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### 1AC Intel Adv.

#### Advantage 1 is Intelligence -

#### Iran will remain a nuclear threat and negotiations will fail

**Pollack and Einhorn 1/23** (Kenneth M. Pollack is an expert on Middle Eastern political-military affairs, with particular emphasis on Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the other nations of the Persian Gulf region. He is currently a senior fellow in the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. He served as the director of the Saban Center from 2009 to 2012, and its director of research from 2002 to 2009. Robert Einhorn is a senior fellow with the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative and the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, both housed within the Foreign Policy program at Brookings. During his career at the U.S. Department of State, Einhorn served as assistant secretary for nonproliferation during the Clinton administration, and as the secretary of state’s special advisor for nonproliferation and arms control during the Obama administration. “Iran Nuclear Talks Fail” <http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/01/iran-nuclear-talks-fail-einhorn-pollack>)

While our negotiators are working hard to get a final nuclear agreement with Iran that meets our requirements, we must be prepared for the possibility that negotiations will fail and the Iranians will then direct their efforts toward eroding sanctions and advancing their nuclear program. The opening created by President Hassan Rouhani’s overtures would close. In this scenario, Iran would reject any extension of the current interim agreement, portray itself publicly as having been the reasonable side in the talks, reach out aggressively to governments and companies around the world to entice them to circumvent or ignore sanctions, and ramp up nuclear activities that have been frozen under the interim deal. We should seek to head off this scenario by keeping the pressure on Iran to accept a final agreement along the lines of our proposal. That will involve three priorities: (1) continuing to urge governments and companies to enforce existing sanctions, (2) showing additional flexibility within the delegation’s existing instructions to avoid an Iranian narrative that we are the intransigent party, and (3) maintaining a strong consensus among the P5+1 governments and the broader international sanctions coalition that the rigorous measures necessary to make a deal acceptable to us are reasonable, fair and essential to a sound agreement. At the same time, we need to prepare for the possibility that no agreement will be reached and Iran will attempt to turn that eventuality to their advantage. To thwart that attempt, we would have to ensure that Iran bears the onus for any breakdown of the talks. We would also want to work with Congress to adopt additional sanctions, urge key states (including Russia and China) to press Iran not to further advance its nuclear program, and convey a clear message to Iran that movement toward or across the nuclear threshold would be met by a firm international response that could involve much stronger sanctions and perhaps more coercive measures. Background Thanks largely to the crippling sanctions we worked hard to put in place, we were able to achieve the six-month “interim” deal that halted further progress in Iran’s nuclear program at a minimal price in terms of measures to ease sanctions. But negotiations on a final agreement may prove difficult, or even impossible, to bring to a successful conclusion. To detect and deter any Iranian decision to break out and move to build nuclear weapons, we have proposed going well beyond a freeze of Iran’s nuclear activities to a major reduction of its nuclear infrastructure, and we have sought verification measures that exceed the requirements of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol. These tough proposals can help restrain Israeli public attacks, although the Israelis can be expected to strongly oppose any watering down of our positions. On the other hand, the Russians and Chinese can be expected to favor significant compromises in order to gain agreement. The Iranian negotiators have demonstrated the same seriousness of purpose as they did during negotiations of the interim deal. But they oppose deep reductions in their enrichment capacity, insist on operating the Arak reactor and Fordow enrichment plant, and have resisted monitoring arrangements that go beyond the Additional Protocol. The domestic Iranian backlash against the interim agreement and our negotiating position for a final agreement has been intense. The newspaper Kayhan, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and hardliners in the Majlis have been outspoken critics of the Iranian negotiators and their efforts. In a mirror image of the positions taken by American critics, they argue that the interim deal concedes too much and receives too little in return. They inaccurately claim that we have already accepted a legal “right to enrich” and assert that we are reneging on the interim deal by denying such acceptance. IRGC Commander Jafari has publicly attacked Foreign Minister and chief negotiator Zarif, who has pushed back firmly and asserted that his negotiating team has the support of the Supreme Leader. Critics in the Majlis have strongly condemned the introduction of a new sanctions bill in our Congress and retaliated by introducing their own legislation that would mandate increasing Iranian enrichment levels to 60 percent, ostensibly for submarine propulsion. To justify a retention and even expansion of Iran’s enrichment capacity, Atomic Energy Organization of Iran head Salehi has spoken of the need to provide fuel for several new nuclear power reactors. While continuing to press for a final deal, we need to recognize that, given the wide gap between U.S. and Iranian positions as well as domestic opposition in Tehran, such a final deal may be very difficult to achieve. If prospects for a negotiated outcome begin to look remote, we may soon find ourselves confronted by an aggressive Iranian effort to erode the sanctions in the absence of agreement and to move its nuclear program closer to the weapons threshold.

#### Drones trade off with CIA’s intelligence agenda

Micah Zenko, 13- “Clip the Agency's Wings”. Micah Zenko is the Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/16/clip\_the\_agencys\_ wings\_cia\_drones

Second, it would focus the finite resources and bandwidth of the CIA on its primary responsibilities of intelligence collection, analysis, and early warning. Last year, the President's Intelligence Advisory Board -- a semi-independent executive branch body, the findings of which rarely leak -- reportedly told Obama that "U.S. spy agencies were paying inadequate attention to China, the Middle East and other national security flash points because they had become too focused on military operations and drone strikes." This is not a new charge, since every few years an independent group or congressional report determines that "the CIA has been ignoring its core mission activities." But, as Mark Mazzetti shows in his indispensable CIA history, the agency has evolved from an organization once deeply divided at senior levels about using armed drones, to one that is a fully functioning paramilitary army. As former senior CIA official Ross Newland warns, the agency's armed drones program "ends up hurting the CIA. This just is not an intelligence mission." There is no longer any justification for the CIA to have its own redundant fleet of 30 to 35 armed drones. During White House debates of CIA requests in 2009, Gen. James Cartwright, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, repeatedly asked: "Can you tell me why we are building a second Air Force?" Obama eventually granted every single request made by then-Director of Central Intelligence Leon Panetta, adding: "The CIA gets what it wants." With this year's proposed National Intelligence Program budget scheduled to fall by 8 percent, an open checkbook for Langley is not sustainable or strategically wise.

#### Intel key to maintaining efforts towards Iranian counter-prolif

James R. **Clapper**, Director of National Intelligence, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” March 12, 20**13**, <http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/130312/clapper.pdf>)

WMD PROLIFERATION Nation-state efforts to develop or acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems constitute a major threat to the security of our nation, deployed troops, and allies. The Intelligence Community is focused on the threat and destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation, proliferation of chemical and biological warfare (CBW)-related materials, and development of WMD delivery systems. Traditionally, international agreements and diplomacy have deterred most nation-states from acquiring biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons, but these constraints may be of less utility in preventing terrorist groups from doing so. The time when only a few states had access to the most dangerous technologies is past. Biological and chemical materials and technologies, almost always dualuse, move easily in our globalized economy, as do the personnel with scientific expertise to design and use them. The latest discoveries in the life sciences also diffuse globally and rapidly. Iran and North Korea Developing WMD-Applicable Capabilities We assess Iran is developing nuclear capabilities to enhance its security, prestige, and regional influence and give it the ability to develop nuclear weapons, should a decision be made to do so. We do not know if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.

#### We will strike their arsenal – locating them is key – stops war from going nuclear

**Lieber and Press 09** (Keir A.,  Associate Professor @ Georgetown University,  Daryl G., Associate Professor of Government, Dartmouth College, Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec)

MODELING THE UNTHINKABLE To illustrate the growth in U.S. counterforce capabilities, we applied a set of simple formulas that analysts have used for decades to estimate the effectiveness of counterforce attacks. We modeled a U.S. strike on a small target set: 20 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in hardened silos, the approximate size of China's current long-range, silo-based missile force. The analysis compared the capabilities of a 1985 Minuteman ICBM to those of a modern Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missile. [The technical details of the analysis presented in this essay are available online [2].] In 1985, a single U.S. ICBM warhead had less than a 60 percent chance of destroying a typical silo. Even if four or five additional warheads were used, the cumulative odds of destroying the silo would never exceed 90 percent because of the problem of "fratricide," whereby incoming warheads destroy each other. Beyond five warheads, adding more does no good. A probability of 90 percent might sound high, but it falls far short if the goal is to completely disarm an enemy: with a 90 percent chance of destroying each target, the odds of destroying all 20 are roughly 12 percent. In 1985, then, a U.S. ICBM attack had little chance of destroying even a small enemy nuclear arsenal. Today, a multiple-warhead attack on a single silo using a Trident II missile would have a roughly 99 percent chance of destroying it, and the probability that a barrage would destroy all 20 targets is well above 95 percent. Given the accuracy of the U.S. military's current delivery systems, the only question is target identification: silos that can be found can be destroyed. During the Cold War, the United States worked hard to pinpoint Soviet nuclear forces, with great success. Locating potential adversaries' small nuclear arsenals is undoubtedly a top priority for U.S. intelligence today. The revolution in accuracy is producing an even more momentous change: it is becoming possible for the United States to conduct low-yield nuclear counterforce strikes that inflict relatively few casualties. A U.S. Department of Defense computer model, called the Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability (HPAC), estimates the dispersion of deadly radioactive fallout in a given region after a nuclear detonation. The software uses the warhead's explosive power, the height of the burst, and data about local weather and demographics to estimate how much fallout would be generated, where it would blow, and how many people it would injure or kill. HPAC results can be chilling. In 2006, a team of nuclear weapons analysts from the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) used HPAC to estimate the consequences of a U.S. nuclear attack using high-yield warheads against China's ICBM field. Even though China's silos are located in the countryside, the model predicted that the fallout would blow over a large area, killing 3-4 million people. U.S. counterforce capabilities were useless, the study implied, because even a limited strike would kill an unconscionable number of civilians. But the United States can already conduct nuclear counterforce strikes at a tiny fraction of the human devastation that the FAS/NRDC study predicted, and small additional improvements to the U.S. force could dramatically reduce the potential collateral damage even further. The United States' nuclear weapons are now so accurate that it can conduct successful counterforce attacks using the smallest-yield warheads in the arsenal, rather than the huge warheads that the FAS/NRDC simulation modeled. And to further reduce the fallout, the weapons can be set to detonate as airbursts, which would allow most of the radiation to dissipate in the upper atmosphere. We ran multiple HPAC scenarios against the identical target set used in the FAS/NRDC study but modeled low-yield airbursts rather than high-yield groundbursts. The fatality estimates plunged from 3-4 million to less than 700 -- a figure comparable to the number of civilians reportedly killed since 2006 in Pakistan by U.S. drone strikes. One should be skeptical about the results of any model that depends on unpredictable factors, such as wind speed and direction. But in the scenarios we modeled, the area of lethal fallout was so small that very few civilians would have become ill or died, regardless of which way the wind blew. Critics may cringe at this analysis. Many of them, understandably, say that nuclear weapons are -- and should remain -- unusable. But if the United States is to retain these weapons for the purpose of deterring nuclear attacks, it needs a force that gives U.S. leaders retaliatory options they might actually employ. If the only retaliatory option entails killing millions of civilians, then the U.S. deterrent will lack credibility. Giving U.S. leaders alternatives that do not target civilians is both wise and just. A counterforce attack -- whether using conventional munitions or low- or high-yield nuclear weapons -- would be fraught with peril. Even a small possibility of a single enemy warhead's surviving such a strike would undoubtedly give any U.S. leader great pause. But in the midst of a conventional war, if an enemy were using nuclear threats or limited nuclear attacks to try to coerce the United States or its allies, these would be the capabilities that would give a U.S. president real options.

#### Iran proliferation causes nuclear war

Edelman, distinguished fellow – Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, ‘11

(Eric S, “The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran,” *Foreign Affairs*, January/February)

The reports of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States and the Commission on the Prevention Of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, as well as other analyses, have highlighted the risk that a nuclear-armed Iran could trigger additional nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, even if Israel does not declare its own nuclear arsenal. Notably, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia,Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates— all signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (npt)—have recently announced or initiated nuclear energy programs. Although some of these states have legitimate economic rationales for pursuing nuclear power and although the low-enriched fuel used for power reactors cannot be used in nuclear weapons, these moves have been widely interpreted as hedges against a nuclear-armed Iran. The npt does not bar states from developing the sensitive technology required to produce nuclear fuel on their own, that is, the capability to enrich natural uranium and separate plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. Yet enrichment and reprocessing can also be used to accumulate weapons-grade enriched uranium and plutonium—the very loophole that Iran has apparently exploited in pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. Developing nuclear weapons remains a slow, expensive, and di⁄cult process, even for states with considerable economic resources, and especially if other nations try to constrain aspiring nuclear states’ access to critical materials and technology. Without external support, it is unlikely that any of these aspirants could develop a nuclear weapons capability within a decade. There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could accelerate throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to respond in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also to preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim world. The Saudi government is already pursuing a nuclear power capability, which could be the first step along a slow road to nuclear weapons development. And concerns persist that it might be able to accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan. During the 1980s, in response to the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation throughout the region, Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen css-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also oªered to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the css-2s, which are not accurate enough to deliver conventional warheads eªectively. There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This “Islamabad option” could develop in one of several diªerent ways. Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer. Not only has Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a second chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own. Alternatively, Pakistan might oªer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the npt since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its chief rival, India. The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how India would respond. Would it target Pakistan’s weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India’s reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the NPT. n-player competition Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.- Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction among three or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other. Multipolar systems are generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack. More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents’ forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarinebased nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to “launch on warning” of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to respond quickly,would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering a regional nuclear war.

