### Ptix

#### Obama’s PC stops Dems from pushing Iran sanctions now – that’s prevents war.

Jacob Glass 3/25/14, Truman-Albright Fellow, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jacob-glass/as-iran-nuclear-negotiati\_b\_5024604.html

Last week Iran and the so-called P5+1 countries -- Russia, China, Britain, France, the U.S., plus Germany -- began a new round of negotiations in the Austrian capital of Vienna. While perhaps overshadowed by tensions on the Crimean Peninsula and missing Malaysian Flight 370, the talks mark a significant step towards resolving the Iranian nuclear crisis. Yet misguided calls by Congress to increase sanctions on Iran threaten to scuttle progress, and underscore the fragility of the negotiating process. Over the past three decades, Iran has faced crippling sanctions imposed by America and the international community. Trade restrictions have steadily increased to block Iran's lucrative petroleum export market as well as the country's participation in the global banking system. All told, international sanctions have cost Iran over $100 billion in lost oil profits alone. So called "carrot and stick" policies have long been fundamental to international diplomacy. The "stick" has been a sharp one, and has finally brought the Iranians to the negotiating table. During his September visit to the UN General Assembly in New York, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani spoke with President Obama over the phone, marking the first direct communication between an American and Iranian president since 1979. On November 24, an interim "first-step" deal was reached to freeze Iran's nuclear development program and pave the way for a comprehensive agreement. The deal halts uranium enrichment above 3.5 percent and puts international observers on the ground in Iran, all but ensuring that negotiations cannot be used as a delay tactic. Yet amid these positive signs that diplomacy is working, members of Congress have advocated for even more sanctions to be levied against Iran, specifically in the form of Senate Bill 1881, sponsored by Illinois Republican Mark Kirk and New Jersey Democrat Robert Menendez. New sanctions would torpedo the Vienna talks and reverse the diplomatic progress that has been made. Iranian officials have already promised to abandon negotiations if new sanctions are passed. Even our own allies, along with Russia and China, have opposed the move. Passing unilateral sanctions will splinter the fragile international coalition, needlessly antagonize Iranian negotiators, and make a violent conflict with Iran more likely. Diplomatic victory will only be achieved if the international community stands united before Iran. To this point, the Obama administration has avoided a vote on SB 1881 by threatening a veto of the bill, and the administration's full court press to prevent Senate Democrats from supporting new sanctions has bought international negotiators time. Several influential Democrats, including Senator Richard Blumenthal from Connecticut, have agreed to postpone a vote on the bill, contingent on productive negotiations. Although legislation imposing new sanctions has been avoided thus far, the pressure on Congressional Democrats to act will intensify as talks in Vienna move forward. This round of negotiations is widely projected to be more difficult than the November deal, and inflammatory rhetoric from Tehran is likely. Nevertheless, sanctions are not the answer. Instead, we must continue to let diplomacy run its course. Sanctions have done their job by bringing Iran to the table. In return, Iran expects to be rewarded with sanctions relief. The passage of new trade restrictions would effectively withdraw the carrot, and hit Iran with another stick. Consider the negotiations over. The risks of delaying new sanctions is slight. The sanctions relief Iran is receiving is valued between $6 and $7 billion, and represents only a small fraction of the remaining restrictions blocking Iran from using the international banking system and selling oil. Should Iran prove to be a dishonest negotiating partner, sanctions can be renewed and ratcheted up. Most importantly, international observers will be on the ground in Iran to prevent Tehran from racing towards a nuclear weapon while negotiations are ongoing. At the same time, the benefits of successful diplomacy are immense, as a comprehensive deal would be a dramatic victory for U.S. non-proliferation efforts. Further, the dismantling of Iran's nuclear program would significantly ease tensions between its two biggest rivals in the region, Israel and Saudi Arabia. Our congressional leaders must not be so confident as to think Iran is desperate for a deal. The unprecedented overtures of President Rouhani to the West are widely seen as a test to gauge if a favorable solution can be negotiated with the international community. Should he fail to do so, hardliners within the Iranian government will be empowered to revert back to a pre-Rouhani foreign policy dominated by isolation from the West and an aggressive nuclear development program.

#### Plan destroys Obama

Loomis 7 Dr. Andrew J. Loomis is a Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and Department of Government at Georgetown University, “Leveraging legitimacy in the crafting of U.S. foreign policy”, March 2, 2007, pg 36-37, http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/1/7/9/4/8/pages179487/p179487-36.php

Declining political authority encourages defection. American political analyst Norman Ornstein writes of the domestic context, In a system where a President has limited formal power, perception matters. The reputation for success—the belief by other political actors that even when he looks down, a president will find a way to pull out a victory—is the most valuable resource a chief executive can have. Conversely, the widespread belief that the Oval Office occupant is on the defensive, on the wane or without the ability to win under adversity can lead to disaster, as individual lawmakers calculate who will be on the winning side and negotiate accordingly. In simple terms, winners win and losers lose more often than not. Failure begets failure. In short, a president experiencing declining amounts of political capital has diminished capacity to advance his goals. As a result, political allies perceive a decreasing benefit in publicly tying themselves to the president, and an increasing benefit in allying with rising centers of authority. A president’s incapacity and his record of success are interlocked and reinforce each other. Incapacity leads to political failure, which reinforces perceptions of incapacity. This feedback loop accelerates decay both in leadership capacity and defection by key allies. The central point of this review of the presidential literature is that the sources of presidential influence—and thus their prospects for enjoying success in pursuing preferred foreign policies—go beyond the structural factors imbued by the Constitution. Presidential authority is affected by ideational resources in the form of public perceptions of legitimacy. The public offers and rescinds its support in accordance with normative trends and historical patterns, non-material sources of power that affects the character of U.S. policy, foreign and domestic.

#### Nuclear war.

James A. **Russell 9,** Senior lecturer in the Department of National Security Affairs at NPS, Spring, Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East, [www.nps.edu/academbvics/sigs/ccc/people/biolinks/.../PP26\_Russell\_2009.pdf](http://www.nps.edu/academbvics/sigs/ccc/people/biolinks/.../PP26_Russell_2009.pdf)

Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is **disturbingly easy** to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could **quickly escalate** in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of **c**hemical, **b**iological, or **n**uclear weapons. It **would be a mistake** to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world.

#### Also – Israeli strikes.

Leubsdorf, 1/22/14 **–** former Washington Bureau chief of The Dallas Morning News (Carl, Dallas Morning News, “Hard-liners’ mischief-making threatens Iran nuke talks” <http://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/columnists/carl-p-leubsdorf/20140122-carl-leubsdorf-hard-liners-mischief-making-threatens-iran-nuke-talks.ece>)

The measure’s most dangerous provision, according to various published reports, reads as follows: “If the government of Israel is compelled to take military action in legitimate self-defense against Iran’s nuclear weapon program, the United States should stand with Israel and provide in accordance with the law of the United States and the constitutional responsibility of Congress to authorize the use of military force, diplomatic and economic support to the Government of Israel in the defense of its territory, people and existence.” While not requiring U.S. action, critics note the language suggests the mere existence of an Iranian “nuclear weapon program” would be sufficient to compel Israel to attack “in legitimate self-defense.” And it says the U.S. “should” provide such an Israeli attack with “military, diplomatic and economic support” according to U.S. laws and congressional constitutional responsibility. In effect, that could enable the hard-liners who control the Israeli government to kill the talks or try to drag the United States into a war against Iran if they decide that Iranian compliance with the current agreement is insufficient to protect Israel. The measure would also enable Congress to kill any agreement the West reaches with Iran by overriding Obama’s decision to waive existing sanctions.

#### Global war and turns case.

Reuveny, 10– professor in the School of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University (Rafael, “Unilateral strike could trigger World War III, global depression” Gazette Xtra, 8/7, - See more at: <http://gazettextra.com/news/2010/aug/07/con-unilateral-strike-could-trigger-world-war-iii-/#sthash.ec4zqu8o.dpuf>)

A unilateral Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would likely have dire consequences, including a regional war, global economic collapse and a major power clash. For an Israeli campaign to succeed, it must be quick and decisive. This requires an attack that would be so overwhelming that Iran would not dare to respond in full force. Such an outcome is extremely unlikely since the locations of some of Iran’s nuclear facilities are not fully known and known facilities are buried deep underground. All of these widely spread facilities are shielded by elaborate air defense systems constructed not only by the Iranians but also the Chinese and, likely, the Russians as well. By now, Iran has also built redundant command and control systems and nuclear facilities, developed early warning systems, acquired ballistic and cruise missiles and upgraded and enlarged its armed forces. Because Iran is well-prepared, a single, conventional Israeli strike—or even numerous strikes—could not destroy all of its capabilities, giving Iran time to respond. Unlike Iraq, whose nuclear program Israel destroyed in 1981, Iran has a second-strike capability comprised of a coalition of Iranian, Syrian, Lebanese, Hezbollah, Hamas, and, perhaps, Turkish forces. Internal pressure might compel Jordan, Egypt and the Palestinian Authority to join the assault, turning a bad situation into a regional war. During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, at the apex of its power, Israel was saved from defeat by President Nixon’s shipment of weapons and planes. Today, Israel’s numerical inferiority is greater, and it faces more determined and better-equipped opponents. After years of futilely fighting Palestinian irregular armies, Israel has lost some of its perceived superiority—bolstering its enemies’ resolve. Despite Israel’s touted defense systems, Iranian coalition missiles, armed forces, and terrorist attacks would likely wreak havoc on its enemy, leading to a prolonged tit-for-tat. In the absence of massive U.S. assistance, Israel’s military resources may quickly dwindle, forcing it to use its alleged nuclear weapons, as it had reportedly almost done in 1973. An Israeli nuclear attack would likely destroy most of Iran’s capabilities, but a crippled Iran and its coalition could still attack neighboring oil facilities, unleash global terrorism, plant mines in the Persian Gulf and impair maritime trade in the Mediterranean, Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Middle Eastern oil shipments would likely slow to a trickle as production declines due to the war and insurance companies decide to drop their risky Middle Eastern clients. Iran and Venezuela would likely stop selling oil to the United States and Europe. From there, things could deteriorate as they did in the 1930s. The world economy would head into a tailspin; international acrimony would rise; and Iraqi and Afghani citizens might fully turn on the United States, immediately requiring the deployment of more American troops. Russia, China, Venezuela, and maybe Brazil and Turkey—all of which essentially support Iran—could be tempted to form an alliance and openly challenge the U.S. hegemony. Russia and China might rearm their injured Iranian protege overnight, just as Nixon rearmed Israel, and threaten to intervene, just as the U.S.S.R. threatened to join Egypt and Syria in 1973. President Obama’s response would likely put U.S. forces on nuclear alert, replaying Nixon’s nightmarish scenario. Iran may well feel duty-bound to respond to a unilateral attack by its Israeli archenemy, but it knows that it could not take on the United States head-to-head. In contrast, if the United States leads the attack, Iran’s response would likely be muted. If Iran chooses to absorb an American-led strike, its allies would likely protest and send weapons but would probably not risk using force. While no one has a crystal ball, leaders should be risk-averse when choosing war as a foreign policy tool. If attacking Iran is deemed necessary, Israel must wait for an American green light. A unilateral Israeli strike could ultimately spark World War III.

