# 1NC

## 1nc debt ceiling da

#### The GOP is ready to cave at the moment – they have come to the table to get a debt ceiling agreement reached

**Memoli and Mascaro 10/2** (Michael A. Memoli and Lisa Mascaro, “House Republicans turn toward seeking a deal on the debt ceiling,” October 2, 2013, <http://www.latimes.com/nation/politics/politicsnow/la-pn-government-shutdown-update-20131002,0,874807.story>)

WASHINGTON -- House Speaker [John A. Boehner](http://www.latimes.com/topic/politics/government/john-boehner-PEPLT007549.topic) (R-Ohio) pleaded for patience Wednesday from a nervous faction of Republicans clamoring for a resolution to the [government shutdown](http://www.latimes.com/topic/politics/government/u.s.-government-shutdown-%282013%29-EVGAP00081.topic), now headed into a third day after congressional leaders left the [White House](http://www.latimes.com/topic/politics/government/executive-branch/white-house-PLCUL000110.topic) without a path toward a deal. Essentially resigned that they will be unable to win support from House Republicans for a no-strings bill to fund the government, the leadership has clearly shifted to the next battle: the debt ceiling. That all but ensures a prolonged government shutdown as Republicans seek a deal aiming at the Oct. 17 deadline to raise the debt ceiling or face a potentially catastrophic default. [FULL COVERAGE: The U.S. government shutdown](http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-obamacare-government-shutdown-sg,0,3402672.storygallery) Top House Republicans have begun working on demands the GOP will make in exchange for raising the debt limit and reopening government, according to those familiar with the internal strategy. Knowing that a delay of [Obamacare](http://www.latimes.com/topic/health/healthcare-laws/affordable-care-act-%28obamacare%29-EVGAP00039.topic) remains unlikely to be accepted by the president, Republicans are expected to revisit the components of past budget battles: cuts to Medicare, Social Security and other entitlement programs, as well as reforming the tax code, a long-standing interest. They may also seek to gain administration approval of the Keystone XL pipeline between Canada and the United States and pursue smaller changes to the healthcare law, including the repeal of the tax on medical-device makers and an end to the individual patient advisory board. House leaders are wary of engaging in another legislative ping-pong match with the [Senate](http://www.latimes.com/topic/politics/government/u.s.-senate-ORGOV0000134.topic) and would prefer to negotiate with Democrats and the White House – a strategy that has proven risky for Boehner in the past, as his troops protested being out of the loop. A major agreement “would be the only way out of the mess right now,” said Rep. [Devin Nunes](http://www.latimes.com/topic/politics/government/devin-nunes-PEPLT007910.topic) (R-Tulare), predicting the shutdown could last for weeks as such a deal comes together. Wednesday’s White House meeting, which included Boehner, Senate Majority [Harry Reid](http://www.latimes.com/topic/politics/government/harry-reid-PEPLT005460.topic) (D-Nev.), Senate Minority Leader [Mitch McConnell](http://www.latimes.com/topic/politics/government/mitch-mcconnell-PEPLT004312.topic) (R-Ky.), House Minority Leader [Nancy Pelosi](http://www.latimes.com/topic/politics/government/nancy-pelosi-PEPLT005126.topic) (D-San Francisco) and Vice President [Joe Biden](http://www.latimes.com/topic/politics/government/joe-biden-PEPLT007548.topic), lasted almost 90 minutes. Boehner emerged alone, saying Democrats “will not negotiate” to end the shutdown. “At some point we’ve got to allow the process that our founders gave us to work out,” he said. “All we’re asking for here is a discussion and fairness to the America people under Obamacare.” Earlier in the day, Boehner held a series of meetings with party moderates. Rep. [Peter T. King](http://www.latimes.com/topic/politics/government/peter-t.-king-PEPLT003549.topic) (R-N.Y.), who was not in the meetings but has been one of the leaders of an effort to press leadership to shift strategy, said Boehner’s message was, “Have patience.” The lawmakers left the speaker’s office understanding that “there is no endgame right now,” he said. Wednesday night, the House approved measures that would resume certain federal functions – reopening national parks and museums, and funding medical research at the [National Institutes of Health](http://www.latimes.com/topic/health/health-organizations/national-institutes-of-health-ORGOV0000101.topic). Earlier, the House also approved funding for the District of Columbia government, ensuring trash pick-up and other municipal services in and around the Capitol. Republicans also held firm to defeat an effort by House Democrats that could have forced the body to vote on a broader spending bill to end the shutdown entirely, despite a new round of statements from centrist Republicans saying they would support such a bill. “Leadership is committed to play the [Cruz](http://www.latimes.com/topic/politics/government/ted-cruz-PEPLT0008957.topic) strategy all the way out,” said Nunes, who has been a vocal critic of that strategy led by Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Texas) even though he has consistently voted to execute it. “I’m going to continue to support our leadership, even if we have entered the valley of death. When you enter the valley of death, you’ve got to keep running and the whole team has to stay together.” Obama’s invitation to congressional leaders to meet at the White House also reassured some moderates. "I think everyone’s trying to give leadership at least the opportunity to have the conversation with the other side," said Rep. [Michael Grimm](http://www.latimes.com/topic/politics/government/michael-grimm-PEPLT007846.topic) (R-N.Y.), who represents a district in New York City that Obama won last November.

#### Plan ends Obama’s credibility with Congress --- cause stronger GOP pushback on the debt ceiling

**Seeking Alpha 9/10**/13 (“Syria Could Upend Debt Ceiling Fight”, <http://seekingalpha.com/article/1684082-syria-could-upend-debt-ceiling-fight>)

Unless President Obama can totally change a reluctant public's perception of another Middle-Eastern conflict, it seems unlikely that he can get 218 votes in the House, though he can probably still squeak out 60 votes in the Senate. This defeat would be totally unprecedented as a President has never lost a military authorization vote in American history. To forbid the Commander-in-Chief of his primary power renders him all but impotent. At this point, a rebuff from the House is a 67%-75% probability.¶ I reach this probability by looking within the whip count. I assume the 164 declared "no" votes will stay in the "no" column. To get to 218, Obama needs to win over 193 of the 244 undecided, a gargantuan task. Within the "no" column, there are 137 Republicans. Under a best case scenario, Boehner could corral 50 "yes" votes, which would require Obama to pick up 168 of the 200 Democrats, 84%. Many of these Democrats rode to power because of their opposition to Iraq, which makes it difficult for them to support military conflict. The only way to generate near unanimity among the undecided Democrats is if they choose to support the President (recognizing the political ramifications of a defeat) despite personal misgivings. The idea that all undecided Democrats can be convinced of this argument is relatively slim, especially as there are few votes to lose. In the best case scenario, the House could reach 223-225 votes, barely enough to get it through. Under the worst case, there are only 150 votes. Given the lopsided nature of the breakdown, the chance of House passage is about one in four.¶ While a failure in the House would put action against Syria in limbo, I have felt that the market has overstated the impact of a strike there, which would be limited in nature. Rather, investors should focus on the profound ripple through the power structure in Washington, which would greatly impact impending battles over spending and the debt ceiling.¶ Currently, the government loses spending authority on September 30 while it hits the debt ceiling by the middle of October. Markets have generally felt that Washington will once again strike a last-minute deal and avert total catastrophe. Failure in the Syrian vote could change this. For the Republicans to beat Obama on a President's strength (foreign military action), they will likely be emboldened that they can beat him on domestic spending issues.¶ Until now, consensus has been that the two sides would compromise to fund the government at sequester levels while passing a $1 trillion stand-alone debt ceiling increase. However, the right wing of Boehner's caucus has been pushing for more, including another $1 trillion in spending cuts, defunding of Obamacare, and a one year delay of the individual mandate. Already, Conservative PACs have begun airing advertisements, urging a debt ceiling fight over Obamacare. With the President rendered hapless on Syria, they will become even more vocal about their hardline resolution, setting us up for a showdown that will rival 2011's debt ceiling fight.¶ I currently believe the two sides will pass a short-term continuing resolution to keep the government open, and then the GOP will wage a massive fight over the debt ceiling. While Obama will be weakened, he will be unwilling to undermine his major achievement, his healthcare law. In all likelihood, both sides will dig in their respective trenches, unwilling to strike a deal, essentially in a game of chicken. If the House blocks Syrian action, it will take America as close to a default as it did in 2011. Based on the market action then, we can expect massive volatility in the final days of the showdown with the Dow falling 500 points in one session in 2011.¶ As markets panicked over the potential for a U.S. default, we saw a massive risk-off trade, moving from equities into Treasuries. I think there is a significant chance we see something similar this late September into October. The Syrian vote has major implications on the power of Obama and the far-right when it comes to their willingness to fight over the debt ceiling. If the Syrian resolution fails, the debt ceiling fight will be even worse, which will send equities lower by upwards of 10%. Investors must be prepared for this "black swan" event.¶ Looking back to August 2011, stocks that performed the best were dividend paying, less-cyclical companies like Verizon (VZ), Wal-Mart (WMT), Coca-Cola (KO) and McDonald's (MCD) while high beta names like Netflix (NFLX) and Boeing (BA) were crushed. Investors also flocked into treasuries despite default risk while dumping lower quality bonds as spreads widened. The flight to safety helped treasuries despite U.S. government issues. I think we are likely to see a similar move this time.¶ Assuming there is a Syrian "no" vote, I would begin to roll back my long exposure in the stock market and reallocate funds into treasuries as I believe yields could drop back towards 2.50%. Within the stock market, I think the less-cyclical names should outperform, making utilities and consumer staples more attractive. For more tactical traders, I would consider buying puts against the S&P 500 and look toward shorting higher-beta and defense stocks like Boeing and Lockheed Martin (LMT). I also think lower quality bonds would suffer as spreads widen, making funds like JNK vulnerable. Conversely, gold (GLD) should benefit from the fear trade.¶ I would also like to address the potential that Congress does not vote down the Syrian resolution. First, news has broken that Russia has proposed Syria turn over its chemical stockpile. If Syria were to agree (Syria said it was willing to consider), the U.S. would not have to strike, canceling the congressional vote. The proposal can be found here. I strongly believe this is a delaying tactic rather than a serious effort. In 2005, Libya began to turn over chemical weapons; it has yet to complete the hand-off. Removing and destroying chemical weapons is an exceptionally challenging and dangerous task that would take years, not weeks, making this deal seem unrealistic, especially because a cease-fire would be required around all chemical facilities. The idea that a cease-fire could be maintained for months, essentially allowing Assad to stay in office, is hard to take seriously. I believe this is a delaying tactic, and Congress will have to vote within the next two weeks.¶ The final possibility is that Democrats back their President and barely ram the Syria resolution through. I think the extreme risk of a full-blown debt stand-off to dissipate. However, Boehner has promised a strong fight over the debt limit that the market has largely ignored. I do believe the fight would still be worse than the market anticipates but not outright disastrous. As such, I would not initiate short positions, but I would trim some longs and move into less cyclical stocks as the risk would still be the debt ceiling fight leading to some drama not no drama.¶ Remember, in politics everything is connected. Syria is not a stand-alone issue. Its resolution will impact the power structure in Washington. A failed vote in Congress is likely to make the debt ceiling fight even worse, spooking markets, and threatening default on U.S. obligations unless another last minute deal can be struck.

