# 1NC

### Realism K

####  “Invisible Man”

Ralph Ellison (Vintage International Edition, 1995)

“Well, I wasn’t always lame, and I’m not really now ‘cause the doctors can’t find anything wrong with that leg. They said it’s sound as a piece of steel. What I meant is I got this limp from dragging a chain.”

I couldn’t see it in his face or hear it in his speech, yet I knew he was neither lying nor trying to shock me. I shook my head.

“Sure,” he said. “Nobody knows that about me, they think I just got rheumatism. But it was the chain, and after nineteen years I haven’t been able to stop dragging my leg.”

“Nineteen years!”

“Nineteen years, six months and two days. And what I did wasn’t much; that is, it wasn’t much when I did it. But after all that time it changed into something else and it seemed to be as bad as they said it was. All that time *made* it bad. I paid for it with everything I had but my life. I lost my wife and my boys and my piece of land. So what started out as an argument between a couple of men turned out to be a crime worth nineteen years of my life”.

“What on earth did you do, Brother Tarp?”

“I said no to a man who wanted to take something from me; that’s what it cost me for saying no, and even now the debt ain’t fully paid and will *never* be paid in their terms.”

A pain throbbed in my throat and I felt a kind of numb despair. Nineteen years! And here he was talking quietly to me about this no doubt the first time he’d tried to tell anyone about it. By why me, I thought, why pick me?

“I said no,” he said. “I said *hell*, no! And I kept saying no until I broke the chain and left.” (387)

\*\*\*

And I awoke in the blackness.

Fully awake now, I simply lay there as though paralyzed. I could think of nothing else to do. Later I would try to find my way out, but now I could lie on the floor, reliving the dream. All their faces were so vivid that they seemed to stand before me beneath a spotlight. They were all up there somewhere, making a mess of the world. Well, let them. I was through, and in spite of the dream, I was whole.

And now I realized that I couldn’t return to Mary’s, or to any part of my old life. I could approach it only from the outside, and I had been invisible to Mary as I had been to the Brotherhood. No, I couldn’t return to Mary’s, or to the campus, or to the Brotherhood, or home. I could only move ahead or stay here, underground. So I would stay here until I was chased out. Here, at least, I could try to think things out in peace, or, if not in peace, in quiet. I would take up residence underground. The end was in the beginning. (570-571)

\*\*\*

Yes, but what *is* the next phase? How often have I tried to find it! Over and over again I’ve gone up above to seek it out. For, like almost everyone else in our country, I started out with my share of optimism. I believed in hard work and progress and action, but now, after first being “for” society and then “against” it, I assign myself no rank or any limit, and such an attitude is very much against the trend of the times. But my world has become one of infinite possibilities. What a phrase—still it’s a good phrase and a good view of life, and a man shouldn’t accept any other; that much I’ve learned underground. Until some gang succeeds in putting the world in a straight jacket, its definition is possibility. Step outside the narrow borders of what men call reality and you step into chaos—ask Rinehart, he’s master of it—or imagination. That too I’ve learned in the cellar, and not by deadening my sense of perception; I’m invisible, not blind.

No, indeed, the world is just as concrete, ornery, vile and sublimely wonderful as before, only now I better understand my relation to it and it to me. I’ve come a long way from those days when, full of illusion, I believed a public life and attempted to function under the assumption that the world was solid and all the relationships therin. Now I know men are different and that life is divided and that only in division is there true health. Hence again I have stayed in my hole, because up above there’s an increasing passion to make men conform to a pattern. Just as in my nightmare, Jack and the boys are waiting with their knives, looking for the slightest excuse to…well, to “ball the jack,” and I do not refer to the old dance step, although what they’re doing is making the old eagle rock dangerously.

Whence all this passion toward conformity anyway?—diversity is the word. Let man keep his many parts and you’ll have no tyrant states. Why, if they follow this conformity business they’ll end up forcing me, an invisible man, to become white, which is not a color but a lack of one. Must I strive towards colorlessness? But seriously, and without snobbery, think of what the world would lose if that should happen. American is woven of many strands; I would recognize them and let it so remain. It’s “winner take nothing” that is the great truth of our country or of any country. Life is to be lived, not controlled; humanity is won by continuing to play in face of certain defeat. Our fate is to become one, and yet many—this is not prophecy, but description. Thus one of the greatest jokes in the world is the spectacle of whites busy escaping blacks and becoming blacker every day, and the blacks striving toward whiteness, becoming quite dull and gray. None of us seems to know who is he or where he’s going. (576-577)

### 1NC- Corporatism (Long)

#### Our alternative is a paradigm shift in social relations towards a more equitable distribution of resources. This recognizes material foundations for autonomy as a pre-requisite for communication

**Briscoe '12** Felicia, Professor of Education at UTSA, "Anarchist, Neoliberal, & Democratic Decision-Making: Deepening the Joy in Learning and Teaching" Education Studies, Vol. 48, Issue 1

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00131946.2011.637257#preview

A More Equal Distribution of Resources **Emma Goldman describes anarchism as “an order that will guarantee to every human being free access to the earth and full enjoyment of the necessities of life”** (1907, 68). Rocker (1938) describes the effects of acute inequality in the distribution of resources: **Our present economic system, leading to a mighty accumulation of social wealth in the hands of a privileged minority and to a continuous impoverishment of the great masses of the people *. . .* sacrificed the general interests of human society to the private interests of individuals** and thus systematically undermined the relationship between man and man [sic]. People forgot that industry is not an end in itself, but should be only a means to insure to man his material subsistence and to make accessible to him the blessings of a higher intellectual culture. Where industry is everything and man is nothing begins the realm of ruthless economic despotism whose workings are no less disastrous than political despotism. (2)19 Although Rocker wrote in 1938, the polarization of wealth20 and the elevation of industry (or business/corporate interests) over human interests remain true.21 **An equal distribution of economic power or resources is fundamental to equalizing power relationships**. One anarchist, Fotopoulos (2008), describes this necessary “economic democracy *. . .* as the authority of the people *demos* in the economic sphere, implying the existence of economic equality in the sense of an equal distribution of economic power” (442). Without equal power relations brought about by a fairly equal distribution of wealth, the individual autonomy advocated by deep democracy and anarchism cannot be operationalized. Each Person Directly Participates in Decisions Affecting Her or His Life (Autonomy) Anarchism’s and deep democracy’s call for a more equal distribution of resources helps to create the conditions necessary for autonomy. Perhaps the single most important foundation of anarchist thought is autonomy, as described by Anna Goldman (2010): [Anarchism is] based in the understanding that we are best qualified tomake decisions about our own lives.Anarchists believe that we must all control our own lives,making decisions collectively about matters, which affect us. Anarchists believe and engage in direct action. (para 7) Several scholars have analyzed the importance of autonomy to human experience. Although Paulo Freire (1970) does not describe himself as an anarchist, his analysis of autonomy in regards to determining one’s own thoughts and actions is often quoted by anarchists such as Spring (2008). Freire (1970) discusses the **death that occurs without autonomy: Overwhelming control—is necrophilic; it is nourished by love of death, not life. Based on a mechanistic, static, naturalistic, spatialized view of consciousness; it transforms students into receiving objects. It attempts to control thinking and action, leads men to adjust to the world, and inhibits their creative power**. (64) Freire’s description of overwhelming control resonates with Mr. Jackson’s description of his experience in an urban school, with students being “tested to death” under the current policies. A number of scholars22 note that **without equal power relationships, there is little autonomy; without autonomy, authentic communication becomes impossible.**

#### The role of the ballot is to resist performances complicit with corporatist ideology of self-creation and the vocabulary of radical choice that constructs them. Insofar as the aff solves, they assert the privilege to call into question the current order from a position that is dominant

