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## 1NC Politics

#### CIR will pass- vote is coming and republicans support it.

Fox News, 10/28 (Republican lobbying groups step up push on House to pass immigration reform, <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/10/28/republican-lobbying-groups-step-up-push-on-house-to-pass-immigration-reform/>)

Republicans who back immigration reform are ramping up their push to get the House to bring legislation to the floor, as the issue threatens to potentially create a public divide within the GOP. The Wall Street Journal reports the group Republicans for Immigration Reform is building up its lobbying efforts in Washington, releasing a web ad last week urging the House to act that has been viewed over 600,000 times, according to the group. This week, the New York Times reports a coalition of about 600 mostly Republican leaders in business and agriculture will begin an effort to lobby 80 GOP representatives on the issue. Some GOP donors are also reportedly privately withholding their contributions from members of Congress who oppose action of immigration reform. The issue has the potential to divide GOP lawmakers again after public in-party fighting over the recent budget negotiations. The New York Times reports that while some House members and House Speaker John Boehner are pushing for the lower chamber of Congress to pass its own immigration legislation before the end of the year; some conservative lawmakers have said they will not act on the issue regardless of pressure. “I care about the sovereignty of the United States of America and what it stands for, and not an open-door policy,” Rep. Ted Yoho, R-Fla., who is opposing all of the bills the House is currently considering, told the New York Times. However, both President Obama and Boehner expressed optimism last week that the House could pass immigration legislation. Obama on Thursday told an audience of business, community and labor leaders that the time to pass the Senate-passed reform bill is now, and urged the House to do so soon. “Everybody knows our current immigration system is broken; across the political spectrum people understand that,” he said. “We’ve known that for years it’s not smart to invite some of the brightest minds in the world to study here and not start businesses here and we send them back to their home countries to create jobs, invent new products someplace else.”

#### A reduction in presidential war powers saps Obama’s PC

**Kriner 10** (Douglas L. Kriner, assistant professor of political science at Boston University, “After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War”, University of Chicago Press, Dec 1, 2010, page 68-69)

While congressional support leaves the president’s reserve of political capital intact, congressional criticism saps energy from other initiatives on the home front by forcing the president to expend energy and effort defending his international agenda. Political capital spent shoring up support for a president’s foreign policies is capital that is unavailable for his future policy initiatives . Moreover, any weakening in the president’s political clout may have immediate ramifications for his reelection prospects, as well as indirect consequences for congressional races.59 Indeed, Democratic efforts to tie congressional Republican incumbents to President George W. Bush and his war policies paid immediate political dividends in the 2006 midterms, particularly in states, districts, and counties that had suffered the highest casualty rates in the Iraq War. 60 In addition to boding ill for the president’s perceived political capital and reputation, such partisan losses in Congress only further imperil his programmatic agenda, both international and domestic. Scholars have long noted that President Lyndon Johnson’s dream of a Great Society also perished in the rice paddies of Vietnam. Lacking the requisite funds in a war-depleted treasury and the political capital needed to sustain his legislative vision, Johnson gradually let his domestic goals slip away as he hunkered down in an effort first to win and then to end the Vietnam War. In the same way, many of President Bush’s highest second-term domestic proprieties, such as Social Security and immigration reform, failed perhaps in large part because the administration had to expend so much energy and effort waging a rear-guard action against congressional critics of the war in Iraq.61 When making their cost-benefit calculations, presidents surely consider these wider political costs of congressional opposition to their military policies. If congressional opposition in the military arena stands to derail other elements of his agenda, all else being equal, the president will be more likely to judge the benefits of military action insufficient to its costs than if Congress stood behind him in the international arena.

#### Consistent pressure and Dem unity are key to make Boehner allow a vote

**Sullivan, 10/24/13** (Sean, “John Boehner's next big test: Immigration” Washington Post Blogs, The Fix, lexis)

President Obama delivered remarks Thursday morning to renew his call for Congress to pass sweeping immigration reform. The prevailing sentiment in Washington is that it’s not going to happen this year, and may not even happen next year. But because of the last few weeks, it just might get done by early next year. It’s all up to House Speaker John A. Boehner (R-Ohio), who by political necessity, must now at least consider leaning in more on immigration. “Let’s see if we can get this done. And let’s see if we can get it done this year,” Obama said at the White House. Fresh off a decisive defeat in the budget and debt ceiling showdown that cost the GOP big and won the party no major policy concessions from Democrats, Boehner was asked Wednesday about whether he plans to bring up immigration legislation during the limited time left on the 2013 legislative calendar. He didn’t rule it out. “I still think immigration reform is an important subject that needs to be addressed. And I’m hopeful,” said Boehner. The big question is whether the speaker’s hopefulness spurs him to press the matter legislatively or whether the cast-iron conservative members who oppose even limited reforms will dissuade him and extinguish his cautiously optimistic if noncommittal outlook. Months ago, as House Republicans were slow-walking immigration after the Senate passed a broad bill, the latter possibility appeared the likelier bet. But times have changed. The position House Republicans adopted in the fiscal standoff badly damaged the party's brand. The GOP is reeling, searching desperately for a way to turn things around. That means Boehner, too, must look for ways to repair the damage. And that's where immigration comes in. Even before the government shutdown showdown, a vocal part of the GOP (think Sen. John McCain) had been talking up the urgent need to do immigration reform or risk further alienating Hispanic voters. Now, amid hard times for the party driven by deeper skepticism from Democrats, independents and even some Republicans following the fiscal standoff, the political imperative is arguably even stronger. The policy imperative already exists for some House Republicans -- perhaps enough of them that if Boehner allowed a vote, reform of some type could pass with a majority of House Democrats and a minority of House Republicans, as did last week's deal to end the government shutdown and raise the debt ceiling. (What specifically could pass and whether Obama could accept it is another question.) What's not clear is whether Boehner would be willing to chart a path with less than majority GOP support again so soon after the last time and without his back against the wall as it was in the fiscal standoff. This much we know: The White House and Senate Democrats will keep applying pressure on Boehner to act on immigration. Obama's planned remarks are the latest example of his plan. The speaker will be feeling external and internal pressure to move ahead on immigration. But he will also feel pressure from conservatives to oppose it. Here's the thing, though: Boehner listened to the right flank of his conference in the fiscal fight, and that path was politically destructive for his party. That's enough to believe he will at least entertain the possibility of tuning the hard-liners out a bit more this time around.

#### Ag industry’s collapsing now---immigration’s key

Alfonso Serrano 12, Bitter Harvest: U.S. Farmers Blame Billion-Dollar Losses on Immigration Laws, Time, 9-21-12, http://business.time.com/2012/09/21/bitter-harvest-u-s-farmers-blame-billion-dollar-losses-on-immigration-laws/

The Broetjes and an increasing number of farmers across the country say that a complex web of local and state anti-immigration laws account for acute labor shortages. With the harvest season in full bloom, stringent immigration laws have forced waves of undocumented immigrants to flee certain states for more-hospitable areas. In their wake, thousands of acres of crops have been left to rot in the fields, as farmers have struggled to compensate for labor shortages with domestic help.¶ “The enforcement of immigration policy has devastated the skilled-labor source that we’ve depended on for 20 or 30 years,” said Ralph Broetje during a recent teleconference organized by the National Immigration Forum, adding that last year Washington farmers — part of an $8 billion agriculture industry — were forced to leave 10% of their crops rotting on vines and trees. “It’s getting worse each year,” says Broetje, “and it’s going to end up putting some growers out of business if Congress doesn’t step up and do immigration reform.”¶ (MORE: Why Undocumented Workers Are Good for the Economy)¶ Roughly 70% of the 1.2 million people employed by the agriculture industry are undocumented. No U.S. industry is more dependent on undocumented immigrants. But acute labor shortages brought on by anti-immigration measures threaten to heap record losses on an industry emerging from years of stiff foreign competition. Nationwide, labor shortages will result in losses of up to $9 billion, according to the American Farm Bureau Federation.

#### Extinction

**Lugar 2k** Chairman of the Senator Foreign Relations Committee and Member/Former Chair of the Senate Agriculture Committee (Richard, a US Senator from Indiana, is Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and a member and former chairman of the Senate Agriculture Committee. “calls for a new green revolution to combat global warming and reduce world instability,” pg online @ http://www.unep.org/OurPlanet/imgversn/143/lugar.html)

In a world confronted by global terrorism, turmoil in the Middle East, burgeoning nuclear threats and other crises, it is easy to lose sight of the long-range challenges. But we do so at our peril. One of the most daunting of them is meeting the world’s need for food and energy in this century. At stake is not only preventing starvation and saving the environment, but also world peace and security. History tells us that states may go to war over access to resources, and that poverty and famine have often bred fanaticism and terrorism. Working to feed the world will minimize factors that contribute to global instability and the proliferation of [WMDs] weapons of mass destruction. With the world population expected to grow from 6 billion people today to 9 billion by mid-century, the demand for affordable food will increase well beyond current international production levels. People in rapidly developing nations will have the means greatly to improve their standard of living and caloric intake. Inevitably, that means eating more meat. This will raise demand for feed grain at the same time that the growing world population will need vastly more basic food to eat. Complicating a solution to this problem is a dynamic that must be better understood in the West: developing countries often use limited arable land to expand cities to house their growing populations. As good land disappears, people destroy timber resources and even rainforests as they try to create more arable land to feed themselves. The long-term environmental consequences could be disastrous for the entire globe. Productivity revolution To meet the expected demand for food over the next 50 years, we in the United States will have to grow roughly three times more food on the land we have. That’s a tall order. My farm in Marion County, Indiana, for example, yields on average 8.3 to 8.6 tonnes of corn per hectare – typical for a farm in central Indiana. To triple our production by 2050, we will have to produce an annual average of 25 tonnes per hectare. Can we possibly boost output that much? Well, it’s been done before. Advances in the use of fertilizer and water, improved machinery and better tilling techniques combined to generate a threefold increase in yields since 1935 – on our farm back then, my dad produced 2.8 to 3 tonnes per hectare. Much US agriculture has seen similar increases. But of course there is no guarantee that we can achieve those results again. Given the urgency of expanding food production to meet world demand, we must invest much more in scientific research and target that money toward projects that promise to have significant national and global impact. For the United States, that will mean a major shift in the way we conduct and fund agricultural science. Fundamental research will generate the innovations that will be necessary to feed the world. The United States can take a leading position in a productivity revolution. And our success at increasing food production may play a decisive humanitarian role in the survival of billions of people and the health of our planet.

## 1NC

#### The Executive branch of the United States federal government should pass and enforce an executive order to require offensive cyber operations be funded, conducted, and/or directed pursuant to Title 50 United States Code § 413b.and implement this by establishing independent commissions to review and ensure compliance with the order. The President of the United States should issue a declaratory policy stating that the United States will not deploy offensive cyber operations first.

#### Including self-binding mechanisms ensures effective constraints and executive credibility

**Posner & Vermeule, 6** --- \*Prof of Law at U Chicago, AND \*\* Prof of Law at Harvard (9/19/2006, Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, “The Credible Executive,” <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=931501)>)

