# 1nc v. wayne state js

## Off-case

### 1nc

#### Interpretation – Restriction requires prohibition

Northglenn 11

(City of Northglenn Zoning Ordinance, “Rules of Construction – Definitions”, http://www.northglenn.org/municode/ch11/content\_11-5.html)

Section 11-5-3. Restrictions. As used in this Chapter 11 of the Municipal Code, the term "restriction" shall mean a prohibitive regulation. Any use, activity, operation, building, structure or thing which is the subject of a restriction is prohibited, and no such use, activity, operation, building, structure or thing shall be authorized by any permit or license.

#### “In the area” means all of the activities

United Nations 13

(United Nations Law of the Sea Treaty, http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention\_agreements/texts/unclos/part1.htm)

PART I¶ INTRODUCTION¶ Article 1

Use of terms and scope¶ 1. For the purposes of this Convention:¶ (1) "Area" means the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction;¶ (2) "Authority" means the International Seabed Authority;¶ (3) "activities in the Area" means all activities of exploration for, and exploitation of, the resources of the Area;

#### Independent T arg – generic restrict answers don’t apply - restrictions must be enforceable

Elizabeth Boalt 5, Professor of Law Emeritus, University of California, Berkeley, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law The Journal of Appellate Practice and Process Fall, 20035 J. App. Prac. & Process 473, lexis

Four questions follow: (1) Are discouraging words "restrictions" on citation under Rule 32.1? (2) What difference, if any, does it make? (3) What is the risk of judicial resistance to [\*493] no-citation rules, through discouraging words or other means? and (4) Should discouraging words be forbidden?

1. Are Discouraging Words "Restrictions" under Rule 32.1?

The committee's statement notwithstanding, it is not clear that discouraging words have to be considered "restrictions" on citation under the proposed Rule 32.1. These words may be wholly admonitory - and unenforceable. The Fourth Circuit's rule, for example, states that citing unpublished opinions is "disfavored," but that it may be done "if counsel believes, nevertheless, that [an unpublished opinion] has precedential value in relation to a material issue in a case and that there is no published opinion that would serve as well." n129 On the question of what counsel "believes," surely counsel should be taken at her word; counsel's asserted belief that an unpublished opinion has precedential or persuasive value should not be considered a falsifiable fact. Hence no sanction should be available for violating the Fourth Circuit's rule, and the rule's discouraging language in turn would not be a "prohibition or restriction" that was barred by Rule 32.1 as presently drafted.

In the rules of some other circuits, however, the language disfavoring citation of unpublished opinions is unmoored from anyone's "belief" and arguably does impose an objective "prohibition or restriction" determinable by a court. n130 A court might find, for example, that the required "persuasive value with respect to a material issue that has not been addressed in a published opinion" n131 was not present, and hence that the citation was not permitted by the circuit rule.

With what result? It would follow, paradoxically, that the opinion could be cited - because the circuit rule would be struck down under Rule 32.1 as a forbidden "restriction" on citation.

The committee's double-negative drafting thus creates a Hall of Mirrors in which citation of an unpublished opinion [\*494] would be allowed either way. If the local rule's discouraging language is merely hortatory, it is not a "restriction" forbidden by Rule 32.1; but that doesn't matter, because such a rule does not bar the citation in the first place. If, on the other hand, the local rule's language has bite and is a "restriction," then Rule 32.1 strikes it down, and again the citation is permitted.

#### Violation: The aff is only a condition or limit on Presidential power that doesn’t set a statutory restriction.

#### Limits and Ground – anything not a prohibition based on a statutory restriction explodes the topic to an infinite number of affs. Our interp would limit it to 4 areas and process mechanisms. Gives the topic 8 affs and neg can’t generate links because they can spike out of them.

#### Bidirectionality – aff can garner offense based off neg ground.

#### Evaluate T in a competing interpretations framework

### 1nc\*\*\*

The United States Congress should require a declaration of war for any decision by the President of the United States to use or deploy armed forces in circumstances likely to lead to an armed attack, with the exception that South Korea needs reinforcements to fight North Korea.

Congress should define “armed attack” as: The use of force of a magnitude that is likely to produce serious consequences, epitomized by territorial intrusions, human casualties, or considerable destruction of property.

Congress should allow an exception in the event of an armed attack against the United States requiring the urgent use of armed forces making prior approval from the legislature impractical. Congress should require immediate notice of such a determination, and shall require a declaration of war within 14 days or the executive shall cease such use of armed force.

#### War with North Korea is inevitable – US should not estimate the necessity of a strong military force

**VOA 13** (Yulia Zamanskaya, “The Second Korean War is inevitable – British expert,” 25 March 2013, http://voiceofrussia.com/2013\_03\_25/The-Second-Korean-War-is-inevitable-British-expert-128/)

\*cites a British expert\*

Since the 1950s the Pyongyang regime has been continuously issuing claims that North Korea was actively preparing for another invasion by South Korea and its close ally, the US. Official press releases from the North Korean government which were warning the potential adversaries of the regime’s offensive posture have almost become legendary. As a result, South Korea and the US now tend to ignore these claims as absurd. Ben Woodward of the East-West Institute contends, however, that neglecting Pyongyang’s threats might eventually play Old Harry with American and South Korean policymakers. As events and the regime’s rhetoric turn even more ominous, US and South Korea might soon find themselves involved in the Second Korean War before they know it. When North Korea's army suddenly launched a full-scale invasion of the South in June 1950, throwing an already tense international situation into outright crisis, American policymakers reacted with understandable alarm, scrambling to organize an immediate military response. Since that time a lot has changed. While no American leader wishes for yet another conflict in Korea, US policymakers have learnt to ignore the threats of the Pyongyang regime. America is no longer alarmed by numerous offensive statements and a sustained high level of North Korean military readiness. On the one hand, such a relatively relaxed posture on the part of the US is understandable. According to Mr Woodward, ”since the 1950s it has been a ‘good’ tradition of all successive North Korean leaders to respond dramatically, and, every-so-often, hysterically, to every action and statement they did not favour. As a result, it has become increasingly difficult to assess exactly what might trigger a militarized response on the part of the Pyongyang regime”. Indeed, it remains largely unclear what might push North Korean leadership over the edge and cause it to lash out its military might. Mr Woodward speculates that it could be an internal struggle within the regime, but this remains a very unlikely perspective. In this sense, US might indeed be justified to sustain a rather relaxed posture toward Pyongyang. On the other hand, Mr Woodward suggests that “US reluctance can potentially result to one of the major miscalculations of the recent decade: America might simply fail to recognize the signs of impending attack”. “After all”, the expert continues, “every armed conflict where US was recently engaged began with a profound miscalculation”. One has to admit, however, that miscalculation always occurred on both sides of the barricades: as American political elites continuously misunderstood the intent of their opponents, their adversaries underestimated US determination and military readiness. According to Mr Woodward, the current political situation in North Korea could repeat this pattern in which case the Second Korean War will become unavoidable. The expert predicts the Second Korean War to begin either with Pyongyang’s missile strike against US and South Korean targets, or a major military invasion on the South. Among the two possible scenarios, the second seems to be more likely since North Korea has been long preparing for a conventional military invasion on its Southern neighbor. Once the war beings, it is going to be long and extremely costly. In this regard, Mr Woodward asserts that “first of all, while North Korean armed forces are rather backward, they are huge. North Korea is probably the most militarized country in the world. The US would need to mobilize a significant army to fight such an enemy”.

#### US ground forces in Korea are critical to the hold the line while reinforcements arrive—early North Korean successes would prevent the US from landing reinforcements

**Globalsecurity.org 10**  (“OPLAN 5027 Major Theater War – West,” April 27, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oplan-5027.htm)

Pyongyang can credibly threaten the prompt destruction of Seoul with conventional arms alone. The North Korean military could also establish a shallow foothold across the DMZ. However, the DPRK's ability to sustain these offensive operations, or advance its forces further to the south, is questionable. South Korean and American air forces could quickly establish air supremacy and destroy North Korean ground forces. The ensuing buildup of US forces in Korea could reverse any remaining North Korean advances into the South, and unlease offensive operations into the North. North Korea does not require long-range missiles with nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads to devastate Seoul or to make a land grab across the DMZ. Such weapons are needed to deter or defeat an American counteroffensive into North Korea. Pyongyang has the ability to start a new Korean War, but not to survive one. North Korea has about 500 long-range artillery tubes within range of Seoul, double the levels of a the mid-1990s. Seoul is within range of the 170mm Koksan gun and two hundred 240mm multiple-rocket launchers. The proximity of these long-range systems to the Demilitarized Zone threatens all of Seoul with devastating attacks. Most of the rest of North Korea's artillery pieces are old and have limited range. North Korea fields an artillery force of over 12,000 self-propelled and towed weapon systems. Without moving any artillery pieces, the North could sustain up to 500,000 rounds an hour against Combined Forces Command defenses for several hours. North Korea's short-term blitzkrieg strategy envisions a successful surprise attack in the early phase of the war to occupy some or all of South Korea before the arrival of US reinforcements on the Korean Peninsula. North Korean ground forces, totaling some 1 million soldiers, are composed of some 170 divisions and brigades including infantry, artillery, tank, mechanized and special operation forces. Of the total, about 60 divisions and brigades are deployed south of the Pyongyang-Wonsan line. North Korea has deployed more than half of its key forces in forward bases near the border. Seventy percent of their active force, to include 700,000 troops, 8,000 artillery systems, and 2,000 tanks, is garrisoned within 100 miles of the Demilitarized Zone. Much of this force is protected by underground facilities, including over four thousand underground facilities in the forward area alone. From their current locations these forces can attack with minimal preparations. This means a surprise attack on South Korea is possible at any time without a prior redeployment of its units. The North Korean navy has also deployed 430 surface combatants and about 60 percent of some 90 submarine combat vessels near the front line in forward bases. With about 40 percent of its 790 fighter planes deployed near the front line, the North Korean air force could launch a surprise attack on any part of South Korea within a short period of time. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea possesses larger forces than Iraq, and they are already deployed along South Korea's border. A war could explode after a warning of only a few hours or days, not weeks. Unlike in the Persian Gulf, this attack would be prosecuted along a narrow peninsula on mountainous terrain. It would probably be accompanied by massed artillery fire, commando raids, and chemical weapons. Initially, the primary battlefield would be only about 125 kilometers wide and 100 kilometers deep. The DPRK attack would be conducted against well-prepared ROK forces in fortified positions and against larger US forces than in the Persian Gulf. Most probably, the DPRK attack would aim at seizing nearby Seoul by advancing down the Kaesong-Munsan, Kumwa, and Chorwon corridors. If successful, North Korean forces might also try to conquer the entire peninsula before large US reinforcements arrive. The South Barrier Fence is the Southern part of the DMZ. The South Koreans have a series of Defensive lines that cross the entire peninsula, but with the exception of the South Barrier Fence, they aren't connected completely across the peninsula. They are designed to withstand an attack and allow a minimum force to hold a line while reinforcement/counter attack forces are assembled and sent to destroy any penetrations. The basic goal of a North Korean southern offensive is destruction of allied defenses either before South Korea can fully mobilize its national power or before significant reinforcement from the United States can arrive and be deployed. The primary objective of North Korea's military strategy is to reunify the Korean Peninsula under North Korean control within 30 days of beginning hostilities. A secondary objective is the defense of North Korea. To accomplish these ambitious objectives, North Korea envisions fighting a two-front war. The first front, consisting of conventional forces, is tasked with breaking through defending forces along the DMZ, destroying defending CFC forces, and advancing rapidly down the entire peninsula. This operation will be coordinated closely with the opening of a second front consisting of SOF units conducting raids and disruptive attacks in CFC's rear. The DPRK offensive against the ROK will consist of three phases. The objective of the first phase will be to breach the defenses along the DMZ and destroy the forward deployed forces. The objective of the second phase will be to isolate Seoul and consolidate gains. The objective of the third phase will be to pursue and destroy remaining forces and occupy the remainder of the peninsula. Approximately forty percent of the South Korean population resides within 40 miles of Seoul. While the terrain north of Seoul is dominated by rice paddies offering limited off-road mobility, the terrain west of Seoul is a wide coastal plan with the main invasion routes to Seoul. North Korean forces attacking Seoul through the Chorwon or Munsan corridors would have to cross the Han or Imjin rivers (while these rivers freeze in the winter, the ice is not strong enough to support heavy armor). The narrow eastern coastal plain is lightly settled and less heavily defended, though mountains make movement of forces from the east coast difficult. The US plans are based on the belief that the North Koreans would not be successful in consolidating their gains around Seoul and could be pushed back across the DMZ -- though the plans assume the North may break through the DMZ in places. A critical issue is strategic warning of unambiguous signs that North Korea is preparing an attack. The warning time has reportedly been shortened from about ten days to about three days as North Korea has covered its military activities. The US-ROK defense plan would be shaped not only by the threat but also by the mountainous terrain. Korea is commonly regarded as rugged infantry terrain that invites neither mobile ground warfare nor heavy air bombardment, but North Korea has assembled large armored forces that are critical to exploiting breakthroughs, and these forces would pass down narrow corridors that are potential killing zones for U.S. airpower. A new Korean War would bear little resemblance to the conflict of 1950­53. During Phase 1, US-ROK forces would conduct a vigorous forward defense aimed at protecting Seoul. Their campaign would be dominated by combined-arms ground battles waged with infantry, artillery, and armor. US air and naval forces would conduct close air support, interdiction, and deep strike missions. After Phase 1, US-ROK operations in Phase 2 would probably focus on seizing key terrain, inflicting additional casualties on enemy forces, and rebuffing further attacks. Phase 3, to start when the US ground buildup was complete and ROK forces were replenished, would be a powerful counteroffensive aimed at destroying the DPRK's military power. The war plan envisions amphibious assaults into North Korea by US Army and Marines at the narrow waist of North Korea. The entire resources of the [US Marine](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oplan-5027.htm) Corps would flow there to establish a beachead, with substantial Army resources quickly conducting over-the-shore operations.

#### Failure to reinforce South Korea and win the war collapses US heg – turns the case

**Green 10** (Stephen, writer and broadcaster, “North vs. South Korea: How Bad Could a War Get?” 5-27-2010, http://pajamasmedia.com/blog/north-vs-south-korea-how-bad-could-a-war-get/?singlepage=true)

It’s almost certain that the South could handle the North without much in the way of American help — and a Chinese coup de grace would certainly bring hostilities to a quick end. (Let’s assume that China would find it much more beneficial this time around to stop a Korean War than to enlist in one.) But: if President Obama did anything less than to order a full and immediate reinforcement of South Korea — on land, sea, and air — our other enemies and rivals would read much into such inaction. They might read too much into it, but they would read it just the same. More importantly — most especially — is the message our allies would receive: that America is no longer a reliable ally. Turkey has already de facto left NATO, in favor of rising Persian power. Obama has personally handed Israel its hat and coat, and shoved it towards the door. Britain has been insulted, India snubbed, and the French ignored. It wouldn’t take much more to see what remains of our alliances blown apart. In fact, it wouldn’t take anything more than the slightest wobble in dealing with a Second Korean War. And as this administration continues to do little or nothing as “the risk of all-out war” reaches historical highs, the signal being sent is most un-American. “Tread on Me.”