**Mueller '13** Sebastian, "NEWSPEAK RULES. HOW NEOLIBERALISM EXPLAINS THE WORLD"

http://www.indybay.org/newsitems/2013/02/05/18731399.php

**How is the socio-economic change of the last decades expressed in political language? Is there a specific ideology vocabulary of an economic paradigm dominating society and public perception?** **As long as neoliberalism is a perpetual theme in public debates, the question about its language must be raised.** The financial- and economic crisis reveals the unbroken hegemony of neoclassical dogma. Since it is more than a mere economic theory, neoliberalism as a whole remains an abstract phenomenon that is hardly graspable. With the much-invoked end of ideologies since the disappearance of “command socialism” and the marginalization of political oppositions in a seemingly rationalized and secularized world, the delimitation of political parties by a different use of language becomes blurred. The struggle over terms is over – it is now waged beyond the parties. Nearly all the parties use concepts of economic rationality and practical constraints. Neoliberalism overarches the parties and extends to all areas of human life together. Michael Baurmann, co-editor of the sociological journal Analyse & Kritik emphasizes that **the model Homo Oeconomicus is propagated as a basic behavioral model for all the social sciences. The fact that academics oriented in economic thinking have crossed the borders of economic disciplines and increasingly focus on subjects far outside traditional economic theory is described as an institutionalistic revolution.** Since our society and the political culture are subject to a process of constant change, linguistic symbols and terms also inevitably change. Such change processes are regarded as unproblematic as long as concrete facts or undisputed connections are involved. However the communicative connection becomes difficult when linguistic signs attempt to characterize complex connections and values that are essential for religion and culture, history and politics. This problem of potential ambiguity or vagueness can become the basis for systematic conceptual interpretation and reinterpretation in the course of ideological conflicts and social-political processes of change. Language becomes a result of the cultural, social and political history of the respective speech community and generation. The political vocabulary is very closely tied to the social life and changes with it. Political terms are a reflection of social development and of an ideology-vocabulary that changes its meaning in the course of time. HETEROGENEITY OF NEOLIBERALISM The ideology vocabulary of neoliberalism is not only the reflection of such a development. It can also steer this development with an unparalleled efficiency. Although neoliberalism is largely discredited as an abstract term, it develops and establishes its hegemony in everyday thinking through reinterpretation of political language in a triumphant hegemonial procession. Since the 1990s the term “neoliberalism” along with the term “globalization” has had a boom season even though it is not used any more by its proponents. The term was judged increasingly negative in the last decade and was no longer merely descriptive or positive. Leftist forces succeeded in using a once positive term, negatively on the plane of conceptuality. Leftist movements celebrated at least a partial success since the strategies of neoliberal think tanks were applied against those think tanks. On the other side, this led to mixing up original meanings. Neoliberalism has become a generic term that covers shareholder value, privatization serving a market-radical capitalism and the economizing of all areas of social life. This can hardly do justice to historical differentiation… Seeking an unequivocal definition is a futile undertaking today after a debate over decades swelling-up and dying-out. However what unites neoliberalism regarding its ideology vocabulary should be highlighted. Firstly, **what most unites neoliberalism is the rejection of collectivism including social democracy and Keynesianism and the welfare state** – after the Second World War – and not only communism, Marxism and socialism. Positive common interests can also be found beyond this smallest common denominator. The broad approval of neoliberal minds on the so-called Statement of Aims of the Mont Pelerien Society is revealing. The MPS founded in 1947 as a union of liberal intellectuals is regarded as the most influential though little-known think tank of the second half of the 20thj century. At first it was led by Albert Hunold and Friedrich August von Hayek. In the Statement of Aims, a “Redefinition of the Functions of the State” and methods for the “Reintroduction of the Rule of Law” are stressed alongside the principles private property, market competition and freedom. Hayek pointed out “the functioning of the `free’ economy assumes and requires very definite activities of the state.” These involve carrying out “the conscious application of competition as an ordering principle of the economy” and “creating conditions under which competition can take effect as charitably and undisturbed as possible.” Before and after 1970, think tanks like the MPS spread Hayek’s market-radical freedom ideology and Milton Friedman’s economic theories. In Germany, the action groups Social Market Economy, Market Economy foundation, Friedrich-August-von-Hayek-society, Friedrich-Naumann-foundation and the Walter Eucken Institute could be named. As a neoliberal think tank, the well-known and influential New Social Market Economy Initiative has great power in Germany. With all substantive differences, the think tanks appear with the goal of establishing neoliberal thou9ght patterns. The possibility of being hegemonial was and is given to neoliberalism since there are different intellectual and pragmatic positions within the MPS, other discussion circles and think tanks. In the German speech area, the INSM is very striking for the reinterpretation of terms and language as a means to an end – namely mixing in everyday understanding. REINTERPRETATION THROUGH THE NEOLIBERAL LANGUAGE CODE The name New Social Market Economy Initiative is already misleading since the goal of the INSM is more a “capitalist free market economy” than a “social” market economy. With this shrewd conceptual adaptation, a catchword coined by Ludwig Erhard and filled with positive associations in the history of Germany is reinterpretated and instrumentalized for its own goals. The INSM pretends to champion a modernization or renewal of a successful model for which there is a broad consensus in Germany. In its core, the INSM supports economic interests through PR-measures. With an annual investment of 10 million Euros for campaigns, it has a significant influence on discourse in the mass media and on the Internet. The INSM has a sphere of activity throu9gh tightly packed personnel networks, prominent and highly decorated academic representatives and professional PR-work. In 2000 the INSM created the slogan “social is what creates work” which was adopted two years later by the CSU in the election campaign. Despite clear references by the press to its historical incrimination, it was applied in the 2005 election campaign by Angela Merkel, Edmund Stoiber, Guido Westerwelle and other CDU- and FDP politicians. The PR-slogan changed the central term “social” without steering the debate in the sense of the INSM. The targeted application of such slogans and catchwords helped initiate political “reform processes.” Bourdieu used this strategy when he demonstrated to the neoliberal proponents that a selective implementation of economic-rational theory and way of thinking was successfully anchored in human consciousness. **Incomprehensible or everyday terms like “fit,” “sleek,” “competitiveness” or “globalization” serve as tools and ends. They help launch a desired ideal or problem,, set it on the political agenda and constitute social reality.** The term “sound bite” in the US is an extremely effective strategy of political communication: “A sound bite is more than a good slogan. It is a three-dimensional illustrative term, a short message that impresses. Sound bite describes that message that a politicians or party want to teach voters and therefore is repeated in many speeches and statements, brochures and posters.” The innate anti-enlightened potential to describe or construct a new “reality” is alarming. Words do not lead inevitably to new conceptual categories. However out of the need for a new picture of society, the catchwords are a necessary political means to simplify an ideology. At the same time they serve in fighting the existing reality or status quo – on one side by decoding the catchwords of the ideological adversary and on the other side by synonymous distinction of terms (liberal democracy instead of social democracy, competition state instead of social state and neosocial instead of social). SOCIAL STATE UNDER ATTACK If one glances at the political debates and opinion climate of the last decades, it is striking that originally positive terms were devalued analogous to selective re-creations or re-interpretations. The social state is targeted in particular. If it was an epitome for solidarity, social security, justice and democracy in the 1960s and 1970s, it has been subjected to vehement attacks at least since the 1990s (“welfare dictatorship”). The changed connotation is connected with the changing social and socio-economic framing conditions of Germany… The erosion of the basic Keynesian consensus in Germany meant simultaneously the turning away from the interventionist welfare state. Visual perceptions shifted ultimately from the security- and provision-state toward increasing “freedom” and “personal responsibility” of citizens. **Social dislocations are charged to the impacted themselves. With personal responsibility, the scandal of poverty mutates to the scandal of the poor themselves.** More possibilities for devaluating the social state are given with this rhetorical justification. Its social legitimation was taken away with word parodies like “social hammock” or with the pretext it stands in the way of reforms and pressing modernization. This neoliberal narrative also has its own catchword. The term “reform backlog” (Reformstau) came into fashion at the beginning of the 1990s in the German media and was the 1997 word of the year. Since the term reform is interpreted as genuinely positive and connected with modernization and progress, the metaphor “reform backlog” was effective and popular. The background of this word creation was the alleged competitive disadvantage of the German economic- and social state model in the location- and competition battle of different models of capitalism. Since the social state opposes the neoliberal ideal of a self-organizing market society, it is represented as bureaucratically encrusted, inefficient and endangering-freedom. That the idea of freedom in the self-image of neoliberalism is limited to the freedom of market participation is completely repressed. “Neoliberalism withdraws from the emancipator roots of middle class liberalism through this one-sided equation of freedom with economic freedom. Political freedom (…) becomes a threat to the market society.” STRATEGIES OF WORD CREATION The creation of terms that mean something different than their literal meaning is also characteristic for neoliberal language work. False words turn facts upside down or conceal unpopular intentions behind a good formulation. When lowering non-wage labor costs is emphasized everywhere, the impression arises that wages will be free from unnecessary costs. However the relief of businesses from their social obligations is really meant. **This is also true for the word over-regulation which on first view can be understood as another word for bureaucratization. However nothing but the dismantling of workers’ rights is intended concretely. Flexibility which implies more freedom of movement becomes the freedom of movement of capital. Generational justice is a theme even when solidarity between the generations is cancelled (pension reform). In the public debates, language forms that veil real events are encountered everywhere.** In this context, Christoph Butterwegge, an erudite critic of neoliberalism, refers to a threefold modification of the term justice: from need- to “performance-justice,” distribution to “participation-justice” and social to “generational justice.” All this casts a new light on the catchwords that were and are used intensively in the course of labor market and social reforms in Germany. Words like performance, efficiency, mobility, flexibility, location-competition, competitiveness and evaluation receive a new meaning as metaphors of an economic ideology. Their constituted meaning has an economic-political basis in the sense of entrepreneurship. They become classic terms of a neoliberal vocabulary. Neoliberal political goals are transported in physical metaphors like the “sleek state” that refer again to the ideal of the efficient, healthy and youthful person. We have to grapple with a dichotomy. While neoliberalism on one side is often verbalized in the form of conservative nature imagery (information flood, state failure) and spongy terms like performance and competition elude critical questioning, an economization and mathematization of nearly all areas of life occurs on the other side. Things that cannot be operationalized in simple comprehensible numerical values are denied their market conformity and often their right to exist (for example, long-term basic research versus profit-oriented, technocratic expert knowledge). The rise of firmly integrated anglicisms in academic- and economic language and in bureaucracy is only consistent. English is integrated as an essential element of the neoliberal ideology vocabulary on one side through the banal fact that a political and social focus on the economic also implies the language of the economy and on the other side the general change of course to an Anglo-Saxon capitalism model. Words like benchmarking, ranking, job center, session, service, management, marketing, product placement, consulting in the economy and outsourcing, public-private partnership, cross-boarder-leasing as catchwords for the transformation and minimization of the state become the neoliberal ideal of the sleek or minimal state. The term New-Public-Management (NPM) stands for a reform of public management entities according to operational standards. STATE FINANCES: THE WAY TO THE “DEBT BRAKE” Thus the power of the political in the spirit of this economic paradigm serves less and less the regulative social organization. Rather it is used to serve an economic society as a model in the sign of neoliberalism. In the same way as with the Homo Oeconomicus within the market society, it is now carried out in the state machine itself – most clearly in the example of state finances. Finances are suited for the physical and ideal health discourse. Revenues and expenditures or deficits and surpluses stand ideally for a model social policy. Accordingly a financial- and austerity-policy of the “sleek state” stands in the foreground and no longer goals like economic policy, investments and job creation schemes, all instruments that neoliberal economists reject as incursions in the free economy. **Legitimating this policy which is inevitably connected with a reduction of diverse public services and investments necessitates a reversal and redefinition of the state political vocabulary.** This new definition is often carried out by PR- and lobby-organizations like the INSM and only indirectly by the political parties. By what special concepts is this ideology of neoliberalism held in state finances? What terms are essential for a hidden change of financial policy? The neoliberal arguments for low taxes that force a “sleek state” suggest on one side on the state revenue side taxes as unbearably high burdens, fiscal exploitation or robbery of taxpayers. On the other side, state spending programs in this view are evidence of an unrestrained wastefulness, an authoritarian attitude of the bureaucracy and an asocial claimant mentality of receivers of social benefits. The financial-political goal of neoliberal think tanks is making the abolition of “obesity,” literally state indebtedness and extravagance, into the idea of “sound state finances” – a lexis with metaphorical dependence on the healthy athletic body. The essential implementations are described as “balanced public budgets,” “sleek state” and “budget consolidation.” Debts on the other hand demonstrate that the state lives above its means and to the burden of future generations. Through the concept constellation “balanced public budgets,” one can speak of the production of a changed perception insofar as the reality of the state as a necessarily independent economic entity with social obligations is denied purely and simply. This can be illustrated in a campaign of the INSM that makes an analogy to the Schwabian housewife. CREATING THE ZEITGEIST **Neoliberalism reflects the zeitgeist of a new generation with catchwords created expressly for the self-propagated market society.** Neoliberal policy if reduced to only social cuts and privatization will hardly gain mass influence. **Rather neoliberal policy seduces everyday consciousness withy new value standards- and catchwords like those cited above – that appeal both to the ideals and the prejudices of the recipients without the recipients understanding that they already move within the neoliberal logic. Entrepreneurial spirit, flexibility, reform-friendliness, individualism and also envy are catchwords that seem very attractive and modern for a service society particularized in consumer- and sub-cultures.** “Whoever uses the little tricks of the tax law, gets excited over the car of his unemployed neighbor and looks annoyed at his social security contributions will find many neoliberal slogans plausible, for example the demand for less state and more personal responsibility or for reducing bureaucracy and transforming sluggish state operations into flexible private enterprises” (Harald Werner). Neoliberalism corresponds to the zeitgeist and constitutes it in part. This is manifest when one sees that neoliberal thinking paradoxically does not find great support among conservatives but among unconventional and promotion-oriented sectors with a liberal attitude to state and society. **These sectors which also include the alternative-green middle class feel addressed by the appeals to independence and personal responsibility** and regard the social state as a bureaucratic institution belonging to the past. **Whoever sees himself as a creator of his own** career and state regulations as tutelage or leading by the nose **also believes he owes his status only to his own performance, adaptability and creativity, not to public provisions**. Large parts of this generation grew up under the conditions of neoliberal policy and did not experience either the state or organizations like unions as promoters of their individual needs, the sociologist Harald Werner explains. **The neoliberal ideology vocabulary has concrete political and social effects in the last decades through targeted diffusion and agitation. Language constitutes reality and vice versa. Communication is action. Whoever controls the discourse also controls concrete politics.** The reform policy since Agenda 2010 under Gerhard Schroeder should be viewed on this background.

#### Only a decision-making calculus that privileges working class LIFE over corporatist valorization can de-link growth from environmental destruction. Failure ensures destruction.

**Harvey '5** David, David Harvey is the Distinguished Professor of Anthropology and Geography at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. "A Brief History of Neoliberalism" http://messhall.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/A-Brief-History-of-Neoliberalism.pdf

**The imposition of short-term contractual logic on environmental uses has disastrous consequences**. Fortunately, views within the neoliberal camp are somewhat divided on this issue. While Reagan cared nothing for the environment, at one point characterizing trees as a major source of air pollution, Thatcher took the problem seriously. She played a major role in negotiating the Montreal Protocol to limit the use of the CFCs that were responsible for the growing ozone hole around Antarctica. She took the threat of global warming from rising carbon dioxide emissions seriously. Her environmental commitments were not entirely disinterested, of course, since the closure of the coalmines and the destruction of the miners’ union could be partially legitimized on environmental grounds. Neoliberal state policies with respect to the environment have therefore been geographically uneven and temporally unstable (depending on who holds the reins of state power, with the Reagan and George W. Bush administrations being particularly retrograde in the US). The environmental movement, furthermore, has grown in significance since the 1970s. It has often exerted a restraining influence, depending on time and place. And **in some instances capitalist firms have discovered that increasing efficiency and improved environmental performance can go hand in hand. Nevertheless, the general balance sheet on the environmental consequences of neoliberalization is** almost **certainly negative. Serious though controversial efforts to create indices of human well-being including the costs of environmental degradations suggest an accelerating negative trend since 1970 or so. And there are enough specific examples of environmental losses resulting from the unrestrained application of neoliberal principles to give sustenance to such a general account. The accelerating destruction of tropical rain forests since 1970 is a well-known example that has serious implications for climate change and the loss of biodiversity. The era of neoliberalization also happens to be the era of the fastest mass extinction of species in the Earth’s recent history.**27 **If we are entering the danger zone of so transforming the global environment, particularly its climate, as to make the earth unfit for human habitation, then further embrace of the neoliberal ethic and of neoliberalizing practices will surely prove nothing short of deadly**. The Bush administration’s approach to environmental issues is usually to question the scientific evidence and do nothing (except cut back on the resources for relevant scientific research). But his own research team reports that the human contribution to global warming soared after 1970. The Pentagon also argues that global warming might well in the long run be a more serious threat to the security of the US than terrorism.28 Interestingly, **the two main culprits in the growth of carbon dioxide emissions these last few years have been the powerhouses of the global economy, the US and China** (which increased its emissions by 45 per cent over the past decade). In the US, substantial progress has been made in increasing energy efficiency in industry and residential construction. The profligacy in this case largely derives from the kind of consumerism that continues to encourage high-energy-consuming suburban and ex-urban sprawl and a culture that opts to purchase gas-guzzling SUVs rather than the more energy-efficient cars that are available. Increasing US dependency on imported oil has obvious geopolitical ramifications. In the case of China, the rapidity of industrialization and of the growth of car ownership doubles the pressure on energy consumption. China has moved from selfsufficiency in oil production in the late 1980s to being the second largest global importer after the US. Here, too, the geopolitical implications are rife as China scrambles to gain a foothold in the Sudan, central Asia, and the Middle East to secure its oil supplies. But China also has vast rather low-grade coal supplies with a high sulphur content. The use of these for power generation is creating major environmental problems, particularly those that contribute to global warming. Furthermore, given the acute power shortages that now bedevil the Chinese economy, with brownouts and blackouts common, there is no incentive whatsoever for local government to follow central government mandates to close down inefficient and ‘dirty’ power stations. The astonishing increase in car ownership and use, largely replacing the bicycle in large cities like Beijing in ten years, has brought China the negative distinction of having sixteen of the twenty worst cities in the world with respect to air quality.29 The cognate effects on global warming are obvious. As usually happens in phases of rapid industrialization, **the failure to pay any mind to the environmental consequences is having deleterious effects everywhere. The rivers are highly polluted, water supplies are full of dangerous cancer-inducing chemicals**, public health provision is weak (as illustrated by the problems of SARS and the avian flu), **and the rapid conversion of land resources to urban uses or to create massive hydroelectric projects (as in the Yangtze valley) all add up to a significant bundle of environmental problems that the central government is only now beginning to address**. China is not alone in this, for the rapid burst of growth in India is also being accompanied by stressful environmental changes deriving from the expansion of consumption as well as the increased pressure on natural resource exploitation. **Neoliberalization has a rather dismal record when it comes to the exploitation of natural resources. The reasons are not far to seek. The preference for short-term contractual relations puts pressure on all producers to extract everything they can while the contract lasts. Even though contracts and options may be renewed there is always uncertainty because other sources may be found. The longest possible time-horizon for natural resource exploitation is that of the discount rate (i.e. about twenty-five years) but most contracts are now far shorter. Depletion is usually assumed to be linear, when it is now evident that many ecological systems crash suddenly after they have hit some tipping point beyond which their natural reproduction capacity cannot function**. Fish stocks––sardines off California, cod off Newfoundland, and Chilean sea bass––are classic examples of a resource exploited at an ‘optimal’ rate that suddenly crashes without any seeming warning. 30 Less dramatic but equally insidious is the case of forestry.

