# F/W

### 1NC Framework—General

#### Interpretation—the purpose of the ballot is to answer the resolutional question: is the outcome of the enactment of a topical plan by the United States federal government better than the status quo or a competitive policy option?

#### They claim advantages independent of the plan and the imagination of governmental action.

#### 1. “Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative form.

Army Officer School 2004 (5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, <http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm>)

The colon introduces the following: a. A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b. A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c. A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d. A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e. After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f. The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g. A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:" Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

#### 2. “United States federal government should” means the resolutional question concerns the imagination of outcome of the establishment of a policy by the government.

Jon M. Ericson 2003 (Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### Reasons to prefer—

#### 1. Fairness:

#### A. Predictable limits—there are limitless investigations of democracy assistance and debate practice, but the grammar of the resolution is based on enacting a policy. We can’t predict the infinite number of critical positions the aff allows because they are disconnected from the resolutional question of demands for government action.

#### B. Ground—their framework makes stable ground impossible because they can always claim ‘critical’ outweigh disads to the plan or shift their advocacy to avoid impact turns—must hold them to a central question for productive argumentation and idea testing to occur.

#### 2. Education:

#### A. Switch-side testing—changing the ballot from a yes/no question about desirability of the plan undermines effective argumentation because there is no point of stasis to continually re-interrogate, removing the ability to test their ideas and others.

#### And, this idea testing is the best model for creating understanding and fostering tolerance.

Gordon Mitchell et al. 2007 (Eric English, Stephen Llano, Catherine E. Morrison, John Rief, and Carly Woods, Pitt Comm Studies Grad Students, Gordon Mitchell is an Associate Comm Studies Professor @ Pitt, Communication & Critical/Cultural Studies 4)

It is our position, however, that rather than acting as a cultural technology expanding American exceptionalism, switch-side debating originates from a civic attitude that serves as a bulwark against fundamentalism of all stripes. Several prominent voices reshaping the national dialogue on homeland security have come from the academic debate community and draw on its animating spirit of critical inquiry. For example, Georgetown University law professor Neal Katyal served as lead plaintiff ’s counsel in Hamdan, which challenged post-9/11 enemy combat definitions. 12 The foundation for Katyal’s winning argument in Hamdan was laid some four years before, when he collaborated with former intercollegiate debate champion Laurence Tribe on an influential Yale Law Journal addressing a similar topic.13 Tribe won the National Debate Tournament in 1961 while competing as an undergraduate debater for Harvard University. Thirty years later, Katyal represented Dartmouth College at the same tournament and finished third. The imprint of this debate training is evident in Tribe and Katyal’s contemporary public interventions, which are characterized by meticulous research, sound argumentation, and a staunch commitment to democratic principles. Katyal’s reflection on his early days of debating at Loyola High School in Chicago’s North Shore provides a vivid illustration. ‘‘I came in as a shy freshman with dreams of going to medical school. Then Loyola’s debate team opened my eyes to a different world: one of argumentation and policy.’’ As Katyal recounts, ‘‘the most important preparation for my career came from my experiences as a member of Loyola’s debate team.’’14 The success of former debaters like Katyal, Tribe, and other sin challenging the dominant dialogue on homeland security points to the efficacy of academic debate as a training ground for future advocates of progressive change. Moreover, a robust understanding of switch-side technique and the classical liberalism which underpins it would help prevent misappropriation of the technique to bolster suspect homeland security policies. For buried within an inner-city debater’s files is a secret threat to absolutism: the refusal to be classified as “with us or against us,” the embracing of intellectual experimentation in an age of orthodoxy, and reflexivity in the face of fundamentalism. But by now, the irony of our story should be apparent\***the more effectively academic debating practice can be focused toward these ends, the greater the proclivity of McCarthy’s ideological heirs to brand the activity as a ‘‘weapon of mass destruction**.’’

#### C.This is a voting issue—limiting discussion to the question being asked is a prerequisite to effective communication.

Ruth Lessl Shively 2000 (Assistant Professor of Political Science, Texas A&M, Partisan Politics & Political Theory, p. 181-2)

The requirements given thus far are primarily negative. The **ambiguists** must say "no" to-they **must** **reject and limit-some ideas** and actions. In what follows, we will also find that they must say "yes" to some things. In particular, they must say "yes" to the idea of rational persuasion. This means, first, that they must recognize the role of agreement in political contest, or the basic accord that is necessary to discord. The mistake that the ambiguists make here is a common one. **The mistake is in thinking that** agreement marks the end of contest-that **consensus kills debate.** But this is true only if the agreement is perfect-if there is nothing at all left to question or contest. **In most cases, however**, our agreements are highly imperfect. **We agree on** some matters but not on others, on **generalities but not on specifics**, on principles but not on their applications, and so on. And this kind of limited agreement is the *starting* condition of contest and debate. As John Courtney Murray writes: We hold certain truths; therefore we can argue about them. It seems to have been one of the corruptions of intelligence by positivism to assume that argument ends when agreement is reached. In a basic sense, the reverse is true. There can be no argument except on the premise, and within a context, of agreement. (Murray 1960, 10) In other words, **we cannot argue about something if we are not communicating: if we cannot agree on the topic and terms of argument or if we have utterly different ideas about what counts as evidence or good argument. At the very least, we must agree about what it is that is being debated before we can debate it. For instance, one cannot have an argument about euthanasia with someone who thinks euthanasia is a musical group.** One cannot successfully stage a sit-in if one's target audience simply thinks everyone is resting or if those doing the sitting have no complaints. Nor can one demonstrate resistance to a policy if no one knows that it is a policy. **In other words, contest is meaningless if there is a lack of agreement or communication about what is being contested. Resisters**, demonstrators, **and debaters must have some shared ideas about the subject and/or the terms of their disagreements**. The participants and the target of a sit-in must share an understanding of the complaint at hand. And **a demonstrator's audience must know what is being** **resisted**. In short, **the contesting of an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and how one might go about intelligibly contesting it**.

**You should presume that the 1AC did not accomplish anything and was a waste of time -- you can never get those 9 minutes of your ever-shrinking life back -- say thank you with a negative ballot**

**CrimeThinc Ex-Workers' Collective '13** -- Access Date, "Your Politics Are Boring As Fuck" Nadia C. http://www.crimethinc.com/texts/selected/asfuck.php