#### Independently, given the capability Iran would give nuclear weapons to Hezbollah – reprioritization of current CT practices is essential

[Clifford D. **May**](http://www.nationalreview.com/author/clifford-d-may), president of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a policy institute focusing on national security, “[Al-Qaeda vs. Hezbollah](http://www.nationalreview.com/article/350249/al-qaeda-vs-hezbollah-clifford-d-may),” JUNE 6, 20**13**, <http://www.nationalreview.com/article/350249/al-qaeda-vs-hezbollah-clifford-d-may>

Back during the Bush administration, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage famously called Hezbollah the “A Team of terrorists,” adding, “al-Qaeda is actually the B Team.” How do these two organizations compare today? Last week, the State Department released the 2012 issue of its annual “Country Reports on Terrorism.”At a “[background briefing](http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/05/210145.htm),” a “senior administration official” highlighted an “alarming trend”: a “marked resurgence of terrorist activity by Iran and Hezbollah. The tempo of operational activity was something we haven’t seen since the 1990s. . . . We see no signs of this activity abating in 2013. In fact, our assessment is that Hezbollah and Iran will both continue to maintain a heightened level of terrorist activity and operations in the near future.” The State Department is right to see Hezbollah and Iran as joined at the hip: The former is financed and instructed by the latter. That has not always been understood, despite the fact that, prior to 9/11/01, Hezbollah was responsible for more American deaths than any other terrorist organization. And Hezbollah’s secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah, has proclaimed, “Death to America was, is, and will stay our slogan.” A pertinent question: If Iran’s rulers should obtain nuclear weapons, might they give one or two to Hezbollah to use for approved purposes? A plausible answer: Why not? It’s well known that Hezbollah has been sending combatants into Syria in support of Bashar Assad, the dictator and Iranian satrap. Less publicized are Hezbollah’s operations in other corners of the world. A Hezbollah attack on a bus in Bulgaria last July killed five Israelis and one Bulgarian. In Nigeria, authorities recently [broke up](http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2013/05/hezbollah_members_arrested_in.php) a Hezbollah cell, seizing what one Nigerian official called “a large quantity of assorted weapons of different types and caliber.” The State Department report contains surprisingly little information about Hezbollah in Latin America. However, a 500-page report [issued](http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/05/argentine_prosecutor.php) last week by Argentine prosecutor Alberto Nisman reveals that Iran has established an archipelago of “clandestine intelligence stations and operative agents” in Latin America that are being used “to execute terrorist attacks when the Iranian regime decides so, both directly or through its proxy, the terrorist organization Hezbollah.” Among the South American countries in which Iran or Hezbollah has set up intelligence/terrorism bases: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile, Colombia, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, and Suriname. Nisman provides additional evidence — not that more is needed — that Iranian officials and one Lebanese Hezbollah operative were responsible for two terrorist bombings in Argentina in the 1990s. There’s an American nexus too: Nisman charges that Mohsen Rabbani, Iran’s former cultural attaché in Buenos Aires — implicated in the 1994 attack on a Jewish center in Buenos Aires in which 85 people were killed — directed “Iranian agent” Abdul Kadir, now serving a life sentence in connection with the 2010 plot to bomb John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York. Connect the dots, Nisman argues, and they draw a picture of Iran “fomenting and fostering acts of international terrorism in concert with its goals of exporting the revolution.” All this considered, can al-Qaeda still be considered a serious competitor? Yes, it can! Last weekend, my colleague, über-researcher Tom Joscelyn, [pointed out](https://www.weeklystandard.com/print/articles/see-no-evil_732050.html?nopager=1) that AQ and its affiliates now “are fighting in more countries than ever.” In Afghanistan, AQ maintains safe havens in the provinces of Kunar and Nuristan. Its loyal ally, the Taliban, is responsible for a level of violence “higher than before the Obama-ordered surge of American forces in 2010,” according to NATO’s International Security Assistance Force. AQ and its affiliates have bases in northern Pakistan. The Pakistani government, Joscelyn notes, “continues to be a duplicitous ally, sponsoring and protecting various al Qaeda-allied groups. The Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), or Pakistani Taliban, remains a threat after orchestrating the failed May 2010 bombing in Times Square. The State Department announced in September 2010 that the TTP has “a ‘symbiotic relationship’ with al Qaeda.” The AQ-affiliated al-Nusrah Front may be the most effective force fighting against Assad’s troops, and againstHezbollah and Iranian combatants in Syria. AQ is resurgent in neighboring Iraq, with April 2013 the deadliest month in that country in nearly five years, according to the U.N. AQ has expanded operations in Yemen. In Somalia, Shabaab — which formally merged with AQ last year — is far from defeated and has managed to carry out attacks in neighboring Kenya and Uganda as well. In Nigeria, Boko Haram[continues to slaughter](http://defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/us-offers-rewards-for-boko-haram-african-al-qaeda-leaders/) Christians. In Egypt, al-Qaeda members and associates — including Mohammed al-Zawahiri, the brother of al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri — are operating more freely than ever. On 9/11/12 they hoisted an AQ flag above the U.S. embassy in Cairo. Libyan groups closely linked to al-Qaeda were responsible for the 9/11/12 attack that killed Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and three other Americans. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb easily took over northern Mali until French forces pushed them out of the population centers. Al-Qaeda affiliates are becoming more visible and perhaps viable in Tunisia, too. Despite all this, the State Department report asserts that “core” al-Qaeda “is on a path to defeat.” I am not convinced that there is sufficient evidence to substantiate that thesis. And even if it does prove to be accurate, who’s to say that a weakening core can’t be compensated for by a stronger periphery? In the final analysis, “Which is the A Team of terrorism?” is not the paramount question. What is: In the years ahead, does the U.S. have what it takes to be the A Team of counterterrorism?

#### Hezbollah can and will attack

Carafano 13June 7th, 2013. “Hezbollah Plays a Dangerous Game” James Jay Cafano <http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2013/6/james-jay-carafano-hezbollah-plays-a-dangerous-game> (James Jay Carafano, a leading expert in national security and foreign policy challenges, is The Heritage Foundation’s Vice President, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, E. W. Richardson Fellow, and Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies)

"The system was blinking red." That's how the 9/11 Commission Report described the intelligence community's state of concern shortly before the 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington.¶ "Counterterrorism officials were receiving frequent but fragmentary reports about threats," the commission reported, adding, "Indeed, there appeared to be possible threats almost everywhere the United States had interests--including at home."¶ But not until planes plowed into the Twin Towers did everyone understand what the chatter meant.¶ In a recent speech at The National Defense University, President Obama declared that the transnational terrorism threat is well in hand. But, plenty of signs indicate that's not the case.¶ **Consider Hezbollah. This multi-tentacle stooge of Iran is a Shi'a Islamist terrorist group. It is also a political party that operates a shadow government in Lebanon.¶** For more than a year, **Hezbollah has been increasing the tempo of its attacks on Western and Israeli targets in Asia and Europe**. The Bulgarian government, for example, has connected the group to a bus bombing that killed five Israeli tourists and their driver last year.¶ Most recently, **Hezbollah deployed "foreign fighters" to assist the Assad regime in beating back the opposition in Syria. This offensive further complicated an already complex crisis. It broadened the sectarian nature of the war, pitting Shi'a (Hezbollah, Iran, and the Syrian militias supporting Assad) against Sunni (the rebels).¶** **It has also pitted terrorists groups against one another. Hezbollah is battling Assad's opposition whether they are "freedom fighters" or al Qaeda. Jabhat al-Nusra, the al Qaeda affiliate in Syria, is now pretty much at war with Hezbollah**.¶ That may not sound like a bad thing, **but it means the war will surely spread to Lebanon**. Hezbollah has to expect payback. Car bombs will explode in Beirut, as Jabhat al-Nusra pays back Hezbollah. And, as terrorists kill terrorists, the people of Lebanon will be caught in the crossfire.¶ The Lebanese recognize this--and they are none too happy about it. Already some have expressed resentment over Hezbollah dragging the country into Syria's civil war. The people are seeing the group for what it is, a tool of Tehran.¶ That awareness may bring pain. **Hezbollah's impulse will likely be to turn up the violence even more--while directing as much blame and animosity as possible toward Israel. And that could spark another military confrontation.**¶ While Hezbollah sets the red lights blinking, the West mostly just blinks. The European Union remains bitterly divided over designating the terrorist organization as... a terrorist organization.¶ France, Britain and Germany are going halfsies--pressing the EU to label Hezbollah's armed-militia wing as a terrorist organization, while letting the political arm off the hook.¶ As long as the political arm is excluded, Europe won't be able to shut down terrorist fund-raising and recruiting in its own backyard.¶ The UN is not doing much to help either. Since 1978, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has been charged with making sure the Lebanese-Israeli border region is free of any non-governmental armed personnel or weaponry. Clearly it has failed, in part because of self-imposed restrictions. For example, UNIFIL peacekeepers cannot even conduct regular building searches for arms!¶ Transnational terrorism is not in hand. **The U.S. desperately needs to shore up its position in the Middle East**. That means showing real leadership in dealing with Turkey, Israel, Iraq, Jordan and the six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council.¶ It means making clear that the "pivot to Asia" does not entail disengaging from the region. It means ramping up, not standing down, our global anti-terrorism initiative.¶ **And it means developing a real strategy to prevent** Islamist **extremists from hijacking the Arab Spring.**

THE A-TEAM OF ISLAMIC TERRORISTS

#### That causes a nuclear war

**Ayson 10**

(Robert Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, 2010 (“After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)

A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. t may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against **them**. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response.

#### The plan shifts the CIA to focus to intel – key to drone effectiveness

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Washington Post national security reporter Greg Miller has an excellent story in Sunday’s paper on the operational role of the CIA in drone warfare. Back at the time of the Brennan confirmation hearings, and even before, there had been discussion that the CIA would be pulled – even if only gradually – out of drone warfare and this form of using lethal force would be turned over the military. The CIA would re-focus itself on intelligence gathering and analysis, which many commentators inside and outside government said had taken a backseat to operational roles. Brennan himself urged this re-configuring of CIA priorities – including a shift away from counterterrorism to re-emphasize other intelligence missions; and the administration has said similar things in recent weeks. Focusing on drone warfare in Yemen, however, Miller’s report suggests this is easier said than done – whether in Yemen (or, it might be added, in Pakistan). A fundamental reason seems to be something noted many times here at Lawfare – the firing of a missile from a drone is the last kinetic step in a long chain of intelligence-gathering that includes surveillance over time from drones, signals intelligence and, crucially, on-ground human intelligence networks that give the US reason to be focusing on certain people as possible targets. Whether in Pakistan or Yemen, the effectiveness of drone warfare has been a function of the quality of the front-end intelligence that finally might lead to a strike. The drone’s contribution to the intelligence is far from being entirely tactical, of course – the drone’s surveillance has far more utility than just the preparation of a strike and that surveillance is crucial for reducing collateral harm from the strike itself. But drones are not quite so useful if one has no prior idea who one is searching for or where he might be or even why him – and much of this intelligence is gathered at the front end of the process in reliance on human intelligence networks. Although in principle the functions of intelligence gathering at the front end might be separated out from the intelligence involved in the preparation of a strike and from the actual strike itself, with the CIA engaged in the intelligence side and the military serving as the trigger pullers, the experience in Yemen raises some cautions about how easy it is to create this division of labor.

#### Shifting authority to the DoD is the only way to enable Congressional oversight – that makes foreign policy objectives more clear

Zenko 13([Micah Zenko](http://www.cfr.org/experts/national-security-conflict-prevention/micah-zenko/b15139), Douglas Dillon Fellow, “Transferring CIA Drone Strikes to the Pentagon,” April 2013, <http://www.cfr.org/drones/transferring-cia-drone-strikes-pentagon/p30434>)