#### The 1AC appeals to the power of agential language to give the ballot itself political force-this buys into a mode of thinking that over-invests in self-liberating discourse. Their notion the ballot can do anything to alter material relations entrenches their resistance

**Cloud and Gunn '10** Joshua Gunn & Dana L. Cloud, Department of Communication, University of Texas at Austin, "Agentic Orientation as Magical Voluntarism" Communication Theory 20(2010) 50–78 © 2010 International Communication Association

**Over a decade ago anthropologists Jean and John L. Comaroff (1999) advanced the provocative thesis that globalization in late capitalism has led to ‘‘a dramatic intensification *. . .* of appeals to enchantment,**’’ often most discernable in industrializing countries such as South Africa (p. 282). **From ‘‘get rich quick’’ pyramid schemes to e-mail promises from millionaire widows in Nigeria, ‘‘capitalism has an effervescent new spirit—a magical, neo-Protestant *zeitgeist*—welling up close to its core’’** (p. 281). Of course, over a half-century ago Theodor Adorno (1994) inveighed against astrology and soothsaying as indices of economic magic, underscoring the ability of capitalism to promote the ‘‘doctrine of the existence of spirit’’ so central to bourgeois consciousness. ‘‘In the concept of mind-in-itself,’’ argued Adorno, ‘‘consciousness has ontologically justified and perpetuated privilege by making it independent of the social principle by which it is constituted. **Such ideology explodes in occultism: It is Idealism come full circle’’ (p. 133).What the Comaroffs point to is not the arrival of a new form of magical thinking, then, but the intensification and proliferation of postenlightenment gullibility via globalization—ironically in what is presumably the age of cynical reason** (e.g., Sloterdijk, 1987). **As human beings, academics are just as susceptible to magical thinking and narcissistic fantasies of omnipotence as everyone else. Perhaps because at some level of communication scholars tend to entertain a sense of the magical in the idea of communication** (see Peters, 1999), **we have been particularly prone to a philosophical belief in what we term ‘‘magical voluntarism,’’ the notion that human agency is better understood as the ability to control a given phenomenon through the proper manipulation of thoughts and symbols (e.g., language).** Going well beyond the straightforward idea that our thoughts necessarily influence our actions in transforming the world around us, what we are calling *magical voluntarism* fosters a deliberate misrecognition of material recalcitrance, an inability to recognize the structural, political, economic, cultural, and psychical limits of an individual’s ability to act in her own interests. Furthermore, **magical voluntarism refuses to acknowledge that there is a limit to the efficacy of symbolic action, beyond which persuasion and thought alone fail to shift existing social relations.** In popular culture, **magical voluntarism is typified by the bestselling book and DVD *The Secret* (Byrne, 2006; Heriot, 2006), which teach the reader/viewer that ‘‘[y]our life right now is a reflection of your thoughts.** That includes all great things, and all the things you consider not so great. Since you attract to you what you think about most, it is easy to see what your dominant thoughts have been on every subject of your life, because that is what you experienced’’ (Byrne, 2006, p. 9). The ‘‘magical, neo-Protestant *zeitgeist*’’ typified by the raging success of *The Secret* (see McGee, 2007) indicates that enchantment is not limited to developing countries, but is also a crowning achievement of late capitalism in the postindustrial world. Nor is magical thinking limited to popular culture. As a recent essay in this journal by Sonja K. Foss, William J. Waters, and Bernard J. Armada (2007) demonstrates, magical thinking has some purchase in the field of communication studies (see also Geisler, 2005; Villadsen, 2008).1 According to Foss, Waters, and Armada, human agency is simply a matter of consciously choosing among differing interpretations of reality. We argue that **the understanding of agency advanced by Foss, Waters, and Armada is informed by the same voluntarist ideology that has enchanted *The Secret’s* millions of readers.** Below we advance a conception of *agency as an open question* in order to combat magical thinking in contemporary communication theory. Although we approach the concept of agency from different theoretical standpoints (one of us from the perspective of psychoanalysis, the other, classicalMarxism), we aremutually opposed to the (bourgeois) idealism of magical voluntarism in recent work in communication and rhetorical studies on agency.2 Our primary vehicle of argument is a critique of Foss, Waters, and Armada’s essay, ‘‘Toward a Theory of Agentic Orientation: Rhetoric and Agency in *Run Lola Run*,’’ which represents a magical-voluntaristic brand of practical reason (*phronesis*) that is increasingly discredited among a number rhetorical scholars. **We are particularly alarmed by the suggestion that even in ‘‘situations’’ such as ‘‘imprisonment or genocide *. . .* agents have choices about how to perceive their conditions and their agency *. . .* [which] opens up opportunities for innovating *. . .* in ways unavailable to those who construct themselves as victims’’ (p. 33). The idea that one can *choose* an ‘‘agentic orientation’’ regardless of context and despite material limitation not only ignores two decades of research within the field of communication studies on agency and its limitations (and is thus ‘‘regressive’’ in more than one sense), but tacitly promotes a belief in wish-fulfillment through visualization and the imagination, as well as a commitment to radical individualism and autonomy. As a consequence, embracing magical voluntarism leads to narcissistic complacency, regressive infantilism, and elitist arrogance.**

#### heir scholarship is a Horatio Alger narrative that buys into the neoliberal fantasy of upward mobility that the system permits success even against the odds. Our criticism is a prior question to their role of the ballot and indicts the way they justify methodological resistance.

**Reed '13** Adolph Reed, Jr., University of Pennsylvania [http://nonsite.org/editorial/django-unchained-or-the-help-how-cultural-politics-is-worse-than-no-politics-at-all-and-why 2-25-13](http://nonsite.org/editorial/django-unchained-or-the-help-how-cultural-politics-is-worse-than-no-politics-at-all-and-why%202-25-13)

So why is a tale about a manumitted slave/homicidal black gunslinger more palatable to a contemporary leftoid sensibility than either a similarly cartoonish one about black maids and their white employers or one that thematizes Lincoln’s effort to push the Thirteenth Amendment through the House of Representatives? The answer is, to quote the saccharine 1970s ballad, “Feelings, nothing more than feelings.” Wiener’s juxtapositions reflect the political common sense that gives pride of place to demonstrations of respect for the **“voices” of the oppressed and recognition of their suffering, agency, and accomplishments**. That common sense informs the proposition that providing inspiration has social or political significance. But it equally shapes the generic human-interest “message” of films like The Help that represent injustice as an issue of human relations—the alchemy that promises to reconcile social justice and capitalist class power as a win/win for everyone by means of attitude adjustments and deepened mutual understanding. That common sense underwrites the tendency to reduce the past to a storehouse of encouraging post-it messages for the present. It must, because the presumption that the crucial stakes of political action concern recognition and respect for the oppressed’s voices is a presentist view, and mining the past to reinforce it requires anachronism. The large struggles against slavery and Jim Crow were directed toward altering structured patterns of social relations **anchored in law and state power**, but stories of that sort are **incompatible with both global marketing imperatives and the ideological predilections of neoliberalism and its identitarian loyal opposition**. One can only shudder at the prospect of how Gillo Pontecorvo’s 1966 film, The Battle of Algiers, or Costa-Gavras’s State of Siege (1972) would be remade today. (Guy Ritchie’s and Madonna’s execrable 2002 remake of Lina Wertmüller’s 1974 film Swept Away may provide a clue; their abomination completely erases the original film’s complex class and political content and replaces it with a banal—aka “universal”—story of an encounter between an older woman and a younger man, while at the same time meticulously, almost eerily, reproducing, scene by scene, the visual structure of Wertmüller’s film.) Particularly as those messages strive for “universality” as well as **inspiration, their least common denominator tends toward the generic story of individual triumph over adversity**. But the imagery of the individual overcoming odds to achieve fame, success, or recognition also maps onto the fantasy of limitless upward mobility for enterprising and persistent individuals who persevere and remain true to their dreams. As such**, it is neoliberalism’s version of an ideal of social justice, legitimizing both success and failure as products of individual character**. When combined with a multiculturalist rhetoric of “difference” that reifies as autonomous cultures—in effect racializes—what are actually contingent modes of life reproduced by structural inequalities, **this fantasy crowds inequality as a metric of injustice out of the picture entirely**. This accounts for the popularity of reactionary dreck like Beasts of the Southern Wild among people who should know better. The denizens of the Bathtub actively, even militantly, choose their poverty and cherish it and should be respected and appreciated for doing so. But no one ever supposed that Leni Riefenstahl was on the left. The tale type of individual overcoming has become a script into which the great social struggles of the last century and a half have commonly been reformulated to fit the requirements of a wan, gestural multiculturalism. Those movements have been condensed into the personae of Great Men and Great Women—Booker T. Washington, W. E. B. Du Bois, Rosa Parks, Malcolm X, George Washington Carver, Martin Luther King, Jr., Harriet Tubman, Frederick Douglass, Ella Baker, Fannie Lou Hamer and others—who seem to have changed the society apparently by virtue of manifesting their own greatness. The different jacket photos adorning the 1982 and 1999 editions of Doug McAdam’s well known sociological study of the civil rights movement, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970, exemplify the shift. The first edition’s cover was a photo of an anonymous group of marching protesters; the second edition featured the (staged) photo—made iconic by its use in an Apple advertising campaign—of a dignified Rosa Parks sitting alone on the front seat of a bus looking pensively out the window.20 Ironically, **the scholarly turn away from organizations and institutional processes to valorize instead the local and everyday dimensions of those movements may have exacerbated this tendency by encouraging a focus on previously unrecognized individual figures and celebrating their lives and “contributions.**” Rather than challenging the presumption that consequential social change is made by the will of extraordinary individuals, however, this scholarship in effect validates it by inflating the currency of Greatness so much that it can be found any and everywhere. **Giving props to the unrecognized or underappreciated has become a feature particularly of that scholarship that defines scholarly production as a terrain of political action in itself** and aspires to the function of the “public intellectual.” A perusal of the rosters of African American History Month and Martin Luther King, Jr. Day speakers **at any random sample of colleges and universities attests to how closely this scholar/activist turn harmonizes with the reductionist individualism of prosperity religion** and the varieties of latter-day mind cure through which much of the professional-managerial stratum of all races, genders, and sexual orientations, narrates its understandings of the world.

#### Exclusion is bad, but inclusion via the ballot enact symbolic violence that outweighs the aff and trades off with the creation of a collectivist community

Page ’99 Helan Enoch Page is an Associate Professor and race theorist in the Department of Anthropology at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst. Transforming Anthropology, Volume 8, Numbers 1&2 1999, Page pp. 111-128

African Americans expecting benefits from racial integration are most apt to patronize products sold through advertisements featuring black models. This was first shown by the success of magazines like Ebony, Essence, Emerge, and Jet with large black markets. Advertising campaigns for black hair care products also demonstrated the value of infusing products with black appeal. **In exchange for control of African American markets, major companies that previously overlooked the black market now grant blacks a new visibility in the nation's public sphere.' Commoditized black images widely promote the products of companies like MacDonalds, Nike, and Ford** (Page 1997a). Yet a new black visibility is thought to prove African America's full integration into America's racial order. While our struggle for visibility has been no easy walk, its cost, despite apparent benefits, is our growing tolerance for symbolic violence involving the racial use of visible black images in commerce. **Why look critically at our visibility in America's public sphere? Why not celebrate and comfortably settle into this popular view of American racial progress? Because most of us who fail to question today's visible black image see it as advancement correcting decades of black invisibility. For five and a half decades African Americans were denied entry into America's image-making culture industry. This happened not simply because of European America's racial distaste or prejudice. It happened mainly in defense of white privilege and specifically on behalf of elite Euro-** **pean America's racial interest** in communications technology. Today's "digital gap" indicating the distance between white and black computer access has deep roots in a historic information apartheid that started during slavery. **European American's sustained racial control over communications technology compels us to regard uses of the commodified black image as acts of symbolic violence. No human rights act will defend us from this subtle form of violence whose perpetrators strive to contain black creativity, opinion, and subjectivity in an American public sphere where our presumed advocates and champions contentedly decline to establish a 'black' public sphere.** **The prescibed African American stance encourages us to act within the system; we sense a prohibition against questing for an autonomous black public sphere in which interracial teams of cultural authorities would work under the management of blackowned technology in the global service of an anti-racist information agenda most affirmative of nonwhite Americans.** Such an agenda need not be disaffirmative of European Americans, but neither should it any longer cater to phobic reactions to blackness.

