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#### Interpretation - signature strikes are distinct – the target is not identified beforehand and it’s a part of a different military strategy

**Anderson 11** (Kenneth, Professor at Washington College of Law, American University, Hoover Institution visiting fellow, member of Hoover Task Force on National Security and Law; nonresident senior fellow, Brookings Institution, 8-29-11, “Distinguishing High Value Targeted Killing and “Signature” Attacks on Taliban Fighters,” http://www.volokh.com/2011/08/29/distinguishing-high-value-targeted-killing-and-signature-attacks-on-taliban-fighters/)

From the US standpoint, it is partly that it does not depend as much as it did on Pakistan’s intelligence. But it is also partly, as a couple of well-publicized incidents a few months ago made clear, that sharing targeting decisions with Pakistan’s military and ISI runs a very considerable possibility of having the targets tipped off (as even The Onion has observed). The article notes in this regard, the U.S. worries that “if they tell the Pakistanis that a drone strike is coming someone within Pakistani intelligence could tip off the intended target.” However, the Journal’s reporting goes from there to emphasize an aspect of targeted killing and drone warfare that is not sufficiently appreciated in public discussions trying to assess such issues as civilian collateral damage, strategic value and uses, and the uses of drones in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency as distinct activities. The article explains: The CIA carries out two different types of drone strikes in the tribal areas of Pakistan—those against so-called high-value targets, including Mr. Rahman, and “signature” strikes targeting Taliban foot-soldiers who criss-cross the border with Afghanistan to fight U.S. forces there. High-value targets are added to a classified list that the CIA maintains and updates. The agency often doesn’t know the names of the signature targets, but it tracks their movements and activities for hours or days before striking them, U.S. officials say. Another way to put this is that, loosely speaking, the high value targets are part of a counterterrorism campaign – a worldwide one, reaching these days to Yemen and other places. It is targeted killing in its strict sense using drones – aimed at a distinct individual who has been identified by intelligence. The “signature” strikes, by contrast, are not strictly speaking “targeted killing,” because they are aimed at larger numbers of fighters who are targeted on the basis of being combatants, but not on the basis of individuated intelligence. They are fighting formations, being targeted on a mass basis as part of the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan, as part of the basic CI doctrine of closing down cross-border safe havens and border interdiction of fighters. Both of these functions can be, and are, carried out by drones – though each strategic function could be carried out by other means, such as SEAL 6 or CIA human teams, in the case of targeted killing, or manned aircraft in the case of attacks on Taliban formations. The fundamental point is that they serve distinct strategic purposes. Targeted killing is not synonymous with drone warfare, just as counterterrorism is analytically distinct from counterinsurgency. (I discuss this in the opening sections of this [draft chapter on SSRN](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1812124).) This analytic point affects how one sees the levels of drone attacks going up or down over the years. Neither the total numbers of fighters killed nor the total number of drone strikes – going up or down over months – tells the whole story. Total numbers do not distinguish between the high value targets, being targeted as part of the top down dismantling of Al Qaeda as a transnational terrorist organization, on the one hand, and ordinary Taliban being killed in much larger numbers as part of counterinsurgency activities essentially part of the ground war in Afghanistan, on the other. Yet the distinction is crucial insofar as the two activities are, at the level of truly grand strategy, in support of each other – the war in Afghanistan and the global counterterrorism war both in support of the AUMF and US national security broadly – but at the level of ordinary strategic concerns, quite distinct in their requirements and conduct. If targeted killing against AQ leadership goes well in Pakistan, those might diminish at some point in the future; what happens in the war against the Afghan Taliban is distinct and has its own rhythm, and in that effort, drones are simply another form of air weapon, an alternative to manned aircraft in an overt, conventional war. Rising or falling numbers of drone strikes in the aggregate will not tell one very much without knowing what mission is at issue. Moreover, to the extent that one can have confidence in counts of civilian casualties (though there is a convergence on accepting that drone warfare is gradually producing far lower civilian casualty counts than alternative means), it is still crucial to distinguish between the two types of strategic uses of drones. Totals that run the two activities together are not analytically very useful. Moreover, there is some reason to believe that the kind of targeting that might produce the most civilian casualties is, under some circumstances (and perhaps counterintuitively) targeting a single, individual terrorist leader, rather than a larger group of fighters. The reason is that a terrorist leader in Al Qaeda might well deliberately surround himself with many women and children all the time, as human shields, thus raising at least the possibility of greater civilian harm, should political authorities decide that a strike is warranted despite the civilian presence. The Taliban formation might consist of more fighters, but fewer civilians. These are analytic possibilities; the publicly available data does not seem to me sufficiently robust to draw strong conclusions about the kind of activity and civilian casualties. My point is an analytic one – one has not said very much about drone warfare without disentangling the distinct strategic uses to which the weapon is put.

**This is best –**

#### a). Limits – signature strikes and targeted killings are distinct operations with entirely separate lit bases and advantages---they kill precision and limits

**Anderson 11** (Kenneth Anderson 11, Professor at Washington College of Law, American University, Hoover Institution visiting fellow, Non-Resident Visiting Fellow at Brookings, “Efficiency in Bello and ad Bellum: Targeted Killing Through Drone Warfare,” Sept 23 2011, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=1812124)

Although targeted killing and drone warfare are often closely connected, they are not the same and are not always associated with each other. We need to **disaggregate** the **practices** of targeted killing from the **technologies** of drone warfare.¶ Targeted killing consists of using deadly force, characterized by the identification of and then strike against an individual marked to be killed. **It is distinguished**, among other things, by making an **individualized determination** of a person to be killed, **rather than simply identifying**, for example, **a mass of enemy combatants** to attack as a whole. Since it is a practice that involves the determination of an identified person, rather than a mass of armed and obvious combatants, it is a use of force that is by its function integrated with intelligence work, whether the intelligence actors involved are uniformed military or a civilian agency such as the CIA.¶ Targeted killing might (and does) take place in the course of conventional warfare, through special operations or other mechanisms that narrowly focus operations through intelligence. But it might also take place outside of a conventional conflict, or perhaps far from the conventional battlefields of that conflict, sufficiently so operationally to best be understood as **its own operational category of the use of force** – “intelligence-driven,” often covert, and sometimes non-military intelligence agency use of force, typically aimed at “high value” targets in global counterterrorism operations. It might be covert or it might not – but it will be driven by intelligence, because of necessity it must identify and justify the choice of target (on operational, because resources are limited; or legal grounds; or, in practice, both).¶ Targeted killing might use a variety of tactical methods by which to carry out the attack. The method might be by drones firing missiles – the focus of discussion here. But targeted killing – assassination, generically – is a very old method for using force and drones are new. Targeted killing in current military and CIA doctrine might, and often does, take place with covert civilian intelligence agents or military special operations forces – a human team carrying out the attack, rather than a drone aircraft operated from a distance. The Bin Laden raid exemplifies the human team-conducted targeted killing, of course, and in today’s tactical environment, the US often uses combined operations that have available both human teams and drones, to be deployed according to circumstances.¶ Targeted killing is thus a tactic that might be carried out either by drones or human teams. If there are two ways to do targeted killing, there are also two functions for the use of drones – **targeted** killing as part of an “intelligence-driven” discrete use of force, on the one hand, and a role (really, roles) in conventional warfare. Drones have a role in an **ever-increasing range of military operations that have no connection to “targeted killing**.” For many reasons ranging from cost-effectiveness to mission-effectiveness, drones are becoming more ramified in their uses in military operations, and will certainly become more so. This is true starting with their fundamental use in surveillance, but is also true when used as weapons platforms.¶ From the standpoint of conventional military operations and ordinary battlefields, drones are seen by the military as simply an **alternative air weapons platform**. One might use an over-the-horizon manned aircraft – or, depending on circumstances, one might instead use a drone as the weapons platform. It might be a missile launched from a drone by an operator, whether sitting in a vehicle near the fighting or farther away; it might be a weapon fired from a helicopter twenty miles away, but invisible to the fighters; it might be a missile fired from a US Navy vessel hundreds of miles away by personnel sitting at a console deep inside the ship. Future **air-to-air fighter aircraft systems** are very likely to be remotely piloted, in order to take advantage of superior maneuverability and greater stresses endurable without a human pilot. Remotely-piloted aircraft are the future of much military and, for that matter, civil aviation; this is a technological revolution that is taking place for reasons having less to do with military aviation than general changes in aviation technology.¶ Missiles fired from a remotely-piloted standoff platform present the same legal issues as any other weapons system – the law of war categories of necessity and proportionality in targeting. To military professionals, therefore, the emphasis placed on “remoteness” from violence of drone weapons operators, and presumed psychological differences in operators versus pilots, is misplaced and indeed mystifying. Navy personnel firing missiles from ships are typically just as remote from the fighting, and yet one does not hear complaints about their indifference to violence and their “Playstation,” push-button approach to war. Air Force pilots more often than not fire from remote aircraft; pilots involved in the bombing campaign over Serbia in the Kosovo war sometimes flew in bombers taking off from the United States; bomber crews dropped their loads from high altitudes, guided by computer, with little connection to the “battlefield” and little conception of what they – what their targeting computers - were aiming at. Some of the crews in interviews described spending the flights of many hours at a time, flying from the Midwest and back, as a good chance to study for graduate school classes they were taking – not Playstation, but study hall. In many respects, the development of new sensor technologies make the pilots, targeters, and the now-extensive staff involved in a decision to fire a weapon from a drone far more aware of what is taking place at the target than other forms of remote targeting, from Navy ships or high altitude bombing.¶ Very few of the actors on a technologically advanced battlefield are personally present in a way that makes the destruction and killing truly personal – and that is part of the point. Fighting up close and personal, on the critics’ psychological theories, seems to mean that it has greater significance to the actors and therefore leads to greater restraint. That is extremely unlikely and contrary to the experience of US warfighters. Lawful kinetic violence is more likely to increase when force protection is an issue, and overuse of force is more likely to increase when forces are under personal pressure and risk. The US military has known since Vietnam at least that increased safety for fighting personnel allows them greater latitude in using force, encourages and permits greater willingness to consider the least damaging alternatives, and that putting violence at a remove reduces the passions and fears of war and allows a coolly professional consideration of what kinds, and how much, violence is required to accomplish a lawful military mission. Remote weapon systems, whether robotic or simply missiles launched from a safe distance, in US doctrine are more than just a means for reducing risk to forces – they are an integral part of the means of allowing more time to consider less-harmful alternatives.¶ This is an important point, given that drones today are being used for tasks that involve much greater uses of force than individualized targeted killing. Drones are used today, and with increasing frequency, to kill whole masses of enemy columns of Taliban fighters on the Pakistan border – in a way that would otherwise be carried out by manned attack aircraft. **This is not targeted killing; this is conventional war operations**. It is most easily framed in terms of the abstract strategic division of counterinsurgency from counterterrorism (though in practice the two are not so distinct as all that). In particular, drones are being deployed in the AfPak conflict as a counterinsurgency means of going after Taliban in their safe haven camps on the Pakistan side of the border. A fundamental tenet of counterinsurgency is that the safe havens have to be ended, and this has meant targeting much larger contingents of Taliban fighters than previously understood in the “targeted killing” deployment. This could be – and in some circumstances today is – being done by the military; it is also done by the CIA under orders of the President partly because of purely political concerns; much of it today seems to be a combined operation of military and CIA.¶ Whoever conducts it and whatever legal issues it might raise, the point is that this activity is fundamentally counterinsurgency. The fighters are targeted in much larger numbers in the camps than would be the case in “targeted killing,” and this is a good instance of how **targeted killing and drone warfare need to be differentiated**. The targets are not individuated, either in the act of targeting or in the decision of who and where to target: this is simply an **alternative air platform** for doing what might otherwise be done with helicopters, fixed wing aircraft, or ground attack, in the course of conventional counterinsurgency operations. But it also means that the numbers killed in such operations are **much larger**, and consist often of **ordinary fighters** who would otherwise pile into trucks and cross back into Afghanistan, **rather than individualized “high value” targets**, whether Taliban or Al Qaeda.

#### b). Ground – neg links are strategies are prepared against the specific concept of targeted killing – they can skirt links to core strategies.

#### T is a voting issue for fairness.

### 1NC Politics DA

#### CIR will pass now, but pressure is key – the window is closing

**NBC Latino 11/08**/ “Forecast on immigration reform? It’s getting murkier and time’s running out,” **11/08**/2013, http://nbclatino.com/2013/11/08/forecast-on-immigration-reform-its-getting-murkier-and-times-running-out/

Arizona Republican Sen. Jeff Flake told his hometown paper there’s a good shot of a[breakthrough](http://www.azcentral.com/news/politics/articles/20131030flake-house-immigration-breakthrough-possible.html) on [immigration](http://nbclatino.com/2013/11/11/immigration-advocates-press-on-despite-house-gop-no-3-nixing-legislation-for-the-year/) this year. Michigan GOP Rep. Fred Upton told a local crowd some 120 to 140 Republicans back immigration reform, according to a [local website.](http://www.mlive.com/news/kalamazoo/index.ssf/2013/11/congressman_fred_upton_says_he.html) But then, Texas Republican Mike McCaul [told a conservative talk show host](http://www.lauraingraham.com/pg/jsp/charts/streamingAudioMaster.jsp;jsessionid=DD71C5747AD70CED1244B815C2ECE3ED?dispid=302&headerDest=L3BnL2pzcC9tZWRpYS9mbGFzaHdlbGNvbWUuanNwP3BpZD0xNjUxNQ==) last week he opposed going to a conference committee on immigration and Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart [said to the Washington Post](http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2013/11/07/immigration-reform-is-dead-for-the-year-top-gop-reformer-says/), immigration isn’t going to happen this year. There have been efforts to crystal ball the future of immigration reform and more specifically what the House plans to do this year or next. What’s becoming clear is that there’s once again a split in the GOP, some of it fed by the upcoming 2014 elections, that the House leadership must navigate to a resolution that satisfies most of its rank-and-file. Speaking at a National Journal [forum](http://www.nationaljournal.com/events/the-next-america-pathways-to-success-20131107) Thursday, Sen. Bob Menendez, D-N.J., said the window for passing immigration reform is open until March. Election filing ends that month for a majority of GOP members. When filing is done for them, they’ll know whether they have primary challengers. Those who don’t get primary challengers or ones that make the race very competitive would “feel more liberated to do right by the nation,” Menendez said. “But we continue to press for a vote this year ,” he said. Clashes within the House GOP – between moderates and conservatives – have been seen on other issues, most recently, in the [debate over Obamacare](http://nbclatino.com/2013/10/01/government-officially-in-shutdown-no-deal-in-congress/) that led to shutting down the government and edging very close to defaulting on the nation’s debt. Republicans are also getting pressure from their backers and donors \_ business, evangelicals, law enforcement and agricultural interests \_ to move immigration along. Hundreds of those GOP loyalists [descended on Washington](http://nbclatino.com/2013/10/29/conservatives-press-house-to-advance-immigration-reform/) last week to cajole GOP members on immigration. “I think the House is probably torn,” said Sen. Lindsey Graham, who helped craft the Senate’s sweeping, bipartisan immigration reform bill. “There are some in the House who want to do a piecemeal approach, which is fine with me, and there are some who just don’t want to deal with the issue. “I don’t know what’s going to happen, but from the country’s point of view our immigration system is hopelessly broken, from the party’s point of view, I think this issue hurts us,” said Graham, R-S.C. Alberto Cardenas, chairman of the American Conservative Union, said reports he got from the conservatives who met with House GOP members have left him believing immigration reform would be done, if not by the end of this year then by early next year, though he said it may not include legalization. Rep. Flake told the Arizona Republic he thought the push from conservatives helped shift momentum on the issue. He suggested the House would only offer those in the country illegally the chance for citizenship through existing pathways of sponsorship from relatives, spouses or employers. House Judiciary Chairman Bob Goodlatte, R-Va., [floated that possibility](http://nbclatino.com/2013/09/19/house-republican-leader-lays-out-citizenship-possibility-for-immigrants/) in September. “I don’t want be seen as trying to tell the House what to do. They are moving a process and have a number of people working on it and I spoke to one of them today (Tuesday). I’m pretty confident they are going to get something on the floor,” Flake told NBC Latino this week. But many in the GOP ranks feel stung by the outcome of last month’s Obamacare-debt ceiling fight. They’ve emerged from the fight unwilling to negotiate with Democrats, saying they no longer trust President Barack Obama or his motives on immigration. House Homeland Security Committee Chairman Mike McCaul said last week he told Boehner he does not want to go to a House-Senate conference committee on the border security bill passed by his committee and included by House Democrats in the comprehensive immigration bill they introduced last month. He told conservative talk show host Laura Ingraham he refused an invitation to a White House meeting because “I saw it as a political trap.” “I’ve been trying to get that border secure for the entire time I have been up here … but I am not going to go down the road of conferencing with the Senate (comprehensive) bill and I told Boehner he needs to stand up and make that very clear … We are not going to conference with the Senate, period,” McCaul said. Others in the GOP see their political survival as dependent on getting immigration reform done in time for 2014 elections when all House members are up for re-election. Some have heavy Hispanic districts with sufficient voters to tilt their elections. Recognizing that,[Reps. Jeff Denham](http://denham.house.gov/) and [David Valadao](http://valadao.house.gov/), R-Calif. and Rep. [Ileana Ros-Lehtinen](http://ros-lehtinen.house.gov/), R-Fla., have signed on to the Democrats’ House immigration bill. Deham’s district is 40 percent Hispanic, Valadao’s is 72 percent and Ros-Lehtinen’s is 73 percent. Others are facing business owners, [farmers and ranchers](http://www.wga.com/blog/2013/10/29/nassif-and-immigration-reform-leaders-push-vote-dc), and evangelical leaders who need the reform to sustain their workforce or are dealing with immigrants in their congregations and communities. Fred Upton told a Rotary Club in his home state there are about 120 to 140 Republican votes in favor of immigration reform and he has backing from Boehner to try to get half the caucus to support reform, according to a report by the website MLive. He also said he expects to see some movement before Thanksgiving. Those Republicans deserve a chance to vote on immigration reform, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev., said. “I can’t understand what is going on in the House of Representatives. It’s basically a place where no one gets to vote except whom Boehner decides can vote. That isn’t the way the House of Representatives is meant to be,” Reid said Tuesday. “We have Republicans over there who are obsessed with spending. They could get a trillion dollars by passing immigration reform but they refuse to do that. I am so disappointed in how the House is being run,” he said. He addressed the stalled bill again on the [Senate floor](http://www.nbcnews.com/video/nbc-news/53488556/#53488556) Thursday. Diaz-Balart told the Washington Post that if immigration isn’t done by early next year “it flatlines.” House GOP members are ready to move on immigration but are waiting on their leadership, said Ali Noorani, executive director for [National Immigration Reform](http://www.immigrationforum.org/) which organized the conservatives’ lobbying.