ONE MISSION, TWO PROGRAMS

U.S. targeted killings are needlessly made complex and opaque by their division between two separate entities: JSOC and the CIA. Although drone strikes carried out by the two organizations presumably target the same people, the organizations have different authorities, policies, accountability mechanisms, and oversight. Splitting the drone program between the JSOC and CIA is apparently intended to allow the plausible deniability of CIA strikes. Strikes by the CIA are classified as Title 50 covert actions, defined as “activities of the United States Government . . . where it is intended that the role . . . will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but does not include traditional . . . military activities.” As covert operations, the government cannot legally provide any information about how the CIA conducts targeted killings, while JSOC operations are guided by Title 10 “armed forces” operations and a publicly available military doctrine. Joint Publication 3-60, Joint Targeting, details steps in the joint targeting cycle, including the processes, responsibilities, and collateral damage estimations intended to reduce the likelihood of civilian casualties. Unlike strikes carried out by the CIA, JSOC operations can be (and are) acknowledged by the U.S. government. The different reporting requirements of JSOC and the CIA mean that congressional oversight of U.S. targeted killings is similarly murky. Sometimes oversight is duplicated among the committees; at other times, there is confusion over who is mandated to oversee which operations. CIA drone strikes are reported to the intelligence committees. Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), has confirmed that the SSCI receives poststrike notifications, reviews video footage, and holds monthly meetings to “question every aspect of the program.” Representative Mike Rogers (R-MI), chair of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), has said that he reviews both CIA and JSOC counterterrorism airstrikes. JSOC does not report to the HPSCI. As of March 2012, all JSOC counterterrorism operations are reported quarterly to the armed services committees. Meanwhile, the foreign relations committees—tasked with overseeing all U.S. foreign policy and counterterrorism strategies—have formally requested briefings on drone strikes that have been repeatedly denied by the White House. However, oversight should not be limited to ensuring compliance with the law and preventing abuses, but rather expanded to ensure that policies are consistent with strategic objectives and aligned with other ongoing military and diplomatic activities. This can only be accomplished by DOD operations because the foreign relations committees cannot hold hearings on covert CIA drone strikes. CONSOLIDATING EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY In 2004, the 9/11 Commission recommended that the “lead responsibility for directing and executing paramilitary operations, whether clandestine or covert, should shift to the Defense Department” to avoid the “creation of redundant, overlapping capabilities and authorities in such sensitive work.” The recommendation was never seriously considered because the CIA wanted to retain its covert action authorities and, more important, it was generally believed such operations would remain a rarity. (At the time, there had been only one nonbattlefield targeted killing.) Nearly a decade later, there is increasing bipartisan consensus that consolidating lead executive authority for drone strikes would pave the way for broader strategic reforms, including declassifying the relevant legal memoranda, explicitly stating which international legal principles apply, and providing information to the public on existing procedures that prevent harm to civilians. During his February 2013 nomination hearing, CIA director John O. Brennan welcomed the transfer of targeted killings to the DOD: “The CIA should not be doing traditional military activities and operations.” The main objection to consolidating lead executive authority in DOD is that it would eliminate the possibility of deniability for U.S. covert operations. However, any diplomatic or public relations advantages from deniability that once existed are minimal or even nonexistent given the widely reported targeted killings in Pakistan and Yemen. For instance, because CIA drone strikes cannot be acknowledged, the United States has effectively ceded its strategic communications efforts to the Pakistani army and intelligence service, nongovernmental organizations, and the Taliban. Moreover, Pakistani and Yemeni militaries have often taken advantage of this communications vacuum by shifting the blame of civilian casualties caused by their own airstrikes (or others, like those reportedly conducted by Saudi Arabia in Yemen) to the U.S. government. This perpetuates and exacerbates animosity in civilian populations toward the United States. If the United States acknowledged its drone strikes and collateral damage—only possible under DOD Title 10 authorities—then it would not be held responsible for airstrikes conducted by other countries.

### 1AC Plan Text

**The Congress of the United States federal government should statutorily restrict funding for targeted killing strikes carried out under Tittle 50.**

### 1AC Norms

#### Countries are modeling CIA drone policy

Betty McCollum, 2013- Congressional Record. June 14, 2013. Betty Louise McCollum is the U.S. Representative for Minnesota's 4th congressional district, serving since 2001. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2013-06-14/pdf/CREC-2013-06-14-pt1-PgE861-2.pdf#page=1

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Mr. Speaker, yesterday in the House Appropriations Committee I offered an amendment to the fiscal year 2014 defense appropriations bill regarding lethal drone strikes. The amendment stated: None of the funds made available by this Act may be used for weapons strikes or lethal action using unmanned aerial vehicles unless conducted by a member of the Armed Forces under the authority provided pursuant to Title 10, United States Code. The amendment was defeated in committee on a voice vote and my request for a recorded vote was denied by the committee. It is my intention to offer this same amendment on the floor of the House in the coming weeks when the defense appropriations bill is debated by the full House. My statement (as prepared for delivery in committee) is as follows: Full Appropriations Committee Statement on the McCollum Amendment: Mr. Chairman, within the classified portion of this bill hundreds of millions of dollars, perhaps billions, are appropriated for a targeted killing program operated by the Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA operates a fleet of weaponized drones armed with laser guided Hellfire missiles. They conduct lethal air strikes against targets in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. The program’s targets are identified terrorists or they are unidentified individuals targeted and killed based on a pattern of behavior. My amendment places sole responsibility for conducting lethal military action using weaponized drones in the hands of the Department of Defense conducted by members of the Armed Forces under the authority of Title 10 of the U.S. Code. The CIA’s use of drones to conduct surveillance and intelligence gathering in support of Defense Department lethal action continues under my amendment. Some of our colleagues do not believe that the Pentagon is not up to the task of carrying out this responsibility. I disagree with that. The Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) is conducting drone strikes now. The Air Force and the Army possess and operate weaponized drones. They operate within a clear chain of command and legal accountability. Lethal military operations using sophisticated weapons systems should be in the hands of the Secretary of Defense and military commanders who are accountable to Congress. CIA strikes have been effective. Terrorists have been killed. But they are not secret. The whole world knows these are CIA strikes operating on behalf of the American people, without transparency, accountability or oversight. In fact, CIA Director John Brennan may actually agree with this amendment. During his Senate confirmation hearing he stated, ‘‘The CIA should not be doing traditional military activities and operations.’’ There are costs associated with these targeted killings. Hundreds of innocent civilians have been killed. There are legal questions, human rights concerns, foreign policy implications and ultimately moral issues. You could dismiss all of these concerns because the program is killing terrorists. But in the near future, as armed drone technology proliferates, if we dismiss these concerns I can guarantee you that China, Iran, Russia and other nations will also dismiss these concerns when they are capable of conducting targeted killings. Why, because we are setting the example. If we want other countries to use these technologies responsibly, then we must use them responsibly. What’s at stake is our country’s moral authority. The Obama Administration is not leading on this issue of ensuring transparency, accountability and oversight. The president claims these CIA strikes are within ‘‘clear guidelines, oversight and accountability’’ that his administration determined all by itself—without input or even the consideration of Congress. And Congress has done less. In fact Congress has done nothing except write a black check that allows a paramilitary force of CIA officers and civilian contractors to kill suspected terrorists and anyone else unlucky enough to be in the vicinity—including women and children—using one of the most sophisticated weapons platforms in our military arsenal. For this Congress and this committee to passively allow the CIA to fire laser guided missiles at human targets in countries in which we are not at war without demanding oversight or accountability is a complete abdication of our sworn obligation to the Constitution and our citizens. This is not intelligence gathering, these are military operations that should be conducted by our Armed Forces and with direct oversight by Congress. Our country is at war with AI-Qaeda and its terrorist affiliates. I trust the members of our Armed Forces to do their job, defeat the enemy, and protect our nation. The drone strike program is a military program and Congress should demand that it be conducted within the same legal framework as any other military operation during a time of war. McCollum statement at the close of debate on the amendment: It is no surprise the White House opposes this amendment. The executive branch wants to maintain its CIA drone program and its target list without congressional oversight, without transparency or accountability. It is absolutely appropriate and responsible for this committee to make the Department of Defense solely responsible for military operations using armed drone program. Doing so does not diminish our military capacity, it in fact it strengthens the program with regard to international law and accountability to Congress and the American people. Right now the CIA is running an assassination program and the world is watching. Soon China, Russia and Iran will have the same capability and will use the CIA’s standard of killing anyone profiled as an enemy. It is time Congress demands transparency, accountability, and oversight to a program that has killed thousands of people—including innocent civilians.

#### Drone strike accountability crucial to US credibility on drones and sets a model for checks and balances.

Peter J **Fusco 12**, McGill University, http://archive.atlantic-community.org/index/articles/view/America's\_Drone\_Strikes\_Setting\_Dangerous\_Precedent\_

The **Obama** administration **is setting a very dangerous global precedence for sending drones** over borders to kill enemies (sometimes innocents). **These drone strikes lack the congressional oversight of the executive branch while Congress does little to oppose it**. At the same time, **employing drones qualifies as a "moral hazard." Drone warfare**, like all developments of new military technologies, **require close examination of their ethical, legal, and political implications.** **The world's first encounter with the use of drones in warfare by** the **Obama** Administration **has set a dangerous precedent for two reasons**. **First, because of the questionable ethics of drone warfare itself and second, because the administration has sidestepped federal checks and balances**. In the coming decades, **this tech**nology **will inevitably diffuse into other nation's military arsenals**, **American policy in the use of drones must change and the model set by** the **Obama** administration **must not be followed**. A recent New York Times blog post co-written by John Kaagand & Sarah Kreps, argues that **drone warfare checks all the boxes to qualify as a "moral hazard."** A moral hazard is an ethical situation in which costs incurred by risks are barely felt, if at all, by those taking the risk. **Drones**, accordingly, minimize or **eliminate government's incentive to prudently exercise lethal force**. **Greater and greater risks are taken,** as the risk taker is able to avoid or minimize taking-on costs. The **Obama** administration**'s** **use of drones is a moral hazard because it allows an unchecked branch of government to wage a counter-terrorism war** **without** the risk of American casualties and limited economic **costs.** **Moral hazards are at the root of many foreign and military policy decisions but they must be subject to checks and balances to prevent gross abuses of executive power**. The Obama Administration fails to acknowledge this and offers a bunk ethical justification instead: drones have the capacity to kill much more efficiently and with less collateral damage. This is not truly a justification because it fails to make a fact-value distinction. Just because we can easily and cheaply carry out targeted killings by the use of drones does not mean we ought to. But, neither the moral hazard created by the use of drones nor the lack official justifications categorically damns drones as unethical. With it's ethical status in limbo, it illustrates the caution with which this new type of weapon must be treated and the need for new policy controlling its usage**. The discourse surrounding the use of drones shows that** our administration and **our society have not engaged with the ethical subject matter sufficiently to warrant the prolif**eration **of drone warfare**. Furthermore, the Obama administration has not used caution nor even followed existing policy. In June 2011, **the Administration released a statement to Congress offering legal justification for sidestepping the** 1973 War Powers Resolution. **This resolution states that in order to maintain the spirit of Constitutional checks and balances, military operations initiated by the executive branch must be disclosed and justified to the Congress** within 48 hours. Operations lasting beyond 60 days require congressional approval. **The administration's statement, outlining the use of drones in Libya, stated that because the drones does not "involve the presence of U.S. ground troops, U.S. casualties or a serious threat thereof" their use does not fall under the War Powers Resolution's jurisdiction.** Thus, **the executive branch has complete control over these classified operations without Congressional oversight.** **As political scientist** Peter W. **Singer** in a recent New York Times Magazine article rightly **points out, this is entirely undemocratic.** **Congress has been circumvented and with the public burden of warfare removed there is almost no public stake in drone military action**. **The dangerous precedent set by** the **Obama** administration **is to ignore the ethical hazards of drone warfare, which demand governmental and public checks, balances, and scrutiny.** In the near future, **drone tech**nology **will cheapen and diffuse into the arsenals of other nations.** The ability to kill more precisely and more cheaply will become widespread**. Other nations must ignore the way in which the Obama Administration first used drones in order to prevent concentrations of power, uphold democratic procedures, preserve the whole idea of taking costly measures to avoid war and protect international diplomacy**.

**Absent a model drone proliferation continues** – it will escalate existing conflicts and erode global deterrence without strong norms. This risks multiple scenarios for international conflict.

Boyle 13. Michael J. Boyle. January 15th, 2013. (Michael Boyle is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at La Salle University in Philadelphia. He was previously a Lecturer in International Relations and Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) at the University of St. Andrews. He is also an alumnus of the Political Science Department at La Salle. ) <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-2346.12002/abstract>