### CP

#### The US Executive branch should

#### --establish ex ante transparency of targeted killing standards and procedures and restrict targeted killings to clear and convincing instances of threat determined using a quantum of information framework.

#### The executive branch should end targeted killings by the Central Intelligence Agency using remotely piloted aircraft systems and only claim authority for targeted killing under Title 50 authority.

#### The United States Congress should create an intelligence appropriation mechanism distinct from defense appropriations. Through this mechanism, the United States Congress should substantially increase funding for CIA intelligence operations.

#### Ex ante transparency and procedures solves accountability and overuse.

Daskal 6/1/2012 (Jennifer, American University College of Law, "The Geography of the Battlefield: A Framework for Detention and Targeting Outside the 'Hot' Conflict Zone" papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2049532)

4. Procedural Requirements Currently, officials in the executive branch carry out all such ex ante review of out-of-battlefield targeting and detention decisions, reportedly with the involvement of the President, but without any binding and publicly articulated standards governing the exercise of these authorities. n163 All ex post review of targeting is also done internally within the executive branch. There is no public accounting, or even acknowledgment, of most strikes, their success and error rates, or the extent of any collateral damage. Whereas the Department of Defense provides solatia or condolence payments to Afghan civilians who are killed or injured as a result of military actions in Afghanistan (and formerly did so in Iraq), there is no equivalent effort in areas outside the active conflict zone. n164 Meanwhile, the degree of ex post review of detention decisions depends on the location of detention as opposed to the location of capture. Thus, [\*1219] Guantanamo detainees are entitled to habeas review, but detainees held in Afghanistan are not, even if they were captured far away and brought to Afghanistan to be detained. n165 Enhanced ex ante and ex post procedural protections for both detention and targeting, coupled with transparency as to the standards and processes employed, serve several important functions: they can minimize error and abuse by creating time for advance reflection, correct erroneous deprivations of liberty, create endogenous incentives to avoid mistake or abuse, and increase the legitimacy of state action. a. Ex Ante Procedures Three key considerations should guide the development of ex ante procedures. First, any procedural requirements must reasonably respond to the need for secrecy in certain operations. Secrecy concerns cannot, for example, justify the lack of transparency as to the substantive targeting standards being employed. There is, however, a legitimate need for the state to protect its sources and methods and to maintain an element of surprise in an attack or capture operation. Second, contrary to oft-repeated rhetoric about the ticking time bomb, few, if any, capture or kill operations outside a zone of active conflict occur in situations of true exigency. n166 Rather, there is often the time and need for advance planning. In fact, advance planning is often necessary to minimize damage to one's own troops and nearby civilians. n167 Third, the procedures and standards employed must be transparent and sufficiently credible to achieve the desired legitimacy gains. These considerations suggest the value of an independent, formalized, ex ante review system. Possible models include the Foreign Intelligence [\*1220] Surveillance Court (FISC), n168 or a FISC-like entity composed of military and intelligence officials and military lawyers, in the mode of an executive branch review board. n169 Created by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) in 1978, n170 the FISC grants ex parte orders for electronic surveillance and physical searches, among other actions, based on a finding that a "significant purpose" of the surveillance is to collect "foreign intelligence information." n171 The Attorney General can grant emergency authorizations without court approval, subject to a requirement that he notify the court of the emergency authorization and seek subsequent judicial authorization within seven days. n172 The FISC also approves procedures related to the use and dissemination of collected information. By statute, heightened restrictions apply to the use and dissemination of information concerning U.S. persons. n173 Notably, the process has been extraordinarily successful in protecting extremely sensitive sources and methods. To date, there has never been an unauthorized disclosure of an application to or order from the FISC court. An ex parte review system for targeting and detention outside zones of active hostility could operate in a similar way. Judges or the review board would approve selected targets and general procedures and standards, while still giving operators wide rein to implement the orders according to the approved standards. Specifically, the court or review board would determine whether the targets meet the substantive requirements and would [\*1221] evaluate the overarching procedures for making least harmful means-determinations, but would leave target identification and time-sensitive decisionmaking to the operators. n174 Moreover, there should be a mechanism for emergency authorizations at the behest of the Secretary of Defense or the Director of National Intelligence. Such a mechanism already exists for electronic surveillance conducted pursuant to FISA. n175 These authorizations would respond to situations in which there is reason to believe that the targeted individual poses an imminent, specific threat, and in which there is insufficient time to seek and obtain approval by a court or review panel as will likely be the case in instances of true imminence justifying the targeting of persons who do not meet the standards applicable to operational leaders. As required under FISA, the reviewing court or executive branch review board should be notified that such an emergency authorization has been issued; it should be time-limited; and the operational decisionmakers should have to seek court or review board approval (or review, if the strike has already taken place) as soon as practicable but at most within seven days. n176 Finally, and critically, given the stakes in any application namely, the deprivation of life someone should be appointed to represent the potential target's interests and put together the most compelling case that the individual is not who he is assumed to be or does not meet the targeting criteria. The objections to such a proposal are many. In the context of proposed courts to review the targeting of U.S. citizens, for example, some have argued that such review would serve merely to institutionalize, legitimize, and expand the use of targeted drone strikes. n177 But this ignores the reality of their continued use and expansion and imagines a world in which targeted [\*1222] killings of operational leaders of an enemy organization outside a zone of active conflict is categorically prohibited (an approach I reject n178). If states are going to use this extraordinary power (and they will), there ought to be a clear and transparent set of applicable standards and mechanisms in place to ensure thorough and careful review of targeted-killing decisions. The formalization of review procedures along with clear, binding standards will help to avoid ad hoc decisionmaking and will ensure consistency across administrations and time. Some also condemn the ex parte nature of such reviews. n179 But again, this critique fails to consider the likely alternative: an equally secret process in which targeting decisions are made without any formalized or institutionalized review process and no clarity as to the standards being employed. Institutionalizing a court or review board will not solve the secrecy issue, but it will lead to enhanced scrutiny of decisionmaking, particularly if a quasi-adversarial model is adopted, in which an official is obligated to act as advocate for the potential target. That said, there is a reasonable fear that any such court or review board will simply defer. In this vein, FISC's high approval rate is cited as evidence that reviewing courts or review boards will do little more than rubber-stamp the Executive's targeting decisions. n180 But the high approval rates only tell part of the story. In many cases, the mere requirement of justifying an application before a court or other independent review board can serve as an internal check, creating endogenous incentives to comply with the statutory requirements and limit the breadth of executive action. n181 Even if this system does little more than increase the attention paid to the stated requirements and expand the circle of persons reviewing the factual basis for the application, those features in and of themselves can lead to increased reflection and restraint. Additional accountability mechanisms, such as civil or criminal sanctions in the event of material misrepresentations or omissions, the granting of far-reaching authority to the relevant Inspectors General, and meaningful ex post review by Article III courts, n182 are also needed to help further minimize abuse. Conversely, some object to the use of courts or court-like review as stymying executive power in wartime, and interfering with the President's Article II powers. n183 According to this view, it is dangerous and potentially unconstitutional to require the President's wartime targeting decisions to be subject to additional reviews. These concerns, however, can be dealt with through emergency authorization mechanisms, the possibility of a presidential override, and design details that protect against ex ante review of operational decisionmaking. The adoption of an Article II review board, rather than an Article III-FISC model, further addresses some of the constitutional concerns. Some also have warned that there may be no "case or controversy" for an Article III, FISC-like court to review, further suggesting a preference for an Article II review board. n184 That said, similar concerns have been raised with respect to FISA and rejected. n185 Drawing heavily on an analogy to courts' roles in issuing ordinary warrants, the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel concluded at the time of enactment that a case and controversy existed, even though the FISA applications are made ex parte. n186 [\*1224] Here, the judges would be issuing a warrant to kill rather than surveil. While this is significant, it should not fundamentally alter the legal analysis. n187 As the Supreme Court has ruled, killing is a type of seizure. n188 The judges would be issuing a warrant for the most extreme type of seizure. n189 It is also important to emphasize that a reviewing court or review board would not be "selecting" targets, but determining whether the targets chosen by executive branch officials met substantive requirements much as courts do all the time when applying the law to the facts. Press accounts indicate that the United States maintains lists of persons subject to capture or kill operations lists created in advance of specific targeting operations and reportedly subject to significant internal deliberation, including by the President himself. n190 A court or review board could be incorporated into the existing ex ante decisionmaking process in a manner that would avoid interference with the conduct of specific operations reviewing the target lists but leaving the operational details to the operators. As suggested above, emergency approval mechanisms could and should be available to deal with exceptional cases where ex ante approval is not possible. Additional details will need to be addressed, including the temporal limits of the court's or review board's authorizations. For some high-level operatives, inclusion on a target list would presumably be valid for some set period of [\*1225] time, subject to specific renewal requirements. Authorizations based on a specific, imminent threat, by comparison, would need to be strictly time-limited, and tailored to the specifics of the threat, consistent with what courts regularly do when they issue warrants. In the absence of such a system, the President ought to, at a minimum, issue an executive order establishing a transparent set of standards and procedures for identifying targets of lethal killing and detention operations outside a zone of active hostilities. n192 To enhance legitimacy, the procedures should include target list reviews and disposition plans by the top official in each of the agencies with a stake in the outcome the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the CIA, the Secretary of State, the Director of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence, with either the Secretary of Defense, Director of National Intelligence, or President himself, responsible for final sign-off. n193 In all cases, decisions should be unanimous, or, in the absence of consensus, elevated to the President of the United States. n194 Additional details will need to be worked out, including critical questions about the standard of proof that applies. Given the stakes, a clear and convincing evidentiary standard is warranted. n195 While this proposal is obviously geared toward the United States, the same principles should apply for all states engaged in targeting operations. n196 States would ideally subject such determinations to independent review or, alternatively, clearly articulate the standards and procedures for their decisionmaking, thus enhancing accountability. b. Ex Post Review For targeted-killing operations, ex post reviews serve only limited purposes. They obviously cannot restore the target's life. But retrospective review either by a FISC-like court or review board can serve to identify errors or overreaching and thereby help avoid future mistakes. This can, and ideally would, be supplemented by the adoption of an additional Article III damages mechanism. n197 At a minimum, the relevant Inspectors General should engage in regular and extensive reviews of targeted-killing operations. Such post hoc analysis helps to set standards and controls that then get incorporated into ex ante decisionmaking. In fact, post hoc review can often serve as a more meaningful and often more searching inquiry into the legitimacy of targeting decisions. Even the mere knowledge that an ex post review will occur can help to protect against rash ex ante decisionmaking, thereby providing a self-correcting mechanism. Ex post review should also be accompanied by the establishment of a solatia and condolence payment system for activities that occur outside the active zone of hostilities. Extension of such a system beyond Afghanistan and Iraq would help mitigate resentment caused by civilian deaths or injuries and would promote better accounting of the civilian costs of targeting operations. n198