IV. Executive Signaling: Law and Mechanisms¶ We suggest that the executive’s credibility problem can be solved by second-order mechanisms of executive signaling. In the general case, well-motivated executives send credible signals by taking actions that are more costly for ill-motivated actors than for well-motivated ones, thus distinguishing themselves from their ill-motivated mimics. Among the specific mechanisms we discuss, an important subset involve executive self-binding, whereby executives commit themselves to a course of action that would impose higher costs on ill-motivated actors. Commitments themselves have value as signals of benign motivations.¶ This departs from the usual approach in legal scholarship. Legal theory has often discussed self-binding by “government” or government officials. In constitutional theory, it is often suggested that constitutions represent an attempt by “the people” to bind “themselves” against their own future decisionmaking pathologies, or relatedly that constitutional prohibitions represent mechanisms by which governments commit themselves not to expropriate investments or to exploit their populations.71 Whether or not this picture is coherent,72 it is not the question we examine here, although some of the relevant considerations are similar.73 We are not concerned with binding the president so that he cannot abuse his powers, but with how he might bind himself or take other actions that enhance his credibility, so that he can generate support from the public and other members of the government.¶ Furthermore, our question is subconstitutional; it is whether a well-motivated executive, acting within an established set of constitutional and statutory rules, can use signaling to generate public trust. Accordingly we proceed by assuming that no constitutional amendments or new statutes will be enacted. Within these constraints, what can a well-motivated executive do to bootstrap himself to credibility? The problem for the well-motivated executive is to credibly signal his benign motivations; in general, the solution is to engage in actions that are less costly for good types than for bad types.¶ We begin with some relevant law; then examine a set of possible mechanisms, emphasizing both the conditions under which they might succeed and the conditions under which they might not; and then examine the costs of credibility.¶ A. A Preliminary Note on Law and Self-Binding¶ Many of our mechanisms are unproblematic from a legal perspective, as they involve presidential actions that are clearly lawful. But a few raise legal questions; in particular, those that involve self-binding.74 Can a president bind himself to respect particular first-order policies? With qualifications, the answer is “yes, at least to the same extent that a legislature can.” Formally, a duly promulgated executive rule or order binds even the executive unless and until it is validly abrogated, thereby establishing a new legal status quo.75 The legal authority to establish a new status quo allows a president to create inertia or political constraints that will affect his own future choices. In a practical sense, presidents, like legislatures, have great de facto power to adopt policies that shape the legal landscape for the future. A president might commit himself to a long-term project of defense procurement or infrastructure or foreign policy, narrowing his own future choices and generating new political coalitions that will act to defend the new rules or policies.¶ More schematically, we may speak of formal and informal means of self-binding:¶ (1) The president might use formal means to bind himself. This is possible in the sense that an executive order, if otherwise valid, legally binds the president while it is in effect and may be enforced by the courts. It is not possible in the sense that the president can always repeal the executive order if he can bear the political and reputational costs of doing so.¶ (2) The president might use informal means to bind himself. This is not only possible but frequent and important. Issuing an executive rule providing for the appointment of special prosecutors, as Nixon did, is not a formal self-binding.76 However, there may be large political costs to repealing the order. This effect does not depend on the courts’ willingness to enforce the order, even against Nixon himself. Court enforcement makes the order legally binding while it is in place, but only political and reputational enforcement can protect it from repeal. Just as a dessert addict might announce to his friends that he is going on a no-dessert diet in order to raise the reputational costs of backsliding and thus commit himself, so too the repeal of an executive order may be seen as a breach of faith even if no other institution ever enforces it.¶ In what follows, we will invoke both formal and informal mechanisms. For our purposes, the distinction between the authority to engage in de jure self-binding (legally limited and well-defined) and the power to engage in de facto self-binding (broad and amorphous) is secondary. So long as policies are deliberately chosen with a view to generating credibility, and do so by constraining the president’s own future choices in ways that impose greater costs on ill-motivated presidents than on well-motivated ones, it does not matter whether the constraint is formal or informal.¶ B. Mechanisms¶ What signaling mechanisms might a well-motivated executive adopt to credibly assure voters, legislators and judges that his policies rest on judgments about the public interest, rather than on power-maximization, partisanship or other nefarious motives? Intrabranch separation of powers. In an interesting treatment of related problems, Neal Katyal suggests that the failure of the Madisonian system counsels “internal separation of powers” within the executive branch.77 Abdication by Congress means that there are few effective checks on executive power; second-best substitutes are necessary. Katyal proposes some mechanisms that would be adopted by Congress, such as oversight hearings by the minority party, but his most creative proposals are for arrangements internal to the executive branch, such as redundancy and competition among agencies, stronger civil-service protections and internal adjudication of executive controversies by insulated “executive” decisionmakers who resemble judges in many ways.78Katyal’s argument is relevant because the mechanisms he discusses might be understood as signaling devices, but his overall approach is conceptually flawed, on two grounds. First, the assumption that second-best constraints on the executive should reproduce the Madisonian separation of powers within the executive branch is never defended. The idea seems to be that this is as close as we can get to the first-best, while holding constant everything else in our constitutional order. But the general theory of second-best states that approaching as closely as possible to the first-best will not necessarily be the preferred strategy;79 the best approach may be to adjust matters on other margins as well, in potentially unpredictable ways. If the Madisonian system has failed in the ways Katyal suggests, the best compensating adjustment might be, for all we know, to switch to a parliamentary system. (We assume that no large-scale changes of this sort are possible, whereas Katyal seemingly assumes that they are, or at least does not make clear his assumptions in this regard). Overall, Katyal’s view has a kind of fractal quality – each branch should reproduce within itself the very same separation of powers structure that also describes the whole system – but it is not explained why the constitutional order should be fractal.¶ Second, Katyal’s proposals for internal separation of powers are self-defeating: the motivations that Katyal ascribes to the executive are inconsistent with the executive adopting or respecting the prescriptions Katyal recommends.80 Katyal never quite says so explicitly, but he clearly envisions the executive as a power-maximizing actor, in the sense that the president seeks to remove all constraints on his current choices.81 Such an executive would not adopt or enforce the internal separation of powers to check himself. Executive signaling is not, even in principle, a solution to the lack of constraints on a power-maximizing executive in the sense Katyal implicitly intends. Although an illmotivated executive might bind himself to enhance his strategic credibility, as explained above, he would not do so in order to restore the balance of powers. Nor is it possible, given Katyal’s premise of legislative passivity or abdication, that Congress would force the internal separation of powers on the executive. In what follows, we limit ourselves to proposals that are consistent with the motivations, beliefs, and political opportunities that we ascribe to the well-motivated executive, to whom the proposals are addressed. This limitation ensures that the proposals are not self-defeating, whatever their costs.¶ The contrast here must not be drawn too simply. A well-motivated executive, in our sense, might well attempt to increase his power. The very point of demonstrating credibility is to encourage voters and legislators to increase the discretionary authority of the executive, where all will be made better off by doing so. Scholars such as Katyal who implicitly distrust the executive, however, do not subscribe to this picture of executive motivations. Rather, they see the executive as an unfaithful agent of the voters; the executive attempts to maximize his power even where fully-informed voters would prefer otherwise. An actor of that sort will have no incentive to adopt proposals intended to constrain that sort of actor.¶ Independent commissions. We now turn to some conceptually coherent mechanisms of executive signaling. Somewhat analogously to Katyal’s idea of the internal separation of powers, a well-motivated executive might establish independent commissions to review policy decisions, either before or after the fact. Presidents do this routinely, especially after a policy has had disastrous outcomes, but sometimes beforehand as well. Independent commissions are typically blue-ribbon and bipartisan.82¶ We add to this familiar process the idea that the President might gain credibility by publicly committing or binding himself to give the commission authority on some dimension. The president might publicly promise to follow the recommendations of such a commission, or to allow the commission to exercise de facto veto power over a policy decision before it is made, or might promise before the policy is chosen that the commission will be given power to review its success after the fact. To be sure, there will always be some wiggle room in the terms of the promise, but that is true of almost all commitments, which raise the costs of wiggling out even if they do not completely prevent it.¶ Consider whether George W. Bush’s credibility would have been enhanced had he appointed a blue-ribbon commission to examine the evidence for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq before the 2003 invasion, and publicly promised not to invade unless the commission found substantial evidence of their existence. Bush would have retained his preexisting legal authority to order the invasion even if the commission found the evidence inadequate, but the political costs of doing so would have been large. Knowing this, and knowing that Bush shared that knowledge, the public could have inferred that Bush’s professed motive – elimination of weapons of mass destruction – was also his real motive. Public promises that inflict reputational costs on badly motivated behavior help the well-motivated executive to credibly distinguish himself from the ill-motivated one.¶ The more common version of this tactic is to appoint commissions after the relevant event, as George W. Bush did to investigate the faulty reports by intelligence agencies that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction.83 If the president appoints after-the-fact commissions, the commissions can enhance his credibility for the next event—by showing that he will be willing, after that event, to subject his statements to scrutiny by public experts. Here, however, the demonstration of credibility is weaker, because there is no commitment to appoint any after-the-fact commissions in the future – merely a plausible inference that the president’s future behavior will track his past behavior.¶ Bipartisan appointments. In examples of the sort just mentioned, the signaling arises from public position-taking. The well-motivated executive might produce similar effects through appointments to office.84 A number of statutes require partisan balance on multimember commissions; although these statutes are outside the scope of our discussion, we note that presidents might approve them because they allow the president to commit to a policy that legislators favor, thus encouraging legislators to increase the scope of the delegation in the first place.85 For similar reasons, presidents may consent to restrictions on the removal of agency officials, because the restriction enables the president to commit to giving the agency some autonomy from the president’s preferences.86¶ Similar mechanisms can work even where no statutes are in the picture. As previously mentioned, during World War II, FDR appointed Republicans to important cabinet positions, making Stimson his Secretary of War. Clinton appointed William Cohen, a moderate Republican, as Secretary of Defense in order to shore up his credibility on security issues. Bipartisanship of this sort might improve the deliberation that precedes decisions, by impeding various forms of herding, cascades and groupthink;87 however, we focus on its credibility-generating effects. By (1) expanding the circle of those who share the president’s privileged access to information, (2) ensuring that policy is partly controlled by officials with preferences that differ from the president’s, and (3) inviting a potential whistleblower into the tent, bipartisanship helps to dispel the suspicion that policy decisions rest on partisan motives or extreme preferences, which in turn encourages broader delegations of discretion from the public and Congress.¶ A commitment to bipartisanship is only one way in which appointments can generate credibility. Presidents might simply appoint a person with a reputation for integrity, as when President Nixon appointed Archibald Cox as special prosecutor (although plausibly Nixon did so because he was forced to do so by political constraints, rather than as a tactic for generating credibility). A person with well-known preferences on a particular issue, even if not of the other party or widely respected for impartiality, can serve as a credible whistleblower on that issue. Thus presidents routinely award cabinet posts to leaders of subsets of the president’s own party, leaders whose preferences are known to diverge from the president’s on the subject; one point of this is to credibly assure the relevant interest groups that the president will not deviate (too far) from their preferences.¶ The Independent Counsel Statute institutionalized the special prosecutor and strengthened it. But the statute proved unpopular and was allowed to lapse in 1999.88 This experience raises two interesting questions. First, why have presidents confined themselves to appointing lawyers to investigate allegations of wrongdoing; why have they not appointed, say, independent policy experts to investigate allegations of policy failure? Second, why did the Independent Counsel Statute fail? Briefly, the statute failed because it was too difficult to control the behavior of the prosecutor, who was not given any incentive to keep his investigation within reasonable bounds.89 Not surprisingly, policy investigators would be even less constrained since they would not be confined by the law, and at the same time, without legal powers they would probably be ignored on partisan grounds. A commission composed of members with diverse viewpoints is harder to ignore, if the members agree with each other.¶ More generally, the decision by presidents to bring into their administrations members of other parties, or persons with a reputation for bipartisanship and integrity, illustrates the formation of domestic coalitions of the willing. Presidents can informally bargain around the formal separation of powers90 by employing subsets of Congress, or of the opposing party, to generate credibility while maintaining a measure of institutional control. FDR was willing to appoint Knox and Stimson, but not to give the Republicans in Congress a veto. Truman was willing to ally with Arthur Vandenbergh but not with all the Republicans; Clinton was willing to appoint William Cohen but not Newt Gingrich. George W. Bush likewise made a gesture towards credibility by briefing members of the Senate Intelligence Committee – including Democrats – on the administration’s secret surveillance program(s), which provided a useful talking point when the existence of the program(s) was revealed to the public.¶ Counter-partisanship. Related to bipartisanship is what might be called counterpartisanship: presidents have greater credibility when they choose policies that cut against the grain of their party’s platform or their own presumed preferences.91 Only Nixon could go to China, and only Clinton could engineer welfare reform. Voters and publics rationally employ a political heuristic: the relevant policy, which voters are incapable of directly assessing, must be highly beneficial if it is chosen by a president who is predisposed against it by convictions or partisan loyalty.92 Accordingly, those who wish to move U.S. terrorism policy towards greater security and less liberty might do well to support the election of a Democrat.93 By the same logic, George W. Bush is widely suspected of nefarious motives when he rounds up alleged enemy combatants, but not when he creates a massive prescription drug benefit.¶ Counter-partisanship can powerfully enhance the president’s credibility, but it depends heavily on a lucky alignment of political stars. A peace-loving president has credibility when he declares a military emergency but not when he appeases; a belligerent president has credibility when he offers peace but not when he advocates military solutions. A lucky nation has a well-motivated president with a belligerent reputation when international tensions diminish (Ronald Reagan) and a president with a pacific reputation when they grow (Abraham Lincoln, who opposed the Mexican War). But a nation is not always lucky.¶ Transparency. The well-motivated executive might commit to transparency, as a way to reduce the costs to outsiders of monitoring his actions.94 The FDR strategy of inviting potential whistleblowers from the opposite party into government is a special case of this; the implicit threat is that the whistleblower will make public any evidence of partisan motivations. The more ambitious case involves actually exposing the executive’s decisionmaking processes to observation. To the extent that an ill-motivated executive cannot publicly acknowledge his motivations or publicly instruct subordinates to take them into account in decisionmaking, transparency will exclude those motivations from the decisionmaking process. The public will know that only a well-motivated executive would promise transparency in the first place, and the public can therefore draw an inference to credibility.¶ Credibility is especially enhanced when transparency is effected through journalists with reputations for integrity or with political preferences opposite to those of the president. Thus George W. Bush gave Bob Woodward unprecedented access to White House decisionmaking, and perhaps even to classified intelligence,95 with the expectation that the material would be published. This sort of disclosure to journalists is not real-time transparency – no one expects meetings of the National Security Council to appear on CSPAN – but the anticipation of future disclosure can have a disciplining effect in the present. By inviting this disciplining effect, the administration engages in signaling in the present through (the threat of) future transparency.¶ There are complex tradeoffs here, because transparency can have a range of harmful effects. As far as process is concerned, decisionmakers under public scrutiny may posture for the audience, may freeze their views or positions prematurely, and may hesitate to offer proposals or reasons for which they can later be blamed if things go wrong.96 As for substance, transparency can frustrate the achievement of programmatic or policy goals themselves. Where security policy is at stake, secrecy is sometimes necessary to surprise enemies or to keep them guessing. Finally, one must take account of the incentives of the actors who expose the facts—especially journalists who might reward presidents who give them access by portraying their decisionmaking in a favorable light.97¶ We will take up the costs of credibility shortly.98 In general, however, the existence of costs does not mean that the credibility-generating mechanisms are useless. Quite the contrary: where the executive uses such mechanisms, voters and legislators can draw an inference that the executive is well-motivated, precisely because the existence of costs would have given an ill-motivated executive an excuse not to use those mechanisms.¶ Multilateralism. Another credibility-generating mechanism for the executive is to enter into alliances or international institutions that subject foreign policy decisions to multilateral oversight. Because the information gap between voters and legislators, on the one hand, and the executive on the other is especially wide in foreign affairs, there is also wide scope for suspicion and conspiracy theories. If the president undertakes a unilateral foreign policy, some sectors of the domestic public will be suspicious of his motives. All recent presidents have faced this problem. In the case of George W. Bush, as we suggested, many have questioned whether the invasion of Iraq was undertaken to eliminate weapons of mass destruction, or to protect human rights, or instead to safeguard the oil supply, or because the president has (it is alleged) always wanted to invade Iraq because Saddam Hussein ordered the assassination of his father. In the case of Bill Clinton, some said that the cruise missile attack on Osama bin Laden’s training camp in Afghanistan was a “wag the dog” tactic intended to distract attention from Clinton’s impeachment.¶ A public commitment to multilateralism can close or narrow the credibility gap.¶ Suppose that a group of nations have common interests on one dimension – say, security from terrorism or from proliferation of nuclear weapons – but disparate interests on other dimensions – say, conflicting commercial or political interests. Multilateralism can be understood as a policy that in effect requires a supermajority vote, or even unanimity, among the group to license intervention. The supermajority requirement ensures that only interventions promoting the security interest common to the group will be approved, while interventions that promote some political agenda not shared by the requisite supermajority will be rejected. Knowing this, domestic audiences can infer that interventions that gain multilateral approval do not rest on disreputable motives.¶ It follows that multilateralism can be either formal or informal. Action by the United Nations Security Council can be taken only under formal voting rules that require unanimity. Informally, in the face of increasing tensions with Iran, George W. Bush’s policy has been extensive multilateral consultations and a quasi-commitment not to intervene unilaterally. Knowing that his credibility is thin after Iraq, Bush has presumably adopted this course in part to reassure domestic audiences that there is no nefarious motive behind an intervention, should one occur.¶ It also follows that multilateralism and bipartisan congressional authorization may be substitutes, in terms of generating credibility. In both cases the public knows that the cooperators – partisan opponents or other nations, as the case may be – are unlikely to share any secret agenda the president may have. The substitution is only partial, however; as we suggested in Part III, the Madisonian emphasis on bipartisan authorization has proven insufficient. The interests of parties within Congress diverge less than do the interests of different nations, which makes the credibility gain greater under multilateralism. In eras of unified government, the ability of the president’s party to put a policy through Congress without the co-operation of the other party (ignoring the threat of a Senate filibuster, a weapon that the minority party often hesitates to wield) often undermines the policy’s credibility even if members of the minority go along; after all, the minority members may be going along precisely because they anticipate that opposition is fruitless, in which case no inference about the policy’s merits should be drawn from their approval. Moreover, even a well-motivated president may prefer, all else equal, to generate credibility through mechanisms that do not involve Congress, if concerned about delay, leaks, or obstruction by small legislative minorities. Thus Truman relied on a resolution of the United Nations Security Council rather than congressional authorization to prosecute the Korean War.99¶ The costs of multilateralism are straightforward. Multilateralism increases the costs of reaching decisions, because a larger group must coordinate its actions, and increases the risks of false negatives – failure to undertake justified interventions. A president who declines to bind himself through multilateralism may thus be either illmotivated and desirous of pursuing an agenda not based on genuine security goals, or well-motivated and worried about the genuine costs of multilateralism. As usual, however, the credibility-generating inference holds asymmetrically: precisely because an ill-motivated president may use the costs of multilateralism as a plausible pretext, a president who does pursue multilateralism is more likely to be well-motivated. ¶ Strict liability. For completeness, we mention that the well-motivated executive might in principle subject himself to strict liability for actions or outcomes that only an ill-motivated executive would undertake. Consider the controversy surrounding George W. Bush’s telecommunications surveillance program, which the president has claimed covers only communications in which one of the parties is overseas; domestic-to-domestic calls are excluded.100 There is widespread suspicion that this claim is false.101 In a recent poll, 26% of respondents believed that the National Security Agency listens to their calls.102 The credibility gap arises because it is difficult in the extreme to know what exactly the Agency is doing, and what the costs and benefits of the alternatives are.¶ Here the credibility gap might be narrowed by creating a cause of action, for damages, on behalf of anyone who can show that domestic-to-domestic calls were examined.103 Liability would be strict, because a negligence rule – did the Agency exert reasonable efforts to avoid examining the communication? – requires too much information for judges, jurors, and voters to evaluate, and would just reproduce the monitoring problems that gave rise to the credibility gap in the first place. Strict liability, by contrast, would require a much narrower factual inquiry. Crucially, a commitment to strict liability would only be made by an executive who intended to minimize the incidence of (even unintentional and non-negligent) surveillance of purely domestic communications.¶ However, there are legal and practical problems here, perhaps insuperable ones. Legally, it is hardly clear that the president could, on his own authority, create a cause of action against himself or his agents to be brought in federal court. It is well within presidential authority to create executive commissions for hearing claims against the United States, for disbursing funds under benefit programs, and so on; but the problem here is that there might be no pot of money from which to fund damages. The so-called Judgment Fund, out of which damages against the executive are usually paid, is restricted to statutorily-specified lawsuits. If so, statutory authorization for the president to create the strict liability cause of action would be necessary, as we discuss shortly.104 Practically, it is unclear whether government agents can be forced to “internalize costs” through money damages in the way that private parties can, at least if the treasury is paying those damages.105 And if it is, voters may not perceive the connection between governmental action and subsequent payouts in any event.¶ The news conference. Presidents use news conferences to demonstrate their mastery of the details of policy. Many successful presidents, like FDR, conducted numerous such conferences.106 Ill-motivated presidents will not care about policy if their interest is just holding power for its own sake; thus, they would regard news conferences as burdensome and risky chores. The problem is that a well-motivated president does not necessarily care about details of policy, as opposed to its broad direction, and journalists might benefit by tripping up a president in order to score points. Reagan, for example, did not care about policy details, but is generally regarded as a successful president.107 To make Reagan look good, his handlers devoted considerable resources trying to prepare him for news conferences, resources that might have been better used in other ways.108¶ “Precommitment politics.”109 We have been surveying mechanisms that the wellmotivated executive can employ once in office. However, in every case the analysis can be driven back one stage to the electoral campaign for executive office. During electoral campaigns, candidates for the presidency take public positions that partially commit them to subsequent policies, by raising the reputational costs of subsequent policy changes. Under current law, campaign promises are very difficult to enforce in the courts.110 But even without legal enforcement, position-taking helps to separate the well-motivated from the ill-motivated candidate, because the costs to the former of making promises of this sort are higher. To be sure, many such promises are vacuous, meaning that voters will not sanction a president who violates them, but some turn out to have real force, as George H.W. Bush discovered when he broke his clear pledge not to raise taxes.