##### Preemptive war is good – regime would collapse immediately

**Smith 3** (Charles R., "Attack North Korea Before It's Too Late, Key Defector Warns," Newsmax, http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2003/7/10/170429.shtml, 7/10/03)

WASHINGTON â€“ A prominent defector is urging the U.S. to use military force against North Korea, and predicts that once the rogue regime acquires nuclear weapons, it will use them against U.S. allies. Park Gap Dong, former chief of the European Section for Propaganda, said that the U.S. should use "pre-emptive strikes against selected targets" to overthrow the brutal North Korean dictator, Kim Jong-il and destroy the nuclear weapons program. "We cannot expect to bring down the regime of Kim Jong-il by internal means. A pre-emptive U.S. strike against selected targets inside North Korea will succeed," stated Park. "U.S. strikes against North Korean targets would force Kim Jong-il to seek asylum in China. Kim Jong-il is a coward. If attacked, he will flee the North. The North Korean army would not fight after the regime collapsed. "Many North Koreans believe that the United States is their savior and the only nation that can liberate North Korea," concluded Park. Park urged the U.S. to take offensive military action against North Korea during a conference held by the American Foreign Policy Council. Park heads the National Salvation Front, a group of high-ranking North Korean exiles living in Moscow and Seoul. NSF's membership includes five former generals of the North Korean army, the former vice minister of home affairs, the former vice minister of culture and the former superintendent of the North Korea Military Academy.

#### Otherwise it causes widespread proliferation

**Sanger 10** – David, chief Washington correspondent for The New York Times

(May 28, “ In the Koreas, Five Possible Ways to War”, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/30/weekinreview/30sanger.html)

With tensions high, American spy satellites are looking for evidence that the North Koreans are getting ready to test another nuclear weapon — just as they did in 2006 and 2009 — or shoot off some more long-range missiles. It is a sure way to grab headlines and rattle the neighborhood. In the past, such tests have ratcheted up tension, and could do so again. But they are not the Obama administration’s biggest worry. As one of Mr. Obama’s top aides said months ago, there is reason to hope that the North will shoot off “a nuclear test every week,” since they are thought to have enough fuel for only eight to twelve. Far more worrisome would be a decision by Pyongyang to export its nuclear technology and a failure by Americans to notice. For years, American intelligence agencies missed evidence that the North was building a reactor in the Syrian desert, near the Iraq border. The Israelis found it, and wiped it out in an air attack in 2007. Now, the search is on to find out if other countries are buying up North Korean technology or, worse yet, bomb fuel. (There are worries about Myanmar.) In short, the biggest worry is that North Korea could decide that teaching others how to build nuclear weapons would be the fastest, stealthiest way to defy a new American president who has declared that stopping proliferation is Job No. 1. It is unclear whether the American intelligence community would pick up the signals that it missed in Syria. And if it did, a crisis might not be contained in the Korean Peninsula; it could spread to the Middle East or Southeast Asia, or wherever else North Korea found its customers.

#### Extinction

Asal and Beardsley 09 (Victor, Department of Political Science, State University of New York, Albany, and Kyle, Department of Political Science, Emory University, Winning with the Bomb, <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/uploads/Beardsley-Asal_Winning_with_the_Bomb.pdf>)

Conclusion Why do states proliferate? Nuclear weapons and the programs necessary to create them are expensive. They are dangerous. Other countries may attack a state while it is trying to create a nuclear arsenal and there is always the risk of a catastrophic accident. They may help generate existential threats by encouraging first strike incentives amongst a state's opponents. This paper has explored the incentives that make nuclear weapons attractive to a wide range of states despite their costly and dangerous nature. We have found that nuclear weapons provide more than prestige, they provide leverage. They are useful in coercive diplomacy, and this must be central to any explanation of why states acquire them. Since 9 August 1945 no state has used a nuclear weapon against another state, but we find evidence that the possession of nuclear weapons helps states to succeed in their confrontations with other states even when they do not “use” them. Conflict with nuclear actors carries with it a potential danger that conflict with other states simply does not have. Even though the probability of full escalation is presumably low, the evidence confirms that the immense damage from the possibility of such escalation is enough to make an opponent eager to offer concessions. Asymmetric crises allow nuclear states to use their leverage to good effect. When crises involve a severe threat – and nuclear use is not completely ruled out – the advantage that nuclear actors have is substantial. Nuclear weapons help states win concessions quickly in 25 salient conflicts. Consistent with the other papers in this issue and the editors’ introduction (Gartzke and Kroenig this issue), we report that nuclear weapons confer tangible benefits to the possessors. These benefits imply that there should be a general level of demand for nuclear weapons, which means that explanations for why so few states have actually proliferated should focus more on the supply side, as applied by Matthew Kroenig (this issue) and Matthew Fuhrmann (this issue). The findings here importantly suggest an additional reason why “proliferation begets proliferation,” in the words of George Shultz (Shultz 1984, 18). If both parties to a crisis have nuclear weapons, the advantage is effectively cancelled out. When states develop nuclear weapons, doing so may encourage their rivals to also proliferate for fear of being exploited by the shifting bargaining positions. And once the rivals proliferate, the initial proliferator no longer has much bargaining advantage. On the one hand, this dynamic adds some restraint to initial proliferation within a rivalry relationship: states fear that their arsenal will encourage their rivals to pursue nuclear weapons, which will leave them no better off (Davis 1993; Cirincione 2007). On the other hand, once proliferation has occurred, all other states that are likely to experience coercive bargaining with the new nuclear state will also want nuclear weapons. The rate of proliferation has the potential to accelerate because the desire to posses the “equalizer” will increase as the number of nuclear powers slowly rises. Our theoretical framework and empirical findings are complementary to Gartzke and Jo (this issue), who posit and find that nuclear states enjoy greater influence in the international realm. An interesting dynamic emerges when comparing the results to Rauchhaus (this issue), who finds that nuclear weapons in asymmetric dyads tend to increase the propensity for escalation. We have argued that nuclear weapons improve the bargaining leverage of the 26 possessors and tested that proposition directly. It is important to note that the factors that shape conflict initiation and escalation are not necessarily the same factors that most shape the outcome of the conflict. Even so, one explanation for why a stronger bargaining position does not necessarily produce less escalation is that escalation is a function of decisions by both sides, and even though the opponent of a nuclear state is more willing to back down, the nuclear state should be more willing to raise its demands and push for a harder bargain in order to maximize the benefits from the nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons appear to need ever-greater shares of their bargains in order to be satisfied, which helps to explain both their proclivity to win and their proclivity toward aggressive coercive diplomacy. An important implication in light of these findings is thus that even though nuclear weapon states tend to fare better at the end of their crises, this does not necessarily mean that the weapons are a net benefit for peace and stability.

### 1nc\*\*\*

#### War powers policy analysis is plagued with flawed scholarship based on constructed threats to US national security – these threats reify the power of the executive while resulting in endless warfare – questioning the underlying assumptions of the knowledge presented in the 1AC is critical to creating a base for substantive political change

Rana, ’11 [Aziz Rana received his A.B. summa cum laude from Harvard College and his J.D. from Yale Law School. He also earned a Ph.D. in political science at Harvard, where his dissertation was awarded the university's Charles Sumner Prize. He was an Oscar M. Ruebhausen Fellow in Law at Yale; “Who Decides on Security?”; 8/11/11; Cornell Law Library; <http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clsops_papers/87/>]

Despite such democratic concerns, a large part of what makes today’s dominant security concept so compelling are two purportedly objective sociological claims about the nature of modern threat. As these claims undergird the current security concept, by way of a conclusion I would like to assess them more directly and, in the process, indicate what they suggest about the prospects for any future reform. The first claim is that global interdependence means that the U.S. faces near continuous threats from abroad. Just as Pearl Harbor presented a physical attack on the homeland justifying a revised framework, the American position in the world since has been one of permanent insecurity in the face of new, equally objective dangers. Although today these threats no longer come from menacing totalitarian regimes like Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union, they nonetheless create of world of chaos and instability in which American domestic peace is imperiled by decentralized terrorists and aggressive rogue states. Second, and relatedly, the objective complexity of modern threats makes it impossible for ordinary citizens to comprehend fully the causes and likely consequences of existing dangers. Thus, the best response is the further entrenchment of Herring’s national security state, with the U.S. permanently mobilized militarily to gather intelligence and to combat enemies wherever they strike – at home or abroad. Accordingly, modern legal and political institutions that privilege executive authority and insulated decisionmaking are simply the necessary consequence of these externally generated crises. Regardless of these trade-offs, the security benefits of an empowered presidency (one armed with countless secret and public agencies as well as with a truly global military footprint)188 greatly outweigh the costs. Yet, although these sociological views have become commonplace, the conclusions that Americans should draw about security requirements are not nearly as clear cut as the conventional wisdom assumes. In particular, a closer examination of contemporary arguments about endemic danger suggests that such claims are not objective empirical judgments but rather are socially complex and politically infused interpretations. Indeed, the openness of existing circumstances to multiple interpretations of threat implies that the presumptive need for secrecy and centralization is not self-evident. And as underscored by high profile failures in expert assessment, claims to security expertise are themselves riddled with ideological presuppositions and subjective biases. All this indicates that the gulf between elite knowledge and lay incomprehension in matters of security may be far less extensive than is ordinarily thought. It also means that the question of who decides – and with it the issue of how democratic or insular our institutions should be – remains open as well. Clearly technological changes, from airpower to biological and chemical weapons, have shifted the nature of America’s position in the world and its potential vulnerability. As has been widely remarked for nearly a century, the oceans alone cannot guarantee our permanent safety. Yet, in truth they never fully ensured domestic tranquility. The nineteenth century was one of near continuous violence, especially with indigenous communities fighting to protect their territory from expansionist settlers. But even if technological shifts make doomsday scenarios more chilling than those faced by Hamilton, Jefferson, or Taney, the mere existence of these scenarios tells us little about their likelihood or how best to address them. Indeed, these latter security judgments are inevitably permeated with subjective political assessments, assessments that carry with them preexisting ideological points of view – such as regarding how much risk constitutional societies should accept or how interventionist states should be in foreign policy. In fact, from its emergence in the 1930s and 1940s, supporters of the modern security concept have – at times unwittingly – reaffirmed the political rather than purely objective nature of interpreting external threats. In particular, commentators have repeatedly noted the link between the idea of insecurity and America’s post-World War II position of global primacy, one which today has only expanded following the Cold War. In 1961, none other than Senator James William Fulbright declared, in terms reminiscent of Herring and Frankfurter, that security imperatives meant that “our basic constitutional machinery, admirably suited to the needs of a remote agrarian republic in the 18th century,” was no longer “adequate” for the “20th- century nation.” For Fulbright, the driving impetus behind the need to jettison antiquated constitutional practices was the importance of sustaining the country’s “preeminen[ce] in political and military power.” Fulbright held that greater executive action and war-making capacities were essential precisely because the United States found itself “burdened with all the enormous responsibilities that accompany such power.”192 According to Fulbright, the United States had both a right and a duty to suppress those forms of chaos and disorder that existed at the edges of American authority. Thus, rather than being purely objective, the American condition of permanent danger was itself deeply tied to political calculations about the importance of global primacy. What generated the condition of continual crisis was not only technological change, but also the belief that the United States’ own ‘national security’ rested on the successful projection of power into the internal affairs of foreign states. The key point is that regardless of whether one agrees with such an underlying project, the value of this project is ultimately an open political question. This suggests that whether distant crises should be viewed as generating insecurity at home is similarly as much an interpretative judgment as an empirically verifiable conclusion. To appreciate the open nature of security determinations, one need only look at the presentation of terrorism as a principal and overriding danger facing the country. According to the State Department’s Annual Country Reports on Terrorism, in 2009 “[t]here were just 25 U.S. noncombatant fatalities from terrorism worldwide” (sixteen abroad and nine at home).194 While the fear of a terrorist attack is a legitimate concern, these numbers – which have been consistent in recent years – place the gravity of the threat in perspective. Rather than a condition of endemic danger – requiring everincreasing secrecy and centralization – such facts are perfectly consistent with a reading that Americans do not face an existential crisis (one presumably comparable to Pearl Harbor) and actually enjoy relative security. Indeed, the disconnect between numbers and resources expended, especially in a time of profound economic insecurity, highlights the political choice of policymakers and citizens to persist in interpreting foreign events through a World War II and early Cold War lens of permanent threat. In fact, the continuous alteration of basic constitutional values to fit ‘national security’ aims highlights just how entrenched Herring’s old vision of security as pre-political and foundational has become, regardless of whether other interpretations of the present moment may be equally compelling. It also underscores a telling and often ignored point about the nature of modern security expertise, particularly as reproduced by the United States’ massive intelligence infrastructure. To the extent that political assumptions – like the centrality of global primacy or the view that instability abroad necessarily implicates security at home – shape the interpretative approach of executive officials, what passes as objective security expertise is itself intertwined with contested claims about how to view external actors and their motivations. This means that while modern conditions may well be complex, the conclusions of the presumed experts may not be systematically less liable to subjective bias than judgments made by ordinary citizens based on publicly available information. It further underscores that the question of who decides cannot be foreclosed in advance by simply asserting deference to elite knowledge. If anything, one can argue that the presumptive gulf between elite awareness and suspect mass opinion has generated its own very dramatic political and legal pathologies. In recent years, the country has witnessed a variety of security crises built on the basic failure of ‘expertise.’ 195 At present, part of what obscures this fact is the very culture of secret information sustained by the modern security concept. Today, it is commonplace for government officials to leak security material about terrorism or external threat to newspapers as a method of shaping the public debate. These ‘open’ secrets allow greater public access to elite information and embody a central and routine instrument for incorporating mass voice into state decision-making. But this mode of popular involvement comes at a key cost. Secret information is generally treated as worthy of a higher status than information already present in the public realm – the shared collective information through which ordinary citizens reach conclusions about emergency and defense. Yet, oftentimes, as with the lead up to the Iraq War in 2003, although the actual content of this secret information is flawed, its status as secret masks these problems and allows policymakers to cloak their positions in added authority. This reality highlights the importance of approaching security information with far greater collective skepticism; it also means that security judgments may be more ‘Hobbesian’ – marked fundamentally by epistemological uncertainty as opposed to verifiable fact – than policymakers admit. If both objective sociological claims at the center of the modern security concept are themselves profoundly contested, what does this mean for reform efforts that seek to recalibrate the r elationship between liberty and security? Above all, it indicates that the central problem with the procedural solutions offered by constitutional scholars – emphasizing new statutory frameworks or greater judicial assertiveness – is that they mistake a question of politics for one of law. In other words, such scholars ignore the extent to which governing practices are the product of background political judgments about threat, democratic knowledge, professional expertise, and the necessity for insulated decision-making. To the extent that Americans are convinced that they face continuous danger from hidden and potentially limitless assailants – danger too complex for the average citizen to comprehend independently – it is inevitable that institutions (regardless of legal reform initiatives) will operate to centralize power in those hands presumed to enjoy military and security expertise. Thus, any systematic effort to challenge the current framing of the relationship between security and liberty must begin by challenging the underlying assumptions about knowledge and security upon which legal and political arrangements rest. Without a sustained and public debate about the validity of security expertise, its supporting institutions, and the broader legitimacy of secret information, there can be no substantive shift in our constitutional politics. The p roblem at present, however, is that no popular base exists to raise these questions. Unless such a base emerges, we can expect our prevailing security arrangements to become ever more entrenched.