#### The CP appropriations reform and funding increase resolves CIA intelligence tradeoffs—specifically resolves CIA over-focus on DOD programs

Marshall C. Erwin, Analyst in Intelligence and National Security, Sept. 2013, Intelligence Spending and Appropriations: Issues for Congress, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R42061.pdf

A key issue here is the potential for competing goals and different priorities that may derive from the respective roles of the DNI and the Secretary of Defense in preparing the annual budgets for intelligence agencies and for allocating appropriated funds for intelligence activities within national-level DOD agencies. The “does not abrogate” language creates a level of ambiguity regarding the respective budgetary authorities of the DNI and Secretary of Defense. While the DNI effectively has authority over the NIP today, in the event of major changes to the budgets of the DOD component of the intelligence community, this ambiguity in the statute could result in challenges to the DNI’s stewardship of the intelligence community. Even absent such changes, the fact that much of the NIP is buried within the defense budget might complicate budget formulation and execution. Some observers have suggested that intelligence appropriations should be separated from defense appropriations and that Congress should consider a separate appropriations act (or a separate title in a larger appropriations act) for intelligence. Others have suggested establishing separate intelligence appropriations subcommittees. Such approaches, proponents maintain, would provide a better opportunity for Congress to consider the national intelligence effort as a collective whole and give the DNI a greater role in ensuring that government-wide requirements are not sacrificed to meet the immediate needs of DOD programs. On the other hand, skeptics argue that these changes would provide the DNI no new insights that he cannot currently obtain, and that they would complicate ties between intelligence programs and closely related non-intelligence DOD programs such as satellite launch programs. Sections below discuss these proposals in more detail. An Intelligence Title Within Defense Appropriations Acts? One option for policy makers would be for defense appropriations subcommittees, as presently constituted, to report a defense appropriation bill that would include a separate title for the NIP. Current defense appropriations bills include a Title VII, Related Agencies, that provides funding for the CIA Retirement and Disability System Fund and for the Intelligence Community Management Account (which includes the Office of the DNI and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)).38 A new title could be established, or Title VII could be expanded, to include all NIP funding, with corresponding reductions in other defense accounts. This approach would give greater visibility to NIP funding and would not necessarily require separate 302(b) allocations, which set limits for each appropriations subcommittee as part of the congressional budget process. A major advantage of this approach is that it would require fewer changes to the intelligence appropriations process compared to the two proposals discussed below. A Separate Intelligence Appropriations Act? The 9/11 Commission, in addition to recommending that amounts appropriated for national intelligence be disclosed, urged that “Congress should pass a separate appropriations act for intelligence, defending the broad allocation of how these tens of billions of dollars have been assigned among the varieties of intelligence work.”39 Overall amounts requested and appropriated are now made public.40 This development arguably facilitates the preparation of a separate intelligence appropriations act. The option of a stand-alone intelligence appropriations act would entail the separation of appropriations for the NIP from the DOD budget. Although not calling for a separate appropriations bill, DNI Clapper spoke favorably of separating the NIP from the DOD budget during his confirmation hearing as DNI in July 2010. Responding to a question from Senator Russ Feingold, DNI Clapper stated: I would support and I’ve also been working and have had dialogue with actually taking the National Intelligence Program out of the DOD budget since the reason, the original reason for having it embedded in the department’s budget was for classification purposes. Well, if it’s going to be publicly revealed, that purpose goes away. And it also serves the added advantage of reducing the topline of DOD department budget, which is quite large, as you know and that’s a large amount of money that the department really has no real jurisdiction over.41

### CP

#### The United States federal government should enact legislation restricting Title 50 authority for targeted killing by the Central Intelligence Agency using remotely piloted aircraft systems.

#### Observation One—the counterplan competes—it eliminates *presidential focus* from the plan text—any elimination of presidential focus severs the plan’s focus on the presidency

#### And this distinction is meaningful—rhetoric matters—when Congress debates the plan the rhetoric they will use frames expectations and scope of policy

#### **Bjork**, prof. of Communication @ University of Utah, **1992** p. 120

#### (Rebecca, *The Strategic Defense Initiative*)

I argued in chapter 3 that **one factor leading to** the rising **support** for the nuclear freeze movement **was the** Reagan **administration’s “loose talk” concerning nuclear** warfighting **strategies**, civil defense, and limited nuclear war scenarios. Although **Regan’s policy** concerning warfighting options **was not substantially different from Carter’s, official statements** from the Reagan Whitee House **used language that was less euphemistic** than previous statements. What Carter’s advisers referred to as escalatory “options,” Caspar Weinberg called “nuclear warfighting”. Assuming for the moment that foreign policy discourse somehow is separate from “reality” **the substance of Reagan’s policy was the same as Carter’s: only the language used to describe it publicly had changed.** Betts agreed with this assessment, when he argued that the freeze campaign was energized in part by Rewagan’s belligerent rhetoric, and that “his loose **talk about** limited **nuclear war simply thrust into wider concsciousness** the reality of what official doctrine has been for over two decades.” **In other words, talk about policy is what matters, not some extra-symbolic “reality” of policy itself**.

#### Best interpretation of fiat: imagine the representations associated with the plan are what are used in Congressional debates over the policy—this allows for a combination of real world policy analysis with scholarly insight—it maintains a focus on policies and institutions while at the same time acknowledging the complexities that language offer for our politics

#### The counterplan competes on discourse alone but even if they win functional competition there are meaningful functional differences between the plan and counterplan

#### Observation Two—Net benefit—hegemonic presidentialism

#### Framing the policy as presidential regulation triggers a media firestorm that undercuts legitimacy of the plan

#### **Nelson 8** (Dana D. Nelson is a professor of English at Vanderbilt university and prominent author/activist. She received her MA and PhD from Michigan State University. “Bad for Democracy: How The Presidency Undermines the Power of the People”, University of Minnesota Press 2008, PRINT, mjb) The first part of my argument is simple enough: it's not particular presi­ dents who are a problem for l\S. democracy, it's presidentialism. Prcsi- dentialism characterizes the unconscious power that the presidency works on citizens, and it describes the gravitational symbolic and insti­tutional place that the presidency assumes within U.S. government. We understand the president's strength to be the strength of U.S. democracy Although the hallmark of constitutional democracy is the separated and balanced powers of the three governmental branches, executive, legisla­tive, and judicial, the fact is, when we think democracy, wrc think of the president, Legislatures and judges alike are factually more likely to assist than to impede the president. On the rare occasions that they set up a roadblock, they are often depicted by media and understood by citizens to be interferingwrith the president's power and the democratic process. Presidentialism has trained us for this conclusion, and insofar as it suc­ceeds, it works to undermine our democratic proclivities and skill build­ing. Baldly put, presidentialism has been bad for democracy. Despite the particular virtues and leadership skills of some presidents, presidential­ism works against peoples' civic cultivation of democratic skills. It trains us to want the president to take care of democracy for us instead of re-mt inhering that democracy, properly defined, is ourjob. Presidentialism depoliticizes citizens, making us less inclined to think and, thus, less likely to participate in self-governing. Presidentialism encourages people to see democracy as a winncr-takc-all endeavor in world politics as well as in the domestic sphere, an arena where presidential candidates go mano a muno and then when the winner ascends to office, the losers (and his supporter- constituents) fade from view. This teaches citizens to see negotiation and compromise as the weakness, not the strength, of democracy. Presiden­tialism trains people to sec democracy as being both led and symbolized by a single person, a strong leader standing for a strong consensus, instead unity, instead of helping us remember that a decently functioning disunity can provide better solutions and make an even stronger nation. ¶ The civically trained desire to sec the U.S. president as "the most pow­erful man in the world" has had the effect of allowing individual presi­dents incrementally and steadily to increase the power of that branch, most recently in the aftermath of 9/11, when Congress gave to the execu­tive their branch's right to supervise war powers (a constitutional power that Congress has in fact not exercised since December 8,1941), In this sense, presidentialism is colonizing democracy for its own powers and purposes, depending on the people to keep believing that the executive's power is somehow our power instead of recognizing that the truth is ex­actly the opposite. Whether particular presidents arc good or not, the in­crease of presidential power concretely diminishes our democracy, by tak­ing prestige as well as power from what was historically denominated the "people's branch," the legislature, and ultimately by taking it away from the people. No single person can make democratic decisions, since de­mocracy gets its vitality from people negotiating their differences to find positive solutions. And even if we account

#### Focus on the president causes political passivity

Ivie 7 (Robert L. Ivie [Professor: University of Indiana, Ph.D., Washington State University, Rhetorical Critique of U.S. public culture; democracy; war propaganda; peace-building communication]], Published 2007 by Kumarian Press, “Dissent from War”, PRINT, note: scanned and run through OCR software, mjb)