#### XO solves because it provides a speedy discussion and shields the link to politics

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¶ Executive Orders also save time in a second sense. The President does not have to expend scarce political capital trying to persuade Congress to adopt his or her proposal. Executive Orders thus save ¶ ¶ presidential attention for other topics. Executive Orders bypass congressional debate and opposition, along with all of the horsetrading and compromise such legislative activity entails.¶ ¶ 292¶ ¶ Speediness of implementation can be especially important when challenges require rapid and decisive action. After the September ¶ ¶ 11, 2001 attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center, for ¶ ¶ instance, the Bush Administration almost immediately passed ¶ ¶ Executive Orders forcing airlines to reinforce cockpit doors and ¶ ¶ freezing the U.S. based assets of individuals and organizations ¶ ¶ involved with terrorist groups.¶ ¶ 293¶ ¶ These actions took Congress ¶ ¶ nearly four months to debate and subsequently endorse with ¶ ¶ legislation. Executive Orders therefore enable presidents to ¶ ¶ rapidly change law without having to wait for congressional action ¶ ¶ or agency regulatory rulemaking.

**Obama ignores statutory limits on war powers – even if they directly prohibit him from acting**

**Greenwald 11**

Glen, “Obama’s new view of his own war powers” [http://www.salon.com/2011/03/31/executive\_power\_2/] March 31//mtc

That was the heart and soul of Bush lawlessness: no “statute can place any limits on the President’s determinations” as “these decisions, under our Constitution, are for the President alone to make.”¶ Yesterday, Hillary Clinton told the House of Representatives that “the White House would forge ahead with military action in Libya even if Congress passed a resolution constraining the mission.” As TPM put it: ”the administration would ignore any and all attempts by Congress to shackle President Obama’s power as commander in chief to make military and wartime decisions,” as such attempts would constitute “an unconstitutional encroachment on executive power.” As Democratic Rep. Brad Sherman noted, Clinton was not relying on the War Powers Resolution of 1973 (WPR); to the contrary, her position is that the Obama administration has the power to wage war in violation even of the permissive dictates of that Resolution. And, of course, the Obama administration has indeed involved the U.S. in a major, risky war, in a country that has neither attacked us nor threatened to, without even a pretense of Congressional approval or any form of democratic consent. Whether the U.S. should go to war is a decision, they obviously believe, “for the President alone to make.”

## 1NC

**The neg just reorients our current relationship with technology – the aff adapts the world to the use of cyber operations by altering the way they are used – the technique eliminates the difference between human and machine**

ELLUL 1964 (Jacques, French sociologist and philosopher but not like totally mainstream like the other ones, The Technological Society, trans John Wilkinson )

Technique integrates everything. It avoids shock and sensational events. Man is not adapted to a world of steel; technique adapts him to it. It changes the arrangement of this blind world so that man can be a part of it without colliding with its rough edges, without the anguish of being delivered up to the inhuman. Technique thus provides a model; it specifies attitudes that are valid once and for all. The anxiety aroused in man by the turbulence of the machine is soothed by the consoling hum of a unified society.

As long as technique was represented exclusively by the machine, it was possible to speak of “man *and* the machine.” The machine remained an external object, and man (though significantly influenced by it in his professional, private, and psychic life) remained none the less independent. He was in a position to assert himself apart from the machine; he was able to adopt a position with respect to it.

But when technique enters into every area of life, including the human, it ceases to be external to man and becomes his very substance. It is no longer face to face with man but is integrated with him, and it progressively absorbs him. In this respect, technique is radically different from the machine. This transformation, so obvious in modern society, is the result of the fact that technique has become autonomous.

When I state that technique leads to mechanization, I am not referring to the simple fact of human adaptation to the machine. Of course, such a process of adaptation exists, but it is caused by the action of the machine. What we are concerned with here, however, is a kind of mechanization in itself. If we may ascribe to the machine a superior form of “know-how,” the mechanization which results from technique is the application of this higher form to *all* domains hitherto foreign to the machine; we can even say that technique is characteristic of precisely that realm in which the machine itself can play no role. It is a radical error to think of technique and machine as interchangeable; from the very beginning we must be on guard against this misconception.

This primacy of technique turns the case and causes extinction

WILKINSON 1964 (John, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, forward to The Technological Society by Jacques Ellul)

It should not be imagined, however, that the universal concentration camp which Ellus thinks is coming into being in all technical societies without exception will be felt as harsh or restrictive by its inmates. Hitler’s concentration camps of hobnailed boots were symptoms of a deficient political technique. The denizen of the technological state of the future will have everything his heart ever desired, except, of course, his freedom. Admittedly, modern man, forced by technique to become in reality and without residue the imaginary producer-consumer of the classical economists, shows disconcertingly little regard for his lost freedom; but, according to Ellul, there are ominous signs that human spontaneity, which in the rational and ordered technical society has no expression except madness, is only too capable of outbreaks of irrational suicidal destructiveness.

The escape valves of modern literature and art, which technique has contrived, may or may not turn out to be adequate to the harmless release of the pent-up “ecstatic” energies of the human being. Technique, which can in principle only oppose technical and quantitative solutions to technical problems, must, in such a case, seek out other technical safety valves. It could, for example, convince men that they were happy and contented by means of drugs, even though they were visibly suffering from the worst kind of spiritual and material privation. It is obvious that *all such ultimate technical measures* must cause the last meager “idealistic” motifs of the whole technical enterprise to disappear. Ellul does not specifically say so, but it seems that he must hold that the technological society, like everything else, bears within itself the seeds of its own destruction.

It must not be imagined that the autonomous technique envisioned by Ellul is a kind of “technological determinism,” to use a phrase of Veblen. It may sometimes seem so, but only because all human institutions, like the motions of all physical bodies, have a certain permanence, or vis inertiae, which makes it highly probably that the near future of statistical aggregations will see them continue more or less in the path of the immediate past. Things could have eventuated in the technological society otherwise than they have.

Technique, to Ellul, is a “blind” force, but one which unfortunately seems to be more perspicacious than the best discernible human intelligences. There *are* other ways out, Ellul maintains, but nobody wants any part of them.