#### The idea that a judge’s decision can “change the world” is the capitalist ideology of sanitizing class inequality by highlighting individual success. Only with a starting focus on structure can we develop pedagogies that make material improvements

**Cane and Zorn ’08 --** Don Cane and Jacob Zorn are of the Spartacist League Central Committee speaks and write on Race, Class and Socialist Revolution ( Communist Organizing in the Jim Crow South: What's Not in The Great Debaters”, “ Workers Vanguard No. 92521 November 2008)

The Great Debaters represents a take on the old theme of “racial uplift”—the belief that a talented black petty bourgeoisie can by hard work and dedication transcend the evils of racism and achieve justice. In the words of Denzel Washington, this is not a film about “racism in Texas in 1935. It’s what these young people did about it...to overcome whatever obstacles were in their way.” It is this very aspect of the film that has made it popular among both black and white critics. Roger Ebert, film critic for the Chicago Sun-Times, called it “the feel-great movie of the year” and black journalist Herb Boyd described it as “a feel-good movie (and the underdogs win)” and an “uplifting film that most African Americans gladly embraced.” “Racial uplift” is the same theme that W.E.B. Du Bois raised in the late 19th century in arguing against Booker T. Washington, who promoted the servile acceptance of segregation. Du Bois argued that it was the responsibility of the educated black petty bourgeoisie to “uplift” black people under capitalism. In a 1903 article, he stated: “The Negro race, like all races, is going to be saved by its exceptional men. The problem of education, then, among Negroes must first of all deal with the Talented Tenth; it is the problem of developing the Best of this race that they may guide the Mass away from the contamination and death of the Worst, in their own and other races.” Du Bois’ thesis was based on the acceptance of capitalism. In The Souls of Black Folk (1903), he defended “the rule of inequality:—that of the million black youth, some were fitted to know and some to dig; that some had the talent and capacity of university men, and some the talent and capacity of blacksmiths.” The point of education, he wrote, was to “teach the workers to work and the thinkers to think.” The Great Debaters articulates the liberal-integrationist view promoted by mainstream civil rights groups that black equality can be achieved under capitalism. In a scene that attracted the attention of all leftist reviewers, a Wiley debater in a contest with a white college team declares, “My opponent says today is not the day for whites and coloreds to go to the same college.... No, the time for justice, the time for freedom, and the time for equality is always, is always right now!” By showing their skills and intelligence, the “talented tenth” are supposed to break down the barrier of racial injustice. But what is left unsaid speaks volumes to the class divisions among the oppressed black population. The black students at Wiley certainly faced a racist world where even distinguished PhDs like Farmer could be killed with relative impunity. One of the more powerful—and accurate—scenes comes when the team narrowly escaped being lynched while on a rural road in the South. The college debating circuit was segregated, with many white universities refusing to debate blacks. Nonetheless, black colleges such as Wiley, Morehouse and Howard University were founded by church institutions to primarily train clergy and teachers, the core of the black petty bourgeoisie. Political protest was forbidden—as shown by the elder Farmer’s negative reaction to Tolson’s radicalism. For the overwhelming majority of black people, exploited and oppressed as sharecroppers and tenants, the halls of Wiley College might as well have been Mars. From the movie, one would get the idea that debate can change the world. The official Web site of the movie declares, “Believe in the power of words.” But racial oppression is fundamentally not a question of bad ideas in people’s heads that they can be argued out of. It is based on the workings of American capitalism. In reality, the material conditions for most black people have continued to deteriorate. While Jim Crow is dead, the majority of black people, as a race-color caste segregated at the bottom of society, face brutal daily racist subjugation and humiliation, by whatever index of social life one might choose—joblessness, imprisonment, lack of decent, integrated housing. As the economy crashes into recession, blacks are disproportionately affected. At the same time, black workers are a strategic part of the proletariat in urban transport, longshore, auto, steel, and they are the most unionized section of the working class. They form an organic link to the downtrodden ghetto masses. Being strategically located in the economy and facing special oppression, black workers led by a multiracial revolutionary party will play a vanguard role in the struggles of the entire U.S. working class. Class-conscious black workers, armed with a revolutionary program, will play a central role in the building of the workers party necessary to sweep away the capitalist system of exploitation and racial oppression.

#### Advancing their speech act in a competitive venue is self-containing—commodifies their speech within the political economy of the ballot which submits to the very mode of control they’re resisting

**James ‘3** Joy, Professor of Africana Studies @ Brown “Academia, activism, and imprisoned intellectuals.” http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Academia,+activism,+and+imprisoned+intellectuals.-a0133368005

Activism is as multidimensional in its appearances as the academy; as academia's alter ego, or problematic twin, it also reflects the best and worst tendencies of the marketplace. When structured by the market, activism is not inherently infused with responsible behavior or compassion. In its push for productivity--more rallies, demos, conferences, meetings--it can lose sight of effective strategies, community, and the importance of young activists exercising decision-making power. To value one's presence, i.e., just showing up for work, class, or demonstrations, over one's preparedness to fully participate in transformational acts is a feature of the crass market (where volume or quantity of a product register more than quality or utility). Likewise, **expectations for unquestioning obedience to managerial elites--whether radical instructor or organizer--are also features of the market found in activism and academia. Thus, beyond confronting the social crises and military and ideological wars enacted by the state, we are disturbed, destabilized, and therefore challenged by the commodification of our own educational sites and political movements. The marketplace--as the dominant metaphor and construct--influences our consciousness and regulates our lives to shape both academia and activism. Conformity and compliance, rebellion and resistance, are often channeled through and structured by markets that turn intellect and action into objects for trade and barter in competition for status and acquisition, while making our ideals (freedom and justice) and their representatives (prisoners of resistance) into commodities.** Through books, videos, and CDs, political representations are purchased and circulated with the intent of creating greater demand not only for the "product," but also for social justice, release campaigns, opposition to expanding police and military powers, and executions and state violence. For the imprisoned, the possibility of release, or at least remembrance, mitigates their social death in prison (or physical death, as in the cases of MOVE's [Merle](http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/merle) Africa and former Black Panther Albert Nuh Washington). Academics and activists use the market to highlight the human rights abuses and conditions of the imprisoned, the 2.5 million people locked in U.S. penal institutions, and the perpetuation of torture and slavery through the Thirteenth Amendment. **The irony is that commodification is another form of containment. Although Harlow advocates the "activist counterapproach" to consumption, not all activism provides an alternative. Some of it re-inscribes the competition, opportunism, disciplinary mechanisms, and demands for institutional loyalty that characterize the marketplace**. Activism or activists, like academia and academics, have their own forms of commerce. **At their weakest and most problematic points, they share, in their respective sites,** [careerism](http://www.thefreedictionary.com/careerism)**, appropriation, and the assertion of "authoritative" voices. For instance, the "political prisoner-as-icon" can be deployed to minimize or silence external and internal critiques. Editors, translators, and advocates can wield iconic power as surrogates (and in surreal fashion use that proxy against the incarcerated themselves). The structural position that the non-incarcerated possess, a quite valuable commodity, permits the appropriation of voice and new forms of dependencies.** Perhaps, the imprisoned use self-censorship not only as a shield against their guards (as Marilyn Buck describes in On Self-Censorship), but also as armor against their allies. Political prisoners have strategies to counter "free" progressives, given that in the social death of the prisoner rebel, the state is not the only entity that has the ability to capitalize on or [cannibalize](http://www.thefreedictionary.com/cannibalize) captive bodies. If indeed the political prisoner or imprisoned intellectual can be either "freed" or frozen in academic and/or activist discourse and productivity, then it is essential that academics-activists, students-scholars, directly communicate with political prisoners, as openly as possible given the structural disparities.

#### Reliance on performativity figures the social order as responsive to speech acts—this confuses performance and agency. The idea we can talk or think our way out lets perpetrators off the hook and re-creates exploitation

**Cloud and Gunn '10** Joshua Gunn & Dana L. Cloud, Department of Communication, University of Texas at Austin, "Agentic Orientation as Magical Voluntarism" Communication Theory 20(2010) 50–78 © 2010 International Communication Association

**Constructivism and the Malleable World** Presumably drawing on the work of Judith Butler (1993, p. 28),5 **Foss, Waters, and Armada argue that orienting oneself as the ‘‘director’’ of one’s life is in tune with a tenet acknowledged by a number of diverse perspectives, ranging from social constructionism to quantum physics. Simply put, it is that symbols create reality*. . . .* Symbolic choices *. . .* can and do affect the structural world*. . . .*** Although the reality of everyday life appears prearranged, ordered, and objective, and therefore outside of agents’ sphere of influence *. . .* the structural world not only ‘‘bears cultural constructions’’ but is itself a construction. (p. 220) **Because the structural world is itself a construction, individuals are capable of changing that world by thinking and making choices about it.** Although the authors acknowledge that ‘‘agents cannot *. . .* lay out precisely the routes through which their desires will be fulfilled,’’ they nevertheless believe that ‘‘desires are realized in outcomes that align with agents’ choices’’ because of the ontological status of the structural world as a construction (p. 220). The key to understanding the ideal of agentic orientation is *full consciousness*: In order to change the construction of the world, one must understand what options are available and put faith in unforeseen possibilities yet to come (pp. 220–221). **Such a position is entirely in keeping with the ‘‘core concept’’ of magic: ‘‘that mind affects matter, and that *. . .* the trained imagination can alter the physical world’’** (Luhrman, p. 7).6 Not surprisingly, Rhonda Byrne also aligns ‘‘The Secret’’ with quantum physics (p. 156); however, constructivism appears in *The Secret* most conspicuously in the guise of ‘‘the law of attraction,’’ which Bob Doyle, ‘‘author and law of attraction specialist,’’ defines simply as ‘‘like attracts like’’ at ‘‘a level of thought.’’ Byrne elaborates: The law of attraction says *like attracts like*, and so as you think a thought, you are also attracting *like* thoughts to you*. . . .* Your life right now is a reflection of your past thoughts. That includes all the great things, and all the things you consider not so great. Since you attract to you what you think about most, it is easy to see what your dominant thoughts have been on every subject of your life *. . .* Until now! Now you are learning The Secret, and with this knowledge, you can change everything. (pp. 8–9) Changing everything depends on understanding the ontological primacy of attraction, which is best grasped as a form of magnetism (even though magnetism is, in physics, the attraction of *opposites*): ‘‘Thoughts are magnetic, and thoughts have a frequency,’’ explains Byrne. ‘‘As you think, those thoughts are sent out into the Universe, and they magnetically attract all *like* things that are on the same frequency’’ (p. 10). Nevertheless, as with Foss, Waters, and Armada, Byrne and her army of specialists insist on the constructedness of reality and the mutability of structure. ‘‘Time,’’ for example, is just an illusion: Einstein told us that. If this is the first time you have heard it, you may find it a hard concept to get your head around*. . . .* What quantum physicists and Einstein tell us is that everything is happening simultaneously*. . . .* It takes no time for the Universe to manifest what you want. Any time delay you experience is due to your delay in getting to the place of believing, knowing, and feeling that you already have it. (p. 63) The concept of temporality is used here to teach readers a certain version of constructivism, which is similar to the version Foss, Waters, and Armada advance in their reading of *Run Lola Run*: all three runs in the film happen at the same time, but reflect different levels of believing, knowing, and feeling. Once Lola understood the mutability of reality and the power of her manipulation of symbols, she could magically bend the laws of the Universe for money**. Similarly, Byrne writes, ‘‘[i]t’s as easy to manifest one dollar as it is to manifest one million dollars’’ if you simply have the right mindset (p. 68). Although we do not dismiss certain forms of constructivist thought, it is important to detail the consequence or ‘‘outcome’’ of choosing magical voluntarism. Both *The Secret* and Foss, Waters, and Armada invoke physics to argue that structural change is possible for *anything you desire* through conscious thought and choice.** Hence, magical voluntarism denies that some material and social conditions are not changeable: Agentic orientations *. . .* are achieved within, rather than simply given by, the conditions of individuals’ lives. Thus, individuals may be in a dominant position as defined by economic and other structural conditions or in a subordinate position as defined by a lack of access to such resources, *but they may choose any agentic orientation and produce any outcome they desire*. We acknowledge that such a view may be difficult to accept in extreme cases such as imprisonment or genocide; even in these situations, however, agents have choices about how to perceive their conditions and their agency. Even in these situations, adoption of the agentic orientation of director opens up opportunities for innovating in ways unavailable to those who construct *themselves* as victims. (p. 223, emphasis added) In other words, the starving prisoner in a concentration camp should choose the director orientation and dream-up the possibility of her liberation or escape.7 **Aside from the offensiveness of such a perspective on imprisonment and genocide, what is the *outcome* of adopting this ontological view about ‘‘structural’’ conditions? *The Secret* is quite clear on the answer: narcissistic complacency. ‘‘Anything we focus on we do create,’’ explains Hale Dwoskin, ‘‘so ifwe’re really angry, for instance, at awar that’s going on, or strife or suffering, we’re adding our energy to it’’ (pp. 141–142). So although the rhetoric of magic exemplified by *The Secret* acknowledges structural injustice, it gets explained away in mystical terms that urge the reader to turn her back to the world and seek within.** The video and book openly discourage social protest, invoking Carl Jung’s phrase, ‘‘what you resist persists’’ (p. 142). ‘‘Don’t give energy to what you don’t want,’’ intones one of the video’s ‘‘teachers.’’ For example, the DVD segment on wealth begins with black-and-white footage of sweatshop laborers in dreary factories, but sweatshops are a mere blip on the screen. Immediately, the text explains that today one can be free from such exploitation and drudgery simply by wishing for money.8 The real world outcome of the constructivism that supports magical voluntarism is ultimately selfish inaction. ‘‘You cannot help the world by focusing on the negative things,’’ says Byrne. ‘‘When I discovered The Secret I made a decision that I would not watch the news or read newspapers anymore, because it did not make me feel good’’ (pp. 144–145). Although professional scholars in the United States may be buffered from some of the vagaries of economic crisis and barriers to achievement, there are, in fact—as opposed to the fantasy of a filmic game or magnetizing your desires into reality—millions of people around the world who cannot wish away the ‘‘conditions, people, or events external to them’’ (p. 209). Nongovernmental organizations, grassroots banks and crafts projects, and other forms of localized ‘‘self-help’’ can do little to curtail the broader abuses of capitalist globalization. But **Foss, Waters, and Armada chastise critical postcolonial scholars Radha Hegde and Raka Shome, as if the (magical) options available to a fictional Lola actually apply to sweatshop workers in India (p. 223). Similarly, *The Secret* encourages readers to turn on to the law of attraction and stop resisting injustice: ‘‘The antiwar movement creates more war,’’ explains Jack Canfield (quoted in Byrne, p. 142). Shockingly, however, Foss, Waters, and Armada carry their magical voluntarism beyond the fuzzy magnetism of *The Secret* to a most extreme conclusion: Symbolic choices**, *Run Lola Run* argues, **can and do affect the structural world**. We acknowledge that a belief in this tenet is disputable in the presence of certain kinds of conditions, but **we ask our readers to consider seriously for a moment *. . .* the possibility that it might be true under all conditions. (p. 220) Even in the contexts of *famine and genocide*, Foss,Waters, and Armada believe that changing one’s interpretation of events is the correct strategy, especially because ‘‘what you resist, persists.’’ While demonstrably different, both their article and *The Secret* counsel passivity—implicitly and explicitly respectively—in the face of the most brutal exploitation and oppression, letting the purveyors of inequality off the hook for their actions, urging millions to think positively in the face of their immiseration.9**