Dissent from war is usefully thought of as a tactic or set of tactics of ordinary communication employed by everyday citizens who interact in settings that are saturated by media of one kind· or another at every point in the process. Thinking of dissent in this way is critical to determining how a people might feasibly resist the ubiquitous caricatures and dehumanizing images that goad them to kill a phantom enemy or to defend a vague symbol such as freedom that has been emptied of any significant meaning. Tactics are all that a people have at their disposal in a political system of representative, rather than direct, democracy. Power is wielded most immediately by political elites. Collective self-governance is achieved only indirectly, if at all, by pressuring elected and appointed officials. ¶ The latent power of the people resides in their ability to resist that which delegated authority is empowered to initiate. The main remaining check on the measures undertaken by political elites-the principal counterweight to the initiatives of governing authorities-is the recalcitrance of articulated public opinion. The governing principle of the commonwealth is to distribute direct political power-the power ro formulate, carry out, and justify or rationalize policy-to executive, legislative, and judicial authorities in various amounts and types. Little to none of this direct authority to originate policy and to author courses of action is granted to, or reserved for, the people themselves. ¶ On matters of foreign relations generally and war specifically, executive license to act prevails over all other political authority. The presidency not only sets and directs policy in this domain but also formulates the official rationale for engaging in warfare. The presidential persona speaks to and for the state on matters of national crisis. It is given license to act with minimal interference from the legislature, the judiciary, and the mainstream press. The president-or whoever wields executive authority in a given system of representative democracy-is presumed ro be in charge of defining the crisis and assumes responsibility for leading the way ro its eventual resolution. ¶ This is a system of governance that would lull the citizenry into mental passivity and encourage political quiescence, except to impel the people to participate in public displays of patriotic fervor or otherwise to affirm, sanction, endorse, or consent to official policy and its justification. It would co-opt the people's power to withhold assent, especially their potential to resist an official rationale for war, to hold executive authority to a higher standard of ¶ the prevailing framework of sense-making because that is the hinge of interpretation most vulnerable to resistance. ¶ The guiding perspective from which governing authority would have I people see warfare as the nation's only realistic option is vulnerable because is subject to daily challenge by ordinary people in small and large venues contributed throughout the land, The people, who are not well-positioned to formulate war policy, are capable of reacting against it. Indeed, they are called into existence as a collective entity on the subject of war by the executive authority's very efforts to vindicate armed hostilities. With the people so constituted, presidential strategy is rendered publicly accountable and subject citizen tactics that can make war propaganda problematic. ¶

#### Distance between citizen and politics results in extermination

Boggs 2000 Carl Boggs, Professor of Social Sciences and Film Studies at National University, Los Angeles, 2000, The End of Politics, p. 244-245 (PDAF3448)

The disintegration of political life in late-twentieth-century America poses a series of novel dilemmas and challenges that I have tried to illuminate in this volume. Many of the social phenomena explored here—metaphysics, the therapeutic culture, localism, deep ecology, urban revolt, and postmodernism, among them—intersect with and reinforce one another. While those intellectual and psychological responses to an increasingly harsh, atomized social order have deep origins in the popular movements of the 1960s and 1970s, the momentum of such responses has not noticably waned throughout the 1990s. Despite their often radically different constituencies, outlooks, and espoused goals, these modalities all share a profoundly depoliticized modus operandi. As the quagmire of political decay widens, urgent social problems go unsolved. Such problems, from urban decline to technological displacement of labor to global ecological crisis, cannot be grasped, much less acted on, without looking at the national and international context of markets, finance, and communications. Yet, paradoxically, the widespread retreat from politics, so often inspired by localist impulses, comes at a time when social agendas that ignore global factors will be, more than ever, reduced to impotence. Localistwithdrawalis in fact powerfully reinforced by the growing remoteness and devaluation of politics (especially state and federal politics) as increasing numbers of people turn away from difficult, frustrating public concerns toward more comfortable, manageable private ones. Of course, the private realm holds significance as a source of self-fulfillment and as a bulwark against an assortment of outside encroachments. Yet, by diminishing the life of common involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public good and social transformation.3 In the meantime, it may not be too hyperbolic to say that the fate of the world hangs in the balance.

## 1NC—Solvency

#### Plan text only curbs “targeted killing” – Obama shifts to signature strikes.

Jens David Ohlin 13, Professor at Cornell Law School, http://www.liebercode.org/2013/02/would-federal-district-court-for-drones.html

One of the more interesting recent proposals for curing the "due process" deficit in the Administration's targeted killings program is for Congress to create a federal court to approve drone strikes. Senator Dianne Feinstein, among others, is championing this strategy. I don't think it will work. Here's why. First, the court would be modeled after the super-secret FISA court for approving government requests for surveillance in terrorism cases. Such courts impose a form of judicial review, yes, but there is little transparency and no adversarial process. But there are bigger problems. As some of my colleagues have already explained, it is unlikely and improbable that such a court could authorize specific operational strikes. That would be difficult to implement in real time, and might even be unconstitutional for infringing on the Executive Branch's commander-in-chief power. Rather, such a court would approve the administration's decision to place an individual's name on an approved target list. A court would review the legitimacy of this decision with the power to remove the name if the individual does not meet the standard for being a functional member of al-Qaeda. Although this is more plausible, I still don't think it will work. In the end, I think it would just push the administration to avoid targeted killings and would have the opposite effect. It would increase, not decrease, collateral damage. Let me explain. Suppose the government has previously used the kill list to govern the selection procedure for targeted killings. The list serves as a clearinghouse for debates and ultimately conclusions about who is a high-value target. If the administration decides that the individual should be pursued, he is placed on the list. If the administration decides that the individual is of marginal or no value, he is removed from the list or never placed on it to begin with. Now imagine that a court is requiring that the list be approved by a judicial process. Why would the administration have any incentive at all to keep adding names to the list? Why not stop using it entirely? It could then rely exclusively on signature strikes -- an important legal development well documented by Kevin Heller in his forthcoming JICJ article on the subject. Such strikes would not be banned by the court because the US would not know exactly who it is bombing. (I'm assuming for the sake of argument that the US is still engaged in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda and that the AUMF or some other statutory authorization for the President's pursuit of the conflict would still be in place.) Essentially, this would be a case of willful blindness -- a concept well known to criminal law scholars. The real benefit of targeted killings is that the administration knows the exact threat and only targets one individual. That has changed warfare tremendously. But the court system would push the military back towards the old system: target groups of individuals who are known terrorists or enemy combatants -- but you don't know exactly who they are. You just know they are the enemy. That's the system that reigned in all previous conflicts. And there would be a disincentive to ever acquire more specific information. Why have a drone hover over an area with known terrorists in order to determine, through surveillance, the exact identity of the individual's there? That would only trigger the jurisdiction of the drone court. So ignorance would maintain the legality of the strike. I don't think that is what Congressional staffers have in mind.

#### Turns the case but not our DA – TK’s are popular and key to counter-terror—sig strikes cause backlash.

David Hastings Dunn 13, Reader in International Politics and Head of Department in the Department of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Birmingham, UK, and Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security at the University of Birmingham in the UK, March 2013, “Drone Use in Counter-Insurgency and Counter-Terrorism: Policy or Policy Component?,” in Hitting the Target?: How New Capabilities are Shaping International Intervention, ed. Aaronson & Johnson, http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Hitting\_the\_Target.pdf

Yet an important distinction needs to be drawn here between acting on operational intelligence that corroborates existing intelligence and confirms the presence of a specific pre-determined target and its elimination – so-called ‘targeted strikes’ (or less euphemistically, ‘targeted killings’) – and acting on an algorithmic analysis of operational intelligence alone, determining on the spot whether a development on the ground suggests terrorist activity or association and thus fulfils certain (albeit, to date, publicly not disclosed) criteria for triggering an armed response by the remote pilot of a drone – so-called ‘signature strikes’.6¶ Targeted strikes rely on corroborating pre-existing intelligence: they serve the particular purpose of eliminating specific individuals that are deemed crucial to enemy capabilities and are meant to diminish opponents’ operational, tactical and strategic capabilities, primarily by killing mid- and top-level leadership cadres. To the extent that evidence is available, it suggests that targeted strikes are highly effective in achieving these objectives, while simultaneously generating relatively little blowback, precisely because they target individual (terrorist) leaders and cause few, if any, civilian casualties. This explains, to a significant degree, why the blowback effect in Yemen – where the overwhelming majority of drone strikes have been targeted strikes – has been less pronounced than in Pakistan and Afghanistan.7¶ Signature strikes, in contrast, can still be effective in diminishing operational, tactical and strategic enemy capabilities, but they do so to a certain degree by chance and also have a much higher probability of causing civilian casualties. Using drones for signature strikes decreases the dependence on pre-existing intelligence about particular leaders and their movements and more fully utilises their potential to carry out effective surveillance and respond to the conclusions drawn from it immediately. Signature strikes have been the predominant approach to drone usage in Pakistan and Afghanistan.8 Such strikes have had the effect of decimating the rank and file of the Taliban and their associates – but they have also caused large numbers of civilian casualties and, at a minimum, weakened the respective host governments’ legitimacy and forced them to condemn publicly, and in no uncertain terms, the infringement of their states’ sovereignty by the US. In turn, this has strained already difficult relations between countries which have more common than divergent interests when it comes to regional stability and the fight against international terrorist networks. That signature strikes have a high probability of going wrong and that such failures prove extremely counterproductive is also illustrated by a widely reported case from Yemen, in which twelve civilians were killed in the proximity of a car identified as belonging to an Al-Qa’ida member.9¶ The kind of persistent and intimidating presence of a drone policy geared towards signature strikes, and the obvious risks and consequences involved in repeatedly making wrong decisions, are both counterproductive in themselves and corrosive of efforts that seek to undercut the local support enjoyed by insurgent and terrorist networks, as well as the mutual assistance that they can offer each other. Put differently, signature strikes, in contrast to targeted killings, do anything but help to disentangle the links between insurgents and terrorists.¶ Counter-insurgency as a strategy works best by providing security on the ground (deploying soldiers amongst the community that they are intended to protect) and establishing and sustaining a sufficiently effective local footprint of the state and its institutions providing public goods and services beyond just security (water, food, sanitation, healthcare, education and so forth). This strategy is often encapsulated in the formula ‘clear, hold, build’,10 and it needs to go hand-in-hand with pursuing a viable political settlement that addresses what are the, in many cases, legitimate concerns of those fighting, and supporting, an insurgency. By living among the communities they seek to secure, soldiers can win their trust, stem support for the insurgents, and understand who their enemies are, what their demands and objectives are, and how best to single out those who represent an irreconcilable threat to the community. In other words, in a context in which the objective is to protect innocent civilians, win over reconcilable insurgents and their supporters, and eliminate those who are irreconcilable, drones can deliver specific contributions to an overall counter-insurgency policy. Yet this can only happen if drones target individuals for a reason, rather than being used, and perceived, as a blanket approach against an entire community.