#### A reduction in presidential war powers saps Obama’s PC

**Kriner 10** (Douglas L. Kriner, assistant professor of political science at Boston University, “After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War”, University of Chicago Press, Dec 1, 2010, page 68-69)

While congressional support leaves the president’s reserve of political capital intact, congressional criticism saps energy from other initiatives on the home front by forcing the president to expend energy and effort defending his international agenda. Political capital spent shoring up support for a president’s foreign policies is capital that is unavailable for his future policy initiatives . Moreover, any weakening in the president’s political clout may have immediate ramifications for his reelection prospects, as well as indirect consequences for congressional races.59 Indeed, Democratic efforts to tie congressional Republican incumbents to President George W. Bush and his war policies paid immediate political dividends in the 2006 midterms, particularly in states, districts, and counties that had suffered the highest casualty rates in the Iraq War. 60 In addition to boding ill for the president’s perceived political capital and reputation, such partisan losses in Congress only further imperil his programmatic agenda, both international and domestic. Scholars have long noted that President Lyndon Johnson’s dream of a Great Society also perished in the rice paddies of Vietnam. Lacking the requisite funds in a war-depleted treasury and the political capital needed to sustain his legislative vision, Johnson gradually let his domestic goals slip away as he hunkered down in an effort first to win and then to end the Vietnam War. In the same way, many of President Bush’s highest second-term domestic proprieties, such as Social Security and immigration reform, failed perhaps in large part because the administration had to expend so much energy and effort waging a rear-guard action against congressional critics of the war in Iraq.61 When making their cost-benefit calculations, presidents surely consider these wider political costs of congressional opposition to their military policies. If congressional opposition in the military arena stands to derail other elements of his agenda, all else being equal, the president will be more likely to judge the benefits of military action insufficient to its costs than if Congress stood behind him in the international arena.

#### Capital key to make Boehner allow a vote

**Sullivan, 10/24/13** (Sean, “John Boehner's next big test: Immigration” Washington Post Blogs, The Fix, lexis)

President Obama delivered remarks Thursday morning to renew his call for Congress to pass sweeping immigration reform. The prevailing sentiment in Washington is that it’s not going to happen this year, and may not even happen next year. But because of the last few weeks, it just might get done by early next year. It’s all up to House Speaker John A. Boehner (R-Ohio), who by political necessity, must now at least consider leaning in more on immigration. “Let’s see if we can get this done. And let’s see if we can get it done this year,” Obama said at the White House. Fresh off a decisive defeat in the budget and debt ceiling showdown that cost the GOP big and won the party no major policy concessions from Democrats, Boehner was asked Wednesday about whether he plans to bring up immigration legislation during the limited time left on the 2013 legislative calendar. He didn’t rule it out. “I still think immigration reform is an important subject that needs to be addressed. And I’m hopeful,” said Boehner. The big question is whether the speaker’s hopefulness spurs him to press the matter legislatively or whether the cast-iron conservative members who oppose even limited reforms will dissuade him and extinguish his cautiously optimistic if noncommittal outlook. Months ago, as House Republicans were slow-walking immigration after the Senate passed a broad bill, the latter possibility appeared the likelier bet. But times have changed. The position House Republicans adopted in the fiscal standoff badly damaged the party's brand. The GOP is reeling, searching desperately for a way to turn things around. That means Boehner, too, must look for ways to repair the damage. And that's where immigration comes in. Even before the government shutdown showdown, a vocal part of the GOP (think Sen. John McCain) had been talking up the urgent need to do immigration reform or risk further alienating Hispanic voters. Now, amid hard times for the party driven by deeper skepticism from Democrats, independents and even some Republicans following the fiscal standoff, the political imperative is arguably even stronger. The policy imperative already exists for some House Republicans -- perhaps enough of them that if Boehner allowed a vote, reform of some type could pass with a majority of House Democrats and a minority of House Republicans, as did last week's deal to end the government shutdown and raise the debt ceiling. (What specifically could pass and whether Obama could accept it is another question.) What's not clear is whether Boehner would be willing to chart a path with less than majority GOP support again so soon after the last time and without his back against the wall as it was in the fiscal standoff. This much we know: The White House and Senate Democrats will keep applying pressure on Boehner to act on immigration. Obama's planned remarks are the latest example of his plan. The speaker will be feeling external and internal pressure to move ahead on immigration. But he will also feel pressure from conservatives to oppose it. Here's the thing, though: Boehner listened to the right flank of his conference in the fiscal fight, and that path was politically destructive for his party. That's enough to believe he will at least entertain the possibility of tuning the hard-liners out a bit more this time around.

#### It’s key to the economy and US leadership

Javier **Palomarez**, Forbes, 3/6/**13**, The Pent Up Entrepreneurship That Immigration Reform Would Unleash, www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/03/06/the-pent-up-entrepreneurship-that-immigration-reform-would-unleash/print/

The main difference between now and 2007 is that today the role of immigrants and their many contributions to the American economy have been central in the country’s national conversation on the issue. Never before have Latinos been so central to the election of a U.S. President as in 2012. New evidence about the economic importance of immigration reform, coupled with the new political realities presented by the election, have given reform a higher likelihood of passing. As the President & CEO of the country’s largest Hispanic business association, the U.S. Hispanic Chamber of Commerce (USHCC), which advocates for the interests of over 3 million Hispanic owned businesses, I have noticed that nearly every meeting I hold with corporate leaders now involves a discussion of how and when immigration reform will pass. The USHCC has long seen comprehensive immigration reform as an economic imperative, and now the wider business community seems to be sharing our approach. It is no longer a question of whether it will pass. Out of countless conversations with business leaders in virtually every sector and every state, a consensus has emerged: our broken and outdated immigration system hinders our economy’s growth and puts America’s global leadership in jeopardy. Innovation drives the American economy, and without good ideas and skilled workers, our country won’t be able to transform industries or to lead world markets as effectively as it has done for decades. Consider some figures: Immigrant-owned firms generate an estimated $775 billion in annual revenue, $125 billion in payroll and about $100 billion in income. A study conducted by the New American Economy found that over 40 percent of Fortune 500 companies were started by immigrants or children of immigrants. Leading brands, like Google, Kohls, eBay, Pfizer, and AT&T, were founded by immigrants. Researchers at the Kauffman Foundation released a study late last year showing that from 2006 to 2012, one in four engineering and technology companies started in the U.S. had at least one foreign-born founder — in Silicon Valley it was almost half of new companies. There are an estimated 11 million undocumented workers currently in the U.S. Imagine what small business growth in the U.S. would look like if they were provided legal status, if they had an opportunity for citizenship. Without fear of deportation or prosecution, imagine the pent up entrepreneurship that could be unleashed. After all, these are people who are clearly entrepreneurial in spirit to have come here and risk all in the first place. Immigrants are twice as likely to start businesses as native-born Americans, and statistics show that most job growth comes from small businesses. While immigrants are both critically-important consumers and producers, they boost the economic well-being of native-born Americans as well. Scholars at the Brookings Institution recently described the relationship of these two groups of workers as complementary. This is because lower-skilled immigrants largely take farming and other manual, low-paid jobs that native-born workers don’t usually want. For example, when Alabama passed HB 56, an immigration law in 2012 aimed at forcing self-deportation, the state lost roughly $11 billion in economic productivity as crops were left to wither and jobs were lost. Immigration reform would also address another important angle in the debate – the need to entice high-skilled immigrants. Higher-skilled immigrants provide talent that high-tech companies often cannot locate domestically. High-tech leaders recently organized a nationwide “virtual march for immigration reform” to pressure policymakers to remove barriers that prevent them from recruiting the workers they need. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, fixing immigration makes sound fiscal sense. Economist Raul Hinojosa-Ojeda calculated in 2010 that comprehensive immigration reform would add $1.5 trillion to the country’s GDP over 10 years and add $66 billion in tax revenue – enough to fully fund the Small Business Administration and the Departments of the Treasury and Commerce for over two years. As Congress continues to wring its hands and debate the issue, lawmakers must understand what both businesses and workers already know: The American economy needs comprehensive immigration reform.

**Extinction**

**Auslin 9**

(Michael, Resident Scholar – American Enterprise Institute, and Desmond Lachman – Resident Fellow – American Enterprise Institute, “The Global Economy Unravels”, Forbes, 3-6, http://www.aei.org/article/100187)

What do these trends mean in the short and medium term? The Great Depression showed how social and **global chaos** followed hard on economic collapse. The mere fact that parliaments across the globe, from America to Japan, are unable to make responsible, economically sound recovery plans suggests that they do not know what to do and are simply hoping for the least disruption. Equally worrisome is the adoption of more statist economic programs around the globe, and the concurrent decline of trust in free-market systems. The threat of instability is a pressing concern. China, until last year the world's fastest growing economy, just reported that 20 million migrant laborers lost their jobs. Even in the flush times of recent years, China faced upward of 70,000 labor uprisings a year. A sustained downturn poses grave and possibly immediate threats to Chinese internal stability. The regime in Beijing may be faced with a choice of repressing its own people or diverting their energies outward, leading to conflict with China's neighbors. Russia, an oil state completely dependent on energy sales, has had to put down riots in its Far East as well as in downtown Moscow. Vladimir Putin's rule has been predicated on squeezing civil liberties while providing economic largesse. If that devil's bargain falls apart, then wide-scale repression inside Russia, along with a continuing threatening posture toward Russia's neighbors, is likely. Even apparently stable societies face increasing risk and the threat of internal or possibly external conflict. As Japan's exports have plummeted by nearly 50%, one-third of the country's prefectures have passed emergency economic stabilization plans. Hundreds of thousands of temporary employees hired during the first part of this decade are being laid off. Spain's unemployment rate is expected to climb to nearly 20% by the end of 2010; Spanish unions are already protesting the lack of jobs, and the specter of violence, as occurred in the 1980s, is haunting the country. Meanwhile, in Greece, workers have already taken to the streets. Europe as a whole will face dangerously increasing tensions between native citizens and immigrants, largely from poorer Muslim nations, who have increased the labor pool in the past several decades. Spain has absorbed five million immigrants since 1999, while nearly 9% of Germany's residents have foreign citizenship, including almost 2 million Turks. The xenophobic labor strikes in the U.K. do not bode well for the rest of Europe. A prolonged global downturn, let alone a collapse, would **dramatically raise tensions** inside these countries. Couple that with possible protectionist legislation in the United States, unresolved ethnic and territorial disputes in **all regions of the globe** and a loss of confidence that world leaders actually know what they are doing. The result may be a series of small explosions that coalesce **into a big bang**.

### 1NC CP

#### The Executive branch of the United States federal government

#### -should pass and enforce an executive order to restrict the Central Intelligence Agency’s Title 50 authority for targeted killing using remotely piloted aircraft systems and implement this by establishing independent commissions to review and ensure compliance with the order.

#### -The Executive branch should publicly articulate its legal rationale for its targeted killing policy, including the process and safeguards in place for target selection. The United States Congress should enact a resolution and issue a white paper stating that, in the conduct of its oversight it has reviewed ongoing targeted killing operations and determined that the United States government is conducting such operations in full compliance with relevant laws, including but not limited to the Authorization to Use Military Force of 2001, covert action findings, and the President’s inherent powers under the Constitution.

#### President should and can do the plan

**Zenko, 13** (Micah Zenko is the Douglas Dillon Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). He currently serves as vice chair of the World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council on Terrorism. Previously, he worked for five years at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, and in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service, and State Department's Office of Policy Planning. “Transferring CIA Drone Strikes to the Pentagon.” Date made April 16, 2013. Date retrieved August 14, 2013. http://www.cfr.org/drones/transferring-cia-drone-strikes-pentagon/p30434)

The president should direct that U.S. drone strikes be conducted as DOD Title 10 operations. That decision would enhance U.S. national security in the following ways:

Improve the transparency and legitimacy of targeted killings, including what methods are used to prevent civilian harm.

 Focus the finite resources of the CIA on its original core missions of intelligence collection, analysis, and early warning. (There is no reason for the CIA to maintain a redundant fleet of armed drones, or to conduct military operations that are inherently better suited to JSOC, the premier specialized military organization. As “traditional military activities” under U.S. law, these belong under Title 10 operations.)

 Place all drone strikes under a single international legal framework, which would be clearly delineated for military operations and can therefore be articulated publicly.

 Unify congressional oversight of specific operations under the armed services committee, which would end the current situation whereby there is confusion over who has oversight responsibility.

 Allow U.S. government officials to counter myths and misinformation about targeted killings at home and abroad by acknowledging responsibility for its own strikes.

 Increase pressure on other states to be more transparent in their own conduct of military and paramilitary operations in nonbattlefield settings by establishing the precedent that the Obama administration claims can have a normative influence on how others use drones.