Ellul’s insistence that the technical phenomenon is not a determinism is not weakened by the enumeration (in the second chapter) of five conditions which are said to be “necessary and sufficient” for its outburst in the recent past, since the sufficient conditions for the conditions (for example, the causes of the population explosion) are not ascertainable.

The inertia of the technical phenomenon guarantees not only the continued refinement and production of relatively beneficial articles such as flush toilets and wonder drugs, but also the emergence of those unpredictable secondary effects which are always the result of ecological meddling and which today are of such magnitude and acceleration that they can scarcely be reconciled with even semistable equilibrium conditions of society. Nuclear explosions and population explosions capture the public’s imagination; but I have argued that Ellul’s analysis demands that *all* indices of modern technological culture are exploding, too, and are potentially just as dangerous to the continued well-being of society, if by well-being we understand social equilibrium.

Voting negative is an assertion of freedom against the determinism of technique—it’s not about rejecting technology, it’s about recognizing the underlying domination of technique

ELLUL 1964 (Jacques, French sociologist and philosopher but not like totally mainstream like the other ones, The Technological Society, trans John Wilkinson )

But this must not lead the reader to say to himself: “All right, here is some information on the problem, and other sociologists, economists, philosophers, and theologians will carry on the work, so I have simply got to wait.” This will not do, for the challenge is not to scholars and university professors, but to all of us. At stake is our very life, and we shall need all the energy, inventiveness, imagination, goodness, and strength we can muster to triumph in our predicament. While waiting for the specialists to get on with their work on behalf of society, each of us, in his own life, must seek ways of resisting and transcending technological determinants. Each man must make this effort in every area of life, in his profession and in his social, religious, and family relationships.

In my conception, freedom is not an immutable fact graven in nature and on the heart of man. It is not inherent in man or in society, and it is meaningless to write it into law. The mathematical, physical, biological, sociological, and psychological sciences reveal nothing but necessities and determinisms on all sides. As a matter of fact, reality is itself a combination of determinisms, and freedom consists in overcoming and transcending these determinisms. Freedom is completely without meaning unless it is related to necessity, unless it represents victory over necessity. To say that freedom is graven in the nature of man, is to say that man is free because he obeys his nature, or, to put it another way, because he is conditioned by his nature. This is nonsense. We must not think of the problem in terms of a choice between being determined and being free. We must look at it dialectically, and say that man is indeed determined, but that it is open to him to oversome necessity, and that this *act* is freedom. Freedom is not static but dynamic; not a vested interest, but a prize continually to be won. The moment ~~man~~ stops and resigns himself, ~~he~~ becomes subject to determinism. He is most enslaved when he thinks he is comfortably settled in freedom.

In the modern world, the most dangerous form of determinism is the technological phenomenon. It is not a question of getting rid of it, but, by an act of freedom, of transcending it. How is this to be done? I do not yet know. That is why this book is an appeal to the individual’s sense of responsibility. The first step in the quest, the first act of freedom, is to become aware of the necessity. The very fact that man can see, measure, and analyze the determinisms that press on him means that he can face them and, by so doing, act as a free man. If man were to say “These are not necessities; I am free because of technique, or despite technique,” this would prove that he is totally determined. However, by grasping the real nature of the technological phenomenon, and the extent to which it is robbing him of freedom, ~~he~~ confronts the blind mechanisms as a conscious being.

At the beginning of this foreword I stated that this book has a purpose. That purpose is to arouse the reader to an awareness of technological necessity and what it means. It is a call to the sleeper to awake.

## 1NC DA

#### CIA focus on paramilitary operations collapses its intelligence operations

Max **Fisher**, Nov 21, **11**, CIA Outsmarted by Hezbollah: Is This the Cost of Counterterrorism?

<http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/11/cia-outsmarted-by-hezbollah-is-this-the-cost-of-counterterrorism/248830/>

Since 2001, the U.S. spy agency has been retooled to fight terror, but what has it lost?

The Lebanese militant group **Hezbollah has unraveled much of the CIA's mission in Lebanon, capturing up to a dozen U.S. spies in the country and effectively shutting down the agency's crucial operations there. "Beirut station is out of business," a source told the Los Angeles Times today. The incident is a major blow to the CIA and to U.S. intelligence. The agency's posting in Lebanon has for decades been one of its most aggressive, most highly valued, and, for its staff, most prestigious.** Though the CIA base there aggressively tracks Hezbollah, it is also a headquarters for monitoring and often countering Syria and Iran**.**¶How was the **CIA outmaneuvered by one of its oldest foes** in one of its proudest outposts? **CIA sources**that spoke to the Associated Press, which broke the story along with the L.A. Times, seem not to fear a strengthening Hezbollah or even to blame the agency's White House overseers, as spy officials often do, but rather **cite a changing culture in the CIA itself. The old CIA mission of counterintelligence, of spy-versus-spy, has taken a back seat to** the new emphasis on **killing terrorists**, they seem to worry, and the agency has suffered as a result.¶ **The Lebanon crisis is the latest mishap involving CIA counterintelligence, the undermining or manipulating of the enemy's ability to gather information**. Former CIA officials have said that once-essential skill has been eroded as the agency shifted from outmaneuvering rival spy agencies to fighting terrorists. **In the rush for immediate results,** former officers say, **tradecraft has suffered**.¶ The most recent high-profile example was the suicide bomber who posed as an informant and killed seven CIA employees and wounded six others in Khost, Afghanistan in December 2009.¶ The Khost incident, which was devastating to the CIA, neatly encapsulates how the world's premier spy agency managed to lose so much of its spy skills. Since September 2001, **the agency's mission has been less and less about subterfuge and intelligence-gathering but more and more about killing terrorists. In its growing emphasis on finding targets over finding information, it** over-exposed itself to the double-agent at Khost. This year, as it was ramping up drone strikes in Pakistan, paramilitary operations in Somalia, and targeted killings in Yemen, it seems to have lostsome of its once-prized focus on outwitting such hostile agencies as Hezbollah's "spy combat unit."¶ The CIA first began to take a more aggressive posture during the Cold War, when presidents from Kennedy to Reagan used it to arm and train anti-Soviet opposition groups. But even then it remained mostly in the shadows, attempting to manipulate world events in the U.S.'s favor. And its primary tools -- back channels, foreign assets, secret bank accounts, and misinformation -- remained the same, even as the mission evolved. It was not until September 2001, when the U.S. quickly and dramatically changed its national security focus to terrorism, that the CIA began its slow transformation from a spy agency into something that at times more closely resembles a paramilitary organization.¶ How much has the CIA changed since 2001? In the late 1990s, senior officials in the Clinton administration debated endlessly over whether the CIA could legally be granted the authority to kill Osama bin Laden; the agency had been banned from assassinations since 1976, following revelations that it had tried to kill Fidel Castro a decade earlier. Even the idea of a direct presidential order to kill the world's most dangerous terrorist, a man who had already blown up two U.S. embassies, was considered controversial and outside the CIA's normal realm. Yet in the first 20 months of the Obama administration, the CIA's drone program in Pakistan alone killed over 800 people. It runs or helps run drone programs and special operations in several countries and even operates detention centers. Under Obama, the CIA and Pentagon have borrowed one another's methods in Afghanistan and Iraq (not to mention one another's leadership) so regularly that the line between U.S. intelligence and the U.S. military has blurred in unprecedented ways.¶ The change has also been political. In the days immediately after September 11, 2001, the Bush administration decided to put the agency on a much tighter leash, using something it called Top Secret Codeword/Threat Matrix. Intelligence reports were fed directly to the White House, which announced it would begin more directly controlling CIA activities. "The mistake was not to have proper analysis of the intelligence before giving it to the president," National Security Council member Roger Cressey told New Yorker reporter Jane Mayer for her Pulitzer-winning book on U.S. national security policy after September 2001, The Dark Side. "There was no filter. Most of it was garbage. None of it had been corroborated or screened. But it went directly to the president and his advisers, who are not intelligence experts. That's when mistakes got made."¶ That's also when the White House began pushing the CIA in a way that encouraged it to put less emphasis on its long-term information-collection and counterintelligence efforts, slow-boil missions that might takes years or more to yield results and that might be more about detecting future threats than combating existing ones. The White House's new urgency about terrorism and al-Qaeda placed far greater pressure on the CIA to deliver immediate results on known threats. First that meant tracking terrorists, then capturing and "interrogating" them, and within a few years it meant killing them outright. That urgency and pressure has been sustained for over a decade now. Judging by Hezbollah's recent victory over the CIA in Lebanon, which appears to have grown somewhat sloppy in its spycraft, some of the patience from the old days was lost.¶ While some in the CIA have zealously embraced the new mission, some have not, speaking out (though always anonymously) to the press. Ultimately, the CIA is guided by the White House and its prevailing assessment of what threatens the nation and how to fight back. In the 1980s, the CIA was so consumed by the Reagan administration's anti-Soviet fervor that in funneled millions of dollars to mujaheddin fighting the Soviet Union in Afghanistan without sufficiently considering whether its actions would increase other threats. The agency was so focused on bleeding the Soviets that, while the mission succeeded, it helped fuel a generation of militants who are still fighting against the U.S. around the world. **A similar sense of** myopia appears to have returned to CIA policy since September 2001, with the agency **and its White House overseers so obsessed with fighting terrorism that other skills go underdeveloped and other threats under-addressed**.¶As in the Cold War, unity of purpose has made the CIA incredibly effective at its central task: al-Qaeda's "central" organization in Afghanistan and Pakistan has been decimated, its Yemen-based branch severely curtailed, and its efforts at expansion left struggling. But as Andrew Exum wrote in response to the story, "It's great to have an intelligence agency with a knife in its teeth, but **the primary** mission of an intelligence organization is to gather and analyze intelligence, not to thwack bad guys."¶ It's not clear if the CIA's "primary mission" has changed as a result of deliberate, top-down decision-making, or if it was simply a slow but inexorable process of mission creep. As the CIA has gotten better at killing, it appears to have simultaneously become worse at spying. Maybe that's the path that the CIA had to take, with instability-fueled insurgencies increasingly able, willing, and interested in attacking U.S. assets and even civilians. **But this changing focus will necessarily leave it, and the U.S., more vulnerable to the non-terrorism threats that the CIA traditionally battles: rogue states, rising powers, and violent but shrewd organizations such as Hezbollah.**¶**Maybe the CIA can continue to handle both its old missions as well as its new, more aggressive tasks. But**the agency's embarrassment in Lebanon suggests that it has emphasized paramilitary-style counterterrorism at the expense of spycraft.**And while al-Qaeda has certainly posed a significant threat to the U.S., the terrorist group's power is eroding. Meanwhile, the U.S. still has to live in a world with dangerous rogue states such as Iran and North Korea, semi-hostile foreign intelligence services such as Russia's and China's, and anti-American groups from Hezbollah to the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence to Mexican drug cartels.** At some point, the CIA -- and the White House -- will have to decide whether al-Qaeda and related groups really outweigh all of those threats

#### Hezbollah is vulnerable to spying, but the CIA to focus more on espionage operations in order to disrupt the organization

**Smith 11.** Lee Smith “Fallible” <http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/84358/fallible> (Lee Smith is an American journalist, and senior editor for The Weekly Standard. He is the author of The Strong Horse: Power, Politics, and the Clash of Arab Civilizations (2003). Smith has written for Slate, the New York Times, the Boston Globe, and a variety of Arab media outlets. He is also a fellow of the Hudson Institute and Foundation for Defense of Democracies.)