## 1NC—Terror

#### No rollback or restrictions—

#### Won’t reach a critical mass

Benjamin Wittes 13, is editor in chief of Lawfare and a Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution. http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/03/coming-at-the-aumf-debate-from-a-different-angle/

The spirit that animates our paper, by contrast, is the suspicion that this belief is a bit less than realistic. In my view, to sketch the alternative, whoever is president is going to continue our current counterterrorism policies for the foreseeable future. Barring a Rand Paul presidency (and it will be interesting to see if either Jen or Steve endorses that prospect in the name of peace), any president is going to feel obliged to maintain counterterrorism on offense, and Congress—whining, carping, complaining all the way both that the president is being too aggressive and that he is not being aggressive enough—will go along with it, indeed, will insist upon it. That’s just the political reality. And it’s the political reality for a very simple reason that is, at its core, not about a point of law: Americans overwhelmingly prefer killing terrorists overseas to allowing them operating wiggle-room with which to attack Americans.

#### No political opposition

Stephen Holmes 13, the Walter E. Meyer Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, July 2013, “What’s in it for Obama?,” The London Review of Books, <http://www.lrb.co.uk/v35/n14/stephen-holmes/whats-in-it-for-obama>

This is the crux of the problem. We stand at the beginning of the Drone Age and the genie is not going to climb back into the bottle. The chances that this way of war will, over time, reduce the amount of random violence in the world are essentially nil. Obama’s drone policy has set an ominous precedent, and not only for future residents of the White House. It promises, over the long term, to engender more violence than it prevents because it excites no public backlash. That, for the permanent national security apparatus that has deftly moulded the worldview of a novice president, is its irresistible allure. It doesn’t provoke significant protest even on the part of people who condemn hit-jobs done with sticky bombs, radioactive isotopes or a bullet between the eyes – in the style of Mossad or Putin’s FSB. That America appears to be laidback about drones has made it possible for the CIA to resume the assassination programme it was compelled to shut down in the 1970s without, this time, awakening any politically significant outrage. It has also allowed the Pentagon to wage a war against which antiwar forces are apparently unable to rally even modest public support.

#### Government won’t take it up

Benjamin Wittes, editor in chief of Lawfare and a Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution. He is the author of several books and a member of the Hoover Institution's Task Force on National Security and Law, 2/27/13, In Defense of the Administration on Targeted Killing of Americans, www.lawfareblog.com/2013/02/in-defense-of-the-administration-on-targeted-killing-of-americans/

This view has currency among European allies, among advocacy groups, and in the legal academy. Unfortunately for its proponents, it has no currency among the three branches of government of the United States. The courts and the executive branch have both taken the opposite view, and the Congress passed a broad authorization for the use of force and despite many opportunities, has never revisited that document to impose limitations by geography or to preclude force on the basis of co-belligerency—much less to clarify that the AUMF does not, any longer, authorize the use of military force at all. Congress has been repeatedly briefed on U.S. targeting decisions, including those involving U.S. persons.[5] It was therefore surely empowered to either use the power of the purse to prohibit such action or to modify the AUMF in a way that undermined the President’s legal reasoning. Not only has it taken neither of these steps, but Congress has also funded the relevant programs. Moreover, as I noted above, Congress’s recent reaffirmation of the AUMF in the 2012 NDAA with respect to detention, once again contains no geographical limitation. There is, in other words, a consensus among the branches of government on the point that the United States is engaged in an armed conflict that involves co-belligerent forces and follows the enemy to the new territorial ground it stakes out. It is a consensus that rejects the particular view of the law advanced by numerous critics. And it is a consensus on which the executive branch is entitled to rely in formulating its legal views.

#### International backlash inevitable

Groves 1/25/’13, senior research fellow – Institute for International Studies @ Heritage (Steven, “The U.S. Should Ignore U.N. Inquiry Into Drone Strikes,” http://blog.heritage.org/2013/01/25/the-u-s-should-ignore-u-n-inquiry-into-drone-strikes/)

Various international legal academics and human rights activists have regularly made these and other similar allegations ever since the Obama Administration stepped up the drone program in 2009. While drone strikes cannot be viewed alone as an effective counterterrorism strategy, the Administration has repeatedly defended the legality of the program. Emmerson and his fellow U.N. special rapporteurs Philip Alston and Christof Heyns have repeatedly demanded that the U.S. provide more information on drone strikes—and the U.S. has repeatedly complied, issuing public statement after public statement defending every aspect of the drone program. Public statements detailing the legality and propriety of the drone program have been made by top Administration officials, including State Department Legal Adviser Harold Koh, Attorney General Eric Holder, Deputy National Security Advisor John Brennan, General Counsel for the Department of Defense Jeh Johnson, and CIA General Counsel Stephen Preston. Increased transparency will, of course, be deemed by human rights activists as insufficient where their true goal is to stop the U.S. drone program in its entirety. Unless and until the U.S. can somehow promise that no civilian casualties will result from drone strikes, such strikes will be considered violations of international law. Ignoring the U.N. probe will not make it go away, but the Obama Administration should not be so naive as to expect that its cooperation will substantively alter the investigation’s findings and conclusions.

#### Host country and ally support is sustainable – they will rail against the drones publicly but secretly back it.

Daniel L. Byman 13, Research Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy – Brookings, August, http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/06/17-drones-obama-weapon-choice-us-counterterrorism-byman

It is also telling that drones have earned the backing, albeit secret, of foreign governments. In order to maintain popular support, politicians in Pakistan and Yemen routinely rail against the U.S. drone campaign. In reality, however, the governments of both countries have supported it. During the Bush and Obama administrations, Pakistan has even periodically hosted U.S. drone facilities and has been told about strikes in advance. Pervez Musharraf, president of Pakistan until 2008, was not worried about the drone program's negative publicity: "In Pakistan, things fall out of the sky all the time," he reportedly remarked. Yemen's former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, also at times allowed drone strikes in his country and even covered for them by telling the public that they were conducted by the Yemeni air force. When the United States' involvement was leaked in 2002, however, relations between the two countries soured. Still, Saleh later let the drone program resume in Yemen, and his replacement, Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, has publicly praised drones, saying that "they pinpoint the target and have zero margin of error, if you know what target you're aiming at." As officials in both Pakistan and Yemen realize, U.S. drone strikes help their governments by targeting common enemies. A memo released by the antisecrecy website WikiLeaks revealed that Pakistan's army chief, Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, privately asked U.S. military leaders in 2008 for "continuous Predator coverage" over antigovernment militants, and the journalist Mark Mazzetti has reported that the United States has conducted "goodwill kills" against Pakistani militants who threatened Pakistan far more than the United States. Thus, in private, Pakistan supports the drone program. As then Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani told Anne Patterson, then the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, in 2008, "We'll protest [against the drone program] in the National Assembly and then ignore it." Still, Pakistan is reluctant to make its approval public. First of all, the country's inability to fight terrorists on its own soil is a humiliation for Pakistan's politically powerful armed forces and intelligence service. In addition, although drones kill some of the government's enemies, they have also targeted pro-government groups that are hostile to the United States, such as the Haqqani network and the Taliban, which Pakistan has supported since its birth in the early 1990s. Even more important, the Pakistani public is vehemently opposed to U.S. drone strikes. A 2012 poll found that 74 percent of Pakistanis viewed the United States as their enemy, likely in part because of the ongoing drone campaign. Similarly, in Yemen, as the scholar Gregory Johnsen has pointed out, drone strikes can win the enmity of entire tribes. This has led critics to argue that the drone program is shortsighted: that it kills today's enemies but creates tomorrow's in the process. Such concerns are valid, but the level of local anger over drones is often lower than commonly portrayed. Many surveys of public opinion related to drones are conducted by anti-drone organizations, which results in biased samples. Other surveys exclude those who are unaware of the drone program and thus overstate the importance of those who are angered by it. In addition, many Pakistanis do not realize that the drones often target the very militants who are wreaking havoc on their country. And for most Pakistanis and Yemenis, the most important problems they struggle with are corruption, weak representative institutions, and poor economic growth; the drone program is only a small part of their overall anger, most of which is directed toward their own governments. A poll conducted in 2007, well before the drone campaign had expanded to its current scope, found that only 15 percent of Pakistanis had a favorable opinion of the United States. It is hard to imagine that alternatives to drone strikes, such as SEAL team raids or cruise missile strikes, would make the United States more popular.