#### Solves---the combination of executive disclosure and Congressional support boosts accountability and legitimacy

Gregory **McNeal 13**, Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University, 3/5/13, “Targeted Killing and Accountability,” <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1819583>

Perhaps the most obvious way to add accountability to the targeted killing process is for someone in government to describe the process the way this article has, and from there, defend the process. The task of describing the government’s policies in detail should not fall to anonymous sources, confidential interviews, and selective leaks. Government’s failure to defend policies is not a phenomenon that is unique to post 9/11 targeted killings. In fact, James Baker once noted "In my experience, the United States does a better job at incorporating intelligence into its targeting decisions than it does in using intelligence to explain those decisions after the fact. This in part reflects the inherent difficulty in articulating a basis for targets derived from ongoing intelligence sources and methods. Moreover, it is hard to pause during ongoing operations to work through issues of disclosure…But articulation is an important part of the targeting process that must be incorporated into the decision cycle for that subset of targets raising the hardest issues…"519 Publicly defending the process is a natural fit for public accountability mechanisms. It provides information to voters and other external actors who can choose to exercise a degree of control over the process. However, a detailed public defense of the process also bolsters bureaucratic and professional accountability by demonstrating to those within government that they are involved in activities that their government is willing to publicly describe and defend (subject to the limits of necessary national security secrecy). However, the Executive branch, while wanting to reveal information to defend the process, similarly recognizes that by revealing too much information they may face legal accountability mechanisms that they may be unable to control, thus their caution is understandable (albeit self-serving).520 It’s not just the Executive branch that can benefit from a healthier defense of the process. Congress too can bolster the legitimacy of the program by specifying how they have conducted their oversight activities. The best mechanism by which they can do this is through a white paper. That paper could include: A statement about why the committees believe the U.S. government's use of force is lawful. If the U.S. government is employing armed force it's likely that it is only doing so pursuant to the AUMF, a covert action finding, or relying on the President's inherent powers under the Constitution. Congress could clear up a substantial amount of ambiguity by specifying that in the conduct of its oversight it has reviewed past and ongoing targeted killing operations and is satisfied that in the conduct of its operations the U.S. government is acting consistent with those sources of law. Moreover, Congress could also specify certain legal red lines that if crossed would cause members to cease believing the program was lawful. For example, if members do not believe the President may engage in targeted killings acting only pursuant to his Article II powers, they could say so in this white paper, and also articulate what the consequences of crossing that red line might be. To bolster their credibility, Congress could specifically articulate their powers and how they would exercise them if they believed the program was being conducted in an unlawful manner. Perhaps stating: "The undersigned members affirm that if the President were to conduct operations not authorized by the AUMF or a covert action finding, we would consider that action to be unlawful and would publicly withdraw our support for the program, and terminate funding for it." A statement detailing the breadth and depth of Congressional oversight activities. When Senator Feinstein released her statement regarding the nature and degree of Senate Intelligence Committee oversight of targeted killing operations it went a long way toward bolstering the argument that the program was being conducted in a responsible and lawful manner. An oversight white paper could add more details about the oversight being conducted by the intelligence and armed services committees, explaining in as much detail as possible the formal and informal activities that have been conducted by the relevant committees. How many briefings have members attended? Have members reviewed targeting criteria? Have members had an opportunity to question the robustness of the internal kill-list creation process and target vetting and validation processes? Have members been briefed on and had an opportunity to question how civilian casualties are counted and how battle damage assessments are conducted? Have members been informed of the internal disciplinary procedures for the DoD and CIA in the event a strike goes awry, and have they been informed of whether any individuals have been disciplined for improper targeting? Are the members satisfied that internal disciplinary procedures are adequate? 3) Congressional assessment of the foreign relations implications of the program. The Constitution divides some foreign policy powers between the President and Congress, and the oversight white paper should articulate whether members have assessed the diplomatic and foreign relations implications of the targeted killing program. While the white paper would likely not be able to address sensitive diplomatic matters such as whether Pakistan has privately consented to the use of force in their territory, the white paper could set forth the red lines that would cause Congress to withdraw support for the program. The white paper could specifically address whether the members have considered potential blow-back, whether the program has jeopardized alliances, whether it is creating more terrorists than it kills, etc. In specifying each of these and other factors, Congress could note the types of developments, that if witnessed would cause them to withdraw support for the program. For example, Congress could state "In the countries where strikes are conducted, we have not seen the types of formal objections to the activities that would normally be associated with a violation of state's sovereignty. Specifically, no nation has formally asked that the issue of strikes in their territory be added to the Security Council's agenda for resolution. No nation has shot down or threatened to shoot down our aircraft, severed diplomatic relations, expelled our personnel from their country, or refused foreign aid. If we were to witness such actions it would cause us to question the wisdom and perhaps even the legality of the program."

#### CP shields the link to politics

**Sovacool 9** Dr. Benjamin K. Sovacool 2009 is a Research Fellow in the Energy Governance Program at the Centre on Asia and Globalization., Kelly E. Sovacool is a Senior Research Associate at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of SingaporeArticle: Preventing National Electricity-Water Crisis Areas in the United States, Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 2009 34 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 333

¶ Executive Orders also save time in a second sense. The President does not have to expend scarce political capital trying to persuade Congress to adopt his or her proposal. Executive Orders thus save ¶ ¶ presidential attention for other topics. Executive Orders bypass congressional debate and opposition, along with all of the horsetrading and compromise such legislative activity entails.¶ ¶ 292¶ ¶ Speediness of implementation can be especially important when challenges require rapid and decisive action. After the September ¶ ¶ 11, 2001 attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center, for ¶ ¶ instance, the Bush Administration almost immediately passed ¶ ¶ Executive Orders forcing airlines to reinforce cockpit doors and ¶ ¶ freezing the U.S. based assets of individuals and organizations ¶ ¶ involved with terrorist groups.¶ ¶ 293¶ ¶ These actions took Congress ¶ ¶ nearly four months to debate and subsequently endorse with ¶ ¶ legislation. Executive Orders therefore enable presidents to ¶ ¶ rapidly change law without having to wait for congressional action ¶ ¶ or agency regulatory rulemaking.

### 1NC Solvency

#### Intelligence high – and CIA isn’t the only game in town DOD intelligence solves

Cheryl Pellerin, 2011 Officials: Defense-Intelligence Integration Strongest Since 9/11 http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=65279

By American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Sept. 8, 2011 – The 9/11 attacks on the U.S. homeland forged a bond between the Defense Department and national-mission intelligence agencies that has never been stronger and that grows with each new challenge, defense officials said in the days before the tragedy’s 10th anniversary.¶ “The biggest change in intelligence capabilities since 9/11 has occurred within intelligence organizations … and not across them,” Michael G. Vickers, undersecretary of defense for intelligence, told American Forces Press Service.¶ “Improved intelligence is more about focus, priorities, additional capacity and new capabilities,” he added.¶ Four of the five big national intelligence agencies are part of the Defense Department, Vickers said. These are the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and the National Reconnaissance Office.¶ The CIA is an independent agency whose primary customer is the president of the United States.¶ The need for improvement among intelligence agencies was addressed in the 2004 report of the National Commission of the Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, called the 9/11 Commission.¶ According to the report, legal, policy and cultural barriers among federal agencies, including intelligence agencies, seriously impeded the kind of information sharing that might have disrupted the 9/11 attacks.¶ This month, in a “Tenth Anniversary Report Card” to the nation on how commission recommendations have been implemented, 9/11 Commission Chairman Thomas Kean and Vice Chairman Lee H. Hamilton said key intelligence community relationships seem to be improving and moving in a constructive direction.¶ “Information sharing within the federal government and among federal, state, local authorities and with allies, while not perfect,” the report authors said, “has considerably improved since 9/11.”¶ Part of the improvement results from an intelligence budget that has risen to more than $80 billion, more than double what was spent in 2001, they added, and federal, state and local authorities investigate leads and share information in 72 fusion centers and 105 joint terrorism task forces.¶ “The FBI, CIA and the broader intelligence community have implemented significant reforms,” they said, “disrupting many plots and bringing to justice many terrorist operatives.”¶ In response to commission recommendations and to unify and focus the community, in 2004 Congress created the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, which assumed many functions of the positions of director and deputy director of Central Intelligence.¶ At the same time, Congress created the National Counterterrorism Center, part of the ODNI, with experts from the CIA, FBI, Defense Department and other agencies.¶ Creation of the Office of the ODNI and DNI “lets the CIA director focus on the core business of running the CIA and its many activities and operations,” Vickers said.¶ The ODNI has provided more depth on such jobs as oversight of intelligence resources, he added, noting that managing the intelligence community was one of three jobs for the former director of central intelligence.¶ But new positions and centers do not drive the depth of integration occurring among DOD and national-mission intelligence agencies, he said.¶ Today, many “intelligence agencies are embedded in each other’s organizations,” Vickers said, “ … and a lot of the integration has been horizontal and driven by mission and not imposed top down” by the DNI.¶ “The analytical community had generally been pretty integrated,” Vickers said, adding that there has been much more integration among those who perform operational intelligence functions.¶ “So [signals intelligence] and [geospatial intelligence] and others are embedded in each other’s organizations, we have more CIA representatives around in the commands, and there’s just a lot more organizational integration than there’s been in the past,” Vickers added, noting that he speaks daily with the CIA acting director and the permanent deputy director.¶ These organizations, the undersecretary said, “have common cause like they’ve never had before and they need each other’s capabilities to get the job done.”¶ In Vickers’ current position, he said among his top priorities are “to make sure we have even tighter integration between defense and national intelligence and between our special operations forces and intelligence, as demonstrated by the bin Laden raid.”¶ In the face of declining budgets, the undersecretary added, the intelligence community must maximize its capabilities.

#### Can’t solve- DOD is secret and doesn’t set framework

Fred Kaplan, 13- “The Drones Are in the Details”. Edward R. Murrow press fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.slate.com/articles/news\_and\_politics/war\_stories/2013/03/john\_brennan\_wants\_the\_pentagon\_to\_take\_command\_of\_the\_cia\_s\_drone\_strike.html

However, there are two ways around these strictures. First, there have been occasions when presidents—including President Obama—have simply (and legally) declared that certain members of the armed forces are, for the moment, acting under Title 50. Most notably, when Navy SEALs raided Osama Bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan, they were declared to be under CIA command. Therefore, they did not need the Pakistanis’ permission to cross the border. The same abracadabra could be recited for drone operators. Or maybe the president wouldn’t even have to go that far. SEALs, like Delta Force and other “shadow” forces, are part of the Joint Special Operations Command. JSOC is part of the armed forces; it therefore falls under Title 10. However, under an executive order signed by President George W. Bush (and still in effect), it has authority to conduct secret operations against al-Qaida and affiliated terrorist networks worldwide. So, if control of drone strikes is shifted from the CIA to the military and the military decides to assign the mission to JSOC, the strikes might be as frequent and far-flung as ever—maybe even more so, since Bush’s executive order allows JSOC to conduct its operations without consulting or notifying Congress. (By contrast, under Title 50, the CIA has to tell the congressional intelligence committees about its covert operations.)

#### Title 50 solves better

Josh Kuyers, 13- “CIA or DoD: Clarifying the Legal Framework Applicable to the Drone Authority Debate”. Law Fellow at Public International Law & Policy Group. National University Law Brief. American University Washington College of Law. http://nationalsecuritylawbrief.com/2013/04/04/cia-or-dod-clarifying-the-legal-framework-applicable-to-the-drone-authority-debate/

Overall, Title 50 oversight may actually be more stringent, though less transparent, than Title 10 oversight. Drone operations classified as covert actions –whether undertaken by the CIA or the DoD- are subject to both a presidential finding and congressional notification requirement. Section 413(b) of Title 50 of the U.S. Code requires the President to keep the congressional intelligence committees “fully and currently informed” of all ongoing covert actions. It also requires the President to report his presidential finding to the intelligence committees “as soon as possible after such approval and before the initiation of the covert action.” However, in “extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States,” this prior notification requirement can be limited to the so-called “Gang of Eight.” Although in these extreme cases the prior notification requirement is limited, it is important to note that, at least under the statutory authority, the President simply cannot refuse to notify Congress.

#### DOD drones remain covert

Josh Kuyers, 13- “CIA or DoD: Clarifying the Legal Framework Applicable to the Drone Authority Debate”. Law Fellow at Public International Law & Policy Group. National University Law Brief. American University Washington College of Law. http://nationalsecuritylawbrief.com/2013/04/04/cia-or-dod-clarifying-the-legal-framework-applicable-to-the-drone-authority-debate/

However, there are multiple scenarios in which DoD drone operations would not fall under Title 10 oversight. Given the conjunctive, three-part test defining a traditional military activity, drone operations 1) outside the context of ongoing hostilities, 2) under CIA command and control, or 3) not acknowledged publicly, would not be considered traditional military activities, regardless of whether military personnel piloted the drone and pulled the trigger. Therefore, the Obama Administrations’ impending decision to move drone operations from the CIA to the DoD may have several loopholes. Indeed, these operations would likely be considered “covert actions” and held accountable to Title 50 oversight and accountability. A covert action is “an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.”

### 1NC Terrorism

#### There is no terror threat – the leadership has been destroyed and they are discouraged from attacking

**Zenko and Cohen 12**

\*Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, \*Fellow at the Century Foundation, (Micah and Michael, "Clear and Present Safety," March/April, Foreign Affairs, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137279/micah-zenko-and-michael-a-cohen/clear-and-present-safety

NONE OF this is meant to suggest that the United States faces no major challenges today. Rather, the point is that the problems confronting the country are manageable and pose minimal risks to the lives of the overwhelming majority of Americans. None of them -- separately or in combination -- justifies the alarmist rhetoric of policymakers and politicians or should lead to the conclusion that Americans live in a dangerous world.¶ Take terrorism. Since 9/11, no security threat has been hyped more. Considering the horrors of that day, that is not surprising. But the result has been a level of fear that is completely out of proportion to both the capabilities of terrorist organizations and the United States' vulnerability. On 9/11, al Qaeda got tragically lucky. Since then, the United States has been preparing for the one percent chance (and likely even less) that it might get lucky again. But al Qaeda lost its safe haven after the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, and further military, diplomatic, intelligence, and law enforcement efforts have decimated the organization, which has essentially lost whatever ability it once had to seriously threaten the United States.¶ According to U.S. officials, al Qaeda's leadership has been reduced to two top lieutenants: Ayman al-Zawahiri and his second-in-command, Abu Yahya al-Libi. Panetta has even said that the defeat of al Qaeda is "within reach." The near collapse of the original al Qaeda organization is one reason why, in the decade since 9/11, the U.S. homeland has not suffered any large-scale terrorist assaults. All subsequent attempts have failed or been thwarted, owing in part to the incompetence of their perpetrators. Although there are undoubtedly still some terrorists who wish to kill Americans, their dreams will likely continue to be frustrated by their own limitations and by the intelligence and law enforcement agencies of the United States and its allies.

