# Kentucky round 2

### K

**Prioritizing lived experience as the starting point for politics is a dangerous epistemological move which elevates identity over deliberation. Their methodology is a breeding ground for violent factionalism, not progressive politics**
Craig **Ireland, 2K2**
[“THE APPEAL TO EXPERIENCE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES VARIATIONS ON A PERSISTENT THOMPSONIAN THEME,” cultural critique, 52 fall 2002. P. 87-89]
Once an arcane philosophical term, experience over the last three decades has become a general buzzword. **By the 1970s, experience spilled over into the streets,** so to speak, **and it has since then become the stuff of programmatic manifestos and has been enlisted as the ground from which microstrategies of resistance and subaltern counter-histories can be erected.**

But for all the blows and counterblows that have carried on for over three decades between those who appeal to the counterhegemonic potential of experience and those who see such appeals as naive voluntarism, such debates show no signs of abating. On the contrary, they have become yet more strident, as can be seen by Michael Pickering’s recent attempt to rehabilitate the viability of the term “experience” for subaltern historiography by turning to E. P. Thompson and Dilthey and, more recently still, by Sonia Kruks’s polemical defense of experience for subaltern inquiry by way of a reminder that poststructuralist critics of experience owe much to those very thinkers, from Sartre to Merleau-Ponty, whom they have debunked as if in oedipal rebellion against their begetters.

Such **debates over experience have so far gravitated around issues of epistemology and agency, pitting those who debunk experience as the stuff of an antiquated philosophy of consciousness against those who argue that subaltern experience provides an enclave against strong structural determination. Lost in such debates, however, have been the potential consequences of appeals to immediate experience as a ground for subaltern agency and specificity.** And it is just such potential consequences that will be examined here.

These indeed **demand our attention, for more is at stake in the appeal to experience than some epistemological faux pas. By so wagering on the perceived immediacy of experience as the evidence for subaltern specificity and** **counter-hegemonic action, appeals to immediate experience, however laudable their goal, end up unwittingly naturalizing what is in fact historical, and, in so doing, they leave the door as wide-open to a progressive politics of identity as to a retreat** to neoethnic tribalism. Most alarming about such appeals to experience is not some failure of epistemological nerve—it is instead their ambiguous political and social ramifications. And these have reverberated beyond academia and found an echo in para-academia—so much so that experience has increasingly become the core concept or key word of subaltern groups and the rallying call for what Craig Calhoun calls the “new social movements” in which “experience is made the pure ground of knowledge, the basis of an essentialized standpoint of critical awareness” (468 n.64). The consequences of such appeals to experience can best be addressed not by individually considering disparate currents, but by seeking their common denominator. And in this regard, E. P. Thompson will occupy the foreground. It is safe to say that what started as an altercation between Thompson and Althusser has since spawned academic and para-academic “histories from below” and subaltern cultural inquiries that, for all their differences, share the idea that the identities and counterhistories of the disenfranchised can be buttressed by the specificity of a group’s concrete experiences. Much theorizing on experience by certain cultural and historiographical trends, as many have already pointed out, has been but a variation on a persistent Thompsonian theme in which Thompson’s “kind of use of experience has the same foundational status if we substitute ‘women’s’ or ‘black’ or ‘lesbian’ or ‘homosexual’ for ‘working class’” (Scott, 786).

**THEIR FETISHIZATION OF MATERIAL LIVED EXPERIENCE DEGENERATES INTO A CRUDE BIOLOGISM THAT NATURALIZES IDENTITY CATEGORIES OF DIFFERENCE AND VIOLENCE. DEBATE DEVOLVES INTO FACTIONALIST POLITICS, WHERE THEIR PRESUMED IMMEDIACY OF ADDRESSING LIVED EXPERIENCE ENDS UP IN THE SAME HYPER-COMPETITIVENESS THAT THEY SAY DEVALUES AGENCY AND RESISTANCE. THIS FORM OF POLITICS NATURALIZES BIOLOGICAL CATEGORIES OF DIFFERENCE THAT FORM MICROFACISMS**
Craig **Ireland, 2K2**
[“THE APPEAL TO EXPERIENCE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES VARIATIONS ON A PERSISTENT THOMPSONIAN THEME,” cultural critique, 52 fall 2002. P. 87-89]

**More is involved here than some epistemological blunder. In their bid to circumvent ideological mediation by turning to the presumed immediacy of experience**, Thompsonian **experience-oriented theories advance an argument that is not so much theoretically specious as it is potentially dangerous: there is nothing within the logic of such an argument that precludes the hypostatization of other nondiscursive bases for group membership and specificity**—bases that can as readily be those of a group’s immediate experiences as they can be those of a group’s presumed materially immediate biological characteristics or physical markers of ethnicity and sexuality. **If the criterion for the disruptive antihegemonic potential of experience is its immediacy, and if, as we have just seen, such a criterion can readily lead to a fetishization of the material body itself, then what starts out as an attempt to account for a nonmediated locus of resistance and agency can end up as a surenchère of immediacy that by but a nudge of a cluster of circumstances can propel toward** what Michael Piore’s Beyond Individualism calls **“biologism”—an increasingly common trend whereby “a person’s entire identity resides in a single physical characteristic, whether it be of blackness, of deafness or of homosexuality”** (quoted in Gitlin, 6). Blut und Boden seem but a step away.

**The step from a wager on immediate experience**, whether from theories hoping to account for agency or from groups struggling for cultural recognition, **to rabid neoethnic fundamentalisms is only a possible step and not a necessary one**; and the link between these two trends is certainly not one of affinity, and still less one of causality. What the parallelism between the two does suggest, however, is that **in spite of their divergent motivations and means, they both attempt to ground group specificity by appealing to immediacy**—by appealing, in other words, to something that is less a historical product or a mediated construct than it is an immediately given natural entity, whether it be the essence of a Volk, as in current tribalisms, or the essence of material experiences specific to groups, as in strains of Alltagsgeschichte and certain subaltern endeavors. If a potential for biologism and the specter of neoethnic tribalism are close at hand in certain cultural theories and social movements, it is because **the recourse to immediate experience opens the back door to what was booted out the front door—it inadvertently naturalizes what it initially set out to historicize.**

**The tendency in appeals to experience toward naturalizing the historical have already been repeatedly pointed out by those most sympathetic to the motivations behind such appeals**. Joan W. Scott—hardly an antisubaltern historian—has argued, as have Nancy Fraser, Rita Felski, and others, that **it is precisely by predicating identity and agency on shared nonmediated experiences that certain historians of difference and cultural theorists in fact “locate resistance outside its discursive construction and reify agency as an inherent attribute of individuals”—a move that, when pushed to its logical conclusion, “naturalizes categories such as woman, black, white, heterosexual and homosexual by treating them as given characteristics of individuals”** (Scott, 777). Although such a tendency within experience-oriented theories is rarely thematized, and rarer still is it intended, it nevertheless logically follows from the argument according to which group identity, specificity, and concerted political action have as their condition of possibility the nonmediated experiences that bind or are shared by their members. On the basis of such a stance, it is hardly surprising that currents of gay identity politics (to take but one of the more recent examples) should treat homosexuality, as Nancy Fraser has noted, “as a substantive, cultural, identificatory positivity, much like an ethnicity” (83).

**It may seem unfair to impute to certain experience-oriented theories an argument that,** when carried to its logical conclusion, **can as readily foster an emancipatory politics of identity as it can neoethnic tribalism.** The potential for biologism hardly represents the intentions of experience-oriented theories; these, after all, focus on the immediacy of experience, rather than on the essence of a group, in order to avoid strong structural determination on the one hand, and the naturalizing of class or subaltern groups on the other. But **if there cannot be a discursive differentiation of one experience from another—the counterhegemonic potential of experience is predicated on its prediscursive immediacy,** and mediation is relegated to a supplemental and retrospective operation—and if a nondiscursive or ideologically uncontaminated common ground becomes the guarantor of group authenticity, then the criterion for group specificiy must be those elements that unite groups in nondiscursive ways. And such elements can as readily be those of a group’s shared nonmediated experience, such as oppression, as they can be those of a group’s biological characteristics. **At best, “the evidence of experience**,” Scott notes, **“becomes the evidence for the fact of difference, rather than a way of exploring how differences are established**” (796); at worst, **the wager on the immediacy of experience fosters tribalistic reflexes that need but a little prodding before turning into those rabid, neoethnic “micro fascisms”** against which Félix Guattari warned in his last essay before his death (26–27).