#### Drones fail

Michael J Boyle 13, Assistant Professor of Political Science at La Salle University, former Lecturer in International Relations and Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St Andrews, PhD from Cambridge University, January 2013, “The costs and consequences of drone warfare,” International Affairs 89: 1 (2013) 1–29, <http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2013/89_1/89_1Boyle.pdf>

Yet the evidence that drones inhibit the operational latitude of terrorist groups and push them towards collapse is more ambiguous than these accounts suggest. 57 In Pakistan, the ranks of Al-Qaeda have been weakened significantly by drone strikes, but its members have hardly given up the fight. Hundreds of Al-Qaeda members have fled to battlefields in Yemen, Somalia, Iraq, Syria and elsewhere. 58 These operatives bring with them the skills, experience and weapons needed to turn these wars into fiercer, and perhaps longer-lasting, conflicts. 59 In other words, pressure from drone strikes may have scattered Al-Qaeda militants, but it does not neutralize them. Many Al-Qaeda members have joined forces with local insur - gent groups in Syria, Mali and elsewhere, thus deepening the conflicts in these states. 60 In other cases, drones have fuelled militant movements and reordered the alliances and positions of local combatants. Following the escalation of drone strikes in Yemen, the desire for revenge drove hundreds, if not thousands, of Yemeni tribesmen to join Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), as well as smaller, indigenous militant networks. 61 Even in Pakistan, where the drone strikes have weakened Al-Qaeda and some of its affiliated movements, they have not cleared the battlefield. In Pakistan, other Islamist groups have moved into the vacuum left by the absence of Al-Qaeda, and some of these groups, particularly the cluster of groups arrayed under the name Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), now pose a greater threat to the Pakistani government than Al-Qaeda ever did. 62 Drone strikes have distinct political effects on the ecology of militant networks in these countries, leaving some armed groups in a better position while crippling others. It is this dynamic that has accounted for the US decision gradually to expand the list of groups targeted by drone strikes, often at the behest of Pakistan. Far from concentrating exclusively on Al-Qaeda, the US has begun to use drone strikes against Pakistan’s enemies, including the TTP, the Mullah Nazir group, the Haqqani network and other smaller Islamist groups. 63 The result is that the US has weakened its principal enemy, Al-Qaeda, but only at the cost of earning a new set of enemies, some of whom may find a way to strike back. 64 The cost of this expansion of targets came into view when the TTP inspired and trained Faisal Shahzad to launch his attack on Times Square. 65 Similarly, the TTP claimed to be involved, possibly with Al-Qaeda, in attacking a CIA outpost at Camp Chapman in the Khost region of Afghanistan on 30 December 2009.66

#### Plan makes it less flexible, creates safe havens and ensures host countries will ban the program

Gordon Lubold and Shane Harris 11/5/13, National security reporter for Foreign Policy, http://killerapps.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/11/05/cia\_pentagon\_drone\_war\_control

In May, the White House leaked word that it would start shifting drone operations from the shadows of the CIA to the relative sunlight of the Defense Department in an effort to be more transparent about the controversial targeted killing program. But six months later, the so-called migration of those operations has stalled, and it is now unlikely to happen anytime soon, Foreign Policy has learned. The anonymous series of announcements coincided with remarks President Obama made on counterterrorism policy at National Defense University in which he called for "transparency and debate on this issue." A classified Presidential Policy Guidance on the matter, issued at the same time, caught some in government by surprise, triggering a scramble at the Pentagon and at CIA to achieve a White House objective. The transfer was never expected to happen overnight. But it is now clear the complexity of the issue, the distinct operational and cultural differences between the Pentagon and CIA and the bureaucratic politics of it all has forced officials on all sides to recognize transferring drone operations from the Agency to the Defense Department represents, for now, an unattainable goal. "The physics of making this happen quickly are remarkably difficult," one U.S. official told FP. "The goal remains the same, but the reality has set in." Another U.S. official emphasized that the transfer is still continuing. "This is the policy, and we're moving toward that policy, but it will take some time," the official said. "The notion that there has been some sort of policy reversal is just not accurate. I think from the moment the policy was announced it was clear it was not something that would occur overnight or immediately." The official noted that all involved are mindful not to disrupt the drone program just for the sake of completing the transfer from the CIA to the military. "While we work jointly towards this transition, we also want to ensure that we maintain capabilities." Officials at the CIA and the Defense Department are loathe to try and fix a program that they don't think is broken, even if it has become a political liability for Obama, who has faced constant pressure from human rights activists, his political base, and a growing chorus of libertarian Republicans to scale back the program and subject it to greater public scrutiny. But the pitfalls of transferring operations reside in more practical concerns. The U.S. official said that while the platforms and the capabilities are common to either the Agency or the Pentagon, there remain distinctly different approaches to "finding, fixing and finishing" terrorist targets. The two organizations also use different approaches to producing the "intelligence feeds" upon which drone operations rely. Perhaps more importantly, after years of conducting drone strikes, the CIA has developed an expertise and a taste for them. The DOD's appetite to take over that mission may not run very deep. The military operates its own drones, of course, and has launched hundreds of lethal strikes in Iraq and Afghanistan. But the CIA is more "agile," another former official said, and has a longer track record of being able to sending drones into places where U.S. combat forces cannot go. "The agency can do it much more efficiently and at lower cost than the military can," said one former intelligence official. Another former official with extensive experience in intelligence and military operations said it takes the military longer to deploy drones -- in part because the military uses a larger support staff to operate the aircraft. The military also cannot conduct overt, hostile action in Pakistan, where the drones have been most active and are practically the only means the United States has to attack terrorists and militants in remote regions. Yes, the pace of strikes has significantly decreased since the 2010 peak of an estimated 122 unmanned attacks in Pakistan. But the drones are most certainly still flying. Last week, a drone strike killed the leader of the Pakistani Taliban, Hakimullah Mehsud, who had a $5 million U.S. bounty on his head for his involvement in a 2009 attack in Afghanistan. Over the summer, a spate of drone strikes killed a dozen militants in Yemen. Keeping the drones with the CIA also offers legal cover for drone strikes, former officials argued. By law, the military is not supposed to conduct hostile actions outside a declared war zone, although special forces do so on occasion acting at the CIA's behest. When the White House began floating the idea earlier this year of transferring the drone program to the military, some lawmakers were skeptical, said a former U.S. official. John Brennan -- the White House counterrorism czar turned CIA director -- might have allegedly grown uncomfortable with the targeted killings that he helped oversee for so long. But the congressmen doubted whether the government of Pakistan would ever allow drone strikes run by the U.S. military to occur in their country. "That was the president's aspirational goal, but no one ever believed the Pakistanis were going to let us do that," said the former official, who was involved in discussions over transferring the drone program to the military. For years, the Pakistani government has given tacit approval to CIA-led strikes. But they were conducted as covert actions under U.S. law, meaning they were never officially acknowledged by U.S. officials. That gave the Pakistanis some wiggle room to tell an angry public, which would never tolerate American troops on the ground, that Pakistani leaders had nothing to do with the strikes on their territory. Even though Obama and other senior U.S. officials now publicly discuss CIA drone strikes, they are still conducted as covert operations. In practical terms, that means it's extremely difficult for journalists and outside researchers to obtain data from the CIA about its drone operations. And they are still briefed to Congress as covert operations, so relatively few lawmakers and congressional staff know about them.

#### Disclosure now solves—further public disclosure allows al Qaeda to avoid strikes

Geoffrey Corn 13, Professor of Law and Presidential Research Professor, South Texas College of Law, 3/15/13, Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, CQ Research Service

In terms of increased transparency, it is my opinion that Congress should be extremely cautious in demanding public disclosure of aspects of the targeting process beyond those that have already been disclosed by the Executive. To that end, I believe it is important to note that the Executive has disclosed substantial aspects of this process. In fact, in my thirty years of military and academic service, I cannot recall a period of time where Executive officials have been anywhere as open in disclosing strategic and operational decision-making processes than during this conflict. I believe demanding more transparency poses significant operational risk, and is, at this point in time, unjustified and unnecessary.

While calls for greater transparency are certainly understandable, I believe each additional layer of disclosure risks compromising the effectiveness of U.S. operations. Ultimately, it is this effectiveness that must remain the priority interest in the transparency debate. It must also be noted that this risk is exacerbated by the nature of the threat and the threat identification methodology. Disclosing target identification methodology to a conventional enemy poses little risk - that enemy knows exactly what indicia of threat identification friendly forces will rely on, and cannot modify that indicia. With an unconventional enemy, this is not the case. Instead, disclosure of these indicia will enable the enemy to alter patterns of behavior in order to avoid attack. In my view, Congress certainly has a legitimate interest in being made aware of such indicia in a forum that ensures operational security. However, like so many wartime decisions, the public appetite for greater insight into these processes must yield to considerations of operational success.

### 1NC—Blowback

#### No data supports the blowback or radicalization thesis

Michael Aaronson 13, Professorial Research Fellow and Executive Director of cii – the Centre for International Intervention – at the University of Surrey, and Adrian Johnson, Director of Publications at RUSI, the book reviews editor for the RUSI Journal, and chair of the RUSI Editorial Board, “Conclusion,” in Hitting the Target?: How New Capabilities are Shaping International Intervention, ed. Aaronson & Johnson, http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Hitting\_the\_Target.pdf

Unintended detrimental consequences of intervention – ‘blowback’– are by no means a new phenomenon, nor an inherent feature of drone versus other kinds of strikes. A widespread view holds that drones are fuelling a political and societal backlash against the US.15 Worse, unintended civilian deaths may be creating new grievances, driving new recruits to join terrorist groups, and undermining the legitimacy of the very governments the US is trying to bolster.16 In other words, the covert drone programme is radical Islamism’s latest recruiting sergeant.17

This is contested, as is inevitable when relying on anecdotal evidence. Some data suggest that the effect is overblown – one analyst conducting fieldwork in Yemen found very little causation between drone strikes and radicalisation.18 The lack of information is a major problem for both policymakers and the public in attempting to definitively determine the strategic impact of any intervention, not just drone strikes. Here, again, the secrecy of the CIA programme is an obstacle – what data we do have on it comes from leaks, rather than systematic analysis.19 Neither is the US alone guilty of secrecy; in the aftermath of the UN Special Rapporteur’s report on the legality of drone strikes in Pakistan, one might note that the Pakistani government’s complaints to the Special Rapporteur seem to be contradictory given what is known from WikiLeaks documents about private approval.20

A lack of data may mean that talk of blowback is misguided, or it might not; Hastings Dunn and Wolff offer some clarity on the relationship between targeting policy and public anger in this regard. A bigger issue is that media reports tend to be unreliable from regions like the FATA, particularly when weapons forensics experts – who would be able to determine, for instance, what kind of weapon system has caused what kind of damage – cannot reach these areas.21 Ultimately, the information problem may mean that we cannot conclude whether anti-Americanism or fragile support for local regimes is caused by or coincident with drone strikes. This highlights the importance of casualty-recording and damage assessment, outlined in this report, to the strategic conduct of intervention.

#### OR blowback’s inevitable---local governments will always deflect blame

Amitai Etzioni 12, senior advisor to the Carter White House; taught at Columbia University, Harvard and The University of California at Berkeley; and is a university professor and professor of international relations at The George Washington University, 4/2/12, “In Defense of Drones,” http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/defense-drones-6715

What about collateral damage? Rohde notes that “across Pakistan, there's a belief that the overwhelming majority of people killed in these strikes are simply civilians.” Actually, he candidly notes, “roughly 70 to 90 percent of those killed are actually militants.” Rohde hence says that he “would involve local governments, and force Pakistan and Yemen . . . [and] Somalia as well to support” the drones so they would be less misunderstood and hence could be used, albeit on a less “extraordinary” scale.