#### Having to defend foreign policy issues takes Obama off-message – it undermines his constant pressure on the GOP

**Milbank, 9/27/13** – Washington Post Opinion Writer (Dana, “Obama should pivot to Dubya’s playbook” Washington Post, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/dana-milbank-obama-should-try-pivoting-to-george-bushs-playbook/2013/09/27/c72469f0-278a-11e3-ad0d-b7c8d2a594b9_story.html>)

If President Obama can stick to his guns, he will win his October standoff with Republicans. That’s an awfully big “if.” This president has been consistently inconsistent, predictably unpredictable and reliably erratic. Consider the events of Thursday morning: Obama gave a rousing speech in suburban Washington, in defense of Obamacare, on the eve of its implementation. “We’re now only five days away from finishing the job,” he told the crowd. But before he had even left the room, his administration let slip that it was delaying by a month the sign-up for the health-care exchanges for small businesses. It wasn’t a huge deal, but it was enough to trample on the message the president had just delivered. Throughout his presidency, Obama has had great difficulty delivering a consistent message. Supporters plead for him to take a position — any position — and stick with it. His shifting policy on confronting Syria was the most prominent of his vacillations, but his allies have seen a similar approach to the Guantanamo Bay prison, counterterrorism and climate change. Even on issues such as gun control and immigration where his views have been consistent, Obama has been inconsistent in promoting his message. Allies are reluctant to take risky stands, because they fear that Obama will change his mind and leave them standing alone. Now come the budget showdowns, which could define the rest of his presidency. Republican leaders are trying to shift the party’s emphasis from the fight over a government shutdown to the fight over the debt-limit increase, where they have more support. A new Bloomberg poll found that Americans, by a 2-to-1 margin, disagree with Obama’s view that Congress should raise the debt limit without any conditions. But Obama has a path to victory. That poll also found that Americans think lawmakers should stop trying to repeal Obamacare. And that was before House Republicans dramatically overplayed their hand by suggesting that they’ll allow the nation to default if Obama doesn’t agree to their laundry list of demands, including suspending Obamacare, repealing banking reforms, building a new oil pipeline, easing environmental regulations, limiting malpractice lawsuits and restricting access to Medicare. To beat the Republicans, Obama might follow the example of a Republican, George W. Bush. Whatever you think of what he did, he knew how to get it done: by simplifying his message and repeating it, ad nauseam, until he got the result he was after. Obama instead tends to give a speech and move along to the next topic. This is why he is forever making “pivots” back to the economy, or to health care. But the way to pressure Congress is to be President One Note. In the debt-limit fight, Obama already has his note: He will not negotiate over the full faith and credit of the United States. That’s as good a theme as any; it matters less what the message is than that he delivers it consistently. The idea, White House officials explained to me, is to avoid getting into a back-and-forth over taxes, spending and entitlement programs. “We’re right on the merits, but I don’t think we want to argue on the merits,” one said. “Our argument is not that our argument is better than theirs; it’s that theirs is stupid.” This is a clean message: Republicans are threatening to tank the economy — through a shutdown or, more likely, through a default on the debt — and Obama isn’t going to negotiate with these hostage-takers. Happily for Obama, Republicans are helping him to make the case by being publicly belligerent. After this week’s 21-hour speech on the Senate floor by Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Tex.), the publicity-seeking Texan and Sen. Mike Lee (R-Utah) objected to a bipartisan request to move a vote from Friday to Thursday to give House Republicans more time to craft legislation avoiding a shutdown. On the Senate floor, Sen. Bob Corker (R-Tenn.) accused them of objecting because they had sent out e-mails encouraging their supporters to tune in to the vote on Friday. The Post’s Ed O’Keefe caught Cruz “appearing to snicker” as his colleague spoke — more smug teenager than legislator. Even if his opponents are making things easier for him, Obama still needs to stick to his message. As in Syria, the president has drawn a “red line” by saying he won’t negotiate with those who would put the United States into default. If he retreats, he will embolden his opponents and demoralize his supporters.

#### A failure over negotiations now would snowball into a default and collapse the economy

**Parker and Lowrey 10/3** ([ASHLEY PARKER](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/p/ashley_parker/index.html) and [ANNIE LOWREY](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/l/annie_lowrey/index.html), “Boehner Pledges to Avoid Default, Republicans Say,” October 3, 2013, Jackie Calmes and Jonathan Weisman contributed reporting, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/04/us/politics/debt-limit-impasse.html?hp&_r=0>)