#### No nuclear terror - even if terrorists have fissile material, they can’t build the bomb and transport it

Mueller 2012 (John, Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science, both at Ohio State University, and Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute. Mark G. Stewart is Australian Research Council Professorial Fellow and Professor and Director at the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at the University of Newcastle in Australia, The Terrorism Delusion, *International Security*, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Summer 2012), pp. 81–110)

Over the course of time, such essentially delusionary thinking has been internalized and institutionalized in a great many ways. For example, an extrapolation of delusionary proportions is evident in the common observation that, because terrorists were able, mostly by thuggish means, to crash airplanes into buildings, they might therefore be able to construct a nuclear bomb. In 2005 an FBI report found that, despite years of well-funded sleuthing, the Bureau had yet to uncover a single true al-Qaida sleeper cell in the United States. The report was secret but managed to be leaked. Brian Ross, “Secret FBI Report Questions Al Qaeda Capabilities: No ‘True’ Al Qaeda Sleeper Agents Have Been Found in U.S.,” ABC News, March 9, 2005. Fox News reported that the FBI, however, observed that “just because there’s no concrete evidence of sleeper cells now, doesn’t mean they don’t exist.” “FBI Can’t Find Sleeper Cells,” Fox News, March 10, 2005. Jenkins has run an internet search to discover how often variants of the term “al-Qaida” appeared within ten words of “nuclear.” There were only seven hits in 1999 and eleven in 2000, but the number soared to 1,742 in 2001 and to 2,931 in 2002. 47 By 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates was assuring a congressional committee that what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is “the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear.” 48 Few of the sleepless, it seems, found much solace in the fact that an al-Qaida computer seized in Afghanistan in 2001 indicated that the group’s budget for research on weapons of mass destruction (almost all of it focused on primitive chemical weapons work) was $2,000 to $4,000. 49 In the wake of the killing of Osama bin Laden, officials now have many more al-Qaida computers, and nothing in their content appears to suggest that the group had the time or inclination, let alone the money, to set up and staff a uranium-seizing operation, as well as a fancy, super-high-technology facility to fabricate a bomb. This is a process that requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators and other criminals, obtaining and transporting highly guarded material, setting up a machine shop staffed with top scientists and technicians, and rolling the heavy, cumbersome, and untested finished product into position to be detonated by a skilled crew—all while attracting no attention from outsiders. 50 If the miscreants in the American cases have been unable to create and set off even the simplest conventional bombs, it stands to reason that none of them were very close to creating, or having anything to do with, nuclear weapons—or for that matter biological, radiological, or chemical ones. In fact, with perhaps one exception, none seems to have even dreamed of the prospect; and the exception is José Padilla (case 2), who apparently mused at one point about creating a dirty bomb—a device that would disperse radiation—or even possibly an atomic one. His idea about isotope separation was to put uranium into a pail and then to make himself into a human centrifuge by swinging the pail around in great arcs. Even if a weapon were made abroad and then brought into the United States, its detonation would require individuals in-country with the capacity to receive and handle the complicated weapons and then to set them off. Thus far, the talent pool appears, to put mildly, very thin. There is delusion, as well, in the legal expansion of the concept of “weapons of mass destruction.” The concept had once been taken as a synonym for nuclear weapons or was meant to include nuclear weapons as well as weapons yet to be developed that might have similar destructive capacity. After the Cold War, it was expanded to embrace chemical, biological, and radiological weapons even though those weapons for the most part are incapable of committing destruction that could reasonably be considered “massive,” particularly in comparison with nuclear ones. 52

#### There are so many barriers and they are so incompetant that there’s virtually no risk

Mueller 2012 (John, Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science, both at Ohio State University, and Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute. Mark G. Stewart is Australian Research Council Professorial Fellow and Professor and Director at the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at the University of Newcastle in Australia, The Terrorism Delusion, *International Security*, Vol. 37, No. 1) BW

In 2009, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a lengthy report on protecting the homeland. Key to achieving such an objective should be a careful assessment of the character, capacities, and desires of potential terrorists targeting that homeland. Although the report contains a section dealing with what its authors call “the nature of the terrorist adversary,” the section devotes only two sentences to assessing that nature: “The number and high profile of international and domestic terrorist attacks and disrupted plots dur- ing the last two decades underscore the determination and persistence of terrorist organizations. Terrorists have proven to be relentless, patient, opportunistic, and flexible, learning from experience and modifying tactics and targets to exploit perceived vulnerabilities and avoid observed strengths.”8 This description may apply to some terrorists somewhere, including at least a few of those involved in the September 11 attacks. Yet, it scarcely describes the vast majority of those individuals picked up on terrorism charges in the United States since those attacks. The inability of the DHS to consider this fact even parenthetically in its fleeting discussion is not only amazing but perhaps delusional in its single-minded preoccupation with the extreme. In sharp contrast, the authors of the case studies, with remarkably few exceptions, describe their subjects with such words as incompetent, ineffective, unintelligent, idiotic, ignorant, inadequate, unorganized, misguided, muddled, amateurish, dopey, unrealistic, moronic, irrational, and foolish.9 And in nearly all of the cases where an operative from the police or from the Federal Bureau of Investigation was at work (almost half of the total), the most appropriate descriptor would be “gullible.” In all, as Shikha Dalmia has put it, would-be terrorists need to be “radicalized enough to die for their cause; Westernized enough to move around without raising red flags; ingenious enough to exploit loopholes in the security apparatus; meticulous enough to attend to the myriad logistical details that could torpedo the operation; self-sufficient enough to make all the preparations without enlisting outsiders who might give them away; disciplined enough to maintain complete secrecy; and—above all—psychologically tough enough to keep functioning at a high level without cracking in the face of their own impending death.”10 The case studies examined in this article certainly do not abound with people with such characteristics.

#### US-Russian nuclear war highly improbable.

Desmond **Ball**, professor at the Strategic Defence Studies Centre of The Australian National University, “The probabilities of 'On the Beach' Assessing 'Armageddon Scenarios' in the 21st Century,” Manning Clark House Symposium Science and Ethics: Can Homo sapiens Survive?, May 20**05**. http://www.manningclark.org.au/papers/se05\_ball.html.

The prospects of a nuclear war between the US and Russia must now be deemed fairly remote. There are now no geostrategic issues that warrant nuclear competition and no inclination in either Washington or Moscow to provoke such issues. US and Russian strategic forces have been taken off day-to-day alert and their ICBMs 'de-targeted', greatly reducing the possibilities of war by accident, inadvertence or miscalculation. On the other hand, while the US-Russia strategic competition is in abeyance, there are several aspects of current US nuclear weapons policy which are profoundly disturbing. In December 2001 President George W. Bush officially announced that the US was withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972, one of the mainstays of strategic nuclear arms control during the Cold War, with effect from June 2002, and was proceeding to develop and deploy an extensive range of both theatre missile defence (TMD) and national missile defence (NMD) systems. The first anti-missile missile in the NMD system, designed initially to defend against limited missile attacks from China and North Korea, was installed at Fort Greely in Alaska in July 2004. The initial system, consisting of 16 interceptor missiles at Fort Greely and four at Vandenberg Air Force in California, is expected to be operational by the end of 2005. The Bush Administration is also considering withdrawal from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and resuming nuclear testing. (The last US nuclear test was on 23 September 1992). In particular, some key Administration officials believe that testing is necessary to develop a 'new generation' of nuclear weapons, including low-yield, 'bunker-busting', earth-penetrating weapons specifically designed to destroy very hard and deeply buried targets (such as underground command and control centres and leadership bunkers).

### 1NC CIA Intel

**Doesn’t solve- still allows the CIA to conduct drone strikes, which means there will never be a compete shift**

#### CIA-JSOC cooperation is key to warfighting, Pakistan proves

Josh Gerstein, Politico.com, September 10, 2011, “9/11 panel's forgotten concern: 'paramilitary' CIA” http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0911/63155.html

Now, even the commission's former chairman and vice chairman seem to be downplaying the recommendation.¶ Last week, former Gov. Tom Kean (R-N.J.) and former Rep. Lee Hamilton (D-Ind.) released a "Tenth Anniversary Report Card" on the commission's proposals that highlighted nine "major" recommendations that were incomplete.¶ Among other things cited in the new study, produced by the Bipartisan Policy Center and an unofficial follow-up commission called the National Security Preparedness Group: standardized identification for Americans, a better tracking system for foreigners exiting the country, an oversight board to safeguard civil liberties and streamlining congressional oversight of the Department of Homeland Security.¶ But the new "report card" said nothing about the recommendation on moving paramilitary operations from CIA to DoD, nor does it mention the mushrooming drone effort.¶ A staffer involved in producing the "report card" told POLITICO that the list of nine unfulfilled recommendations was not intended to be comprehensive. The follow-up report also focused on areas where the authors thought additional progress could be achieved in the near term.¶ While many government officials in recent days have again paid tribute to the work of the 10-member commission, they have made it clear that calling for the transfer of paramilitary operations out of the CIA remains unpopular at the highest echelons.¶ "I actually think that was a bad recommendation," Michael Leiter said during an Aspen Security Forum earlier this summer, just weeks after stepping down as director of the National Counterterrorism Center. "The CIA has a targeted piece of this which is a clandestine ability to do partnerships with nations ... in a way that augments the role of the Special Operations community."

"I don't think that who does them matters that much," Leiter added.

"We didn't support that [commission recommendation] and others didn't and the CIA retained that role - and very appropriately," Adm. Eric Olson, head of the special forces command, said at the same conference shortly before he retired last month.

Asked about the recommendation, a CIA spokeswoman said the hybrid system the military and the agency have developed has been successful - including the mission in May to kill Osama bin Laden that involved military special forces operating under CIA leadership.

"The CIA and the Defense Department have worked closely together in the fight against Al Qaeda since 9/11 - most notably with the operation to find and kill" bin Laden, CIA spokeswoman Marie Harf said. "Our capabilities are complementary, not duplicative. And the success of those capabilities should speak for itself."

The executive director of the 9/11 commission, Philip Zelikow, said cooperation between the CIA and the military has improved significantly since the panel issued its report, but he defended the recommendation to scale back the CIA's paramilitary role.

"The problem that we identified in '04 was a problem that we identified correctly, [but] the question in 2011 is different from the question in 2004," said Zelikow, now a history professor at the University of Virginia. "A lot has happened in the last seven years... . The organizations have really grown and developed all kinds of interesting capabilities and experience."

Zelikow noted that the CIA's involvement in drones increased substantially after Sept. 11 mainly because of U.S. laws that made it easier for the agency to quickly ramp up such a program and to operate secretly overseas.

"The reasons it developed that way had to with the legal authorities - not because the CIA is actually better at flying guided missiles," he said. "After 9/11, they kind of grabbed it... . Immediately, you had to ask yourself how much further down that road you wanted to get because it is really a case where the tail was wagging the dog."

Zelikow, a former diplomat and National Security Council staffer under President George H.W. Bush, was not involved in the recent Bipartisan Policy Center "report card." However, he discussed the paramilitary recommendation in an afterword he wrote to a new edition of the 9/11 Commission report.

"The core of the recommendation was pretty simple: If you've got a military function, it ought to be performed by trained military organizations ... Who do we think builds [Predator drones] and buys them? Who's trained to fly planes?" Zelikow said in an interview. "Do you want the CIA operating a combatant command responsible for fighting our twilight wars, especially in a world when twilight wars are the wars we mainly fight?"

The CIA operation, particularly in Pakistan, has become highly unpopular - so unpopular that former Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair recently urged that all unilateral U.S. drone strikes be halted. If the military were in the lead there, it could discuss the targeting rules in a way that the CIA - which will not confirm even the existence of a drone program in Pakistan - cannot, Zelikow argued. "The military can answer that question publicly, and it would be good that they do so," he said.

A former CIA official who spoke on condition of anonymity called the commission's suggestion from "an alternative universe" and said it ran contrary to other 9/11 panel recommendations that intelligence analysts be in closer contact with operatives in the field.

"If you want all this integration, communication and breaking down walls, it seems to me the ideal would be to set up an integrated chain of command within the CIA," the official said. He also said the sensitivity of countries like Pakistan made the CIA a more logical choice, even though the Air Force operates similar drone programs over the border in Afghanistan.

"As a matter of law and policy, the military has a lot less stuff they do black" - or secretly - the ex-CIA official said. "If you have a [host] country that wants to deny a program, the CIA is going to move to the front of the queue."

#### DOD expansion solves

Greg Miller, “DIA sending hundreds more spies overseas” By,December 01, 2012

http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-12-01/world/35585098\_1\_defense-clandestine-service-cia-spy-agency

The Pentagon will send hundreds of additional spies overseas as part of an ambitious plan to assemble an espionage network that rivals the CIA in size, U.S. officials said. The project is aimed at transforming the Defense Intelligence Agency, which has been dominated for the past decade by the demands of two wars, into a spy service focused on emerging threats and more closely aligned with the CIA and elite military commando units. When the expansion is complete, the DIA is expected to have as many as 1,600 “collectors” in positions around the world, an unprecedented total for an agency whose presence abroad numbered in the triple digits in recent years. The total includes military attachés and others who do not work undercover. But U.S. officials said the growth will be driven over a five-year period by the deployment of a new generation of clandestine operatives. They will be trained by the CIA and often work with the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command, but they will get their spying assignments from the Department of Defense. Among the Pentagon’s top intelligence priorities, officials said, are Islamist militant groups in Africa, weapons transfers by North Korea and Iran, and military modernization underway in China. “This is not a marginal adjustment for DIA,” the agency’s director, Lt. Gen. Michael T. Flynn, said at a recent conference, during which he outlined the changes but did not describe them in detail. “This is a major adjustment for national security.”

#### No CBW escalation.

**Roberts,** Research Fellow in International Security Studies at CSIS, **04** (Brad, “The Prospects for Biological War in the Middle East,” [www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cpc-pubs/biostorm/roberts.doc](http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cpc-pubs/biostorm/roberts.doc))

 The logic that would lead to the use of biological weapons seems clearly to be missing in a couple of the conflict potentialities described above.  In anti-regime, low-intensity conflicts, the use of biological weapons seems quite unlikely.  The violent Islamic and other oppositionist movements of concern here are seeking to mobilize public support, to cast existing governments as illegitimate, and generally to create the political conditions that enable them to emerge as successors to the regimes they are attacking.  The use of biological weapons could run counter to these interests.1  The use of a banned weapon—especially its use to generate broad suffering among civilians—could de-legitimize these movements in the eyes of their intended domestic supporters, and perhaps internationally as well. Some groups depend substantially on international support, such as the groups supporting Palestinian and Kurdish statehood.  This may be less true of those Islamic groups that have claimed a holy writ for their chosen tactics.  Moreover, in many if not all of the countries where such movements are a concern, there is a significant measure of external, usually covert, meddling; the meddling states have interests that could be damaged if BW use were to result in international condemnation, sanctions, and even military action.  A disturbing footnote to this analysis relates to the potential utility of biological weapons for attacks not on humans but on plants and animals; anti-regime actors could potentially find such attacks useful for destabilizing a country without unduly risking a punishing reply and perhaps without alienating excessively the target state’s human population.2  Again, this may be less true of some of the Islamic groups, who perceive a strong base of support among those who are politically and economically disenfranchised.

#### Plan would collapse the effectiveness of Special Forces missions

Larry **Maher 10,** Quartermaster General, Veterans of Foreign Wars, et al, 9/30/10, BRIEF OF THE VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS OF THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS AND DISMISSAL, Nasser al-Aulaqi, Plaintiff, vs. Barack H. Obama, et al., Defendants, <http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/VFW_Brief_PACER.pdf>

Finally, the VFW’s membership includes many current and former members of the U.S. armed forces’ elite special operations forces—Army Rangers and Special Forces, Navy SEALs, Air Force parajumpers and combat controllers, and Marine Corps Force Reconnaissance personnel, among others. These elite warriors conduct highly dangerous missions today in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other countries around the world. By definition, special operations “are operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. These operations often require covert, clandestine, or low-visibility capabilities.” U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, at I-1 (2003), available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new\_pubs/jp3\_05.pdf.

Special operations are differentiated from conventional operations in many ways, but foremost among these are their “degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets.” Id. “Surprise is often the most important principle in the conduct of successful [special operations] and the survivability of employed [special operations forces],” and the very nature of special operations requires “high levels of security . . . to protect the clandestine/covert nature of missions.” Id. at I-6. More than mission accomplishment is at stake—“[g]iven their operating size, [special operations teams] are more vulnerable to potential hostile reaction to their presence than larger conventional units,” and therefore the protection of sources and methods is essential for the survival of special operations forces. Id. To preserve this element of surprise, special operations forces must broadly conceal their tactics, techniques and procedures, including information about unit locations and movements, targeting decisions, and operational plans for future missions. Disclosure of this information would allow this nation’s adversaries to defend themselves more effectively, potentially inflicting more casualties upon U.S. special operations forces. Such disclosure would also provide information about how the U.S. military gathers information about its adversaries, enabling terrorist groups like Al Qaeda to alter its communications and activities in order to evade future detection and action by the U.S. Government. Such harm would not be limited to just this instance or terrorist group group; these disclosures would also provide future terrorist adversaries and military adversaries with insight into U.S. special operations capabilities which would enable them to counter such capabilities in future conflicts. Cf. Public Declaration of Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense, Govt. Exhibit 4, September 23, 2010, at ¶¶ 6-7.

#### Special forces’ effectiveness is key to counter-prolif

Jim **Thomas 13,** Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, and Chris Dougherty is a Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2013, “BEYOND THE RAMPARTS THE FUTURE OF U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES,” http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/SOF-Report-CSBA-Final.pdf

WMD do not represent new threats to U.S. security interests, but as nascent nuclear powers grow their arsenals and aspirants like Iran continue to pursue nuclear capabilities, the threat of nuclear proliferation, as well as the potential for the actual use of nuclear weapons, will increase. Upheaval in failing or outlaw states like Libya and Syria, which possess chemical weapons and a range of missiles, highlights the possibility that in future instances of state collapse or civil war, such weapons could be used by failing regimes in an act of desperation, fall into the hands of rebel forces, or be seized by parties hostile to the United States or its interests. SOF can contribute across the spectrum of counter-WMD efforts, from stopping the acquisition of WMD by hostile states or terrorist groups to preventing their use. The global CT network SOF have built over the last decade could be repurposed over the next decade to become a global counter-WMD network, applying the same logic that it takes a network to defeat a network. Increasing the reach and density of a global counter-WMD network will require expanding security cooperation activities focused on counter-proliferation. Finally, SOF may offer the most viable strategic option for deposing WMD-armed regimes through UW campaigns should the need arise.