If wishes were horses, beggars would ride. The notion that if we ask these governments to explain to their people what’s up—including that while they are providing us with targeting information they denounce the drones—they would do so (or that we could make them speak truth to their people) is a lovely sociological fantasy.

### Terror D

#### No scenario for nuclear terror---consensus of experts

Matt Fay 13, PhD student in the history department at Temple University, has a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from St. Xavier University and a Master’s in International Relations and Conflict Resolution with a minor in Transnational Security Studies from American Military University, 7/18/13, “The Ever-Shrinking Odds of Nuclear Terrorism”, webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:HoItCUNhbgUJ:hegemonicobsessions.com/%3Fp%3D902+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=firefox-a

For over a decade now, one of the most oft-repeated threats raised by policymakers—the one that in many ways justified the invasion of Iraq—has been that of nuclear terrorism. Officials in both the Bush and Obama administrations, including the presidents themselves, have raised the specter of the atomic terrorist. But beyond mere rhetoric, how likely is a nuclear terrorist attack really?¶ While pessimistic estimates about America’s ability to avoid a nuclear terrorist attack became something of a cottage industry following the September 11th attacks, a number of scholars in recent years have pushed back against this trend. Frank Gavin has put post-9/11 fears of nuclear terrorism into historical context (pdf) and argued against the prevailing alarmism. Anne Stenersen of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment has challenged the idea that al Qaeda was ever bound and determined to acquire a nuclear weapon. John Mueller ridiculed the notion of nuclear terrorism in his book Atomic Obsessions and highlighted the numerous steps a terrorist group would need to take—all of which would have to be successful—in order to procure, deliver, and detonate an atomic weapon. And in his excellent, and exceedingly even-handed, treatment of the subject, On Nuclear Terrorism, Michael Levi outlined the difficulties terrorists would face building their own nuclear weapon and discussed how a “system of systems” could be developed to interdict potential materials smuggled into the United States—citing a “Murphy’s law of nuclear terrorism” that could possibly dissuade terrorists from even trying in the first place.¶ But what about the possibility that a rogue state could transfer a nuclear weapon to a terrorist group? That was ostensibly why the United States deposed Saddam Hussein’s regime: fear he would turnover one of his hypothetical nuclear weapons for al Qaeda to use.¶ Enter into this discussion Keir Lieber and Daryl Press and their article in the most recent edition of International Security, “Why States Won’t Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists.” Lieber and Press have been writing on nuclear issues for just shy of a decade—doing innovative, if controversial work on American nuclear strategy. However, I believe this is their first venture into the debate over nuclear terrorism. And while others, such as Mueller, have argued that states are unlikely to transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists, this article is the first to tackle the subject with an empirical analysis.¶ The title of their article nicely sums up their argument: states will not turn over nuclear weapons terrorists. To back up this claim, Lieber and Press attack the idea that states will transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists because terrorists operate of absent a “return address.” Based on an examination of attribution following conventional terrorist attacks, the authors conclude:¶ [N]either a terror group nor a state sponsor would remain anonymous after a nuclear attack. We draw this conclusion on the basis of four main findings. First, data on a decade of terrorist incidents reveal a strong positive relationship between the number of fatalities caused in a terror attack and the likelihood of attribution. Roughly three-quarters of the attacks that kill 100 people or more are traced back to the perpetrators. Second, attribution rates are far higher for attacks on the U.S. homeland or the territory of a major U.S. ally—97 percent (thirty-six of thirty-seven) for incidents that killed ten or more people. Third, tracing culpability from a guilty terrorist group back to its state sponsor is not likely to be difficult: few countries sponsor terrorism; few terrorist groups have state sponsors; each sponsor terrorist group has few sponsors (typically one); and only one country that sponsors terrorism, has nuclear weapons or enough fissile material to manufacture a weapon. In sum, attribution of nuclear terror incidents would be easier than is typically suggested, and passing weapons to terrorists would not offer countries escape from the constraints of deterrence.¶ From this analysis, Lieber and Press draw two major implications for U.S. foreign policy: claims that it is impossible to attribute nuclear terrorism to particular groups or potential states sponsors undermines deterrence; and fear of states transferring nuclear weapons to terrorist groups, by itself, does not justify extreme measures to prevent nuclear proliferation.¶ This is a key point. While there are other reasons nuclear proliferation is undesirable, fears of nuclear terrorism have been used to justify a wide-range of policies—up to, and including, military action. Put in its proper perspective however—given the difficulty in constructing and transporting a nuclear device and the improbability of state transfer—nuclear terrorism hardly warrants the type of exertions many alarmist assessments indicate it should.

### 1NC—Pakistan Impact

#### Squo solves Pakistan – No civilian casualties and drones are decreasing.

Lisa Schlein 3/12/14, VOA News, http://www.voanews.com/content/us-drone-strikes-civilian-casualties-drop-in-pakistan-last-year/1870012.html

A United Nations investigation finds a significant reduction in the use of armed drones by the United States in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas [FATA] of Pakistan in 2013. The report, which has been submitted to the U.N. Human Rights Council, paints a much bleaker picture, however, of the use of drones in Afghanistan and Yemen.

Ben Emmerson, a British lawyer and special investigator on counterterrorism and human rights, said there were 27 recorded drone strikes in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas last year. That's down from a peak of 128 in 2010.

“But perhaps most significantly, for the first time in nine years there were no reports of civilian casualties during 2013 in the FATA area of Pakistan," he said. "The diplomatic and political efforts of Pakistan to bring these strikes to a halt, so as to enable peace talks with the Tehrik-i-Taliban to take place, appear to have borne fruit.”

#### Multiple alt causes to Pakistani instability – no alternative to drones.

C. Christine Fair 11/12/13, Georgetown University, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 25.1, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2353447

Even after carefully reading these varied works, this author is left genuinely pondering what are the alternatives to drones in Pakistan’s tribal areas? Both the International Crisis Group and the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan agree that the FCR is part of the problem. Equally they agree that the citizens of FATA are denied basic human rights and the Pakistani state as well as the militants are intimately connected to the culture of violence that has ensnared and terrorized many of FATA’s residents. If the state is unwilling to give up its commitment to Islamist militants as tools of foreign policy, end the FCR and render FATA’s residents fully enfranchised citizens with access to police, courts and other institutions of rule of law, how can the problem of Islamist terrorism in FATA end? This problem is not restricted to Pakistan as these militants operate in South Asia and beyond. Equally important the militants there have killed tens of thousands of Pakistanis in the last decade. Oddly, the use of U.S. armed drones in FATA may actually save more Pakistani lives than Americans. How ironic it would be if American drone pilots are violating their own laws to kill Pakistani terrorists who mostly kill Pakistanis while angry Pakistanis denounce the program in disbelief that this could possibly be true?

#### No Pakistan collapse and it doesn't escalate

Sunil Dasgupta 13 is Director of the University of Maryland Baltimore County Political Science Program at the Universities at Shady Grove and non-resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, East Asia Forum, February 25, 2013, "How will India respond to civil war in Pakistan?", http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/02/25/how-will-india-respond-to-civil-war-in-pakistan/

As it is, India and Pakistan have gone down to the nuclear edge four times — in 1986, 1990, 1999 and 2001–02. In each case, India responded in a manner that did not escalate the conflict. Any incursion into Pakistan was extremely limited. An Indian intervention in a civil war in Pakistan would be subject to the same limitations — at least so long as the Pakistani army maintains its integrity. Given the new US–India ties, the most important factor in determining the possibility and nature of Indian intervention in a possible Pakistani civil war is Washington. If the United States is able to get Kabul and Islamabad to work together against the Taliban, as it is trying to do now, then India is likely to continue its current policy or try to preserve some influence in Afghanistan, especially working with elements of the Northern Alliance. India and Afghanistan already have a strategic partnership agreement in place that creates the framework for their bilateral relationship to grow, but the degree of actual cooperation will depend on how Pakistan and the Taliban react. If Indian interests in Afghanistan come under attack, New Delhi might have to pull back. The Indian government has been quite clear about not sending troops to Afghanistan. If the United States shifts its policy to where it has to choose Kabul over Islamabad, in effect reviving the demand for an independent Pashtunistan, India is likely to be much more supportive of US and Afghan goals. The policy shift, however, carries the risk of a full-fledged proxy war with Pakistan in Afghanistan, but should not involve the prospect of a direct Indian intervention in Pakistan itself. India is not likely to initiate an intervention that causes the Pakistani state to fail. Bill Keller of the New York Times has described Pakistani president Asif Ail Zardari as overseeing ‘a ruinous kleptocracy that is spiraling deeper into economic crisis’. But in contrast to predictions of an unravelling nation, British journalist-scholar Anatol Lieven argues that the Pakistani state is likely to continue muddling through its many problems, unable to resolve them but equally predisposed against civil war and consequent state collapse. Lieven finds that the strong bonds of family, clan, tribe and the nature of South Asian Islam prevent modernist movements — propounded by the government or by the radicals — from taking control of the entire country. Lieven’s analysis is more persuasive than the widespread view that Pakistan is about to fail as a state. The formal institutions of the Pakistani state are surprisingly robust given the structural conditions in which they operate. Indian political leaders recognise Pakistan’s resilience. Given the bad choices in Pakistan, they would rather not have anything to do with it. If there is going to be a civil war, why not wait for the two sides to exhaust themselves before thinking about intervening? The 1971 war demonstrated India’s willingness to exploit conditions inside Pakistan, but to break from tradition requires strong, countervailing logic, and those elements do not yet exist. Given the current conditions and those in the foreseeable future, India is likely to sit out a Pakistani civil war while covertly coordinating policy with the United States.