**THE ALTERNATIVE IS TO VOTE NEGATIVE TO EMBRACE AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL MIDDLE-GROUND.**

**THIS ESSENTIAL TO CONVINCING PEOPLE YOUR ALTERNATIVE IS A GOOD IDEA, I.E. THE VERY COALITION-BUILDING AROUND IDEAS, NOT STATIC IDENTITIES, NECESSARY TO THEIR AFFIRMATIVE. THE NET-BENEFIT IS INTELLECTUAL BALKANIZATION, WHICH SUPPRESSES ANY MEANINGFUL VALUE TO ACADEMIC PURSUIT. OUR ALTERNATIVE IS A BETTER OPTION FOR MEANINGFUL DIALOGUE AND SOCIAL CHANGE**

Rudra **Sil,** Associate Professor & Undergraduate Chair in the Dept. of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, **2000**

[Beyond Boundaries: Disciplines, Paradigms, and Theoretical Integration in International Studies, p.166, JT]

In the final analysis, **it may be best to regard the entire process of social research as an ongoing collective search for meanings by a commu­nity of scholars. This search may not result in any definitive answers to the­oretical or practical questions** given the diverse foundations informing the puzzles, texts, and models that preoccupy members of this community. **Nevertheless, thanks to the mediating role played by those subscribing to a pragmatic epistemological middle-ground, the process can still yield valu­able insights, partial explanations, and even** modest **"lessons" and that can be judged as "more or less convincing in the eyes of one's audience whether this audience consists of academic peers, the lay public at large, or the pol­icy-making community.** In an era of increasingly divided disciplines, **scholars adopting a more pragmatic epistemological "middle ground,"** by virtue of their agnosticism, **are likely to make the most critical contributions to whatever culmination of knowledge is possible in the social sciences. These scholars are in a bet­ter position than those at the extreme ends for the purpose of generating and sustaining greater dialogue across different disciplines, theoretical approaches and intellectual movements precisely because their assumptions prevent them from hastily dismissing a study on grounds that are only meaningful to a subgroup within the wider community of scholars. In the absence of meaningful dialogue across different intellectual communities**—whether delimited by disciplines, paradigms or methodological schools—**the social sciences risk becoming permanently "balkanized,"** with scholars passing up opportunities to glean valuable insights from intellectual prod­ucts developed on the basis of different foundational assumptions.

### 1NC T

**Interpretation – A restriction limits allowable action**

**Oxford** Advanced Learner’s **Dictionary** – **2013**, <http://oald8.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/dictionary/restriction>

**restriction** NOUN 1 [countable] **a rule or law that limits what you can do or what can happen import/speed/travel, etc**. **restrictions** restriction on something to impose/place a restriction on something The government has agreed to lift restrictions on press freedom. There are no restrictions on the amount of money you can withdraw. 2 [uncountable] the act of limiting or controlling somebody/something sports clothes that prevent any restriction of movement A diet to lose weight relies on calorie restriction in order to obtain results. 3 [countable] a thing that limits the amount of freedom you have the restrictions of a prison

#### War powers authority is derived from unrestricted implicit or explicit congressional approval

**Krass 11** (Caroline D. Krass, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Memorandum Opinion For The Attorney General, 2011 “Authority To Use Military Force In Libya,” http://www.justice.gov/olc/2011/authority-military-use-in-libya.pdf

The President had the constitutional authority to direct the use of military force in Libya because he could reasonably determine that such use of force was in the national interest. Prior congressional approval was not constitutionally required to use military force in the limited operations under consideration. Earlier opinions of this Office and other historical precedents establish the framework for our analysis. As we explained in 1992, Attorneys General and this Office “have concluded that the President has the power to commit United States troops abroad,” as well as to “take military action,” “for the purpose of protecting important national interests,” even without specific prior authorization from Congress. Authority to Use United States Military Forces in Somalia, 16 Op.O.L.C. 6, 9 (1992) (“Military Forces in Somalia”). This independent authority of the President, which exists at least insofar as Congress has not specifically restricted it, see Deployment of United States Armed Forces into Haiti, 18 Op. O.L.C. 173, 176 n.4, 178 (1994) (“Haiti Deployment”), derives from the President’s “unique responsibility,” as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive, for “foreign and military affairs,” as well as national security. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993); U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1, § 2, cl. 2.¶ The Constitution, to be sure, divides authority over the military between the President and Congress, assigning to Congress the authority to “declare War,” “raise and support Armies,” and “provide and maintain a Navy,” as well as general authority over the appropriations on which any military operation necessarily depends. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 11-14. Yet, under “the historical gloss on the ‘executive Power’ vested in Article II of the Constitution,” the President bears the “‘vast share of responsibility for the conduct of our foreign relations,’” Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.¶ v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)), and accordingly holds “independent authority ‘in the areas of foreign policy and national security.’” Id. at 429 (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 291 (1981)); see also, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S.6 Authority to Use Military Force in Libya at 635-36 n.2 (Jackson, J., concurring) (noting President’s constitutional power to “act in external affairs without congressional authority”). Moreover, the President as Commander in Chief “superintend[s] the military,” Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 772 (1996), and “is authorized to direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at his command.” Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 615 (1850); see also Placing of United States Armed Forces Under United Nations Operational or Tactical Control, 20 Op. O.L.C. 182, 184 (1996). The President also holds “the implicit advantage . . . over the legislature under our constitutional scheme in situations calling for immediate action,” given that imminent national security threats and rapidly evolving military and diplomatic circumstances may require a swift response by the United States without the opportunity for congressional deliberation and action. Presidential Power to Use the Armed Forces Abroad Without Statutory Authorization, 4A Op.¶ O.L.C. 185, 187 (1980) (“Presidential Power”); see also Haig, 453 U.S. at 292 (noting “‘the changeable and explosive nature of contemporary international relations, and the fact that the Executive is immediately privy to information which cannot be swiftly presented to, evaluated by, and acted upon by the legislature’” (quoting Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965)). Accordingly, as Attorney General (later Justice) Robert Jackson observed over half a century ago, “the President’s authority has long been recognized as extending to the dispatch of armed forces outside of the United States, either on missions of goodwill or rescue, or for the purpose of protecting American lives or property or American interests.” Training of British Flying Students in the United States, 40 Op. Att’y Gen. 58, 62 (1941).¶ This understanding of the President’s constitutional authority reflects not only the express assignment of powers and responsibilities to the President and Congress in the Constitution, but also, as noted, the “historical gloss” placed on the Constitution by two centuries of practice. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 414. “Our history,” this Office observed in 1980, “is replete with instances of presidential uses of military force abroad in the absence of prior congressional approval.” Presidential Power, 4A Op. O.L.C. at 187; see generally Richard F. Grimmett, Cong. Research Serv., R41677, Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2010 (2011). Since then, instances of such presidential initiative have only multiplied, with Presidents ordering, to give just a few examples, bombing in Libya (1986), an intervention in Panama (1989), troop deployments to Somalia (1992), Bosnia (1995), and Haiti (twice, 1994 and 2004), air patrols and airstrikes in Bosnia (1993-1995), and a bombing campaign in Yugoslavia (1999), without specific prior authorizing legislation. See Grimmett, supra, at 13-31. This historical practice is an important indication of constitutional meaning, because it reflects the two political branches’ practical understanding, developed since the founding of the Republic, of their respective roles and responsibilities with respect to national defense, and because “[m]atters intimately related to foreign policy and national security are rarely proper subjects for judicial intervention.” Haig, 453 U.S. at 292. In this context, the “pattern of executive conduct, made under claim of right, extended over many decades and engaged in by Presidents of both parties, ‘evidences the existence of broad constitutional power.’” Haiti Deployment, 18 Op. O.L.C. at 178 (quoting Presidential Power, 4A Op. O.L.C. at 187); see also Proposed Deployment of United States Armed Forces into Bosnia, 19 Op. O.L.C. 327, 330-31 (1995) (“Proposed Bosnia Deployment”) (noting that “[t]he scope and limits” of Congress’s power to declare war “are not well defined by constitutional text, case law, or statute,” but the relationship between that power and the President’s authority as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive has been instead “clarified by 200 years of practice”).7¶ Indeed, Congress itself has implicitly recognized this presidential authority. The War Powers Resolution (“WPR”), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (2006), a statute Congress described as intended “to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States,” id. § 1541(a), provides that, in the absence of a declaration of war, the President must report to Congress within 48 hours of taking certain actions, including introduction of U.S. forces “into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.” Id. § 1543(a). The Resolution further provides that the President generally must terminate such use of force within 60 days (or 90 days for military necessity) unless Congress extends this deadline, declares war, or “enact[s] a specific authorization.” Id. § 1544(b). As this Office has explained, although the WPR does not itself provide affirmative statutory authority for military operations, see id. § 1547(d)(2), the Resolution’s “structure . . . recognizes and presupposes the existence of unilateral presidential authority to deploy armed forces” into hostilities or circumstances presenting an imminent risk of hostilities. Haiti Deployment, 18 Op. O.L.C. at 175; see also Proposed Bosnia Deployment, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 334. That structure— requiring a report within 48 hours after the start of hostilities and their termination within 60 days after that—“makes sense only if the President may introduce troops into hostilities or potential hostilities without prior authorization by the Congress.” Haiti Deployment, 18 Op. O.L.C. at 175-76; see also Proposed Bosnia Deployment, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 334-35.1 We have acknowledged one possible constitutionally-based limit on this presidential authority to employ military force in defense of important national interests—a planned military engagement that constitutes a “war” within the meaning of the Declaration of War Clause may require prior congressional authorization. See Proposed Bosnia Deployment, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 331; Haiti Deployment, 18 Op. O.L.C. at 177. But the historical practice of presidential military action without congressional approval precludes any suggestion that Congress’s authority to declare war covers every military engagement, however limited, that the President initiates. In our view, determining whether a particular planned engagement constitutes a “war” for constitutional purposes instead requires a fact-specific assessment of the “anticipated nature, scope, and duration” of the congressional approval. Id. at 174 n.1, 178-79 & n.10; see also Address to the Nation on Haiti, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1799 (Sept. 18, 1994); Maureen Taft-Morales & Clare Ribando Seelke, Cong. Research Serv., RL32294, Haiti: Developments and U.S. Policy Since 1991 and Current Congressional Concerns 4 (2008). “In deciding whether prior Congressional authorization for the Haitian deployment was constitutionally necessary,” we observed, “the President was entitled to take into account the anticipated nature, scope, and duration of the planned deployment, and in particular the limited antecedent risk that United States forces would encounter significant armed resistance or suffer or inflict substantial casualties as a result of the deployment.” Haiti Deployment, 18 Op. O.L.C. at 179. Similarly, a year later we concluded that a proposed deployment of approximately 20,000 ground troops to enforce a peace agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina also was not a “war,” even though this deployment involved some “risk that the United States [would] incur (and inflict) casualties.” Proposed Bosnia Deployment, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 333. For more than two years preceding this deployment, the United States had undertaken air operations over Bosnia to enforce a UNSC-declared “no-fly zone,” protect United Nations peacekeeping forces, and secure “safe areas” for civilians, including one two-week operation in which NATO attacked hundreds of targets and the United States alone flew over 2300 sorties—all based on the President’s “constitutional authority to conduct the foreign relations of the United States and as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive,” without a declaration of war or other specific prior approval from Congress. Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the Deployment of United States Aircraft to Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1995 Pub. Papers of William J. Clinton 1279, 1280 (Sept. 1, 1995); see also, e.g., Letter to Congressional Leaders on Bosnia, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2431, 2431 (Nov. 22, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders on Bosnia-Herzegovina, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1699, 1700 (Aug. 22, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders on Protection of United Nations Personnel in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 793, 793 (Apr. 12, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on NATO Action in Bosnia, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 406, 406 (Mar. 1, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia, 30 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 324, 325 (Feb. 17, 1994); Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the No-Fly Zone Over Bosnia, 29 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 586, 586 (Apr. 13, 1993); Proposed Bosnia Deployment, 19 Op.¶ O.L.C. at 328-29; Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning 334, 341-44 (Col. Robert C. Owen, ed., 2000), available at http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS20446. This Office acknowledged that “deployment of 20,000 troops on the ground is an essentially different, and more problematic, type of intervention,” than air or naval operations because of the increased risk of United States casualties and the far greater difficulty of withdrawing United States ground forces. But we nonetheless concluded that the anticipated risks were not sufficient to make the deployment a “‘war’ in any sense of the word.” Proposed Bosnia Deployment, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 333-34.\