WASHINGTON — Speaker John A. Boehner has privately told Republican lawmakers anxious about fallout from the government shutdown that he would not allow a potentially more crippling federal default as the atmosphere on Capitol Hill turned increasingly tense on Thursday. Mr. Boehner’s comments, recounted by multiple lawmakers, that he would use a combination of Republican and Democratic votes to increase the federal debt limit if necessary appeared aimed at reassuring his colleagues — and nervous financial markets — that he did not intend to let the economic crisis spiral further out of control. They came even though he has so far refused to allow a vote on a Senate budget measure to end the shutdown that many believe could pass with bipartisan backing. They also reflect Mr. Boehner’s view that a default would have widespread and long-term economic consequences while the shutdown, though disruptive, had more limited impact. With the mood in Congress already unsettled by the bitter sparring over the fiscal standoff, the Capitol was shaken anew Thursday afternoon when a high-speed chase beginning near the White House ended near the Senate office complex with Capitol Police shooting the driver to death. The sound of gunfire outside the Capitol forced at least five senators in the vicinity to take cover on their stomachs and led to a temporary lockdown of members of Congress and their staffs. The House and Senate adjourned for the day shortly after the incident as the shutdown extended into a third day. Along with Senator Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, the Senate Republican leader, Mr. Boehner has long dismissed the idea that Congress would not act to prevent a damaging default, and President Obama on Thursday called a default “the height of irresponsibility.” But the failure of the House and Senate to reach a deal ahead of the shutdown has raised questions of whether Republicans could be persuaded to join in raising the debt limit before the Treasury Department runs out of money about the middle of October. His comments were read by members of both parties as renewing his determination on the default and came as the Treasury warned that an impasse over raising the debt limit might prove catastrophic and potentially result “in a financial crisis and recession that could echo the events of 2008 or worse.” Lawmakers said that in recent days, Mr. Boehner, who is under fierce attack from Democrats over his handling of the shutdown, has made clear that he is willing to use a combination of Republican and Democratic votes on the debt limit if need be. Representative Leonard Lance of New Jersey, one of the moderate Republicans who met privately with Mr. Boehner on Wednesday, would not provide details of the meeting, but said, “The speaker of the House does not want to default on the debt on the United States, and I believe he believes in Congress as an institution, and I certainly believe he is working for the best interests of the American people.” One lawmaker, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said Mr. Boehner suggested he would be willing to violate the so-called Hastert Rule to pass a debt-limit increase. The informal rule refers to a policy of not bringing to the floor any measure that does not have a majority of Republican votes. A spokesman for Mr. Boehner pushed back on the idea that the speaker would try to pass a debt-limit increase mainly with Democratic votes. “The speaker always, always prefers to pass legislation with a strong Republican majority,” said Michael Steel, a spokesman for Mr. Boehner. But Mr. Steel acknowledged that Mr. Boehner, who has long and deep ties to the business community, understood the need to head off a default. “The speaker has always been clear that a default would be disastrous for our economy,” Mr. Steel said. “He’s also been clear that a ‘clean’ debt hike cannot pass the House. That’s why the president and Senate Democrats should drop their ‘no negotiations’ stance, and work with us on a plan to raise the debt limit in a responsible way, with spending cuts and reforms to get our economy moving again and create jobs.” It is conceivable that Mr. Boehner could pass a debt-limit increase with a slim majority of Republican votes, with Democrats making up the difference, as he has in the past on budget measures. But moving in that direction poses risks of a threat to Mr. Boehner’s leadership position from a watchful conservative bloc, which has warned that his post could be on the line if he goes against the legislative position of large numbers of the rank and file. Representative John C. Fleming, Republican of Louisiana and one of his conference’s more conservative members, said that he doubted Mr. Boehner would be able to pass any bill — with or without Democratic support — that did not extract some significant concessions from Mr. Obama and Senate Democrats. “I just don’t think there’d be hardly any Republicans in support of raising the debt ceiling without cuts to spending, changes to Obamacare, and perhaps other issues,” Mr. Fleming said. He added that he thought House Republicans would demand at least some sort of delay to the president’s signature health care law, as well as require that every dollar increase in the debt ceiling be matched by a dollar increase in spending cuts. At the same time, growing numbers of House Republicans have expressed frustration at those insisting on changes to the health law when Mr. Obama has made clear he will not accept them. Their unhappiness, the furor caused by the shutdown and the desire to avoid default could help protect Mr. Boehner. Representative James Lankford, Republican of Oklahoma and chairman of the Republican Policy Committee, said he did not think House Republicans had the “energy” to deal with a debt default. “The speaker’s been over and over on that on the debt ceiling, that there’s no intention for default,” he said. “That’s been public, private, everywhere he’s had an opportunity.” Democrats saw the disclosure of Mr. Boehner’s private comments as a possible sign of progress. “Even coming close to the edge of default is very dangerous, and putting this issue to rest significantly ahead of the default date would allow everyone in the country to breathe a huge sigh of relief,” said Senator Charles E. Schumer of New York, the No. 3 Democrat in the Senate. A Treasury Department report released Thursday said the debt-limit impasse could cause credit markets to freeze, the dollar to plummet and interest rates to rise precipitously. After its release, Mr. Obama reiterated administration warnings about the potential economic consequences of not increasing the debt limit. “As reckless as a government shutdown is, as many people as are being hurt by a government shutdown, an economic shutdown that results from default would be dramatically worse,” Mr. Obama said Thursday, speaking to construction workers at M. Luis Construction in Rockville, Md., a suburb north of Washington. W. James McNerney Jr., chief executive of Boeing, and also the chairman of the Business Roundtable, a corporate association, and of the White House export council, said in an interview on Thursday that for corporate America, the standoff over the government shutdown “drives an even deeper concern about the debt limit.”

#### Nuclear war

**Friedberg and Schoenfeld 8**

[Aaron, Prof. Politics. And IR @ Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School and Visiting Scholar @ Witherspoon Institute, and Gabriel, Senior Editor of Commentary and Wall Street Journal, “The Dangers of a Diminished America”, 10-28, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html>]

Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures.

## CP

The Executive branch of the United States federal government should pass and enforce an executive order to ***should require a declaration of war that is consistent with jus ad bellum principles of self-defense under international law for any decision to use or deploy armed forces against a nation-state in circumstances likely to lead to an armed attack. The President should*** define “armed attack” as: The use of force of a magnitude that is likely to produce serious consequences, epitomized by territorial intrusions, human casualties, or considerable destruction of property.

The President should allow an exception in the event of an armed attack against the United States, or its allies, or other such national security emergency making prior approval impractical. The President should require immediate notice to Congress of such a determination, and shall require approval from Congress within 14 days.

#### and implement this by establishing independent commissions to review and ensure compliance with the order.

#### XO solves because it provides a speedy discussion and shields the link to politics

**Sovacool 9** Dr. Benjamin K. Sovacool 2009 is a Research Fellow in the Energy Governance Program at the Centre on Asia and Globalization., Kelly E. Sovacool is a Senior Research Associate at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of SingaporeArticle: Preventing National Electricity-Water Crisis Areas in the United States, Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 2009 34 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 333

¶ Executive Orders also save time in a second sense. The President does not have to expend scarce political capital trying to persuade Congress to adopt his or her proposal. Executive Orders thus save ¶ ¶ presidential attention for other topics. Executive Orders bypass congressional debate and opposition, along with all of the horsetrading and compromise such legislative activity entails.¶ ¶ 292¶ ¶ Speediness of implementation can be especially important when challenges require rapid and decisive action. After the September ¶ ¶ 11, 2001 attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center, for ¶ ¶ instance, the Bush Administration almost immediately passed ¶ ¶ Executive Orders forcing airlines to reinforce cockpit doors and ¶ ¶ freezing the U.S. based assets of individuals and organizations ¶ ¶ involved with terrorist groups.¶ ¶ 293¶ ¶ These actions took Congress ¶ ¶ nearly four months to debate and subsequently endorse with ¶ ¶ legislation. Executive Orders therefore enable presidents to ¶ ¶ rapidly change law without having to wait for congressional action ¶ ¶ or agency regulatory rulemaking.

## T

#### Interpretation – Restriction requires prohibition

Northglenn 11

(City of Northglenn Zoning Ordinance, “Rules of Construction – Definitions”, http://www.northglenn.org/municode/ch11/content\_11-5.html)

Section 11-5-3. Restrictions. As used in this Chapter 11 of the Municipal Code, the term "restriction" shall mean a prohibitive regulation. Any use, activity, operation, building, structure or thing which is the subject of a restriction is prohibited, and no such use, activity, operation, building, structure or thing shall be authorized by any permit or license.

#### “In the area” means all of the activities

United Nations 13

(United Nations Law of the Sea Treaty, http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention\_agreements/texts/unclos/part1.htm)

PART I¶ INTRODUCTION¶ Article 1

Use of terms and scope¶ 1. For the purposes of this Convention:¶ (1) "Area" means the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction;¶ (2) "Authority" means the International Seabed Authority;¶ (3) "activities in the Area" means all activities of exploration for, and exploitation of, the resources of the Area;

#### Interpretation statutes must be restrictive laws derived from congressional bills

**West’s 08** (West’s encyclopedia of American Law 2008, “Statute,” http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/statute+law)

An act of a legislature that declares, proscribes, or commands something; a specific law, expressed in writing. A statute is a written law passed by a legislature on the state or federal level. Statutes set forth general propositions of law that courts apply to specific situations. A statute may forbid a certain act, direct a certain act, make a declaration, or set forth governmental mechanisms to aid society. A statute begins as a bill proposed or sponsored by a legislator. If the bill survives the legislative committee process and is approved by both houses of the legislature, the bill becomes law when it is signed by the executive officer (the president on the federal level or the governor on the state level). When a bill becomes law, the various provisions in the bill are called statutes. The term statute signifies the elevation of a bill from legislative proposal to law. State and federal statutes are compiled in statutory codes that group the statutes by subject. These codes are published in book form and are available at law libraries. Lawmaking powers are vested chiefly in elected officials in the legislative branch. The vesting of the chief lawmaking power in elected lawmakers is the foundation of a representative democracy. Aside from the federal and state constitutions, statutes passed by elected lawmakers are the first laws to consult in finding the law that applies to a case.