An important, but overlooked, strategic consequence of the [Obama’s] administration’s embrace of drones is that it has generated a new and dangerous arms race for this technology. At present, the use of lethal drones is seen as acceptable to US policy-makers because no other state possesses the ability to make highly sophisticated drones with the range, surveillance capability and lethality of those currently manufactured by the United States. Yet the rest of the world is not far behind. At least 76 countries have acquired UAV technology, including Russia, China, Pakistan and India.120 China is reported to have at least 25 separate drone systems currently in development.121 At present, there are 680 drone programmes in the world, an increase of over 400 since 2005.122 Many states and non-state actors hostile to the United States have begun to dabble in drone technology. Iran has created its own drone, dubbed the ‘Ambassador of Death’, which has a range of up to 600 miles.123 Iran has also allegedly supplied the Assad regime in Syria with drone technology.124 Hezbollah launched an Iranian-made drone into Israeli territory, where it was shot down by the Israeli air force in October 2012.125 A global arms race for drone technology is already under way. According to one estimate, global spending on drones is likely to be more than US$94 billion by 2021.126 One factor that is facilitating the spread of drones (particularly non-lethal drones) is their cost relative to other military purchases. The top-of-the line Predator or Reaper model costs approximately US$10.5 million each, compared to the US$150 million price tag of a single F-22 fighter jet.127 At that price, drone technology is already within the reach of most developed militaries, many of which will seek to buy drones from the US or another supplier. With demand growing, a number of states, including China and Israel, have begun the aggressive selling of drones, including attack drones, and Russia may also be moving into this market.128 Because of concerns that export restrictions are harming US competitiveness in the drones market, the Pentagon has granted approval for drone exports to 66 governments and is currently being lobbied to authorize sales to even more.129 The Obama administration has already authorized the sale of drones to the UK and Italy, but Pakistan, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have been refused drone technology by congressional restrictions.130 It is only a matter of time before another supplier steps in to offer the drone technology to countries prohibited by export controls from buying US drones. According to a study by the Teal Group, the US will account for 62 per cent of research and development spending and 55 per cent of procurement spending on drones by 2022.131 As the market expands, with new buyers and sellers, America’s ability to control the sale of drone technology will be diminished. It is likely that the US will retain a substantial qualitative advantage in drone technology for some time, but even that will fade as more suppliers offer drones that can match US capabilities. The emergence of this arms race for drones raises at least five long-term strategic consequences, not all of which are favourable to the United States over the long term. First, it is now obvious that other states will use drones in ways that are inconsistent with US interests. One reason why the US has been so keen to use drone technology in Pakistan and Yemen is that at present it retains a substantial advantage in high-quality attack drones. Many of the other states now capable of employing drones of near-equivalent technology—for example, the UK and Israel—are considered allies. But this situation is quickly changing as other leading geopolitical players, such as Russia and China, are beginning rapidly to develop and deploy drones for their own purposes. While its own technology still lags behind that of the US, Russia has spent huge sums on purchasing drones and has recently sought to buy the Israeli-made Eitan drone capable of surveillance and firing air-to-surface missiles.132 China has begun to develop UAVs for reconnaissance and combat and has several new drones capable of long-range surveillance and attack under development.133 China is also planning to use unmanned surveillance drones to allow it to monitor the disputed East China Sea Islands, which are currently under dispute with Japan and Taiwan.134 Both Russia and China will pursue this technology and develop their own drone suppliers which will sell to the highest bidder, presumably with fewer export controls than those imposed by the US Congress. Once both governments have equivalent or near-equivalent levels of drone technology to the United States, they will be similarly tempted to use it for surveillance or attack in the way the US has done. Thus, through its own over-reliance on drones in places such as Pakistan and Yemen, the US may be hastening the arrival of a world where its qualitative advantages in drone technology are eclipsed and where this technology will be used and sold by rival Great Powers whose interests do not mirror its own. A second consequence of the spread of drones is that many of the traditional concepts which have underwritten stability in the international system will be radically reshaped by drone technology. For example, much of the stability among the Great Powers in the international system is driven by deterrence, specifically nuclear deterrence.135 Deterrence operates with informal rules of the game and tacit bargains that govern what states, particularly those holding nuclear weapons, may and may not do to one another.136 While it is widely understood that nuclear-capable states will conduct aerial surveillance and spy on one another, overt military confrontations between nuclear powers are rare because they are assumed to be costly and prone to escalation. One open question is whether these states will exercise the same level of restraint with drone surveillance, which is unmanned, low cost, and possibly deniable. States may be more willing to engage in drone overflights which test the resolve of their rivals, or engage in ‘salami tactics’ to see what kind of drone-led incursion, if any, will motivate a response.137 This may have been Hezbollah’s logic in sending a drone into Israeli airspace in October 2012, possibly to relay information on Israel’s nuclear capabilities.138 After the incursion, both Hezbollah and Iran boasted that the drone incident demonstrated their military capabilities.139 One could imagine two rival states—for example, India and Pakistan—deploying drones to test each other’s capability and resolve, with untold consequences if such a probe were misinterpreted by the other as an attack. As drones get physically smaller and more precise, and as they develop a greater flying range, the temptation to use them to spy on a rival’s nuclear programme or military installations might prove too strong to resist. If this were to happen, drones might gradually erode the deterrent relationships that exist between nuclear powers, thus magnifying the risks of a spiral of conflict between them. Another dimension of this problem has to do with the risk of accident. Drones are prone to accidents and crashes. By July 2010, the US Air Force had identified approximately 79 drone accidents.140 Recently released documents have revealed that there have been a number of drone accidents and crashes in the Seychelles and Djibouti, some of which happened in close proximity to civilian airports.141 The rapid proliferation of drones worldwide will involve a risk of accident to civilian aircraft, possibly producing an international incident if such an accident were to involve an aircraft affiliated to a state hostile to the owner of the drone. Most of the drone accidents may be innocuous, but some will carry strategic risks. In December 2011, a CIA drone designed for nuclear surveillance crashed in Iran, revealing the existence of the spying programme and leaving sensitive technology in the hands of the Iranian government.142 The expansion of drone technology raises the possibility that some of these surveillance drones will be interpreted as attack drones, or that an accident or crash will spiral out of control and lead to an armed confrontation.143 An accident would be even more dangerous if the US were to pursue its plans for nuclear-powered drones, which can spread radioactive material like a dirty bomb if they crash.144 Third, lethal drones create the possibility that the norms on the use of force will erode, creating a much more dangerous world and pushing the international system back towards the rule of the jungle. To some extent, this world is already being ushered in by the United States, which has set a dangerous precedent that a state may simply kill foreign citizens considered a threat without a declaration of war. Even John Brennan has recognized that the US is ‘establishing a precedent that other nations may follow’.145 Given this precedent, there is nothing to stop other states from following the American lead and using drone strikes to eliminate potential threats. Those ‘threats’ need not be terrorists, but could be others— dissidents, spies, even journalists—whose behaviour threatens a government. One danger is that drone use might undermine the normative prohibition on the assassination of leaders and government officials that most (but not all) states currently respect. A greater danger, however, is that the US will have normalized murder as a tool of statecraft and created a world where states can increasingly take vengeance on individuals outside their borders without the niceties of extradition, due process or trial.146 As some of its critics have noted, the Obama administration may have created a world where states will find it easier to kill terrorists rather than capture them and deal with all of the legal and evidentiary difficulties associated with giving them a fair trial.147 Fourth, there is a distinct danger that the world will divide into two camps: developed states in possession of drone technology, and weak states and rebel movements that lack them. States with recurring separatist or insurgent problems may begin to police their restive territories through drone strikes, essentially containing the problem in a fixed geographical region and engaging in a largely punitive policy against them. One could easily imagine that China, for example, might resort to drone strikes in Uighur provinces in order to keep potential threats from emerging, or that Russia could use drones to strike at separatist movements in Chechnya or elsewhere. Such behaviour would not necessarily be confined to authoritarian governments; it is equally possible that Israel might use drones to police Gaza and the West Bank, thus reducing the vulnerability of Israeli soldiers to Palestinian attacks on the ground. The extent to which Israel might be willing to use drones in combat and surveillance was revealed in its November 2012 attack on Gaza. Israel allegedly used a drone to assassinate the Hamas leader Ahmed Jabari and employed a number of armed drones for strikes in a way that was described as ‘unprecedented’ by senior Israeli officials.148 It is not hard to imagine Israel concluding that drones over Gaza were the best way to deal with the problem of Hamas, even if their use left the Palestinian population subject to constant, unnerving surveillance. All of the consequences of such a sharp division between the haves and have-nots with drone technology is hard to assess, but one possibility is that governments with secessionist movements might be less willing to negotiate and grant concessions if drones allowed them to police their internal enemies with ruthless efficiency and ‘manage’ the problem at low cost. The result might be a situation where such conflicts are contained but not resolved, while citizens in developed states grow increasingly indifferent to the suffering of those making secessionist or even national liberation claims, including just ones, upon them. Finally, drones have the capacity to strengthen the surveillance capacity of both democracies and authoritarian regimes, with significant consequences for civil liberties. In the UK, BAE Systems is adapting military-designed drones for a range of civilian policing tasks including ‘monitoring antisocial motorists, protesters, agricultural thieves and fly-tippers’.149 Such drones are also envisioned as monitoring Britain’s shores for illegal immigration and drug smuggling. In the United States, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued 61 permits for domestic drone use between November 2006 and June 2011, mainly to local and state police, but also to federal agencies and even universities.150 According to one FAA estimate, the US will have 30,000 drones patrolling the skies by 2022.151 Similarly, the European Commission will spend US$260 million on Eurosur, a new programme that will use drones to patrol the Mediterranean coast.152 The risk that drones will turn democracies into ‘surveillance states’ is well known, but the risks for authoritarian regimes may be even more severe. Authoritarian states, particularly those that face serious internal opposition, may tap into drone technology now available to monitor and ruthlessly punish their opponents. In semi-authoritarian Russia, for example, drones have already been employed to monitor pro-democracy protesters.153 One could only imagine what a truly murderous authoritarian regime—such as Bashar al-Assad’s Syria—would do with its own fleet of drones. The expansion of drone technology may make the strong even stronger, thus tilting the balance of power in authoritarian regimes even more decisively towards those who wield the coercive instruments of power and against those who dare to challenge them.

**These conflicts go nuclear.**

Jürgen **Altmann 10,** Researcher and lecturer at the University of Dortmund, is one of the founding members of the International Committee for Robot Arms Control, http://www.irf.ac.at/index.php?option=com\_content&task=view&id=314&Itemid=1

**Where do you see the main challenges for the international community regarding the use of armed un~~man~~ned systems by the military**. What are the specific challenges of autonomous systems as compared to current telerobotic systems? **The main challenge is in deciding whether the present trend should continue and expand to many more countries and to many more types of armed uninhabited vehicles** (in the air, on and under water, on the ground, also in outer space**), or whether efforts should be taken to constrain this arms race and limit the dangers connected to it**. Here not only governments, but non-governmental organisations and the general public should become active. **Autonomous systems obviously would open many new possibilities for war by accident** (possibly **escalating up to nuclear war) and for violations of the international laws of warfare**. A human decision in each single weapon use should be the minimum requirement.

#### Congress is essential -

#### a). Only congress can solve public trust

**Goldsmith 13** – (5/1, Jack, Henry L. Shattuck Professor at Harvard Law School, former Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel from 2003–2004, and Special Counsel to the Department of Defense from 2002–2003, member of the Hoover Institution Task Force on National Security and Law, “How Obama Undermined the War on Terror,” http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112964/obamas-secrecy-destroying-american-support-counterterrorism)

Feeling the heat from these developments, President Obama promised in his recent State of the Union address "to engage with Congress to ensure not only that our targeting, detention, and prosecution of terrorists remains consistent with our laws and system of checks and balances, but that our efforts are even more transparent to the American people and to the world." So far, this promise, like similar previous ones, remains unfulfilled.

The administration has floated the idea of "[shifting] the CIA's lethal targeting program to the Defense Department," as The Daily Beast reported last month. Among other potential virtues, this move might allow greater public transparency about the way of the knife to the extent that it would eliminate the covert action bar to public discussion. But JSOC's non-covert targeted killing program is no less secretive than the CIA's, and its congressional oversight is, if anything, less robust.

A bigger problem with this proposed fix is that it contemplates executive branch reorganization followed, in a best-case scenario, by more executive branch speeches and testimony about what it is doing in its stealth war. **The proposal fails to grapple altogether with the growing mistrust of the administration's oblique representations about secret war.** **The president** **cannot establish trust in the way of the knife through internal moves and more words.** Rather, he must take advantage of the separation of powers. Military detention, military commissions, and warrantless surveillance became more legitimate and less controversial during the Bush era because adversarial branches of government assessed the president's policies before altering and then approving them. President Obama should ask Congress to do the same with the way of the knife, even if it means that secret war abroad is harder to conduct.

Administration officials resist this route because they worry about the outcome of the public debate, and because the president is, as The Washington Post recently reported, "seen as reluctant to have the legislative expansion of another [war] added to his legacy." But the administration can influence the outcome of the debate only by engaging it. And as Mazzetti makes plain, the president's legacy already includes the dramatic and unprecedented unilateral expansion of secret war. What the president should be worried about for legacy purposes is that this form of warfare, for which he alone is today responsible, is increasingly viewed as illegitimate.

#### B). Executive transparency fails – that destroys the sustainability of the drone program in the future

**Goldsmith 13** – (5/1, Jack, Henry L. Shattuck Professor at Harvard Law School, former Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel from 2003–2004, and Special Counsel to the Department of Defense from 2002–2003, member of the Hoover Institution Task Force on National Security and Law, “How Obama Undermined the War on Terror,” http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112964/obamas-secrecy-destroying-american-support-counterterrorism)

For official secrecy abroad to work, the secrets must be kept at home as well. In speeches, interviews, and leaks, Obama's team has tried to explain why its operations abroad are lawful and prudent. **But to comply with rules of classified information and covert action, the explanations are conveyed in limited, abstract, and often awkward terms**. They usually raise more questions than they answer—and secrecy rules often preclude the administration from responding to follow-up questions, criticisms, and charges.

As a result, much of what the administration says about its secret war—about civilian casualties, or the validity of its legal analysis, or the quality of its internal deliberations—seems incomplete, self-serving, and ultimately non-credible. These **trust-destroying tendencies** are exacerbated by its persistent resistance to transparency **demands from Congress**, from the press, and from organizations such as the aclu that have sought to know more about the way of the knife through Freedom of Information Act requests.

A related sin is the Obama administration's surprising failure to secure **formal congressional support.** Nearly every element of Obama's secret war rests on laws—especially the congressional authorization of force (2001) and the covert action statute (1991)—designed for different tasks. The administration could have **worked with Congress to update these laws**, thereby forcing members of Congress to accept responsibility and take a stand, and putting the secret war on a **firmer political and legal foundation.** But doing so would have required extended political efforts, public argument, and the possibility that Congress might not give the president precisely what he wants.