#### Special forces are key to disarm rogues’ nuclear programs---the alternative is U.S. counterforce nuclear strikes

Jim **Thomas 13,** Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, and Chris Dougherty is a Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2013, “BEYOND THE RAMPARTS THE FUTURE OF U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES,” http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/SOF-Report-CSBA-Final.pdf

Finally, if the United States goes to war with a nuclear-armed adversary, SOF may offer the least-worst option for regime change. In 2011, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates famously said that, “…future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should ‘have his head examined,’ as General MacArthur so delicately put it.” 209 While current and future American political leaders may be reluctant to dispatch large-scale forces to conduct regime change operations akin to Operation Iraqi Freedom, SOF offer a viable strategic option for deposing WMD-armed regimes through UW campaigns should the need arise. Using UW may represent the best alternative to using nuclear weapons or large ground forces to invade and occupy a country possessing WMD. The traditional downside of UW is that preparations for such campaigns could take years to put in place, if not longer. The United States would do well to begin developing limited UW options in advance - by using SOF and intelligence assets to build relationships with groups that could threaten WMD-armed regimes - so that future presidents have a viable unconventional regime-change option when confronting WMD-armed adversaries.

#### Rogues will locate their WMD in cities---U.S. nuclear strikes cause mass casualties

**Gormley** 9 – Dennis Gormley, Senior Fellow in the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute for International Studies, Fall 2009, “The Path to Deep Nuclear Reductions: Dealing with American Conventional Superiority,” online: http://www.ifri.org/files/Securite\_defense/PP29\_Gormley.pdf

Attacking strategic underground targets seems superficially to be the role for which nuclear weapons are most indispensable. According to the U.S. Intelligence Community, there are roughly 2,000 of these targets of interest to U.S. military planners. Due to their burial depth, a good number of these facilities are beyond the reach of existing conventional earth-penetrator weapons.24 Many are susceptible to destruction by one or more nuclear earth penetrators, but not without unwanted consequences. Because more than half of these strategic underground targets are located near or in urban areas, a nuclear attack could produce significant civilian casualties (depending on yield, between thousands and more than a million, according to the U.S. National Academy of Sciences); even in more remote areas, casualties could range between a few hundred to hundreds of thousands, depending on yield and wind conditions.25 A new nuclear earthpenetrator weapon, which the Bush administration favored studying and their NPR endorsed but Congress rejected, would effectively capture a few hundred of these strategic underground targets but some uncertain number would presumably remain beyond reach, and such weapons would still produce unwanted collateral effects.26

#### Loss of warfighting effectiveness ensures nuclear war in every hotspot

**Kagan and O’Hanlon 07**, resident scholar at AEI and senior fellow in foreign policy at Brookings

(Frederick and Michael, The Case for Larger Ground Forces, April, http://www.aei.org/files/2007/04/24/20070424\_Kagan20070424.pdf)

We live at a time when **wars not only rage in nearly every region but threaten to erupt in many places where the current relative calm is** tenuous. To view this as **a strategic military challenge for the U**nited **S**tates **is not to espouse a specific theory of America’s role in the world** or a certain political philosophy. Such an assessment flows directly from the basic bipartisan view of American foreign policy makers since World War II that **overseas threats must be countered before they can directly threaten this country’s shores**, that the **basic stability of the international system is essential to American peace** and prosperity, **and that no country besides the U**nited **S**tates **is in a position to lead the way in countering major challenges to the global order**. Let us highlight the **threats and their consequences** with a few concrete examples, emphasizing those **that involve key strategic regions of the world such as the Persian Gulf and East Asia, or** key potential **threats to American security, such as the spread of nuclear weapons and** the strengthening of the global **Al Qaeda**/jihadist movement. The Iranian government has rejected a series of international demands to halt its efforts at enriching uranium and submit to international inspections. What will happen if the US—or Israeli—government becomes convinced that Tehran is on the verge of fielding a nuclear weapon? North **Korea**, of course, has already done so, and the ripple effects are beginning to spread. Japan’s recent election to supreme power of a leader who has promised to rewrite that country’s constitution to support increased armed forces—and, possibly, even nuclear weapons— may well alter the delicate balance of fear in Northeast Asia fundamentally and rapidly. Also, in the background, at least for now, Sino Taiwanese tensions continue to flare, as do tensions between India and Pakistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan, Venezuela and the United States, and so on**.** Meanwhile, the world’s nonintervention in Darfur troubles consciences from Europe to America’s Bible Belt to its bastions of liberalism, yet with no serious international forces on offer, the bloodletting willprobably, tragically, continue unabated. And as bad as things are in Iraq today, they could get worse. What would happen if the key Shiite figure, Ali al Sistani, were to die? If another major attack on the scale of the Golden Mosque bombing hit either side (or, perhaps, both sides at the same time)? Such deterioration might convince many Americans that the war there truly was lost—but the costs of reaching such a conclusion would be enormous. Afghanistan is somewhat more stable for the moment, although a major Taliban offensive appears to be in the offing. Sound US grand strategy must proceed from the recognition that, over the next few years and decades, the world is going to be a very unsettled and quite dangerous place, with Al Qaeda and its associated groups as a subset of a much larger set of worries. The onlyserious response to this international environmentis to developarmedforces capable of protecting America’svitalintereststhroughout this dangerous time**.** Doing so requires a military capable of a wide range of missions—including **not only** deterrence of great power conflict indealing with potentialhotspotsin Korea, the Taiwan Strait, and the Persian Gulf but also associated with a variety of Special Forces activities and stabilization operations. For today’s US military, which already excels at high technology and is increasingly focused on re-learning the lost art of counterinsurgency, this is first and foremost a question of finding the resources to field a large-enough standing Army and Marine Corps to handle personnel intensive missions such as the ones now under way in Iraq and Afghanistan.

# 2NC

## CP

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**McNeal 13** – (3/15, Gregory, JD, professor at Pepperdine University, former Assistant Director of the Institute for Global Security, former legal consultant to the Chief Prosecutor of the Department of Defense Office of Military Commissions, “Presidential Politics, International Affairs and (a bit on) Pakistani Sovereignty,” Lawfare, http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/03/presidential-politics-international-affairs-and-a-bit-on-pakistani-sovereignty/)

Other political constraints from outside the U.S. may also impose costs on the conduct of targeted killings and those costs may serve as a form of accountability. For example, in current operations, targeted killings that affect foreign governments (as in domestic public opinion in Pakistan) or alliances (as in the case of UK support to targeting) all have associated with them higher political costs. Other international political constraints can impose accountability on the targeting process. For example, if Pakistan wanted to credibly protest the U.S. conduct of targeted killings, they could do so through formal mechanisms such as complaining at the UN General Assembly, petitioning the UN Security Council to have the matter of strikes in their country added to the Security Council’s agenda, or they could lodge a formal complaint with the UN Human Rights Committee. (UPDATE: In Emmerson’s letter he notes that the Pakistani government says they have at least made “public statements” regarding their lack of consent and their calls for “an immediate end to the use of drones by any other State on the territory of Pakistan.”). **Pakistan could also expel U.S. personnel from their country, reject U.S. foreign aid, cut off diplomatic relations, and even threaten to shoot down U.S. aircraft.** Despite apoplectic headlines, ledes and press releases, the fact that Pakistan has not pursued these means of international political accountability says a lot about the credibility of the sovereignty complaint.

Another international political mechanism can be seen in the form of overflight rights. As Zenko notes, sovereign states can constrain U.S. intelligence and military activities; “[t]hough not sexy and little reported, deployingCIA drones or special operations forces requires **constant behind-the-scenes diplomacy**: with very rare exceptions—like the Bin Laden raid—the U.S. military follows the rules of the world’s other 194 sovereign, independent states.” Other international political checks can be seen in the conduct of military operations. For example, during the 1991 Gulf War, the U.S. lawfully targeted Iraqi troops as they fled on what became known as the “highway of death.” The images of destruction broadcast on the news caused a rift in the coalition. Rather than lose coalition partners, the U.S. chose to stop engaging fleeing Iraqi troops, even though those troops were lawful targets. The U.S. government has similarly noted the importance of international public opinion, even highlighting its importance in its own military manuals. For example, the Army’s Civilian Casualty Mitigation manual states civilian casualties may “lead to ill will among the host-nation population and political pressure that can limit freedom of action of military forces. If Army units fail to protect civilians, for whatever reason, **the legitimacy of U.S. operations is likely to be questioned by the host nation and other partners**.”(See more here).

### 2NC CP Solves Trasnparency

#### Congressional oversight of the program is already effective, it’s just not publicly discussed---the CP solves soft power

Gregory **McNeal 13**, Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University, 3/5/13, “Targeted Killing and Accountability,” <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1819583>

Congressional oversight of executive branch activities is believed to be a core constitutional duty.443 Arthur Schlesinger wrote that this duty, while not written into the Constitution, existed because “the power to make laws implied the power to see whether they were faithfully executed.”444 Founding-era actions support this view, with Congress conducting in 1792 its first oversight investigation into America’s military campaign against Indians on the frontier.445 In 1885, future president Woodrow Wilson (at the time an academic) wrote in Congressional Government that Congressional oversight was just as important as lawmaking.446 Oversight is a form of accountability, but what exactly is oversight? Moreover, how can we know what “good” oversight is?

Amy Zegart argues that defining good oversight is difficult for three reasons.447 First, “‘good’ oversight is embedded in politics and intertwined with policy advocacy on behalf of constituents and groups and their interests.”448 Second, “many agencies are designed with contradictory missions that naturally pull them in different directions as the power of contending interest groups waxes and wanes.”449 Third, “good oversight is hard to recognize because many important oversight activities are simply invisible or impossible to gauge.”450 In a particularly salient example, Zegart notes:

Telephone calls, e-mails and other informal staff oversight activities happen all the time, but cannot be counted in data sets or measured in other systematic ways. Even more important, the very possibility that an agency’s action might trigger a future congressional hearing (what some intelligence officials refer to as ‘the threat of the green felt table’) or some other sort of congressional response can dissuade the executive branch officials from undertaking the proposed action in the first place. This kind of anticipatory oversight can be potent. But from the outside, it looks like no oversight at all.451

If oversight of targeted killings is a form of political accountability, it may be one that is difficult to see from the outside. This fact is borne out by Senator Diane Feinstein’s release of details regarding congressional oversight of the targeted killing program. Those details were largely unknown and impossible to gauge until political pressure prompted her to issue a statement. In that statement she noted:

The committee has devoted significant time and attention to targeted killings by drones. The committee receives notifications with key details of each strike shortly after it occurs, and the committee holds regular briefings and hearings on these operations—reviewing the strikes, examining their effectiveness as a counterterrorism tool, verifying the care taken to avoid deaths to non-combatants and understanding the intelligence collection and analysis that underpins these operations. In addition, the committee staff has held 35 monthly, in-depth oversight meetings with government officials to review strike records (including video footage) and question every aspect of the program.452

#### Executive transparency combined with Congressional expressions of support for the process demonstrates accountability for the overall program---solves legitimacy

**Jack Goldsmith 12 1ac author**, Harvard Law professor and a member of the Hoover Task Force on National Security and Law, 3/19/12, “Fire When Ready,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/03/19/fire\_when\_ready

There are at least two separate issues about what information should be disclosed. The first concerns the legal basis for the targeted killing program. In addition to the New York Times leak, four senior Obama administration officials -- Attorney General Holder, Defense Department General Counsel Jeh Johnson, State Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh, and senior counterterrorism advisor John Brennan -- have given major speeches outlining this legal basis. These speeches go far beyond the usual public explanations for actions of this sort. But, as Charlie Savage of the New York Times said of Holder's Northwestern talk, they "fell far short of the level of detail contained in the Office of Legal Counsel memo." After Holder's speech, the nation has a general explanation of the constitutional and international law bases for the administration's actions. But the speech also shows that the legal rationale for targeted killing can be discussed without disclosing operations, targets, means of fire, or countries, and without revealing means and methods of intelligence gathering. The Holder speech, in short, weakens the rationale against disclosing more detail and analysis about the legal basis for (and limitations on) targeted killings.

A second disclosure issue concerns the process by which targeting decisions are made and the factual basis for those decisions (including the evidence of ties to al Qaeda, the imminence of the threat posed by the target, the extent of cooperation with other nations, and the reasons capture is not feasible). This is the most legitimate concern of critics and even some supporters of the president's targeted killing campaign, especially when that campaign involves a U.S. citizen. There is every reason to think that the government was super careful and extra scrupulous in the process preceding the Awlaki killing. But despite the elaborate system of deliberation, scrutiny, and legitimation supporting U.S. targeting practices, the U.S. government can and sometimes does make mistakes about its targets. There is simply no way to wring all potential error from the system and still carry on a war. Even full-blown ex ante judicial review of targeting would not guarantee the elimination of errors.

The government needs a way to credibly convey to the public that its decisions about who is being targeted -- especially when the target is a U.S. citizen -- are sound. The government did provide this kind of information when there was public uncertainty about whether Awlaki was an operational leader of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula or merely an inspirational figure. In its sentencing memorandum for "underwear bomber" Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the government revealed details about Awlaki meeting with Abdulmutallab and providing assistance for the planned attack on a U.S.-bound plane on Christmas Day 2009. This disclosure is credible because it is based on Abdulmutallab's debriefing statements. And because it is based on those statements, it does not reveal the sensitive intelligence that originally informed the government's conclusion that Awlaki was an operational leader. Outside this unusual context, however, it is hard for the executive branch to disclose more than it has about the factual basis for its high-value targeting decisions without disclosing and thus destroying its intelligence-gathering techniques or its arrangements with foreign governments. And that, in turn, leaves the government in the unattractive position of asking the public to trust its controversial targeting decisions without any outside confirmation of the facts.

I can think of only two ways to improve the current arrangement. First, the government can and should tell us more about the process by which it reaches its high-value targeting decisions. It should answer a number of questions, such as: How many layers of bureaucracy are involved? How many people, from how many agencies, typically weigh in on such decisions? How long do the deliberations generally take? What, in general, are the intelligence review processes like? How long does a typical congressional briefing on such an issue take? How many members of the relevant congressional committees show up? Does the administration show committee members legal analyses? Do committee staffers, including committee lawyers, participate? How much sharing is there, if any, between the intelligence and armed services committees? Are targets or operations sometimes, frequently, or always revised by these processes? Are they sometimes, or frequently, aborted? The more the government tells us about the eyeballs on the issue and the robustness of the process, the more credible will be its claims about the accuracy of its factual determinations and the soundness of its legal ones. All of this information can be disclosed in some form without endangering critical intelligence.

Second, the government should take advantage of the separation of powers. Military detention at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba has become more legitimate and less controversial in part because another branch of government, the judiciary, has looked at the detentions and agreed with the executive's assessment. Such judicial review is inappropriate for targeting decisions and, in any event, not available. But a different adversarial branch of government -- Congress -- can play an analogous role. The congressional intelligence and arms services committees know a lot about the president's targeting policies, and have gone along with the president's actions. These committees could (without revealing sensitive information) do more to enhance the president's credibility by stating publicly -- and preferably in a bipartisan fashion -- that they have monitored the president's high-value targeting decisions and find them, and the facts and processes on which they are based, to be sound. Congress does not typically like the responsibility (or the hard work) that such an endorsement would entail. But especially when courts are not available to review the president's actions, it should step up its public involvement in scrutinizing and vouching for (or criticizing) the president's targeting decisions. Indeed, the president should insist on it.

### 2NC A/T: Executive Trust Deficit

#### The CP shapes the development of global norms on drones and actively builds legitimacy---that means it solves their perception deficits because all their ev is only about the way that drones are perceived now, not how they’re perceived after a vigorous defense by the U.S.