Statutory restrictions are controls or limits imposed by the legislative body

#### Violation: The aff is only a condition or limit on Presidential power that doesn’t set a statutory restriction.

#### Voters:

#### 1. Fairness –

#### a. Predictable limits – Anything that is not a prohibition based on a statutory restriction explodes the topic to an infinite number of affs. Our interp would limit it to 4 areas and process mechanisms. Gives the topic 8 affs.

#### b. Ground – Can’t generate links to DAs and makes CPs uncompetitive. Especially since they set a restriction based on international law.

#### c. Bidirectionality – Allows aff to set conditions that would expand the authority of the executive.

#### Evaluate topicality in a competing interpretations framework.

## war

**Six constraints on U.S. action that make heg ineffective- balancing, legitimacy, timing, domestic constraints, sunk costs, and restraint**

**Legro 11** \*Jeffrey W Legro is Randolph P Compton Professor at the University of Virginia [Jeffrey W Legro (2011): The mix that makes unipolarity: hegemonic purpose

and international constraints, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 24:2, 185-199, July 26th]

Systemic constraints under unipolarity: not gone¶ We cannot, however, understand unipolarity through a sole focus on unipolar¶ purpose. This is because even under unipolarity when one country has immense¶ power and greater ability to shape the system, there are global conditions that¶ limit the desirability and efficacy of unipole effort.¶ Brooks and Wohlforth contend that this is not the case: a hegemon in a¶ unipolar world will not be subject to significant systemic constraints. Well, that is¶ their explicit argument, but they qualify it in a piecemeal way and when the pieces¶ are put together with others they do not consider, the picture may be a different¶ one. Their analysis fingers three constraints and there are at least three others that¶ escape their reach.5¶ The first constraint involves the potential that other countries will oppose the¶ hegemon under unipolarity. Brooks and Wohlforth suggest this need not happen.¶ They do an excellent job debunking the notion that balancing is constraining the¶ United States today. Yet they also acknowledge that balancing is possible if states¶ view their security as sufficiently challenged. At the extreme, if the United States¶ tried to ‘run the table’ with a strategy of global aggression and domination, Brooks¶ and Wohlforth do expect balancing. Thus the lack of balancing depends on a¶ perception that the United States is not likely to attempt domination. For example,¶ the United States, with a reputation for geopolitical restraint (even if diminished¶ in recent years), provokes less reaction than would a Napoleonic France or Fascist¶ Germany with the same power advantages. Balancing, therefore, can occur under¶ some circumstances (for example, different perceptions of hegemonic intent) even¶ in unipolarity.¶ Second, states will also constrain the United States if they have important¶ opposing interests not related to security. Brooks andWohlforth count this as part¶ of their argument as long as it does not involve the security concerns central to¶ balancing theory. Thus if other countries resist the United States due to economic¶ interests, regional security concerns, disagreements over non-security issues, or¶ domestic policy issues, this would not be security balancing or evidence against¶ their thesis.¶ In this view, the Russian-Chinese strategic partnership in the Shanghai¶ Cooperation Organization is not about offsetting the United States, but is instead¶ about arms sales and fighting terrorism in their region. Likewise, Russia’s ties to¶ Tehran have commercial and regional security roots. And opposition to the Iraq¶ War in places like Germany and Turkey is seen as a product of ‘long term domestic¶ political dynamics’ rather than a reaction to the concentration of US power.¶ Brooks andWohlforth’s argument is not that other countries will not constrain¶ the unipole; it is that they will not do so simply because of the unipole’s¶ extraordinary power. Yet it is clear that international order is dependent not just¶ on unipolarity but also on the distribution of interests. Variations in international¶ order, given a constant power distribution, may still occur if there are splits in¶ purpose between the hegemon and significant, if lesser, countries. Rifts between¶ the United States and Europe over such issues as UN reform, the WTO, and the¶ Middle East have hampered global governance and US aims in those areas¶ (Abdelal and Segal 2007). The structure of interests among major countries is a¶ constraint on US actions. Strategies, security or otherwise, that do not attend to¶ those interests will suffer.¶ Third, Brooks and Wohlforth’s analysis of legitimacy adds further caveats to¶ their argument. As with the other systemic constraints, they find that the need for¶ legitimacy does not provide a strong check on US policy. They do however¶ conclude that legitimacy is a ‘weakly conditional’ constraint. They insightfully¶ explore how dominant powers have many tools to shape strategically what¶ constitutes legitimacy and paper over the instances where they prefer to ignore¶ the rules. But ultimately hegemons ‘want and need rules and the legitimation¶ that they bring’ (Brooks and Wohlforth 2008, 207). Those rules for that very¶ reason must have some integrity. Hegemons, it might be said, can shape the¶ rules of order, but not always exactly as they please, and sometimes at significant¶ cost. The United States did not want to alter existing practices on landmines¶ but due to the Ottawa Treaty aimed at banning their use, it has had to spend¶ much money looking for military alternatives not to mention the international¶ and domestic political costs of resisting such a law (Finnemore 2009;¶ Landler 2010).¶ A fourth systemic constraint that deserves more weight involves¶ transaction and sunk costs that reduce incentives to change and or create¶ new institutions.6 One of the reasons the United States has not attempted a¶ redesign of international architecture may indeed be the heavy costs involved. For¶ example, NATO endures not because it is optimal to deal with the new threats¶ beyond Europe, but instead because it already exists and is too expensive to¶ reinvent. Other institutions that fit this vein include the Nuclear Non-Proliferation¶ Treaty and the United Nations. These institutions may not allow the United States¶ to get everything it wants but it would be even more costly to create new¶ institutions. Relative transactions (or sunk) costs contain Goliath.¶ The fifth systemic constraint is timing. It is easier for the top dog of international¶ politics to work its will in the international arena at some times versus others. For¶ example, it is often argued that major crises or wars present opportunities for¶ systemic transformation with little pushback (Krasner 1976; Ikenberry 2000; Olson¶ 1982; Higgs 1987; Goldstone 1991; Khong 1992). Thus the Concert of Europe came¶ out of the Napoleonic Wars, the League of Nations from World War I, the United¶ Nations fromWorldWar II, and so on. Such times involve conditions that facilitate¶ change including, not only an altered balance of power, but also war or economic¶ weariness, the desire to avoid prior problems, and the emergence of new domestic¶ coalitions and policy ideas. The general point is that the hegemon will be more or¶ less likely to receive pushback on its efforts to redo the international system¶ depending on whether extraordinary events act as an icebreaker on political¶ inertia. Timing has arguably not been favourable to unipolar revisionism with the¶ possible exception of post 9/11—an opportunity neutralized by the perceived¶ failure of the Bush doctrine. Absent such conditions, inertia tends to dominate and¶ a hegemon that recognizes this knows that changing the rules of the game will be¶ more difficult.¶ The sixth constraint involves domestic politics. Brooks and Wohlforth do note¶ that domestic resistance, not systemic constraints, might limit resources to pursue¶ activism. Their thesis, however, is about the lack of systemic constraints. What¶ deserves more attention, however, is the way that systemic factors in world¶ politics might inspire US domestic opposition to primacy. It seems that systemic¶ effects—perhaps other states opposing the United States, a loss of trading¶ privileges, or anti-American sentiment, arguably does mould US domestic¶ resistance to global projects.¶ For example, perhaps part of the reason for the turn of domestic opinion¶ against the policy activism of the ‘Bush doctrine’ related to the decline in US¶ international standing. The American public may view US international standing¶ as a type of performance criteria for presidents and administrations. There is some¶ evidence that US presidential approval ratings are influenced by satisfaction¶ rankings of the United States’ global position (Task Force on US Standing inWorld¶ Affairs 2009, 20–23). Standing functions as a proxy for presidential performance¶ and hence can be a constraint. Americans thought less of President Bush and his¶ agenda because the reaction abroad was so negative. Indeed, there have been¶ reports that Vice President Cheney believed Bush became too sensitive to public¶ opinion in the second term (Gellman 2009).¶ The cumulative effect of these six constraints—reputation for restraint,¶ interests, legitimacy, sunk costs, timing, and domestic externalities—seem to add¶ up to something more significant than merely an asterisk to the thesis that¶ systemic constraints are not binding. It appears that even under unipolarity, the¶ international system can limit the dominant power. Goliath may not be bound, but¶ the hurdles faced may discourage or channel action in ways that cannot be¶ understood without taking them into account.¶

**Heg causes war and prolif-recalcitrant power balancing takes out the benefits of heg**

**Monteiro 11** \*Nuno P. Monteiro is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University [<http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00064>, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is not Peaceful”]