The administration that embraced the way of the knife in order to lower the political costs of counterterrorism abroad found it easier to avoid political costs at home as well. But this choice deprived it of the many benefits of public argumentation and congressional support. What Donald Rumsfeld said self-critically of Bush-era unilateralism applies to Obama's unilateralism as well: it fails to "take fully into account the broader picture—the complete set of strategic considerations of a president fighting a protracted, unprecedented and unfamiliar war for which he would need **sustained domestic and international support."**

#### C). Congress is crucial to legal clarity because it provides statutory codification

Mark David Maxwell, Colonel, Judge Advocate with the U.S. Army, Winter 2012, TARGETED KILLING, THE LAW, AND TERRORISTS, Joint Force Quarterly, http://www.ndu.edu/press/targeted-killing.html

The weakness of this theory is that **it is not codified in U.S. law**; it is merely the extrapolation of international theorists and organizations. The **only entity under the Constitution** that can frame and settle Presidential power regarding the enforcement of international norms is **Congress**. As the check on executive power, Congress must amend the AUMF to **give the executive a statutory roadmap that articulates when force is appropriate** and under what circumstances the President can use targeted killing. This would be the needed endorsement from Congress, the other political branch of government, to clarify the U.S. position on its use of force regarding targeted killing. For example, it would spell out the limits of American lethality once an individual takes the status of being a member of an organized group. Additionally, **statutory clarification** will **give other states a roadmap** for the contours of what constitutes anticipatory self-defense and the **proper conduct of the military** under the law of war.¶ Congress should also require that the President brief it on the decision matrix of articulated guidelines before a targeted killing mission is ordered. As Kenneth Anderson notes, “[t]he point about briefings to Congress is partly to allow it to exercise its democratic role as the people’s representative.”74¶ The desire to feel safe is understandable. The consumers who buy SUVs are not buying them to be less safe. Likewise, the champions of targeted killings want the feeling of safety achieved by the elimination of those who would do the United States harm. But allowing the President to order **targeted killing without congressional limits** means the President can manipulate force in the name of national security without **tethering it to** the law advanced by international **norms**. The potential consequence of such **unilateral executive action** is that it gives other states, such as **North Korea** and **Iran**, the **customary precedent to do the same**. Targeted killing **might be required in certain circumstances**, but if the guidelines are debated and understood, the decision can be executed **with** the full faith of the people’s representative, **Congress**. When the decision is made **without Congress**, the result might make the United States feel safer, but the process **eschews** what gives a state its greatest safety: the **rule of law**.

# 2ac

### Terror K

#### Believing that a nuclear WMD terrorist attack is possible is necessary to prevent it from happening

**Allison, 10**– professor of government and director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard (1/25/10, Graham, “A Failure to Imagine the Worst: The first step toward preventing a nuclear 9/11 is believing it could happen,”

<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/25/a_failure_to_imagine_the_worst?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full>, JMP)

In his first speech to the U.N. Security Council, U.S. President Barack Obama challenged members to think about the impact of a single nuclear bomb.He said: "Just one nuclear weapon exploded in a city -- be it New York or Moscow, Tokyo or Beijing, London or Paris -- could kill hundreds of thousands of people." The consequences, he noted, would "destabilize our security, our economies, and our very way of life." Before the Sept. 11, 2001, assault on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, who could have imagined that terrorists would mount an attack on the American homeland that would kill more citizens than Japan did at Pearl Harbor? As then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice testified to the 9/11 Commission: "No one could have imagined them taking a plane, slamming it into the Pentagon ... into the World Trade Center, using planes as missiles." For most Americans, the idea of international terrorists conducting a successful attack on their homeland, killing thousands of citizens, was not just unlikely. It was inconceivable. As is now evident, assertions about what is "imaginable" or "conceivable," however, are propositions about our minds, not about what is objectively possible. Prior to 9/11, how unlikely was a megaterrorist attack on the American homeland? In the previous decade, al Qaeda attacks on the World Trade Center in 1993, U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, and the USS Cole in 2000 had together killed almost 250 and injured nearly 6,000. Moreover, the organization was actively training thousands of recruits in camps in Afghanistan for future terrorist operations. Thinking about risks we face today, we should reflect on the major conclusion of the bipartisan 9/11 Commission established to investigate that catastrophe. The U.S. national security establishment's principal failure prior to Sept. 11, 2001, was, the commission found, a "failure of imagination." Summarized in a single sentence, the question now is: Are we at risk of an equivalent failure to imagine a nuclear 9/11? After the recent attempted terrorist attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253, this question is more urgent than ever. The thought that terrorists could successfully explode a nuclear bomb in an American city killing hundreds of thousands of people seems incomprehensible. This essential incredulity is rooted in three deeply ingrained presumptions. First, no one could seriously intend to kill hundreds of thousands of people in a single attack. Second, only states are capable of mass destruction; nonstate actors would be unable to build or use nuclear weapons. Third, terrorists would not be able to deliver a nuclear bomb to an American city. In a nutshell, these presumptions lead to the conclusion: inconceivable. Why then does Obama call nuclear terrorism "the single most important national security threat that we face" and "a threat that rises above all others in urgency?" Why the unanimity among those who have shouldered responsibility for U.S. national security in recent years that this is a grave and present danger? In former CIA Director George Tenet's assessment, "the main threat is the nuclear one. I am convinced that this is where [Osama bin Laden] and his operatives desperately want to go." When asked recently what keeps him awake at night, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates answered: "It's the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear." Leaders who have reached this conclusion about the genuine urgency of the nuclear terrorist threat are not unaware of their skeptics' presumptions. Rather, they have examined the evidence, much of which has been painstakingly compiled here by Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, former head of the CIA's terrorism and weapons-of-mass-destruction efforts, and **much of which remains classified.** Specifically, who is seriously motivated to kill hundreds of thousands of Americans? Osama bin Laden, who has declared his intention to kill "4 million Americans -- including 2 million children." The deeply held belief that even if they wanted to, "men in caves can't do this" was then Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf's view when Tenet flew to Islamabad to see him after 9/11. As Tenet (assisted by Mowatt-Larssen) took him step by step through the evidence, he discovered that indeed they could. Terrorists' opportunities to bring a bomb into the United States follow the same trails along which 275 tons of drugs and 3 million people crossed U.S. borders illegally last year. In 2007, Congress established a successor to the 9/11 Commission to focus on terrorism using weapons of mass destruction. This bipartisan Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism issued its report to Congress and the Obama administration in December 2008. In the **commission's unanimous judgment:** "it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013." Faced with the possibility of an American Hiroshima, many Americans are paralyzed by a combination of denial and fatalism. Either it hasn't happened, so it's not going to happen; or, if it is going to happen, there's nothing we can do to stop it. Both propositions are wrong. **The countdown to a nuclear 9/11 can be stopped, but only by realistic recognition of the threat, a clear agenda for action, and relentless determination to pursue it.**

#### Threat construction in terms of terror is good – censorship precludes prevention

**Rychlak 10** (Ronald, Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of Mississippi School of Law; adviser to the Holy See's delegation to the United Nations., <http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/onfaith/panelists/ronald_rychlak/2010/07/the_language_of_counter-terrorism.html>)

**What we call terrorists may not matter very much, but a restriction on what we can call them is of enormous importance**. In order to get to the truth of any issue, people have to be free to talk about it without fear of repercussion. Unfortunately, one of the issues around which many problems revolve - religion - is also a topic that is particularly hard to discuss freely. In our day-to-day life, we may avoid the topic with only minimal inconvenience. **When it comes to global terrorism, restricting what we say about religion can lead to devastating results**. Next month I will start the new semester by teaching a course called "Terrorism and the Law." On the very first day, I will explain to the students that we will be talking about religion even though we are at a state law school. Islam, or at least the way some people interpret Islam, is an important issue when it comes to modern terrorism. I will, of course, explain that not all Muslims agree with the terrorist tactics - or even their long term aims - and not all terrorists are Muslim, but **we can't really study modern terrorism without developing an understanding of the motivations.** Unfortunately, religion is a significant motivation underlying much modern terrorism. Four or five years ago I traveled with a group to Israel. Instead of studying the holy sites, however, the focus of our trip was on counter-terrorism. Most members of my group were college educators who taught courses on terrorism. One of them had authored a major textbook. He told me that his publisher forbid him from any discussion of religion in the book. He said that was common. Publishers were afraid that books would not be used if they ventured into that area. He also said that most experts in the field lacked the knowledge to write about religion anyway. **By keeping religion out of these textbooks and the related courses we were knowingly providing an insufficient education to our next generation of counter-terror experts**. The author said that when the book came out in its next edition (which was going to be its third), he planned to demand inclusion of religious issues. He felt that by then the book would be well enough established that he would be able to make that demand. Still, the very idea that we had been intentionally excluding important issues when discussing this topic was shocking. Of course, a private entity might fear a violent reaction such as the riots that followed the publication of those Danish political cartoons. It is not, however, only private publishing interests that feel unable to talk about religion. The United States government also has a very hard time doing it. After all, as an inclusive society, we can't really argue that a Christian or Judeo-Christian outlook is better than even "hard-line" Islam, can we? The government's inability to talk about religion reached almost comical proportions in 2003, when the Department of State launched a "cultural magazine" for young men and women in Arab-speaking countries. A special coordinator for public diplomacy in the State Department explained: "This is a long-term way to build a relationship with people who will be the future leaders of the Arab world.... This is, in a very subtle way, a vehicle for American values." "Hi" magazine focused on things like entertainment, technology, and sports. Among the early articles that I remember was one about sand-surfing and another about protecting against over-exposure to the sun. There was, of course, no direct discussion of religion or religious values. The magazine floundered for a year or two, added an English version, went online, and finally died a quiet death. It was a phenomenal waste of time and money. I don't know how we are going to resolve issues that surround our very different world views, but I am quite certain that **restricting what we say - whether that means barring topics from textbooks or rejecting the use of terms like 'Islamic terrorist' and 'jihad' - is not a good start.** Let's first be honest in our language and our discussions. That will be hard, but it is the surest way to the truth. If we get to the truth, let's hope that we can also find peace.

#### Their terror K is wrong – our method is good and reflexive

Boyle 8 (Michael J., School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews, and John Horgan, International Center for the Study of Terrorism, Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State University, April 2008, “A Case Against Critical Terrorism Studies,” Critical Studies On Terrorism, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 51-64)

One of the tensions within CTS concerns the issue of ‘policy relevance’. At the most basic level, **there are some sweeping generalizations made by CTS scholars, often with little evidence**. For example, Jackson (2007c) describes ‘the core terrorism scholars’ (without explicitly saying who he is referring to) as ‘intimately connected – institutionally, financially, politically, and ideologically – with a state hegemonic project’ (p. 245). **Without giving any details of who these ‘core’ scholars are, where they are, what they do, and exactly who funds them, his arguments are tantamount to conjecture at best. We do not deny that governments fund terrorism research and terrorism researchers, and that this can influence the direction** (and even the findings) of the research. But **we are suspicious of over-generalizations of this count on two grounds: (1) accepting government funding or information does not necessarily obviate one’s independent scholarly judgment in a particular project; and (2) having policy relevance is not always a sin**. On the first point, we are in agreement with some CTS scholars. Gunning provides a sensitive analysis of this problem, and calls on CTS advocates to come to terms with how they can engage policy-makers without losing their critical distance. He recognizes that CTS can (and should) aim to be policy-relevant, but perhaps to a different audience, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society than just governments and security services. In other words, CTS aims to whisper into the ear of the prince, but it is just a different prince.

Gunning (2007a) also argues that **research should be assessed on its own merits, for ‘just because a piece of research comes from RAND does not invalidate it; conversely, a “critical” study is not inherently good’** (p. 240). We agree entirely with this. Not all sponsored or contract research is made to ‘toe a party line’, and **much of the work coming out of** official **government agencies** or affiliated government agencies **has little agenda and can be** analytically **useful. The task of the scholar is to retain one’s sense of critical judgment and integrity, and we believe that there is no prima facie reason to assume that this cannot be done in sponsored research projects**. What matters here are the details of the research – what is the purpose of the work, how will it be done, how might the work be used in policy – and for these questions the scholar must be self-critical and insistent on their intellectual autonomy. The scholar must also be mindful of the responsibility they bear for shaping a government’s response to the problem of terrorism. **Nothing – not the source of the funding, purpose of the research or prior empirical or theoretical commitment – obviates the need of the scholar to consider his or her own conscience carefully when engaging in work with any external actor. But simply engaging with governments on discrete projects does not make one an ‘embedded expert’ nor does it imply sanction to their actions**. But we also believe that the **study of political violence lends itself to policy relevance and** that **those who seek to produce research that might help policy-makers reduce the rates of terrorist attack are committing no sin**, provided that they retain their independent judgment and report their findings candidly and honestly. In the case of terrorism, we would go further to argue that being policy relevant is in some instances an entirely justifiable moral choice. For example, neither of us has any problem producing research with a morally defensible but policy relevant goal (for example, helping the British government to prevent suicide bombers from attacking the London Underground) and we do not believe that engaging in such work tarnishes one’s stature as an independent scholar. **Implicit in the CTS literature is a deep suspicion about the state** and those who engage with it. **Such a suspicion may blind some CTS scholars to good work** done by those associated with the state. But to assume that being ‘embedded’ in an institution linked to the ‘establishment’ consists of being captured by a state hegemonic project is too simple. We do not believe that scholars studying terrorism must all be policy-relevant, but equally we do not believe that being policy relevant should always be interpreted as writing a blank cheque for governments or as necessarily implicating the scholar in the behaviour of that government on issues unrelated to one’s work. Working for the US government, for instance, does not imply that the scholar sanctions or approves of the abuses at Abu Ghraib prison. **The assumption that those who do not practice CTS are all ‘embedded’ with the ‘establishment’ and that this somehow gives the green light for states to engage in illegal activity is in our view unwarranted, to say the very least.**

### 2NC Authors – CTS

#### Their criticism is based on a poorly researched caricature of terrorism studies, orthodox analysis includes a self-reflexive element that makes the permutation more likely to succeed than the alternative. Pure rejection of the Western social order won’t replace terrorism discourse and is likely to reinforce the totalitarian impulse of al Qaeda

Schmid 9 - Chair in International Relations; the Director of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at St. Andrews University(Alex, Perspectives on Terrorism, v.3, issue 4, Book Review of “Critical Terrorism Studies. A new research agenda. by Richard Jackson”, http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php?option=com\_rokzine&view=article&id=96