#### Extinction is inevitable absent a reconceptualization absent questioning the epistemological failures of the 1ac

**Ahmed 12** Dr. Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed is Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development (IPRD), an independent think tank focused on the study of violent conflict, he has taught at the Department of International Relations, University of Sussex "The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society" Global Change, Peace & Security Volume 23, Issue 3, 2011 Taylor Francis

While recommendations to shift our frame of orientation away from conventional state-centrism toward a 'human security' approach are valid, this cannot be achieved without confronting the deeper theoretical assumptions underlying conventional approaches to 'non-traditional' security issues.106 By occluding the structural origin and systemic dynamic of global ecological, energy and economic crises, orthodox approaches are incapable of transforming them. Coupled with their excessive state-centrism, this means they operate largely at the level of 'surface' impacts of global crises in terms of how they will affect quite traditional security issues relative to sustaining state integrity, such as international terrorism, violent conflict and population movements. Global crises end up fuelling the projection of risk onto social networks, groups and countries that cross the geopolitical fault-lines of these 'surface' impacts - which happen to intersect largely with Muslim communities. Hence, regions particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts, containing large repositories of hydrocarbon energy resources, or subject to demographic transformations in the context of rising population pressures, have become the focus of state security planning in the context of counter-terrorism operations abroad. The intensifying problematisation and externalisation of Muslim-majority regions and populations by Western security agencies - as a discourse - is therefore not only interwoven with growing state perceptions of global crisis acceleration, but driven ultimately by an epistemological failure to interrogate the systemic causes of this acceleration in collective state policies (which themselves occur in the context of particular social, political and economic structures). This expansion of militarisation is thus coeval with the subliminal normative presumption that the social relations of the perpetrators, in this case Western states, must be protected and perpetuated at any cost - precisely because the efficacy of the prevailing geopolitical and economic order is ideologically beyond question. As much as this analysis highlights a direct link between global systemic crises, social polarisation and state militarisation, it fundamentally undermines the idea of a symbiotic link between natural resources and conflict per se. Neither 'resource shortages' nor 'resource abundance' (in ecological, energy, food and monetary terms) necessitate conflict by themselves. There are two key operative factors that determine whether either condition could lead to conflict. The first is the extent to which either condition can generate socio-political crises that challenge or undermine the prevailing order. The second is the way in which stakeholder actors choose to actually respond to the latter crises. To understand these factors accurately requires close attention to the political, economic and ideological strictures of resource exploitation, consumption and distribution between different social groups and classes. Overlooking the systematic causes of social crisis leads to a heightened tendency to problematise its symptoms, in the forms of challenges from particular social groups. This can lead to externalisation of those groups, and the legitimisation of violence towards them. Ultimately, this systems approach to global crises strongly suggests that conventional policy 'reform' is woefully inadequate. Global warming and energy depletion are manifestations of a civilisation which is in overshoot. The current scale and organisation of human activities is breaching the limits of the wider environmental and natural resource systems in which industrial civilisation is embedded. This breach is now increasingly visible in the form of two interlinked crises in global food production and the global financial system. In short, industrial civilisation in its current form is unsustainable. This calls for a process of wholesale civilisational transition to adapt to the inevitable arrival of the post-carbon era through social, political and economic transformation. Yet conventional theoretical and policy approaches fail to (1) fully engage with the gravity of research in the natural sciences and (2) translate the social science implications of this research in terms of the embeddedness of human social systems in natural systems. Hence, lacking capacity for epistemological self-reflection and inhibiting the transformative responses urgently required, they reify and normalise mass violence against diverse 'Others', newly constructed as traditional security threats enormously amplified by global crises - a process that guarantees the intensification and globalisation of insecurity on the road to ecological, energy and economic catastrophe. Such an outcome, of course, is not inevitable, but extensive new transdisciplinary research in IR and the wider social sciences - drawing on and integrating human and critical security studies, political ecology, historical sociology and historical materialism, while engaging directly with developments in the natural sciences - is urgently required to develop coherent conceptual frameworks which could inform more sober, effective, and joined-up policy-making on these issues.

#### Reject the aff as an instance of the violent logic of security

**Burke**, School of Political Science and International Studies, University of Queensland **2002** [Anthony, Aporias of Security, Alternatives 27]

It is perhaps easy to become despondent, but as countless struggles for freedom, justice, and social transformation have proved, a sense of seriousness can be tempered with the knowledge that many tools are already available—and where they are not, the ef­fort to create a productive new critical sensibility is well advanced. There is also a crucial political opening within the liberal problematic itself, in the sense that it assumes that power is most effec­tive when it is absorbed as truth, consented to and desired—which creates an important space for refusal. As Colin Gordon argues, Foucault thought that the very possibility of governing was condi­tional on it being credible to the governed as well as the govern­ing. This throws weight onto the question of how security works as a technology of subjectivity. It is to take up Foucault's challenge, framed as a reversal of the liberal progressive movement of being we have seen in Hegel, not to discover who or what we are so much as to refuse what we are. Just as security rules subjectivity as both a totalizing and individualizing blackmail and promise, it is at these levels that we can intervene. We can critique the machinic frame­works of possibility represented by law, policy, economic regulation, and diplomacy, while challenging the way these institutions deploy language to draw individual subjects into their consensual web. This suggests, at least provisionally, a dual strategy. The first as­serts the space for agency, both in challenging available possibilities for being and their larger socioeconomic implications. Roland Bleiker formulates an idea of agency that shifts away from the lone (male) hero overthrowing the social order in a decisive act of re­bellion to one that understands both the thickness of social power and its "fissures," "fragmentation," and "thinness." We must, he says, "observe how an individual may be able to escape the discur­sive order and influence its shifting boundaries. ... By doing so, discursive terrains of dissent all of a sudden appear where forces of domination previously seemed invincible." Pushing beyond security requires tactics that can work at many-levels—that empower individuals to recognize the larger social, cul­tural, and economic implications of the everyday forms of desire, subjection, and discipline they encounter, to challenge and rewrite them, and that in turn contribute to collective efforts to transform the larger structures of being, exchange, and power that sustain (and have been sustained by) these forms. As Derrida suggests, this is to open up aporetic possibilities that transgress and call into question the boundaries of the self, society, and the international that security seeks to imagine and police. The second seeks new ethical principles based on a critique of the rigid and repressive forms of identity that security has heretofore offered. Thus writers such as Rosalyn Diprose, William Con­nolly, and Moira Gatens have sought to imagine a new ethical rela­tionship that thinks difference not on the basis of the same but on the basis of a dialogue with the other that might, allow space for the unknown and unfamiliar, for a "debate and engagement with the other's law and the other's ethics"—an encounter that involves a transformation of the self rather than the other. Thus while the sweep and power of security must be acknowledged, it must also be refused: at the simultaneous levels of individual identity, social order, and macroeconomic possibility, it would entail another kind of work on "ourselves"—a political refusal of the One, the imagination of an other that never returns to the same. It would be to ask if there is a world after security, and what its shimmering possibilities might be.

## Case

### 1nc wars of choice

#### Current precedent enables Obama to use remote technology to circumvent congressional statute – allows Obama to wage wars with drones instead – makes conflict inevitable

**Savage & Landler ’11** **1AC Author**, \*Charles Savage is a Washington correspondent for The New York Times. He is known for his work on presidential power and other legal policy matters. ¶ Before joining The Times, Mr. Savage covered national legal affairs for the Boston Globe from 2003 to 2008. He received a Pulitzer Prize for National Reporting in 2007 for his coverage of presidential signing statements for the Globe. Other awards he earned while at the Globe include the American Bar Association's Silver Gavel Award and the Gerald R. Ford Prize for Distinguished Reporting on the Presidency.¶ Mr. Savage's book about the growth of executive power, “Takeover: The Return of the Imperial Presidency and the Subversion of American Democracy,” was named one of the best books of 2007 by both Slate and Esquire. The book also received the bipartisan Constitution Project's inaugural Award for Constitutional Commentary, the NCTE George Orwell Award for Distinguished Contribution to Honesty and Clarity in Public Language and the New York Public Library's Helen Bernstein Book Award for Excellence in Journalism.¶ Mr. Savage was born and raised in Fort Wayne, Indiana. He graduated summa cum laude with degrees in English and American literature from Harvard College in 1998. In 2003, he earned a master's degree from Yale Law School, where he was a Knight Journalism Fellow. Mr. Savage got his start as a local government and politics reporter for the Miami Herald. ¶ \*\*Mark Landler is a White House correspondent for The New York Times. Prior to taking up this post in March 2011, he was the newspaper’s diplomatic correspondent. He has reported for The Times from 67 countries on six continents, from Afghanistan to Yemen. ¶ Before moving to Washington in 2008, Mark was a foreign correspondent for 10 years, serving as European economic correspondent in Frankfurt, from 2002 to 2008, and as Hong Kong bureau chief, from 1998 to 2002. He won an Overseas Press Club award in 2007. ¶ Mark began his career at The Times in 1987 as a copy boy. From 1990 to 1995, he was a reporter and editor at Business Week magazine, rejoining The Times in 1995 as a business reporter. He is a 1987 graduate of Georgetown University, and was a Reuter Fellow at Oxford University in 1997.¶ New York Times, June 15, 2011, White House Defends Continuing U.S. Role in Libya Operation, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/16/us/politics/16powers.html?pagewanted=all>, jj

WASHINGTON — **The White House, pushing hard against criticism in Congress over the deepening air war in Libya, asserted Wednesday that President Obama had the authority to continue the military campaign without Congressional approval because American involvement fell short of full-blown *hostilities***.¶ In a 38-page report sent to lawmakers describing and defending the NATO-led operation, the White House said the mission was prying loose Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi’s grip on power.¶ In contending that the limited American role did not oblige the administration to ask for authorization under the War Powers Resolution, the report asserted that “U.S. operations do not involve sustained fighting or active exchanges of fire with hostile forces, nor do they involve U.S. ground troops.” Still, the White House acknowledged, the operation has cost the Pentagon $716 million in its first two months and will have cost $1.1 billion by September at the current scale of operations.¶ The report came one day after the House Speaker, John A. Boehner, Republican of Ohio, had sent a letter to Mr. Obama warning him that he appeared to be out of time under the Vietnam-era law that says presidents must terminate a mission 60 or 90 days after notifying Congress that troops have been deployed into hostilities, unless lawmakers authorize the operation to continue.¶ Mr. Boehner had demanded that Mr. Obama explain his legal justification for passing the deadline. On Wednesday, Brendan Buck, a spokesman for Mr. Boehner, said he was still reviewing the documents, adding that “**the creative arguments made by the White House raise a number of questions that must be further explored**.”¶ The escalating confrontation with Congress reflects the radically altered political landscape in Washington: a Democratic president asserting sweeping executive powers to deploy American forces overseas, while Republicans call for stricter oversight and voice fears about executive-branch power getting the United States bogged down in a foreign war.¶ “We are acting lawfully,” said Harold H. Koh, the State Department legal adviser, who expanded on the administration’s reasoning in a joint interview with the White House counsel, Robert Bauer.¶ **The two senior administration lawyers contended that American forces had not been in “hostilities” at least since early April, when NATO took over the responsibility for the no-fly zone and the United States shifted to primarily a supporting role — providing refueling and surveillance to allied warplanes, although remotely piloted drones operated by the United States periodically fire missiles, too**.¶ They argued that United States forces are at little risk because there are no troops on the ground and Libyan forces are unable to exchange fire with them meaningfully. And they said the military mission was constrained by a United Nations Security Council resolution, which authorized air power for the purpose of defending civilians.¶ “We are not saying the president can take the country into war on his own,” said Mr. Koh, a former Yale Law School dean and outspoken critic of the Bush administration’s expansive theories of executive power. “**We are not saying the War Powers Resolution is unconstitutional or should be scrapped or that we can refuse to consult Congress. We are saying the limited nature of this particular mission is not the kind of ‘hostilities’ envisioned by the War Powers Resolution**.”¶ **Jack L. Goldsmith, who led the Justice Department’s *O*ffice of *L*egal *C*ounsel during the Bush administration, said the Obama theory would *set a precedent* expanding future presidents’ unauthorized war-making powers, especially given the rise of remote-controlled combat technology**.¶ “**The administration’s theory implies that the president can wage war with drones and all manner of offshore missiles without having to bother with the *W*ar *P*owers *R*esolution’s time limits**,” Mr. Goldsmith said.¶ **It remains to be seen whether majorities in Congress will acquiesce to the administration’s argument, defusing the confrontation, or if the theory will fuel greater criticism. Either way, because the statute does not define hostilities and the Supreme Court has never ruled on the issue, *the debate is likely to be resolved politically***, **said Richard H. Pildes, a New York University law professor.**¶ Also on Wednesday, 10 lawmakers — led by Representative Dennis J. Kucinich, Democrat of Ohio, and Representative Walter B. Jones, Republican of North Carolina — filed a lawsuit asking a judge to order Mr. Obama to pull out of the Libya operation because Congress did not authorize it. That lawsuit faces steep challenges, however, because courts in the past have dismissed similar cases on technical grounds.¶ The administration had earlier argued that Mr. Obama could initiate the intervention on his own authority as commander in chief because its anticipated nature, scope and duration fell short of a “war” in the constitutional sense. Since then, the conflict has dragged on for longer than expected, and the goal of the NATO allies has all but openly shifted from merely defending civilians to forcing the Libyan leader, Colonel Qaddafi, from power. But Mr. Koh and Mr. Bauer said that while regime change in Libya might be a diplomatic goal, the military’s mission was separate and remained limited to protecting civilians.¶ **While many presidents have challenged the constitutionality of other aspects of the War Powers Resolution — which Congress enacted over President Richard M. Nixon’s veto — no administration has declared that the section imposing the 60-day clock is unconstitutional, and in 1980, the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel concluded that it was within Congress’s power to enact such a limit**.