#### Narrative challenges to privilege are scripted around static understandings of power, obscuring particularity. This enacts new hierarchies and makes resistance cooptable

**Ewick and Silbey '95** Patricia Ewick and Susan S. Silbey, "Subversive Stories and Hegemonic Tales: Toward a Sociology of Narrative" Law & Society Review, 00239216, 1995, Vol. 29, Issue 2 http://web.mit.edu/ssilbey/www/pdf/subversive.pdf

In the previous section, we discussed how narratives, like the lives and experiences they recount, are cultural productions. Narratives are generated interactively through normatively structured performances and interactions. Even the most personal of narratives rely on and invoke collective narratives — symbols, linguistic formulations, structures, and vocabularies of motive — without which the personal would remain unintelligible and uninterpretable. Because of the conventionalized character of narrative, then, our stories are likely to express ideological effects and hegemonic assumptions.[ [10](http://web.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/ehost/detail?vid=4&hid=106&sid=c00733b3-4acd-4926-b4f9-94f849d6e9f1%40sessionmgr109" \l "bib10" \o "10)] We are as likely to be shackled by the stories we tell (or that are culturally available for our telling) as we are by the form of oppression they might seek to reveal. In short, the structure, the content, and the performance of stories as they are defined and regulated within social settings often articulate and reproduce existing ideologies and hegemonic relations of power and inequality. It is important to emphasize that narratives do more than simply reflect or express existing ideologies. Through their telling, our stories come to constitute the hegemony that in turn shapes social lives and conduct "The hegemonic is not simply a static body of ideas to which members of a culture are obliged to conform" (Silberstein 1988:127). Rather, Silberstein writes, hegemony has "a protean nature in which dominant relations are preserved while their manifestations remain highly flexible. The hegemonic must continually evolve so as to recuperate alternative hegemonies." In other words, the hegemonic gets produced and evolves within individual, seemingly unique, discrete personal narratives. Indeed, the resilience of ideologies and hegemony may derive from their articulation within personal stories. Finding expression and being refashioned within the stories of countless individuals may lead to a polyvocality that inoculates and protects the master narrative from critique. The hegemonic strength of a master narrative derives, Brinkley Messick (1988:657) writes, from "its textual, and lived heteroglossia … [, s]ubverting and dissimulating itself at every … turn"; thus ideologies that are encoded in particular stories are "effectively protected from sustained critique" by the fact that they are constituted through variety and contradiction. Research in a variety of social settings has demonstrated the hegemonic potential of narrative by illustrating how narratives can contribute to the reproduction of existing structures of meaning and power. First, narratives can function specifically as mechanisms of social control (Mumby 1993). At various levels of social organization — ranging from families to nation-states — storytelling instructs us about what is expected and warns us of the consequences of nonconformity. Oft-told family tales about lost fortunes or spoiled reputations enforce traditional definitions and values of family life (Langellier & Peterson 1993). Similarly, bureaucratic organizations exact compliance from members through the articulation of managerial prerogatives and expectations and the consequences of violation or challenge (Witten 1993). Through our narratives of courtship, lost accounts, and failed careers, cultures are constructed; we "do" family, we "do" organization, through the stories we tell (Langellier & Peterson 1993). Second, the hegemonic potential of narrative is further enhanced by narratives' ability to colonize consciousness. Well-plotted stories cohere by relating various (selectively appropriated) events and details into a temporally organized whole (see part I above). The coherent whole, that is, the configuration of events and characters arranged in believable plots, preempts alternative stories. The events seem to speak for themselves; the tale appears to tell itself. Ehrenhaus (1993) provides a poignant example of a cultural meta-narrative that operates to stifle alternatives. He describes the currently dominant cultural narrative regarding the United States's involvement in the Vietnam War as one that relies on themes of dysfunction and rehabilitation. The story, as Ehrenhaus summarizes it, is structured as a social drama which characterizes both the nation and individual Vietnam veterans as having experienced a breakdown in normal functioning only recently resolved through a process of healing. This narrative is persuasive because it reiterates and elaborates already existing and dominant metaphors and interpretive frameworks in American culture concerning what Philip Rieff (1968) called the "triumph of the therapeutic" (see also Crews 1994). Significantly, the therapeutic motif underwriting this narrative depicts veterans as emotionally and psychologically fragile and, thus, disqualifies them as creditable witnesses. The connection between what they saw and experienced while in Vietnam and what the nation did in Vietnam is severed. In other words, what could have developed as a powerful critique of warfare as national policy is contained through the image of illness and rehabilitation, an image in which "'healing' is privileged over 'purpose' [and] the rhetoric of recovery and reintegration subverts the emergence of rhetoric that seeks to examine the reasons that recovery is even necessary" (Ehrenhaus 1993:83). Constituent and distinctive features of narratives make them particularly potent forms of social control and ideological penetration and homogenization. In part, their potency derives from the fact that narratives put "forth powerful and persuasive truth claims — claims about appropriate behavior and values — that are shielded from testing or debate" (Witten 1993:105). Performative features of narrative such as repetition, vivid concrete details, particularity of characters, and coherence of plot silence epistemological challenges and often generate emotional identification and commitment. Because narratives make implicit rather than explicit claims regarding causality and truth as they are dramatized in particular events regarding specific characters, stories elude challenges, testing, or debate. Van Dijk (1993) has reported, for instance, that **stories containing negative images and stereotypes of nonwhite persons are less subject to the charge of racism when they recount personal experiences and particular events.** Whereas a general claim that a certain group is inferior or dangerous might be contested on empirical grounds, an individual story about being mugged, a story which includes an incidental reference to the nonwhite race of the assailant, communicates a similar message but under the protected guise of simply stating the "facts." The causal significance or relevance of the assailant's race is, in such a tale, strongly implied but not subject to challenge or falsifiability. Thus representations, true and/or false, made implicitly without either validation or contest, are routinely exchanged in social interactions and thereby occupy social space. Third, narratives contribute to hegemony to the extent that they conceal the social organization of their production and plausibility. Narratives embody general understandings of the world that by their deployment and repetition come to constitute and sustain the life-world. Yet because narratives depict specific persons existing in particular social, physical, and historical locations, those general understandings often remain unacknowledged. By failing to make these manifest, narratives draw on unexamined assumptions and causal claims without displaying these assumptions and claims or laying them open to challenge or testing. Thus, as narratives depict understandings of particular persons and events, they reproduce, without exposing, the connections of the specific story and persons to the structure of relations and institutions that made the story plausible. To the extent that the hegemonic is "that order of signs and practices, relations and distinctions, images and epistemologies … that come to be taken-for-granted as the natural and received shape of the world and everything that inhabits it" (Comaroff & Comaroff 1991), the unarticulated and unexamined plausibility is the story's contribution to hegemony.

The following two examples drawn from recent sociolegal research illustrate the ways in which legally organized narrativity helps produce the taken-for-granted and naturalized world by effacing the connections between the particular and the general. Sara Cobb (1992) examines the processes through which women's stories of violence are "domesticated" (tamed and normalized) within mediation sessions. Cobb reports that the domestication of women's stories of violence are a consequence of the organization of the setting in which they are told: within mediation, the storyteller and her audience are situated within a normative organization that recognizes the values of narrative participation over any substantive moral or epistemological code or standard. Being denied access to any external standards, the stories the women tell cannot therefore be adjudged true or compelling. The stories are interpreted as one version of a situation in which "multiple perspectives are possible." Cobb demonstrates how this particular context of elicitation specifically buries and silences stories of violence, effectively reproducing women's relative powerlessness within their families. With women deprived of the possibility of corroboration by the norms of the mediation session, their stories of violence are minimized and "disappeared." As a consequence, the individual woman can get little relief from the situation that brought her to mediation: she is denied an individual legal remedy (by being sent from court to mediation) and at the same time denied access to and connections with any collective understanding of or response to the sorts of violence acknowledged by the law (through the organization of the mediation process). Through this process, "violence, as a disruption of the moral order in a community, is made familiar (of the family) and natural — the extraordinary is tamed, drawn into the place where we eat, sleep and [is] made ordinary" (ibid., p. 19). Whereas mediation protects narratives from an interrogation of their truth claims, other, formal legal processes are deliberately organized to adjudicate truth claims. Yet even in these settings, certain types of truth claims are disqualified and thus shielded from examination and scrutiny. The strong preference of courts for individual narratives operates to impede the expression (and validation) of truth claims that are not easily represented through a particular story. Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's decision in the McClesky case (1986). The defendant, a black man who had been convicted of the murder of a police officer, was sentenced to death. His Supreme Court appeal of the death sentence was based on his claim that the law had been applied in a racially discriminatory way, thus denying him equal protection under the law. As part of McClesky's appeal, David Baldus, a social scientist, submitted an amicus brief in which he reported the results of his analysis of 2,000 homicide cases in that state (Baldus 1990). The statistical data revealed that black defendants convicted of killing white citizens were significantly more likely to receive the death sentence than white defendants convicted of killing a black victim. Despite this evidence of racial discrimination, the Court did not overturn McClesky's death sentence. The majority decision, in an opinion written by Justice Powell, stated that the kind of statistical evidence submitted by Baldus was simply not sufficient to establish that any racial discrimination occurred in this particular case. The court declared, instead, that to demonstrate racial discrimination, it would be necessary to establish that the jury, or the prosecutor, acted with discriminatory purpose in sentencing McClesky.[ [11](http://web.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/ehost/detail?vid=4&hid=106&sid=c00733b3-4acd-4926-b4f9-94f849d6e9f1%40sessionmgr109" \l "bib11" \o "11)] Here, then, an unambiguous pattern of racial inequity was sustained through the very invocation of and demand for subjectivity (the jury's or prosecutor's state of mind) and particularity (the refusal to interpret this case as part of a larger category of cases) that are often embodied in narratives. In this instance, relative powerlessness and injustice (if one is to believe Baldus's data) were preserved, rather than challenged, by the demand for a particular narrative about specific concrete individuals whose interactions were bounded in time and space. In other words, the Court held that the legally cognizable explanation of the defendant's conviction could not be a product of inferential or deductive comprehension (Mink 1970; Bruner 1986). Despite its best efforts, the defense was denied discursive access to the generalizing, and authoritative, language of social logico-deductive science and with it the type of "truths" it is capable of representing. The court insists on a narrative that effaces the relationship between the particular and the general, between this case and other capital trials in Georgia. Further, the McClesky decision illustrates not only how the demand for narrative particularity may reinscribe relative powerlessness by obscuring the connection between the individual case and larger patterns of institutional behavior; it also reveals how conventionalized legal procedures impede the demonstration of that connection.[ [12](http://web.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/ehost/detail?vid=4&hid=106&sid=c00733b3-4acd-4926-b4f9-94f849d6e9f1%40sessionmgr109" \l "bib12" \o "12)] The court simultaneously demanded evidence of the jurors' states of mind and excluded such evidence. Because jury deliberations are protected from routine scrutiny and evaluation, the majority demanded a kind of proof that is institutionally unavailable. Thus, in the McClesky decision, by insisting on a narrative of explicit articulated discrimination, the court calls for a kind of narrative truth that court procedures institutionally impede. As these examples suggest, a reliance on or demand for narrativity is neither unusual nor subversive within legal settings. In fact, given the ideological commitment to individualized justice and case-by-case processing that characterizes our legal system, narrative, relying as it often does on the language of the particular and subjective, may more often operate to sustain, rather than subvert, inequality and injustice. The law's insistent demand for personal narratives achieves a kind of radical individuation that disempowers the teller by effacing the connections among persons and the social organization of their experiences. This argument is borne out if we consider that being relieved of the necessity, and costs, of telling a story can be seen as liberatory and collectively empowering. **Insofar as particular and subjective narratives reinforce a view of the world made up of autonomous individuals interacting only in immediate and local ways, they may hobble collective claims and solutions to social inequities** (Silbey 1984). In fact, the progressive achievements of workers' compensation, no-fault divorce, no-fault auto insurance, strict liability, and some consumer protection regimes derive directly from the provision of legal remedies without the requirement to produce an individually crafted narrative of right and liability.