#### Without precision the topic is unlimited – no meaning to the phrase “war powers authority”

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(Mariah, *War Powers: The Politics of Constitutional Authority*, 2013, pp. 33-34)

I also translate this strength in a way that some will find controversial: namely, that the **branches actually link their arguments about constitutional authority to their substantive agendas for security policy**. In other words, as the Obama administration's OLC did in its reasoning on Libya, **the branches should justify their own, and challenge one another's, constitutional positions through reference to the security consequences at stake in one allocation of constitutional war authority versus another. This**, after all**, is one of their strengths: a capacity to think about the link between security processes and security outcomes. If such expertise is a reason for judicial deference on the war power, then it is also a resource that the president and legislature should use in developing their positions. This standard directly opposes the common idea that arguments about constitutional meaning should not hinge on policy consequences.** There is something questionable about interpreting the Constitution's guarantee of a qualified executive veto into an absolute veto to support a desired policy outcome. The settled, framework dimensions of the Constitution would not do a very good job of enabling secure decision-making if they were manipulable in this way. Policy-based constitutional reasoning for judges is also professionally suspect because and to the extent that judges are professionally insulated from the policy implications of the decisions they make. However, **the war powers controversy occurs within a zone of textual vagueness. It is difficult to read the war powers text of the Constitution only through the lens of a framework when the text seems to settle so little**. Also, the national Congress and presidency have strengths not in policy neutrality but in policy development

### Case

#### Their method is coutnerproductive---substantive debates about the costs of war are the only way to make connections troops and the war itself

Julian E. Zelizer 11, Professor of History and Public Affairs at Princeton University, "War powers belong to Congress and the president", June 27, www.cnn.com/2011/OPINION/06/27/zelizer.war.powers/index.html

But the failure of Congress to fully participate in the initial decision to use military force has enormous costs for the nation beyond the obvious constitutional questions that have been raised.¶ The first problem is that the U.S. now tends to go to war without having a substantive debate about the human and financial costs that the operation could entail. Asking for a declaration of war, and thus making Congress take responsibility for the decision, had required presidents to enter into a heated debate about the rationale behind the mission, the potential for large-scale casualties and how much money would be spent.¶ When presidents send troops into conflict without asking Congress for approval, it has been much easier for presidents to elude these realities. President Lyndon Johnson famously increased the troop levels in Vietnam without the public fully realizing what was happening until after it was too late.¶ Although Johnson promised Democrats when they debated the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964 that they would only have a limited deployment and he would ask them again if the mission increased, he never did. He used the broad authority granted to him to vastly expand the operations during his presidency.¶ By the end of his time in office, hundreds of thousands of troops were fighting a hopeless war in the jungles of Vietnam. Johnson also continued to mask the budgetary cost, realizing the opposition that would emerge if legislators knew how much the nation would spend. When the costs became clear, Johnson was forced to request a tax increase from Congress in 1967, a request which greatly undermined his support.¶ The second cost of presidents going to war rather than Congress doing so is that major mistakes result when decisions are made so quickly. When there is not an immediate national security risk involved, the slowness of the legislative process does offer an opportunity to force policymakers to prove their case before going to war.¶ Speed is not always a virtue. In the case of Iraq, the president started the war based on the shoddiest of evidence about WMD. The result was an embarrassment for the nation, an operation that undermined U.S. credibility abroad.¶ Even in military actions that have stronger justifications, there are downsides to speed. With President Obama and the surge in Afghanistan, there is considerable evidence that the administration went in without a clear strategy and without a clear objective. With Libya, there are major concerns about what the administration hopes to accomplish and whether we are supporting rebel forces that might be connected with terrorist networks intent on harming the U.S.¶ The third cost has been the cheapening of the decision about using military force. In the end, the decision about whether to send human treasure and expend valuable dollars abroad should be one that is made by both branches of government and one that results from a national dialogue. Requiring Congress to declare war forces voters to think about the decision sooner rather than later.¶ While efficiency is essential, so too is the democratic process upon which our nation is built.¶ The result of the decision-making process that has been used in recent decades is that as a nation too many citizens lose their connection to the war. Indeed, most Americans don't even think twice when troops are sent abroad. The shift of power toward the president has compounded the effects of not having a draft, which Congress dismantled in 1973. Wars sometimes resemble just another administrative decision made by the White House rather than a democratic decision.¶ So Boehner has raised a fair point, though he and other Republicans don't have much ground to stand on given their own party's history. Republicans, like Democrats, have generally supported presidential-war power in addition to a weak Congress.¶ Most politicians have only worried about war power when it is politically convenient. Indeed, in 2007, then-Sen. Obama wrote, the "President does not have power under the Constitution to unilaterally authorize a military attack in a situation that does not involve stopping an actual or imminent threat to this nation."¶ Clearly, Obama has not governed by the principles on which he campaigned.¶ It is doubtful whether the parties will do anything about this. The War Powers Resolution has not worked well and there seems to be little appetite to pass something else. But the consequences of the path that the nation has chosen are enormously high.¶ We've moved too far away from the era when Congress matters. As a result, the decision to use troops is too easy and often made in haste. Obama, who spoke about this issue so cogently on the campaign trail, should be a president who understands that reality.