#### That’s not the aff – armed forces is limited to u.s. soldiers

**Lorber 13** – Eric Lorber, J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Ph.D Candidate, Duke University Department of Political Science. January 2013, "Executive Warmaking Authority and Offensive Cyber Operations: Can Existing Legislation Successfully Constrain Presidential Power?" University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law, 15 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 961, lexis nexis

As is **evident from a** textual analysis, n177 an examination of the legislative history, n178 and **the broad** policy purposes behind the creation of the Act, n179 [\*990] "armed forces" refers to U.S. soldiers and members of the armed forces, not weapon systems or capabilities such as offensive cyber weapons. Section 1547 does not specifically define "armed forces," but it states that "the term "introduction of United States Armed Forces' includes the assignment of members of such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or government." n180 While this definition pertains to the broader phrase "introduction of armed forces," the clear implication is that **only members of the armed forces count for the purposes of the definition under the WPR.** Though not dispositive, **the term "member" connotes a human individual who is part of an organization.** n181 Thus, it appears that the term "armed forces" means human members of the United States armed forces. However, there exist two potential complications with this reading. First, the language of the statute states that "the term "introduction of United States Armed Forces' includes the assignment of members of such armed forces." n182 By using inclusionary - as opposed to exclusionary - language, one might argue that the term "armed forces" could include more than members. This argument is unconvincing however, given that a core principle of statutory interpretation, expressio unius, suggests that **expression of one thing (i.e., members) implies the exclusion of others (**such as non-members **constituting armed forces)**. n183 Second, the term "member" does not explicitly reference "humans," and so could arguably refer to individual units and beings that are part of a larger whole (e.g., wolves can be members of a pack). As a result, though a textual analysis suggests that "armed forces" refers to human members of the armed forces, such a conclusion is not determinative.¶ **An examination of the legislative history also suggests that Congress clearly conceptualized "armed forces" as human members of the armed forces**. For example, disputes over the term "armed forces" revolved around who could be considered members of the armed forces, not what constituted a member. Senator Thomas Eagleton, one of the Resolution's architects, proposed an amendment during the process providing that the Resolution cover military officers on loan to a civilian agency (such as the Central [\*991] Intelligence Agency). n184 This amendment was dropped after encountering pushback, n185 but the debate revolved around whether those military individuals on loan to the civilian agency were still members of the armed forces for the purposes of the WPR, suggesting that Congress considered the term to apply only to soldiers in the armed forces. Further, during the congressional hearings, the question of deployment of "armed forces" centered primarily on past U.S. deployment of troops to combat zones, n186 suggesting that **Congress conceptualized "armed forces" to mean U.S. combat troops.**¶ **The broad purpose of the Resolution aimed to prevent the large-scale but unauthorized deployments of U.S. troops into hostilities**. n187 While examining the broad purpose of a legislative act is increasingly relied upon only after examining the text and legislative history, here it provides further support for those two alternate interpretive sources. n188 As one scholar has noted, "the War Powers Resolution, for example, is concerned with sending U.S. troops into harm's way." n189 The historical context of the War Powers Resolution is also important in determining its broad purpose; as the resolutions submitted during the Vietnam War and in the lead-up to the passage of the WPR suggest, Congress was concerned about its ability to effectively regulate the President's deployments of large numbers of U.S. troops to Southeast Asia, n190 as well as prevent the President from authorizing troop incursions into countries in that region. n191 The WPR was a reaction to the President's continued deployments of these troops into combat zones, and as such suggests that Congress's broad purpose was to prevent the unconstrained deployment of U.S. personnel, not weapons, into hostilities.¶ This analysis suggests that, when defining the term "armed forces," Congress meant members of the armed forces who would be placed in [\*992] harm's way (i.e., into hostilities or imminent hostilities). **Applied to offensive cyber operations, such a definition leads to the conclusion that the** W**ar** P**owers** R**esolution likely does not cover such activities**. Worms, viruses, and kill switches are clearly not U.S. troops. Therefore, the key question regarding whether the WPR can govern cyber operations is not whether the operation is conducted independently or as part of a kinetic military operation. Rather, the key question is the delivery mechanism. For example, if military forces were deployed to launch the cyberattack, such an activity, if it were related to imminent hostilities with a foreign country, could trigger the WPR. This seems unlikely, however, for two reasons. First, it is unclear whether small-scale deployments where the soldiers are not participating or under threat of harm constitute the introduction of armed forces into hostilities under the War Powers Resolution. n192 Thus, **individual operators deployed to plant viruses in particular enemy systems may not constitute armed forces introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities.** Second, such a tactical approach seems unlikely. If the target system is remote access, the military can attack it without placing personnel in harm's way. n193 If it is close access, there exist many other effective ways to target such systems. n194 As a result, unless U.S. troops are introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities while deploying offensive cyber capabilities - which is highly unlikely - such operations will not trigger the War Powers Resolution.

#### Obama’s lawyers find a way to circumvent – makes war inevitable

**Savage & Landler ’11** **1AC Author**, \*Charles Savage is a Washington correspondent for The New York Times. He is known for his work on presidential power and other legal policy matters. ¶ Before joining The Times, Mr. Savage covered national legal affairs for the Boston Globe from 2003 to 2008. He received a Pulitzer Prize for National Reporting in 2007 for his coverage of presidential signing statements for the Globe. Other awards he earned while at the Globe include the American Bar Association's Silver Gavel Award and the Gerald R. Ford Prize for Distinguished Reporting on the Presidency.¶ Mr. Savage's book about the growth of executive power, “Takeover: The Return of the Imperial Presidency and the Subversion of American Democracy,” was named one of the best books of 2007 by both Slate and Esquire. The book also received the bipartisan Constitution Project's inaugural Award for Constitutional Commentary, the NCTE George Orwell Award for Distinguished Contribution to Honesty and Clarity in Public Language and the New York Public Library's Helen Bernstein Book Award for Excellence in Journalism.¶ Mr. Savage was born and raised in Fort Wayne, Indiana. He graduated summa cum laude with degrees in English and American literature from Harvard College in 1998. In 2003, he earned a master's degree from Yale Law School, where he was a Knight Journalism Fellow. Mr. Savage got his start as a local government and politics reporter for the Miami Herald. ¶ \*\*Mark Landler is a White House correspondent for The New York Times. Prior to taking up this post in March 2011, he was the newspaper’s diplomatic correspondent. He has reported for The Times from 67 countries on six continents, from Afghanistan to Yemen. ¶ Before moving to Washington in 2008, Mark was a foreign correspondent for 10 years, serving as European economic correspondent in Frankfurt, from 2002 to 2008, and as Hong Kong bureau chief, from 1998 to 2002. He won an Overseas Press Club award in 2007. ¶ Mark began his career at The Times in 1987 as a copy boy. From 1990 to 1995, he was a reporter and editor at Business Week magazine, rejoining The Times in 1995 as a business reporter. He is a 1987 graduate of Georgetown University, and was a Reuter Fellow at Oxford University in 1997.¶ New York Times, June 15, 2011, White House Defends Continuing U.S. Role in Libya Operation, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/16/us/politics/16powers.html?pagewanted=all>, jj

Mr. Bauer and Mr. Koh said that the 1980 memorandum remained in force, but that their legal argument was not invoking any constitutional challenge to bolster their interpretation of hostilities. It was not clear whether the Justice Department had endorsed the White House’s interpretation of hostilities. Mr. Bauer declined to say whether it had signed off on the theory, saying he would not discuss interagency deliberations. In his letter on Tuesday, Mr. Boehner demanded to know whether there was internal dissent about the administration’s legal stance. Mr. Koh noted that there had been disputes about whether the 60-day clock of the War Powers Resolution (a deadline that can be extended for 30 days under some circumstances) applied to deployments in which — unlike in Libya — there were troops on the ground and American casualties.

#### Alt causes to u.s. hegemony decline – russian soi, budgets, credibility, NSA scandal, oil shocks – all decimate American heg.

#### Turn - Reducing presidential war powers creates a power vacuum that triggers new conflicts and weakens heg

**Gottlieb '12** Stuart, CNN Special correspondent, prof of American foreign policy and international security at Columbia, affiliate of the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, "What if U.S. stops policing the world?" September 19, 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/18/opinion/gottlieb-us-retrenchment/index.html

But the question is not whether promises to bring home troops and reduce military spending can be sold in an election year -- the question is what impact would retrenchment have on future U.S. and global security. If history is any guide, the answer is troubling: **Over the past century, each of America's attempts to reduce its role in the world was met by rising global threats, eventually requiring a major U.S. re-engagement.** This is not to argue that the U.S. should sustain its muscular post-9/11 global posture or continue its land war in Afghanistan. It is to urge caution against a growing belief that scaling back American power in the world will be without risks or costs. History shows that in the aftermath of America's major wars of the 20th century -- World War I, World War II and Vietnam -- the American public and powerful leaders in Washington demanded strict new limits in foreign policy. After World War I, that meant rejecting participation in the League of Nations and receding into isolation. After World War II, it meant embarking on one of the largest voluntary military demobilizations in world history. And after Vietnam, it meant placing new restrictions on a president's ability to conduct overseas operations. But **in each case, hopes were soon dashed by global challengers who took advantage of America's effort to draw back from the world stage** -- Germany and Japan in the 1930s, the Soviet Union in the immediate post-World War II period and the Soviet Union again after Vietnam. In each case, **the United States was forced back into a paramount global leadership role** -- in World War II, the Cold War and the military build-up and proxy wars of the 1980s. **Similar effects have also followed the withdrawal of U.S. troops from global hot spots**, as in Somalia in 1993. America's need to extricate itself from that calamitous humanitarian mission, in which 18 U.S. soldiers were killed, was clear. But the withdrawal came at a huge strategic cost: It emboldened the narrative of the emerging al Qaeda network that America was a "paper tiger," setting the stage for the escalating terrorist attacks of the 1990s and September 11, 2001. Obama's desire to withdraw from costly and unpopular foreign conflicts and refocus on domestic issues is understandable. And he is by no means an isolationist, as his intensified war on al Qaeda can attest. But **Obama's assertion that his recalibration of U.S. foreign policy -- centered on withdrawing U.S. troops from Mideast wars and leaning more on allies and the United Nations -- has awakened "a new confidence in our leadership" is without foundation.** Like Great Britain in the 19th century, America since the turn of the 20th century has been the world's pivotal global power. **Fair or not, in moments when America seemed unsure of its role in the world, the world noticed and reacted.** There is no reason to believe now is different. Indeed, in many ways **looming opportunists are more obvious today** than the 1930s, 1970s and 1990s. **These include al Qaeda and other Islamist movements spinning U.S. troop withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan as strategic defeats; an emboldened Iran on the cusp of attaining nuclear weapons; and a rising China flexing its muscles in the South China Sea**.

#### SQUO solves heg – post-iraq already re-oriented our strategy and withdrawal is already occurring in the status quo

### 1nc pre-emption

#### Turn—Warming

#### A) Middle East war solves it

**CETRON AND DAVIES SEPTEMBER 1 2007** (Marvin, president of Forecasting International Ltd.; Owen, former senior editor at Omni magazine and freelance writer, The Futurist)

Coal gasification. In an effort to wean the United States off foreign oil, the Department of Energy has mounted a substantial R&D program for coal gasification. A gasification pilot plant is expected toenter operation in 2010, and the zero-emissions FutureGen power plant, based on an advanced gasifier, is scheduled to begin producing electricity and hydrogen a few years later. Nothing can make coal miningenvironmentally friendly, but these technologies at least reduce thegreenhouse and respiratory impact of burning coal for power. The gasification program will be one of the first alternative energy programs to be accelerated in time of Middle Eastern war. Coupled with consumer trends toward plug-in hybrid cars, real opportunities for energy efficiency exist through coal power. [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] \* Renewables. We can expect a much stronger push for renewable energy as well. Given the proper incentives--and a world oil shortage seems likely to qualify--solar, wind, and other renewable power technologies already have proven useful.

#### B) Extinction

**Tickell 8** [Oliver, Climate Researcher, The Guardian, 8-11, “On a planet 4C hotter, all we can prepare for is extinction”, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/11/climatechange>]

We need to get prepared for four degrees of global warming, Bob Watson told the Guardian last week. At first sight this looks like wise counsel from the climate science adviser to Defra. But the idea that we could adapt to a 4C rise is absurd and dangerous. Global warming on this scale would be a catastrophe that would mean, in the immortal words that Chief Seattle probably never spoke, "the end of living and the beginning of survival" for humankind. Or perhaps the beginning of our extinction. The collapse of the polar ice caps would become inevitable, bringing long-term sea level rises of 70-80 metres. All the world's coastal plains would be lost, complete with ports, cities, transport and industrial infrastructure, and much of the world's most productive farmland. The world's geography would be transformed much as it was at the end of the last ice age, when sea levels rose by about 120 metres to create the Channel, the North Sea and Cardigan Bay out of dry land. Weather would become extreme and unpredictable, with more frequent and severe droughts, floods and hurricanes. The Earth's carrying capacity would be hugely reduced. Billions would undoubtedly die. Watson's call was supported by the government's former chief scientific adviser, Sir David King, who warned that "if we get to a four-degree rise it is quite possible that we would begin to see a runaway increase". This is a remarkable understatement. The climate system is already experiencing significant feedbacks, notably the summer melting of the Arctic sea ice. The more the ice melts, the more sunshine is absorbed by the sea, and the more the Arctic warms. And as the Arctic warms, the release of billions of tonnes of methane – a greenhouse gas 70 times stronger than carbon dioxide over 20 years – captured under melting permafrost is already under way. To see how far this process could go, look 55.5m years to the Palaeocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum, when a global temperature increase of 6C coincided with the release of about 5,000 gigatonnes of carbon into the atmosphere, both as CO2 and as methane from bogs and seabed sediments. Lush subtropical forests grew in polar regions, and sea levels rose to 100m higher than today. It appears that an initial warming pulse triggered other warming processes. Many scientists warn that this historical event may be analogous to the present: the warming caused by human emissions could propel us towards a similar hothouse Earth.