The editors accuse, in their introduction  “the orthodox field” of orthodox terrorism studies of functioning “ideologically in the service of existing power structures”, with their academic research. Furthermore, they claim that orthodox scholars are frequently being used “to legitimise coercive intervention in the global South….” (p.6). The present volume is edited by three authors associated with the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence (CSRV) in the Department of International Politics in Aberystwyth (Wales, UK). They also happen to be editors of a new Routledge journal “Critical Studies on Terrorism’ . The “critical” refers principally but not exclusively to the “Frankfurt-via-Welsh School Critical Theory Perspective”. The twelve contributors are not all equally “critical” in aHabermasian sense. The programmatic introduction of the editors is followed by two solid chapters from Magnus Ranstorp (former Director of CSTPV, St. Andrews, and currently Director of the Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies at the Swedish National Defence College) and Andrew Silke (formerly with the UK Home Office and now Field Leader for Criminology at the University of East London). They both rightfully criticize some of the past sins and present shortcomings of the field of Terrorism Studies. One of them approvingly quotes Marc Sageman who observed that “disagreements among experts are the driving force of the scientific enterprise”. Such disagreements, however, exist among “orthodox” scholars like Sageman and  Hoffman or Pape and Abrams. In that sense, the claim by some critical theorists that the field of traditional Terrorism Studies is ossified without them, is simply is not true. One of the problems with many of the adherents of the “critical” school is that the focus is almost exclusively on the strawman they set up to shoot - ”orthodox” terrorism discourse rather than on the practitioners of terrorism. Richard Jackson claims that “…most of what is accepted as well-founded ‘knowledge’ in terrorism studies is, in fact, highly debatable and unstable” (p.74), dismissing thereby almost four decades of scholarship as “based on a series of ‘virulent myths’, ‘half-truths’ and contested claims…biased towards Western state priorities” (p.80). For him “terrorism is…a social fact rather than a brute fact” and “…does not exist outside of the definitions and practices which seek to enclose it, including those of the terrorism studies field” (pp.75-76). He objects to prevailing “problem-solving theories of terrorism” in favour of an approach that questions “ the status quo and the dominant acts within it” (p.77). Another contributor, J.A. Sluka, argues, without offering any proof,  that “terrorism is fundamentally a product of social inequality and state politics” (p. 139). Behind many of the critical theorists who blame mainstream terrorism research for taking ‘the world as it finds it’ there is an agenda for changing the status quo and overthrowing existing power structures. There is, in itself, nothing wrong with wanting a new and better world order. However, it is not going to be achieved by using an alternative discourse on terrorism and counter-terrorism. Toros and Gunning, contributors of another chapter, state that “the sine qua non of Critical Theory is emancipation” (p. 99) and M. McDonald als puts “emancipation as central to the study of terrorism” (p.121). However, there is not a single word on the non-emancipated position of women under Islam in general or among the Taliban and their friends from al-Qaeda in particular. One of the strength (some argue weakness) of Western thinking is its ability for self-criticism – something largely absent in the Muslim world. In that sense, this volume falls within a Western tradition. However, self-criticism should not come at the cost of not criticising   adversaries by using the same yardstick. In this sense, this volume is strangely silent about the worldview of those terrorists who have no self-doubts and attack the Red Cross,  the United Nations, NGOs and their fellow Muslims with equal lack of scruples. A number of authors in the volume appear to equate terrorism uncritically with political violence in general while in fact it is more usefully thought of as one of some twenty sub-categories of  political violence - one characterized by deliberate attacks on civilians and non-combatants in order to intimidate, coerce or otherwise manipulate  various audiences and parties to a conflict. Part of the volume advocates reinventing the wheel. J. Gunning, for instance, recommends to employ Social Movement Theory for the study of terrorism. However, that theory has been employed already explicitly or implicitly by a number of more orthodox scholars, e.g. Donatella della Porta. Many “critical” statements in the volume are unsupported by convincing evidence, e.g. when C. Sylvester and S. Parashar state “The September 11 attacks and the ongoing war on terror reinforce gender hierarchy and power in international relations” (p.190). Jackson claims that the key question  for critical terrorism theory is “who is terrorism research for and how does terrorism knowledge support particular interests?” (p.224) It does not seem to occur to him that he could have studied this question by looking at the practitioners of terrorism and study al-Qaeda’s ideological writings and its training and  recruiting manuals. If CTS is a call for “making a commitment to emancipatory praxis central to the research enterprise” (R. Jackson et al, p. 228), CTS academics should be the first on the barricades against jihadists who treat women not as equals and who would, if they get their way, eradicate freedom of thought and religion for all mankind. It is sad that some leading proponents of Critical Terrorism Studies appear to be in fact uncritical and blind on one eye.

### 2ac: Top Line

#### 2. Obama will follow through- aligns himself with Congress

**Bellinger ’13** (John B. Bellinger III, Adjunct Senior Fellow for International and National Security Law, “Seeking Daylight on U.S. Drone Policy”, <http://www.cfr.org/drones/seeking-daylight-us-drone-policy/p30348>, March 29, 2013)

The president also has additional constitutional authority anytime to use force to protect the Unites States, either in self-defense or because he believes that it's in our national security interest. So if President Obama concludes that it's necessary to carry out a drone strike against a terror suspect, but that individual does not fall into the categories covered by the AUMF, he would have additional constitutional authority. But this administration has taken great pains to emphasize that it has been relying on congressional grant of authority rather than the president's own constitutional authority to conduct most of its counterterrorism operations. It has wanted to do that to contrast itself with the Bush administration, which had, at least early in its tenure, relied heavily on the president's constitutional authority. It's not clear though, at this point, given how old and somewhat limited the AUMF is, if the Obama administration has now been forced to rely on constitutional powers for certain drone strikes. It appears to many observers that the administration may be stretching the limits of the AUMF by targeting people who were not responsible for 9/11 or who were not affiliated or associated co-belligerents with those who carried out 9/11. In theory, could the president always claim constitutional authority with regard to these strikes? Although, as you pointed out, the administration is obviously loath to do that. This administration is already finding that 95 percent of its counterterrorism policies, and the legal basis therefore, are the same as the Bush administration's. Absolutely. I think the issue is, in this administration, political. This administration is already finding that 95 percent of its counterterrorism policies, and the legal basis therefore, are the same as the Bush administration's. It came into office with both domestic and international supporters expecting that it would change all of those policies. So one area where it really has been loath to act like the Bush administration is to rely heavily on the president's constitutional authority. We simply don't know whether they are doing it, but politically I'm sure that administration officials would be very reluctant to have to acknowledge that they are acting outside of the grant given to them by Congress.

### Invisible committee

#### The alternative fails

Sauthoff 10 (Patricia, an American journalist, artist and graduate student living in London, a town in which nearly all the bicycles are in disrepair. She can’t freelance for cash because her immigration papers won’t let her, but she will still find your grammatical errors for her own amusement, in the past she has worked as a newspaper editor in the world of alternative weeklies and taught courses on writing and religious studies to students at the now defunct College of Santa Fe, current studies at the University of London’s School of Oriental, “THE COMING INSURRECTION – The Invisible Committee”, <http://theendofbeing.com/2010/03/07/the-coming-insurrection-the-invisible-committee/>)

The insurrection is coming! The insurrection is coming! The insurrection is…probably not actually coming. In spite of the bitch fit thrown by conservative pundit Glenn Beck in July of 2009, The Coming Insurrection (pdf) is little more than an intellectual exercise that’s a fun read and offers an idealism as obvious as Beck’s own conservative utopia. Does The Coming Insurrection include, as Beck has been informed (watch the video above, please. It shows Beck at his opportunistic best.) a call to arms. Technically, yes. But it also offers the advice that arms should be borne so as to assure they aren’t used. And though Beck again is technically correct when he spits out with bigotry “France of all places” the French who wrote this book are not the intellectual powerhouses the right loves to hate. The truest piece of writing in The Coming Insurrection, comes in the book’s first paragraph, which states: From whatever angle you approach it, the present offers no way out. This is not the least of its virtues. From those who seek hope above all, it tears away every firm ground. Those who claim to have solutions are contradicted almost immediately. Everyone agrees that things can only get worse. It is this claim that begins what then becomes something of an offered solution. But what would truly terrify Beck, if he were to take the time to actually read the book (I assume he hasn’t because, despite his promise to do so and follow-up, he used his audience’s lack of attention or care to leave the book further undiscussed) is not the call to arms but the attempt to get people thinking about the world that surrounds them and to act. By delving into marketing, entertainment, family and the environment, the Invisible Committee hopes to prove to its readers that we are in a dire state. Rather than fix what exists — government, corporate culture, etc. — it instead tells people to mobilize. But this mobilization is where the argument falls apart — though it must be said that two of the four points listed above, marketing and entertainment, found themselves more coherently and thoroughly demonized in Naomi Klein’s No Logo. The Committee acknowledges that these communes must rely on money to survive. The Committee does not offer a solution outside of the paradigm in order to tear the paradigm down, but rather a fringe group that is dependent on said paradigm for its very survival. While The Coming Insurrection is an enjoyable theoretical puzzle it is simply that. Theoretical.The ideas put forth by the Invisible Committee are unrealistic and, frankly, the kind of idealism that comes from the bored, educated, politically left, upper class. A group so self-unaware that it spends its time calling for revolution while it travels the globe sipping wine and eating cheese that would cost a typical American worker half a day of pay.

#### Liberal democracy key to global peace - data

**Zakaria**, Political Science – Harvard, editor – Newsweek, **‘97**

(Fareed, <http://www.fareedzakaria.com/ARTICLES/other/democracy.html>)

Lang's embarrassment highlights two common, and often mistaken, assumptions -- that the forces of democracy are the forces of ethnic harmony and of peace. Neither is necessarily true. Mature liberal democracies can usually accommodate ethnic divisions without violence or terror and live in peace with other liberal democracies. But without a background in constitutional liberalism, the introduction of democracy in divided societies has actually fomented nationalism, ethnic conflict, and even war. The spate of elections held immediately after the collapse of communism were won in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia by nationalist separatists and resulted in the breakup of those countries. This was not in and of itself bad, since those countries had been bound together by force. But the rapid secessions, without guarantees, institutions, or political power for the many minorities living within the new countries, have caused spirals of rebellion, repression, and, in places like Bosnia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, war. Elections require that politicians compete for peoples' votes. In societies without strong traditions of multiethnic groups or assimilation, it is easiest to organize support along racial, ethnic, or religious lines. Once an ethnic group is in power, it tends to exclude other ethnic groups. Compromise seems impossible; one can bargain on material issues like housing, hospitals, and handouts, but how does one split the difference on a national religion? Political competition that is so divisive can rapidly degenerate into violence. Opposition movements, armed rebellions, and coups in Africa have often been directed against ethnically based regimes, many of which came to power through elections. Surveying the breakdown of African and Asian democracies in the 1960s, two scholars concluded that democracy "is simply not viable in an environment of intense ethnic preferences." Recent studies, particularly of Africa and Central Asia, have confirmed this pessimism. A distinguished expert on ethnic conflict, Donald Horowitz, concluded, "In the face of this rather dismal account . . . of the concrete failures of democracy in divided societies . . . one is tempted to throw up one's hands. What is the point of holding elections if all they do in the end is to substitute a Bemba-dominated regime for a Nyanja regime in Zambia, the two equally narrow, or a southern regime for a northern one in Benin, neither incorporating the other half of the state?" Over the past decade, one of the most spirited debates among scholars of international relations concerns the "democratic peace" -- the assertion that no two modern democracies have gone to war with each other. The debate raises interesting substantive questions (does the American Civil War count? do nuclear weapons better explain the peace?) and even the statistical findings have raised interesting dissents. (As the scholar David Spiro points out, given the small number of both democracies and wars over the last two hundred years, sheer chance might explain the absence of war between democracies. No member of his family has ever won the lottery, yet few offer explanations for this impressive correlation.) But even if the statistics are correct, what explains them? Kant, the original proponent of the democratic peace, contended that in democracies, those who pay for wars -- that is, the public -- make the decisions, so they are understandably cautious. But that claim suggests that democracies are more pacific than other states. Actually they are more warlike, going to war more often and with greater intensity than most states. It is only with other democracies that the peace holds. When divining the cause behind this correlation, one thing becomes clear: the democratic peace is actually the liberal peace. Writing in the eighteenth century, Kant believed that democracies were tyrannical, and he specifically excluded them from his conception of "republican" governments, which lived in a zone of peace. Republicanism, for Kant, meant a separation of powers, checks and balances, the rule of law, protection of individual rights, and some level of representation in government (though nothing close to universal suffrage). Kant's other explanations for the "perpetual peace" between republics are **all** **closely linked** to their constitutional and liberal character: a mutual respect for the rights of each other's citizens, a system of checks and balances assuring that no single leader can drag his country into war, and classical liberal economic policies -- most importantly, free trade -- which create an interdependence that makes war costly and cooperation useful. Michael Doyle, th leading scholar on the subject, confirms in his 1997 book Ways of War and Peace that without constitutional liberalism, democracy itself has no peace-inducing qualities: Kant distrusted unfettered, democratic majoritarianism, and his argument offers no support for a claim that all participatory polities -- democracies -- should be peaceful, either in general or between fellow democracies. Many participatory polities have been non-liberal. For **two thousand years** before the modern age, popular rule was widely associated with aggressiveness (by Thucydides) or imperial success (by Machiavelli) . . . The **decisive preference** of [the] median voter might well include "ethnic cleansing" against other democratic polities. The distinction between liberal and illiberal democracies sheds light on another striking statistical correlation. Political scientists Jack Snyder and Edward Mansfield contend, using an **impressive data set**, that over the **last 200 years** democratizing states went to war **significantly more often** than either stable autocracies or liberal democracies. In countries not grounded in constitutional liberalism, the rise of democracy often brings with it **hyper-nationalism** and **war-mongering**. When the political system is opened up, diverse groups with incompatible interests gain access to power and press their demands. Political and military leaders, who are often embattled remnants of the old authoritarian order, realize that to succeed that they must rally the masses behind a national cause. The result is **invariably aggressive** rhetoric and **policies**, which often drag countries into **confrontation and war**. Noteworthy examples range from Napoleon III's France, Wilhelmine Germany, and Taisho Japan to those in today's newspapers, like Armenia and Azerbaijan and Milosevic's Serbia. The democratic peace, it turns out, has little to do with democracy.