Face it, **your politics are boring as fuck. You know it's true. Otherwise, why does everyone cringe when you say the word? Why has attendance at your anarcho-communist theory discussion group meetings fallen to an all-time low?** **Why has the oppressed proletariat not come to its senses and joined you in your fight for world liberation?** **Perhaps, after years of struggling to educate them about their victimhood, you have come to blame them for their condition. They must want to be ground under the heel of capitalist imperialism; otherwise, why do they show no interest in your political causes?** Why haven't they joined you yet in chaining yourself to mahogany furniture, chanting slogans at carefully planned and orchestrated protests, and frequenting anarchist bookshops? Why haven't they sat down and learned all the terminology necessary for a genuine understanding of the complexities of Marxist economic theory? **The truth is, your politics are boring to them because they really are irrelevant. They know that your antiquated styles of protest—your marches, hand held signs, and gatherings—are now powerless to effect real change because they have become such a predictable part of the status quo.** They know that your post-Marxist jargon is off-putting because it really is a language of mere academic dispute, not a weapon capable of undermining systems of control. **They know that your infighting, your splinter groups and endless quarrels over ephemeral theories can never effect any real change in the world they experience from day to day. They know that no matter who is in office, what laws are on the books, what "ism"s the intellectuals march under, the content of their lives will remain the same. They—we—know that our boredom is proof that these "politics" are not the key to any real transformation of life**. For **our lives are boring enough already!** And you know it too. For how many of you is politics a responsibility? Something you engage in because you feel you should, when in your heart of hearts there are a million things you would rather be doing? Your volunteer work—is it your most favorite pastime, or do you do it out of a sense of obligation? Why do you think it is so hard to motivate others to volunteer as you do? Could it be that it is, above all, a feeling of guilt that drives you to fulfill your "duty" to be politically active? Perhaps you spice up your "work" by trying (consciously or not) to get in trouble with the authorities, to get arrested: not because it will practically serve your cause, but to make things more exciting, to recapture a little of the romance of turbulent times now long past. Have you ever felt that you were participating in a ritual, a long-established tradition of fringe protest, that really serves only to strengthen the position of the mainstream? Have you ever secretly longed to escape from the stagnation and boredom of your political "responsibilities"? **It's no wonder that no one has joined you in your political endeavors. Perhaps you tell yourself that it's tough, thankless work, but somebody's got to do it. The answer is, well, NO. You actually do us all a real disservice with your tiresome, tedious politics.** **For in fact, there is nothing more important than politics.** NOT the politics of American "democracy" and law, of who is elected state legislator to sign the same bills and perpetuate the same system. **Not the politics of the "I got involved with the radical left because I enjoy quibbling over trivial details and writing rhetorically about an unreachable utopia" anarchist.** Not the politics of any leader or ideology that demands that you make sacrifices for "the cause." But the politics of our everyday lives. When you separate politics from the immediate, everyday experiences of individual men and women, it becomes completely irrelevant. Indeed, it becomes the private domain of wealthy, comfortable intellectuals, who can trouble themselves with such dreary, theoretical things. When you involve yourself in politics out of a sense of obligation, and make political action into a dull responsibility rather than an exciting game that is worthwhile for its own sake, you scare away people whose lives are already far too dull for any more tedium. **When you make politics into a lifeless thing, a joyless thing, a dreadful responsibility, it becomes just another weight upon people, rather than a means to lift weight from people. And thus you ruin the idea of politics for the people to whom it should be most important.** For everyone has a stake in considering their lives, in asking themselves what they want out of life and how they can get it. But you make politics look to them like a miserable, self-referential, pointless middle class/bohemian game, a game with no relevance to the real lives they are living out. What should be political? Whether we enjoy what we do to get food and shelter. Whether we feel like our daily interactions with our friends, neighbors, and coworkers are fulfilling. Whether we have the opportunity to live each day the way we desire to. And "politics" should consist not of merely discussing these questions, but of acting directly to improve our lives in the immediate present. Acting in a way that is itself entertaining, exciting, joyous—because political action that is tedious, tiresome, and oppressive can only perpetuate tedium, fatigue, and oppression in our lives. **No more time should be wasted debating over issues that will be irrelevant when we must go to work again the next day.** No more predictable ritual protests that the authorities know all too well how to deal with; no more boring ritual protests which will not sound like a thrilling way to spend a Saturday afternoon to potential volunteers—clearly, those won't get us anywhere. Never again shall we "sacrifice ourselves for the cause." For we ourselves, happiness in our own lives and the lives of our fellows, must be our cause! **After we make politics relevant and exciting, the rest will follow. But from a dreary, merely theoretical and/or ritualized politics, nothing valuable can follow.** This is not to say that we should show no interest in the welfare of humans, animals, or ecosystems that do not contact us directly in our day to day existence. But the foundation of our politics must be concrete: it must be immediate, it must be obvious to everyone why it is worth the effort, it must be fun in itself. How can we do positive things for others if we ourselves do not enjoy our own lives? To make this concrete for a moment: an afternoon of collecting food from businesses that would have thrown it away and serving it to hungry people and people who are tired of working to pay for food—that is good political action, but only if you enjoy it. If you do it with your friends, if you meet new friends while you're doing it, if you fall in love or trade funny stories or just feel proud to have helped a woman by easing her financial needs, that's good political action. On the other hand, if you spend the afternoon typing an angry letter to an obscure leftist tabloid objecting to a columnist's use of the term "anarcho-syndicalist," that's not going to accomplish shit, and you know it.

# Counter Advocacy

**The United States federal government should determine that the offensive use of uninhabited aerial vehicles constitutes an introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities.**

#### Oversight through the WPR solves and still allows drone strikes in crucial missions.

Brock Laney 13 Graduates with a BA in International Relations in April 2013 and will begin law school in fall 2013 BYU Prelaw review, vol. 27, 2013

Observed individually, single drone strikes might more closely resemble assassinations than warfare. A more comprehensive view of US drone operations in Pakistan, Yemen, or Somalia, however, reveals several characteristics that place drone strikes campaigns more securely within the category of conventional warfare. Just as Yorktown and Bunker Hill fall under the broader category of the American Revolutionary War, individual drone strikes are often constituent parts of larger campaigns with identifiable goals. Pro longed drone strike campaigns resemble war in levels of casualties, spillover effects into civilian populations, and consistency of attacks. Additionally, the Obama administration has justified drone activity by appealing to international conflict law, calling drone attacks part of a war on a specific belligerent.67 Thus, in this section I discuss similarities between drone strikes campaigns and war to justify the inclusion of drones under the authority of Congress. After establish- ing this, I discuss specific changes to the WPR that can provide an institutionalized accounting for drone activity. (i) War-Like Characteristics of Drone Strikes Campaigns First, drone strikes cause civilian and militant casualties in numbers that resemble trends typical of conventional warfare. Drone strikes’ clandestine nature makes estimates of deaths from attacks difficult to calculate, but careful studies of drone activity in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia since 2002 estimate casualties between 3,90068 and 4,700.69 To provide a comparison, the US suffered roughly 4,485 casualties from 2003-2012 in Iraq.70Although US officials have praised drones as capable of conducting surgical strikes with little or no collateral damage,71 third parties estimate hundreds of civilian casualties.72 Drone strikes also cause significant injuries and prop- erty damage.73 Finally, the nearly constant presence of drones over many villages in North and South Waziristan causes psychological and stress-related health problems that affect large proportions of civilian populations.74 Next, drone activity resembles war in its targeting of a specific belligerent over an extended period of time. Drone strikes occur on a monthly basis, with an average of roughly 32 deaths per month.75 Further, most drone strikes have targeted militants, the majority of which were associated with the Taliban and al-Qaeda.76 Attorney General Holder argued that the US faces a “stateless enemy,”77 but it is a specific enemy nonetheless. These facts, along with the regional focus of anti-militant drone strikes, bear similarity to conventional warfare wherein belligerents remain fixed and identifiable through- out the duration of a conflict. Finally, the Obama administration consistently justifies drone activity by citing international law as it relates to war, referring to individual drone strikes as part of a war on al-Qaeda and the Tali- ban.78 Harold Koh, for example, defended drones by referencing the right of the US to self-defense, which is sanctioned by international law.79 Koh stated that “the U.S. is in armed conflict with al-Qaeda as well as the Taliban and associated forces in response to the horrific acts of 9/11.”80 The administration’s explicit and repeated branding of drone activity in the Middle East as war provides strong evidence that drone campaigns deserve attention under the WPR alongside conventional warfare. Admittedly, drone campaigns are not identical to other forms of war. Pakistan, for example, has not reacted to US military activity in its country with physical retributive action. In drone warfare, how- ever, countries are not the targets, which explains in great measure Pakistan’s lack of military retaliation. Classifying drone campaigns as war does not require complete uniformity of attributes with other implements of traditional warfare because the nature of war is con- text dependent. Drones, deployed in the name of national defense, should not be subject to a separate list of constraints than are other instruments of war deployed for similar reasons.81 (ii) Accounting for Drones in the War Powers Resolution The inclusion of drone strikes in the WPR would duly anticipate an increasing trend towards fighting through unmanned vehicles.82 This global trend has indicated that “technologies that remove humans from the battlefield are becoming the new normal in war.”83 The costs to the US in terms of personnel casualties and political capital remain so low relative to other types of conflict that drone usage will likely persist or increase in frequency. The changing nature of international conflict suggests that drones and other un- ~~man~~ned military assets will probably become important aspects of war. Properly classifying drones and implementing a congressional check on their usage at a time when they are emerging as conventional weapons is therefore very important. Accounting for drones through the WPR would require only small modifications to the legislation. The resolution refers to “armed forces” as the asset of interest that Congress seeks to regulate.84 To induct drones into the WPR, legislators can expand the definition of armed forces therein to explicitly include drones and other un- manned military assets. Specifically, the resolution should define “armed forces” as any US military asset, manned or unmanned, deployed in the interest of national security with specific military target(s). Similar to the current version of the resolution, the updated law should require any President that deploys these military assets to abide by the restrictions and protocols outlined therein. An effective definition of drone strikes as part of the armed forces must necessarily address conditional factors since drones are not used exclusively for long-term campaigns. Drones are sometimes used for assassinations and other objectives, and although guidelines for controlling their use in these other areas are too broad to be dis- cussed here, modifications to the resolution should account for those distinct circumstances. To avoid unnecessary and possibly detri- mental consequences of reporting covert operations to Congress, the updated resolution should include a clause that limits the type of drone activity the President must report to Congress. To distinguish between long-term campaigns and single attacks, the law should specify that two attacks targeting the same group or occurring in the same country within one month of each other constitute the begin- ning of a campaign. Once this condition is met, proceeding with the campaign would require presidential action as outlined in the WPR. Although seemingly arbitrary, two drone strikes in one month is likely an effective indicator that a series of attacks is becoming a campaign, and Congress should have the power to exert its constitu- tional authority when such a benchmark is reached. Reports indicate that there have been, on average, 2.84 drone attacks per month in Pakistan since 2004.85 Attacks in Yemen exhibit similar patterns, although the consistency of those attacks has not risen to Pakistan’s levels until recently.86 Using these current trends as a baseline helps determine the appropriate attack frequency for determining the starting point of a campaign. Because unsuccessful assassination at- tempts may necessitate a second attack in a relatively short period of time, the success of an attack should be considered in the definition of which attacks count towards defining a series of attacks as a cam- paign. Only attacks that successfully eliminate the intended target should be counted towards the limit. This will allow for repeated attempts if an assassination or other single operation endeavor fails after an initial attempt. Some might argue that including drone strikes in the WPR raises the cost of using drones to an unacceptably high level because their use would require formal sanction. Congressional approval, however, does not necessarily constitute an official declaration of war. Presidents have reported a number of conflicts to Congress consistent with the WPR that have proceeded without an official declaration from Congress.87 Additionally, the Obama administra- tion explicitly classifies the conflict with al-Qaeda and the Taliban as “armed conflict”88 and gaining explicit approval from Congress would not change the costs of moving forward with the conflict. Finally, obtaining congressional approval would potentially create greater domestic legitimacy for a campaign, thereby strengthening the President’s political position instead of weakening it. These con- siderations indicate that Congress can justifiably and easily address the lack of institutional oversight for drone warfare through modify- ing the WPR.