#### Middle East war would be short and small-scale

**FERGUSON 2006** (Niall, Professor of History at Harvard University, Senior Research Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford, and Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institution, Stanford, LA Times, July 24)

Could today's quarrel between Israelis and Hezbollah over Lebanon produce World War III? That's what Republican Newt Gingrich, the former speaker of the House, called it last week, echoing earlier fighting talk by Dan Gillerman, Israel's ambassador to the United Nations. Such language can — for now, at least — safely be dismissed as hyperbole. This crisis is not going to trigger another world war. Indeed, I do not expect it to produce even another Middle East war worthy of comparison with those of June 1967 or October 1973. In 1967, Israel fought four of its Arab neighbors — Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq. In 1973, Egypt and Syria attacked Israel. Such combinations are very hard to imagine today. Nor does it seem likely that Syria and Iran will escalate their involvement in the crisis beyond continuing their support for Hezbollah. Neither is in a position to risk a full-scale military confrontation with Israel, given the risk that this might precipitate an American military reaction. Crucially, Washington's consistent support for Israel is not matched by any great power support for Israel's neighbors. During the Cold War, by contrast, the risk was that a Middle East war could spill over into a superpower conflict. Henry Kissinger, secretary of State in the twilight of the Nixon presidency, first heard the news of an Arab-Israeli war at 6:15 a.m. on Oct. 6, 1973. Half an hour later, he was on the phone to the Soviet ambassador in Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin. Two weeks later, Kissinger flew to Moscow to meet the Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev. The stakes were high indeed. At one point during the 1973 crisis, as Brezhnev vainly tried to resist Kissinger's efforts to squeeze him out of the diplomatic loop, the White House issued DEFCON 3, putting American strategic nuclear forces on high alert. It is hard to imagine anything like that today. In any case, this war may soon be over. Most wars Israel has fought have been short, lasting a matter of days or weeks (six days in '67, three weeks in '73). Some Israeli sources say this one could be finished in a matter of days. That, at any rate, is clearly the assumption being made in Washington.

# 2nc v. wayne state js

## PreEmption

### ME – Warming Overview

#### Turns all their impacts—warming makes every war more likely

**ECES 2004** (Earth Crash Earth Spirit, Feb 22, <http://www.eces.org/articles/000796.php>)

According to the [U.K. Guardian](http://www.guardian.co.uk/climatechange/story/0,12374,1153530,00.html), a Pentagon report warns that major European cities could be sunk beneath rising seas, Britain plunged into a "Siberian" climate by 2020, and nuclear war, mega-droughts, famine and widespread rioting will erupt across the world as global warming increasingly disrupts the global climate and food and water supplies around the world. Unlike most climate change studies which examine global warming over more than a century, the Pentagon study is based on an "abrupt climate change" that scientists say has happened in the past and could happen again soon, according to [Knight Ridder](http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/8023054.htm). The planning document predicts that abrupt climate change could bring the planet to the edge of anarchy as countries develop nuclear weapons to defend and secure dwindling food, water and energy supplies. The threat to global stability vastly eclipses that of terrorism, say the experts privy to its contents. "Disruption and conflict will be endemic features of life," concludes the Pentagon analysis. "Once again, warfare would define human life."

### a/t: instability solves

#### There will be no cause of instability anymore in the status quo

**Al Jazeera 13** (http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/12/iran-seeks-arab-help-regional-stability-2013122184535505699.html

Iran's foreign minister has appealed to Gulf Arab states to overcome their differences and work together for regional stability and to find a solution to the Syrian crisis.

Speaking on Talk to Al Jazeera programme, to be broadcast on Tuesday at 07:30 GMT and 16:30 GMT, Mohammad Javad Zarif said all countries in the region needed to reach across the sectarian divide to contain threats of violence and extremism, particularly in Syria.

"We should all work to end violence to bring about a political solution to end this tragedy that is a shame for both the Sunnis and Shias," said Zarif, who was in Doha, Qatar, as part of a tour of Gulf Arab states.

"It's a shame for the Islamic world. It's a shame for our region. We have to come to the realisation that these divisions will not help resolve the problem."

### ME Defense

#### 1). No escalation

#### A) Arab states won’t escalate

**COOK et al 2007** (Steven A., fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations; Ray Takeyh (fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations) Suzanne Maloney (senior fellow at Saban Center) June 28 2007 “Why the Iraq war won't engulf the Mideast”, International Herald Tribune

Finally, there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight. Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight. As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, they have long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiite militias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary. So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnic struggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the borders of Iraq. The Middle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil wars. But given its experience with ambiguous conflicts, the region has also developed an intuitive ability to contain its civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East.

#### B) No economic damage and no great power intervention

**KELLEY 2002** (Jack, national security writer for the Post-Gazette and The Blade of Toledo Pittsburgh Post Gazette, April 7)

During the Cold War, there was reason to suppose an Arab-Israeli war could spark a third world war. In those days, Israel was a client of the United States. The radical Arab states were clients of the Soviet Union. If the proxies got into a tiff, the conflict could spread to the principals. The closest we came to this was during the Yom Kippur War of 1973, when Egyptians, in a surprise attack, dealt a severe blow to Israeli defense forces. Only an airlift of M-60 tanks from U.S. bases in Germany kept Israel from being overrun. Once its initial battle losses had been replaced, Israel quickly regained the initiative, routing Egyptian and Syrian forces. Israeli troops were poised to take Cairo and Damascus. The Soviets were willing to permit the United States to restore the status quo ante. But they threatened to intervene to prevent a decisive Israeli victory. So we prevailed upon the Israelis to stop short of humiliating their enemies. The Yom Kippur War was a near thing for the world. Only three times in history have U.S. forces gone to DEFCON 1, the highest war footing. The Yom Kippur War was one of those times. Now the Cold War is over. Russia is a shadow of what we thought the Soviet Union was, and is more or less an ally in the war on terror. Radical Arabs have lost their sponsor. And Egypt has, after a fashion, switched sides. There is no longer good reason to suppose a conflict between Israelis and Palestinians would spread. Another consequence of the Yom Kippur war was the Arab oil embargo. But the oil "weapon" has lost much of its bang. We are more dependent upon foreign oil now than we were then, but less dependent on oil from the Persian Gulf, since new sources elsewhere have been developed. And Arab governments have become so dependent upon oil revenues that the loss of them would harm Arabs more than the loss of their oil would harm us.

### a/t: Saudi arabia

#### Oil prices low and dropping-as a result of slowed demand

**Reuters 4/21**, (April 21st, 2013, “How lower gold and oil prices affect India” http://profit.ndtv.com/news/economy/article-how-lower-gold-and-oil-prices-affect-india-321181)nasokan

Brent crude is down about 16 per cent from the year's high at $119.17, hit on February 8.¶ Economists at JP Morgan estimate a 15 per cent drop in the price of oil, caused by a supply increase, would be enough to lift global economic output this year by 0.2 percentage points.¶ But if the price fall reflects a darkening economic outlook, the same 15 per cent decline is consistent with a 0.5 per cent downgrade in global growth prospects for the year, the bank calculates.¶ An executive at Indian engineering company Larsen & Toubro said the broader fall in commodity prices cut both ways. Cheaper materials would help profit margins and, if the trend were sustained, would increase the chances of lower interest rates, he said. But prices were falling for a reason.¶ "Prices are down today because the investment cycle has slowed and demand for commodities has slowed. If this extends over the long term, it cannot be a good thing for a projects company such as ours," he said.

#### Oil prices are at an 8 month low

**Reuters 4/10** [“Oil prices near eight-month low on demand worries” 4/10/13 http://thepeninsulaqatar.com/business/232435-oil-prices-near-eight-month-low-on-demand-worries.html]crk

LONDON: Brent crude oil steadied below $105 per barrel yesterday, close to an eight-month low, as investors worried faltering global growth and recession in some developed economies would cap energy demand at a time of increasing global supply. Oil prices found some support from worries over increasing tension in North Korea and a stalemate in talks between Iran and Western nations, raising fears of a possible disruption to fuel supplies from the Middle East. Brent was unchanged at $104.66 per barrel by 1415 GMT, not far above a low of $103.40 reached on Monday, its weakest since last July. US crude futures was unchanged at $93.36 per barrel. Both crude contracts strengthened earlier yesterday after news of lower-than-expected Chinese inflation which could help bolster demand in the world’s second biggest oil consumer. China’s annual consumer inflation eased to 2.1 percent in March from 3.2 percent in February, while producer price deflation deepened, data showed yesterday. But the short-covering rally quickly petered out and analysts said further losses could be in prospect. “With oil stocks so high, supply improving and the outlook for oil demand so uncertain, there seems to be little basis for a strong, sustained rally,” said Carsten Fritsch, senior oil analyst at Commerzbank in Frankfurt. Brent has fallen from a peak above $119 at the beginning of February, with nearby North Sea crude futures bearing much of the pressure as investors switched into other assets. The prompt Brent futures contract slumped last week to a discount below the second month for the first time in nine months, throwing the front of the price curve into “contango”. Brent’s premium over U S light crude, also known as West Texas Intermediate or WTI has also narrowed to about $11 from $23 over the last two months. Analysts say the Brent-WTI spread could narrow further as European concerns weigh on Brent, while the start-up of a new pipeline will alleviate a glut of crude at the Cushing, Oklahoma, hub for U S oil, and keep the US crude contract well supported. Oil markets await U S inventory data for the week ended April 5. Data last week showed an inventory build last seen in 1990, dragging oil prices down to an eight-month low on Friday. A Reuters analysts’ survey showed crude stockpiles were expected to rise by 1.5 million barrels.

### a/t: oil shocks

#### No economic impact to oil shocks – trade and petrodollar recycling check

Tobias N. Rasmussen and Agustín Roitman August 2011 Middle East and Central Asia Department, International Monetary Fund; “Oil Shocks in a Global Perspective: Are they Really that Bad?”

VII. CONCLUSION Conventional wisdom has it that oil shocks are bad for oil-importing countries. This is grounded in the experience of slumps in many advanced economies during the 1970s. It is also consistent with the large body of research on the impact of higher oil prices on the U.S. economy, although the magnitude and channels of the effect are still being debated. In this paper, we offer a global perspective on the macroeconomic impact of oil prices. In doing so, we are filling a void of research on the effects of oil prices on developing economies. Our findings indicate that oil prices tend to be surprisingly closely associated with good times for the global economy. Indeed, we find that the United States has been somewhat of an outlier in the way that it has been negatively affected by oil price increases. Across the world, oil price shock episodes have generally not been associated with a contemporaneous decline in output but, rather, with increases in both imports and exports. There is evidence of lagged negative effects on output, particularly for OECD economies, but the magnitude has typically been small. Controlling for global economic conditions, and thus abstracting from our finding that oil price increases generally appear to be demand-driven, makes the impact of higher oil prices stand out more clearly. For a given level of world GDP, we do find that oil prices have a negative effect on oil-importing countries and also that cross-country differences in the magnitude of the impact depend to a large extent on the relative magnitude of oil imports. The effect is still not particularly large, however, with our estimates suggesting that a 25 percent increase in oil prices will cause a loss of real GDP in oil-importing countries of less than half of one percent, spread over 2–3 years. One likely explanation for this relatively modest impact is that part of the greater revenue accruing to oil exporters will be recycled in the form of imports or other international flows, thus contributing to keep up demand in oil-importing economies. We provide a model illustrating this effect and find supporting empirical evidence.

#### High oil prices good—Norwegian economy

**DAGENS NÆRINGSLIV 10-15-2008** (lexis)

DnB Nor's chief economist in Norway, Øystein Dørum, says that although the financial crisis is far from over, it has hit a turning point and he thinks Norway will do best out of all the western economies, in particular if the oil price stays above US$ 60 (EUR 44.49)-70 per barrel. Nevertheless the labour market and property market will be weakened in the near-future.

#### Norwegian economy solves war and contains escalation worldwide

**WHITFIELD 2008 (**Teresa Whitfield, Director, Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum, Social Science Research Council, 2008Armed conflict and the Role of Norway, http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/kampanjer/refleks/innspill/engasjement/whitfield.html?id=493364)

From the mid-1990s on there has been a sharp decline in the numbers of wars, genocides, and international crises after a steady rise for more than four decades and a notable growth in the number of conflicts that ended, and ended in negotiated peace agreements rather than in victory, as has been amply documented by the Human Security Report and others.[1] Much of this decline can be attributed to the explosion of international attention – through the United Nations, by regional organizations, individual states such as Norway, states acting together in “Friends” or “contact groups”, and non-governmental actors – to peacemaking and conflict management. But there is no room for complacency. Experience has shown that those who underestimate how difficult it is to stop wars on a self-sustaining basis do so at their peril. Sub-Saharan Africa was the only region in the world to see a decline in armed conflict between 2002 and 2005; as of mid-2007 there remain some 56 active conflicts (defined by 25 or more battle-related deaths in a given year), while the list of conflicts or situations in which conflict or crisis might threaten maintained by the International Crisis Group in its “Crisis Watch” numbers over seventy. The most likely prognosis for the future is that violent conflict, crisis and instability will be constant - if constantly unpredictable - and driven by some combination of the following factors: \* the persistence of intractable conflicts within states, as well as entrenched regional conflict systems; \* the recurrence of some conflicts as a consequence of the failure or reversal of a significant number of peace agreements; \* new or transformed conflicts, mostly within states and involving one or more groups of non-state armed actors, arising from a combination of elements including:\* large numbers of “weak” states with a limited capacity to fulfill the basic institutional and other functions (security, justice, public administration) required by the citizenry;\* the uneven pace of economic and social development, whose inequities may be accentuated by contravening forces of globalization; \* crises in relations between militant Islamists, more moderate elements of the Arab world, and western societies; \* growing transnational networks exploited by criminal and terrorist organizations; \* environmental degradation and consequent competition over natural resources. Areas of particular instability, violence and intractability - all involving some combination of the above - are likely to include the Middle East and Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Sudan and the Horn of Africa, in addition to eastern DRC and Central Africa, and South and South east Asia. This list is daunting, and accentuates the urgency for those in a position to do so, such as Norway, to prepare themselves to meet the challenges that lie ahead. Peacemaking and international actors Peacemaking since the end of the Cold War has been in constant evolution. The achievements of international third-party mediators and facilitators have been significant, but who these third parties are, and how they engage, both with conflict parties and with each other, has changed dramatically. The primacy of great power, or United Nations-led, peacemaking, pulling on the strings left behind by Cold War support of proxy actors, has given way to a much more confused environment in which issues of leverage are less clear cut and the characteristics and motivations of conflict actors more diffuse. Meanwhile third parties are rarely disinterested actors, and their own ambitions, capacities, and institutional cultures frequently collide. Indeed the challenges of coordination amongst many would-be peacemakers and/or builders can often appear to rival the complexity of the conflicts themselves. Some of challenges facing international peacemakers include: \* The evolution of the United Nations: the UN has been the preeminent actor in conflict management in the post-Cold War period, and is in the midst of a period of significant institutional reform, but the jury is still out on whether it will enter the second decade of the 21st century as a stronger or weaker actor with respect to international peacemaking. A number of different factors are involved: \* the organization suffers from its identification with a western, and specifically U.S. agenda; \* consensus among the five permanent members of the Security Council may prove harder to reach in the context of continuing hegemonic tendencies by