Nonetheless, Hezbollah officials are putting up a good front. “The resistance blinded American intelligence eyes,” one Hezbollah member of Lebanese parliament [said](http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=335221) last week. Perhaps he’s right—even as there are plenty of good reasons for the American intelligence community to encourage Hezbollah to think it bested the CIA. But contrary to its reputation, **Hezbollah may be** more **vulnerable to** hostile **clandestine services** than any organization in the history of espionage. Hassan Nasrallah certainly thinks so. Unique among world leaders, Nasrallah lives in hiding. **He has spent the last five years since the end of the party’s 2006 war with Israel bunkered underground because he fears his organization is so porous** that the Israelis have a good shot at assassinating him. Other recent intelligence triumphs against Hezbollah include Israel [destroying](http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0%2C7340%2CL-3284302%2C00.html) most of the party’s long- and medium-range missiles within the first few hours of the 2006 war. Perhaps most spectacularly, Hezbollah’s legendary commander, Imad Mugniyeh, was [assassinated](http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/mesh/2008/02/imad_mughniyah_is_dead/) in February 2008 in the middle of Damascus. Then there was an Israeli spy ring that penetrated Hezbollah. And even though more than 100 people have been detained by Hezbollah and[arrested](http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/84358/%20http%3A/www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=335221) by Lebanese security forces for espionage since April 2009, things keep blowing up—literally—in Hezbollah strongholds. Maybe the [blast](http://www.newenglishreview.org/blog_display.cfm/blog_id/39212) last week at a Hezbollah arms depot in Tyre was just an accident. Or perhaps it was a timely reminder that there are plenty of hostile assets still operating successfully in some of Hezbollah’s most sensitive areas. It is best, then, to treat Hezbollah’s Spartan reputation with a grain of salt. Unfortunately, many Western experts legitimize the party’s propaganda. For instance, Hezbollah leadership denied for many years that Mughniyeh had any official relationship to the organization. It was bad enough that [researchers](http://beirut2bayside.blogspot.com/2008/02/paging-norton-and-other-hezbollah.html) and journalists swallowed the party’s line. But even after Hezbollah buried Mughniyeh with full honors—not merely as a Hezbollah martyr, but as a pillar of the party’s revered leadership—regional experts never stopped to wonder: If Hezbollah lied about that, maybe they were lying about other things as well. Obviously Hezbollah, like all security and intelligence institutions, dissimulates. What’s different about Hezbollah is that its fictions are the foundation of a self-image that touches not only on earthly matters, but on heavenly ones as well. The CIA is the intelligence service of a regular state; it is designed and ruled by human beings and therefore imperfect in its very nature. Hezbollah, however, is not a regular political organization, but the party of God. **The arms of the resistance are sacred, entrusted with the duty of liberating Jerusalem, and its victories, like the 2006 war, are divine. But as it turns out, Hezbollah is not divine. It’s in fact quite flawed. And so the CIA story comes as another blow in a series of shocks to the Islamic resistance’s prestige**. Only credulous Western media sources believe that Hezbollah won a “divine victory” over Israel in 2006. The Shiite community in southern Lebanon knows better, which is why tens of thousands of them tried to flee when a rocket was fired from their area during the middle of Cast Lead in 2008-09. Even Hezbollah knows it is deterred, which is why the border with Israel has been relatively quiet since then. On the domestic front, Hezbollah isn’t faring much better. In 2009, a financier close to the party and nicknamed the [Lebanese Madoff](http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/09/22/us-lebanon-businessman-idUSTRE58L00Q20090922) was found to have stolen more than half a billion dollars from the Shiite community. Hezbollah’s May 2008 [attack](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7391600.stm) on Sunni neighborhoods in Beirut and on Druze regions in the mountains sullied the resistance—through the use of weapons that, according to Hezbollah mythology, are only to be used against the Zionist invaders, not fellow Lebanese. Even more significantly, Hezbollah has been named in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. In August, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon [indicted](http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2011/Aug-17/Hariri-assassination-result-of-suicide-attack.ashx#axzz1f4LUn14I) four Hezbollah operatives, including two of Mughniyeh’s brothers-in-law, for their role in the killing. In other words, the party of God stands accused of murdering one of the Middle East’s major Sunni leaders, which puts Hezbollah in a dangerous position with its Sunni neighbors inside Lebanon and around the region. It certainly doesn’t help the party’s reputation that its Syrian patron, President Bashar al-Assad, has been slaughtering members of the Sunni-majority uprising in neighboring Syria. Without Assad, Hezbollah will lose its supply lines. Even with Assad fighting to survive, circumstances are trying for Hezbollah. In the eyes of the regional Sunni majority, the regime in Damascus and Hezbollah are no longer Arabs at war with Israel—they are minorities, killing fellow Arabs on behalf of the Iranians. **It’s true the CIA has made plenty of mistakes in Beirut over the last several decades, and the U.S. intelligence community may have blundered badly in this instance, too. And yet no one knows exactly the parameters of the game now under way in Lebanon, where a number of regional and internatio0nal actors**—including, among others, Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, France, Israel, and the United States—**all have a stake in the outcome. All we know for certain is that the timing is bad for Hezbollah,** divine no more

#### Additionally, Hezbollah weapons transfers cause third Lebanon war – it has embedded military infrastructure throughout the country

Badran 13Tony Badran, 7th March 2013. “A Nifty Conceit: The EU, Hezbollah, and Lebanon.” <http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/a-nifty-conceit-the-eu-hezbollah-and-lebanon/> (Tony Badran is a Research Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) in Washington, DC. He focuses on Lebanon, Syria and Hezbollah. His research includes US policy towards Lebanon and Syria; Syrian foreign policy, with a focus on its regional relations and its ties to militant non-state actors and terrorist groups)

The Hezbollah bus bombing in Bulgaria as well as their foiled operation in Cyprus have put Europe in an uncomfortable position, as pressure increases on the EU to designate Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. The plot in Cyprus is especially embarrassing, as the Hezbollah operative there was arrested and is being publicly tried, making it harder for EU officials to deny evidence laid out in the open. Still, it is painfully obvious that Europe would much prefer this whole Hezbollah inconvenience go away. In resisting calls to designate the Shiite group, the Europeans have hid behind a nifty conceit: designating Hezbollah could destabilize Lebanon. Espousing such a seemingly altruistic position is rather convenient. It affords the Europeans the semblance of judicious sagacity, enabling them to skirt the issue altogether, regardless of the evidence. Take for instance what Gilles de Kerchove, the EU’s Counterterrorism Coordinator, had to [say](http://euobserver.com/foreign/118859) about the matter. While strong evidence is a prerequisite for designating the group, Kechrove opined, there’s also a “political assessment.” The EU counterterrorism official then added, “for Hezbollah, you might ask, given the situation in Lebanon, which is a highly fragile, highly fragmented country, is listing it going to help you achieve what you want?” **The proposition that targeting Hezbollah would negatively impact Lebanon presupposes that the group currently contributes to stability. Such a view requires quite the suspension of disbelief. In reality, Hezbollah has thoroughly subverted the country and its citizens in virtually every aspect. Left unmolested, Hezbollah not only undermines Lebanon's security, institutions, and political system, but is also set track to compromise its foreign relations, ruin its financial system, and destroy whatever remains of its social cohesion. The most obvious threat has been and continues to be Hezbollah’s illegal arsenal.** As I have [written](https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/israels_free_hand) in recent weeks, **Hezbollah’s effort to transport into Lebanon the strategic weapons it had stored in Syria is placing the country in tremendous danger. What makes the peril inescapable is the fact that Hezbollah has turned entire population centers into military sites. It has embedded its military infrastructure inside towns and villages all throughout the country**. **The Israelis have already struck one such convoy in Syria. However, eventually Hezbollah may succeed in bringing another convoy across the border. This will surely prompt another Israeli strike, which in turn is sure to result in significant collateral damage**. In his February 16 address, Hezbollah’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah [declared](http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0%2C7340%2CL-4345592%2C00.html) that any such Israeli strike inside Lebanon would be met with retaliation against Israel’s infrastructure. Nasrallah’s threats, whether or not they’re to be taken seriously, are unlikely to alter Israel’s calculations **regarding the smuggling of strategic weapons. Given that Hezbollah will surely attempt to bring in more of these weapons systems stored in Syria, an Israeli strike in Lebanon is, in all likelihood, a matter of time.** **Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria has had other deleterious effects on Lebanon and its fragile social fabric. By joining the war on the side of the Assad regime, Hezbollah is also acting as the regime’s flank in Lebanon. As such, it has taken action against Lebanese Sunnis who are assisting the Syrian opposition**. Whenever the Shiite group could not do so itself, it has relied on its allies in the military and security apparatuses to perform a task on its behalf, as we witnessed in the Arsal [incident](https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/hollow-praise-for-the-laf) several weeks ago. The damage has been, therefore, double. On the one hand, Hezbollah further exacerbated Sunni-Shiite tensions. Already it had brought those communal relations to the brink in May 2008, when it assaulted Sunni neighborhoods of Beirut (and the Druze Shouf Mountains), killing dozens. On the other hand, it pitted the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) against the Sunni community, which has come to view the Party of God’s relationship with the LAF with great suspicion. In addition, not only does Hezbollah provide cover to a host of criminal activities in its areas of influence – keeping them beyond the reach of the law – but also, the Party of God stands accused in the murder of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. Four of its commanders and operatives have been named as suspects, but, naturally, the LAF would never consider moving in to apprehend them. Perhaps the EU would also prefer to abort justice and gloss over political assassination in order to avoid action that would ‘destabilize’ the country. It’s bad enough that [suspicions](http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2012/10/25/irans_bloody_power_play_100309.html) over Hezbollah’s role in other political murders and assassination [attempts](http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local-News/2013/Mar-06/209068-judge-requests-life-in-prison-for-suspect-in-harb-case.ashx) have eaten at the core of communal coexistence and the political system altogether. But the Party of God’s penetration of state institutions has also implicated the Lebanese state in Hezbollah’s activities, both in Lebanon and abroad. Take for instance Hezbollah’s control over General Security. That apparatus is responsible for ports of entry as well as for the issue of travel documents. In recent years, as Hezbollah cells have been uncovered abroad, it came to light that many of its operatives held false identification papers that were nevertheless issued by the government. The case of Sami Shehab, who was [arrested](http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/14/world/middleeast/14egypt.html) in Egypt in 2009, is but one example. Shehab was in Egypt on an officially issued false passport. Such activities abroad have not only damaged Lebanon’s diplomatic relations, but have also hurt Lebanese expatriates, especially those working in the Gulf Arab states. Most recently, the uncovering of Hezbollah cells in the United Arab Emirates have led to the [deportation of Lebanese resident workers](http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/42441of) in that country. This is hardly the worst economic calamity Hezbollah has brought on Lebanon. **The Party of God’s vast,** [global](http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/hezbollah-acts-local-thinks-global/)**, criminal,** [enterprise](https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/reportsfeatures/eyes_on_hezbollah) **has infected the backbone of the Lebanese economy: the banking sector.** [The case of the Lebanese Canadian Bank](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/14/world/middleeast/beirut-bank-seen-as-a-hub-of-hezbollahs-financing.html?pagewanted=all) **is one ominous example. And while it may have been papered over, the potential damage to Lebanese banks, as a result of Hezbollah (and Iranian) money-laundering operations is simply devastating.** The group’s terrorist activities in Bulgaria and Cyprus (with whom Lebanon has critical energy interests) are bad enough. But its involvement in the drug trade and laundering of the proceeds through the banking sector and exchange houses is earning Lebanon the unenviable title of a “veritable money laundering machine,” [as illicit finance expert David Asher put it](http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/01/17/time_to_get_serious_about_sanctions_on_iran_especially_through_lebanese_banks). Asher also notes that Hezbollah’s money laundering has infiltrated the real estate sector just as much as it has the banking sector. Designating Hezbollah, and purging it from the Lebanese financial system, may be the only way to salvage the critical banking sector down the road. The above is but a quick sample of how Hezbollah has corroded Lebanon’s security, economy, society, politics and state institutions. There is much more, including the [mutilation of the political system by force of arms](https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/the_tyranny_of_the_black_shirts). The bottom line is that the EU rationale for not designating Hezbollah is not only absurd; it is detrimental to Lebanon’s long-term prospects. Lebanon may not in the end survive the metastasis of Hezbollah. But Europe’s refusal to take action against the Party of God will only help ensure Lebanon’s demise.

#### Also, a war in Lebanon would go global and nuclear

The Earl of Stirling 11, hereditary Governor & Lord Lieutenant of Canada, Lord High Admiral of Nova Scotia, & B.Sc. in Pol. Sc. & History; M.A. in European Studies, “General Middle East War Nears - Syrian events more dangerous than even nuclear nightmare in Japan”, http://europebusines.blogspot.com/2011/03/general-middle-east-war-nears-syrian.html

**Any Third Lebanon War**/General Middle East War is apt to involve WMD on both side quickly as both sides know the stakes and that the Israelis are determined to end, once and for all, any Iranian opposition to a 'Greater Israel' domination of the entire Middle East. **It will be a case of 'use your WMD or lose them' to enemy strikes. Any massive WMD usage against Israel will result in the usage of Israeli thermonuclear warheads against Arab and Persian populations centers in large parts of the Middle East, with the resulting spread of radioactive fallout over large parts of the Northern Hemisphere.** However, the first use of nukes is apt to be lower yield warheads directed against Iranian underground facilities including both nuclear sites and governmental command and control and leadership bunkers, with some limited strikes also likely early-on in Syrian territory.¶ **The Iranians are well prepared to launch a global Advanced Biological Warfare terrorism based strike against not only Israel and American and allied forces in the Middle East but also against the American, Canadian, British, French, German, Italian, etc., homelands. This will utilize DNA recombination based genetically engineered 'super killer viruses' that are designed to spread themselves throughout the world using humans as vectors.** There are very few defenses against such warfare, other than total quarantine of the population until all of the different man-made viruses (and there could be dozens or even over a hundred different viruses released at the same time) have 'burned themselves out'**. This could kill a third of the world's total population.¶Such a result from an Israeli triggered war would almost certainly cause a Russian-Chinese response that would eventually finish off what is left of Israel and begin a truly global war/WWIII with multiple war theaters around the world. It is highly unlikely that a Third World War, fought with 21st Century weaponry will be anything but the Biblical Armageddon.**

## LOAC

#### No other country would follow the international norm - Lack of oversight and attribution problems

Tom Gjelten, 12- ’10 (Antioch University New England, “Shadow Wars: Debating Cyber 'Disarmament'”, World Affairs http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/shadow-wars-debating-cyber-disarmament)

But what constitutes an “armed attack” in cyberspace? There are no soldiers crossing borders or shots fired. International law pertaining to the actual conduct of military operations is also unclear. Among the key principles under the Geneva Conventions is that the damage inflicted in a military attack should be “proportional” to the objective and that civilian targets should be avoided. But the application of those principles to cyber war is problematic. A targeting officer can use algorithms to predict the damage that will be caused by a bomb, based on its size, the angle of its approach, and the strength of the target, but an attack on a computer network can have unpredictable second- and third-order effects. The geographic spread of infections from the Stuxnet computer worm suggests that even a cyber weapon with extraordinary targeting capability cannot be easily controlled once it is let loose. Under the Bush administration, little progress was made in the cyber war discussions at the U.N. and elsewhere. Many conservatives had a longstanding aversion to arms control in general, having concluded from experiences with the Soviets during the Cold War that the U.S. military would generally adhere to treaty and legal commitments while its adversaries would not. Among those who question the value of discussing cyber war from a legal or arms control perspective is Stewart Baker, a former general counsel at the National Security Agency and an assistant secretary for policy at the Department of Homeland Security under President George W. Bush. “It is a near certainty that the United States will scrupulously obey whatever is written down,” Baker says, “and it is almost as certain that no one else will.” The U.S. disadvantage would be compounded by the fact that, by most analyses, no other military has such an advanced offensive capability for cyber war. Under a comprehensive cyber arms limitation agreement, the United States would presumably have to accept deep constraints on its use of cyber weapons and techniques. Critics also point to the so-called “attribution problem.” In conventional warfare, an aggressor can quickly be identified, and the responsibility for war crimes or treaty violations can be determined, but an attack on a computer network can be almost impossible to attribute. The use of hijacked “zombie” computers means the geographic origin of an attack may be unclear, as will be the identity of the perpetrator. “Since no one is going to get caught,” says Baker, “to say [a cyber attack] is a violation of the law of war is simply to make the law of war irrelevant.”