# DA

**1NC—Drones Version**

**The Executive’s independent authority to conduct drone strikes is crucial to their operational effectiveness.**

Steven **Groves 13**, is Bernard and Barbara Lomas Senior Research Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. April 10, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/drone-strikes-the-legality-of-us-targeting-terrorists-abroad

What the U.S. Should Do The U.S. drone program and its practices regarding targeted strikes against al-Qaeda and its associated forces are lawful. They are lawful because the United States is currently engaged in an armed conflict with those terrorist entities and because the United States has an inherent right to defend itself against imminent threats to its security. Moreover, the available evidence indicates that U.S. military and intelligence forces conduct targeted strikes in a manner consistent with international law. Military and intelligence officials go to great lengths to identify al-Qaeda operatives that pose an imminent threat and continually reassess the level of that threat. Decisions on each potential target are debated among U.S. officials before the target is placed in the “disposition matrix.” In conducting targeted strikes U.S. forces strive to minimize civilian casualties, although such casualties cannot always be prevented**. The U**nited **S**tates **will continue to face asymmetric threats from non-state actors operating from the territory of nations that are either unwilling or unable to suppress the threats.** **To confront these threats, the U**nited **S**tates **must retain its most effective operational capabilities**, **including targeted strikes by armed drones, even if U.S. forces degrade al-Qaeda** and its associated forces **to such an extent that the U**nited **S**tates **no longer considers itself to be in a non-international armed conflict**. Moreover, the United States must continue to affirm its inherent right to self-defense to eliminate threats to its national security, regardless of the presence or absence of an armed conflict recognized by international law. To that end, the United States should: Continue to affirm existing use-of-force authorities. During the past three years, senior officials of the Obama Administration have publicly set out in significant detail U.S. policies and practices regarding drone strikes. The Administration should continue to do so, emphasizing that U.S. policies adhere to widely recognized international law. **Critics** of the United States **will continue to claim that a lack of transparency surrounds U.S. policy and actions. Such critics will likely never be satisfied**, **not even with full disclosure** of the relevant classified legal memoranda, and their criticism will not cease until the United States abandons its practice of targeting terrorist threats in Pakistan, Yemen, and elsewhere. However, consistent repetition of the U.S. legal position on targeted drone strikes may blunt such criticism. Not derogate from the AUMF. At the 2012 NATO summit in Chicago, NATO agreed that the vast majority of U.S. and other NATO forces would be withdrawn from Afghanistan by the end of 2014, a time frame that President Obama confirmed during this year’s State of the Union address. Some **critics of U.S. drone policy will inevitably argue that due to the drawdown the U**nited **S**tates **may no longer credibly claim that it remains in a state of armed conflict** with the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and its associated forces, whether they are located in Afghanistan, the FATA, or elsewhere**. Congress should pass no legislation that could be interpreted as a derogation from the AUMF or an erosion of the inherent right of the U**nited **S**tates **to defend itself against imminent threats posed by transnational terrorist organizations.** Not create a drone court. **The concept of a drone court is fraught with danger** and may be an unconstitutional interference with the executive branch’s authority to wage war. U.S. armed forces have been lawfully targeting enemy combatants in armed conflicts for more than 200 years without being second-guessed by Congress or a secret “national security court.” **Targeting decisions**, including those made in connection with drone strikes, **are carefully deliberated by military officers and intelligence officials based on facts and evidence gathered from** a variety of human, signals, and imagery **intelligence sources**. During an armed conflict, all al-Qaeda operatives are subject to targeting; therefore, a drone court scrutinizing targeting decisions would serve no legitimate purpose. Rather than creating a special tribunal that is ill equipped to pass judgment on proportionality and military necessity, and that will never fully assuage the concerns of the critics of drone strikes, **Congress should continue to leave decisions pertaining to the disposition of al-Qaeda terrorists**—**including U.S. citizens**—**with military and intelligence officials**. Conclusion The debate within the international legal, academic, and human rights communities on the legality and propriety of drone strikes will likely continue unabated. **To surrender to the demands of such critics would be equivalent to forgetting the lessons of September 11**, when a small, non-state terrorist organization operating from a nation with which the United States was not at war planned and launched an attack that killed almost 3,000 Americans. **The U**nited **S**tates **should preserve its ability to use all of the tools in its arsenal to ensure that the plots hatched by terrorist organizations do not become successful attacks on the U.S. homeland. Armed drones have proved to be one of the most effective and discriminating tools** available to U.S. forces, and their lawful use should continue until such time as non-state, transnational terrorist organizations no longer present an imminent threat to the United States.

**Drones prevent Al Qaeda attacks on the homeland and alternatives would result in worse civilian casualties.**

Clinton **Watts 12**, Senior fellow with the George Washington University’s Homeland Security Policy Institute and consultant at Navanti Group, May 29, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/foreign-affairs-defense/al-qaeda-in-yemen/understanding-yemens-al-qaeda-threat/

… I believe **the escalation in drone** and SOF [Special Operations Forces] operations **has kept AQAP in check during a time when the U.S. has been absent an effective Yemeni counterterrorism partner that can effectively resist the terror group**. Today, **members of AQAP in Yemen are plotting terrorist attacks against U.S. targets** as seen by this past month’s revelation of Ibrahim al-Asiri developing a third generation underwear bomb likely able to pass through airport security. **The U.S. has no other effective option for countering AQAP’s current threat to the U.S. homeland**. **AQAP’s repeated attempts to attack the U.S. necessitate a persistent counterterrorism response. Inaction is not an option**. Media reports and anti-drone advocates have rightly noted that civilian casualties have occurred from drone strikes and increases in these casualties enrage local populations and bolster support for AQAP. However, **drones provide the most effective and least casualty-producing method for engaging AQAP**. **Any other option that could apply equal military pressure on AQAP would likely inflict far more civilian casualties on the Yemeni population**. [See this post at KingsOfWar for some appropriate comparison.]