Kenneth **Anderson 10**, Professor of International Law at American University, 3/8/10, “Predators Over Pakistan,” The Weekly Standard, <http://www.weeklystandard.com/print/articles/predators-over-pakistan>

But a thorough reading of the Predator coverage calls to mind how the detention, interrogation, and rendition debates proceeded over the years after 9/11. As Brookings scholar Benjamin Wittes observes, those arguments also had elements of both legal sense and sensibility. Ultimately the battle of international legal legitimacy was lost, even though detention at Guantánamo continues for lack of a better option. It is largely on account of having given up the argument over legitimacy, after all, that it never occurred to the Obama administration not to Mirandize the Christmas Bomber. Baseline perceptions of legitimacy have consequences. ¶ Nor is the campaign to delegitimize targeted killing only about the United States. Legal moves in European courts have already been made against Israeli officials involved in targeted killing against Hamas in the Gaza war. Unsavory members of the U.N. act alongside the world’s most fatuously self-regarding human rights groups to press for war crimes prosecutions. All of this is merely an opening move in a larger campaign to stigmatize and delegitimize targeted killing and drone attacks. What can be done to Israelis can eventually be done to CIA officers. Perhaps a London bookmaker can offer odds on how soon after the Obama administration leaves office CIA officers will be investigated by a court, somewhere, on grounds related to targeted killing and Predator drone strikes. And whether the Obama administration’s senior lawyers will rise to their defense—or, alternatively, submit an amicus brief calling for their prosecution. ¶ Thus it matters when the U.N. special rapporteur on extrajudicial execution, Philip Alston, demands, as he did recently, that the U.S. government justify the legality of its targeted killing program. Alston, a professor at New York University, is a measured professional and no ideologue, and he treads delicately with respect to the Obama administration—but he treads. Likewise it matters when, in mid-January, the ACLU handed the U.S. government a lengthy FOIA request seeking extensive information on every aspect of targeted killing through the use of UAVs. The FOIA request emphasizes the legal justification for the program as conducted by the U.S. military and the CIA. ¶ Legal justification matters, partly for reasons of legitimacy and partly because the United States is, and wants to be, a polity governed by law. This includes international law, at least insofar as it means something other than the opinions of professors and motley member-states at the U.N. seeking to extract concessions. International law, it is classically said, consists of what states consent to by treaty. Add to this “customary law”—as evidenced by how states actually behave and as provided in their statements, their so-called opinio juris. Customary law is evidenced when states do these things because they see them as binding obligations of law, done from a sense of legal obligation—not merely habit, policy, or convenience, practices that they might change at any moment because they did not engage in them as a matter of law. ¶ What the United States says regarding the lawfulness of its targeted killing practices matters. It matters both that it says it, and then of course it matters what it says. The fact of its practices is not enough, because they are subject to many different legal interpretations: The United States has to assert those practices as lawful, and declare its understanding of the content of that law. This is for two important reasons: first to preserve the U.S. government’s views and rights under the law; and second, to make clear what it regards as binding law not just for itself, but for others as well. ¶ Other states, the United Nations, international tribunals, NGOs, and academics can cavil and disagree with what the United States thinks is law. But no Great Power’s consistently reiterated views of international law, particularly in the field of international security, can be dismissed out of hand. It is true of the United States and it is also true of China. It is not a matter of “good” Great Powers or “bad.” Nor is it merely “might makes right.” It is, rather, a mechanism that keeps international law grounded in reality, and not a plaything of utopian experts and enthusiasts, departing this earth for the City of God. It remains tethered to the real world both as law and practice, conditioned by how states see and act on the law. ¶ The venerable U.S. view of the “law of nations” is one of moderate moral realism—the world “as it is,” as the president correctly put it in his Nobel Prize address. It is not the vision of radical utopians and idealists; neither is it that of radical skeptics about the very existence of law in international affairs. On the contrary, the time-honored American view has always been pragmatic about international law (thereby acting to preserve it from radical internationalism and radical skepticism). But upholding the American view requires more than simply dangling the inference that if the United States does it, it means the United States must intend it as law. Traditional international law requires more than that, for good reason. The U.S. government should provide an affirmative, aggressive, and uncompromising defense of the legal sense and sensibility of targeted killing. The U.S. government’s interlocutors and critics are not wrong to demand one, even those whose own conclusions have long since been set in stone. ¶ A clear statement of legal position need not be an invitation to negotiate or alter it, even when others loudly disagree. In international law, a state’s assertion that its policies are lawful, particularly such an assertion from a great power in matters of international security, is an important element all by itself in making it lawful, or at least not unlawful. But in vast areas of security, self-defense, and the use of force, the U.S. government has in recent years left a huge deficit as to how its actions constitute a coherent statement of international law. ¶ For once, Washington should move to get ahead of a contested issue of international legal legitimacy and “soft law.” Why else have an Obama administration, if not to get out in front on a practice that it has ramped up on grounds of both necessity and humanitarian minimization of force? The CIA has taken a few baby steps by selectively leaking some collateral damage data to a few reporters. But the CIA is going to have to say more. The U.S. government needs to defend targeted killings as both lawful, and as an important step forward in the development of more sparing and discriminating—more humanitarian—weaponry.

## Solvency

#### JSOC as secretive as the CIA

**Goldsmith, 13**- “How Obama Undermined the War on Terror”. Jack Goldsmith teaches at Harvard Law School and is a member of the Hoover Institution Task Force on National Security and Law. http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112964/obamas-secrecy-destroying-american-support-counterterrorism

The administration has floated the idea of "[shifting] the CIA's lethal targeting program to the Defense Department," as The Daily Beast reported last month. Among other potential virtues, this move might allow greater public transparency about the way of the knife to the extent that it would eliminate the covert action bar to public discussion. But JSOC's non-covert targeted killing program is no less secretive than the CIA's, and its congressional oversight is, if anything, less robust.

## China Relations

**Relations are higher than ever before and overcome existing barriers**

NYT 4-24

[The New York Times. “US, China Unite.” <http://www.mb.com.ph/article.php?aid=9032&sid=1&subid=1#.UXbKA8pKN9o> 4/24/13 //GBS-JV]

The United States (US) and China held their highest-level military talks in nearly two years on Monday, with a senior Chinese general pledging to work with the United States on cybersecurity because the consequences of a major cyberattack “may be as serious as a nuclear bomb.”¶ Cybersecurity has become a sudden source of tension between the two countries. China has bristled over the growing body of evidence that its military has been involved in cyberattacks on American corporations and some government agencies. Last month, the Obama administration demanded that the Chinese government stop the theft of data from American computer networks and help create global standards for cybersecurity.¶ At a news conference on Monday after talks with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, the Chinese general, Fang Fenghui, said he would be willing to set up a cybersecurity “mechanism,” but warned that progress might not be swift.¶ “I know how difficult it is,” General Fang said. “Anyone can launch the attacks – from the place where he lives, from his own country or from another country.”¶ General Dempsey arrived in Beijing on Sunday for his first visit to China. His predecessor, Admiral Mike Mullen, held talks in Beijing in July 2011.¶ General Dempsey’s three-day visit comes as mistrust has mounted between Beijing and Washington over a host of issues, including differences over North Korea, Washington’s strengthened military posture in the Asia Pacific region, China’s assertiveness in the South and East China Seas and basic problems of how the two militaries should communicate in a crisis.¶ China invited General Dempsey for the talks after the lengthy transition process to a new Chinese government was completed in March. His arrival followed the first visit by Secretary of State John Kerry more than a week ago, and Obama administration officials say they hope the almost back-to-back talks will yield a starting point for better relations after a rocky period of drift.¶ At the news conference, General Fang, who is the chief of the People’s Liberation Army General Staff and a member of the powerful Central Military Commission, also talked of wanting a “new kind of military relationship that is consistent with the state-to-state relationship.” He spoke with a confidence that reflected the growing strength of China’s military, including expanding its naval presence.¶ “The Pacific Ocean is wide enough to accommodate us both,” General Fang said, a suggestion that it was time for the United States to understand the American military would not be able to dominate forever. President Xi Jinping used the same phrase on the eve of his visit to Washington as vice president in February 2012.¶ General Dempsey did not allow the remark to go unnoticed. The United States, he said, is looking for a “better, deeper and more enduring relationship” with the Chinese military – but in the context of “other historic and enduring alliances.”

**The plan is a drop in the bucket relative to overall disputes**

**Stokes and Hatchigian, 12** [U.S.-China Relations in an Election Year Taking the Long View in a Season of Heated Rhetoric, Jacob, Research Assistant at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), where his research focuses on U.S. national security and defense policy. His writing has appeared in CNN.com, Politico, BusinessWeek, *The Baltimore Sun*, *The Guardian* and *The American Prospect*, among other publications, Senior Fellow at American Progress.¶ <http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:QG6048mP53AJ:www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/2012/03/pdf/us_china_relations.pdf+&hl=en&gl=us>]

This report examines the 10 most debated challenges in the U.S.-China relation-¶ ship in the 2012 presidential and congressional campaign season, exploring¶ differences between progressive and conservative approaches to China. We¶ detail these 10 issues in the pages that follow, but briefly, here is a summation of the top challenges and the different approaches advocated by conservatives and¶ taken by progressives.¶ • Ensuring fair trade. The Obama administration’s policy of vigorous enforce-¶ ment and results-oriented dialogue beats conservatives’ refusal to invest in¶ American competitiveness at home; empty, antagonistic rhetoric toward China;¶ and highly inconsistent positions on trade cases. The Obama administration has¶ announced a new trade-enforcement unit and has brought more major trade¶ cases against China than any of its predecessors.¶ • Progress on currency. The Obama administration’s efforts, on its own and with¶ other nations, to pressure China to deal with its undervalued currency have¶ resulted in progress, though more remains to be done. The administration is **keeping the pressure on**. The conservative answer is both needlessly antago-¶ nistic and ineffective.¶ • China owning U.S. debt. China owning just more than 8 percent of our federal¶ debt is not leverage China can use without unacceptably harming its own interests.¶ Conservative hysterics and fearmongering about this complex issue is misplaced.¶ • Chinese direct investment. Chinese investment in our country can be a major¶ source of capital and jobs going forward. We should allow proven national ¶ 4 Center for American Progress Action Fund | U.S.-China Relations in an Election Year¶ security processes to weed out threats to our nation and avoid excessive¶ paranoia around Chinese purchases, lest we miss investment-led growth¶ opportunities. Conservatives should take heed.¶ • Championing human rights. The Obama administration has consistently **called**¶ **China out on human rights**, speaking privately and publicly with Chinese¶ leaders, meeting with the Dalai Lama twice, and giving our diplomats new¶ forums to engage fully with their Chinese counterparts and the Chinese peo-¶ ple to improve human rights and religious freedoms in China. Conservatives’¶ only answer is even more forceful browbeating of Chinese leaders—emotion-¶ ally satisfying, but not an effective tactic to make real change.¶ • America the Pacific power. Under the Obama administration new trade part-¶ nerships, defense arrangements, and serious connections with regional orga-¶ nizations all support deeper U.S. engagement in Asia. Extremist conservative¶ rhetoric claiming the administration is not investing adequately in defense in¶ Asia is nonsense.¶ • Addressing China’s military. China’s military has grown rapidly in recent years,¶ albeit from a very low base. While some technologies are worrisome, the¶ United States retains a huge advantage over China. The Obama administration¶ is responding to China’s military buildup but is not exaggerating the threat, in¶ contrast to conservative efforts to use the “China threat” to justify unsustain-¶ able increases in military spending.¶ • Supporting regional allies. Asian nations continue to turn to America to ensure¶ peace and security. The United States is meeting that need by strengthening rela-¶ tions with our Pacific friends and allies. Relationships with Japan, South Korea,¶ and Australia are rock-solid, and the United States joined with regional players¶ to push back on Chinese belligerence. Conservatives ignore this track record in¶ desperate attempts to tag the Obama administration as abandoning our allies.¶ • A friend to Taiwan. The Obama administration has sold unprecedentedly large¶ packages of arms to Taiwan, including major fighter upgrades, while also upping¶ outreach to the island in ways that will not destabilize cross-Strait relations.¶ Conservatives are left complaining that the current administration, like the Bush¶ administration before it, did not sell Taiwan the most advanced jet fighters.¶ The Obama¶ administration¶ is responding to¶ China’s military¶ buildup but is¶ not exaggerating¶ the threat, in¶ contrast to¶ conservative efforts¶ to use the “China¶ threat” to justify¶ unsustainable¶ increases in military¶ spending.¶ 5 Center for American Progress Action Fund | U.S.-China Relations in an Election Year¶ • Tackling cybersecurity. From the start the Obama administration has identi-¶ fied cybersecurity as an issue of grave concern and mounted a comprehensive¶ response. Conservatives who condemn the administration’s response do not¶ understand its scope; they also offer little in the way of new ideas for combat-¶ ing the threat.¶ In the pages that follow, we will present in more detail these 10 challenges along-¶ side the response of the Obama administration and the misplaced criticisms and¶ hostile rhetoric of many conservatives.

## Terror Advantage

### 2nc no impact to russia war

**Cold war calculations no longer apply – neither side would consider war**

**Cartwright et al 12** [Gen (Ret) James Cartwright, former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Amb. Richard Burt, former ambassador to Germany and chief negotiator of START; Sen. Chuck Hagel; Amb. Thomas Pickering, former ambassador to the UN; Gen. (Ret.) Jack Sheehan, former Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic for NATO and Commander-in-Chief for the U.S. Atlantic Command; GLOBAL ZERO U.S. NUcLEAR POLicy cOMMiSSiON REPORT, http://orepa.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/cartwright-report.pdf]

These illustrative next steps are possible and desirable for five basic reasons. First, mutual nuclear deterrence based on the threat of nuclear retaliation to attack is no longer a cornerstone of the U.S.-Russian security relationship. Security is mainly a state of mind, not a physical condition, and mutual assured destruction (MAD) no longer occupies a central psychological or political space in the U.S.-Russian relationship. To be sure, there remains a physical-technical side of MAD in our relations, but it is increasingly peripheral. Nuclear planning for Cold War-style nuclear conflict between our countries, driven largely by inertia and vested interests left over from the Cold War, functions on the margins using outdated scenarios that are implausible today. There is no conceivable situation in the contemporary world in which it would be in either country’s national security interest to initiate a nuclear attack against the other side. Their current stockpiles (roughly 5,000 nuclear weapons each in their active deployed and reserve arsenals) vastly exceed what is needed to satisfy reasonable requirements of deterrence between the two countries as well as vis-à-vis third countries whose nuclear arsenals pale in comparison quantitatively.

**Russia has abandoned aggression in favor of cooperation**

**Sawczak 11** [Dr. Peter Sawczak, Adjunct Research Fellow at Monash University, “Obama’s Russia Policy: The Wages and Pitfalls of the Reset,” peer reviewed paper presented at the 10th Biennial Conference of the Australasian Association for Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Feb 3-4 2011, <http://cais.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/Sawczak_Obama.pdf>]

As a measure of their optimism, US officials like to point – cautiously – to a discernible shift in Russian foreign policy towards a more pragmatic, cooperative approach. Whether or not the Obama administration can claim credit for this, the United States has at least shown Russia the dividends which could flow from enhanced cooperation. This is most palpably reflected in the Russian foreign policy paper leaked in May 2010, which identifies a “need to strengthen relations of mutual interdependence with the leading world powers, such as the European Union and the US,” 5 as well as, more indirectly, in Medvedev’s modernisation agenda. The fact that Russia has sought, in the tragic circumstances attending commemoration ceremonies at Katyn, rapprochement with Poland and moved to demarcate its border with Norway, in addition to partnering with the US on arms control, Iran and Afghanistan, suggests to US policy-makers that a rethink, however tenuous, is underway. Noteworthy also is the fact that Russia, gladdened by the emergence of more compliant leaders in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, has been remarkably restrained of late in its dealings closer to home, not having waged any major gas wars, threatened leaders, or incited civil war.