#### Perceptions of America are already crystallized – the aff can’t reverse the past

**Gray 11** – Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, England, (Colin S., April, “HARD POWER AND SOFT POWER: THE UTILITY OF MILITARY FORCE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY.” Published by Strategic Studies Institute)

Moreover, no contemporary U.S. government owns all of America’s soft power—a considerable understatement. Nor do contemporary Americans and their institutions own all of their country’s soft power. America today is the product of America’s many yesterdays, and the worldwide target audiences for American soft power respond to the whole of the America that they have perceived, including facts, legends, and myths.41 Obviously, what they understand about America may well be substantially untrue, certainly it will be incomplete. At a minimum, foreigners must react to an American soft power that is filtered by their local cultural interpretation. America is a futureoriented country, ever remaking itself and believing that, with the grace of God, history moves forward progressively toward an ever-better tomorrow. This optimistic American futurism both contrasts with foreigners’ cultural pessimism—their golden ages may lie in the past, not the future—which prevails in much of the world and is liable to mislead Americans as to the reception our soft power story will have.42 **Many people indeed, probably most people, in the world beyond the United States have a fairly settled view of America, American purposes, and Americans**. This locally held view derives from their whole experience of exposure to things American as well as from the features of their own “cultural thoughtways” and history that shape their interpretation of American-authored words and deeds, past and present.43

**No impact---mitigation and adaptation will solve---no tipping point or “1% risk” args**

**Mendelsohn 9** (Robert O. Mendelsohn 9, the Edwin Weyerhaeuser Davis Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, June 2009, “Climate Change and Economic Growth,” online: http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gcwp060web.pdf

The heart of the debate about climate change comes from a number of warnings from scientists and others that give the impression that human-induced climate change is an immediate threat to society (IPCC 2007a,b; Stern 2006). Millions of people might be vulnerable to health effects (IPCC 2007b), crop production might fall in the low latitudes (IPCC 2007b), water supplies might dwindle (IPCC 2007b), precipitation might fall in arid regions (IPCC 2007b), extreme events will grow exponentially (Stern 2006), and between 20–30 percent of species will risk extinction (IPCC 2007b). Even worse, there may be catastrophic events such as the melting of Greenland or Antarctic ice sheets causing severe sea level rise, which would inundate hundreds of millions of people (Dasgupta et al. 2009). Proponents argue there is no time to waste. Unless greenhouse gases are cut dramatically today, economic growth and well‐being may be at risk (Stern 2006).

These statements are largely alarmist and misleading. Although climate change is a serious problem that deserves attention, society’s immediate behavior has an extremely low probability of leading to catastrophic consequences. The science and economics of climate change is quite clear that emissions over the next few decades will lead to only mild consequences. The severe impacts predicted by alarmists require a century (or two in the case of Stern 2006) of no mitigation. Many of the predicted impacts assume there will be no or little adaptation. The net economic impacts from climate change over the next 50 years will be small regardless. Most of the more severe impacts will take more than a century or even a millennium to unfold and many of these “potential” impacts will never occur because people will adapt. It is not at all apparent that immediate and dramatic policies need to be developed to thwart long‐range climate risks. What is needed are long‐run balanced responses.

## Turf War

**No impact to cyber warfare – its all hype**

**Barnett - March 2013** (Barnett, Thomas P.M. – special assistant for strategic futures in the U.S. Defense Department’s Office of Force Transformation from 2001 to 2003, is chief analyst for Wikistrat. "Think again: The Pentagon: the military’s Chicken Littles want you to think the sky is falling. Don’t believe them: America has never been safer." Foreign Policy 199 (March-April 2013): 77+. Academic OneFile. Web. 12 Mar. 2013.

"Cyberwar Is the Next Big Thing." You bet. That is, at least as far as D.C.'s Beltway bandits are concerned. There is only one great growth area in the U.S. defense budget today -- besides health care, which now eats up roughly 10 percent of the Pentagon's spending each year. Spending on cyberweapons and network defense has been skyrocketing for years. Over the next five years, the Pentagon alone is set to spend [$18 billion on cyber](http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/Transcripts/2012/03%20March/12-19%20-%203-27-12.pdf) (it requested $3.4 billion for fiscal year 2013), and the Obama administration's 2009 decision to set up U.S. Cyber Command sanctified that emerging "war-fighting domain" and its budgetary standing. Washington's small army of IT contractors couldn't be happier. But is this a good use of taxpayer money? There's no question that the U.S. government and national security establishment in general are pretty bad at network security, and by that I mean both fall far below the standards of the world's best corporations and banks. Most Silicon Valley experts will tell you that, but you'll never hear it from D.C.'s many contractors or the national security cyber offices they serve in parasitic symbiosis. As far as they are concerned, it's the private sector that's light-years behind. As for cyber serving as a stand-alone war-fighting domain, there you'll find the debates no less theological in their intensity. After serving as senior managing director for half a dozen years at a software firm that specializes in securing supply chains, I'm deeply skeptical. Given the uncontrollable nature of cyberweapons (see: Stuxnet's many permutations), I view them as the 21st century's version of chemical weapons -- nice to have, but hard to use. Another way to look at it is to simply call a spade a spade: Cyberwarfare is nothing more than espionage and sabotage updated for the digital era. Whatever cyberwar turns out to be in the national security realm, it will always be dwarfed by the industrial variants -- think cyberthieves, not cyberwarriors. But you wouldn't know it from the panicky warnings from former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and the generals about the imminent threat of a "cyber Pearl Harbor." Please remember amid all this frenetic scaremongering that the Pentagon is never more frightened about our collective future than when it's desperately uncertain about its own. Given the rising health-care costs associated with America's aging population and the never-ending dysfunction in Washington, we should expect to be bombarded with frightening scenarios of planetary doom for the next decade or two. None of this bureaucratic chattering will bear any resemblance to global trends, which demonstrate that wars have grown increasingly infrequent, shorter in duration, and diminished in lethality. But you won't hear that from the next-warriors on the Potomac.

#### Infrastructure safe

**Economist 12** “Hype and Fear” December 8th, 2012. <http://www.economist.com/news/international/21567886-america-leading-way-developing-doctrines-cyber-warfare-other-countries-may>

Few would argue against improving resilience, particularly of critical national infrastructure such as power grids, sewerage and transport systems. But such targets are not as vulnerable as is now often suggested. Cyber-attacks on physical assets are most likely to use what Mr Libicki calls “one-shot weapons” aimed at industrial control systems. Stuxnet was an example: it destroyed perhaps a tenth of the Iranian centrifuges at Natanz and delayed some uranium enrichment for a few months, but the vulnerabilities it exposed were soon repaired. Its limited and fleeting success will also have led Iran to take measures to hinder future attacks. If that is the best that two first-rate cyber-powers can do against a third-rate industrial power, notes Mr Libicki, it puts into perspective the more alarmist predictions of impending cyber-attacks on infrastructure//

 in the West. Moreover, anyone contemplating a cyber-attack on physical infrastructure has little idea how much actual damage it will cause, and if people will die. They cannot know if they are crossing an adversary’s red line and in doing so would trigger a violent “kinetic” response (involving real weapons). Whether or not America has effective cyber-weapons, it has more than enough conventional ones to make any potential aggressor think twice

# Kritik

### 2nc overview

The K outweighs and turns the case – the primacy of technique suppresses human culture to its breaking point – instead of technology adapting to humans, now it’s the humans that have to adapt to technology – technique has become a machine in and of itself – turning humans into the most efficient beings for their use – any abberations in the system are systematically eliminated – the end point of this is extinction humanity eliminates itself in the name of more efficient technology – we also view eachother as simple tools to be exploited, furthering our indifference to humanity’s destruction

**They frame the case around consequences to avoid, not positive political goals that we should value—this supports the overall system of technical domination and undermines effective deliberation over technology**

**WINNER 1989** (Prof of Poli Sci at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, The Whale and the Reactor)

In recent times the idea of recognizing limits upon the growth of certain technologies has experienced something of a revival. Many people are prepared to entertain the notion of limiting a given technology if:

1. Its application threatens public health or safety

2. Its use threatens to exhaust some vital resource

3. It degrades the quality of the environment (air, land, and

water)

4. It threatens natural species and wilderness areas that ought

to be preserved

5. Its application causes social stresses and strains of an exaggerated

kind.

Along with ongoing discussions about ways to sustain economic growth, national competitiveness, and prosperity, these are the only matters of technology assessment that the general public, decision makers, and academicians are prepared to take seriously.

While such concerns are valid, they severely restrict the range of moral and political criteria that are permissible in public deliberations about technological change. Several years ago I tried to register my discomfort on this score with some colleagues in computer science and sociology who were doing a study of the then-novel systems ofelectronic funds transfer (EFT). They had concluded that such systems contained the potential for redistributing financial power in the world of banking. Electronic money would make possible a shift ofpower from smaller banks to large national and international financial institutions. Beyond that it appeared such systems posed serious problems about data protection and individual privacy. They asked me to suggest an effective way of presenting the possible dangers of this development to their audience of scholars and policy makers. I recommended that their research try to show that under conditions of heavy, continued exposure, EFT causes cancer in laboratory animals. Surely, that finding would be cause for concern. My ironic suggestion acknowledged what I take to be the central characteristic of socially acceptable criticism of technology in our time. Unless one can demonstrate conclusively that a particular technical practice will generate some physically evident catastrophe cancer, birth defects, destruction of the ozone layer, or some other-one might as well remain silent.

The conversation about technology and society has continued to a point at which an obvious question needs to be addressed: Are there no shared ends that matter to us any longer other than the desire to be affluent while avoiding the risk of cancer? It may be that the answer is no. The prevailing consensus seems to be that people love a life ofhigh consumption, tremble at the thought that it might end, and are displeased about having to clean up the messes that modern technologies sometimes bring. To argue a moral position convincingly these days requires that one speak to (and not depart from) people's love of material well-being, their fascination with efficiency, or their fear of death. The moral sentiments that hold force can be arrayed on a spectrum ranging from Adam Smith to Frederick W. Taylor to Thomas Hobbes. I do not wish to deny the validity of these sentiments, only to point out that they represent an extremely narrow mindset. Concerns about particular technological hazards are sometimes the beginning of a much broader political awareness. But for the most part we continue to disregard a problem that has been brewing since the earliest days of the industrial revolution-whether our society can establish forms and limits for technological change, forms and limits that derive from a positively articulated idea of what society ought to be.

### 2nc framework

**Framework – our interpretation is that the ballot should be a question of the technique**

**Debate is always a comparison of rhetoric – the only portable skills we learn are how to speak and influence people through persuasion – everything else can be learned in a classroom**

#### Voting aff does nothing, yet voting negative shows your solidarity with the feminist separatist movement which allows for real world change

#### The more specific the education, the shorter its shelf-life – we should focus on framing questions

**ECHEVARR 2005** (Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II is the Director of Research and Director of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute, US ArmyWar College, Parameters, Summer)

Accordingly, history faces stiff competition for curriculum space from other disciplines—the political and behavioral sciences, for instance—all of which claim (more or less dubiously) to be more relevant to the task of preparing military leaders to address contemporary challenges. **The issue of relevance**, for instance, while a favorite criterion of curriculum developers, **is often overplayed**. As a general rule, the greater the relevance of any particular knowledge, the **shorter its shelf-life**. Moreover, the problems that plague history and allow it to be abused are essentially epistemological in nature, and thus afflict the political and behavioral sciences as well.2 Therefore, while this article focuses on the troubles underlying history, it should not be construed as an argument for replacing history with another equally troubled discipline. On the contrary, despite the faults that will be discussed here, history has much to offer. But not in the way traditionally thought.