**Extinction.**

Yonah **Alexander 10**, Director of the International Center for Terrorism Studies at the Potomac Institute for Policy Sciences, “Maghreb & Sahel Terrorism: Addressing the Rising Threat from al-Qaeda & other Terrorists in North & West/Central Africa,” January, <http://www.potomacinstitute.org/attachments/524_Maghreb%20Terrorism%20report.pdf>

Current and **future perpetrators include** the following: “freelance” and **sub-state terrorist groups**; individual terrorists; mentally deranged “crusaders” or “martyrs”; single-issue political extremists; ideological-based groups; ethnic, racial, and religious movements; nationalist and separatist actors; criminal and political mercenaries; and international networks, **particularly al-Qaeda and its affiliates in** Africa, Asia, and **the Middle East**. Terrorists’ impulses cover a broad range of motivations. These consist of political discontent— ideological (anarchism, ambitions, radicalism) and nationalistic (resistance, separatism, irredentism)— economic discontent (low living standards, lack of opportunity, unfulfilled expectations, loss or squandered resources); and cultural discontent (class constraints, ethnic discrimination, religious intolerance, technological and environmental irritants). There is also a long record of governments that provide terror groups both direct and indirect support (e.g., financing, training, intelligence, operations, and weaponry). A rogue nation utilizes terrorist proxies to further its own country’s interests. As formal, open, and direct malevolent actions undertaken by a government would call immediate attention to state sponsors, using terrorist groups to carry out operations such as assassinations and bombings enables the government sponsor to deny any claim. The roles played by Iran, Sudan, Cuba, previously Libya, and North Korea in such events come to mind. Currently, Iran and North Korea are of particular concern to the international community because of their nuclear ambitions. In addition, the latest focus of concern is so-called “failed states” wherein there are no effective government institutions to intercede and prevent the spread of terrorist facilities within a country. These lawless zones are increasingly becoming target-rich opportunities for the consolidation of terrorist assets and ventures. Current Trends Modern terrorism is characterized by an ideological and theological fanaticism, an education in hatred toward one’s enemy, which has coupled with rapid technological advancements in communications (e.g., the internet), transportation (e.g., modern international air travel), as well as conventional and unconventional weaponry to create a truly lethal threat. Indeed, this threat has become much more decentralized as it now emanates not only from established terrorist organizations but also from freelance individuals with the motives, means, and opportunity to visit harm upon civil society. Because of these developments, **contemporary terrorism presents a multitude of threats to all nations, large and small**. One measurement of evaluating the terrorist threat is to calculate the enormous cost to all societies in terms of the number of incidents, the human toll, and the economic damage. Indeed, since the 1960s, **modern society has suffered dearly from the global disease of terrorism, a reality that grows in scope and brutality with every passing year**. For example, in the 1970s, a total of 300 domestic and international terrorist attacks were recorded worldwide. Today, almost 40 years later, the count totals more than 80,000 incidents. Clearly, no community, country, or region is immune from the impact of terrorism. In the 9/11 attacks in New York City, citizens from 78 countries were killed. That year alone, 3,537 people died. During the period between 2002-2008, more than 113,000 persons perished and hundreds of thousands were wounded in terrorist attacks throughout the world. The economic, political, psychological, and strategic costs must also be considered in this assessment. Criminal-Terrorist Nexus Globalization and the information revolution have enabled criminals and organized crime to do business and engage in a broad range of criminal activities. For instance, “white collar” crimes are expanding. These crimes target sectors such as antitrust law, securities, commodities futures, environmental activities, maritime business, gaming, the internet, intellectual property, and tax customs. Trafficking in human beings (e.g., buying and selling of women and children, usually for sexual exploitation) represents another “new,” substantive, and transnational offense. In addition, serious organized criminal threats facing the international community (e.g., the Maghreb and Sahel regions) consist of current and emerging challenges to law enforcement, including drug trafficking (particularly in heroin, both powder and crack cocaine, and ecstasy), organized immigration crime, fraud (particularly in revenue fraud), money laundering, counterfeiting, illicit weapons possession and sales, and high-tech criminal activity (e.g., the Abdul Qadeer Khan nuclear smuggling network). Legitimate companies support terrorists and criminals—directly and unwittingly—to initiate their illicit activities. Numerous identifiable forums of these relationships include the following interfaces: funding and money laundering; employment and accessibility of personnel and equipment; generic tools (e.g., trucks); instruments of terror (e.g., dynamite or explosives); information about local landmarks and prospective targets (e.g., highlighting vulnerabilities and access to targets); communications, resources, and contacts; work permits (particularly for immigration-related criminal activity); and sponsorship (e.g., employment and resources). Terrorist groups and criminals also use front companies, which combine both legitimate and illicit sources of revenue, and shell companies, opaque firms used to hide a legitimate owner’s interests, to finance unlawful operations. In addition to the foregoing, terrorists and criminals feed off each other in a wide variety of criminal activities, including counterfeiting currency, credit card theft, misappropriating and using credit card information, forging documents, identity theft, money laundering, drug trafficking, corruption, and commercial espionage. Terrorist groups use a variety of means—from the simple to the complex—to secure funding for their activities. The initial sources of terrorist funding include both legal (e.g., personal savings and legitimate business revenue) and illicit avenues (e.g., criminal activity such as drug trafficking, kidnapping, and financial fraud). Once the funds are raised, they are distributed to various factions of terrorist groups through a variety of means. These include the use of traditional and alternative financial services entities (e.g., banks and hawalas—informal money-transfers systems firmly established in Asia and the Middle East), nonprofit organizations trading in commodities (e.g., “conflict diamonds” and gold), bogus financial instruments, smuggling of currency and products, wire transfers, drug trafficking, extortion, money laundering, securities fraud, and other scams. Future Outlook: Super Terrorism What is of particular concern is that **unconventional weapons—biological, chemical, radiological, and nuclear—are slowly emerging upon the contemporary terrorist scene**. That is, **as technological developments offer new capabilities for terrorist groups, the modus operandi of these groups** **may subsequently alter most drastically**. Reportedly, at least a dozen terrorist groups, in addition to **al-Qaeda’s network, have shown an interest in acquiring or actively attempting to obtain nuclear weapons, which is a significant threat throughout the world**. Thus, while the probability of nuclear terrorism remains low in comparison to the use of other weapons of mass destruction, the **consequences of “super” terrorism could be enormous. If a nuclear bomb is stolen (or built** by a terrorist group with reasonable resources and talent**), it could result in massive devastation**. For example, an explosion of about one kiloton (one-twentieth the power of the Hiroshima attack) in any major city has the potential to cause more than 100,000 fatalities and result in damage totaling billions of dollars. Another dangerous emerging trend of contemporary international life is the growing threat of cyberterrorism. The expanding concern is that not only criminal hackers but also terrorists will intensify the utilization of this form of electronic warfare as an equalizer weapon. It is evident that the threat of “non-explosive” terrorist assaults is growing with every passing day. Three contributing factors account for the reality. First, the “globalization” of the internet makes government and industry efforts to control cyber attacks much more challenging than ever before. Second, there are now tens of thousands of hacker-oriented sites on the internet resulting in “democratization” of the tools used for disruption and destruction. With their systematic cyber “cookbooks,” the exploitation of Trojan horses, logic bombs, and other electric modus operandi alternatives are becoming a permanent fixture of international life. Third, **terrorist organizations have broken away from their place within the formerly bipolar world and have become multidirectional**, causing further complications to our technologically vulnerable societies. **These new developments have enhanced the threats and capabilities of terrorist groups** to the degree in which **they could forever alter our planet’s existence**.

**Drones prevent US retrenchment**

Michael A. **Reynolds 13**, Associate Professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton, Global Discourse, Vol. 3, No. 1