#### The status quo makes aff solvency impossible---elites in charge of war-making build support for war through technical expertise that no-one is challenging substantively---the public inevitably listens to them because they’re scared for security reasons

Stephen M. Walt 11, Professor of International Affairs at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, July 21, “International Affairs and the Public Sphere”, http://publicsphere.ssrc.org/walt-international-affairs-and-the-public-sphere/

Academics can make at least three distinct contributions to public discourse on global affairs. First, although the digital revolution has made a wealth of information from around the world accessible on a near real-time basis, most of us still lack both extensive direct data on events in far-flung areas and the background knowledge necessary to understand what new developments mean. If our town’s school district is troubled or the local economy is suffering, we can observe that for ourselves and make reasonably well-informed judgments about what might be done about it. But if the issue is the war in Afghanistan, an uprising in Yemen, a naval confrontation in the South China Sea or the prospects that some battered economy will be bailed out successfully, most of us will lack the factual knowledge or conceptual understanding to know what is really going on. Even when basic information is readily available, it may be hard for most of us to put it in the appropriate context or make sense of what it means. ¶ When citizens and leaders seek to grasp the dizzying complexity of modern world politics, therefore, they must inevitably rely upon the knowledge and insights of specialists in military affairs, global trade and finance, diplomatic/international historians, area experts, and many others. And that means relying at least in part on academic scholars who have devoted their careers to mastering various aspects of world affairs and whose professional stature has been established through the usual procedures of academic evaluation (e.g., peer review, confidential assessments by senior scholars, the give-and-take of scholarly debate, etc.). ¶ Second, and more importantly, an independent academic community is an essential counterweight to official efforts to shape public understanding of key foreign policy issues. Governments enjoy enormous information asymmetries in many areas of political life, but these advantages are especially pronounced when dealing with international affairs.[5] Much of what we know about the outside world is ultimately derived from government sources (especially when dealing with national security affairs), and public officials often go to considerable lengths to shape how that information is reported to the public. Not only do governments collect vast amounts of information about the outside world, but they routinely use secrecy laws to control public access to this information. Government officials can shape public beliefs by leaking information strategically, or by co-opting sympathetic journalists whose professional success depends in part on maintaining access to key officials.[6] Given these information asymmetries and their obvious interest in retaining public support for their preferred policies, it is hardly surprising that both democratic and non-democratic leaders use their privileged access to information to build support for specific policies, at times by telling outright lies to their own citizens.[7] ¶ This situation creates few problems when the policies being sold make good strategic sense, but the results can be disastrous when they don’t. In such cases, alternative voices are needed to challenge conventional wisdoms and official rationales, and to suggest different solutions to the problem(s) at hand. Because scholars are protected by tenure and cherish the principle of academic freedom, and because they are not directly dependent on government support for their livelihoods, they are uniquely positioned to challenge prevailing narratives and policy rationales and to bring their knowledge and training to bear on vital policy issues. If we believe that unfettered debate helps expose errors and correct missteps, thereby fostering more effective public policies, then a sophisticated, diverse and engaged scholarly community is essential to a healthy polity. ¶ Third, the scholarly world also offers a potentially valuable model of constructive political disagreement. Political discourse in many countries (and especially the United States) has become increasingly personal and ad hominem, with little attention paid to facts and logic; a trend reinforced by an increasingly competitive and loosely regulated media environment. Within academia, by contrast, even intense disputes are supposed to be conducted in accordance with established canons of logic and evidence. Ad hominem attacks and other forms of character assassination have no place in scholarly discourse and are more likely to discredit those who employ them than those who are attacked. By bringing the norms of academic discourse into the public sphere, academic scholars could help restore some of the civility that has been lost in recent years. ¶ For all of these reasons, it is highly desirable for university-based scholars to play a significant role in public discourse about key real-world issues and to engage directly with policymakers where appropriate. As I have argued elsewhere, academic research can provide policymakers with relevant factual knowledge, provide typologies and frameworks that help policymakers and citizens make sense of emerging trends, and create and test theories that leaders can use to choose among different policy instruments. Academic theories can also be useful when they help policymakers anticipate events, when they identify recurring tendencies or obstacles to success, and when they facilitate the formulation of policy alternatives and the identification of benchmarks that can guide policy evaluation. Because academic scholars are free from daily responsibility for managing public affairs, they are in an ideal position to develop new concepts and theories to help us understand a complex and changing world.[8] ¶ The picture sketched here is obviously something of an ideal type, and I am not suggesting that that the academic world consistently lives up to these expectations. As noted above, university-based scholars of international affairs—and especially the disciplines of political science and history—have increasingly focused on narrow and arcane topics and are contributing less and less to policy formation or public discourse.[9] And when academics do address topics of obvious policy relevance or public interest, the results are often presented in impenetrable, jargon-ridden prose and disseminated in venues that neither policymakers nor the public are likely to read. Even when scholars have something useful to say, in short, their tendency to “speaking in tongues” diminishes their impact on the public sphere**.** ¶Why Is There a Gap between Academia and the Public Sphere?¶ To some degree, the gap between the ivory tower and the world of policy arises because the two spheres have different agendas and operate under different incentives and constraints. Academics focus on developing generalizations and testing conjectures as rigorously as possible, while policymakers and the public are often preoccupied with individual cases (i.e., whatever is in the headlines or in a policymaker’s in-tray). Thus, scholars are delighted whenever they identify a powerful general tendency, but policymakers may be more interested in figuring out how to overcome that general tendency or worried that the case at hand might be an exception to it. Academics strive to make their work as accurate as possible, even if this takes more time, but policymakers cannot always wait until a complete analysis is possible.[10] To take a recent example, policymakers in the Obama administration had to respond to the 2011 “Arab Spring” long before anyone fully understood what was driving these events or where they might lead. Given these different agendas, it is not surprising that policymakers often find academic scholarship to be of less value than the scholars who produce it might wish.

**Discourse doesn’t shape policy making**

**Walt 13** ([Stephen M. Walt](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/author/Stephen%20M.%20Walt), is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. “[Empty words](http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/03/25/empty_words),” March 25, 2013, Foreign Policy, Realist In an Ideological Age) GANGEEZY

And therein lies the test of competing theories. There is a broad school of thought in international relations -- often labeled "social constructivism" -- which maintains that discourse can be of tremendous importance in shaping the conduct of states. In this view, how leaders talk and how intellectuals write gradually shapes how we all think, and over time these discursive activities can exert a tremendous influence on norms, identities, and perceptions of what is right and what is possible. It is this view of the world that President Obama was channeling during his trip. By telling Israelis that he loved them and by telling both Israelis and Palestinians that the latter had just as much right to a state as the former, he was hoping to mold hearts and minds and convince them -- through logic and reason -- to end their century-old conflict. And make no mistake: He was saying that peace would require a powerful and increasingly wealthy Israel to make generous concessions, because the Palestinians have hardly anything more to give up. As Churchill put it, "in victory, magnanimity." Discourse does matter in some circumstances, of course, and perhaps Obama's words will prompt some deep soul-searching within the Israeli political establishment. But there is another broad family of IR theories -- the realist family -- and it maintains that what matters most in politics is power and how it is applied. In this view, national leaders often say lots of things they don't really mean, or they say things they mean but then fail to follow through on because doing so would be politically costly. From this perspective, words sometimes inspire and may change a few minds on occasion, but they are rarely enough to overcome deep and bitter conflicts. No matter how well-written or delivered, a speech cannot divert whole societies from a well-established course of action. Policies in motion tend to remain in motion; to change the trajectory of a deeply-entrenched set of initiatives requires the application of political forces of equal momentum. For realists like me, in short, halting a colonial enterprise that has been underway for over forty years will require a lot more than wise and well-intentioned words. Instead, it would require the exercise of power. Just as raw power eventually convinced most Palestinians that Israel's creation was not going to be reversed, Israelis must come to realize that denying Palestinians a state of their own is going to have real consequences. Although Obama warned that the occupation was preventing Israel from gaining full acceptance in the world, he also made it clear that Israelis could count on the United States to insulate them as much as possible from the negative effects of their own choices. Even at the purely rhetorical level, in short, Obama's eloquent words sent a decidedly mixed message. Because power is more important than mere rhetoric, it won't take long before Obama's visit is just another memory. The settlements will keep expanding, East Jerusalem will be cut off from the rest of the West Bank, the Palestinians will remain stateless, and Israel will continue on its self-chosen path to apartheid. And in the end, Obama will have proven to be no better a friend to Israel or the Palestinians than any of his predecessors. All of them claimed to oppose the occupation, but none of them ever did a damn thing to end it. And one of Obama's successors will eventually have to confront the cold fact that two states are no longer a realistic possibility. What will he or she say then?

#### Representational violence does not preclude the need for concrete action

Richard Rorty, Professor of Humanities, University of Virginia, Truth, Politics, and Postmodernism, Spinoza Lectures, 1997, p. 51-2

This distinction between the theoretical and the practical point of view is often drawn by Derrida, another writer who enjoys demonstrating that something very important – meaning, for example, or justice, or friendship – is both necessary and impossible. When asked about the implications of these paradoxical fact, Derrida usually replies that the paradox doesn't matter when it comes to practice. More generally, a lot of the writers who are labeled `post‑modernist; and who talk a lot about impossibility, turn out to be good experimentalist social democrats when it comes to actual political activity. I suspect, for example, that Gray, Zizek, Derrida and I, if we found ourselves citizens of the same country, would all be voting for the same candidates, and supporting the same reforms. Post‑modernist philosophers have gotten a bad name because of their paradox‑mongering habits, and their constant use of terms like `impossible; `self‑contradictory' and `unrepresentable'. They have helped create a cult of inscrutability, one which defines itself by opposition to the Enlightenment search for transparency ‑ and more generally, to the `metaphysics of presence; the idea that intellectual progress aims at getting things clearly illuminated, sharply delimited, wholly visible. I am all for getting rid of the metaphysics of presence, but I think that the rhetoric of impossibility and unrepresentability is counterproductive overdramatization. It is one thing to say that we need to get rid of the metaphor of things being accurately represented, once and for all, as a result of being bathed in the light of reason. This metaphor has created a lot of headaches for philosophers, and we would be better off without it. But that does not show that we are suddenly surrounded by unrepresentables; it just shows that `more accurate representation' was never a fruitful way to describe intellectual progress. Even if we agree that we shall never have what Derrida calls "a full presence beyond the reach of play"; our sense of the possibilities open to humanity will not have changed. We have learned nothing about the limits of human hope from metaphysics, or from the philosophy of history, or from psychoanalysis. All that we have learned from `post‑modern' philosophy is that we may need a different gloss on the notion of `progress' than the rationalistic gloss which the Enlightenment offered. We have been given no reason to abandon the belief that a lot of progress has been made by carrying out the Enlightenment's political program. Since Darwin we have come to suspect that whether such progress is made will be largely a matter of luck. But we have been given no reason to stop hoping to get lucky.