**Our framework is the most fair – the affirmative picks everything in the 1AC, if they can’t defend every part of it, then they should limit the number of things they put in it – smaller, better defended 1ACs create in-depth debates – eliminating kritiks also doesn’t solve infinite regress – there are also endless cheating counterplans and contrived agenda disads**

**Their framework removes the incentive to avoid racist and gendered language which makes the community hostile to excluded people and outweighs fairness**

#### Policy education from debate is unrealistic – therefore unpredictable and useless

**CLAUDE 1988** (Inis, Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia, States and the Global System, pages 18-20)

This view of the state as an institutional monolith is fostered by the notion of sovereignty, which calls up the image of the monarch, presiding over his kingdom. Sovereignty emphasizes the singularity of the state, its monopoly of authority, its unity of command and its capacity to speak with one voice. Thus, France wills, Iran demands, China intends, New Zealand promises and the Soviet Union insists. One all too easily conjures up the picture of a single-minded and purposeful state that decides exactly what it wants to achieve, adopts coherent policies intelligently adapted to its objectives, knows what it is doing, does what it intends and always has its act together. This view of the state is reinforced by political scientists’ emphasis upon the concept of *policy* and upon the thesis that governments derive policy from calculations of national interest. We thus take it for granted that states act internationally in accordance with rationally conceived and consciously constructed schemes of action, and we implicitly refuse to consider the possibility that alternatives to policy-directed behaviour may have importance–alternatives such as random, reactive, instinctual, habitual and conformist behaviour. Our rationalistic assumption that states do what they have planned to do tends to inhibit the discovery that states sometimes do what they feel compelled to do, or what they have the opportunity to do, or what they have usually done, or what other states are doing, or whatever the line of least resistance would seem to suggest. Academic preoccupation with the making of policy is accompanied by academic neglect of the execution of policy. We seem to assume that once the state has calculated its interest and contrived a policy to further that interest, the carrying out of policy is the virtually automatic result of the routine functioning of the bureaucratic mechanism of the state. I am inclined to call this the *Genesis* theory of public administration, taking as my text the passage: ‘And God said, Let there be light: and there was light’. I suspect that, in the realm of government, policy execution rarely follows so promptly and inexorably from policy statement. Alternatively, one may dub it the Pooh-Bah/Ko-Ko theory, honouring those denizens of William S. Gilbert’s Japan who took the position that when the Mikado ordered that something e done it was as good as done and might as well be declared to have been done. In the real world, that which a state decides to do is not as good as done; it may, in fact, never be done. And what states do, they may never have decided to do. Governments are not automatic machines, grinding out decisions and converting decisions into actions. They are agglomerations of human beings, like the rest of us inclined to be fallible, lazy, forgetful, indecisive, resistant to discipline and authority, and likely to fail to get the word or to heed it. As in other large organizations, left and right governmental hands are frequently ignorant of each other’s activities, official spokesmen contradict each other, ministries work at cross purposes, and the creaking machinery of government often gives the impression that no one is really in charge. I hope that no one will attribute my jaundiced view of government merely to the fact that I am an American–one, that is, whose personal experience is limited to a governmental system that is notoriously complex, disjointed, erratic, cumbersome and unpredictable. The United States does not, I suspect, have the least effective government or the most bumbling and incompetent bureaucracy in all the world. Here and there, now and then, governments do, of course perform prodigious feats of organization and administration: an extraordinary war effort, a flight to the moon, a successful hostage-rescue operation. More often, states have to make do with governments that are not notably clear about their purposes or coordinated and disciplined in their operations. This means that, in international relations, states are sometimes less dangerous, and sometimes less reliable, than one might think. Neither their threats nor their promises are to be taken with absolute seriousness. Above all, it means that we students of international politics must be cautious in attributing purposefulness and responsibility to governments. To say the that the United States was informed about an event is not to establish that the president acted in the light of that knowledge; he may never have heard about it. To say that a Soviet pilot shot down an airliner is not to prove that the Kremlin has adopted the policy of destroying all intruders into Soviet airspace; one wants to know how and by whom the decision to fire was made. To observe that the representative of Zimbabwe voted in favour of a particular resolution in the United Nations General Assembly is not necessarily to discover the nature of Zimbabwe’s policy on the affected matter; Zimbabwe may have no policy on that matter, and it may be that no one in the national capital has ever heard of the issue. We can hardly dispense with the convenient notion that Pakistan claims, Cuba promises, and Italy insists, and we cannot well abandon the formal position that governments speak for and act on behalf of their states, but it is essential that we bear constantly in mind the reality that governments are never fully in charge and never achieve the unity, purposefulness and discipline that theory attributes to them–and that they sometimes claim.

#### Identifying with the state scapegoats it for violence which allows evil to continue

**Shaffer 2007** [Butler teaches at the Southwestern University School of Law. B.S., Law, 1958, University of Nebraska, Lincoln; B.A., Political Science, 1959, and J.D., 1961, University of Chicago; Member, Colorado and Nebraska State Bars. “Identifying With the State” June 29th 2007. <http://www.lewrockwell.com/shaffer/shaffer159.html>]

One of the deadliest practices we engage in is that of identifying ourselves with a collective entity. Whether it be the state, a nationality, our race or gender, or any other abstraction, we introduce division – hence, conflict – into our lives as we separate ourselves from those who identify with other groupings. If one observes the state of our world today, this is the pattern that underlies our deadly and destructive social behavior. This mindset was no better articulated than when George W. Bush declared “you’re either with us, or against us.” Through years of careful conditioning, we learn to think of ourselves in terms of agencies and/or abstractions external to our independent being. Or, to express the point more clearly, we have learned to internalize these external forces; to conform our thinking and behavior to the purposes and interests of such entities. We adorn ourselves with flags, mouth shibboleths, and decorate our cars with bumper-stickers, in order to communicate to others our sense of “who we are.” In such ways does our being become indistinguishable from our chosen collective. In this way are institutions born. We discover a particular form of organization through which we are able to cooperate with others for our mutual benefit. Over time, the advantages derived from this system have a sufficient consistency to lead us to the conclusion that our well-being is dependent upon it. Those who manage the organization find it in their self-interests to propagate this belief so that we will become dependent upon its permanency. Like a sculptor working with clay, institutions take over the direction of our minds, twisting, squeezing, and pounding upon them until we have embraced a mindset conducive to their interests. Once this has been accomplished, we find it easy to subvert our will and sense of purpose to the collective. The organization ceases being a mere tool of mutual convenience, and becomes an end in itself. Our lives become “institutionalized,” and we regard it as fanciful to imagine ourselves living in any other way than as constituent parts of a machine that transcends our individual sense. Once we identify ourselves with the state, that collective entity does more than represent who we are; it is who we are. To the politicized mind, the idea that “we are the government” has real meaning, not in the sense of being able to control such an agency, but in the psychological sense. The successes and failures of the state become the subject’s successes and failures; insults or other attacks upon their abstract sense of being – such as the burning of “their” flag – become assaults upon their very personhood. Shortcomings on the part of the state become our failures of character. This is why so many Americans who have belatedly come to criticize the war against Iraq are inclined to treat it as only a “mistake” or the product of “mismanagement,” not as a moral wrong. Our egos can more easily admit to the making of a mistake than to moral transgressions. Such an attitude also helps to explain why, as Milton Mayer wrote in his revealing post-World War II book, [They Thought They Were Free](http://www.amazon.com/They-Thought-Were-Free-Germans/dp/0226511928/lewrockwell/), most Germans were unable to admit that the Nazi regime had been tyrannical. It is this dynamic that makes it easy for political officials to generate wars, a process that reinforces the sense of identity and attachment people have for “their” state. It also helps to explain why most Americans – though tiring of the war against Iraq – refuse to condemn government leaders for the lies, forgeries, and deceit employed to get the war started: to acknowledge the dishonesty of the system through which they identify themselves is to admit to the dishonest base of their being. The truthfulness of the state’s rationale for war is irrelevant to most of its subjects. It is sufficient that they believe the abstraction with which their lives are intertwined will be benefited in some way by war. Against whom and upon what claim does not matter – except as a factor in assessing the likelihood of success. That most Americans have pipped nary a squeak of protest over Bush administration plans to attack Iran – with nuclear weapons if deemed useful to its ends – reflects the point I am making. Bush could undertake a full-fledged war against Lapland, and most Americans would trot out their flags and bumper-stickers of approval. The “rightness” or “wrongness” of any form of collective behavior becomes interpreted by the standard of whose actions are being considered. During World War II, for example, Japanese kamikaze pilots were regarded as crazed fanatics for crashing their planes into American battleships. At the same time, American war movies (see, e.g., [Flying Tigers](http://www.amazon.com/Flying-Tigers-John-Wayne/dp/0782011276/lewrockwell/)) extolled the heroism of American pilots who did the same thing. One sees this same double-standard in responding to “conspiracy theories.” “Do you think a conspiracy was behind the 9/11 attacks?” It certainly seems so to me, unless one is prepared to treat the disappearance of the World Trade Center buildings as the consequence of a couple pilots having bad navigational experiences! The question that should be asked is: whose conspiracy was it? To those whose identities coincide with the state, such a question is easily answered: others conspire, we do not. It is not the symbiotic relationship between war and the expansion of state power, nor the realization of corporate benefits that could not be obtained in a free market, that mobilize the machinery of war. Without most of us standing behind “our” system, and cheering on “our” troops, and defending “our” leaders, none of this would be possible. What would be your likely response if your neighbor prevailed upon you to join him in a violent attack upon a local convenience store, on the grounds that it hired “illegal aliens?” Your sense of identity would not be implicated in his efforts, and you would likely dismiss him as a lunatic. Only when our ego-identities become wrapped up with some institutional abstraction – such as the state – can we be persuaded to invest our lives and the lives of our children in the collective madness of state action. We do not have such attitudes toward organizations with which we have more transitory relationships. If we find an accounting error in our bank statement, we would not find satisfaction in the proposition “the First National Bank, right or wrong.” Neither would we be inclined to wear a T-shirt that read “Disneyland: love it or leave it.” One of the many adverse consequences of identifying with and attaching ourselves to collective abstractions is our loss of control over not only the meaning and direction in our lives, but of the manner in which we can be efficacious in our efforts to pursue the purposes that have become central to us. We become dependent upon the performance of “our” group; “our” reputation rises or falls on the basis of what institutional leaders do or fail to do. If “our” nation-state loses respect in the world – such as by the use of torture or killing innocent people we consider ourselves no longer respectable, and scurry to find plausible excuses to redeem our egos. When these expectations are not met, we go in search of new leaders or organizational reforms we believe will restore our sense of purpose and pride that we have allowed abstract entities to personify for us. As the costs and failures of the state become increasingly evident, there is a growing tendency to blame this system. But to do so is to continue playing the same game into which we have allowed ourselves to become conditioned. One of the practices employed by the state to get us to mobilize our “dark side” energies in opposition to the endless recycling of enemies it has chosen for us, is that of psychological projection. Whether we care to acknowledge it or not – and most of us do not – each of us has an unconscious capacity for attitudes or conduct that our conscious minds reject. We fear that, sufficiently provoked, we might engage in violence – even deadly – against others; or that inducements might cause us to become dishonest. We might harbor racist or other bigoted sentiments, or consider ourselves lazy or irresponsible. Though we are unlikely to act upon such inner fears, their presence within us can generate discomforting self-directed feelings of guilt, anger, or unworthiness that we would like to eliminate. The most common way in which humanity has tried to bring about such an exorcism is by subconsciously projecting these traits onto others (i.e., “scapegoats”) and punishing them for what are really our own shortcomings. The state has trained us to behave this way, in order that we may be counted upon to invest our lives, resources, and other energies in pursuit of the enemy du jour. It is somewhat ironic, therefore, that most of us resort to the same practice in our criticism of political systems. After years of mouthing the high-school civics class mantra about the necessity for government – and the bigger the government the better – we begin to experience the unexpected consequences of politicization. Tax burdens continue to escalate; or the state takes our home to make way for a proposed shopping center; or ever-more details of our lives are micromanaged by ever-burgeoning state bureaucracies. Having grown weary of the costs – including the loss of control over our lives – we blame the state for what has befallen us. We condemn the Bush administration for the parade of lies that precipitated the war against Iraq, rather than indicting ourselves for ever believing anything the state tells us. We fault the politicians for the skyrocketing costs of governmental programs, conveniently ignoring our insistence upon this or that benefit whose costs we would prefer having others pay. The statists have helped us accept a world view that conflates our incompetence to manage our own lives with their omniscience to manage the lives of billions of people – along with the planet upon which we live! – and we are now experiencing the costs generated by our own gullibility. We have acted like country bumpkins at the state fair with the egg money who, having been fleeced by a bunch of carnival sharpies, look everywhere for someone to blame other than ourselves. We have been euchred out of our very lives because of our eagerness to believe that benefits can be enjoyed without incurring costs; that the freedom to control one’s life can be separated from the responsibilities for one’s actions; and that two plus two does not have to add up to four if a sizeable public opinion can be amassed against the proposition. By identifying ourselves with any abstraction (such as the state) we give up the integrated life, the sense of wholeness that can be found only within each of us. While the state has manipulated, cajoled, and threatened us to identify ourselves with it, the responsibility for our acceding to its pressures lies within each of us. The statists have – as was their vicious purpose – simply taken over the territory we have abandoned. Our politico-centric pain and suffering has been brought about by our having allowed external forces to move in and occupy the vacuum we created at the center of our being. The only way out of our dilemma involves a retracing of the route that brought us to where we are. We require nothing so much right now as the development of a sense of “who we are” that transcends our institutionalized identities, and returns us – without division and conflict – to a centered, self-directed integrity in our lives.