**The absence of a large, easily identifiable challenge raised the peril that Americans would be lulled into a false sense of security and turn inward and withdraw from world affairs**. **This would allow multiple new threats to incubate and emerge on the margins**. These threats would be small and easily overcome. But they would also be persistent and recurring. Gradually, the American public would tire of ceaseless campaigning against minor powers and petty challengers in remote areas of marginal significance, much as a lion would tire of swatting at flies. Yet, **if it ignored those tertiary threats, they would multiply, and**, unlike flies, metastasize **and eventually overwhelm** the lion. In short**, America would face a classic dilemma of a hegemon**. **The absence of a large enemy would breed complacency**. In the meantime, a procession of small challengers would cause the hegemon eventually to exhaust himself, abandon the field to his enemies out of weariness, and ultimately succumb. The solution is to maintain a deterrent capability that does not merely underscore the unassailable might of the hegemon but also demonstrates the unyielding determination of the hegemon to vanquish all his foes. The classical method of imperial deterrence against minor but innumerable challengers was through example: to so thoroughly and mercilessly annihilate one challenger that no other would dare chance the same fate. Athens' devastation of Melos, immortalized by Thucydides, illustrates this principle. The catch is that, in order to work, this strategy demands cruelty and the use of vastly disproportionate force (Rosen 2003). It would be exceedingly difficult for a liberal democracy to employ such a strategy over the long term in an age of television and instant media, not to mention in an age of international humanitarian law. **The R**evolution in **M**ilitary **A**ffairs, however**, suggested a potential way out of this dilemma**. First, **the development of vastly more accurate weapons promised to make it possible to destroy** in detail **any challengers while limiting** the so-called **collateral damage**. Second, **by leveraging superior tech**nology, **the U**nited **S**tates **could dispense with its comparatively cumbersome standing volunteer armed forces**, which ultimately were still dependent on reservists for any extended deployment. A smaller force composed of highly trained soldiers equipped with the latest technology, by contrast, would be more mobile, more powerful, and, not least important, more deployable. The President could deploy it at his sole discretion and render the innately irresolute voices of Congress and public opinion irrelevant. **By combining great speed with high accuracy** – and thus overwhelming – **firepower, such a force could be used to quash emerging threats as soon as they emerged with minimal disruption of life at home**. For a brief span of time between 2001 and 2003, it appeared that this technological-military revolution had arrived. In Afghanistan, a handful of American Special Forces soldiers and CIA officers mounted on horses and equipped with laptop computers oversaw a blistering rout and collapse of Afghanistan's Taliban government. In Iraq, General Tommy Franks oversaw the application of the doctrine of ‘shock and awe’ that showcased on live television broadcast around the world American technological proficiency in using aircraft and cruise missiles to strike targets in Baghdad and elsewhere in Iraq at will. It is worth noting the use of cruise missiles – a weapons system adopted by the US originally for the delivery of nuclear warheads but then later fitted with conventional high-explosive warheads once sufficiently accurate guidance systems came into existence. Then, with a rapidity perhaps unprecedented in history, American ground forces overran Iraq and captured Baghdad in two weeks. The initial triumphs of American arms and technology in Afghanistan and Iraq appeared smashing successes. They provided stunning demonstrations of the potential of coercive high technology. Overwhelming firepower delivered with extraordinary precision had routed America's foes, causing them to crumble. For a moment, it looked as if America had not simply exorcised the ghost of Vietnam, but had restored the technological balance of the late nineteenth century when European armies by virtue of their modern firearms were virtually unchallengeable. As the character ‘Blood’ in Hillaire Belloc's 1898 poem ‘The Modern Traveller’, expressed it: ‘Whatever happens, we have got/the Maxim Gun, and they have not’. America, it seemed, had reinvented Blood's Maxim gun. The aggressive exploitation of high technology promised to make the world safe for American policing. Technology would allow Washington to field a small and mobile but well-equipped and powerful force that it could deploy rapidly and at will to meet and overwhelm threats, thereby maintaining a formidable deterrent effect against myriad would-be challengers, without having to resort to the politically unpalatable options of indiscriminate use of violence or the deployment of large number of Americans for protracted periods. That vision ultimately proved a mirage. Not content with smiting its foes and feeling compelled to justify its invasions with the ends of democracy promotion, Washington committed itself to transforming Iraq and Afghanistan and occupied the two countries. Armed resistance to the forces of the United States and its allies in those two countries did not abate, but persisted and even grew. The Americans found their edge in weaponry dissipated, not enhanced, by technology as anti-American forces began adapting cell phones and infrared light beams to detonate comparatively cheap improvised explosive devices. The fascination with military technology induced by laptop carrying Special Forces in Afghanistan and ‘shock and awe’ tactics in Iraq quickly dissipated as clever use of off-the-shelf technology in the form of IEDs and suicide bombs came to dominate narratives of the war. The Americans now found themselves on the receiving end of the cycle of weapons innovation, directing their efforts not to exploit their supremacy in advanced technology but rather to neutralize the innovations of their enemies. The US Army thus scrambled to respond to the IED threat by redesigning its Stryker armored fighting vehicle and rushing into the production of an armored vehicle designed specifically to protect against IEDs – the MRAP (Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected vehicle). Far from summarily defeating foes of the American-led global order with fast and hard strikes, the Americans were bogged down in a frustrating and inconclusive eight-year occupation in Iraq and a more than a decade-old war in Afghanistan. The military travails of the Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan and their subsequent economic troubles at home have convinced many that the age of American empire is over (Galloway 2011; Gardner 2013). Technology, to the extent it would impact politics, has come to be seen as subversive of state control. Observers of Iran's Green Revolution and the mass protests and uprisings known as the Arab Spring thrilled to accounts of activists using cyber social networks to organize and orchestrate popular opposition to ruling regimes. Often overlooked in those accounts were the ways in which regimes could and did exploit those same technologies to identify and suppress their opponents. Governments can use platforms like Twitter and Facebook to identify, trace, and track down their opponents and critics. Social media, like any technology, is a two-edged sword, its effect determined not by any innate quality but rather by who wields it and for what purpose. **The U**nited **S**tates, although it may not have the equivalent of the mythological Maxim gun, **has successfully leveraged tech**nology **to extend its power and reach into foreign societies in ways that would have been inconceivable to the empires of the high-imperial age. American military personnel**, often physically located in the interior of the continental United States, **have employed thousands of** unmanned aerial vehicles, UAVs, or **drones** more popularly, **to surveil, track, and kill hostile individuals literally around the globe**, particularly in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Libya. From 2004 through 2012, American drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia have killed nearly 3500 people (Zenko 2012). Guerrillas, insurgents, and terrorists have long protected themselves from the superior firepower of regular armies and police forces by declining to wear uniforms or other open markers of identity and by refusing to fight in the open. These tactics compel states to do one of the two things: either to curb their use of firepower and thereby neutralize their own advantage, or to employ force indiscriminately and thereby risk alienating their population and public opinion around the world with excessive violence. This is the classic dilemma of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism. To American strategic planners, surveillance and attack drones hold out the promise that they can, if not overcome this dilemma, at least mitigate it. **By employing drones** to find, monitor, and track specific individuals**, the U**nited **S**tates **can aspire to identify whether or not those individuals are hostile and then seamlessly employ an attack drone to destroy that individual**. Thus, the United States government now routinely uses drones to mount extended and even around-the-clock observation of foreign locales to identify and kill suspected terrorists. To be sure, non-combatants are all too often casualties of such strikes and the use of drones has by no means dissolved the counter-insurgent dilemma. Indeed, some observers argue that the so-called ‘collateral damage’ from drone strikes generate more opponents of the United States than they could kill or intimidate (International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic at Stanford Law School and Global Justice Clinic at NYU School of Law 2012). Nonetheless**, it seems clear that drones have reduced the counter-insurgent dilemma**. In countries where they fly they certainly have made life for armed opponents of the United States and its allies significantly more difficult. Alongside their utility in locating, tracking, targeting, and destroying individuals**, a major appeal of drones is their cost**. **Drones pose no risk of death to** highly trained and valuable **pilots and** they **are comparatively cheap**. The Predator, the best-known armed drone, costs a little over $4 million. The more capable Reaper costs $37 million. By comparison, an F-35 fighter costs on the order of $235 million. Relative to their capabilities, **drones will likely only grow cheaper** as design improves, economies of scale drive costs down, and computer components continue to fall in price. Indeed, observation drones are available for purchase to the general public for only several hundred dollars. When combined with the increasingly sophisticated signals, intelligence capabilities of the United States armed forces and intelligence agencies, **drones emerge as a potent tool for monitoring unstable regions and meting out punishment to violent challengers**. **The drone is**, in essence, **a tool well-suited to imperial policing,** on sea as well as on land. Thus, **the withdrawal of** American military **forces** from Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in the greater Middle East **due to war fatigue and financial constraints will not** necessarily eq**uate to an equivalent reduction in America's coercive capabilities.** For better or for worse, technology such as **drones**, satellite surveillance, and improved signals intelligence **provide the world's policeman with a more potent, if not bigger, baton for the buck.** Further advances in computer technology, imaging, nano-technology, biotechnology, and other fields may be translated into more powerful and effective systems of coercion. **Tech**nology **makes many things possible. Empire in an age of austerity might well be one of them**.