# 2NC

#### And the idea that they can appropriate things like the N-word from their cultural position takes for granted the individual’s position to break with the violent history of slavery – this is an independent reason to reject the speech act of the 1nc and a net-benefit to a negative ballot that affirms their speech act without this word – our argument is \*\*not\*\* that black folks \*\*should never use the word\*\* or that it isn’t theirs to use but rather that their use empowers a form of individualistic politics that does more harm than good

Patrice R. Ferguson 6, http://www.csun.edu/csbs/departments/pan\_african\_studies/programs/hip\_hop\_think\_tank/articles.html

At what point does a word take on a life of its own? When is a word a representation of a state of mind? At what point does a word represent the ideology of a nation? When does a word have the capacity to communicate the pain of centuries of malevolent disregard? NIGGER, in all its forms of spelling and pronunciation carries a legacy of slavery that reaches beyond the void of time and history. The genre of Hip-Hop is the new arena in which nigger can audaciously parade itself through the psyche of a new generation, and at the same time continue to distort the image of these oppressed children of slavery with the oppressor’s image of the enslaved. The new fields of slavery are in the minds of the Hip-Hop generation. The psyche of this lost cohort is littered with the effects of nigger, which rampantly disfigures the perception of the consumers of Hip-Hop and its contaminated product, rap music. Renowned psychologist Naim Akbar comments on the implications of mental enslavement and the effect on the enslaved when he states: The slavery that feeds on the mind, invading the soul of man, destroying his loyalties to himself and establishing allegiance to forces which destroy ~~him~~, is an even worse form of capture. The influences that permit an illusion of freedom, liberation, and self-determination, while tenaciously holding one’s mind in subjugation, is the folly of only the sadistic. (Akbar, VI) Nigger, and its most infamous synonym nigga, is especially prolific in the realm of Hip-Hop, which is the vehicle in which gangster rap canonized itself into mainstream society with all its hype and controversy. Along with gangster rap came the onslaught of the use of the word nigger in American media, in addition to all of its synonyms. In the dominion of Hip-Hop, those professing allegiance with the image of a “hard-core rapper” or a “gangster rapper” must pepper their lyrics with the mantra of nigga, and promote the attitude that is connected to it. The self-destructive and dehumanizing connection to the racist term goes hand in hand with the rebel without a cause or clue phenomenon, closely associated with many rap artists of the Hip-Hop generation. Murphy Forman et al analyzes how rap disseminates into the consciousness of American culture and its incestuous nature with the human psyche: By the early ‘90s, the American pop consciousness was well aware of the Los Angeles Gangsta Ethos. Artists like Ice-T introduced the concept, but it was the collective of DJs and MCs known as Niggaz With Attitude who would define and refine it. Eazy-E, DJ Yella, MC Ren, Dr. Dre, and Ice Cube articulated the style, stance and raw ghetto rhetoric that would not only capture the imagination of young people worldwide but also permanently transform merican pop culture. N.W.A [Niggaz With Attitude] seared their unsettling image onto the contemporary psyche. (Forman, 319) The union of gangster rap with the “nigga attitude” and “nigger image” demonstrates the diseased psyche of the afflicted Hip-Hop generation. The affliction is self-hatred, self-destructive behavior, thought pattern, and lifestyle. As persons of African descent, there is a dangerous connection to the word and several of its forms. The union of nigger with those, who for centuries were oppressed by it, is one that contorts itself to the heart of the issues of race and ascribed status in the United States of America. The plague of the social structure of this nation is racism. Nigga is the blazing flag of America’s racist doctrine. The doctrine of racism has seeped into the minds of the oppressed persons of African decent. Hip-Hop very distinctly demonstrates the disease of racism by the abundant propagation of the use of nigga in numerous avenues of American culture, while spreading beyond the borders of the urban impoverished communities like an infection. The continuation of the fertile use of the word has undermined and eroded the souls of those originally oppressed by the ethnic slur. A disease left untreated will destroy the host from the inside out. Nigga is a parasite in the souls of those of African descent, and it persists, to our detriment, sucking the self-respect and love right out of us. …Hip-Hop ‘has probably been the greatest vehicle for promulgating’ the use of the N-word in America today. The trend of young Black men publicly calling one another “nigga” and “my nigga” in song lyrics, comedy routines, film, and television underscores the self-image dilemmas of African Americans. (Cole et al, 205)

### Link- Radical Individualism

#### Belief in radical individualism proves the link—

#### Belief in the power of the will against material reality engages in victim blaming and opens the door for further neoliberal domination

Cloud and Gunn '10 Joshua Gunn & Dana L. Cloud, Department of Communication, University of Texas at Austin, "Agentic Orientation as Magical Voluntarism" Communication Theory 20(2010) 50–78 © 2010 International Communication Association

**Radical Individualism** Finally, both *The Secret* and Foss, Waters, and Armada’s versions of **magical voluntarism repeatedly stress a radical individualism in two ways: (a) by insisting the individual alone has the power to transcend limitation without the help of others; and (b) by insisting that individuals must take full responsibility for their material, social, and cultural existence. ‘‘You are the master of your life,**’’ intones Byrne, ‘‘and the Universe is answering your every command’’ (p. 146). Such juvenile omnipotence is reflected in the opening remarks of the most recent program on *The Secret* and the law of attraction by Oprah Winfrey (2008): ‘‘I am grateful that *. . .* millions of people, for so many millions of people, the door was at least opened to the idea that we are each responsible for the quality of our lives *. . .* so that people can begin to understand that our thoughts *. . .* are literally creating our experiences.’’ Throughout the hour-long program various individuals testify to the transformative power of the law of attraction (for example, ‘‘34-year-old Meadow’’ was ‘‘fat, broke,’’ and ‘‘crying every day’’ until she picked up and read *Oprah* magazine and saw *The Secret* DVD). The ‘‘experts’’ on *Oprah* continuously underscore the centrality of the individual and necessity for forgiveness and personal responsibility even to the point of ‘‘disappearing’’ those who have harmed you through acts of forgiveness. *The Secret* always comes back to this refrain: ‘‘To love yourself fully, you must focus on a new dimension of You. Youmust focus on the *presence* inside you’’ (p. 173). **In a manner that resembles Ayn Rand’s (1964) defense of the ‘‘virtue of selfishness,’’ Byrne argues that focusing on others is the problem: ‘‘It is not people who are giving you the things you desire. If you hold that false belief, you will experience lack, because you are looking at the outside world and people as the supply’’** (p. 163). **Only by forsaking the world and centering in oneself can true, positive change begin. Again, while not as extreme, Foss, Waters, and Armada similarly advocate individualism and personal responsibility when they stress the ‘‘internal’’ locus of choice.** As with *The Secret* and Oprah’s experts, **the problem with achieving the ideal is a basic misunderstanding about how the Universe truly works: That everyone has the same capacity for agency, regardless of access to resources, is not to be confused with the notion that everyone chooses well. With their agency, all individuals may choose situations that make them suffer and reduce their control over structural conditions**. Those who make agentic choices that appear less desirable gain at least some rewards from such choices—possibly a greater capacity to attract others to a cause, the generation of positive responses in the form of sympathy or avoidance of responsibility. (p. 224) Herein we confront the outcome of choosing a radical individualism: elitist arrogance. The elitism of *The Secret* and Foss, Waters, and Armada’s agentic orientation is pronounced in their claim that oppression is a matter of perception. For example, Foss, Waters and Armada argue that ‘‘Lola sees herself as helpless and disempowered’’ in the first filmic run (p. 209), but when an individual in the real world confronts a real, deadly situation, she might *really* be helpless and disempowered (e.g., the stories of child abuse, rape, American slavery, Indian Removal, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as well as the Holocaust, come to mind). According to Foss, Waters, and Armada, Lola dies in the first run, not because her father is a misogynist, but because of *her* ‘‘adoption of the victim orientation’’ (p. 209). ‘‘Because Lola views structural conditions as controlling, she sees them as limiting’’ (p. 210). Never mind that space, time, and social relations *are* actually constraints on human action (and more so for some than for others). Indeed, in both *The Secret* and the theory of agentic orientation, every act is ‘‘an *interpretation* of a set of conditions’’ (Foss, Waters, and Armada, p. 207). **Oppression is a matter of perception and liberation is an outcome of wishful thinking.** ‘‘Lola also cedes power to structural conditions by refusing to take responsibility for what happens to Manni and her. She places the blame for events in their lives on conditions, people, or events external to them’’ (p. 209). For practitioners of The Secret, Oprah and her experts, as well as Foss, Waters and Armada, Lola is wholly responsible for her existential condition.11 **McGee (2007) calls attention to the conservative consequences of this way of thinking: ‘‘What about the unfortunate corollary that would necessarily apply to those who are ill, impoverished, dispossessed, or worse? What about *The Secret*’s more egregious claims *. . .* that the children of Darfur attracted the starvation their families are facing with their wrong thinking.’’ Strangely, this judgment—that women and oppressed others are wrong to blame ‘‘conditions, people, or events external to them’’ for the hardships of their lives—resembles the rhetoric of conservative real world policies and agencies, suggesting a common ideological underpinning** (see Cloud, 1998). **Neoliberal structural adjustment programs, in which the World Bank or International Monetary Fund ‘‘help’’ suffering populations only if those populations interpret their problems as something other than a structured result of global capitalism, are good examples** (see Soederberg, 2006). Some of these programs compel the desperately hungry to grow luxury crops for export, asking debtor nations to sacrifice infrastructure—plumbing, waste management, transportation, employment, and social services—to the servicing of their debt (see Bond, 2001; Geier, 2000).12

#### Turns the aff—the corporatist ideology of individualism will be appropriated as a mask for racism and economic violence

**Perelman ‘5**  Michael, Professor of Economics at CSU-Chico, “Manufacturing Discontent: The Trap of Individualism in Corporate Society” Pluto Press, p. 139

Of course, **no society can completely abolish risk, but the government can help to shelter people from some of the consequences of a society led by corporations that focus on self-dealing chasing after profits to the exclusion of any other considerations**. Mandel cited the conclusion from one study that regarded the costs of economic fluctuations, which estimated that “**consumers would roughly trade all growth for the elimination of fluctuations**” (Mandel 1996: 159; citing Campbell and Cochrane 1995: 3). Unfortunately, while the cost of risks has been soaring, the government has abdicated its responsibility for buffering those costs. The position expressed by Peter Fisher above suggests that the goal of the government is to move even further in that direction. **The idea that the government should play a role by reducing risk for the general population flies in the face of the current rhetorical fashion that emphasizes the importance of individual responsibility.** Recall Senator Santorum’s declaration that making people struggle is a good thing. But if the social welfare state has the potential to shelter people from the uncertainties of the market system and most people are vulnerable to these uncertainties, why is the support for the social welfare state so weak in the United States today? How did the antipathy for government become so strong? A number of reasons come into play. To begin with, surveys indicate that the belief in individual responsibility is much stronger in the United States than in Western Europe. Maybe the mythology of Horatio Alger or the cowboy on the frontier affects the mentality of people in the United States. Some **researchers suggest that racism might be involved in the unwillingness to give the state more of a role in protecting individuals.** For example, within the United States, those states that are more ethnically fragmented spend a smaller fraction of their budget on social services and productive public goods, and more on crime prevention (Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote 2001: 229). Daniel Levitas, author of an extensive study on extreme right-wing movements, comes to a similar conclusion. He makes the case that **the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the 1965 Voting Rights Act, and federal enforcement of the 1954 *Brown* decision, which declared segregation in public schools unconstitutional, caused a sizeable number of white people to become more antagonistic toward taxes, believing that the financial product of their hard work was being used to support “undeserving” and “parasitic” elements of the population (read: black people)** (Levitas 2002: 102—3). He cites one right-wing activist’s interpretation: “The exactions demanded from the self-reliant and the largesse given the lazy, the incompetent, and the non-productive, cannot be an accident: all this MUST be the result of carefully constructed policy with long-range objectives” (Levitas 2002: 103; citing Larson 1979, pp. ix—x). Although he does not imply, any more than the Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote paper does, that all anti-statist views are racist in nature, he does suggest that a growing racism helped to tilt public sentiment in that direction. Regardless of the cause, the prevailing belief in the United States seems to be that a particular person is rich or poor because of his or her individual efforts. Europeans tend to give more weight to luck or social circumstances (Alesina and Angeletos 2002). In effect, then**, the U.S. mindset calls upon the state to emphasize the minimization of one kind of personal risk—namely crime—while preferring it avoid its responsibility to eliminate the sort of risks that Mandel discussed**. Ironically the more energetic efforts in creating economic stability happen to be what is probably the most effective policy in reducing crime. At the same time, **many of the very people who oppose policies that shelter individuals from risk call upon the state to offer wildly generous benefits to the corporate sector: I would prefer that the state be no more considerate of corporations than it would be toward a young, immigrant, single mother of color.**

# 1NR

#### Reading the story of the Invisible Man serves as a chrono-political afro-futurist intervention into dominant and oppressive histories of the past and future that gets outside of the historical and cultural understanding of the aff. This is key.