#### Legal interventions work and the alt is worse

Joseph Margulies and Hope Metcalf 11, Joe is a law prof at Northwestern, Hope is a lecturer at Yale Law, “Terrorizing Academia”, Journal of Legal Education, Volume 60, Number 3 (February 2011)

From the vantage of 2010, it appears the interventionist position—our position—has failed. As we see it, it failed because it was premised upon a legalistic view of rights that simply cannot be squared with the reality of the American political experience. Yet the interventionist stance holds an undeniable attraction. Of all the positions advanced since 9/11, it holds out the best promise of preserving the pluralist ideals of a liberal democracy. The challenge going forward, therefore, is to re-imagine the interventionist intellectual endeavor. To retain relevance, we must translate the lessons of the social sciences into the language of the law, which likely requires that we knock law from its lofty perch. As a beginning, scholarship should be more attuned to the limitations of the judiciary, and mindful of the complicated tendency of narratives to generate backlash and counter-narratives.

But there is another tendency we must resist, and that is the impulse to nihilism—to throw up our hands in despair, with the lament that nothing works and repression is inevitable. Just how to integrate the political and the ideal is, of course, a problem that is at least as old as legal realism itself and one we do not purport to solve in this essay.154 Still, we are heartened by the creative work undertaken in other arenas, ranging from poverty law to gay rights, that explores how, done properly, lawyering (and even litigation) can make real differences in the lives of marginalized people.155 We hope that the next decade of reflections on the policies undertaken in the name of national security will follow their lead in probing not just what the law should be, but how it functions and whom it serves.

### Fear good

#### Especially true in the context of nuclear weapons---key to change

Krieger 12 David, President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, "Fear of Nuclear Weapons", June 19, www.wagingpeace.org/articles/db\_article.php?article\_id=371

I was recently asked during an interview whether people fear nuclear weapons too much, causing them unnecessary anxiety. The implication was that it is not necessary to live in fear of nuclear weapons.¶ My response was that fear is a healthy mechanism when one is confronted by something fearful. It gives rise to a fight or flight response, both of which are means of surviving real danger.¶ In the case of nuclear weapons, these are devices to be feared since they are capable of causing terrifying harm to all humanity, including one’s family, city and country. If one is fearful of nuclear weapons, there will be an impetus to do something about the dangers these weapons pose to humanity.¶ But, one might ask, what can be done? In reality, there is a limited amount that can be done by a single individual, but when individuals band together in groups, their power to bring about change increases. Individual power is magnified even more when groups join together in coalitions and networks to bring about change.¶ Large numbers of individuals banded together to bring about the fall of the Berlin Wall, the breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of apartheid in South Africa. The basic building block of all these important changes was the individual willing to stand up, speak out and join with others to achieve a better world. The forces of change have been set loose again by the Arab Spring and the Occupy Movement across the globe.¶ When dangers are viewed rationally, there may be good cause for fear, and fear may trigger a response to bring about change. On the other hand, complacency can never lead to change. Thus, while fear may be a motivator of change, complacency is an inhibitor of change. In a dangerous world, widespread complacency should be of great concern. ¶ If a person is complacent about the dangers of nuclear weapons, there is little possibility that he will engage in trying to alleviate the danger. Complacency is the result of a failure of hope to bring about change. It is a submission to despair.¶ After so many years of being confronted by nuclear dangers, there is a tendency to believe that nothing can be done to change the situation. This may be viewed as “concern fatigue.” We should remember, though, that any goal worth achieving is worth striving for with hope in our hearts. A good policy for facing real-world dangers is to never give up hope and never stop trying.

#### No risk of endless warfare

**Gray 7**—Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, graduate of the Universities of Manchester and Oxford, Founder and Senior Associate to the National Institute for Public Policy, formerly with the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hudson Institute (Colin, July, “The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration”, <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ssi10561/ssi10561.pdf>)

7. A policy that favors preventive warfare expresses a futile quest for absolute security. It could do so. Most controversial policies contain within them the possibility of misuse. In the hands of a paranoid or boundlessly ambitious political leader, prevention could be a policy for endless warfare. However, the American political system, with its checks and balances, was designed explicitly for the purpose of constraining the executive from excessive folly. Both the Vietnam and the contemporary Iraqi experiences reveal clearly that although the conduct of war is an executive prerogative, in practice that authority is disciplined by public attitudes. Clausewitz made this point superbly with his designation of the passion, the sentiments, of the people as a vital component of his trinitarian theory of war. 51 It is true to claim that power can be, and indeed is often, abused, both personally and nationally. It is possible that a state could acquire a taste for the apparent swift decisiveness of preventive warfare and overuse the option. One might argue that the easy success achieved against Taliban Afghanistan in 2001, provided fuel for the urge to seek a similarly rapid success against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. In other words, the delights of military success can be habit forming. On balance, claim seven is not persuasive, though it certainly contains a germ of truth. A country with unmatched wealth and power, unused to physical insecurity at home—notwithstanding 42 years of nuclear danger, and a high level of gun crime—is vulnerable to demands for policies that supposedly can restore security. But we ought not to endorse the argument that the United States should eschew the preventive war option because it could lead to a futile, endless search for absolute security. One might as well argue that the United States should adopt a defense policy and develop capabilities shaped strictly for homeland security approached in a narrowly geographical sense. Since a president might misuse a military instrument that had a global reach, why not deny the White House even the possibility of such misuse? In other words, constrain policy ends by limiting policy’s military means. This argument has circulated for many decades and, it must be admitted, it does have a certain elementary logic. It is the opinion of this enquiry, however, that the claim that a policy which includes the preventive option might lead to a search for total security is **not at all convincing**. Of course, folly in high places is always possible, which is one of the many reasons why popular democracy is the superior form of government. It would be absurd to permit the fear of a futile and dangerous quest for absolute security to preclude prevention as a policy option. Despite its absurdity, this rhetorical charge against prevention is a stock favorite among prevention’s critics. It should be recognized and dismissed for what it is, a debating point with little pragmatic merit. And strategy, though not always policy, **must be nothing if not pragmatic**.

### Edelman

#### 2. Scenario planning is critical in a world where annihilation is a possibility – addressing problems now greatly enhances our ability to avert global catastrophe.

**Kurasawa, 04**

(Professor of Sociology, York University of Toronto, Fuyuki, Constellations Volume 11, No 4, 2004).

Independently of this contractualist justification, global civil society actors are putting forth a number of arguments countering temporal myopia on rational grounds. They make the case that no generation, and no part of the world, is immune from catastrophe. Complacency and parochialism are deeply flawed in that even if we earn a temporary reprieve, our children and grandchildren will likely not be so fortunate unless steps are taken today. Similarly, though it might be possible to minimize or contain the risks and harms of actions to faraway places over the short-term, parrying the eventual blowback or spillover effect is improbable. In fact, as I argued in the previous section, all but the smallest and most isolated of crises are rapidly becoming globalized due to the existence of transnational circuits of ideas, images, people, and commodities. Regardless of where they live, our descendants will increasingly be subjected to the impact of environmental degradation, the spread of epidemics, gross North-South socioeconomic inequalities, refugee flows, civil wars, and genocides. What may have previously appeared to be temporally and spatially remote risks are ‘coming home to roost’ in ever faster cycles. In a word, then, procrastination makes little sense for three principal reasons: it exponentially raises the costs of eventual future action; it reduces preventive options; and it erodes their effectiveness. With the foreclosing of long-range alternatives, later generations may be left with a single course of action, namely, that of merely reacting to large-scale emergencies as they arise. We need only think of how it gradually becomes more difficult to control climate change, let alone reverse it, or to halt mass atrocities once they are underway. Preventive foresight is grounded in the opposite logic, whereby the decision to work through perils today greatly enhances both the subsequent room for maneuver and the chances of success. Humanitarian, environmental, and techno-scientific activists have convincingly shown that we cannot afford not to engage in preventive labor. Moreover, I would contend that farsighted cosmopolitanism is not as remote or idealistic a prospect as it appears to some, for as Falk writes, “[g]lobal justice between temporal communities, however, actually seems to be increasing, as evidenced by various expressions of greater sensitivity to past injustices and future dangers.”36 Global civil society may well be helping a new generational self-conception take root, according to which we view ourselves as the provisional caretakers of our planetary commons. Out of our sense of responsibility for the well-being of those who will follow us, we come to be more concerned about the here and now.

#### 2. Accepting a radically stigmatized version of queer identity results in actual stigma and fractures movements

**Kirsch, 2000**

(Max, Associate Professor at Florida Atlantic University, “Queer Theory and Social Change”, p. 92)

"Queer" in this sense, then, attempts to dissolve sexuality and annuls the basis for sexual identity, **precluding a confrontation with a morality that dictates sexual correctness**, affirming some practices while stigmatizing others. "Worse," as Lee Siegel writes, "it often seems that calling oneself queer is a tactic for not acknowledging that one is merely gay, for not shouldering the burdens of coming out or the responsibilities that come with accepting the inevitable reality of a sexual identity and getting on with the rest of life" (1998: 14). If we do not "come out:' we cannot identify our sexuality or gender in the sense of knowing exactly who we are. This knowing is impossible without identifying with others engaged in a similar struggle. Since it is, in fact, **impossible** to constitute a movement for social change based on individual self-ness, we must ask ourselves what or who Butler's position benefits. To see one's gender identity as imitation or parody is to view the self as unreal. It distances the actor from a confrontation with the objects of oppression and thwarts any resistance that matters. It is individual difference reified to the exclusion of community. When we are not comfortable enough with our positions to seek out others who are in the same position, and to use this identity, our identification with them, to counter the symbolic and real violence that exists, we are also hiding from ourselves the real discrimination that denies self-assertion and fulfillment. The result is a fear of engagement, a true manifestation of an internalized homophobia that rests on the individual's rejection of identity and of power, the refusal to identify and to engage power, and thus the rejection of labels. To have a label that is not accepted as equal to others in this culture is to be "less-than," producing marginalization and shame for those desiring to be on an equal par. Here marginality can become an identity in itself: if one recognizes and embraces the fact that one is marginalized, then there is no need to seek support. This position declares that the only way to prevent being eaten by power is to reject participation, "to disclaim:' a pessimistic stance that reinforces rejection. Denying a label or an identity is far easier than a fight for equity that might fail, thus rendering the individual even more isolated. By denying the identification and the material fact of labeling, shame is thus avoided and no real resistance is actualized. But in fact the individual becomes even more alone.

### Util

#### Preventing death is the first ethical priority – it’s the only impact you can’t recover from.

Zygmunt **Bauman,** University of Leeds Professor Emeritus of Sociology, 1995, Life In Fragments: Essays In Postmodern Morality, p. 66-71