Realism is inevitable and the space they open up would be filled by fascist violence – realism is the best way to solve

**Mearsheimer 95** (John, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, *International Security,* Summer)

Realists believe that state behavior is largely shaped by the *material structure* of the international system. The distribution of material capabilities among states is the key factor for understanding world politics. For realists, some level of security competition among great powers is inevitable because of the material structure of the international system. Individuals are free to adopt non-realist discourses, but in the final analysis, the system forces states to behave according to the dictates of realism, or risk destruction. Critical theorists, on the other hand, focus on the *social structure* of the international system. They believe that “world politics is socially constructed,” which is another way of saying that shared discourse, or how communities of individuals think and talk about the world, largely shapes the world. Wendt recognizes that “material resources like gold and tanks exist,” but he argues that “such capabilities...only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded.” Significantly for critical theorists, discourse can change, which means that realism is not forever, and that therefore it might be possible to move beyond realism to a world where institutionalized norms cause states to behave in more communitarian and peaceful ways.

The most revealing aspect of Wendt’s discussion is that he did not respond to the two main charges leveled against critical theory in “False Promise.” The first problem with critical theory is that although the theory is deeply concerned with radically changing state behavior, it says little about how change comes about. The theory does not tell us why particular discourses become dominant, and others fall by the wayside. Specifically, Wendt does not explain why realism has been the dominant discourse in world politics for well over a thousand years, although I explicitly raised this question in “False Promise” (p. 42). Moreover, he sheds no light on why the time is ripe for unseating realism, nor on why realism is likely to be replaced by a more peaceful, communitarian discourse, although I explicitly raised both questions.

Wendt’s failure to answer these questions has important ramifications for his own arguments. For example, he maintains that if it is possible to change international political discourse and alter state behavior, “then it is irresponsible to pursue policies that perpetuate destructive old orders [i.e., realism], especially if we care about the well-being of future generations.” The clear implication here is that realists like me are irresponsible and do not care much about the welfare of future generations. However, even if we change discourses and move beyond realism, a fundamental problem with Wendt’s argument remains: because his theory cannot predict the future, he cannot know whether the discourse that ultimately replaces realism will be more benign than realism. He has no way of knowing whether a fascistic discourse more violent than realism will emerge as the hegemonic discourse. For example, he obviously would like another Gorbachev to come to power in Russia, but he cannot be sure we will not get a Zhirinovsky instead. So even from a critical theory perspective, defending realism might very well be the more responsible policy choice.

Their alternative is all talk and no action – “opening space” doesn’t challenge the dominant discourse.

Huysmans 02 - , Jef Lecturer in Politics in the Department of Government at Open University, (“Defining Social Constructivism in Security Studies: The Normative Dilemma of Writing Security," *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, Volume 27, Issue 1, February (Supplemental Issue), Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Elite, p. 50-51)

Although the critical edge of this literature cannot be ignored, denaturalizing security fields is not necessarily successful in moderating the normative dilemma. The research continues to map the security discourses, therefore repeating, in an often highly systematic way, a security approach to, for example, migration or drugs. Demonstrating the contingent character of the politicization does question the foundational character of this contingent construction, but it does not necessarily undermine the real effects. It does this only when these discourses rely heavily for their effects on keeping the natural character of its foundations unquestioned. This points to a more general issue concerning this kind of analysis. Although it stresses that language makes a difference and that social relations are constructed, it leaves underdeveloped the concept of security formation that heavily prestructures the possibilities to "speak" differently through rarifying who can speak security, what security can be spoken about, how one should speak about security, and so on. 27 Another related problem is that the approach assumes that indicating the mere existence of alternative practices challenges the dominance of the dominant discourse. This is problematic since the alternative constructions do not exist in a vacuum or in a sheltered space. To be part of the game, they must, for example, contest political constructions of migration. Alternative practices are thus not isolated but engage with other, possibly dominant, constructions. This raises the question of how the "engagement" actually works. It involves relations of power, structuring and restructuring the social exchanges. Staging alternative practices does not necessarily challenge a dominant construction. The political game is more complex, as Foucault's interpretation of the "sexual revolution" - the liberation from sexual repression - of the second half of the twentieth century showed. 28 In a comment on human-rights approaches to migration, Didier Bigo raises a similar point - that opposing strategies do not necessarily radically challenge established politicizations: "It is often misleading to counterpose the ideology of security to human rights because they sometimes have more in common than their authors would like to admit. They often share the same concept of insecurity and diverge only in their solutions." 29 The main point is that alternative discourses should not be left in a vacuum. The way they function in the political struggle should be looked at. How are the alternative discourses entrenched in a specific political game? Are they possibly a constitutive part of the mastery of the dominant construction?

**Capitalism organizes their aesthetic expression**

**The Pinnochio Theory 2008**(<http://www.shaviro.com/Blog/?cat=11>)

It is true that **the old** Taylorist, **hierarchical style** of business management **has largely been abandoned** – at least in the developed world. But the new management style that has replaced it, with its emphasis on local autonomy and responsibility, and on horizontal networks rather than vertical, hierarchical chains of command, is not in any sense more open and liberating. What the creativity of the multitude comes down to, in postmodern globalized capitalism, is this. **Today capitalism demands of its workers not just physical exertion, but mental exertion as well. In order to survive, we are forced to sell, not just our “labor power”** (as Marx called it**), but** also **our affective** and cognitive **powers, our abilities to think and feel and create, our aesthetic sensibility and our capacity for enjoyment. Capitalism does not just steal the fruits of these powers from us. It also organizes our very expression of these powers in the first place.**

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#### Narratives are accommodated into hegemonic structures- they obscure the connection between particular stories and universal problems and place certain truths beyond question- this is an epistemological indict

**Ewick and Silbey 95** (Patricia Ewick and Susan S. Silbey Law & Society Review, 00239216, 1995, Vol. 29, Issue 2

In the previous section, we discussed how narratives, like the lives and experiences they recount, are cultural productions. Narratives are generated interactively through normatively structured performances and interactions. Even the most personal of narratives rely on and invoke collective narratives — symbols, linguistic formulations, structures, and vocabularies of motive — without which the personal would remain unintelligible and uninterpretable. Because of the conventionalized character of narrative, then, our stories are likely to express ideological effects and hegemonic assumptions.