the United States, the rising influence of China as a global actor, and the likely assertion by Russia of its role in conflicts in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus; \* the ability of the current Secretary-General to rise to the enormous challenges of his office is not yet assured; \* the value of institutional innovations, such as the Peacebuilding Commission and the Mediation Support Unit as well as the current reform of the peacekeeping machinery, will take longer to prove itself than some of their backers had hoped;\* there is a dearth of experienced UN mediators. \* The capacity and coherence of regional and sub-regional organizations: although regional organizations may in many instances – and particularly in Africa - be the peacemakers of choice, they can be hindered by substantive differences over conflicts within their own neighborhoods (viz the limitations of IGAD in the Horn of Africa) and suffer from poorly resourced peacemaking capacities. \* Problems of competition and coordination: competition among rival, if well-intentioned, peacemakers is a relatively recent but complicated phenomenon. Under some circumstances a mechanism such as a group of Friends has helped ensure that would-be peacemakers work together, ideally in support of a recognized lead. Benefits include leverage, information, and practical support for the mediator; influence and an identified (and therefore legitimate) role for the states in the groups; technical and other assistance to parties to the conflict; and attention, resources, and strategic coordination to the peace process as a whole. Different arrangements have sought to coordinate post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction, with a mixed record of success. \* Identifying their role: primary responsibility for resolving conflicts lies with the belligerent parties and those affected by the conflict. External actors, it follows, play an essentially auxiliary role in peacemaking. They need to be careful not to exert such pressure (as on Darfur in 2006) as to encourage compromises unsustainable in the medium or long term. \* Engaging with non-state armed actors: engaging with non-state armed actors has become more complex since the attacks of September 2001 and launch by the United States of its “war on terrorism”, but it remains an obvious pre-requisite for effective peacemaking. \* Issues of peace and justice: external actors join national actors and conflict parties in struggling to work with changing normative concerns, in particular tensions between peace and justice, and the growing role of the International Criminal Court. These issues can be more, not less, complex for actors such as Norway strongly identified by their commitment to human rights and humanitarian principles. \* Complexity: external actors still struggle to understand the complexity of each individual peace process; sufficient humility to accept that this is the case is often lacking. Norway’s Comparative Advantages and Limitations Norway is in many respects uniquely well-placed to address these and other challenges. Its emergence as a peacemaker and security exporting state has been a significant element within the landscape of conflict management in recent years and has contributed to decisions by other states to redirect their foreign policy priorities in a similar direction. Norway’s comparative advantages are many. Resources: Norway is not just a rich and generous donor, but, importantly, not afraid to invest significantly and over the long term in efforts to promote peace and reconciliation, whether on its own behalf, through multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, or in support of regional and non-governmental organizations. Perceived lack of interest: Norway’s wealth, distance from conflict arenas and lack of a colonial past insulate it from suspicion that it is acting on the basis of strategic or economic interests. (That it nevertheless has an interest in successful participation in conflict management is a separate matter).Track record: Norway’s track record as lead peacemaker (in the Middle East, the Philippines and Sri Lanka), or supporting member of a Friends or other such mechanism (in Colombia, Guatemala and Sudan or the new International Contact Group it helped to form on Somalia) have won it a reputation as a “helpful fixer” and “honest broker”, even when the outcome of the processes with which it has been involved have not been successful. Consensus builder: Norway’s strategic position and good standing with the United States – in some respects a consequence of its active membership of NATO and the transatlantic policy its pursued during the Cold War – places it in a good position to help build consensus on issues that have the potential to divide key members of the international community, as its role on Somalia, for example, demonstrates. Lack of EU membership: Not being member of the European Union brings with its significant advantages, most obviously the discretion to engage with armed actors who may be proscribed by the EU as terrorists. Not to be overlooked, however, are the time and resources liberated by not having to fulfill the responsibilities of EU membership. Flexibility: Norway has displayed admirable flexibility in its ability to draw on the expertise of actors outside the foreign ministry (Fafo in the Middle East, the Lutheran World Federation in Guatemala, Norwegian Church Aid in Sudan, well-connected individuals in Sri Lanka) to develop official engagement; in its readiness to partner with non-governmental peacemakers such as the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue; and its ability to respond quickly and effectively to well-founded requests for support from the United Nations (for example in the help it provided in launching of the UN Mission in Nepal) and other actors. Targeting of diplomatic resources: Norway has also garnered benefits from its decision to assign good people to hard places, and open up embassies (in Guatemala, Colombia and the Middle East for example) in function of its involvement in a peace effort. Commitment to gender equality: Norway’s role in promoting the participation and representation of women in peace processes, including through the adoption of an Action Plan for the implementation of SCR 1325, has been commendable - although there is a long way to go. Patience: Norway’s ability to commit to the long haul in circumstances that do not appear auspicious has had demonstrable benefits. This is true even in circumstances other than a recognizable peace process. A quiet but consistent involvement in Haiti, for example – even as other donors pulled out – is a notable example of this approach and one which has placed Norway in a prime position to make a useful contribution as the country’s dynamics appear to be moving in a more positive direction But Norway is not without its limitations and challenges. Norway is a small country and consequently has a relatively small pool of individual peacemakers and diplomats to draw upon. It cannot expect to intervene in all conflict situations, or support those that it does choose to engage with to an equal degree. When the going gets tough – as Sri Lanka has demonstrated - many of the positive aspects of Norway’s identity render it vulnerable to criticism that it is a remote, Northern, do-gooder, with little understanding of the dynamics of the conflicts of others. In some contexts (for example at the UN) Norway can be vulnerable to jealousies that its ample resources buy it a disproportionate influence in some of the bodies, organizations or processes that it contributes to. Priorities in moving forward Clearly there is much about Norway’s engagement in activities that support peace and reconciliation in recent years that is to be commended. But as it moves ahead with the current review of globalization and national interests, a few core priorities can be suggested. Norway will face tough strategic decisions with respect to the prioritization of its resources and efforts. Important contributions would be to champion attention to conflicts whose resolution may help “unlock” wider regional conflict formations (Ethiopia and Eritrea for example) and prioritize early engagement with countries in processes of transition (such as Cuba) that others may have greater difficulties engaging with. This will involve a hard assessment at some of its areas of long-standing engagement, where adverse developments on the ground may have damaged the comparative advantages with which Norway entered the conflict arena. Norway’s successful experiences of working with others place it in a good position to help international actors face tough questions about their own involvements. Whether and how the international community is able organize itself in support of a given peace process has never been more critical. In considering future relationships, a particular priority should be to identify and develop partnerships in the global South and from the Islamic world. Norway’s extraordinary contribution to the United Nations should be continued. Assisting the Mediation Support Unit – and encouraging others to do so as well – not least in the MSU’s effort to engage with and support peacemakers outside the UN system is an obvious priority. Norway’s experience, including the role it plays in hosting the Oslo Forum and Mediators’ Retreats, well equip it to continue to help professionalize the practice of peacemaking. Thought should be given to how to provide capacity to a new generation of peacemakers, with priority attention to women and peacemakers from the South (fellowships, secondment to mediation teams etc).

## Wars of choice

### Squo solves

#### Shift to multi-lateral engagement solves their impacts

**Fawcett 13 1AC Author** (Dr. LOUISE FAWCETT, author of International Relations of the Middle East, Oxford University, “The Iraq War ten years on: assessing the fallout”, International Affairs, 2013 http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2013/89\_2/89\_2Fawcett.pdf)

In summarizing the international fallout from Iraq, it is important to separate myth from reality and take a long hard look at the impact of events in the region on the wider international system. Despite valid claims of imperial overstretch, some of the consequences of which are playing out in Obama’s policies, the episode has not led to any sudden demise of US power and influence in the region; it has not split the western alliance; it has not led to a revitalized ‘normative power Europe’; nor has it significantly opened more space for challengers to the United States—challengers that would have emerged anyway, particularly in the light of Asia’s growing energy needs and the desire of consumers and producers to diversify markets. There has been, at least in the short term, a discernible shift from US unilateralism to a more multilateralist policy, engaging international institutions like the UN and regional actors, but it is not one that abandons core US interests. It also leaves Europe, riven by internal crisis and economic woes, a subsidiary partner as before. The Iraq War therefore contributed significantly to shifts in the region’s security complex, as described above, but its impact on the wider global balance of power has so far perhaps been less than predicted. The Arab Spring, though failing to deliver the kind of democratization that western powers hoped for, may, by introducing new regional divisions, have provided new opportunities for manoeuvre, which have helped rather than hindered US ambitions, though the dangers of escalation and further spillover of the conflict in Syria cannot be discounted. However, in continuing efforts to reset their relations with the Arab world, both the West and non-western powers will need to take increasing account of the agency of Middle Eastern peoples themselves. When the dust finally settles on the Arab Spring, it may be the fact of greater regional autonomy and self-reliance, rather than dependence on the West, that becomes the long-term legacy of Iraq. The Arab Spring is neither 1989 nor 1848 but 2010.59 This shows, yet again, as Middle Eastern scholars have repeatedly pointed out, that whatever the extent of outside penetration of the region, it demonstrates a degree of autonomy and agency of its own and proves resistant to external pressures for change.60

#### And even if hegemony works – Obama will shift to a multipolar world

**Hachigan 10** — Senior Fellow at American Progress, Senior political scientist at RAND Corporation, Director of the RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy, International affairs fellowship from the Council on Foreign Relations, National Security Council at the White House (Nina, “The False Promise of Primacy in US Foreign Policy”, World Focus, January 22, 2010, http://worldfocus.org/blog/2010/01/22/the-false-promise-of-primacy-in-us-foreign-policy/9372/)

Nevertheless, the fact that the Bush administration embraced the notion of primacy was a comfort to the remaining Cold Warriors. President Barack Obama’s approach is different, to say the least. His political allies and his detractors can agree that Obama sees foreign policy not in terms of asserting America’s unparalleled might, but of seeking common cause, including with other major powers. On the one-year mark of his presidency, the contours of the new paradigm are fairly clear: Lead the world in addressing shared challenges Treat other governments and peoples — friends and foes — with respect Forge strategic collaborations with big, pivotal powers and demand responsibility from them on global challenges Reinvigorate and repair existing alliances Reengage with international institutions and rules, pushing for increased accountability Make basic political and economic rights available to more people, knowing that democratic government is the best way to achieve this goal As for primacy, Obama dismissed that as a strategy goal in his inaugural address when he observed, “Our power alone cannot protect us.” Later, in Moscow, Obama elaborated on his view of great power relations, saying, “a great power does not show strength by dominating or demonizing other countries…[G]iven our interdependence, any world order that tries to elevate one nation or group of people over another will inevitably fail. The pursuit of power is no longer a zero-sum game — progress must be shared.”

#### There are no threats – regional actors can prevent war

**Bandow 11** – senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A former special assistant to Ronald Reagan, he is the author of Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire (Xulon) [1-31-2011, Doug Bandow, “Solving the Debt Crisis: A Military Budget for a Republic”, January 31st, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=12746>]

More than two decades after the Cold War dramatically ended, the U.S. maintains a Cold War military. America has a couple score allies, dozens of security commitments, hundreds of overseas bases, and hundreds of thousands of troops overseas. Yet international hegemonic communism has disappeared, the Soviet Union has collapsed, Maoist China has been transformed, and pro-communist Third World dictatorships have been discarded in history's dustbin.

The European Union has a larger economy and population than America does. Japan spent decades with the world's second largest economy. South Korea has 40 times the GDP and twice the population of North Korea. As Colin Powell exclaimed in 1991, "I'm running out of demons. I'm running out of enemies. I'm down to Castro and Kim Il-sung."

Yet America accounts for roughly half of the globe's military outlays. In real terms the U.S. government spends more on the military today than at any time during the Cold War, Korean War, or Vietnam War. It is difficult for even a paranoid to concoct a traditional threat to the American homeland.

Terrorism is no replacement for the threat of nuclear holocaust. Commentator Philip Klein worries about "gutting" the military and argued that military cuts at the end of the Cold War "came back to haunt us when Sept. 11 happened." Yet the reductions, which still left America by far the world's most dominant power, neither allowed the attacks nor prevented Washington from responding with two wars.

And responding with two wars turned out to be a catastrophic mistake. Evil terrorism is a threat, but existential threat it is not. Moreover, the best response is not invasions and occupations — as the U.S. has learned at high cost in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Rather, the most effective tools are improved intelligence, Special Forces, international cooperation, and restrained intervention.

Attempts at nation-building are perhaps even more misguided than subsidizing wealthy industrialized states. America's record isn't pretty. The U.S. wasn't able to anoint its preferred Somali warlord as leader of that fractured nation. Washington's allies in the still unofficial and unstable nation of Kosovo committed grievous crimes against Serb, Roma, and other minorities. Haiti remains a failed state after constant U.S. intervention. The invasion of Iraq unleashed mass violence, destroyed the indigenous Christian community, and empowered Iran; despite elections, a liberal society remains unlikely. After nine years most Afghans dislike and distrust the corrupt government created by the U.S. and sustained only by allied arms.

The last resort of those who want America to do everything everywhere is to claim that the world will collapse into various circles of fiery hell without a ubiquitous and vast U.S. military presence. Yet there is no reason to believe that scores of wars are waiting to break out. And America's prosperous and populous allies are capable of promoting peace and stability in their own regions.

### Don’t Solve Owen

**No internal link to Owen –**

**a). The warrant is democracy, not globalization – those two things are not the same – the process of democratization MAY lead to increasing globalization, but that is not necessarily true – the desire to maintain local content outweighs – preference for own products**

**b). The U.S. is not key to democracy anyways**

**Fawcett 13 1AC Author** (Dr. LOUISE FAWCETT, author of International Relations of the Middle East, Oxford University, “The Iraq War ten years on: assessing the fallout”, International Affairs, 2013 <http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2013/89_2/89_2Fawcett.pdf>)

Western hubris insists that everything that happens in the Middle East somehow depends on western agency, but the region’s past and present demonstrate this to be untrue. In their partnership programmes and Middle Eastern initiatives that mushroomed before and after the Iraq War, both the US and European powers have been party to attempts to recreate the region in their image. The consequences of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the wave of Arab uprisings over which outside powers ultimately have little control, for the most part repudiate such efforts. Western powers claim to have been humbled by the lessons of Iraq and the Arab Spring. The hardest lesson to accept is that if and when democracy and stability come to the region, they will arrive in their own way and on their own terms. Even if the US and European powers, in contemplating the fallout from the Iraq War and Arab Spring, may draw some comfort from realignments that still support core western interests, the drift from dependence to greater autonomy—facilitated by domestic changes and a wider menu of international choices—will continue to draw the region into new orbits. Ten years after the start of the Iraq War, the region shows evidence of huge and continuing changes, some of which the war helped to generate, but there are many features of continuity. For the moment, the US remains the predominant power Ten years after the start of the Iraq War, the region shows evidence of huge and continuing changes, some of which the war helped to generate, but there are many features of continuity. For the moment, the US remains the predominant power in the region and the position of the Gulf monarchies appears secure. The region is becoming more democratic, but democratization, in the Middle East or anywhere else, is a long and punctuated process. Events that seemed to be seminal in 2003 appear less compelling today; rather, they form a marker in which the relative, if slow, decline of western interests and the new dynamism of the Middle East have given rise to a set of challenges and opportunities for regional and international players whose consequences are still unfolding. The lesson of Iraq, as of the Arab Spring, is that it is regional powers themselves who will increasingly set the pace of change.