A unipole carrying out a defensive-dominance strategy will seek to preserve all three aspects of the status quo: maintaining the territorial boundaries and international political alignments of all other states, as well as freezing the global distribution of power. 60 This strategy can lead to conflict in two ways, both of which stem from uncertainty about the unipole’s intentions. First, not knowing the extent of the unipole’s determination to pursue a strategy of defensive dominance may spur some minor powers to develop their capabilities. Second, uncertainty about the degree to which the unipole will oppose small changes to the status quo may lead some minor powers to attempt them. In both cases, the opposition of the unipole to these actions is likely to lead to war. In this section, I lay out these two pathways to conflict and then illustrate them with historical examples. To be sure, states can never be certain of other states’ intentions. 61 There are a couple of reasons, however, why this uncertainty increases in unipolarity, even when the unipole appears to be determined to maintain the status quo. First, other states cannot be certain that the unipole will always pursue nonrevisionist goals. This is particularly problematic because unipolarity minimizes the structural constraints on the unipole’s grand strategy. As Waltz writes, “Even if a dominant power behaves with moderation, restraint, and forbearance, weaker states will worry about its future behavior. . . . The absence of se rious threats to American security gives the United States wide latitude in making foreign policy choices.” 62 Second, unipolarity takes away the principal tool through which minor powers in bipolar and multipolar systems deal with uncertainty about great power intentions—alliances with other great powers. Whereas in these other systems minor powers can, in principle, attenuate the effects of uncertainty about great power intentions through external balancing, in a unipolar world no great power sponsor is present by definition. In effect, the systemic imbalance of power magnifies uncertainty about the unipole’s intentions. 63 Faced with this uncertainty, other states have two options. First, they can accommodate the unipole and minimize the chances of conºict but at the price of their external autonomy. 64 Accommodation is less risky for major powers because they can guarantee their own survival, and they stand to beneªt greatly from being part of the unipolar system. 65 Major powers are therefore unlikely to attempt to revise the status quo. Minor powers are also likely to accommodate the unipole, in an attempt to avoid entering a confrontation with a preponderant power. Thus, most states will accommodate the unipole because, as Wohlforth points out, the power differential rests in its favor. 66 Accommodation, however, entails greater risks for minor powers because their survival is not assured if the unipole should turn against them. Thus some of them are likely to implement a second strategic option—resisting the unipole. The structure of the international system does not entirely determine whether or not a minor power accommodates the unipole. Still, structure conditions the likelihood of accommodation in two ways. To begin, a necessary part of a strategy of dominance is the creation of alliances or informal security commitments with regional powers. Such regional powers, however, are likely to have experienced conºict with, or a grievance toward, at least some of its neighboring minor powers. The latter are more likely to adopt a recalcitrant posture. Additionally, by narrowing their opportunities for regional integration and security maximization, the unipole’s interference with the regional balance of power is likely to lower the value of the status quo for these minor powers. 67 As the literature on the “value of peace” shows, countries that attribute a low value to the status quo are more risk acceptant. This argument helps explain, for example, Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 and Syria’s and Egypt’s decision to attack Israel in 1973. 68 In both cases, aggressor states knew that their capabilities were significantly weaker than those of their targets. They were nonetheless willing to run the risk of launching attacks because they found the prewar status quo unacceptable. 69 Thus, for these states, the costs of balancing were lower relative to those of bandwagoning. In an international system with more than one great power, recalcitrant minor powers would, in principle, be able to balance externally by finding a great power sponsor. 70 In unipolarity, however, no such sponsors exist. 71 Only major powers are available, but because their survival is already guaranteed, they are likely to accommodate the unipole. And even if some do not, they are unlikely to meet a recalcitrant minor power’s security needs given that they possess only limited power-projection capabilities. 72 As such, recalcitrant minor powers must defend themselves, which puts them in a position of extreme selfhelp. There are four characteristics common to states in this position: (1) anarchy, (2) uncertainty about other states’ intentions, (3) insufªcient capabilities to deter a great power, and (4) no potential great power sponsor with whom to form a balancing coalition. The ªrst two characteristics are common to all states in all types of polarity. The third is part of the rough-and-tumble of minor powers in any system. The fourth, however, is unique to recalcitrant minor powers in unipolarity. This dire situation places recalcitrant minor powers at risk for as long as they lack the capability to defend themselves. They depend on the goodwill of the unipole and must worry that the unipole will shift to a strategy of offensive dominance or disengagement. Recalcitrant minor powers will therefore attempt to bolster their capabilities through internal balancing. To deter an eventual attack by the unipole and bolster their chances of survival in the event deterrence fails, recalcitrant minor powers will attempt to reinforce their conventional defenses, develop the most effective asymmetric strategies possible, and, most likely in the nuclear age, try to acquire the ultimate deterrent—survivable nuclear weapons. 73 In so doing, they seek to become major powers. Defensive dominance, however, also gives the unipole reason to oppose any such revisions to the status quo. First, such revisions decrease the benefits of systemic leadership and limit the unipole’s ability to convert its relative power advantage into favorable outcomes. In the case of nuclear weapons, this limitation is all but irreversible, virtually guaranteeing the recalcitrant regime immunity against any attempt to coerce or overthrow it. Second, proliferation has the potential to produce regional instability, raising the risk of arms races. These would force the unipole to increase defense spending or accept a narrower overall relative power advantage. Third, proliferation would lead to the emergence of a recalcitrant major power that could become the harbinger of an unwanted large-scale balancing attempt. The unipole is therefore likely to demand that recalcitrant minor powers not revise the status quo. The latter, however, will want to resist such demands because of the threat they pose to those states’ security. 74 Whereas fighting over such demands would probably lead to defeat, conceding to them peacefully would bring the undesired outcome with certainty. A preventive war is therefore likely to ensue. In the second causal path to war, recalcitrant minor powers test the limits of the status quo by making small revisions—be they territorial conquests, altered international alignments, or an increase in relative power—evocative of Thomas Schelling’s famous “salami tactics.” 75 The unipole may not, however, accept these revisions, and instead demand their reversal. For a variety of reasons, including incomplete information, commitment problems, and the need for the minor power to establish a reputation for toughness, such demands may not be heeded. As a result, war between the unipole and recalcitrant minor powers emerges as a distinct possibility. 76 Regardless of the causal path, a war between the unipole and a recalcitrant minor power creates a precedent for other recalcitrant minor powers to boost their own capabilities. Depending on the unipole’s overall capabilities—that is, whether it can launch a second simultaneous conºict—it may also induce other recalcitrant minor powers to accelerate their balancing process. Thus, a war against a recalcitrant minor power presents other such states with greater incentives for, and (under certain conditions) higher prospects of, assuring their survival by acquiring the necessary capabilities, including nuclear weapons. At the same time, and depending on the magnitude of the unipole’s power preponderance, a war against a recalcitrant minor power creates an opportunity for wars among major and minor powers—including major power wars. To the extent that the unipole’s power preponderance is limited by its engagement in the ªrst war, **its ability to manage confrontations** between other states elsewhere is curtailed, increasing the chances that these will erupt into military conflicts. Therefore, even when the unipole is engaged, war remains a possibility. Between the end of the Cold War and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States generally implemented a strategy of defensive dominance. During this period, the dynamics described in this section can be seen at work in the cases of the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the 1999 Kosovo War, as well as in the Kargil War between India and Pakistan, and in North Korea’s and Iran’s nuclear programs. On August 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein ordered his forces to invade Kuwait, convinced the United States would not oppose this revision of the status quo. During the months that followed, the United States assembled an international coalition determined to restore Kuwaiti independence, and it obtained UN authorization to use force if Iraq did not withdraw its occupation forces by January 15, 1991. Two days after this deadline, the U.S.-led coalition began military action against Iraqi forces, expelling them from Kuwait in six weeks. 77 Two points deserve mention. First, the Gulf War was triggered by Iraq’s miscalculation regarding whether the United States would accept Iraqi annexation of Kuwait. At the outset of the unipolar era, great uncertainty surrounded the limits of what actions U.S. decisionmakers would find permissible. 78 Iraq miscalculated the degree of U.S. ºexibility, and war ensued. Second, the war was made possible by unipolarity, which placed Iraq in a situation of extreme selfhelp. Indeed, lack of a great power sponsor—at the time, the Soviet Union was in strategic retrenchment—was duly noted in Baghdad. Immediately after the war, Saddam’s foreign minister, Tariq Aziz, lamented, “We don’t have a patron anymore. . . . If we still had the Soviets as our patron, none of this would have happened.” 79 Similarly, in 1999, Serbian leaders miscalculated U.S. tolerance to ethnic violence in Kosovo, a secessionist province of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In March 1999, reacting to increasing brutality in the province, the international community convened a conference, which produced the Rambouillet accords. This agreement called for the restoration of Kosovo’s autonomy and the deployment of NATO peacekeeping forces, both unacceptable to Serbian authorities, who refused to submit to it. 80 In response, NATO launched a bombing campaign in Yugoslavia. In early June, after nine weeks of bombing, NATO offered the Serbian leadership a compromise, which it accepted, ending the war. 81 Once the war had started and it became clear that Serbia had overreached, Belgrade relied on the support of its ancestral major power ally, Russia. Serbian strategy during the war thus aimed in part at buying time for Russia to increase pressure on NATO to cease hostilities. Contrary to Belgrade’s expectations, however, Russian support for Serbian aims eroded as the war continued. On May 6, Russia agreed with the Group of Seven nations on a plan that included the deployment of UN peacekeepers and a guarantee of Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity. By mid-May, faced with Serbia’s obduracy, Moscow began to press its ally to accept the offer. Thus, not only did Russian support fail to prevent a U.S.-led intervention, but it was instrumental in convincing Serbia to accede to NATO’s demands. 82 The only war between major powers to have occurred thus far in a unipolar world—the Kargil War between India and Pakistan—started, as my theory would have predicted, while the United States was involved in Kosovo. 83 In May 1999, India detected Pakistani forces intruding into the Kargil sector in Indian-controlled Kashmir. This action triggered the ªrst Indo-Pakistani war of the nuclear age, which ended on July 4—after the cessation of military operations in Kosovo—when President Bill Clinton demanded Pakistan’s withdrawal, which occurred on July 26. 84 In the absence of a great power sponsor and uncertain of U.S. intentions, Iran and North Korea—both recalcitrant minor powers—have made considerable efforts to bolster their relative power by developing a nuclear capability. Unsurprisingly, the United States has consistently opposed their efforts, but has so far been unable to persuade either to desist. The North Korean nuclear program dates to the 1960s, but most of the nuclear development was conducted in a world with a status quo unipole. 85 Throughout the 1990s and into the early 2000s, North Korea sought to elude U.S. opposition without ever crossing the nuclear threshold. The North Korean regime seemed to have understood that the United States would view an explicit move toward a nuclear breakout as an extreme provocation and raise the possibility of a preventive war. When the United States shifted to a strategy of offensive dominance in late 2001, however, Pyongyang wasted little time in acquiring its nuclear deterrent. Iran, too, pursued a nuclear program throughout the 1990s. 86 The Iranian nuclear program, started in the 1950s, gained new impetus with the end of the Cold War as the result of a conºuence of factors: the 1989 replacement of an antinuclear supreme leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, with a pronuclear Ayatollah Ali Khamenei; the discovery of Iraq’s covert nuclear program during the 1991 Gulf War; and, above all, an increased U.S. presence in the region following that war. 87 A decade later, the expansion of Iran’s nuclear program prompted the State Department to proclaim, “We believe Iran’s true intent is to develop the capability to produce ªssile material for nuclear weapons.” 88 Iran’s nuclear program continued throughout the period in which the United States shifted toward a strategy of offensive dominance, to which I turn next.