Yaszek 2007 (Lisa, Rethinking History: The Journal of Theory and Practice, "An Afrofuturist Reading of Ralph Ellison's Invisible Man" [www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13642520500149202#.UyY8mK1dUag](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13642520500149202#.UyY8mK1dUag))

Not surprisingly, Ellison's sense of a uniquely modern American sociopolitical identity is closely related to his belief in a uniquely modern American aesthetic practice. As a participant in a 1955 debate over ‘What's wrong with the american novel?’ Ellison dumbfounded his fellow panelists by proposing that the real problem with the contemporary American novel was not that it failed to make everyday experience fresh for readers (as the white authors unanimously concluded), but that it failed to adequately capture what is truly new about the modern experience—rapid social and industrial change. As he explained, ‘in the early days when the novel came into being…society had begun to shift, and the novel was about these new things which were happening so fast that men needed to get an idea of what was simply temporary and what was abiding…. Reality changes fast, and if you don't keep up with it, you are apt to fall into writing the same book or the book that is expected of you’ (Ellison [1955] 1995, pp. 27, 49). For Ellison, the goal of the contemporary writer is to induce ‘a sense of wonder’ both at the multiplicity of American realities and the speed with which they evolve into new futures (p. 25). As such, Ellison advocates the kind of ‘chronopolitical intervention’ into dominant historical and aesthetic representational practices championed by Afrofuturists such as Kodwo Eshun nearly four decades later. Ellison performs just this kind of chronopolitical intervention in Invisible Man by inviting readers to critically assess the rhetoric of the mid-century futures industry as it served to define appropriate modes of American—and specifically African American—subjectivity. Ellison's novel follows the adventures of an unnamed protagonist who tries to become a national leader by allying himself with various institutions: the historic black college he attends as a young man in the south, the paint factory he works for when he first moves north, and then finally the leftist political group known as the Brotherhood. As I read this text in the history of Afrofuturism, what Ellison's protagonist is looking for is the possibility of a black future that, in the 1930s of the novel, he cannot find. In each case his dreams of self-realization are thwarted because he is treated as little more than a blank slate upon which institutional authority projects its own vision of the future. The most explicit acknowledgement of this comes from Mr. Norton, the rich white college trustee who tells Ellison's protagonist: ‘You are my fate, young man. Only you can tell me what it really is…. Through you…I can observe in terms of living personalities to what extent my money, my time and my hopes have been fruitfully invested’ (pp. 42, 45). Here then the black subject is figured as a kind of venture capital, a natural resource available to white investors speculating in the stock market of tomorrow. Although white members of the Brotherhood explicitly oppose themselves to capitalists like Norton, they, too, treat black men as natural resources rather than as human beings. This attitude is clearly encapsulated in a Brotherhood poster entitled ‘After the Struggle: The Rainbow of America's Future.’ The poster depicts ‘a group of heroic figures. An American Indian couple, representing the dispossessed past; a blond brother (in overalls) and a leading Irish sister, representing the dispossessed present; and [black] Brother Tod Clifton and a young white couple (it had been felt unwise simply to show Clifton and the girl) surrounded by a group of children of mixed races, representing the future’ (Ellison [1952] 1989, p. 385). Much like Norton, then, the Brotherhood equates blackness with futurity, but only insofar as the black subject conforms to a predictable and carefully controlled vision of the future of which he is not totally a part. Like later Afrofuturists, Ellison strategically deploys the language of science fiction to emphasize the alienation of black subjects from these kinds of whitewashed futures. The invisible man describes his fellow college students as ‘robots’ with ‘laced up’ minds (p. 36); later, a disillusioned black vet dismisses the invisible man himself as ‘a walking personification of the Negative…. [a] mechanical man’ (p. 94). Elsewhere in Invisible Man a black factory worker notes that ‘we the machines inside the machine’ (p. 217), and the Brotherhood leaders themselves treat black men as scientific prototypes, ‘one step in the experiment’ of making society new (p. 350). Furthermore, both during the battle royale and his stay at the paint factory hospital, Ellison's protagonist—much like Frankenstein's monster—finds himself subject to manipulation by white culture through literal applications of electricity. At the end of the battle royale the invisible man scrambles for coins tossed on to an electrified rug by an amused group of white townsmen; meanwhile, at the paint factory hospital white doctors carefully administer a kind of electrical lobotomy to Ellison's protagonist to ensure his future docility. Taken together, these science fictional references allow Ellison to suggest that American institutions do more than simply conspire to ‘Keep This Nigger-Boy Running’ (p. 33). They conspire to keep him running right into the future as well. Ellison also insists that, as the alien others of America, black subjects are defined by complex historic and material relations that cannot be streamlined to fit institutional visions of tomorrow. For example, the invisible man shatters Norton's dreams of a docile black future when he allows the trustee to meet Jim Trueblood, a black sharecropper who accidentally impregnates his own daughter, and then after that the mad black veterans who haunt the local tavern. In the north Ellison's protagonist more consciously challenges the Brotherhood's blandly multicultural vision of futurity when he refuses to subordinate the needs of the African American community to the cause of international class struggle. Not surprisingly, in both cases reprisal is swift and absolute. Confronted with the chaos of a rural black world which refuses to respond to benevolent white paternalism, Norton suffers a nervous breakdown and the invisible man is banished from school. Similarly, when Brotherhood leaders are confronted with what they perceive to be the chaos of the invisible man's adherence to the backward past of racial community they immediately relieve him of his position as the head of the Brotherhood's Harlem chapter. In essence, then, the invisible man loses his status as a symbol of futurity precisely because he cannot—or will not—reinforce those official future histories that relegate all kinds of disruptive black behaviour to the safety of a sealed-off past. Of course it is not enough for Ellison's protagonist to simply witness what he calls ‘the boomerang of history.’ Eventually he must learn to take control of history and deny those whitewashed histories of the future predicated on the erasure of black subjectivity. He learns this lesson from Brother Tarp, an unassuming old man who becomes a kind of spokesperson for Afrofuturity. As a young man in the south, Tarp refuses to give up his possessions to a white man; later, he refuses to accept the sentence of life imprisonment he receives for doing so, and, after nineteen years of patient waiting, he finds his opportunity and escapes to the north. As he tells the invisible man: ‘I said no to a man who wanted to take something from me; that's what it cost me for saying no and even now the debt ain't fully paid and will never be paid in their terms…. I said no…I said hell no! And I kept saying no until I broke the chain and left’ (p. 387). Significantly, this passage does more than demonstrate one man's refusal to play the role that has been socially scripted for him. It shows how, in refusing this role, one man can change the future: Tarp's ‘debt’—such as it is—will never be paid because he refuses to become the subservient black man he is supposed to be. Instead, he removes himself from the future that has been imposed on him and allies himself with the Brotherhood in the hope of a better tomorrow. But if Ellison's protagonist says no to all those whitewashed futures that deny the complexity of his history and identity—including, eventually, those offered by the Brotherhood—what is left to him? Towards the end of the novel he encounters two possible black futures, but neither seem particularly satisfactory. Ras the Exhorter/Destroyer dreams of a Black Nationalist future in Africa, but his is a dream of tomorrow that has been pieced together from nothing more than an artificial past. Ras rides to battle during the Harlem riots in his ‘foreign costume,’ hefting a spear like ‘the kind you see them African guys carrying in the moving pictures’ and riding his horse ‘like Heigho, the goddam Silver’ (pp. 563 – 564). This leads the invisible man to conclude that the separatist is ‘funny and dangerous and sad’ (p. 564): dangerous because he dares to dream of preserving an authentic black identity through rebellion and revolution, but funny and sad because these same dreams are always already mediated by the narratives of white culture through which he speaks them. The other black future is embodied by Rinehart, a man who rules the Harlem underworld by shifting into whatever role is appropriate to the moment: lover or fighter, preacher or pimp, gangster or police informant. Rinehart ‘opens up a new section of reality’ for Ellison's protagonist precisely because, like Tarp, he says no to any one predetermined future. As the invisible man himself puts it: ‘his world was possibility and he knew it’ (pp. 499, 498). But possibility alone is not enough to ensure a viable black future—indeed, it turns out to do quite the opposite. Taking his cue from Rinehart, the invisible man decides to become all things to all people, cheerfully assuring the Brotherhood that he has Harlem well under control while solemnly assuring the people of Harlem that they have every right to be angry at the way they have been treated by white politicians—including, implicitly, the Brotherhood itself. Unfortunately, the invisible man's plan backfires and, rather than coming to a collective awareness that it must find its own destiny, Harlem explodes in a night of apocalyptic rioting that tears the community apart and leaves the invisible man trapped in the sewers beneath New York City. Stunned by the disastrous chain of events he has triggered, Ellison's protagonist decides to refuse history—including the history of the future—altogether. After a feverish dream in which the invisible man finally recognizes that until now he has been nothing more than a sacrifice to the ‘iron man’ of industrial futurity, he concludes, ‘I couldn't return to Mary's, or to any part of my old life…. No, I couldn't return to Mary's, or to the campus, or to the Brotherhood, or home. I could only move ahead or stay here, underground. So I would stay here until I was chased out’ (p. 571). Here, then, Ellison's protagonist goes beyond Tarp and all the other black subjects who have said no to the historical trajectories predetermined for them by institutional authorities. Rather than running either backward into a sentimentalized yesterday or forward into a whitewashed tomorrow, he instead opts out of linear time altogether. Although the invisible man's decision to stay underground marks the end of Ellison's novel proper, it is not the end of his protagonist's story. Ellison's portrait of the artist as a young man is framed by a prologue and epilogue that reveal what happens to the invisible man as he moves into middle age during his long stay underground.5 In short, he finally learns who he is—and who he may someday be—as both a black man and an American: Like almost everyone else in this country I started out with my share of optimism. I believed in hard work and progress and action, but now, after being first ‘for’ society and then ‘against’ it, I assign myself no rank or any limit, and such an attitude is very much against the trend of the times…. Whence all this passion toward conformity anyway?—diversity is the word. Let man keep his many parts and you'll have no tyrant states…. America is woven of many strands, I would recognize them and let it remain so…. This is not prophecy, but description. (pp. 576 – 577) In essence, then, the invisible man's basement home becomes a kind of time- and spaceship that carries him outside of the known world, providing him with a new perspective from which he can see both the multiple aspects of the Afrodiasporic experience and its complex relations to the ‘many strands’ of American reality. Much like Kodwo Eshun's ideal Afrofuturist subject, then, Ellison's protagonist begins to experience the kind of multiple consciousness that is itself the first step towards the creation of a new and more egalitarian multiracial futurity.

#### We should start the process of re-thinking ‘politics as usual’ by reclaiming the critical power of writing—must be open to the unpredictability of multiple meanings.