[ [10](http://web.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/ehost/detail?vid=4&hid=106&sid=c00733b3-4acd-4926-b4f9-94f849d6e9f1%40sessionmgr109" \l "bib10" \o "10)] We are as likely to be shackled by the stories we tell (or that are culturally available for our telling) as we are by the form of oppression they might seek to reveal. In short, the structure, the content, and the performance of stories as they are defined and regulated within social settings often articulate and reproduce existing ideologies and hegemonic relations of power and inequality. It is important to emphasize that narratives do more than simply reflect or express existing ideologies. Through their telling, our stories come to constitute the hegemony that in turn shapes social lives and conduct "The hegemonic is not simply a static body of ideas to which members of a culture are obliged to conform" (Silberstein 1988:127). Rather, Silberstein writes, hegemony has "a protean nature in which dominant relations are preserved while their manifestations remain highly flexible. The hegemonic must continually evolve so as to recuperate alternative hegemonies." In other words, the hegemonic gets produced and evolves within individual, seemingly unique, discrete personal narratives. Indeed, the resilience of ideologies and hegemony may derive from their articulation within personal stories. Finding expression and being refashioned within the stories of countless individuals may lead to a polyvocality that inoculates and protects the master narrative from critique. The hegemonic strength of a master narrative derives, Brinkley Messick (1988:657) writes, from "its textual, and lived heteroglossia … [, s]ubverting and dissimulating itself at every … turn"; thus ideologies that are encoded in particular stories are "effectively protected from sustained critique" by the fact that they are constituted through variety and contradiction. Research in a variety of social settings has demonstrated the hegemonic potential of narrative by illustrating how narratives can contribute to the reproduction of existing structures of meaning and power. First, narratives can function specifically as mechanisms of social control (Mumby 1993). At various levels of social organization — ranging from families to nation-states — storytelling instructs us about what is expected and warns us of the consequences of nonconformity. Oft-told family tales about lost fortunes or spoiled reputations enforce traditional definitions and values of family life (Langellier & Peterson 1993). Similarly, bureaucratic organizations exact compliance from members through the articulation of managerial prerogatives and expectations and the consequences of violation or challenge (Witten 1993). Through our narratives of courtship, lost accounts, and failed careers, cultures are constructed; we "do" family, we "do" organization, through the stories we tell (Langellier & Peterson 1993). Second, the hegemonic potential of narrative is further enhanced by narratives' ability to colonize consciousness. Well-plotted stories cohere by relating various (selectively appropriated) events and details into a temporally organized whole (see part I above). The coherent whole, that is, the configuration of events and characters arranged in believable plots, preempts alternative stories. The events seem to speak for themselves; the tale appears to tell itself. Ehrenhaus (1993) provides a poignant example of a cultural meta-narrative that operates to stifle alternatives. He describes the currently dominant cultural narrative regarding the United States's involvement in the Vietnam War as one that relies on themes of dysfunction and rehabilitation. The story, as Ehrenhaus summarizes it, is structured as a social drama which characterizes both the nation and individual Vietnam veterans as having experienced a breakdown in normal functioning only recently resolved through a process of healing. This narrative is persuasive because it reiterates and elaborates already existing and dominant metaphors and interpretive frameworks in American culture concerning what Philip Rieff (1968) called the "triumph of the therapeutic" (see also Crews 1994). Significantly, the therapeutic motif underwriting this narrative depicts veterans as emotionally and psychologically fragile and, thus, disqualifies them as creditable witnesses. The connection between what they saw and experienced while in Vietnam and what the nation did in Vietnam is severed. In other words, what could have developed as a powerful critique of warfare as national policy is contained through the image of illness and rehabilitation, an image in which "'healing' is privileged over 'purpose' [and] the rhetoric of recovery and reintegration subverts the emergence of rhetoric that seeks to examine the reasons that recovery is even necessary" (Ehrenhaus 1993:83). Constituent and distinctive features of narratives make them particularly potent forms of social control and ideological penetration and homogenization. In part, their potency derives from the fact that narratives put "forth powerful and persuasive truth claims — claims about appropriate behavior and values — that are shielded from testing or debate" (Witten 1993:105). Performative features of narrative such as repetition, vivid concrete details, particularity of characters, and coherence of plot silence epistemological challenges and often generate emotional identification and commitment. Because narratives make implicit rather than explicit claims regarding causality and truth as they are dramatized in particular events regarding specific characters, stories elude challenges, testing, or debate. Van Dijk (1993) has reported, for instance, that stories containing negative images and stereotypes of nonwhite persons are less subject to the charge of racism when they recount personal experiences and particular events. Whereas a general claim that a certain group is inferior or dangerous might be contested on empirical grounds, an individual story about being mugged, a story which includes an incidental reference to the nonwhite race of the assailant, communicates a similar message but under the protected guise of simply stating the "facts." The causal significance or relevance of the assailant's race is, in such a tale, strongly implied but not subject to challenge or falsifiability. Thus representations, true and/or false, made implicitly without either validation or contest, are routinely exchanged in social interactions and thereby occupy social space. Third, narratives contribute to hegemony to the extent that they conceal the social organization of their production and plausibility. Narratives embody general understandings of the world that by their deployment and repetition come to constitute and sustain the life-world. Yet because narratives depict specific persons existing in particular social, physical, and historical locations, those general understandings often remain unacknowledged. By failing to make these manifest, narratives draw on unexamined assumptions and causal claims without displaying these assumptions and claims or laying them open to challenge or testing. Thus, as narratives depict understandings of particular persons and events, they reproduce, without exposing, the connections of the specific story and persons to the structure of relations and institutions that made the story plausible. To the extent that the hegemonic is "that order of signs and practices, relations and distinctions, images and epistemologies … that come to be taken-for-granted as the natural and received shape of the world and everything that inhabits it" (Comaroff & Comaroff 1991), the unarticulated and unexamined plausibility is the story's contribution to hegemony. The following two examples drawn from recent sociolegal research illustrate the ways in which legally organized narrativity helps produce the taken-for-granted and naturalized world by effacing the connections between the particular and the general. Sara Cobb (1992) examines the processes through which women's stories of violence are "domesticated" (tamed and normalized) within mediation sessions. Cobb reports that the domestication of women's stories of violence are a consequence of the organization of the setting in which they are told: within mediation, the storyteller and her audience are situated within a normative organization that recognizes the values of narrative participation over any substantive moral or epistemological code or standard. Being denied access to any external standards, the stories the women tell cannot therefore be adjudged true or compelling. The stories are interpreted as one version of a situation in which "multiple perspectives are possible." Cobb demonstrates how this particular context of elicitation specifically buries and silences stories of violence, effectively reproducing women's relative powerlessness within their families. With women deprived of the possibility of corroboration by the norms of the mediation session, their stories of violence are minimized and "disappeared." As a consequence, the individual woman can get little relief from the situation that brought her to mediation: she is denied an individual legal remedy (by being sent from court to mediation) and at the same time denied access to and connections with any collective understanding of or response to the sorts of violence acknowledged by the law (through the organization of the mediation process). Through this process, "violence, as a disruption of the moral order in a community, is made familiar (of the family) and natural — the extraordinary is tamed, drawn into the place where we eat, sleep and [is] made ordinary" (ibid., p. 19). Whereas mediation protects narratives from an interrogation of their truth claims, other, formal legal processes are deliberately organized to adjudicate truth claims. Yet even in these settings, certain types of truth claims are disqualified and thus shielded from examination and scrutiny. The strong preference of courts for individual narratives operates to impede the expression (and validation) of truth claims that are not easily represented through a particular story. Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's decision in the McClesky case (1986). The defendant, a black man who had been convicted of the murder of a police officer, was sentenced to death. His Supreme Court appeal of the death sentence was based on his claim that the law had been applied in a racially discriminatory way, thus denying him equal protection under the law. As part of McClesky's appeal, David Baldus, a social scientist, submitted an amicus brief in which he reported the results of his analysis of 2,000 homicide cases in that state (Baldus 1990). The statistical data revealed that black defendants convicted of killing white citizens were significantly more likely to receive the death sentence than white defendants convicted of killing a black victim. Despite this evidence of racial discrimination, the Court did not overturn McClesky's death sentence. The majority decision, in an opinion written by Justice Powell, stated that the kind of statistical evidence submitted by Baldus was simply not sufficient to establish that any racial discrimination occurred in this particular case. The court declared, instead, that to demonstrate racial discrimination, it would be necessary to establish that the jury, or the prosecutor, acted with discriminatory purpose in sentencing McClesky.[ [11](http://web.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/ehost/detail?vid=4&hid=106&sid=c00733b3-4acd-4926-b4f9-94f849d6e9f1%40sessionmgr109" \l "bib11" \o "11)] Here, then, an unambiguous pattern of racial inequity was sustained through the very invocation of and demand for subjectivity (the jury's or prosecutor's state of mind) and particularity (the refusal to interpret this case as part of a larger category of cases) that are often embodied in narratives. In this instance, relative powerlessness and injustice (if one is to believe Baldus's data) were preserved, rather than challenged, by the demand for a particular narrative about specific concrete individuals whose interactions were bounded in time and space. In other words, the Court held that the legally cognizable explanation of the defendant's conviction could not be a product of inferential or deductive comprehension (Mink 1970; Bruner 1986). Despite its best efforts, the defense was denied discursive access to the generalizing, and authoritative, language of social logico-deductive science and with it the type of "truths" it is capable of representing. The court insists on a narrative that effaces the relationship between the particular and the general, between this case and other capital trials in Georgia. Further, the McClesky decision illustrates not only how the demand for narrative particularity may reinscribe relative powerlessness by obscuring the connection between the individual case and larger patterns of institutional behavior; it also reveals how conventionalized legal procedures impede the demonstration of that connection.[ [12](http://web.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/ehost/detail?vid=4&hid=106&sid=c00733b3-4acd-4926-b4f9-94f849d6e9f1%40sessionmgr109" \l "bib12" \o "12)] The court simultaneously demanded evidence of the jurors' states of mind and excluded such evidence. Because jury deliberations are protected from routine scrutiny and evaluation, the majority demanded a kind of proof that is institutionally unavailable. Thus, in the McClesky decision, by insisting on a narrative of explicit articulated discrimination, the court calls for a kind of narrative truth that court procedures institutionally impede. As these examples suggest, a reliance on or demand for narrativity is neither unusual nor subversive within legal settings. In fact, given the ideological commitment to individualized justice and case-by-case processing that characterizes our legal system, narrative, relying as it often does on the language of the particular and subjective, may more often operate to sustain, rather than subvert, inequality and injustice. The law's insistent demand for personal narratives achieves a kind of radical individuation that disempowers the teller by effacing the connections among persons and the social organization of their experiences. This argument is borne out if we consider that being relieved of the necessity, and costs, of telling a story can be seen as liberatory and collectively empowering. Insofar as particular and subjective narratives reinforce a view of the world made up of autonomous individuals interacting only in immediate and local ways, they may hobble collective claims and solutions to social inequities (Silbey 1984). In fact, the progressive achievements of workers' compensation, no-fault divorce, no-fault auto insurance, strict liability, and some consumer protection regimes derive directly from the provision of legal remedies without the requirement to produce an individually crafted narrative of right and liability.

* ***heteroglossia*** describes the coexistence of distinct varieties within a single linguistic code.