**Extinction**

Asal and Beardsley 09 (Victor, Department of Political Science, State University of New York, Albany, and Kyle, Department of Political Science, Emory University, Winning with the Bomb, <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/uploads/Beardsley-Asal_Winning_with_the_Bomb.pdf>)

Conclusion Why do states proliferate? Nuclear weapons and the programs necessary to create them are expensive. They are dangerous. Other countries may attack a state while it is trying to create a nuclear arsenal and there is always the risk of a catastrophic accident. They may help generate existential threats by encouraging first strike incentives amongst a state's opponents. This paper has explored the incentives that make nuclear weapons attractive to a wide range of states despite their costly and dangerous nature. We have found that nuclear weapons provide more than prestige, they provide leverage. They are useful in coercive diplomacy, and this must be central to any explanation of why states acquire them. Since 9 August 1945 no state has used a nuclear weapon against another state, but we find evidence that the possession of nuclear weapons helps states to succeed in their confrontations with other states even when they do not “use” them. Conflict with nuclear actors carries with it a potential danger that conflict with other states simply does not have. Even though the probability of full escalation is presumably low, the evidence confirms that the immense damage from the possibility of such escalation is enough to make an opponent eager to offer concessions. Asymmetric crises allow nuclear states to use their leverage to good effect. When crises involve a severe threat – and nuclear use is not completely ruled out – the advantage that nuclear actors have is substantial. Nuclear weapons help states win concessions quickly in 25 salient conflicts. Consistent with the other papers in this issue and the editors’ introduction (Gartzke and Kroenig this issue), we report that nuclear weapons confer tangible benefits to the possessors. These benefits imply that there should be a general level of demand for nuclear weapons, which means that explanations for why so few states have actually proliferated should focus more on the supply side, as applied by Matthew Kroenig (this issue) and Matthew Fuhrmann (this issue). The findings here importantly suggest an additional reason why “proliferation begets proliferation,” in the words of George Shultz (Shultz 1984, 18). If both parties to a crisis have nuclear weapons, the advantage is effectively cancelled out. When states develop nuclear weapons, doing so may encourage their rivals to also proliferate for fear of being exploited by the shifting bargaining positions. And once the rivals proliferate, the initial proliferator no longer has much bargaining advantage. On the one hand, this dynamic adds some restraint to initial proliferation within a rivalry relationship: states fear that their arsenal will encourage their rivals to pursue nuclear weapons, which will leave them no better off (Davis 1993; Cirincione 2007). On the other hand, once proliferation has occurred, all other states that are likely to experience coercive bargaining with the new nuclear state will also want nuclear weapons. The rate of proliferation has the potential to accelerate because the desire to posses the “equalizer” will increase as the number of nuclear powers slowly rises. Our theoretical framework and empirical findings are complementary to Gartzke and Jo (this issue), who posit and find that nuclear states enjoy greater influence in the international realm. An interesting dynamic emerges when comparing the results to Rauchhaus (this issue), who finds that nuclear weapons in asymmetric dyads tend to increase the propensity for escalation. We have argued that nuclear weapons improve the bargaining leverage of the 26 possessors and tested that proposition directly. It is important to note that the factors that shape conflict initiation and escalation are not necessarily the same factors that most shape the outcome of the conflict. Even so, one explanation for why a stronger bargaining position does not necessarily produce less escalation is that escalation is a function of decisions by both sides, and even though the opponent of a nuclear state is more willing to back down, the nuclear state should be more willing to raise its demands and push for a harder bargain in order to maximize the benefits from the nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons appear to need ever-greater shares of their bargains in order to be satisfied, which helps to explain both their proclivity to win and their proclivity toward aggressive coercive diplomacy. An important implication in light of these findings is thus that even though nuclear weapon states tend to fare better at the end of their crises, this does not necessarily mean that the weapons are a net benefit for peace and stability.

## Deterrence

#### Deterrence breaks down – history and human nature.

Utgoff, 2002 (Victor A., Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses. In 1998–99, he established the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, former senior member of the National Security Council Staff, International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Survival*, “Proliferation, Missile Defence and American Ambitions”)