**Extinction.**

Thomas **Barnett 11**, Professor, Warfare Analysis and Research Dept – U.S. Naval War College, 3/7, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-at-crossroads>

Events in Libya are a further reminder for Americans that we stand at a crossroads in our continuing evolution as the world's sole full-service superpower. Unfortunately, we are increasingly seeking change without cost, and shirking from risk because we are tired of the responsibility. We don't know who we are anymore, and our president is a big part of that problem. Instead of leading us, he explains to us. Barack Obama would have us believe that he is practicing strategic patience. But many experts and ordinary citizens alike have concluded that he is actually beset by strategic incoherence -- in effect, a man overmatched by the job.  It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of arguably the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack of mass violence. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II.  Let me be more blunt: As the **guardian of globalization**, the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known. Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century, the **mass murder never would have ended.** Indeed, it's entirely conceivable **there would now be** no identifiable human civilization left**, once** nuclear weapons **entered the killing equation.**  But the world did not keep sliding down that **path of perpetual war**. Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by **ushering in our now-**perpetual great-power peace. We introduced the **international liberal trade order known as** globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. What resulted was the collapse of empires, an explosion of democracy, the persistent spread of human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and a **profound and persistent reduction in** battle deaths from state-based conflicts.

# Case

#### a. the 1ac speech act orients itself towards pain and death as knowable metaphysical truths

Gianni **Vattimo**, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Turin “Nihilism and Emancipation” trans. William McCuaig 20**04** pg. 74-75

The "flaw" in metaphysics seen from a Heideggerian perspec­tive is the idea that, at the basis of things, there is a stable order, a structure necessary, eternal, and hence rational, which it is our task to gain knowledge of and adopt as a norm (even this much barely holds up: if it is a necessary datum, why a norm? This is an instance of what is improperly called "Hume's law": we cannot derive a norm from a fact, it simply makes no sense). For the Hei­degger of *Being and Time,* to think of true Being in this "objec­tivistic" manner implies that a) the historicity of human existence "is" not; b) authentically to be would mean escaping from this historicity—to conform to a necessary rational order; c) of which the implicit corollary would be the project for a rationalized soci­ety, overriding the quirks of individuality—the society that Adorno characterized as "total organization" and that Chaplin depicted in *Modern Times.* These are themes found in existential­ism and in the early-twentieth-century avant-garde; they pro­vided inspiration to Heidegger and in him more than in other thinkers they justify his polemic against metaphysics. But historicity, the opening up of human existence, the refusal to let it be reduced to the eternal structure of true Being (true because immutable)—all these signify mortality. In brief, then: **a nonmetaphysical consideration of pain demands a non-metaphysical consideration of death.** This is what Heidegger is striving to attain when, in his work of 1927, he gives a central place in his own teaching to the idea of "being-for-death" and the resolute anticipation of one's own death as the key to the authenticity of existence. Since the world is given as world only to the gaze that man is, to his "thrown project" (a position that Kantism had already reached), and this project is precisely finite, is born and dies, the conclusion must be that Being is not eter­nal structure given once and for all, set before *(ob-jectum)* the mind, which through ascesis becomes capable of seeing it. It is event, happening, historicity. From such a perspective, 'pain and death—we may reason­ably take the two terms as virtual synonyms: we are always suffering from and for mortality; even physical evil is a sign, consequence, and symptom of mortality—are both insuperable and irredeemable. They are beyond explanation or justification because they give no access to a truer truth; instead, they are what sets us free from slavery and resentment vis-à-vis any truer truth (a law of Being, God as creator or judge, baleful des­tiny). What Jesus said about the man born blind might even apply: it is not his fault, or that of his parents, but only "thus it pleased.... " These words should be taken to mean that it was an absolute happenstance. There is no reason for pain, not even a specific and mysterious divine will. With this the foundation has been laid for a twofold, non-metaphysical conception of and treatment for pain. On one hand, pain has no dignity, it merits no respect as such, it is only something that happens, and inasmuch as it is always some­thing that happens without our wishing for it (unlike things that happen for which we have wished, like pleasure and suc­cess), it is pure accident in every sense of the term, it is event *schlechthin,* pure and simple. (Sartre wrote some fine pages on death understood as senseless occurrence, in the belief, proba­bly mistaken, that in so doing he was critiquing Heidegger.)

#### b. reject the affirmative claims of absolute universal truth— otherwise extinction is inevitable

Gianni **Vattimo**, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Turin “Nihilism and Emancipation” trans. William McCuaig 20**04** pg. 55-56

If we do not want—as indeed we cannot, except at the risk of terrible new wars of extinction—to give way to the temptation of resurgent fundamentalisms grounded in race, religion, or even the defense of individual national cultures against invasion by "foreigners," we will have to imagine a humanity with at least some of the characteristics of Nietzsche's *Ubermensch.* The superficial image of some sort of brawny strongman prevailing in the process of natural selection through sheer muscle power need not detain us. Nietzsche said explicitly that he was no Darwinian ass, and what he means by the *Ubermensch* is someone who does have the capacity to move about like a tourist in the park of his­tory, in other words one who is able to look at many cultures with a gaze more esthetic than "objective" and truth seeking. Many ethical positions advanced in our time appear to incorporate an image of this kind; the first name that comes to mind is that of Michel Foucault, for whom morality is at bot­tom the construction of one's own life as a coherent work of art. This stance does not derive from decadentism or D'Annunzio; what Foucault means is the preoccupation with a choice of style and a coherence no less binding than an ethical imperative in the current sense of the term. But Foucault was certainly a thinker profoundly influenced by Nietzsche. If we turn our attention instead to the work of many analytic thinkers in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, we see that for them the task is to bring out the implications of concrete moral options with arguments along these lines: If you accept such and such a behavior, that entails also wishing for this or that consequence, but then you have to decide whether that is the outcome you really do desire. Except for some forms of utilitarianism too dogmatic and abstract ever to be applied, no ultimate foundation for impera­tives and maxims is ever supplied. The real goal of this approach, though, is a certain coherence: not necessarily just the coherence of an arbitrary, individual project but—and this holds for the moral styles of Foucault as well—coherence mostly with historical situations, with tables of shared values. The same is true of moral action as seen from the perspective of Kantian thinkers like Habermas, Hare, and Rawls: here the aim is to choose maxims of action that one could reasonably adopt vis-a-vis all possible interlocutors, with no claim to the status of apodictic proofs. Are we really to conclude that these ethical stances of today must be rejected because of some contamination by profound estheticism? In my opinion, we ought rather to heed this "esthetic" tendency in order to see how the culture of today can and should reconcile social peace with liberty. What we really need to do—and this does not necessarily have to conflict with religiosity, especially Christian religiosity—is to say farewell to claims to absolute truth. In a society in which we are more and more likely to encounter ethical and religious positions and cul­tural traditions unlike the ones we were born into and grew up with, the best stance to adopt is that of a "tourist" in a history park. The real enemy of liberty is the person who thinks she can and should preach final and definitive truth.

**Turn – Oversight of targeting killings causes a shift to signature strikes.**

Jens David **Ohlin 13**, Professor at Cornell Law School, http://www.liebercode.org/2013/02/would-federal-district-court-for-drones.html

**One of the more interesting recent proposals for curing the "due process" deficit in the Administration's targeted killings program is for Congress to create a federal court to approve drone strikes**. Senator Dianne Feinstein, among others, is championing this strategy. I don't think it will work. Here's why. First, the court would be modeled after the super-secret FISA court for approving government requests for surveillance in terrorism cases. Such courts impose a form of judicial review, yes, but there is little transparency and no adversarial process. But there are bigger problems. As some of my colleagues have already explained**, it is unlikely and improbable that such a court could authorize specific operational strikes**. **That would be difficult to implement in real time, and might even be unconstitutional for infringing on the Executive Branch's commander-in-chief power**. Rather, **such a court would approve the administration's decision to place an individual's name on an approved target list**. A court would review the legitimacy of this decision with the power to remove the name if the individual does not meet the standard for being a functional member of al-Qaeda. Although this is more plausible, I still don't think it will work. In the end, I think **it would just push the administration to avoid targeted killings and would have the opposite effect.** **It would increase, not decrease, collateral damage**. Let me explain. **Suppose the government has previously used the kill list to govern the selection procedure for targeted killings.** The list serves as a clearinghouse for debates and ultimately conclusions about who is a high-value target. If the administration decides that the individual should be pursued, he is placed on the list. If the administration decides that the individual is of marginal or no value, he is removed from the list or never placed on it to begin with. Now imagine that a court is requiring that the list be approved by a judicial process. **Why would the administration have any incentive at all to keep adding names to the list? Why not stop using it entirely? It could then rely exclusively on signature strikes** -- an important legal development well documented by Kevin Heller in his forthcoming JICJ article on the subject. **Such strikes would not be banned by the court because the US would not know exactly who it is bombing**. (I'm assuming for the sake of argument that the US is still engaged in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda and that the AUMF or some other statutory authorization for the President's pursuit of the conflict would still be in place.) Essentially, **this would be a case of willful blindness** -- a concept well known to criminal law scholars. **The real benefit of targeted killings is that the administration knows the exact threat and only targets one individual. That has changed warfare tremendously**. **But the court system would push the military back towards the old system**: **target groups of individuals who are known terrorists or enemy combatants** -- but you don't know exactly who they are. You just know they are the enemy. **That's the system that reigned in all previous conflicts**. **And there would be a disincentive to ever acquire more specific information**. Why have a drone hover over an area with known terrorists in order to determine, through surveillance, the exact identity of the individual's there? That would only trigger the jurisdiction of the drone court. So ignorance would maintain the legality of the strike. I don't think that is what Congressional staffers have in mind.