#### Hegemony has no relationship to globalization – liberalism is inevitable

**Gartzke 9** \*Erik Gartzke is an associate professor of political science at UC San Diego [Gartzke Power Shuffle: Will the Coming Transition Be Peaceful? [Gartzke, Erik](http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/docview.lateralsearchlink:lateralsearch/sng/author/Gartzke,+Erik/$N?t:ac=200780115/fulltext/1359B17966B78DAEF0F/7&t:cp=maintain/resultcitationblocks). [Current History](http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/docview.lateralsearchlinkbypubid:lateralsearch/sng/pubtitle/Current+History/$N/41559?t:ac=200780115/fulltext/1359B17966B78DAEF0F/7&t:cp=maintain/resultcitationblocks)[108. 721](http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.library.wisc.edu/docview.issuebrowselink:searchpublicationissue/41559/Current+History/02009Y11Y01$23Nov+2009$3b++Vol.+108+$28721$29/108/721?t:ac=200780115/fulltext/1359B17966B78DAEF0F/7&t:cp=maintain/resultcitationblocks) (Nov 2009): 374-380]

Too often, the tendency has been to equate US leadership with the US-inspired system. In previous epochs, this sort of assumption was natural, given that hegemons imposed parochial systems of governance on their worlds. Today, it is much less clear that changes in international leadership require a fundamental reordering of the global system of governance - any more than a change in the chairmanship of the European Union, say, means dramatic changes in the direction of that organization. The emergence of multipolarity does not in itself invite the prospect of world instability and conflict. The connection between decline and violence is tenuous at best. Nor is there a good reason to believe that war would alter in any fundamental way America's relative decline. Shooting at another nation will not increase the appeal of US products or reduce the US debt. Nor will rising powers help their commercial enterprises through the use of force. Given the fact that power depends on wealth in the modern world, nations are much better off if they can find ways to avoid disrupting markets and burdening budgets, especially when the most valuable assets are no longer readily conquerable. If war will not prevent the conditions that lead the United States to lose influence or that enable a challenger to rise, then war of any significant intensity is a futile act.

#### Owen – here cites the Human Security Report – explains why it is awesome

Andrew Mack and his colleagues at the Human Security Report Project are to be congratulated…..

#### His study is wrong anyways

**Arquilla 12** – chairman of the Defense Analysis department at the United States Naval Postgraduate School

(John, “The Big Kill”, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/12/03/the_big_kill?page=0,0>)

The Human Security Report bases its conclusion on some key trends. First, the number of ongoing conflicts in a given year in which more than 1,000 people die in battle has declined, if a bit choppily, from 25 in the mid-80s to five in 2006. (In 2012, the total I see is back up to about 10.) In addition to this, the number of battle deaths per year, worldwide, has dropped since the end of World War II -- with just a few spikes largely explained by the Korean War (1950-1953), Vietnam from the mid-‘60's to mid-‘70s, and the strife in the Balkans and among former-Soviet republics in the ‘90s. In his Better Angels of Our Nature, Pinker goes a little further, noting that over the past 70-plus years the number of battle deaths per 100,000 people has fallen dramatically -- with no spikes, just a couple of "blips." ¶ The problem with the conclusions reached in these studies is their **reliance on "battle death" statistics**. The pattern of the past century -- one recurring in history -- is that **the deaths of noncombatants** due to war has risen, steadily and very dramatically. In World War I, perhaps only 10 percent of the 10 million-plus who died were civilians. The number of noncombatant deaths jumped to as much as 50 percent of the 50 million-plus lives lost in World War II, and the sad toll has kept on rising ever since. Perhaps the worst, but hardly the only, terrible example of this trend can be seen in the Congo war -- flaring up again right now -- in which over 90 percent of the several million dead were noncombatants. As to Pinker's battle-death ratios, they **are somewhat skewed** by the fact that overall populations have exploded since 1940; so even a very deadly war **can be masked** by a "per 100,000 of population" stat.¶ There are better ways to parse the problem of war's prevalence and its patterns over time. One approach would be simply to look at the number of armed conflicts under way at any given time. The Human Security Report actually does this for the period 1946-2008, its compelling graphic showing a steady rise to over 50 wars per year in the early 1990s. The rest of that decade saw a drop of about 40 percent -- to a great extent driven by the winding down of the Balkan and post-Soviet wars -- and then a rising pattern once again post-9/11. Yes, the number of wars is down by over a third since the peak 20 years ago, but **ongoing conflicts today are still** more than double **the totals seen** in the years from the end of World War II until the mid-1950s, and are equal to the numbers of wars ongoing during the Vietnam era. It is hard to describe this as a world in which war is on the wane. ¶ The argument that the world has become more peaceful is **even harder to sustain** if one focuses on the patterns of the most destructive wars of the past few centuries. In my own work, I chose to search for what I call "**big-kill" wars**, during which a million or more die -- soldiers and civilians. From 1800-1850, only the Napoleonic Wars surpassed the million-death mark. In the latter half of the 19th century, there were two such wars: the Taiping Rebellion, during which 20 million or more Chinese died; and the Lopez War between Paraguay and its neighbors. The latter conflict resulted in "only" a million deaths, but Paraguay lost roughly 80 percent of military-age males during this war, which had a shattering societal effect.¶ Between 1900 and 1950, the number of big-kill wars doubled, if one is willing to accept the view of some that the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) reached a million deaths. About the two world wars there is no doubt. The same is true of the civil war in China that ultimately brought Mao Zedong to power. And if one wants to consider the forced collectivization of farms that Stalin pursued as a form of internal war -- which also saw the deaths of millions -- then the total for this period would rise to five.¶ The troubling rise in big-kill wars in the first half of the 20th century was followed by an even more disturbing pattern in the second half: they doubled once again. There was nothing of the magnitude of World War II in sheer numbers of dead, but **the million-mark in war deaths was** steadily surmounted, mostly in societies in which such losses had staggering effects.¶ Six of these wars occurred in Africa. In rough chronological order they took place in Biafra, Sudan, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Congo. Some debate whether the Rwandan genocide reached a million or fell slightly below, and the Human Security Project asserts that the International Red Cross's estimate that five million people have died in the Congo war (an estimate echoed by many other reporting agencies) is a bit high -- but both wars clearly fit the "big-kill" category in terms of percentages of the populations that have died from these wars and their societal effects. Besides, **the more common historical pattern** in the statistics of deadly quarrels **has been to** under-report deaths, so Rwanda and Congo should be kept in the count.¶ The other four big-kill wars occurred in Asia: Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Afghanistan -- the last just counting the Russian war there (1979-1989), not the civil strife of the ‘90s and the American intervention over the past decade. All four easily surpassed the million-mark in war deaths. There is debate about whether the Iran-Iraq War during the 1980s reached this level -- though there is little doubt about the profound effect of the conflict on both countries. ¶ The rising number of the deadliest conflicts over the past two centuries belies both the conclusions of **the Human Security Report and** those of Professor **Pinker**. However, since 2000 there has been only one big-kill war: the one in Congo, which now has the dubious distinction of suffering seven-figure war deaths both before and just after the turn the century. But I don't see much prospect for yet another doubling of big-kill wars during the first half of this century. The most likely scenario for a war causing massive loss of life would be a second Korean war. Does the dearth of new million-death conflicts mean that war has finally begun to wane?¶ **I don't think so**. For there is another alarming trend that has been getting under way alongside the big-kill wars: the rise of **smaller conflicts** that nevertheless cause the deaths of hundreds of thousands. The Balkan wars of the 1990s fit this pattern. As does the Chechen resistance to Russia, both before and since the millennium. The civil war in Burundi (1993-2005) and Somalia (ongoing) fit this bill as well. The same goes for the strife in Darfur, and Syria is on the edge of entering this category as well. Most of the conflicts that fall into this category will occur in failed or failing states -- see this magazine's Failed States Index as a guide to where the next disaster may occur. The "red zones" of critical concern are massive.

### a/t: bryzenski

**Be skeptical of their impact evidence –**

**a). asinine scenarios – they selectively unhighlighted the part where bryzenski says Mexico is going to invade dude! – really?**

The worsening of relations between a declining America and an internally troubled Mexico could even give rise to a particularly ominous phenomenon: the emergence, as a major issue in nationalistically aroused Mexican politics, of territorial claims justified by history and ignited by cross-border incidents

***This perceived loss of leadership ensures lash-out and superpower conflicts – followed by an inward turn that results in the corrosion of the global commons***

**Brzezinski ’12** (Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security advisor under U.S. President Jimmy Carter, is author of the forthcoming book Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power, Foreign Policy, After America¶ <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/03/after_america?page=0,1>, jj)

For **if America falters, the world is unlikely to be dominated by a single preeminent successor** -- not even China. **International uncertainty, increased tension among global competitors, and** even **outright chaos would be far more likely outcomes**. **While a sudden, massive crisis of the American system** -- for instance, another financial crisis -- **would produce a fast-moving chain reaction leading to global political and economic disorder, a steady drift by America into increasingly pervasive decay or endlessly widening warfare with Islam would be unlikely to produce, even by 2025, an effective global successor**. **No single power will be ready by then to exercise the role that the world,** upon the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, **expected the United States to play: the leader of a new, globally cooperative world order**. **More probable would be** a protracted phase of rather inconclusive realignments of both global and regional power, with no grand winners and many more losers, in a setting of **international uncertainty and even of potentially fatal risks to global well-being. Rather than a world where dreams of democracy flourish, a Hobbesian world of enhanced national security based on varying fusions of authoritarianism, nationalism, and religion could ensue**. The leaders of the world's second-rank powers, among them India, Japan, Russia, and some European countries, are already assessing the potential impact of U.S. decline on their respective national interests. The Japanese, fearful of an assertive China dominating the Asian mainland, may be thinking of closer links with Europe. Leaders in India and Japan may be considering closer political and even military cooperation in case America falters and China rises. **Russia**, while perhaps engaging in wishful thinking (even schadenfreude) about America's uncertain prospects, **will almost certainly have its eye on the independent states of the former Soviet Union**. Europe, not yet cohesive, would likely be pulled in several directions: Germany and Italy toward Russia because of commercial interests, France and insecure Central Europe in favor of a politically tighter European Union, and Britain toward manipulating a balance within the EU while preserving its special relationship with a declining United States. **Others may move more rapidly to carve out their own regional spheres: Turkey in the area of the old Ottoman Empire, Brazil in the Southern Hemisphere, and so forth**. **None of these countries, however, will have the requisite combination of economic, financial, technological, and military power even to consider inheriting America's leading role**. China, invariably mentioned as America's prospective successor, has an impressive imperial lineage and a strategic tradition of carefully calibrated patience, both of which have been critical to its overwhelmingly successful, several-thousand-year-long history. China thus prudently accepts the existing international system, even if it does not view the prevailing hierarchy as permanent. It recognizes that success depends not on the system's dramatic collapse but on its evolution toward a gradual redistribution of power. Moreover, the basic reality is that **China is not yet ready to assume in full America's role in the world. Beijing's leaders themselves have repeatedly emphasized that on every important measure of development, wealth, and power, China will still be a modernizing and developing state several decades from now, significantly behind not only the United States but also Europe and Japan in the major per capita indices of modernity and national power**. Accordingly, **Chinese leaders have been restrained in laying any overt claims to global leadership.** At some stage, however, **a more assertive Chinese nationalism could arise** and damage China's international interests. **A swaggering, nationalistic Beijing would unintentionally mobilize a powerful regional coalition against itself**. None of China's key neighbors -- India, Japan, and Russia -- is ready to acknowledge China's entitlement to America's place on the global totem pole. They might even seek support from a waning America to offset an overly assertive China. **The resulting regional scramble could become intense, especially given the similar nationalistic tendencies among China's neighbors**. **A phase of acute international tension in Asia could ensue**. ***Asia of the 21st century could then begin to resemble Europe of the 20th century -- violent and bloodthirsty.*** At the same time, **the security of a number of weaker states located geographically next to major regional powers also depends on the international status quo reinforced by America's global preeminence -- and would be made significantly more vulnerable in proportion to America's decline. The states in that exposed position -- including Georgia, Taiwan, South Korea, Belarus, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel, and the greater Middle East -- are today's geopolitical equivalents of nature's most endangered species**. Their fates are closely tied to the nature of the international environment left behind by a waning America, be it ordered and restrained or, much more likely, self-serving and expansionist. A faltering United States could also find its strategic partnership with Mexico in jeopardy. America's economic resilience and political stability have so far mitigated many of the challenges posed by such sensitive neighborhood issues as economic dependence, immigration, and the narcotics trade. A decline in American power, however, would likely undermine the health and good judgment of the U.S. economic and political systems. ***A waning United States would likely be more nationalistic, more defensive about its national identity, more paranoid about its homeland security, and less willing to sacrifice resources* for the sake of others' development.** The worsening of relations between a declining America and an internally troubled Mexico could even give rise to a particularly ominous phenomenon: the emergence, as a major issue in nationalistically aroused Mexican politics, of territorial claims justified by history and ignited by cross-border incidents. **Another consequence of American decline could be a corrosion of the generally cooperative management of *the global commons* -- shared interests such as sea lanes, space, cyberspace, and the environment, whose protection is imperative to the long-term growth of the global economy and the continuation of basic geopolitical stability**. In almost every case, **the potential absence of a constructive and influential U.S. role would fatally undermine the essential communality of the global commons because the superiority and ubiquity of American power creates order where there would normally be conflict.** None of this will necessarily come to pass. Nor is the concern that America's decline would generate global insecurity, endanger some vulnerable states, and produce a more troubled North American neighborhood an argument for U.S. global supremacy. In fact, the strategic complexities of the world in the 21st century make such supremacy unattainable. But **those dreaming today of America's collapse would** probably **come to regret it. And as the world after America would be increasingly complicated and chaotic, it is imperative that the United States pursue a new, timely strategic vision for its foreign policy -- or start bracing itself for a dangerous slide into global turmoil.**

**b). Qualifications – he might be the former national security advisor, but that doesn’t mean he is qualified to talk about international politics and relations in an academic sense.**

**The impact to this is that the evidence should be rejected – that means they have no impact to their advantage – don’t let them weigh the owen evidence as impact evidence – owen doesn’t isolate specific scenarios like brzyenski.**

**EVEN IF AFTER THAT YOU GRANT THEM SOME IMPACT, here is more evidence to disprove the theory of hegemony**

#### a). threats are manufacturing without any basis

**Fettweis 10** – Professor of national security affairs @ U.S. Naval War College. [Christopher J. Fettweis, “Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy,” Survival, Volume 52, Issue 2 April 2010 , pages 59 – 82//informaworld]

Today's security debate often seems to be driven less by actual threats than vague, unnamed dangers. Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld warned about 'unknown unknowns': the threats 'we don't know we don't know', which 'tend to be the difficult ones'.32 Kristol and Kagan worry that if the United States fails to remain highly engaged, the international system 'is likely to yield very real external dangers, as threatening in their own way as the Soviet Union was a quarter century ago'.33 What exactly these dangers are is left open to interpretation. In the absence of identifiable threats, the unknown can provide us with an enemy, one whose power is limited only by the imagination. This is what Benjamin Friedman and Harvey Sapolsky call 'the threat of no threats', and is perhaps the most frightening danger of all.34 Even if, as folk wisdom has it, anything is possible, not everything is plausible. Vague, generalised dangers should never be acceptable replacements for specific threats when crafting national policy. There is no limit to the potential dangers the human mind can manufacture, but there are very definite limits to the specific threats the world contains. 'To make anything very terrible, obscurity seems in general to be necessary', noted Edmund Burke. 'When we know the full extent of any danger, when we can accustom our eyes to it, a great deal of the apprehension vanishes.'35 The full extent of today's dangers is not only knowable, but relatively minor.