#### The affirmative fetishizes the narrative

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But if the silences in discourses of domination are a site for insurrectionary noise, if they are the corridors we must fill with explosive counter-tales, it is also possible to make a fetish of breaking silence. Even more than a fetish, it is possible that this ostensible tool of emancipation carries its own techniques of subjugation--that it converges with non-emancipatory tendencies in contem- porary culture (for example, the ubiquity of confessional discourse and rampant personalization of political life), that it establishes regulatory norms, coincides with the disciplinary power of confession, in short, feeds the powers we meant to starve. While attempting to avoid a simple reversal of feminist valorizations of breaking silence, it is this dimension of silence and its putative opposite with which this Article is concerned. In the course of this work, I want to make the case for silence not simply as an aesthetic but a political value, a means of preserving certain practices and dimensions of existence from regulatory power, from normative violence, as well as from the scorching rays of public exposure. I also want to suggest a link between, on the one hand, a certain contemporary tendency concerning the lives of public figures--the confession or extraction of every detail of private and personal life (sexual, familial, therapeutic, financial) and, on the other, a certain practice in feminist culture: the compulsive putting into public discourse of heretofore hidden or private experiences--from catalogues of sexual pleasures to litanies of sexual abuses, from chronicles of eating disorders to diaries of homebirths, lesbian mothering, and Gloria Steinam's inner revolution. In linking these two phenomena--the privatization of public life via the mechanism of public exposure of private life on the one hand, and the compulsive/compulsory cataloguing of the details of women's lives on the other--I want to highlight a modality of regulation and depoliticization specific to our age that is not simply confessional but empties private life into the public domain, and thereby also usurps public space with the relatively trivial, rendering the political personal in a fashion that leaves injurious social, political and economic powers unremarked and untouched. In short, while intended as a practice of freedom (premised on the modernist conceit that the truth shall make us free), these productions of truth not only bear the capacity to chain us to our injurious histories as well as the stations of our small lives but also to instigate the further regulation of those lives, all the while depoliti- cizing their conditions.

#### This turns the case- it writes oppression into the law

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These questions suggest that in legally codifying a fragment of an insurrec- tionary discourse as a timeless truth, interpellating women as unified in their victimization, and casting the "free speech" of men as that which "silences" and thus subordinates women, MacKinnon not only opposes bourgeois liberty to substantive equality, but potentially intensifies the regulation of gender and sexuality in the law, abetting rather than contesting the production of gender identity as sexual. In short, as a regulatory fiction of a particular identity is deployed to displace the hegemonic fiction of universal personhood, the discourse of rights converges insidiously with the discourse of disciplinarity to produce a spectacularly potent mode of juridical-regulatory domination. Again, let me emphasize that the problem I am seeking to delineate is not specific to MacKinnon or even feminist legal reform. Rather, MacKinnon's and kindred efforts at bringing subjugated discourses into the law merely constitute examples of what Foucault identified as the risk of re-codification and re- colonisation of "disinterred knowledges" by those "unitary discourses, which first disqualified and then ignored them when they made their appearance." n23 They exemplify how the work of breaking silence can metamorphose into new techniques of domination, how our truths can become our rulers rather than our emancipators, how our confessions become the norms by which we are regulated.

#### Your censorship bad args link you to all our narratives turns

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My concern with what might be called compulsory feminist discursivity and the presumed evil of silences has yet another source. Notwithstanding American academic feminism's romance with Foucault, there is an oddly non- or pre-Foucauldian quality to much feminist concern with censorship and silencing. In these formulations, expression is cast either as that which makes us free, tells our truth, puts our truth into circulation, n3 or as that which oppresses us by putting "their" truth into circulation in the form of pornogra- phy, hate speech, harassment or simply the representation of the world from "the male point of view." n4 If one side in the debate argues for more expres- sion on our part--for example, by making our own pornography or telling our own stories--and the other argues for less on "their" part, both sides none- theless subscribe to an expressive and repressive notion of speech, its capacity to express the truth of an individual's desire or condition, or to repress that truth. Both equate freedom with voice and visibility. n5 Both assume recognition to be unproblematic when we tell our own story, and assume that such recognition is the material of power and pleasure. Neither, in short, confronts the regulatory potential of speaking ourselves. I think the whole contemporary debate over censorship--whether focused on porn or rap music--is necessarily bound to an expressive-repressive model of power and freedom, which may explain why those who feel passionately about both freedom and dignity have trouble finding their way in this debate. If the choice is cast either as the free circulation of music and pictures venerating rape, racism, and misogyny, or state repression of the same, how does one choose?

#### Narratives of suffering permanently relate subjectivity to victimhood and exclude anyone who does not fit the model of subordination

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If, taken together, the two passages from Foucault we have been consider- ing call feminists to account in our compulsion to put everything about women into discourse, they do not yet exhaust the phenomenon of being ensnared 'in the folds of our own discourses.' For if the problem I have been discussing is easy enough to see--indeed, largely familiar to those who track techniques of co-optation--at the level of legal and bureaucratic discourse, it is altogether more disquieting when it takes the form of regulatory discourse in our own sub- and counter-cultures of resistance . . . when confessing injury becomes that which attaches us to the injury, paralyzes us within it, and prevents us from seeking or even desiring a status other than injured. In an age of social identification through attributes marked as culturally significant--gender, race, sexuality, and so forth--confessional discourse, with its truth-bearing status in a post-epistemological universe, not only regulates the confessor in the name of freeing her as Foucault described that logic, but extends beyond the confess- ing individual to constitute a regulatory truth about the identity group. Confessed truths are assembled and deployed as "knowledge" about the group. This phenomenon would seem to undergird a range of recurring troubles in feminism, from the "real woman" rejoinder to post-structuralist deconstructions of her, to totalizing descriptions of women's experience that are the inadvertent effects of various kinds of survivor stories. Thus, for example, the porn star who feels miserably exploited, violated and humiliated in her work invariably monopolizes the truth about sex work; as the girl with math anxieties constitutes the truth about women and math; as eating disor- ders have become the truth about women and food; as sexual abuse and viola- tion occupy the knowledge terrain of women and sexuality. In other words, even as feminism aims to affirm diversity among women and women's ex- periences, confession as the site of production of truth and its convergence with feminist suspicion and deauthorization of truth from other sources tends to reinstate a unified discourse in which the story of greatest suffering becomes the true story of woman. (I think this constitutes part of the rhetorical power of MacKinnon's work; analytically, the epistemological superiority of confes- sion substitutes for the older, largely discredited charge of false consciousness). Thus, the adult who does not suffer from her or his childhood sexual experi- ence, the lesbian who does not feel shame, the woman of color who does not primarily or "correctly" identify with her marking as such--these figures are excluded as bonafide members of the categories which also claim them. Their status within these discourses is that of being "in denial," "passing" or being a "race traitor." This is the norm-making process in feminist traditions of "breaking silence" which, ironically, silence and exclude the very women these traditions mean to empower. (Is it surprising, when we think in this vein, that there is so little feminist writing on heterosexual pleasure?) But if these practices tacitly silence those whose experiences do not parallel those whose suffering is most marked (or whom the discourse produces as suffering markedly), they also condemn those whose sufferings they record to a permanent identification with that suffering. Here, we experience a temporal ensnaring in 'the folds of our own discourses' insofar as we identify ourselves in speech in a manner that condemns us to live in a present dominated by the past. But what if speech and silence aren't really opposites? Indeed, what if to speak incessantly of one's suffering is to silence the possibilities of overcoming it, of living beyond it, of identifying as something other than it? What if this incessant speech not only overwhelms the experiences of others, but alternative (unutterable? traumatized? fragmentary? inassimilable?) zones of one's own experience? Conversely, what if a certain modality of silence about one's suffering--and I am suggesting that we must consider modalities of silence as varied as modalities of speech and discourse--is to articulate a variety of possibilities not otherwise available to the sufferer?

### Block K cards

**PRIVILEGING PERSONAL EXPERIENCE AS THE STARTING POINT OF DISCUSSION REPLICATES THE SAME NETWORKS OF POWER AND EXCLUSION IN DEBATE THEY CRITICIZE. THIS MIRRORS THE SAME TEMPLATE FOR HEGEMONIC DOMINATION THEY CRITICIZE. THEIR DISMISSAL OF POLICY DELIBERATION DEBILITATES PROGRESSIVE DIALOGUE AND DEMOCRATIC POLITICS**

**Tonn, 2K5** [Mari Boor Tonn, Assoc. Prof of Communication at the Univ. of Maryland, College Park, “Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public,” Rhetoric and Public Affairs 8.3, p.423-24, JT]
This widespread recognition that access to public deliberative processes and the ballot is a baseline of any genuine democracy points to the most curious irony of the conversation movement: portions of its constituency. Numbering among the most fervid dialogic loyalists have been some feminists and multiculturalists who represent groups historically denied both the right to speak in public and the ballot. Oddly, some feminists who championed the slogan "The Personal Is Political" to emphasize ways relational power can oppress tend to ignore similar dangers lurking in the appropriation of conversation and dialogue in public deliberation. Yet **the** conversational model's **emphasis on empowerment through intimacy can duplicate the power networks that traditionally excluded females and nonwhites and gave rise to numerous, sometimes necessarily uncivil, demands for democratic inclusion. Formalized participation structures in deliberative processes obviously cannot ensure the elimination of relational power blocs, but,** as Freeman pointed out, **the absence of formal rules leaves relational power unchecked and potentially capricious. Moreover, the privileging of the self, personal experiences, and individual perspectives of reality intrinsic in the conversational paradigm mirrors justifications once used by dominant groups who used their own lives, beliefs, and interests as templates for hegemonic social premises to oppress women, the lower class, and people of color.** Paradigms infused with the therapeutic language of emotional healing and coping likewise flirt with the type of psychological diagnoses once ascribed to disaffected women. But as Betty Friedan's landmark 1963 The Feminist Mystique argued, the cure for female alienation was neither tranquilizers nor attitude adjustments fostered through psychotherapy but, rather, unrestricted opportunities.102

