated strategic motif erode the ‘ firebreak’ from the other side as well. This planning contributes as much as the development of new tactical nuclear capabilities does to increasing the dangers of nuclear weapons use. Thus, while the Bush Administration’s NPR does not introduce truly original thinking about the role of nuclear weapons, it does abandon the limitation of justifying nuclear armament only by deterrence purposes, elevating potential offen- sive uses of nuclear weapons in limited tactical situations to the level of official US government policy.10 This dramatic departure not only from past US strategic and nuclear policies but also from the administration’s own conservative progenitors puts the US nuclear posture in a qualitatively more aggressive stance, carrying with it significant practical and ethical consequences.