## Hegemony Advantage

### 2NC TK = SOPs

#### SpecOps do targeted killing – that includes the aff

Sascha-Dominik Bachmann 13, Reader in International Law (University of Lincoln), 2013, “Targeted Killings: Contemporary Challenges, Risks and Opportunities,” Journal of Conflict and Security Law, doi: 10.1093/jcsl/krt007

Targeted killing has also been used by the USA in theatres of actual combat operations, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as outside these theatres of war and as part of CIA and US military run covert operations in Pakistan. The USA is using drone strikes and Special Forces there to conduct pre-emptive as well as defensive targeted killing operations against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The argument is brought forward that such operations are necessary to protect US forces and its allies in Afghanistan and to disrupt the existent terrorist infrastructure. The focus of such operations is on the so-called ‘Tribal Areas’ of Pakistan, Waziristan, where the Taliban have effectively established an autonomous sphere of influence to the exclusion of the central government in Peshawar.32 Other such covert operations have seen CIA operated drone strikes in Yemen, Somalia as well Sudan, where a lack of cooperation and/or relative capabilities of the respective governments have created areas which are outside effective state control.33

### 2NC Op Temps Internal Link

#### Op Tempos internal link

**Malvesti 10**¸Michele, served more than five years on the National Security Council staff, including as the Senior Director for Combating Terrorism Strategy [“To Serve the Nation U.S. Special Operations Forces in an Era of Persistent Conflict,” June, <http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_To%20Serve%20the%20Nation_Malvesti.pdf>]

Endowed with greater resources and in light of their success in recent years, the community is likely to experience increasing demands from senior government officials and other stakeholders who have invested in SOF, benefitted from their accomplishments, or both. In general, demands for greater SOF employment in helping to defeat imminent threats and prevent or deter other security challenges, particularly outside theaters of combat, should be embraced, given SOF’s value to the nation in this regard. But not all demands placed upon SOF will be in their best interests over the long term. For example, SOF have been invaluable in helping the United States achieve its national security objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan, and demand for SOF contributions will continue for the foreseeable future. While SOF have gained unprecedented combat experience in these two countries, there also could be downsides to this experience. First, SOF could be at risk of growing accustomed to operating in relatively permissive and highly enabled environments. This could take a toll on SOF’s trademark unorthodox thinking over the long term if a generation of SOF develops an operating mentality that tilts toward technology and brawn to the detriment of ingenuity, imagination, and cunning.99 Additionally, these relatively permissive and primitive environments may not prove to be the best training grounds for possible future SOF missions, such as for operations against or within a more technology-enabled and capable state.100 Second, with more than half of today’s Special Operators entering the community after 9/11, SOF are now more operationally adept than at any other time in the modern era. Yet even while recognizing the aptitude of the force, the current SOCOM commander has said, “Most recent SOF combat experience is not Special Operations specific; rather, it has tended to be more conventionalized experience.”101 The modern SOF force may be more skilled and combat-capable, and given the right resources, it is likely to adapt to virtually any situation. Yet current combat experience may not be directly fungible to all types of Special Operations, especially if it contributes to a potential degradation in SOF innovation or hinders operating proficiency in less mature environments—where little support is available and SOF encounter a sophisticated defense against their access to the area of operations.

# 1NR

## Econ

#### Econ decline causes war

**Royal 10** (Jedediah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction – U.S. Department of Defense, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises”, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases**,** as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularlyduring periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate externalmilitary conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in theuse of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflictat systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

#### Escalates globally

Merlini 11

[Cesare Merlini, nonresident senior fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe and chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Italian Institute for International Affairs (IAI) in Rome. He served as IAI president from 1979 to 2001. Until 2009, he also occupied the position of executive vice chairman of the Council for the United States and Italy, which he co-founded in 1983. His areas of expertise include transatlantic relations, European integration and nuclear non-proliferation, with particular focus on nuclear science and technology. A Post-Secular World? DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2011.571015 Article Requests: Order Reprints : Request Permissions Published in: journal Survival, Volume 53, Issue 2 April 2011 , pages 117 - 130 Publication Frequency: 6 issues per year Download PDF Download PDF (357 KB) View Related Articles To cite this Article: Merlini, Cesare 'A Post-Secular World?', Survival, 53:2, 117 – 130]

Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system. One or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into an open and traditional conflict between states, perhaps even **involving the use of nuclear weapons**. The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of the global economic and financial system, the vulnerability of which we have just experienced, and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences for peace and democracy similar to those of the first. Whatever the trigger, the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection of outside interference would likely be amplified, emptying, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of multilateralism, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as those related to immigration might become unbearable. Familiar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated. One way or another, the secular **rational approach would be sidestepped** by a return to theocratic absolutes, competing or converging with secular absolutes such as unbridled nationalism.

#### Causes multiple scenarios for conflict

O’Hanlon 12 — Kenneth G. Lieberthal, Director of the John L. Thornton China Center and Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development at the Brookings Institution, former Professor at the University of Michigan, served as special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Asia on the National Security Council, holds a Ph.D. from Columbia University, and Michael E. O'Hanlon, Director of Research and Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, Visiting Lecturer at Princeton University, Adjunct Professor at Johns Hopkins University, holds a Ph.D. from Princeton University, 2012 (“The Real National Security Threat: America's Debt,” *Los Angeles Times*, July 10th, Available Online at http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/07/10-economy-foreign-policy-lieberthal-ohanlon, Accessed 07-12-2012)

Lastly, American economic weakness undercuts U.S. leadership abroad. Other countries sense our weakness and wonder about our purported decline. If this perception becomes more widespread, and the case that we are in decline becomes more persuasive, countries will begin to take actions that reflect their skepticism about America's future. Allies and friends will doubt our commitment and may pursue nuclear weapons for their own security, for example; adversaries will sense opportunity and be less restrained in throwing around their weight in their own neighborhoods. The crucial Persian Gulf and Western Pacific regions will likely become less stable. Major war will become more likely. When running for president last time, Obama eloquently articulated big foreign policy visions: healing America's breach with the Muslim world, controlling global climate change, dramatically curbing global poverty through development aid, moving toward a world free of nuclear weapons. These were, and remain, worthy if elusive goals. However, for Obama or his successor, there is now a much more urgent big-picture issue: restoring U.S. economic strength. Nothing else is really possible if that fundamental prerequisite to effective foreign policy is not reestablished.

#### No econ resiliency --- collapsing confidence kills it.

**Naroff**, 11/11/**2012** (Joel – president and chief economist of Naroff Economic Advisors Inc., "Fiscal cliff' poses risks of another recession, Philly Inquirer, p. <http://www.philly.com/philly/business/20121111__quot_Fiscal_cliff__poses_risks_of_another_recession.html>)

The problem with falling into another recession is that there are no policies left to stimulate the economy. The Federal Reserve is out of bullets, and fiscal policy is restrictive. It is hard to cut interest rates when they already are at zero percent. While Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke and his merry band of monetary policymakers keep telling us they have more tricks up their sleeves, few believe they would be very effective. As for fiscal policy, it is spending cuts and tax increases that would be implemented, the exact opposite of what you would want to see being put in place in a recession. In other words, the economy would have to fix itself without any help. While it is not unreasonable to think that would happen, the ability to adjust would depend on how badly consumer and business confidence would be hurt. Estimates, which don't include any impacts on confidence, are that going off the cliff would cause the unemployment rate to rise above 9 percent. But if confidence tanks, the jobless rate could easily go back to double digits. The recession would become longer and steeper. Is there an upside to the austerity imposed by the tax increases and spending cuts? Yes, the budget deficit would be cut. And there are few who don't realize that the current deficits are unsustainable. Once growth resumes, we would be in better fiscal shape and have the potential to grow even faster. That is the source of the argument that says we would have some short-term pain with some long-term gain. Of course, we would also have a lot higher taxes and less spending. Though it is nice to hope that we could get out of the recession in a short period of time, when you start with an economy that has been weakened as much as ours has, it is not clear how long it would take to turn it around. The Great Depression was a series of recessions and failed recoveries that lasted a decade. The Great Recession and its disappointing recovery have already lasted five years. Another recession could put us in the same time frame as the Great Depression, and that is a risk most people don't want to take.

#### Not resilient

Nadler 9 [Jon Nadler, Senior Metals Market Analyst, “Easy Money. Who Needs It?,” http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/20090213/easy-money-who-needs-it\_2.htm]

The first line of defense is gone. The economy is not resilient and is not stable. And the second line of defense is eroding. The Fed already has taken interest rates to zero, and lent out nearly $2 trillion in fruitless attempts to revive demand. In his speech, Bernanke proposed that the central bank "can always generate higher spending and hence positive inflation" by simply printing money as fast as possible. We're nowhere near that point yet. But the Fed hasn't demonstrated convincingly that lowering rates to zero and lending out trillions of dollars has had any impact on increasing final demand. It turns out that the Fed can print all the money it wants, but it can't make anyone spend it." Therein lies the rub. Consumer have shifted towards savings. Consumers are avoiding borrowing. Banks will eventually turn to making more credit available than they now are, but if there are no takers for their loans, well, you know the rest. It's called the waiting game. Waiting for prices to fall, and watching employers not hiring. And thus, the spiral whirls until it becomes a hypnotizing, self-perpetuating fall into an abyss. Once again, we are hearing the desirability of 'positive inflation' - what a label.

## Uniqness debate

#### The votes are there

REBECCA **KAPLAN**, **November 5, 2013**, “Obama: House has votes to pass immigration reform,” http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250\_162-57610933/

In a meeting with business leaders to discuss immigration reform, President Obama predicted that there are enough votes in the House to pass the contentious issue. "Although right now there's been some resistance from House Republicans, what's been encouraging is that there are a number of House Republicans who have said we think this is the right thing to do as well," Mr. Obama said Tuesday at the White House. "It's my estimation that we actually have the votes to get comprehensive immigration reform done in the House right now. The politics are challenging for [Speaker Boehner] and others, and we want to make it as easy for them as possible. This is not an issue where we're looking for a political win, this is one where we're looking for a substantive win for the U.S. economy and the American people and the businesses that are represented here." Mr. Obama met with CEOs from Evercore Partners, Motorola Solutions, Deloitte, Lockheed Martin, State Farm, Marriott, Blackstone and McDonalds to discuss ways to move forward on immigration reform. Business leaders have been part of a coalition that includes labor, faith, high-tech and agriculture leaders to [push for legislation](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/30/us/politics/business-conservative-coalition-presses-for-immigration-overhaul-do-it-now.html). [Obama to House GOP: Pass immigration reform this year](http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162-57609109/obama-to-house-gop-pass-immigration-reform-this-year/) [Obama's priorities for the year: Budget, immigration and farm bill](http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162-57607996/obamas-priorities-for-the-year-budget-immigration-and-farm-bill/) Efforts have largely been stalled since June when the Senate [passed](http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162-57591402/immigration-bill-sails-through-senate-has-little-hope-in-house/) a comprehensive immigration bill. The House is unwilling to take up the Senate bill, and although [several other measures have been introduced](http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162-57609109/obama-to-house-gop-pass-immigration-reform-this-year/), none are scheduled for votes before the full body. House Speaker John Boehner has rejected the Senate bill because of its size and complexity. When Mr. Obama renewed his push for immigration reform last month, Boehner spokesman Brendan Buck said, "The House is committed to a common sense, step-by-step approach that gives Americans confidence that reform is done the right way. We hope that the president will work with us - not against us - as we pursue this deliberate approach." House Democrats have [introduced a version](http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/10/02/house-democrats-introduce-separate-immigration-bill/) of the Senate bill that has [attracted three Republican co-sponsors](http://news.fresnobeehive.com/archives/4094), including Reps. David Valadao, R-Calif., Jeff Denham, R-Calif., and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, R-Fla. The president has [singled out immigration reform](http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162-57607996/obamas-priorities-for-the-year-budget-immigration-and-farm-bill/) as a top priority for the rest of the year, and he said again Tuesday that "there's no reason why we can't get this one" in that time frame. Speaking to the press about the meeting, he detailed outside analysis of the [economic benefits](http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/44346-Immigration.pdf) of immigration reform such as billions of dollars in deficit reduction and growth for the economy.

#### Multiple signs point toward passage

**Creamer 10/25** ([Robert Creamer](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-creamer), Political Organizer, Strategist, Author; Partner Democracy Partners , “Four Reasons Why Shutdown Battle Increases Odds of Passing Immigration Reform,” 10/25/2013, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-creamer/four-reasons-why-shutdown_b_4162829.html>)

Portions of the pundit class continue to believe the immigration reform is barely hanging on life support. In fact, in the post-shutdown political environment, there are four major reasons to believe that the odds of Congressional passage of immigration reform have actually substantially increased: Reason #1. The extreme Tea Party wing of the Republican Party has been marginalized. That is particularly true when it comes to the efficacy of their political judgment. For those Republicans who want to keep the Republican Party in the majority - or who occupy marginal seats and hope to be reelected -- it's a safe bet that fewer and fewer are taking political advice from the likes of Ted Cruz. The Republican Party brand has sunk to all-time lows. In a post-shutdown Washington Post-ABC News poll, the percentage of voters holding unfavorable views of the Republican Party jumped to 67 percent. Fifty-two percent of the voters hold the GOP responsible for the shutdown, compared with only 31 percent who hold President Obama responsible. And, of course, far from achieving their stated goal of defunding ObamaCare, they basically got nothing in exchange for spending massive amounts of the Party's political capital. Increasingly, many Republicans have come to the view that taking political advice from the Tea Party crowd is like taking investment advice from Bernie Madoff. And many Republicans are coming to realize that hard-core opponents of immigration reform like Congressmen Steve King and Louie Gohmert are just not attractive to swing voters - especially not to suburban women.The fear of being tainted by the Tea Party has grown among moderate Republicans and those in marginal districts. All of that has lessened the extremist clout within the GOP House caucus. And it should also be acknowledged that the "shutdown the government - to hell with the debt ceiling" crowd is not entirely the same as the "round up all the immigrants" gang. Immigration reform has a good deal of support among Evangelical activists that might share Tea Party tendencies on other issues. That's also true among a growing group of economic libertarians. The business community provides most of the money to fuel the Republican political machine. And the business community - which very much wants comprehensive immigration reform (along with the Labor movement) - is furious with the Tea Party wing and is more ready than ever to challenge them - especially on immigration. Yesterday's Wall Street Journal reports that: Some big-money Republican donors, frustrated by their party's handling of the standoff over the debt ceiling and government shutdown, are stepping up their warnings to GOP leaders that they risk long-term damage to the party if they fail to pass immigration legislation. Some donors say they are withholding political contributions from members of Congress who don't support action on immigration, and many are calling top House leaders. Their hope is that the party can gain ground with Hispanic voters, make needed changes in immigration policy and offset some of the damage that polls show it is taking for the shutdown. Reason #2. House Speaker John Boehner emerged from the shutdown battle with his support in the caucus in tact. At the beginning of the shutdown one Boehner aide was quoted as saying that the Speaker had to let his Tea Party wing find out that the stove is hot by touch it. That's exactly what Boehner did. Instead of just telling them the consequences of shutting down the government and threatening default over ObamaCare, he showed them. He let them run down their entire strategy, get nothing in return and suffer enormous political damage for their trouble. Because Boehner stuck with the Tea Party wing to the bitter end, they joined in the standing ovation the GOP Caucus gave Boehner as he was negotiating the terms of surrender. Had much of the rank and file caucus believed that Boehner sold them out in negotiations with the White House and Senate, he would have had a much more difficult time allowing the House to vote on a pathway to citizenship than is now the case. Reason #3. Their handling of the shutdown left House Republicans with a desperate need to demonstrate that they have the ability to govern effectively. The polling and focus groups make it very clear that increasing numbers of swing voters think they do not. If the GOP is tagged with responsibility for blocking common sense immigration reform that is supported by a wide majority of the voters, was passed with a robust bi-partisan majority in the Senate, and is supported by majority of House members, that will add mightily to the negative narrative about the GOP. A July CBS News poll that asked about immigration found that 78 percent of people surveyed were in favor of providing a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants in the U.S. if they meet certain requirements, including a waiting period, paying fines and back taxes, passing criminal background checks and learning English. It is hard to see how the Republican leadership can afford one more major, iconic instance is which it allows a small extremist minority to gridlock the government by preventing action to repair an immigration system that is universally believed to be broken. Reason #4. Most important, the political outcome of the shutdown has generated a credible narrative that the GOP could, in fact, lose control of the House. Until the shutdown disaster, only a few true believers thought that was possible. Today, it is increasingly viewed as a real possibility. As a result of the shutdown, the Cook Report changed its ratings on 15 House seats. Twelve more Republican seats were moved into the toss-up category, and three Democratic seats moved solidly towards the incumbents. Cook now views a Democratic takeover as a possibility. The recent Washington Post - ABC poll found that Democrats now maintain a 48 percent to 40 percent lead among all voters in the mid-term Congressional elections. The conventional wisdom among political consultants is that once the generic lead exceeds 7 percent it is possible for Democrats to overcome the GOP's redistricting advantage and take control of the House. But, of course what really matters is what happens in individual House districts. Public Policy Polling (PPP) recently conducted a survey for MoveOn.org in 36 swing Congressional districts with Republican incumbents. PPP found that, after the shutdown, Democrats could easily win at least 29. Democrats only need 17 seats to take control of the House. In virtually every district the shutdown was highly unpopular, and messaging about the shutdown increased the Democratic lead in the survey. Plunging Republican fortunes helped Democrats raise record amounts of money in September and October. It also helped propel a number of top tier Democratic challengers into the race. And just this week the death of Congressman Bill Young of Florida, and the announcement that Congressman Tim Griffin in Arkansas will retire, turn two additional districts into open, swing seats. The possibility of losing control of the House is beginning to stare GOP strategists in the face. Do they really want to risk incensing a big block of Hispanic and other immigrant voters by blocking immigration reform, and energizing them to go out to vote in large numbers to punish Republicans for blocking immigration reform? Mid-term elections are more than anything else about turnout. They are about who shows up at the polls. In 2010, motivated Republicans turned out -- and many voters who would cast their ballots for Democrats stayed home. Motivating Hispanic voters to turn out in larger numbers in the mid-terms is a very bad idea for the GOP. Remember that in 2012 Hispanic voters cast 70 percent of their votes for Democrats. It would be one thing if the GOP were only risking losses in a handful of districts. But massive Hispanic voter mobilization could be dispositive to the outcome of dozens of races while Democrats only need to win 17 to reclaim the Speaker's gavel. In fact, a top Hispanic pollster, Latino Decisions, lists 44 GOP-held districts where it believes the Latino vote could be the deciding factor. There are probably more. Bottom line: there is every reason for the GOP leadership to make the decision that it needs to give a comprehensive immigration bill with a path to citizenship an up or down vote on the House floor. If they do, the bill will pass. That would provide Republicans with a good example of bipartisan problem-solving for independent voters, avoid the political risks of mobilizing an incensed, increasingly Democratic Hispanic voting block, please GOP business supporters and -- according to independent economists -- boost economic output over the next two decades by about a 1.4 trillion dollars while reducing the federal deficit by almost a trillion.