### 2NC Link Block

The improvement of cyberoperations in order to make them more effective under the covert operation statute is based on ideas of efficiency – the adherence to the centralized technological ordering of society creates built in inequality as it predetermines how humans should act and excludes those who do not fit the norm – the question of how cyber operations should be deployed and used – they gloss over the use of cyber operations focusing on how we can adapt ourselves to the use of cyber operations to make it more effective - efficiency is elevated as the supreme technique of society

**The aff has technological adaptation backwards—we don’t adapt new tech to solve social problems, we adapt human beings to the technology itself—the result is inequality, dehumanization, and the eclipse of culture**

**ELLUL 1989** (Jacques, French sociologist and philosopher but not like totally mainstream like the other ones, What I Believe, Trans. Bromiley, http://www.jesusradicals.com/wp-content/uploads/what.pdf)

Thus one of the great themes today is technological culture. We are supposedly adding technological knowledge to our humanist legacy. At least this is not an attempt to raise technology to the rank of a true culture, to find in it a source of values, intelligence, a critical spirit, a universalism. A technological culture is in fact impossible, for technology is the negation of culture. We find a similar desire to show that technology becomes social inasmuch as it simplifies and amplifies social actions, or that it creates a new art. This is merely playing with words; there is no substance to it. The art created by painters, sculptors, and musicians imitates what technology alone proposes and permits and has nothing in common with what has been produced as art, and called such up to about 1930, since Prehistoric times.2 People are always talking about humanizing technology, but this talk has no effect whatever on its development. All questioning of technology on basic grounds (e.g, by ecology and the ecological movement in its early days) has either been ruthlessly dismissed or integrated into the technological world. This world sometimes seems capable of producing a counterforce, for in the period of transition from one environment to another susceptibilities have to be taken into account. Thus we find the concern for human relations in the 1950s and the movement of technology assessment today. But these simply serve to allay disquiet and thus to make development easier.

The second result of the domination of this environment is that human beings have to adapt to it and accept total change. At issue here is not just a slight modification or adaptation but an essential transformation. A first aspect of this radical adaptation concerns the relation between human beings and machines. If machines have to be perfectly adapted to us, the reverse is unavoidable. We have to be exactly what is useful for machines, **their** perfect **complement**. Human life is no longer merely a matter of muscle and reflex. We now have to have our gadgets. We can see the mutation very clearly and decisively in the academic world. The humanities are now disparaged. Traditional culture is valueless relative to machines. At the beginning of the 20th century, and again in 1930, people in the industrial and commercial world began to ask what good such studies as history and Greek are. How can they help us to make money or to forge ahead economically? Today we are putting much the same question, but in a new way: How do they serve the technological world? How do they make us a proper complement for machines? This is why there is such an incredible stress on information in our schools. The important thing is to prepare young people to enter the world of information, able to handle computers, but knowing only the reasoning, the language, the combinations, and the connections between computers. This movement is invading the whole intellectual domain and also that of conscience.

But this is not the only feature. Part of the human mutation is the appearance and consecration of the human guinea pig in furtherance of science and technology. Since science and technology are plainly dominant, we have to test their effects and usefulness on people. Experiments are becoming ever more numerous and varied. I was horrified many years ago to learn that in the United States, for scientific reasons (to study the evolution of the embryo), pregnant women were being paid to have an abortion at a given stage, and we have gone much further than that today. Remedies, pharmaceutical products, are being tested on people for pay. There is experimentation in the field of what is everywhere called genetic makeup. We are growing used to the idea that people are simply guinea pigs upon whom it is quite legitimate to conduct scientific experiments. "Humanity is our most precious resource" is a slogan that has been taken up in many forms the last few years. But let us remember that if humanity is only a resource, this implies that we may treat humanity as simply a factor in economic production. Leases are taken out on resources. In the genetic field there seems to be no limit to what can be done (implants, test-tube babies, surrogate mothers, etc.). The imagination has free rein. But genetic manipulation is designed to produce exactly the type of people that we need. Much has been made of the book 1984, but what is in prospect is really Huxley's Brave New World. From birth individuals are to be adapted specially to perform various services in society. They are to be so perfectly adapted physiologically that there will be no maladjustment, no revolt, no looking elsewhere. The combination of genetic makeup and educational specialization will make people adequate to fulfill their technological functions.

Beyond that, American experiments directly on the brain have shown that the implantation of minute electrodes (with the consent of the subject) might induce specific impressions, desires, and pleasures, and effect obedience to orders no matter who gives them and with no need for speech. At an experimental stage this has caused no scandal. But is it not apparent that this new form of intervention in human nature will finally suppress human freedom altogether, will bring about complete obedience without choice, and will result in the perfect adaptation that technology needs? People will no longer be a hindrance to proper conduct. The more perfect technology becomes, the more refined and complex and subtle and swift its processes, the more human conduct has to be perfect. We can no longer dream or forget or have other centers of interest. An instrument panel in an automated factory is no place for the recalling of poetry. The technological environment demands a radical transformation of humanity. Previously human adaptation followed the slow rhythm of evolution from generation to generation. Only over centuries did people become social, political, and urban. No one decided for them that they had to follow this pattern. Today the technological environment is coming upon us very quickly. Technology develops with ever increasing speed. In every sector and in all directions the new environment is being formed explosively. Hence human adaptation to it cannot be extended over many centuries. We have to adjust rapidly.

Examination of the last thirty years will be enough to demonstrate this incredible rapidity. Technology cannot wait, for it soon becomes unusable. Everything has to be done in a single generation. Nor can the adaptation be spontaneous, following our physiological and intellectual rhythm. To move quickly, we have to move by act of will. We cannot wait for progressive and cumulative adaptations. We have to create at once the kind of people that machines demand. Human language has already been modified to become that of the computer. Some numbers and letters have been modified so as to correspond exactly to the form that the computer gives them. This is an almost unrecognizable occurrence, yet it is of major importance.

A problem arises, however. For a long time those who have been genetically manipulated so as to conform to the technological model will be a small minority. Most people will still be at the social stage or even the natural stage. What will be the relations between these groups? They will certainly not understand one another. There will be no more in common between them than in the transition from the first to the second stage there was between nomadic brigands and the first city merchants five thousand years ago. On the one hand there will be a kind of aristocracy marked off by its total and infallible adaptation to technical gadgets and the technological system, and on the other hand there will be a vast number of people who are outdated, who cannot use the technology, who are powerless, who are still at the social stage but who live in a technological environment for which they are totally unadapted.

In this respect I must make a final observation. When I talk about adaptation, readers might think that I mean adjustment to various minor differences in environment. Thus people in hot countries adjust their clothes and habits and customs accordingly. But the changes of environment that I have in mind demand a total and fundamental mutation, so that I am inclined to say that the Prehistoric people of the natural environment had nothing in common with the historical people of the social environment, and that we are now witnessing a mutation of the same order. We have only to think how alien the bushmen or aborigines of Australia were to all that the 19th century regarded as human nature. By a change of environment what is regarded as human nature in one epoch is transformed and a new model of humanity emerges. It might be argued that I am exaggerating and that the environment cannot have this impact on human nature. But that argument is a mere hypothesis based on the conviction that there is such a thing as an inalienable and basically identical human nature. For my part, I am not so sure. Furthermore, no one has ever been able to say clearly what this human nature really is.

Nevertheless, I have still to answer a question of my own. Why have I given this sketch of the development of three environments in a book entitled What I Believe? It is true that at a first glance all that I have written here seems to have nothing to do with my fundamental beliefs, with what is fundamentally existential for me. Yet at root what I have presented is not a scientific theory. I cannot prove the impact of the environment or the relation of human beings to it. I do not pretend to be able to give strict answers to the many questions that. confront anthropologists, ethnologists, and historians. I have put forward a simple hypothesis. But all hypotheses include a great deal of intuition and belief. Conversely, all beliefs finally express themselves in hypotheses which will be more or less strict and more or less daring, but which we have to take into account if we are to get the complete picture of an epoch. I would say in fact that this relation of human beings to their environment and these changes of environment do form part of what I believe. And if some disappointed readers are tempted to say: "And is this all that Jacques Ellul believes?" I would reply that what is at issue here is evaluating the danger of what might happen to our humanity in the present half-century, and distinguishing between what we want to keep and what we are ready to lose, between what we can welcome as legitimate human development and what we should reject with our last ounce of strength as dehumanization. I cannot think that choices of this kind are unimportant. What I believe with this theory of three environments has to do very definitely with the need to formulate what kind of humanity we want and what kind we repudiate. The relevance of this aspect of what I believe is by no means negligible.

**The inclusion of the plan makes the alt impossible—it deploys a technological structure that can’t be questioned and the first decision is key**

**WINNER 1989** (Prof of Poli Sci at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, The Whale and the Reactor)

The things we call "technologies" are ways of building order in our world. Many technical devices and systems important in everyday life contain possibilities for many different ways of ordering human activity. Consciously or unconsciously, deliberately or inadvertently, societies choose structures for technologies that influence how people are going to work, communicate, travel, consume, and so forth over a very long time. In the processes by which structuring decisions are made, different people are situated differently and possess unequal degrees of power as well as unequal levels of awareness. By far the greatest latitude of choice exists the very first time a particular instrument, system, or technique is introduced. Because choices tend to become strongly fixed in material equipment, economic investment, and social habit, the original flexibility vanishes for all practical purposes once the initial commitments are made. In that sense **technological innovations are similar to legislative acts** or political foundings that establish a framework for public order that will endure over many generations. For that reason the same careful attention one would give to the rules, roles, and relationships of politics must also be given to such things as the building of highways, the creation of television networks, and the tailoring of seemingly insignificant features on new machines. The issues that divide or unite people in society are settled not only in the institutions and practices of politics proper, but also, and less obviously, in tangible arrangements of steel and concrete, wires and semiconductors, nuts and bolts.

### 2NC Perm Block

The permutation literally cannot function – the alternative was a process of criticism – you cannot simultaneous do the plan and criticize it – even if you did that would be a reason to vote negative because its not an affirmative of the resolution

If the permutation works – then it severs – voting issue

**Concern for efficiency can’t be combined with our critique—technological thought will overrun our concern for political change no matter how good the aff’s intentions are**

**WINNER 1989** (Prof of Poli Sci at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, The Whale and the Reactor)

Even those who held unorthodox viewpoints in this debate found it necessary to uphold the supreme importance of this criterion. Thus, Amory B. Lovins, a leading proponent ofsoft energy paths, wrote of his method: "While not under the illusion that facts are separable from values, I have tried ... to separate my personal preferences from my analytic assumptions and to rely not on modes of discourse that might be viewed as overtly ideological, but rather on classicial arguments of economic and engineering efficiency (which are only tacitly ideological)." 16 To Lovins's credit, he consistently argued that the social consequences of energy choices were, in the last analysis, the most important aspect of energy policy making. In his widely read Soft Energy Paths, Lovins called attention to "centrism, vulnerability, technocracy, repression, alienation" and other grave problems that·afflict conventional energy solutions. Lovins compares "two energy paths that are distinguished by their antithetical social implications." He notes that basing energy decisions on social criteria may appear to involve a "heroic decision," that is, "doing something the more expensive way because it is desirable on other more important grounds than internal cost." But Lovins is careful not to appeal to his readers' sense of courage or altruism. "Surprisingly," he writes, "a heroic deci- sion does not seem to be necessary in this case, because the energy system that seems socially more attractive is also cheaper and easier." 17 But what if the analysis had shown the contrary?

Would Lovins have been prepared to give up the social advantages believed to exist along the soft energy path? Would he have accepted "centrism, vulnerability, technocracy, repression, alienation," and the like? Here Lovins yielded ground that in recent history has again and again been abandoned as lost territory. It raises the question of whether even the best intentioned, best qualified analysts in technological decision making are anything more than mere efficiency worshippers. Much the same strategy often appears in the arguments of those who favor democratic self-management, decentralization, and human-scale technology. As Paul Goodman once noted, "Now, if lecturing at a college, I happen to mention that some function of society which is highly centralized could be much decentralized without loss of efficiency, or perhaps with a gain in efficiency, at once the students want to talk about nothing else." 18 That approach is, indeed, one way of catching people's attention; if you can get away with it, it is certainly a most convincing kind of argument. Because the idea ofefficiency attracts a wide consensus, it is sometimes used as a conceptual Trojan horse by those who have more challenging political agendas they hope to smuggle in. But victories won in this way are in other respects great losses. For they affirm in our words and in our methodologies that there are certain human ends that no longer dare be spoken in public. Lingering in that stuffy Trojan horse too long, even soldiers of virtue eventually suffocate.