Worse still, in a highly proliferated world there would be more frequent opportunities for the use of nuclear weapons. And more frequent opportunities means shorter expected times between conflicts in which nuclear weapons get used, unless the probability of use at any opportunity is actually zero. To be sure, some theorists on nuclear deterrence appear to think that in any confrontation between two states known to have reliable nuclear capabilities, the probability of nuclear weapons being used is zero.3 These theorists think that such states will be so fearful of escalation to nuclear war that they would always avoid or terminate confrontations between them, short of even conventional war. They believe this to be true even if the two states have different cultures or leaders with very eccentric personalities. History and human nature, however, suggest that they are almost surely wrong. History includes instances in which states known to possess nuclear weapons did engage in direct conventional conflict. China and Russia fought battles along their common border even after both had nuclear weapons. Moreover, logic suggests that if states with nuclear weapons always avoided conflict with one another, surely states without nuclear weapons would avoid conflict with states that had them. Again, history provides counter-examples. Egypt attacked Israel in 1973 even though it saw Israel as a nuclear power at the time. Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands and fought Britain’s efforts to take them back, even though Britain had nuclear weapons. Those who claim that two states with reliable nuclear capabilities to devastate each other will not engage in conventional conflict risking nuclear war also assume that any leader from any culture would not choose suicide for his nation. But history provides unhappy examples of states whose leaders were ready to choose suicide for themselves and their fellow citizens. Hitler tried to impose a ‘victory or destruction’ policy on his people as Nazi Germany was going down to defeat.4 And Japan’s war minister, during debates on how to respond to the American atomic bombing, suggested ‘Would it not be wondrous for the whole nation to be destroyed like a beautiful flower?’5 If leaders are willing to engage in conflict with nuclear-armed nations, use of nuclear weapons in any particular instance may not be likely, but its probability would still be dangerously significant. In particular, human nature suggests that the threat of retaliation with nuclear weapons is not a reliable guarantee against a disastrous first use of these weapons. While national leaders and their advisors everywhere are usually talented and experienced people, even their most important decisions cannot be counted on to be the product of well-informed and thorough assessments of all options from all relevant points of view. This is especially so when the stakes are so large as to defy assessment and there are substantial pressures to act quickly, as could be expected in intense and fast-moving crises between nuclear-armed states.6 Instead, like other human beings, national leaders can be seduced by wishful thinking. They can misinterpret the words or actions of opposing leaders. Their advisors may produce answers that they think the leader wants to hear, or coalesce around what they know is an inferior decision because the group urgently needs the confidence or the sharing of responsibility that results from settling on something. Moreover, leaders may not recognise clearly where their personal or party interests diverge from those of their citizens. Under great stress, human beings can lose their ability to think carefully. They can refuse to believe that the worst could really happen, oversimplify the problem at hand, think in terms of simplistic analogies and play hunches. The intuitive rules for how individuals should respond to insults or signs of weakness in an opponent may too readily suggest a rash course of action. Anger, fear, greed, ambition and pride can all lead to bad decisions. The desire for a decisive solution to the problem at hand may lead to an unnecessarily extreme course of action.

#### Deterrence does not check escalation – history and human nature.

Utgoff, 2002 (Victor A., Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses. In 1998–99, he established the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, former senior member of the National Security Council Staff, International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Survival*, “Proliferation, Missile Defence and American Ambitions”)

We can almost hear the kinds of words that could flow from discussions in nuclear crises or war. ‘These people are not willing to die for this interest’. ‘No sane person would actually use such weapons’. ‘Perhaps the opponent will back down if we show him we mean business by demonstrating a willingness to use nuclear weapons’. ‘If I don’t hit them back really hard, I am going to be driven from office, if not killed’. Whether right or wrong, in the stressful atmosphere of a nuclear crisis or war, such words from others, or silently from within, might resonate too readily with a harried leader. Thus, both history and human nature suggest that nuclear deterrence can be expected to fail from time to time, and we are fortunate it has not happened yet. But the threat of nuclear war is not just a matter of a few weapons being used. It could get much worse. Once a conflict reaches the point where nuclear weapons are employed, the stresses felt by the leaderships would rise enormously. These stresses can be expected to further degrade their decision-making. The pressures to force the enemy to stop fighting or to surrender could argue for more forceful and decisive military action, which might be the right thing to do in the circumstances, but maybe not. And the horrors of the carnage already suffered may be seen as justification for visiting the most devastating punishment possible on the enemy.7 Again, history demonstrates how intense conflict can lead the combatants to escalate violence to the maximum possible levels. In the Second World War, early promises not to bomb cities soon gave way to essentially indiscriminate bombing of civilians. The war between Iran and Iraq during the 1980s led to the use of chemical weapons on both sides and exchanges of missiles against each other’s cities. And more recently, violence in the Middle East escalated in a few months from rocks and small arms to heavy weapons on one side, and from police actions to air strikes and armoured attacks on the other. Escalation of violence is also basic human nature. Once the violence starts, retaliatory exchanges of violent acts can escalate to levels unimagined by the participants beforehand.8 Intense and blinding anger is a common response to fear or humiliation or abuse. And such anger can lead us to impose on our opponents whatever levels of violence are readily accessible.

# 2NC

## Heg Bad

### 2nc overview

**Weak states will create their own institutions to limit u.s. influence internationally**

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Weaker states in a unipolar structure similarly have incentives to utilize institutions. Two types of motivation are relevant. First, weaker states may engage a unipole by enlisting its participation in new or modified institutional arrangements in order to constrain or tie it down. Since a unipolar state may be powerful enough to follow its own rules, possibly to the detriment of weaker states, those states may appeal within an institutional context to the unipole’s concern for its reputation as a member of the international community or to its need for cooperating partners, in order to persuade it to engage in rule-based order even if it cannot simply determine the rules unilaterally. The dispute between the United States and some of its allies over U.S. participation in the International Criminal Court reflects the attempt by weaker states to tie the unipole down and the unipole’s effort in turn to remain a free agent in the event it cannot define the institutional rules. Second, weaker states may create or strengthen international institutions that exclude the unipolar state. These institutions might be designed or intended to foster a common identity (for example, the European Union, the East Asian Economic Caucus), build capacity to withstand influence attempts by the unipole (for example, the European common currency), or create the potential to act independently of the unipole or at cross-purposes with it (for example, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, European Rapid Reaction Force). In bipolarity, weaker states tend to participate in institutional arrangements defined and dominated by one or the other of the major players. The nonaligned movement during the cold war was distinctive precisely because it sought—though not necessarily with success—to institutionalize a path independent of either superpower. Under conditions of unipolarity, we can hypothesize that weaker states, lacking the capacity to balance the unipole, will turn to a variety of institutional initiatives intended to constrain the unipolar state or to enhance their own autonomy in the face of its power. The use of international institutions by weaker states is highlighted in the articles by Walt and Finnemore.

**We’ll internal link turn all of their military power arguments-eminent military power makes all of our threats non-credible and prevents peaceful resolution to crises-a world of parity is the only way to access credible threats and military power**

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Well into the Obama presidency, the broadest foreign policy challenge facing the United States remains unmentioned. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States has frequently threatened dire consequences for states that pursue policies contrary to its interests. But despite the formidable power that backs these threats, they are often ignored. When threatened with U.S. military action, Milosevic did not fold, the Taliban did not give in, nor did Saddam roll over. Similarly, Iran and North Korea continue to resist U.S. pressure to stop their nuclear programs. Despite their relative weakness vis-à-vis the world’s sole superpower, all these states defied it. In contrast, during the Cold War, U.S. threats were taken seriously by the Soviet Union, the world’s other superpower. Despite their tremendous power, the Soviets were deterred from invading Western Europe and coerced into withdrawing their missiles from Cuba. Why were U.S. threats heeded by another superpower but are now disregarded by far less powerful states? Two explanations are commonly offered. The first is that the United States is militarily overextended and needs to make more troops available or to augment its own power for its threats to be credible. The second is that while the Soviets were evil, they were also rational. The enemies of today, alas, are not. Both these views are wrong. Despite being at war in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States is capable of badly damaging any regime that defies it while suffering little itself. And America’s new enemies are not more “irrational” than its old ones. If U.S. threats were able to deter shoe-slamming “we will bury you” Soviet premier Khrushchev with his 3,000 intercontinental nuclear weapons, why are we unable to stop Kim Jong-Il and his handful of rudimentary warheads—not to mention Ahmadinejad, who has none? Because threats are not the problem. Deterrence and coercion do not only require credible threats that harm will follow from defiance. They require credible assurances that no harm will follow from compliance. In order for America to expect compliance with U.S. demands, it must persuade its foes that they will be punished if and only if they defy us. During the Cold War, the balance of power between the two superpowers made assurances superfluous. Any U.S. attack on the Soviet Union would prompt Moscow to retaliate, imposing catastrophic costs on America. The prospect of an unprovoked U.S. attack was therefore unthinkable. Soviet power meant Moscow knew no harm would follow from complying with U.S. demands. But in today’s world, none of our enemies has the wherewithal to retaliate. U.S. threats, backed by the most powerful military in history, are eminently credible. The problem is the very same power advantage undermines the credibility of U.S. assurances. Our enemies feel vulnerable to an American attack even if they comply with our demands. They are therefore less likely to heed them. As the world’s most powerful state, the United States must work hard to assure other states that they are not at the mercy of an unpredictable behemoth. This is particularly important in the aftermath of the Iraq invasion, which many see, rightly or wrongly, as unprovoked. To make its assurances credible, the United States must restrain itself through multilateral action, a less aggressive military posture, and by pledging to eschew regime change. A failure to make American assurances credible will continue to hinder U.S. goals. As long as other regimes suspect we are bent on eliminating them even if they comply with our demands, it will be difficult to stop them from pursuing policies opposed to U.S. interests. The same old problems will persist. Iran and North Korea will maintain their nuclear programs. China and Russia will become increasingly belligerent. And Burma and Sudan will maintain policies that further already endemic human rights abuses. In sum, non-credible assurances will lead to a world in which U.S. power fails to bring about the desired results in a peaceful manner. This should come as no surprise. It follows from the unparalleled power of the United States.