**The price exacted by promoting approaches to complex public issues**—models that cast conventional deliberative processes, including the marshaling of evidence beyond individual subjectivity, as "elitist" or "monologic"—**can be steep**. Consider comments of an aide to President George W. Bush made before reports concluding Iraq harbored no weapons of mass destruction, the primary justification for a U.S.-led war costing thousands of lives. Investigative reporters and other persons sleuthing for hard facts, he claimed, operate "in what we call the reality-based community." Such people "believe that solutions emerge from [the] judicious study of discernible reality." Then baldly flexing the muscle afforded by increasingly popular social-constructionist and poststructuralist models for conflict resolution, he added: "That's not the way the world really works anymore . . . We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you're studying that reality—judiciously, as you will—we'll act again, creating other new realities."103

The recent fascination with public conversation and dialogue most likely is a product of frustration with the tone of much public, political discourse. Such concerns are neither new nor completely without merit. Yet, as Burke insightfully pointed out nearly six decades ago, **"A perennial embarrassment in liberal apologetics has arisen from its 'surgical' proclivity: its attempt to outlaw a malfunction by outlawing the function." The attempt to eliminate flaws in a process by eliminating the entire process,** he writes, "is like trying to eliminate heart disease by eliminating hearts."104 **Because public argument and deliberative processes are the "heart" of true democracy, supplanting those models with social and therapeutic conversation and dialogue jeopardizes the very pulse and lifeblood of democracy itself.**

**SOCIAL LOCATION IS INADEQUATE TO GROUND ONTOLOGY. THEIR ARGUMENT ESTABLISHES A TRUTH REGIME WHERE THEIR SPECIFIC LOCATION BECOMES THE STANDARD BY WHICH TO EXCLUDE ALL OTHERS. THE NET RESULT IS TO ENTRENCH OPPRESSION**

Carolyn **D'Cruz,** LaTrobe University, Australia, **2K1**

["What Matter Who's Speaking?" Authenticity and Identity in Discourses of Aboriginality in Australia, Vol. 5 Issue 3, Jouvert, http://social.chass.ncsu.edu/jouvert/v5i3/cdcr.htm, ACC. 10-2-2008, DREG]

Borrowing from Marx's materialist conception of history, feminist standpoint theory finds its point of departure by criticising the privilege accorded to the category of (male) labour, claiming that the position of women in relations of reproduction and production is ontologically 'better' situated to analyse social and political inequalities. Without giving a detailed description of standpoint theorists, it is sufficient to note, for present purposes, that proponents of standpoint theory, such as Sandra Harding, claim that the experiences of the subjugated not only expose the theoretical biases and effects of power exerted by the 'master position' (usually identified as white, capitalist and male), but also can provide the grounds for providing a better account of the world (The Science Question 191). **Taken to an extreme form, standpoint theory suggests that a subject with the most markers of oppressed identities would be the best situated to ground a theory of knowing! Notwithstanding the failure to account for the 'formidable materiality' of discourse mediating the formation of such knowledges, there is an obvious practical impossibility in trying to establish a collective singular subject to ground such an epistemology, as the list of possible subjugated identities would be endless and there would be no way of occupying the position of 'God's eye'** -- as Donna Haraway puts it -- **to see from all positions at once**.[8] Furthermore, **standpoint theory's idea of privileged perspective becomes ironically dependent on the continued subjugation of oppressed identities in order to be maintained.**

**This** very brief **summary of standpoint theory exposes a prevelant problem within discourses of identity politics in general -- the propensity to speak about an identity's experiences of oppression in ways that unwittingly promote the view that truth claims are reducible to the standpoints of subjugated identities.** It also draws attention to the need to differentiate between orders of analysis. That is, **it might often be appropriate to draw from the perspectives of subjugated identities for some forms of social criticism, but this is not to be confused with drawing upon the same perspectives as a means for grounding an ontology**. That is**, social criticism and ontology do not belong to the same order of analysis, and therefore should not be permitted to be so easily conflated.** While the positions in the Oceania debate are by no means as extreme in making such conflations, it is worth considering the way in which the issues raised by standpoint positions impinge upon that debate.

**4. OUR ALTERNATIVE IS MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE**

**Tonn, 2K5**

[Mari Boor Tonn, Assoc. Prof of Communication at the Univ. of Maryland, College Park, “Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public,” Rhetoric and Public Affairs 8.3, p.410, JT]

Still, in important respects**, received conceptions of democracy and public deliberation stand in sharp relief to social conversations and therapeutic dialogues. First, unlike the scrupulous avoidance of conflict in social conversations, democratic argument,** as Kenneth Burke contends**, is necessarily an admixture of “competition” and “cooperation.”** As he argues, **“Only if all reports were in and if there were no vital questions still unanswered, could a social body dispense with the assistance of a vocal opposition in the maturing of our chart as to what is going on, which social functions are helpful and which are harmful.**”29 Thus, contrary to the relational harmony privileged in social conversations, true civic deliberation fully recognizes, in Schudson’s words, that “Democracy is deeply uncomfortable.”30 Public arguments are catalyzed by predicament or dispute, placing them at odds with the social convention prescribing divisive issues such as politics and religion as off-limits in “polite conversation.”

**THEIR APPROACH IS JUST THE LATEST ACADEMIC FIXATION WITH PERSONAL EXPERIENCE AND NOTIONS OF EMPOWERMENT, THAT ACTUALLY STIFLES DISSENT, FORTIFIES INTELLECTUAL HEGEMONY AND BECOMES BLINDED BY THEIR OWN PERSPECTIVES. THIS ALSO PROVES WE’LL NEVER GET TO THE POLICYMAKING, SO THEIR APPROACH CANNOT COMBINE WITH OUR OFFENSE**
**Tonn, 2K5**

[Mari Boor Tonn, Assoc. Prof of Communication at the Univ. of Maryland, College Park, “Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public,” Rhetoric and Public Affairs 8.3, p.405-406, JT]

**As the last century neared its close, the second-wave feminist slogan “The Personal Is Political” was turned on its head: the political became highly personalized.** In this new politics of intimacy, candidates whistlestopped on Oprah Winfrey, political journalists posed as psychotherapists, and President “I feel your pain” Clinton presided in the popular imagination as The Great Empathizer and the Commander in Grief. **Emblematic of** this **conflation of the private and the public was the increasing casting of social controversies** such as affirmative action, escalating crime, and welfare reform **in the language of “conversation,” “dialogue,” and the therapeutic talk of healing,** dysfunction, coping, self-esteem, **and empowerment.**1

**Among academics, this cult of conversation has been championed** most ardently by communitarian political theorists, civic journalists, cultural feminists, postmodernists, multiculturalists, family therapists, and a number of communication scholars concerned with identity, the public sphere, conflict and negotiation, and counseling. In many cases, the rationale for a conversational turn in the ways citizens conduct business, solve problems, and approach conflict is couched in a language interpolating “conversation” or “dialogue” with spirituality and therapy. Particularly visible is Deborah Tannen’s 1998 bestseller The Argument Culture: Moving from Debate to Dialogue, wherein she blames a culture of critique for “corroding our spirit.”2 Likewise, the earlier The Conversation of Journalism proposed supplanting the “disabling” monological approach to news reporting with a more inclusive dialogic paradigm overtly engaging citizens.3 So, too, at the University of New Hampshire in the late 1990s, administrators and some faculty proposed replacing the existing Academic Senate, which they termed “dysfunctional,” with a nonvoting University Forum aimed to “advance functional conversation” and attendant community.4 And the conflation of the conversational and therapeutic for approaching public controversies is made explicit in the Boston Public Conversations Project, premised on “[t]he idea that family therapy skills can be fruitfully applied in the realm of ‘public conversations’” on “divisive public issues” such as abortion.5

Perhaps the most conspicuous effort at replacing public debate with therapeutic dialogue was President Clinton’s Conversation on Race, launched in mid-1997. Controversial from its inception for its ideological bent, the initiative met further widespread criticism for its encounter-group approaches to racial stratification and strife, critiques echoing previously articulated concerns—my own among them6—that certain dangers lurk in employing private or social communication modes for public problem-solving.7 Since then, **others have joined in contesting the treating of public problems with narrative and psychological approaches, which—in the name of promoting** civility, cooperation, **personal empowerment, and socially constructed or idiosyncratic truths—actually work to contain dissent, locate systemic social problems solely within individual neurosis, and otherwise fortify hegemony**.8