Hemer 2006 (Oscar, Professor at Malmo University, "Fiction's truth and social change. Preliminary outlines for an investigation of fiction as a research method and a means of communication for social change" dspace.mah.se/handle/2043/7465)

Literature played a key-role in the formation of nation-states and the construction of national identity, in Europe as well as in the newly independent former colonies of Africa, Asia and the Americas. Many post-colonial writers actively contributed to the nation-building process, providing epics for identification. Fiction has served a similar (nationally) modernizing and vitalizing function in Ireland, Norway and Iceland as it has in India and Nigeria. If fiction – prose, poetry, drama, film – played a crucial role in building the imagined communities of both colonial empires and nation-states, I assume that literature and other forms of mediated fiction may also serve as an important means of deconstructing the same mental figures and, possibly, foster the building of new transnational and glocal communities. Social impact does not necessarily imply that readers/listeners/viewers are moved into intense action. Works of art and fiction may just as well play a testimonial role and/or provide a deeper analysis, directly or indirectly informing debate among the so-called public opinion. South Africa in the 1980s is an example of the important role of literary imagination in creating and proposing subject-positions that exceeded the racialized determinations of the apartheid system and the colonial legacy (Helgesson 1999). And it may well be that J M Coetzee’s allegorical way of addressing the brutal absurdity of the apartheid state in for example The Life & Times of Michael K had more lasting impact on South African imaginary than the contemporary realistic novels with clear affiliations with the on-going political struggle . I would also claim that Coetzee’s late novel Disgrace (1999) is one of the most accurate, yet of course subjective, descriptions of the South Africa of the early transition period, post apartheid and post TRC. But how can such impact, which does not translate into social action or individual behavior change, be measured? Calling for evidence is like asking for a quantification of literary quality. We know that it is impossible, yet hardly anyone would deny that quality can be assessed, and most of us would agree that it is not merely a matter of subjective taste. There are standards for critical judgment that cannot be defined and I would suggest, as a hypothesis for scrutiny, that truth in the sense that I am trying to encircle here is the main criterion for literary quality. Truth may not always be compatible with reconciliation, and Disgrace is certainly a prime example. It is, as Krog would put it, “busy with the truth” but not with reconciliation, other than perhaps at an individual level. The novel’s main character David Lurie does repent in the end, in his solitary way, but without bowing to the illusionary myth of the reconciled New South Africa. Coetzee’s non-compromising stand remained as controversial after apartheid as it had been during the struggle and eventually led him to voluntary exile in Australia. The role of fiction that I have pictured above is primarily as a transgressive means of investigation and innovation, secondly as a vehicle for cultural identification and social empowerment. From the perspective of the communicator for social change the second may at a first glance seem most relevant, or immediately applicable. We have, in the last ten or fifteen years, seen an enormous rise in the use of soap operas and other forms of fictional popular culture as tools of strategic communication. The successful use of narrative and fiction is one of the most striking features when it comes to actually mediating social change. Edutainment (Education-Entertainment) has become the favored medium for HIV/AIDS communication, with success stories such as HIP Femina in Tanzania, Puntos de Encuentro in Nicaragua and the often evoked Soul City of South Africa (Hemer & Tufte 2005, chapters 9, 23, 24, 25). There isn’t necessarily a conflict between the two objectives – fiction as investigation and social analysis on the one hand and as strategic communication on the other – but the hypothesis I intend to prove is that they are intrinsically connected and that the second must always be subordinated to the first. The instrumental use of fiction in campaigns that merely aim at individual behavior change is, at best, a form of social marketing and may have limited effect as such – provided that it is repeated incessantly, like commercial advertisements. Lasting social change requires a number of concurrent factors, many of which may be incidental and difficult to predict. But a prerequisite for any work of fiction with claims to really transform the world, in Freire’s sense, is that it is capable of saying something different, by consciously or subconsciously transcending the polarities and limitations of its time and place. Fiction’s truth is almost by definition unpredictable. It defies not only the market logic, but often also communication strategies. However, regardless of our purpose – whether we are writers of novels or communicators for social change – we should start by re-examining our own professional practices, whose conventions we too often take for granted, and reclaim the critical power of writing: overcoming the traditional separation between form and content, exploring the tension between what is documented and what is imagined.

## Scott Link

#### One of the spits of the 2AC discusses the affs ability to come to the debate community and speak the truth but this assumes that there is a “truth” to be experienced rather than a million different experiences. That his experience is the same with UDLs as all is a form of individual politics. He says we don’t link to your corporatism kritik because we are “talking overacrchingly about what all experience.” It is a mimicry of the liberal politics of the powerful that demand minority groups submit a single entity to speak on their behalf in order to foreclose a discussion of broader edifices of power. This turns politics into policing

**Scott, 92** – professor of sociology at Princeton (Joan, “Multiculturalism and the Politics of Identity,” The Identity in Question (Summer, 1992), pp. 12-19, JSTOR)

There is nothing wrong, on the face of it, with teaching individuals about how to behave decently in relation to others and about how to empathize with each other's pain. The problem is that difficult analyses of how history and social standing, privilege, and subordination are involved in personal behavior entirely drop out. Chandra Mohanty puts it this way:

There has been an erosion of the politics of collectivity through the reformulation of race and difference in individualistic terms. The 1960s and '70s slogan "the personal is political" has been recraftedin the 1980s as "the political is personal." In other words, all politics is collapsed into the personal, and questions of individual behaviors, attitudes, and life-styles stand in for political analysis of the social. Individual political struggles are seen as the only relevant and legitimate form of political struggle.5

Paradoxically, individuals then generalize their perceptions and claim to speak for a whole group, but the groups are also conceived as unitary and autonomous. This individualizing, personalizing conception has also been behind some of the recent identity politics of minorities; indeed it gave rise to the intolerant, doctrinaire behavior that was dubbed, initially by its internal critics, "political correctness."

It is particularly in the notion of "experience" that one sees this operating. In much current usage of "experience," references to structure and history are implied but not made explicit; instead, personal testimony of oppression re-places analysis, and this testimony comes to stand for the experience of the whole group. The fact of belonging to an identity group is taken as authority enough for one's speech; the direct experience of a group or culture-that is, membership in it-becomes the only test of true knowledge.

The exclusionary implications of this are twofold: all those not of the group are denied even intellectual access to it, and those within the group whose experiences or interpretations do not conform to the established terms of identity must either suppress their views or drop out. An appeal to "experience" of this kind forecloses discussion and criticism and turns politics into a policing operation: the borders of identity are patrolled for signs of nonconformity; the test of membership in a group becomes less one's willingness to endorse certain principles and engage in specific political actions, less one's positioning in specific relationships of power, than one's ability to use the prescribed languages that are taken as signs that one is inherently "of" the group. That all of this isn't recognized as a highly political process that produces identities is troubling indeed, especially because it so closely mimics the politics of the powerful, naturalizing and deeming as discernably objective facts the prerequisites for inclusion in any group.

### A2- Perm

#### Adding other forms to fiction destroys the imaginative potential—recreates dominant political practices

Hemer 2013 (Oscar, professor at Malmö University and co-director of Ørecomm, “Global Histories through the Lens of Fiction” Lecture given as part of the seminar “What Time is Global History? <http://195.178.227.4/bitstream/handle/2043/16520/Global_Histories_RUC.pdf?sequence=3>)

That could have been my concluding remark. But I’ll give you one final example, to bring¶ us back to the notion of the future past. The example is my¶ own¶ writing.¶ PP¶ 8 (The Triangle)¶ This has become my trademark.¶ What this simple figure illustrates is what I regard as the three main writing practices and their interrelations.¶ I would even¶ suggest¶ that¶ all forms of creative writing happen in the dynamic tension between these three poles. (Think of them, not as a triangle, or¶ a pyramid,¶ but as the three poles of a triangular field of force.)¶ There is a crucial difference between the literary practice and the other two.¶ While everything in the world can, metaphorically speaking, be turned into literature,¶ everything cannot claim to be journalism or science. A novel can incorporate the other genres in a totalizing effort that the others could only dream of. (Gamerro’s novel¶ is¶ a¶ good example of that.¶ Another¶ more recent¶ example, that you may be more familiar¶ with, is David Mitch¶ ell’s extraordinary novel¶ Cloud Atlas¶ from 2004¶ . I didn’t see¶ Tom¶ Tykwer¶ ’s film yet, but turning¶ that¶ novel into a film inevitably implies a severe¶ reduction.¶ )¶ (The flip side of this cannibalistic capacity is a correspondent vulnerability to the influence of these other practices with their more formatted language and sturdier genre conventions.) The literary¶ freedom¶ can¶ indeed also serve as an excuse for not¶ doing proper research on a subject. You can always hide behind this shield of fiction...¶ 11¶ It has been very fashionable lately to play on the borders of fact and fiction.¶ And¶ , it is the¶ privilege of the arts to do so. Historians may play with¶ counterfactual hypotheses¶ ,¶ and¶ that is certainly a form of fiction¶ –¶ but based on the assumption of established fa¶ ct, that¶ serves as comparison or corrective.¶ I actually don’t believe that the practices should be fused. I am very much in favour of¶ hybrid forms¶ and¶ genre transgressions¶ , but I believe that every such attempt still has to be anchored in one of the three¶ corners of the triangle (t¶ here is nothing in the middle).¶ When I did my research on fiction and truth in the transition processes of Argentina and¶ South Africa¶ PP9¶ ,¶ I,¶ as a non¶ -¶ academic on the outset, adapt¶ ed¶ to the academic form and¶ push¶ ed¶ its limits from¶ within. The resulting text has elements of reportage and memoir,¶ but it is definitely to be classified as¶ non¶ -¶ fiction¶ .¶ However.¶ After spending five years doing this arduous academic research, it was really a¶ relief to go back to writing fiction. My lates¶ t novel,¶ Santiago,¶ was published in 2007, as¶ the second part in a planned Argentina trilogy (that is why all my previous examples¶ were from Argentina). The first novel came out in 2000, and the third, which I have¶ recently¶ completed, will hopefully be out¶ within the next¶ year. (They are all in Swedish,¶ so no need to give you the titles, but the last one is called¶ Misiones¶ .¶ PP1¶ 0¶ I’ve had that¶ title in the back of my head ever since I wrote¶ Santiago¶ , or even earlier, and I’d probably¶ written it a long time ag¶ o if the Fiction and Truth project had not come in¶ -¶ between.¶ But then, it would certainly have become a quite different novel. Why?¶ 12¶ The more thorough research into the ethnographic material that I was beginning¶ to explore in¶ Santiago¶ has given my writing¶ a more solid historical ground. And, more¶ importantly, the subsequent greater confidence in my own authority, if you like, has¶ given me the ability and motivation to invent more freely.¶ One of my South African interviewees, Ivan Vladislavic, suggested tha¶ t there is¶ not enough invention in literature and called for more writers who would simply make¶ things up. (He was primarily thinking of South African literature of the transition, but I¶ think it can be applied to Literature in general¶ –¶ and I think that i¶ s a good point.¶ For example, Misiones (which means¶ Missions¶ ) is a province in NE Argentina with¶ a fairly large and largely unknown community of Swedish immigrants, who arrived in¶ the late 19th and early 20th century. I have been there, very briefly, but I¶ have all the¶ time planned to go there and do some proper research for my novel.¶ But in the end I decided to write the novel first,¶ completely¶ based on imagination¶ and not making use of any of the ”real” history.¶ Moreover I decided to set my novel in a ne¶ ar future¶ –¶ 2018/19. If you didn’t know, a¶ low¶ -¶ scale world war will then be going on, with its epicentre in Central Asia... All¶ intercontintental air traffic will be cancelled, Europe is on the verge of complete¶ dissolution, millions of migrants are once aga¶ in going¶ –¶ by boat¶ -¶ from the old world to¶ the new, and from North to South, with Argentina and Australia as main recipients¶ –¶ and¶ emerging new economic and political powers, joining the others in what someone¶ wittily has named ABRICA.¶ It has been truly funny to write completely without inhibitions not knowing where imagination would take me.¶ But—and this will be my concluding remark—this literary fantasy is a just as serious interrogation of the present past as the academic dissertation.

#### Only through a discussion of particular characters can we make the 1ac discussion accessible

**Carroll, '2** [The Wheel of Virtue: Art, Literature, and Moral Knowledge Author(s): Noël Carroll Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 60, No. 1, 60th Anniversary Issue (Winter, 2002), pp. 3-26]

Perhaps some evidence for this hypothesis can be found in the typical response of plain audiences to narrative artworks. What do ordinary folk (or even academics when they leave the classroom and conference hall) talk about after they see a play or a film, or the morning after the airing of a TV show, or when they discuss a new novel? They talk about characters. Though the discussion of character is not a major concern in contemporary theoretical approaches to the arts,it is usually **the first order of business in informal discussions** of narrative artworks.64 Frequently, people begin by discussing their likes and dislikes regarding the characters. But this, where opinions differ, soon leads to a consideration of the character attributes that ground those assessments. Here we point to the features of the characters that warrant our judgments,pro and con. And this, in large measure, involves pointing to the virtues and vices of the characters. As we compare and contrast what we have observed about the characters with the views of others, and as we weigh our judgments against what others have to say, we are, of course, **engaging in a process of reflective equilibrium** about the aptness of our applications of concepts of virtue and vice that, among other things, brings to the fore or makes available to us an awareness of the conditions in accordance with which we make those applications and issue our judgments. **Often informal conversation and debate of this sort explicitly interrogates** disputants' use of this or that virtue in describing this or that character. Is so-and-so correct in calling such-andsuch a character shy rather than aloof,65 arrogant rather than magnanimous, reckless rather than courageous? Does the ingenue have character, properly so called, or merely personality? This then can quickly escalate into questions about what it means to call a behavior or a character truly courageous, or cowardly, or reckless.66 And at this point-in what I conjecture is a representative scenario of informal discussions of narrative art-**our conversationalists have embarked upon something that can be unequivocably described as a form of conceptual analysis**. I believe that philosophers and theorists do not pay enough heed to the ordinary transactions that transpire between artworks and their audiences, despite the fact that this is an obvious place to look for the lineaments of our artistic practices. **Instead**, **they** **often build their theories in response to certain epistemological constraints that have** **little to do with the actual reception of art.** Perhaps this is why philosophers and theorists have so little to say about characters, often referring to them gingerly by means of technical phrases such as "character functions." **But this is not how typical consumers of art and literature regard them**. Not only do they very often read for character-read **because of their interest in characters**-but they understand these characters in terms of virtually the same person schemas they use to understand each other in everyday life.