### 2nc heg defense

**Six constraints on U.S. action that make heg ineffective- balancing, legitimacy, timing, domestic constraints, sunk costs, and restraint**

**1). Balancing**

**2). Legitimacy**

**3). Timing**

**4). Domestic**

**5). Costs**

**6). Restraint**

**Hegemony is unnecessary and doesn’t solve anything**   
**Preble 10 -** director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, taught history at St. Cloud State University and Temple University, was a commissioned officer in the U.S. Navy, Ph.D. in history from Temple University (Christopher, 8/13, “U.S. Military Power: Preeminence for What Purpose?”) <http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/u-s-military-power-preeminence-for-what-purpose/>)   
Most in Washington still embraces the notion that America is, and forever will be, the world’s indispensable nation. Some scholars, however, questioned the logic of hegemonic stability theory from the very beginning. A number continue to do so today. They advance arguments diametrically at odds with the primacist consensus. Trade routes need not be policed by a single dominant power; the international economy is complex and resilient. Supply disruptions are likely to be temporary, and the costs of mitigating their effects should be borne by those who stand to lose — or gain — the most. Islamic extremists are scary, but hardly comparable to the threat posed by a globe-straddling Soviet Union armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. It is frankly absurd that we spend more today to fight Osama bin Laden and his tiny band of murderous thugs than we spent to face down Joseph Stalin and Chairman Mao. Many factors have contributed to the dramatic decline in the number of wars between nation-states; it is unrealistic to expect that a new spasm of global conflict would erupt if the United States were to modestly refocus its efforts, draw down its military power, and call on other countries to play a larger role in their own defense, and in the security of their respective regions. But while there are credible alternatives to the United States serving in its current dual role as world policeman / armed social worker, the foreign policy establishment in Washington has no interest in exploring them. The people here have grown accustomed to living at the center of the earth, and indeed, of the universe. The tangible benefits of all this military spending flow disproportionately to this tiny corner of the United States while the schlubs in fly-over country pick up the tab. In short, we shouldn’t have expected that a group of Washington insiders would seek to overturn the judgments of another group of Washington insiders. A genuinely independent assessment of U.S. military spending, and of the strategy the military is designed to implement, must come from other quarters.

**No relationship between US capabilities and peace**

Fettweis 10 – Professor of national security affairs @ U.S. Naval War College. [Christopher J. Fettweis, “Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy,” Survival, Volume 52,

Issue 2 April 2010 , pages 59 – 82//informaworld]

One potential explanation for the growth of global peace can be dismissed fairly quickly: US actions do not seem to have contributed much. The limited evidence suggests that there is little reason to believe in the stabilising power of the US hegemon, and that there is no relation between the relative level of American activism and international stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defence spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defence in real terms than it had in 1990, a 25% reduction.29 To internationalists, defence hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible 'peace dividend' endangered both national and global security. 'No serious analyst of American military capabilities', argued neo-conservatives William Kristol and Robert Kagan in 1996, 'doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace'.30 And yet the verdict from the 1990s is fairly plain: the world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable US military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilis-ing presence of the US military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in US military capabilities. Most of all, the United States was no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the UnitedStatescut its military spending under President Bill Clinton, and kept declining as the George W. Bush administration ramped the spending back up. Complex statistical analysis is unnecessary to reach the conclusion that world peace and US military expenditure are unrelated.

### a/t: wolforth

**Wohlforth assumes a stable grand strategy**

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My theory therefore differs from Wohlforth’s in two key aspects. First, Wohlforth believes that power preponderance in a unipolar system is so marked that the expected costs of balancing are always prohibitive. Consequently, every state in the system will bandwagon with the unipole, making it impossible for the latter to be involved in wars. In contrast, I show that some states face lower costs of balancing relative to bandwagoning. They are therefore more likely to become recalcitrant minor powers, with whom the sole great power is likely to go to war even when implementing a defensivedominance strategy. Second, Wohlforth assumes that the unipole will always implement a strategy of defensive dominance: it will not engage in offensive revisionism, nor will it disengage from the world. I show how both offensive dominance and disengagement are plausible strategic options for the unipole and then extrapolate the types of conºict that each is likely to produce. Speciªcally, offensive dominance (like its defensive variant) is likely to pit the unipole against recalcitrant minor powers. Disengagement, for its part, brings with it the possibility of wars between major powers.

### 2nc prolif

**Causes prolif – link turns don’t apply**

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IF ALL of this were not enough, global dominance, especially the Bush administration’s penchant for big-stick diplomacy, negatively affects nuclear proliferation as well. The United States is deeply committed to making sure that Iran does not acquire a nuclear arsenal and that North Korea gives up its atomic weapons, but the strategy we have employed is likely to have the opposite effect. The main reason that a country acquires nuclear weapons is that they are the ultimate deterrent. It is extremely unlikely that any state would attack the homeland of a nuclear-armed adversary because of the fear that it would prompt nuclear retaliation. Therefore, any country that feels threatened by a dangerous rival has good reason to want a survivable nuclear deterrent. This basic logic explains why the United States and the Soviet Union built formidable stockpiles during the Cold War. It also explains why Israel acquired atomic weapons and refuses to give them up. All of this tells you that when the United States places Iran, Iraq and North Korea on the “axis of evil” and threatens them with military force, it gives those countries a powerful incentive to acquire a nuclear deterrent. The Bush administration, for example, would not have invaded Iraq in March 2003 if Saddam had an atomic arsenal because the Iraqi leader probably would have used it, since he almost certainly was going to die anyway. It is not clear whether Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons today, but given that the United States and Israel frequently hint that they might attack it nevertheless, the regime has good reason to want a deterrent to protect itself. Similarly, Pyongyang would be foolish to give up its nuclear capability in the absence of some sort of rapprochement with Washington. And there is no good reason to think that spreading democracy would counter proliferation either. After all, five of the nine nuclear-armed states are democracies (Britain, France, India, Israel and the United States), and two others (Pakistan and Russia) are borderline democracies that retain significant authoritarian features. In short, the Bush administration’s fondness for threatening to attack adversaries (oftentimes with the additional agenda of forced democratization) encouraged nuclear proliferation. The best way for the United States to maximize the prospects of halting or at least slowing down the spread of nuclear weapons would be to stop threatening other countries because that gives them a compelling reason to acquire the ultimate deterrent. But as long as America’s leaders remain committed to global dominance, they are likely to resist this advice and keep threatening states that will not follow Washington’s orders.

**American hegemony cannot prevent proliferation by itself.**

**Brzezinski 7** (formerly President Carter’s National Security Advisor, counselor and trustee at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and professor of American foreign policy at the School of Advanced International Studies @ Johns Hopkins University) **2007** “Second Chance” p 103

The failure to contain nuclear proliferation in the Far East and in South Asia conveyed a sobering lesson. Short of a unilateral military action--with all its unpredictable consequences—even the world's only superpower could not by itself dissuade a country firmly determined to acquire nuclear weapons. A successful preventive effort would have required an early concentration of attention on the issue, determined and coordinated mobilization of other concerned states, and early formulation of a program including both incentives, self-restraint and costly consequences for continued pursuit of nuclear weapons. In the early, heady days of American unilateral supremacy, it was easy to ignore incipient proliferation in the belief that an intimidating response by the United States would eventually suffice to halt it. The lesson bequeathed to the Clinton administration's successor was that even given the great asymmetry of power between the United States and any would-be proliferator, the only alternative to sear was genuine international cooperation, mounted on at least a regional basis, at an early stage of the nuclear challenge.

**Heg causes soft balancing**

**Pape 5** \***Robert Pape** is professor of political science at the University of Chicago. His current work focuses on American grand strategy, causes and solutions to suicide terrorism, the logic of soft balancing in a unipolar world, and the limits and advantages of precision air power [http://mershoncenter.osu.edu/events/09-10%20events/Sept09/papesept09.htm, International Security Summer 2005, Vol. 30, No. 1: 7–45]

The international image of the United States as a benign superpower is declining, particularly with regard to the aspects that are likely to erode its relative immunity to balance of power dynamics. Without the perception of benign intent, a unipolar leader’s intervention in regions beyond its own, especially those with substantial economic value, is likely to produce incentives among the world’s other major powers to balance against it. That the United States does not pose an imminent threat to attack any major power is not sufficient to prevent these incentives, because the main danger for second-ranked states is that the United States would pose an indirect threat or evolve from a unipolar leader into an unrestrained global hegemon. In a unipolar world, the response to an expansionist unipolar leader is likely to be global balancing.

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### T – No New Cards