## Intel Advantage

### 1NC

#### CIA is effective now—drone shift not key

Willing 13 (Richard, “The Way of the Knife: The CIA, a Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth”, Book Review, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol-57-no-3/the-way-of-the-knife-the-cia-a-secret-army-and-a-war-at-the-ends-of-the-earth.html)

“Everything is backwards,” former CIA lawyer W. George Jameson is quoted as saying. “You’ve got an intelligence agency fighting a war and a military organization trying to gather on-the-ground intelligence.” (314) Perhaps this is so, especially for those overly concerned by organizational charts. But the fact remains that the CIA did continue to collect and analyze, and the military did its share of fighting (recall that a Navy SEAL team, not a CIA unit, carried out the raid on Bin Ladin’s compound). Organizational “bleed” or not, **the combined efforts of the Intelligence Community, with the CIA in the lead, and the American military largely** have been getting the job done over the past 10 years. Mazzetti gives this little consideration, leaving the reader to wonder what other inconvenient truths were cast aside as he assembled his book?

#### CIA involvement in drones is inevitable and there’s no impact

Greg Miller, Foreign Policy Writer, 11/25/13 [“CIA remains behind most drone strikes, despite effort to shift campaign to Defense,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-remains-behind-most-drone-strikes-despite-effort-to-shift-campaign-to-defense/2013/11/25/c0c07a86-5386-11e3-a7f0-b790929232e1\_story.html]

When missiles fired by CIA drones slammed into Yemen and Pakistan last week, the attacks ended a period of relative quiet for the Obama administration’s lethal counterterrorism program. They also served as a reminder that the CIA is not ready to relinquish its role in the drone war.¶ Six months after President Obama signaled his desire to shift the campaign to the Defense Department, the CIA’s drone operations center in Langley, Va., is still behind the vast majority of strikes.¶ And although senior CIA and Pentagon officials have held meetings in recent months aimed at finding a way for the military’s elite U.S. Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) to take over the job, U.S. officials said the White House vision is a distant goal.¶ The emerging plan is likely to allow the CIA to maintain its drone fleet and stay deeply involved in targeted killing operations, even if the final step in any strike sequence is eventually handled by someone wearing a U.S. military uniform, said officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations.¶ U.S. officials said the discussions between the CIA and the Pentagon have involved CIA Director John Brennan; his deputy, Avril Haines; and Michael G. Vickers, the undersecretary of defense for intelligence, who previously worked at the CIA.¶ The talks are focused on finding a way to merge key aspects of the CIA’s drone operations with those of JSOC, so that both sides are deeply and simultaneously involved in nearly every strike, officials said.¶ “The goal is a find, fix and finish process that features seamless cooperation and robust integration between CIA and DOD,” a senior U.S. intelligence official said, using terminology that has become nearly ubiquitous among CIA and U.S. military operatives for the three-step sequence of lethal strikes.¶ Even if JSOC takes over sole responsibility for the “finish,” the intelligence official said, “Brennan has said from the very beginning that the agency contributes important tools to the nation’s counterterrorism capacity . . . the so-called find and fix.”¶ The effort is beset by technical snags. Despite their overlapping “orbits” in Yemen, the CIA and JSOC employ different surveillance equipment on their drone fleets. They also rely on separate and sometimes incompatible communications networks to transmit video feeds and assemble intelligence from multiple streams in the moments before a strike.¶ Brennan met twice with senior officials at the Pentagon this month “to better integrate CIA and DOD counterterrorism efforts,” the intelligence official said.¶ The push to get the CIA out of large-scale lethal operations “is a goal broadly shared within the administration” but “proving difficult to accomplish,” said Rep. Adam B. Schiff (D-Calif.), a member of the House Intelligence Committee. Even when it happens, he said, “it isn’t going to mean that either the intelligence community or the Department of Defense make a clean break.”¶ That prospect could undermine a main rationale for the switch: the conviction among many senior administration officials that the CIA should return its focus to its mission of intelligence-gathering.¶ During his confirmation hearing before the Senate Intelligence Committee this year, Brennan described the drone program as “an aberration” from the agency’s historic role and seemed to signal that he intended to preside over an unambiguous shift back. “The CIA should not be doing traditional military activities and operations,” he said.¶ The lack of significant progress toward that aim has raised questions among some about whether Brennan’s enthusiasm for ending CIA strikes has waned since he made the switch from senior White House adviser to CIA director.¶ One senior administration official said Brennan had “gone native” since moving into the director’s office on the CIA’s seventh floor.¶ U.S. officials close to Brennan disputed that characterization, saying he remains committed to the White House goal. But they acknowledged that there is no timetable for reaching it and that Brennan never envisioned a complete CIA withdrawal from the drone program.¶ When Brennan speaks of “traditional” military activities, he “is referring to the military conducting lethal ‘finishing’ operations, i.e. ‘dropping ordnance,’ ” the intelligence official said, meaning the agency would remain involved in tracking terrorist groups and identifying targets even if it ultimately surrendered its authority to execute strikes.¶ “There has been no change in policy since the president’s speech in May” at the National Defense University, White House spokeswoman Caitlin Hayden said. “I’m not going to speculate on how long the transition will take, but we’re going to ensure that it’s done right and not rushed.”¶ The outcome has significant implications for U.S. counterterrorism strategy, as well as the CIA’s identity. The agency, which rarely carried out lethal operations during most of its history, was transformed into a paramilitary force over the past 12 years, with its own fleet of armed aircraft.¶ Since 2004, the United States has launched 433 drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen, according to the Long War Journal Web site. The CIA has carried out the vast majority of them, killing more than 2,200 militants and as many as 400 civilians in Pakistan alone, according to a recent report by a United Nations human rights investigator. U.S. officials have insisted that the civilian casualty count is far lower but have never released a figure.¶ In his confirmation hearing, Brennan voiced concern that the drone war had absorbed too much of the agency’s resources and attention, creating potential gaps in the nation’s understanding of critical developments overseas, including the political turmoil that has swept across the Middle East as part of the Arab Spring.¶ “The principal mission of the agency is to collect intelligence,” Brennan testified, adding that one of his first priorities as director would be to examine “whether or not there has been too much of an emphasis on the CT front.”¶ U.S. officials said that Brennan, now in his eighth month on the job, is continuing to assess the agency’s posture and allocation of resources, and has made significant adjustments. But current and former U.S. officials said they have seen little indication that the CIA’s counterterrorism focus and its role in targeted killing have been curtailed.¶ “It has been business as usual,” said a former senior U.S. intelligence official familiar with CIA operations overseas.¶ The number of strikes has declined this year, in part because of stricter targeting criteria imposed by Obama in May.¶ But at a time when U.S. spy agencies are facing their first budget cuts in more than a decade, the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center — which swelled to about 3,000 employees after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks — has been shielded from reductions in resources or personnel.¶ And although Brennan has made personnel moves across most of the CIA’s major divisions, he has left the leadership ranks of the agency’s Counterterrorism Center intact. Among those still in place is the chief of the center, who has led the CIA’s drone operations for the past seven years and is described as fiercely opposed to giving up the agency’s role.

### Heg-D

#### Hegemony’s inevitable and resilient

Eric S. Edelman 10, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, was Principal Deputy Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs, 2010, “Understanding America’s Contested Primacy,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

A rigorous assessment should consider the strengths and weaknesses of the United States’ putative competitors on the global scene as well as the enduring strengths and sources of resilience that have enabled America to extend its primacy and maintain a stabilizing, global hegemonic role against all expectations. There is a need for a framework to inform how US policymakers might think about the problem of developing strategies and policies to extend that role yet again, since it is at least an arguable proposition that rather than a multipolar world, the global system, after the current Great Recession passes, will continue to be unipolar but with some additional challenges for US leadership.

Arguments for US national decline are not new. They have been made repeatedly in the past, and before they are accepted as the prevailing conventional wisdom it would be worthwhile to review the history of “declinism” and to submit some of the arguments that undergird the declinist persuasion to a searching re-examination. This paper, in the remaining pages, will consider the declinist arguments and will raise several questions. Will the undeniable relative decline of the United States, in fact, lead to the end of unipolarity? Do the BRIC countries really represent a bloc? What would multipolarity look like? How does one measure national power anyhow, and how can one measure the change in the power distribution globally? Is the rise of global competitors inevitable? What are some of the weaknesses that might hamper the would-be competitors from staying on their current favorable economic and political trajectory? Does the United States possess some underappreciated strengths that might serve as the basis for continued primacy in the international system and, if so, what steps would a prudent government take to extend that primacy into the future?

The history of straight-line projections of economic growth and the rise of challengers to the dominance of the United States has not been kind to those who have previously predicted US decline. It is not necessarily the case that the United States will be caught between the end of the “unipolar moment” of post- Cold War predominance and a global multipolar world. The emerging international environment is likely to be different than either of the futures forecast by the NIC in Mapping the Global Future in 2004 or Global Trends 2025 in 2008. It would seem more likely that the relative decline of American power will still leave the United States as the most powerful actor in the international system. But the economic rise of other nations and the spread of nuclear weapons in some key regions are likely to confront the United States with difficult new challenges.

#### Heg doesn’t solve war

Preble, 10 – (Christopher Preble, director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, August 2010 “U.S. Military Power: Preeminence for What Purpose?” <http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/u-s-military-power-preeminence-for-what-purpose/>)

Most in Washington still embraces the notion that America is, and forever will be, the world’s indispensable nation. Some scholars, however, questioned the logic of hegemonic stability theory from the very beginning. A number continue to do so today. They advance arguments diametrically at odds with the primacist consensus. Trade routes need not be policed by a single dominant power; the international economy is complex and resilient. Supply disruptions are likely to be temporary, and the costs of mitigating their effects should be borne by those who stand to lose — or gain — the most. Islamic extremists are scary, but hardly comparable to the threat posed by a globe-straddling Soviet Union armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. It is frankly absurd that we spend more today to fight Osama bin Laden and his tiny band of murderous thugs than we spent to face down Joseph Stalin and Chairman Mao. Many factors have contributed to the dramatic decline in the number of wars between nation-states; it is unrealistic to expect that a new spasm of global conflict would erupt if the United States were to modestly refocus its efforts, draw down its military power, and call on other countries to play a larger role in their own defense, and in the security of their respective regions. But while there are credible alternatives to the United States serving in its current dual role as world policeman / armed social worker, the foreign policy establishment in Washington has no interest in exploring them. The people here have grown accustomed to living at the center of the earth, and indeed, of the universe. The tangible benefits of all this military spending flow disproportionately to this tiny corner of the United States while the schlubs in fly-over country pick up the tab.