#### Aff meets the definition of targeted killings

**Alston 2011**

[Philip, John Norton Pomeroy Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. The author was UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions from 2004 until 2010. “ARTICLE: The CIA and Targeted Killings Beyond Borders” Harvard National Security Journal, 2 Harv. Nat'l Sec. J. 283, Nexis]

C. **Defining "Targeted Killings"** As with many terms that have entered the popular consciousness as though they had a clear and defined meaning, **there is no established or formally agreed upon legal definition of the term "targeted killings" and scholarly definitions vary widely. Some** commentators **have sought to "call a spade a spade" and used terms such as** "leadership decapitation," n30 which clearly captures only some of the practices at stake, **assassinations**, n31 or "extrajudicial executions," **which has the downside of building per se illegality into the description of the process**, or "targeted pre-emptive actions," which is designed to characterize a killing as a legal exercise of the right of self-defense. n32 **But these usages have not caught on and do not seem especially helpful in light of the range of practices generally sought to be covered by the use of the term-targeted killing.** The term was brought into common usage after 2000 to describe Israel's self-declared policy of "targeted killings" of alleged terrorists in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. n33 But influential commentators also sought to promote more positive terminology. The present head of the [\*296] Israeli Military Intelligence Directorate, for example, argued that they should be termed "preventive killing," which was consistent with the fact that they were "acts of self-defense and justified on moral, ethical and legal grounds." n34 Others followed suit and adopted definitions designed to reflect Israeli practice. n35 Kremnitzer, for example, defined a "preventative (targeted) killing" as "the intended and precise assassination of an individual; in many cases of an activist who holds a command position in a military organization or is a political leader." n36 For Kober, it is the "selective execution of terror activists by states." n37 But **such definitions reflect little,** if any, **recognition of the constraints imposed by international law, a dimension to which subsequent definitions have**, at least in theory**, been more attuned**. Most recently, Michael Gross has defined such killing as "an unavoidable, last resort measure to prevent an immediate and grave threat to human life." Although this too remains rather open-ended, Gross relies on international standards to defend it when he suggests that it tracks "exactly the same rules that guide law enforcement officials." n38 He cites as authority for that proposition the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, n39 but these principles contain no such provisions. The quotation he uses is, in fact, a rough summary of the text of Article 2(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights, a standard that was adopted in 1950 and has since been interpreted in a much more restrictive manner than he suggests. n40 Gross then goes on to suggest that the approach he proposes is "like that of the Israeli courts," when in fact the key judgment of the Israeli Supreme Court on the question [\*297] of targeted killings does not apply international human rights law at all, but instead uses the customary law applicable to international armed conflicts. n41 At the other end of the definitional spectrum is a five-part definition proposed by Gary Solis. For there to be a targeted killing: (i) there must be an armed conflict, either international or non-international in character; (ii) the victim must be specifically targeted; (iii) he must be "beyond a reasonable possibility of arrest"; (iv) the killing must be authorized by a senior military commander or the head of government; (v) and the target must be either a combatant or someone directly participating in the hostilities. n42 But whereas Gross seeks to use a human rights-based definition, Solis proposes one which is unsuitable outside of international humanitarian law. **A more flexible approach is needed in order to reflect the fact that "targeted killing" has been used to describe a wide range of situations**. They include, for example: the killing of a "rebel warlord" by Russian armed forces, the killing of an alleged al Qaeda leader and five other men in Yemen by a CIA-operated Predator drone using a Hellfire missile; killings by both the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam of individuals accused by each side of collaborating with the other; and the killing in Dubai of a Hamas leader in January 2010, allegedly carried out by a team of Israeli Mossad intelligence agents. **Targeted killings therefore take place in a variety of contexts and may be committed by governments and their agents in times of peace as well as armed conflict**, or by organized armed groups in armed conflict. **The means and methods of killing vary, and include shooting at close range, sniper fire, firing missiles from helicopters or gunships, firing from UAVs, the use of car bombs, and poison.** **There are thus three central requirements for a workable definition. The first is that it be able to embrace the different bodies of international law that apply** and is not derived solely from either IHRL or IHL. **The second is that it should not prejudge the question of the legality** or illegality [\*298] **of the practice in question. And the third is that it must be sufficiently flexible to be able to encompass a broad range of situations in relation to which it has regularly been applied.** The common element in each of the very different contexts noted earlier is that **lethal force is intentionally and deliberately used**, with a degree of pre-meditation, against an individual or individuals specifically identified in advance by the perpetrator. n43 **In a targeted killing, the specific goal of the operation is to use lethal force. This distinguishes targeted killings from** unintentional, **accidental**, or reckless **killings**, or killings made without conscious choice. **It also distinguishes them from law enforcement operations**, e.g., against a suspected suicide bomber. Under such circumstances, it may be legal for law enforcement personnel to shoot to kill based on the imminence of the threat, but the goal of the operation, from its inception, should not be to kill. **Although in most circumstances targeted killings violate the right to life**, in the exceptional circumstance of armed conflict, **they may be legal. This is in contrast to other terms with which "targeted killing" has sometimes been interchangeably used, such as "extrajudicial execution,**" "summary execution**," and "assassination," all of which are, by definition, illegal**. n44 Consistent with the detailed analysis developed by Nils Melzer, n45 **this Article adopts the following definition: a targeted killing is the intentional, premeditated, and deliberate use of lethal force, by States or their agents acting under color of law,** or by an organized armed group in armed conflict, **against a specific individual who is not in the physical custody of the perpetrator**. n46

**-- No root cause -- Philosophical outcomes do not determine political ones.**

**Yar, ‘2k** (Lecturer at the School of Social Policy, Sociology and Social Research at the University of Kent, January, Cultural Values, Volume 4, Issue 1)