#### Obama is going to make it as easy as possible for Boehner to pass it – votes are there

Fred **Lucas**, “OBAMA WANTS TO MAKE IT AS EASY ‘AS POSSIBLE’ FOR JOHN BOEHNER TO GET IMMIGRATION REFORM DONE,” **Nov. 5, 2013**, http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/11/05/obama-wants-to-make-it-as-easy-as-possible-for-john-boehner-to-get-immigration-reform-done/

President Barack Obama said he’s going to try to make it as easy “as possible” for House Speaker John Boehner to get immigration reform past House conservatives who have expressed vocal opposition to such efforts. “It’s my estimation that we actually have the votes to get comprehensive immigration reform done in the House right now,” Obama said Tuesday before going into a closed-door meeting with business leaders. “The politics have been challenging for the speaker of the House and we want to make this as easy for him as possible. This is not an issue where we are looking for a political win. This is one where we are looking for a substantive win.” Obama and Vice President Joe Biden were meeting with business leaders at the White House to push immigration reform. The reform would grant legal status to the more than 11 million illegal immigrants in the United States, providing what supporters call a “pathway to citizenship” and what opponents say is amnesty. The president did not elaborate in his remarks before the meeting as to whether making it easier for Boehner (R-Ohio) would mean compromising on certain provisions of the Senate bill that passed this summer. Obama repeated his view that more illegal immigrants gaining legal status would grow the economy and reduce the federal deficit. Some conservatives fear it would harm American workers and while also ushering in millions of Democratic voters. “As we saw in the Senate, there is strong potential for bipartisan support,” Obama said. “So what I’m going to be talking to the business community about is about how we can continue to amplify this issue in the coming weeks.” “There is no reason we can’t get this done before the end of the year and I continue to be hopeful that with the leadership around this table, who represent hundreds of thousands of employees and billions of dollars in assets for communities all across the country, them joining up with law enforcement, clergy, citizens to make the case that ultimately folks up on Capitol Hill will do the right thing,” he continued. “Right now, there has been some resistance from House Republicans. What’s been encouraging is that a number of House Republicans have said we think this is the right thing to do as well.”

## Vote coming

#### Window will close soon – push key in order to get it passed in 2013

**LEXOLOGY 10/29** (“Window closing to pass immigration reform legislation in 2013,” http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=eb978609-4529-4920-902f-d57f7533b899)

Many analysts believe that a possible window for passage of immigration reform will close at the end of 2013. The topic is considered too hot to handle during 2014, an election year. The Senate has passed a comprehensive immigration bill. Although House committees have passed a few smaller bills addressing specific aspects of immigration reform, the House leadership has not announced plans to act on immigration in 2013. With the resolution of the government shutdown and debt ceiling crises, at least for now, President Obama encouraged Congress to get back to work on other priority issues, including immigration reform. The President reiterated the arguments for comprehensive immigration reform in an October 24 speech, but recognized the political challenges: "Now, obviously just because something is smart and fair and good for the economy and fiscally responsible and supported by business and labor, the evangelical community and many Democrats and many Republicans, that does not mean that it will actually get done. This is Washington, after all." As previously reported, the Senate [passed a comprehensive immigration reform bill](http://www.faegrebd.com/20175) in June. The House will not consider the Senate bill. House committees have [passed a series of targeted bills](http://www.faegrebd.com/20461) addressing specific aspects of immigration reform. A few more bills are expected. Rep. Eric Cantor is working on a KIDS Act that would give legal status to young people brought to the U.S. illegally as children. Rep. Darrell Issa is expected to introduce a bill offering legal status to the undocumented, but only for a temporary period of six years. This is not acceptable to Democrats who want a pathway to full citizenship. Democrats, including President Obama, also oppose a piecemeal approach to immigration reform.

#### It is slowly becoming more undead – vote coming soon

**Sargent 10/29** (Greg, columnist for the Washington Post. “Immigration reform is sort of undead” http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2013/10/29/immigration-reform-is-sort-of-undead/)

We now have two House Republicans on record supporting the immigration reform bill introduced by House Democrats, a version of the Senate bill that gets rid of one border security amendment disliked by House Dems and replaces it with another security measure that has House bipartisan support. Which is to say that immigration reform is just a bit more undead than it was yesterday. GOP Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Florida today signed on to the Democratic bill, after GOP Rep. Jeff Denham did the same over the weekend. This measure is unlikely to get a vote in the House. But Dems have not given up on the possibility that House Republicans will allow a vote on something immigration related this year. Pro-reform Republicans are also not giving up. Here is what GOP Rep. Denham told my Post colleague Peter Wallsten: As for whether his party leadership would let votes happen on any immigration proposals, Denham said he expects the House will get the chance to address the issue in some fashion. “They’ve told me that we’re going to have this [issue] on the floor by the end of the year.” I followed up with Denham’s office for more clarification, and got back this quote from Denham: “I’ve spoken with various members of leadership on this issue. They have told me and said publicly that they expect to see a vote on this issue by the year’s end.”

## link debate

#### Plans unpopular-sparks congressional turf war

John Bennett, 13- “White House Quietly Shifts Armed Drone Program from CIA to DoD”. Defense News. http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130524/DEFREG02/305240010/White-House-Quietly-Shifts-Armed-Drone-Program-from-CIA-DoD

WASHINGTON — The White House has quietly shifted lead responsibility for its controversial armed drone program from the CIA to the Defense Department, a move that could encounter resistance on Capitol Hill. The decision is a landmark change in America’s 12-year fight against al-Qaida and raises new legal and operational questions while solving others. The shift could set off a bitter congressional turf war among the leaders of the committees that oversee the military and intelligence community, who already have sparred over the issue. At issue is a months-long debate about whether the CIA should remain the lead organization for planning and conducting aerial strikes on al-Qaida targets from remotely piloted aircraft.

#### GOP hates the aff – support for broad targeted killing powers

Savage 11 Charlie Savage, newspaper reporter in Washington, D.C., with the New York Times, “In G.O.P. Field, Broad View of Presidential Power Prevails”, Herald Tribune, December 20th, 2011, http://www.heraldtribune.com/article/20111229/ZNYT02/112293016/-1/news?Title=In-G-O-P-Field-Broad-View-of-Presidential-Power-Prevails

WASHINGTON — Even as they advocate for limited government, many of the Republican presidential candidates hold expansive views about the scope of the executive powers they would wield if elected — including the ability to authorize the targeted killing of United States citizens they deem threats and to launch military attacks without Congressional permission.

#### Restricting drones empirically unpopular

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(S, witer for the Washington Times, "Drones over U.S. get OK by Congress", Feb 7, [www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/feb/7/coming-to-a-sky-near-you/?page=all](http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/feb/7/coming-to-a-sky-near-you/?page=all) NL)

Look! Up in the sky! Is it a bird? Is it a plane? It’s … a drone, and it’s watching you. That’s what privacy advocates fear from a bill [Congress](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/congress/) passed this week to make it easier for the government to fly unmanned spy planes in U.S. airspace. The [FAA](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/federal-aviation-administration/) Reauthorization Act, which President [Obama](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/barack-obama/) is expected to sign, also orders the [Federal Aviation Administration](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/federal-aviation-administration/) to develop regulations for the testing and licensing of commercial drones by 2015. Privacy advocates say the measure will lead to widespread use of drones for electronic surveillance by police agencies across the country and eventually by private companies as well. “There are serious policy questions on the horizon about privacy and surveillance, by both government agencies and commercial entities,” said [Steven Aftergood](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/steven-aftergood/), who heads the Project on Government Secrecy at the [Federation of American Scientists](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/federation-of-american-scientists/). The [Electronic Frontier Foundation](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/electronic-frontier-foundation/) also is “concerned about the implications for surveillance by government agencies,” said attorney [Jennifer Lynch](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/jennifer-lynch/). The provision in the legislation is the fruit of “a huge push by lawmakers and the defense sector to expand the use of drones” in American airspace, she added. According to some estimates, the commercial drone market in the United States could be worth hundreds of millions of dollars once the [FAA](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/federal-aviation-administration/) clears their use. The agency projects that 30,000 drones could be in the nation’s skies by 2020. The highest-profile use of drones by the United States has been in the [CIA](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/united-states-central-intelligence-agency/)’s armed Predator-drone program, which targets [al Qaeda](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/al-qaeda/) terrorist leaders. But the vast majority of U.S. drone missions, even in war zones, are flown for surveillance. Some drones are as small as model aircraft, while others have the wingspan of a full-size jet. In [Afghanistan](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/afghanistan/), the U.S. use of drone surveillance has grown so rapidly that it has created a glut of video material to be analyzed. The legislation would order the [FAA](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/federal-aviation-administration/), before the end of the year, to expedite the process through which it authorizes the use of drones by federal, state and local police and other agencies. The [FAA](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/federal-aviation-administration/) currently issues certificates, which can cover multiple flights by more than one aircraft in a particular area, on a case-by-case basis. The [Department of Homeland Security](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/department-of-homeland-security/) is the only federal agency to discuss openly its use of drones in domestic airspace. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, an agency within the [department](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/department-of-homeland-security/), operates nine drones, variants of the [CIA](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/united-states-central-intelligence-agency/)’s feared Predator. The aircraft, which are flown remotely by a team of 80 fully qualified pilots, are used principally for border and counternarcotics surveillance under four long-term [FAA](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/federal-aviation-administration/) certificates. Officials say they can be used on a short-term basis for a variety of other public-safety and emergency-management missions if a separate certificate is issued for that mission. “It’s not all about surveillance,” [Mr. Aftergood](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/steven-aftergood/) said. Homeland Security has deployed drones to support disaster relief operations. Unmanned aircraft also could be useful for fighting fires or finding missing climbers or hikers, he added. The [FAA](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/federal-aviation-administration/) has issued hundreds of certificates to police and other government agencies, and a handful to research institutions to allow them to fly drones of various kinds over the United States for particular missions. The agency said it issued 313 certificates in 2011 and 295 of them were still active at the end of the year, but the [FAA](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/federal-aviation-administration/) refuses to disclose which agencies have the certificates and what their purposes are. The [Electronic Frontier Foundation](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/electronic-frontier-foundation/) is suing the [FAA](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/federal-aviation-administration/) to obtain records of the certifications. “We need a list so we can ask [each agency], ‘What are your policies on drone use? How do you protect privacy? How do you ensure compliance with the Fourth Amendment?’ ” [Ms. Lynch](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/jennifer-lynch/) said. “Currently, the only barrier to the routine use of drones for persistent surveillance are the procedural requirements imposed by the [FAA](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/federal-aviation-administration/) for the issuance of certificates,” said [Amie Stepanovich](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/amie-stepanovich/), national security counsel for the Electronic Privacy Information Center, a research center in Washington. The Department of Transportation, the parent agency of the [FAA](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/federal-aviation-administration/), has announced plans to streamline the certification process for government drone flights this year, she said. “We are looking at our options” to oppose that, she added. Section 332 of the new [FAA](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/federal-aviation-administration/) legislation also orders the agency to develop a system for licensing commercial drone flights as part of the nation’s air traffic control system by 2015. The agency must establish six flight ranges across the country where drones can be test-flown to determine whether they are safe for travel in congested skies. Representatives of the fast-growing unmanned aircraft systems industry say they worked hard to get the provisions into law. “It sets deadlines for the integration of [the drones] into the national airspace,” said [Gretchen West](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/gretchen-west/), executive vice president of the Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International, an industry group. She said drone technology is new to the [FAA](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/federal-aviation-administration/). The legislation, which provides several deadlines for the [FAA](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/federal-aviation-administration/) to report progress to [Congress](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/congress/), “will move the [drones] issue up their list of priorities,” [Ms. West](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/gretchen-west/) said.

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## Politiccs

#### Health care does not affect immigration reform

TONY LEE, “OBAMA: 'NO REASON' NOT TO PASS IMMIGRATION AFTER OBAMACARE DISASTER,” 14 Nov 2013, http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2013/11/14/Obama-No-Reason-Not-to-Pass-Immigration-Reform-After-Obamacare-Disaster

On Thursday, President Barack Obama said the credibility that he lost after lying to the American people about Obamacare was not a reason to be skeptical about the comprehensive immigration reform legislation he has been pushing. "If it comes to immigration reform, there is no reason not to do immigration reform," Obama said in response to a question in the White House briefing room about how the flaws in Obamacare would impact immigration efforts. Obama made his comments at a press conference in which he admitted he "fumbled" the ball on the Obamacare rollout. The president suggested an administrative fix so that Americans who lost the health insurance plans he promised they could keep could now re-enroll in those programs. He also admitted he made promises to Americans about the law's impact while knowing they were inaccurate. For instance, Obama conceded that he knew that roughly 5% of Americans would not be able to keep their insurance plans when he promised Americans in 2009, "If you like your healthcare plan, you'll be able to keep your healthcare plan, period." Yet, a day after House Speaker John Boehner (R-OH) and other leaders announced they would not be going to conference on the Senate's immigration reform legislation, Obama continued to push for it, saying that there was "strong bipartisan" support for the bill and that he has met recently with clergy and the "business community" who support the bill.

## CP

#### Title 10 drone operations are worse, CIA with regular consultation solves

Josh Kuyers, 13- “CIA or DoD: Clarifying the Legal Framework Applicable to the Drone Authority Debate”. Law Fellow at Public International Law & Policy Group. National University Law Brief. American University Washington College of Law. http://nationalsecuritylawbrief.com/2013/04/04/cia-or-dod-clarifying-the-legal-framework-applicable-to-the-drone-authority-debate/

Ultimately, as many of the recent editorials note, any shift in the operational authority over drone strikes from the CIA to the DoD may have little practical effect. This posting explains that the intended increase in accountability and transparency may actually be prevented by the Title 10-Title 50 legal framework meant to provide congressional oversight over drone operations. This is because Congress’ Title 50 oversight functions are meant to provide limited, yet timely information for those operations that, if made public, would prove damaging to U.S. national security or foreign relations. In contrast, Congress’ Title 10 oversight is less stringent because did not envision the military engaging in ongoing hostilities against a global terrorist threat. Given the legal framework governing operational oversight, the Obama Administration might consider providing more transparency and accountability through regularly scheduled, voluntary briefings rather than shifting operational command and control.