## Alt Causes

### AC – Manufacturing

#### First manufacturing -

#### It will collapse now

**Gulfnews.com 2/22** (“Gold’s current shine unlikely to last,” http://gulfnews.com/business/your-money/gold-s-current-shine-unlikely-to-last-1.1294110

The US Federal Reserve’s tapering or the gradual winding down of the stimulus by reducing $10 billion in bond buying in the coming months depends on the country’s economic growth, seen through various indicators, including US non farm employment report and retail, manufacturing and consumer confidence data.

As weak US manufacturing data came in on the back of weak retail data, doubts were cast on the pace of the US tapering, with speculation suggesting there could be a pause in the monetary tightening policy. That led to gains in the holdings in exchange traded funds (ETFs).

#### That is a bigger internal link to hegemony – short-circuits military effectiveness because we don’t maintain awesome weapons systems

**Boushey 12** – Heather Boushey, Senior Economist, Center for American Progress Action Fund, July 19th, 2012, "Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Meanson Tax Reform and the U.S. Manufacturing Sector" waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/boushey\_testimony.pdf

Having a strong manufacturing industry in the United States should be at the top of our national economic agenda. Without a vibrant and innovative manufacturing base, we will not be a global leader for long. Moreover, as more of our energy future will rely on high-tech manufacturing,///

our economic competitiveness will be even more closely aligned with our ability to be an innovator and producer of manufactured goods.¶ Further, this is an urgent national issue and one of those cases where success begets success. Economists have begun to study and show that the “industrial commons” matters for innovation and the extent to which we allow manufacturing processes to continue to go overseas, we only make it that much harder to regain our place as a global leader.11 As my colleagues Michael Ettlinger and Kate Gordon have put it, “the cross-fertilization and engagement of a community of experts in industry, academia, and government is vital to our nation’s economic competitiveness.”12¶ Manufacturing is not only a key part of our economy, but moving forward it will remain critical to our nation’s economic vitality¶ The U.S. manufacturing sector is still a force internationally and an important part of our economy, despite employment losses and the relative rise in manufacturing in other countries over the past few decades.13 Last year, manufacturing contributed over $1.8 trillion to U.S. gross domestic product, or about 12 percent of the economy.14 Two years ago, manufacturing accounted for 60 percent of all U.S. exports.15 In 2008, the United States ranked first in the world in manufacturing value added, and it was the third largest exporter of manufactured goods to the world, behind only China and Germany and ahead of Japan and France.16 Between 1979 and 2010 manufacturing output per hour of labor in the United States increased by an average of 4 percent annually, and the United States has one of the world’s most productive workforces.17 Moreover, in 2009 there were 11.8 million direct jobs in manufacturing and 6.8 million additional jobs in related sectors.18 Put another way, one in six U.S. private-sector jobs is directly linked to manufacturing.19¶ Yet the industry suffered declines in the 2000s. The U.S. share of worldwide manufacturing value added dropped from 26 percent in 1998 to less than 20 percent in 2007, and we have gone from being a net exporter of manufactured goods in the 1960s to a net importer.20 Manufacturing as a share of U.S. GDP has declined from more than 15 percent in 1998 to 11 percent in 2009.21 And jobs in U.S. manufacturing declined from 17.6 million in January 1998 to 11.5 million in January 2010.22 And although the manufacturing sector has gained jobs in every month since then, for a total of 504,000 jobs as of June 2012, its share of total employment is down from 16.8 percent in 1998 to 10.8 percent today.23¶ These trends matter because the United States needs a strong manufacturing sector. Manufacturing provides good, middle-class jobs; propels U.S. leadership in technology and innovation, which is critical to our economic growth and vitality; and is important to balancing the trade deficit, as well as important for our nation’s long-term national security. The manufacturing sector has historically been a source of solid, middle-class jobs and it continues to be so today. The average manufacturing worker earns a weekly wage that is 8.4 percent higher than non-manufacturing workers, taking into account worker and job characteristics that influence wages, including unionization.24 Economist Susan Helper and her colleagues conclude that the economic evidence points to the fact that “the main reason why manufacturing wages and benefits are higher than those outside of manufacturing is that manufacturers need to pay higher wages to ensure that their workers are appropriately skilled and motivated.” 25 U.S.-based manufacturing underpins a broad range of jobs in other industries, including higher skill service jobs such as accountants, bankers, and lawyers, as well as a broad range of other jobs such as basic research and technology development, product and process engineering and design, operations and maintenance, transportation, testing, and lab work.26 Compared to jobs in other economic sectors, manufacturing jobs have the highest “multiplier effect,” that is, the largest effect on the overall economy for each job created, relative to jobs in other industries. To put this in perspective, each job in motor vehicle manufacturing creates 8.6 indirect jobs, each job in computer manufacturing creates 5.6 indirect jobs, and each job in steel product manufacturing creates 10.3 indirect jobs.27¶ Manufacturing is also important because it fuels the United States’ leadership in technology and innovation, which are critical to maintain for our future economic competitiveness.28 Manufacturing firms are more likely to innovate than firms in other industries: Research from the National Science Foundation finds that 22 percent of manufacturing companies are active innovators compared to only 8 percent of nonmanufacturing companies.29 This number is even higher for specific sectors within manufacturing. For example, in computer and electronic products manufacturing, 45 percent of companies are product innovators and 33 percent are process innovators.30 Manufacturing firms also perform the vast majority of private research and development: Despite comprising just 12 percent of the nation’s GDP in 2007, manufacturing companies contributed 70 percent of private research and development spending.31 ¶ In addition to what manufacturers spend on innovation, there is increasingly strong empirical evidence showing a tight link between innovation and manufacturing production. Economic research now shows that the United States will not likely be able to keep the highly skilled technical jobs if the production jobs go overseas. Harvard Business School professors Gary Pisano and Willy Shih have written about the decline of the “industrial commons” in the United States: the collective R&D, engineering, and manufacturing capabilities that mutually reinforce each other to sustain innovation.32 For many types of manufacturing, geographic proximity is key to having a strong “commons,” and they point to evidence showing that there are few hightech industries where the feedback loop from the manufacturing process is not a factor in developing new products.33 As they put it, “product and process innovation are intertwined.” Pisano and Shih point to the example of rechargeable batteries as a product where innovation followed manufacturing. Rechargeable battery manufacturing left the United States many years ago, leading to the migration of the batteries commons to Asia. Now new technology (batteries for hybrid and electric vehicles) are being designed in Asia where the commons are located. I’d draw your attention to a January New York Times article on China’s increasing investment in research and development, which asked, “Our global competitiveness is based on being the origin of the newest, best ideas. How will we fare if those ideas originate somewhere else?”34

# 1nr v wayne state js

## Victory cp

### 2nc congress = inconsistent with president

#### Congress would not necessarily say yes to declaration of war against North Korea – they are increasingly sending inconsistent messages from Obama – this is particularly true for our allies

Harald **Malmgren**, chief executive of Malmgren Global, advises governments and companies on international trade and investment. He served as principal deputy trade negotiator for Presidents Nixon and Ford, “US Foreign Policy: Spin, or Spinning Out of Control?, **12/17**/13, http://breakingdefense.com/2013/12/us-foreign-policy-spin-or-spinning-out-of-control/

As the end of 2013 approached, US foreign policy was confronted with a number of new, critical tests of US foreign and security policy positions on such varied questions as relations between the US and China, Japan, Vietnam, Indonesia, Philippines, etc. as well as on US Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps repositioning of forces in the Asian Pacific region. Together will apparent alienation of US relations with the GCC kingdoms and heightened tensions with Israel, a growing degree of foreign policy apprehension will likely also cast a public cloud of loss of confidence in the run-up to congressional elections. These political and security strains unfolded at the time of an uncoordinated and ill-thought-through Treasury Department initiative to criticize aggressively Germany’s strong balance of payments surplus while maintaining crushing fiscal austerity pressure on most of the rest of Europe. US Treasury Secretary Lew’s public attack on Chancellor Merkel’s government — before a new coalition was fully in place — escalated Washington-Berlin political strains to the point where German diplomats privately remarked this represented the worst period in the bilateral relationship since the middle of World War II. Returning to the issue of what constitutes an effective presidency, the Obama administration has obviously had great difficulty demonstrating continuity and determination in its relations with both friendly governments as well as unfriendly or troublesome governments. The perception abroad (even in Canada) is that the US leadership feels conflicted and threatened, overcome by the need for managing both domestic and international challenges at the same time. In Congress, there are growing signs of serious rifts not only among Republicans but also among Democrats on both domestic and foreign issues. The White House has presented an imaginative array of explanations for its delays and inconsistencies in actions, but its “spin” seems to be losing effectiveness with Congress, with a growing number of voters and with many foreign leaders. The president’s multi-tasking management and decision system seems to be faltering. Confidence in US government leadership among other nations in continuity, clarity of direction, and willingness to execute its declared intentions seems to be fading. Ironically, the perception of US passivity is encouraging a new arms race as other nations seek to strengthen their own security in an increasingly threatening context of weak economies, domestic political unrest, and challenges from neighbors. Spin is a routine foreign policy tool, often sufficiently effective to maintain stability in foreign relations. Are world events now spinning out of control for this administration?

#### Congress distrusts Obama – that means they would be less willing to agree with uses of force by Obama

Harald **Malmgren**, chief executive of Malmgren Global, advises governments and companies on international trade and investment. He served as principal deputy trade negotiator for Presidents Nixon and Ford, “US Foreign Policy: Spin, or Spinning Out of Control?, **12/17**/13, http://breakingdefense.com/2013/12/us-foreign-policy-spin-or-spinning-out-of-control/

Moreover, so much information so fast enables every member of Congress, every state and local official, and even every citizen to take a position and try to assert influence. Presidents cannot simply rely on oratory or threats or exercise of their executive authority to overcome opposition. These twenty-first century technologies require presidents to manage a complex decision process in which authority and responsibility are delegated to many subordinates, some close by and some remote from the White House. That decision process requires consensus building among competing opinions and demands, because decisions can only be executed and enforced if there is broad enough support, among the Executive Branch, the Congress, and even the Courts. The primary job of a modern day president is management, and building the confidence of politicians, citizens, and governments of other nations in how effective that management is. Lately, the president and his White House staff have been preoccupied by major malfunctions in the rollout of “Obamacare.” The rollout of a new Department of Health and Human Services website for enrollment in the new insurance plans under “Obamacare” was disrupted by system crashes and incorrect transmittal of information from individuals to insurers. In October and November the rollout of ACA revealed Presidential promises about ability of Americans to retain their previous health insurance and doctors could not be fulfilled. A severe drop in Congressional and public “trust” in the president and his administration seems to have developed. There was also gradual public recognition of likelihood of much higher health care insurance costs beginning in the next year or two, at a time when family incomes after taxes were no longer rising, and indeed had been shrinking slightly in recent years. In November and December, public opinion polls showed dramatic decline of support for President Obama and for incumbent Democrats in Congress in reaction to evolving news about negative consequences of the new health care initiative. The domestic political damage was so severe that White House aides instructed government officials to stop referring to the new health care insurance programs as “Obamacare,” and instead talk publicly about the Affordable Care Act (ACA), which is the technical name of the new national health care insurance framework. The rapid decline in domestic political support for the president has been associated with doubts about administration credibility or “truthfulness.” Continuous ambiguities and sometimes misleading statements about other matters, including the IRS scandal, the Benghazi events, and White House assertions about Syrian toxic gas episodes accumulated in raising voter skepticism about the Obama administration’s truthfulness.

### 2nc a/t: perm do the cp

#### Restrict means the aff must define the conditions in which use of armed forces is allowed

**Cambridge Dictionary of American English 09**

([http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key=restrict\*1+0&dict=A](http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key=restrict*1+0&dict=A);)

restrict verb [T] to limit (an intended action) esp. by setting the conditions under which it is allowed to happen

### 2nc no deterrence – rogue state

#### Deterrence will break down because rogue state are more likely to act irrationally

**Litwak, ’03** – Vice President for Programs and Director of International Security Studies (Robert S., The New Calculus of Pre-Emption, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/newcalc.pdf)

The controversy over counter-proliferation and military pre-emption was embedded in the broader US debate over policy toward ‘rogue states’ and the novel threat to international security posed by those countries in the post-cold war era. Secretary of defense William Perry warned in April 1996 of a ‘future threat that a rogue state, that may be impossible to deter, will obtain ICBMs that can read the United States’.11 Secretary Perry’s reference to ‘undeterrable rogue states’ was striking, for it suggested that countries such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq are potentially prone to irrational behavior and that a reliance on deterrence and diplomacy may therefore prove futile.12

### 2nc Chinese reports

#### Although North Korea’s resources may be limited they are still willing to go to war

**Globaltimes.cn 13** (“Military conflict on Korean Peninsula inevitable, says Chinese media,” 2013-3-12, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/767582.shtml#.UwdacfldVPM)

●Commentator Qiu Zhenhai with Phoenix TV “I don’t think we’re on the verge of a large-scale war, but with increasing tensions on the Korean Peninsula, conflict will be inevitable, and the situation leaves no room for foreign powers to intervene in North Korea.” ●Hong Kong-based China Review News Agency North Korea’s nullification of the Korean War Armistice Agreement can be seen as a warning to the US and South Korea. If they insist on provoking North Korea, a small-scale military conflict might be inevitable. ///

In addition, with the increasing amount of distrust mounting between North Korea and China, any military action taken by North Korea puts pressure on China, something the latter should be prepared for. ●China.com.cn It is unlikely any confrontation on the Korean Peninsula will result in nuclear war. Long-term conflict with South Korea and the US is unsustainable, as Pyongyang’s nuclear power and other resources are limited. However, regular military conflicts may occur since Pyongyang’s statement was an unprecedented direct threat.