A second, and not unrelated difficulty, is a causal attribution to philosophy in relation to politics, culture and society. That is, the tendency is not simply to attribute philosophical figurations of the political to the political experiences of actual social beings, but also to depict those philosophical interpretations standing in a determining relation to the culture and society as a whole. As Heidegger declaims at the beginning of 'The Age of the World Picture', 'Metaphysics grounds an age, in that through a specific interpretation of what is and through a specific comprehension of truth it gives to that age the basis upon which it is essentially formed [emphasis added]' (Heidegger, 1977, p. 115). 'Metaphysics', as an 'interpretation', is the basis upon which an age is formed. The 'interpretation' adduced here, let us be clear, is that of philosophy. Hence, for Arendt, the emergence of philosophy's metaphysical discourse on the political, its figuration of the political in terms of a dualistic metaphysical ontology, in terms of theoretical models of truth, and so on, rather than in terms of doxical opinion, agonism and performativity etc., -- this philosophical figuration is taken as a disaster for political life. Yet this disastrous consequence only follows from the philosophical refiguration if we accord philosophical understanding a determinative or prescriptive role, in that it has the power to efface and override the existing understandings that political actors might have. The 'onto-theological' or 'onto-typological' tradition is taken to permeate Western science, culture, and politics as a whole; the language of metaphysics is held to be central to constituting the entire range of human possibilities (McCarthy, 1991, p. 102; Rorty, 1984, p. 3, pp. 15-6; Rorty, 1998, p. 45; also, Rorty, 1991). As Richard Rorty puts it: 'there is something called 'philosophy' or 'metaphysics' which is central to our culture and has been radiating evil influences outward' (Rorty, 1984, pp. 18-9).[ 19] In short, the 'postmetaphysical' discourse on the political 'presupposes a prior determination of the political as the practical effectuation of the philosophical' (Fraser, 1984, p. 136). This casts philosophy in a relation to the political as both villain and hero. First philosophy qua metaphysics is the party responsible for the parlous state of the modem political, the cause of its pathological degradation into a totalitarian form of relation toward Being and beings. Then philosophy charges itself with the responsibility of redeeming the political, by way of philosophy's self-transformation into a postphilosophical, literary-poetic 'thinking'. What is missed here is the possibility that the political never did mirror or actualise the metaphysicians' understanding of Being; that for political life, it might well have been 'business as usual', largely indifferent to philosophy's discourse. From the standpoint of political beings it might be claimed that they never have lived their relations in the way in which philosophers' discourses figured them. Consequently, there is no need to 'breach a wholly other politics' to lead them back from an oblivion which only ever existed as part of philosophical manifestos. Hence there is no necessity to lead political beings back to something primordial or essential from which they have supposedly departed - this departure, or 'forgetting', is characteristic only of philosophy's turn to metaphysics, not of the field of political practice. I'm not necessarily claiming that this is the case, that there is a profound disjunction between the comportment toward humans and other entities envisioned by modern philosophy on the one hand, and that to be found in the understandings of our political culture and the practices of political life on the other. The point is, that this a question for substantive inquiry; if we want to say something about the way in which the modem political reveals the Being of beings (technologically, coercively, forgettingly, etc.) this is something which has to be investigated. The 'postmetaphysical' critique of political modernity assumes convergence or identity by mapping philosophical renditions onto the culture as a whole, and what is more, makes philosophy responsible for that convergence via its determining influence. If we insist on proceeding in this way, we might get our 'diagnosis of the present', and any attendant 'prescription' for our ailing political life, rather alarmingly wrong.

**Reps won’t alter policy—looking to structures and politics is more vital**

**Tuathail, ‘96** (Gearoid, Department of Georgraphy at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Political Geography, 15(6-7), p. 664, science direct)

While theoretical debates at academic conferences are important to academics, the discourse and concerns of foreign-policy decision- makers are quite different, so different that they constitute a distinctive problem- solving, theory-averse, policy-making subculture. There is a danger that academics assume that the discourses they engage **are more significant** in the practice of foreign policy and the exercise of power than they really are. This is not, however, to minimize the obvious importance of academia as a general institutional structure among many that sustain certain epistemic communities in particular states. In general, I do not disagree with Dalby’s fourth point about politics and discourse except to note that his statement-‘Precisely because reality could be represented in particular ways political decisions could be taken, troops and material moved and war fought’-evades the important question of agency that I noted in my review essay. The assumption that it is representations that make action possible **is inadequate** by itself. Political, military and economic structures, institutions, discursive networks and leadership are all crucial in explaining social action and should be theorized together with representational practices. Both here and earlier, Dalby’s reasoning inclines towards a form of idealism. In response to Dalby’s fifth point (with its three subpoints), it is worth noting, first, that his book is about the CPD, not the Reagan administration. He analyzes certain CPD discourses, root the geographical reasoning practices of the Reagan administration nor its public-policy reasoning on national security. Dalby’s book is narrowly textual; the general contextuality of the Reagan administration is not dealt with. Second, let me simply note that I find that the distinction between critical theorists and post- structuralists is a little too rigidly and heroically drawn by Dalby and others. Third, Dalby’s interpretation of the reconceptualization of national security in Moscow as heavily influenced by dissident peace researchers in Europe is highly idealist, an interpretation that ignores the structural and ideological crises facing the Soviet elite at that time. Gorbachev’s reforms and his new security discourse were also strongly self- interested, an ultimately futile attempt to save the Communist Party and a discredited regime of power from disintegration. The issues raised by Simon Dalby in his comment are important ones for all those interested in the practice of critical geopolitics. While I agree with Dalby that questions of discourse are extremely important ones for political geographers to engage, there is a danger of fetishizing this concern with discourse so that we **neglect** the institutional and the sociological, the materialist and the cultural, the political and the geographical contexts within which particular discursive strategies **become significant**. Critical geopolitics, in other words, should not be a prisoner of the sweeping ahistorical cant that sometimes accompanies ‘poststructuralism nor convenient reading strategies like the identity politics narrative; it needs to always be open to the patterned mess that is human history.

**Postmodernists focus too much on the representations of war—they will inevitably reify the dominant discourse by ignoring the realities of the effects of war**

**Krishna, ’93** – Prof Poli Sci @ U of Hawaii (Summer, Sankaran, Alternatives, “The Importance of Being Ironic: A Postcolonial View on Critical International Relations Theory”, pg. 398-399)

Yet overemphasizing the new forms of representations of the war in the media can become politically problematic. First, a focus on the newness of "cyberwar" detracts attention from the fact that in many ways the Gulf War was very much in the mold of previous conflicts. Far from indicating any shift from the material to the perceptual, this conflict was about territory, oil, and reasserting US hegemony. Second, one ought not to confuse the actual nature of the Gulf War with the Pentagon's close orchestration of its media coverage. In this regard, quotes such as the following leave this reviewer with a sense of disquiet: The consequence ... is that in modern warfare, as the aim of battle shifts from territorial, economic, and material gains to immaterial, perceptual fields the spectacle of war is displaced by the war of spectacle. (AD: 191) For several reasons (technological, political, and theoretical), the warrior has ceased to hold any kind of possibility. Instances where the warrior seems to be present—Panama, Liberia, Grenada, Afghanistan, even the Persian Gulf—quickly present themselves as failures, spectacles, or exercises in nostalgia. (KN: 24) Contrasted with this supposed dematerialization of war, territory, and the warrior, and a supposedly new era of cyberwars of sign systems, a few enduring realities seem to need reiteration: The war in Iraq was over one of those stubborn geopolitical facts of the present era—oil. It was preceded by a Hannibal-esque build-up lasting more than six months (in contrast to all this talk about speed). The overwhelming percentage of the bombs used in Iraq were not "smart" bombs; in fact nearly 93 percent of the 88,500 tons of bombs used in that war were not precision-guided but "dumb" bombs. US bombs are estimated to have "missed" their targets about 70 percent of the time (needless to add, a "missed target" probably means higher civilian casualties). Far from being a "clean" war (as General Powell and others suggested during the conflict), the weapons systems used were deliberately designed to increase human casualties and suffering. Thus, the Multiple-Launch Rocket System; the Army Tactical Missile System; the "Adam" bombs designed to "spin out tiny darts with razor edges; phosphorous howitzer shells that spew fragments which penetrate enemy bodies and produce lesions"; fuel-air bombs, which "burn oxygen over a surface of over 1 or 2 square kilometers, destroying all human life through asphyxiation or through implosion of the lungs, leaving no chance for survival" and replicating tactical nuclear weapons in their destructiveness—all these and more were used on the traffic jam on the road connecting Kuwait to Iraq, where thousands of soldiers and civilians (including migrant laborers) were trapped and became a turkey-shoot for US "technology."29 By emphasizing the technology and speed in the Gulf War, endlessly analyzing the representation of the war itself, without a simultaneous exposition of the "ground realities," postmodernist analyses wind up, unwittingly, echoing the Pentagon and the White House in their claims that this was a "clean" war with smart bombs that take out only defense installations with minimal "collateral damage." One needs to reflesh the Gulf War dead through our postmortems instead of merely echoing, with Virilio and others, the "disappearance" of territory or the modern warrior with the new technologies; or the intertext connecting the war and television; or the displacement of the spectacle of war by the war of spectacle.30 Second, the emphasis on the speed with which the annihilation proceeded once the war began tends to obfuscate the long build-up to the conflict and US complicity in Iraqi foreign and defense policy in prior times. Third, as the details provided above show, if there was anything to highlight about the war, it was not so much its manner of representation as the incredible levels of annihilation that have been perfected. To summarize: I am not suggesting that postmodernist analysts of the war are in agreement with the Pentagon's claims regarding a "clean" war; I am suggesting that their preoccupation with representation, sign systems, and with the signifier over the signified, leaves one with little sense of the annihilation visited upon the people and land of Iraq. And, as the Vietnam War proved and Schwarzkopf well realized, without that physicalistic sense of violence, war can be more effectively sold to a jingoistic public.