The being‑for is like living towards‑the‑future: a being filled with anticipation, a being aware of the abyss between future foretold and future that will eventually be; it is this gap which, like a magnet, draws the self towards the Other,as it draws life towards the future, making life into an activity of overcoming, transcending, leaving behind. The self stretches towards the Other, as life stretches towards the future; neither can grasp what it stretches toward, but it is in this hopeful and desperate, never conclusive and never abandoned stretching‑toward that the self is ever anew created and life ever anew lived. In the words of M. M. Bakhtin, it is only in this not‑yet accomplished world of anticipation and trial, leaning toward stubbornly an‑other Other, that life can be lived ‑ not in the world of the `events that occurred'; in the latter world, `it is impossible to live, to act responsibly; in it, I am not needed, in principle I am not there at all." Art, the Other, the future: what unites them, what makes them into three words vainly trying to grasp the same mystery, is the modality of possibility. A curious modality, at home neither in ontology nor epistemology; itself, like that which it tries to catch in its net, `always outside', forever `otherwise than being'. The possibility we are talking about here is not the all‑too‑familiar unsure‑of‑itself, and through that uncertainty flawed, inferior and incomplete being, disdainfully dismissed by triumphant existence as `mere possibility', `just a possibility'; possibility is instead `plus que la reahte' ‑ both the origin and the foundation of being. The hope, says Blanchot, proclaims the possibility of that which evades the possible; `in its limit, this is the hope of the bond recaptured where it is now lost."' The hope is always the hope of *being fu filled,* but what keeps the hope alive and so keeps the being open and on the move is precisely its *unfu filment.* One may say that the paradox *of hope* (and the paradox of possibility founded in hope) is that it may pursue its destination solely through betraying its nature; the most exuberant of energies expends itself in the urge towards rest. Possibility uses up its openness in search of closure. Its image of the better being is its own impoverishment . . . The togetherness of the being‑for is cut out of the same block; it shares in the paradoxical lot of all possibility. It lasts as long as it is unfulfilled, yet it uses itself up in never ending effort of fulfilment, of recapturing the bond, making it tight and immune to all future temptations. In an important, perhaps decisive sense, it is selfdestructive and self‑defeating: its triumph is its death. The Other, like restless and unpredictable art, like the future itself, is a *mystery.* And being‑for‑the‑Other, going towards the Other through the twisted and rocky gorge of affection, brings that mystery into view ‑ makes it into a challenge. That mystery is what has triggered the sentiment in the first place ‑ but cracking that mystery is what the resulting movement is about. The mystery must be unpacked so that the being‑for may focus on the Other: one needs to know what to focus on. (The `demand' is *unspoken,* the responsibility undertaken is *unconditional;* it is up to him or her who follows the demand and takes up the responsibility to decide what the following of that demand and carrying out of that responsibility means in practical terms.) Mystery ‑ noted Max Frisch ‑ (and the Other is a mystery), is an exciting puzzle, but one tends to get tired of that excitement. `And so one creates for oneself an image. This is a loveless act, the betrayal." Creating an image of the Other leads to the substitution of the image for the Other; the Other is now fixed ‑ soothingly and comfortingly. There is nothing to be excited about anymore. I know what the Other needs, I know where my responsibility starts and ends. Whatever the Other may now do will be taken down and used against him. What used to be received as an exciting surprise now looks more like perversion; what used to be adored as exhilarating creativity now feels like wicked levity. Thanatos has taken over from Eros, and the excitement of the ungraspable turned into the dullness and tedium of the grasped. But, as Gyorgy Lukacs observed, `everything one person may know about another is only expectation, only potentiality, only wish or fear, acquiring reality only as a result of what happens later, and this reality, too, dissolves straightaway into potentialities'. Only death, with its finality and irreversibility, puts an end to the musical‑chairs game of the real and the potential ‑ it once and for all closes the embrace of togetherness which was before invitingly open and tempted the lonely self." `Creating an image' is the dress rehearsal of that death. But creating an image is the inner urge, the constant temptation, the *must* of all affection . . . It is the loneliness of being abandoned to an unresolvable ambivalence and an unanchored and formless sentiment which sets in motion the togetherness of being‑for. But what loneliness seeks in togetherness is an end to its present condition ‑ an end to itself. Without knowing ‑ without being capable of knowing ‑ that the hope to replace the vexing loneliness with togetherness is founded solely on its own unfulfilment, and that once loneliness is no more, the togetherness ( the being‑for togetherness) must also collapse, as it cannot survive its own completion. What the loneliness seeks in togetherness (suicidally for its own cravings) is the foreclosing and pre‑empting of the future, cancelling the future before it comes, robbing it of mystery but also of the possibility with which it is pregnant. Unknowingly yet necessarily, it seeks it all to its own detriment, since the success (if there is a success) may only bring it back to where it started and to the condition which prompted it to start on the journey in the first place. The togetherness of being‑for is always in the future, and nowhere else. It is no more once the self proclaims: `I have arrived', `I have done it', `I fulfilled my duty.' The being‑for starts from the realization of the bottomlessness of the task, and ends with the declaration that the infinity has been exhausted. This is the tragedy of being‑for ‑ the reason why it cannot but be death‑bound while simultaneously remaining an undying attraction. In this tragedy, there are many happy moments, but no happy end. Death is always the foreclosure of possibilities, and it comes eventually in its own time, even if not brought forward by the impatience of love. The catch is to direct the affection to staving off the end, and to do this against the affection's nature. What follows is that, if moral relationship is grounded in the being-for togetherness (as it is), then it can exist as a project, and guide the self's conduct only as long as its nature of a project (a not yet-completed project) is not denied. Morality, like the future itself, is forever not‑yet. (And this is why the ethical code, any ethical code, the more so the more perfect it is by its own standards, supports morality the way the rope supports the hanged man.) It is because of our loneliness that we crave togetherness. It is because of our loneliness that we open up to the Other and allow the Other to open up to us. It is because of our loneliness (which is only belied, not overcome, by the hubbub of the being‑with) that we turn into moral selves. And it is only through allowing the togetherness its possibilities which only the future can disclose that we stand a chance of acting morally, and sometimes even of being good, in the present.

### AT root cause

#### No root cause of war

Gat, 9 (Azar, Chair of the Department of Political Science at Tel Aviv University, So Why Do People Fight? Evolutionary Theory and the Causes of War, European Journal of International Relations, 2009, Vol. 15(4): 571–599, http://ejt.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/15/4/571)

Thus attempts to find the root cause of war in the nature of either the individual, the state, or the international system are fundamentally misplaced. In all these ‘levels’ there are necessary but not sufficient causes for war, and the whole cannot be broken into pieces.13 People’s needs and desires — which may be pursued violently — as well as the resulting quest for power and the state of mutual apprehension which fuel the security dilemma are all molded in human nature (some of them existing only as options, potentials, and skills in a behavioral ‘tool kit’); they are so molded because of strong evolutionary pressures that have shaped humans in their struggle for survival over geological times, when all the above literally constituted matters of life and death. The violent option of human competition has been largely curbed within states, yet is occasionally taken up on a large scale between states because of the anarchic nature of the inter-state system. However, returning to step one, international anarchy in and of itself would not be an explanation for war were it not for the potential for violence in a fundamental state of competition over scarce resources that is imbedded in reality and, consequently, in human nature. The necessary and sufficient causes of war — that obviously have to be filled with the particulars of the case in any specific war — are thus as follows: politically organized actors that operate in an environment where no superior authority effectively monopolizes power resort to violence when they assess it to be their most cost-effective option for winning and/or defending evolution-shaped objects of desire, and/or their power in the system that can help them win and/or defend those desired goods. Wars have been fought for the attainment of the same objects of human desire that underlie the human motivational system in general — only by violent means, through the use of force. Politics — internal and external — of which war is, famously, a continuation, is the activity intended to achieve at the intra- and inter-state ‘levels’ the very same evolution-shaped human aims we have already seen. Some writers have felt that ‘politics’ does not fully encompass the causes of war. Even Thayer (2004: 178–9), who correctly argues that evolutionary theory explains ultimate human aims, nonetheless goes on to say, inconsistently, that Clausewitz needs extension because war is caused not only by political reasons but also by the evolutionarily rooted search for resources, as if the two were separate, with politics being somehow different and apart, falling outside of the evolutionary logic. What is defined as ‘politics’ is of course a matter of semantics, and like all definitions is largely arbitrary. Yet, as has been claimed here, if not attributed to divine design, organisms’ immensely complex mechanisms and the behavioral propensities that emanate from them — including those of human beings — ultimately could only have been ‘engineered’ through evolution. The challenge is to lay out how evolution-shaped human desires relate to one another in motivating war. The desire and struggle for scarce resources — wealth of all sorts — have always been regarded as a prime aim of ‘politics’ and an obvious motive for war. They seem to require little further elaboration. By contrast, reproduction does not appear to figure as a direct motive for war in large-scale societies. However, as we saw, appearance is often deceptive, for somatic and reproductive motives are the two inseparable sides of the same coin. In modern societies, too, sexual adventure remained central to individual motivation in going to war, even if it usually failed to be registered at the level of ‘state politics.’ This may be demonstrated by the effects of the sexual revolution since the 1960s, which, by lessening the attraction of foreign adventure for recruits and far increasing the attraction of staying at home, may have contributed to advanced societies’ growing aversion to war. Honor, status, glory, and dominance — both individual and collective — enhanced access to somatic and reproductive success and were thus hotly pursued and defended, even by force. The security dilemma sprang from this state of actual and potential competition, in turn pouring more oil onto its fire. Power has been the universal currency through which all of the above could be obtained and/or defended, and has been sought after as such, in an often escalating spiral. Kinship — expanding from family and tribe to peoples — has always exerted overwhelming influence in determining one’s loyalty and willingness to sacrifice in the defense and promotion of a common good. Shared culture is a major attribute of ethnic communities, in the defense of which people can be invested as heavily as in the community’s political independence and overall prosperity. Finally, religious and secular ideologies have been capable of stirring enormous zeal and violence; for grand questions of cosmic and socio-political order have been perceived as possessing paramount practical significance for securing and promoting life on earth and/or in the afterlife. In the human problem-solving menus, ideologies function as the most general blueprints. Rather than comprising a ‘laundry list’ of causes for war, all of the above partake in the interconnected human motivational system, originally shaped by the calculus of survival and reproduction.

# 1ar

## Terror

### Violence

#### Perception of force is vital to a successful war on terror – signaling strength causes global populations to tip toward the U.S.

**Gitz 7—**Bradley R. Gitz, William Jefferson Clinton Professor of International Politics – Lyon College, “Perception as Destiny”, Arkansas Democrat-Gazette (Little Rock), 1-14-2007, Lexis

Muslim majorities will eventually reject Islamism only if it is perceived as being effectively and resolutely resisted, as is happening at present in the horn of Africa. They will accommodate themselves to Islamism regardless of their personal preferences if they feel it is the stronger force and represents their reluctant future. Osama bin Laden would be the first to agree that what we are engaged in is a struggle for the hearts and minds of the world's Muslims and that the single most important variable influencing that struggle is perceptions of who is stronger, the Islamists or us. To the extent that Islamist fanatics appear to be winning because we in the West lack the necessary resolve to use our superior power to resist their advances, our superior values will never get the chance to prove their appeal. The appropriate analogy here comes from the urban war zones of America, where the willingness of law-abiding residents to cooperate with the police in their struggle against drug dealers and street gangs is contingent upon which side they feel can hurt or protect them more. Such people constitute the vast majority of the residents of those neighborhoods and almost certainly want the same things for their children that those living in the affluent suburbs want, but they can only afford to "do the right thing," i.e., help the police identify and arrest the criminals, if they can do so without risking their lives and those of their children. Just as the "good guys" (the police) can prevail in crime-ridden neighborhoods only by receiving the help of the people living there and the people living there will help only if they believe that the police are stronger than the bad guys, moderate Muslims around the world will only reject the terrorists and their governments will cooperate with ours in the struggle against those terrorists only if they believe that we, not the terrorists, will win. Such a struggle is playing out in miniature inside Iraq at present and features almost exactly the same incentive system for ordinary Iraqis. We can build a stable democracy in Iraq only if we can overcome the terrorists and the sectarian militias, but to overcome the terrorists and diminish the appeal of the sectarian militias we must first win the support and confidence of the Iraqi people. The people of Iraq would almost certainly prefer to actively cooperate with us and with the government most of them stood in long lines to elect, but will do so only if it doesn't mean jeopardizing themselves and their families. If the people of Iraq believe that the insurgents are stronger and our will to prevail is too weak, they will accommodate the insurgents who control their neighborhoods and punish those who defy them. If they believe that we are about to throw up our hands and withdraw in frustration, they will find protection wherever they can, most obviously among Iraq's heavily armed sectarian militias. In Vietnam, we lost primarily because the villagers of South Vietnam feared the Viet Cong to a greater extent than they trusted either their army or our soldiers to protect them. Most of them didn't want the kind of oppressive future that communism promised, but then most Muslims don't want to be ruled by the Taliban or al-Qa'ida, either. Thus, what we should never forget when discussing our options in Iraq and elsewhere is that the strength of the other side will be determined by perceptions of our strength and resolve.

### Otherization

#### Otherization is necessary to stop the worst forms of violence

**Rasch 5** (William, “Lines in the Sand: Enmity as a Structuring Principle” The South Atlantic Quarterly 104:2, Spring 2005.)

Accepting Cohen’s invitation means deciding on a fundamental distinction that runs through all political philosophy and that has risen once again to the surface in the radical responses to the emerging global order that some want to call Pax Americana and others simply Empire. It is a distinction that Carl Schmitt was keenly aware of; indeed, an unambiguous decision for one alternative over the other structures his entire thought.1 That distinction is between good and evil, or, in the world of ‘‘those’’ about whom Cohen sings, between the presupposition of primordial peace and the presupposition of a war of all against all. In The Concept of the Political, Schmitt concludes that ‘‘all genuine political theories presuppose man to be evil, i.e., by no means an unproblematic but a dangerous and dynamic being.’’2 This anthropological fiction—and Schmitt is aware of the claim’s fictional status—serves as the logical premise that secures Schmitt’s definition of the political as the friend/enemy distinction. We live in a world, he says, in which associations with likeminded others are our only means of security and happiness. Indiscriminate concourse of all with all cannot be the foundation for necessary political discriminations. Thus, the anthropological presupposition of evil, guilt, and violence is designed to expose what Schmitt sees as the duplicity of liberal theory, which consists in using the promise of formal equality to camouflage political power by displacing it in the realms of economics and morality. Liberal theory denies original enmity by assuming the innate goodness of the human being.Those—communitarians and liberals alike— who say there is no war presuppose a counterfactual ‘‘ontological priority of non-violence,’’ a ‘‘state of total peace’’ 3 that invites universal inclusion based on the ‘‘essential homogeneity and natural virtue of mankind.’’ 4 If, in such a benign state of nature, violence were to break out, such violence would be considered a perversion and, if all else were to fail, would have to be extirpated by an even greater violence. To cite John Locke, this ‘‘State of perfect Freedom’’ and universal ‘‘Equality,’’ governed solely by reason and natural law, can be disturbed only by an ‘‘Offender’’ who ‘‘declares himself to live by another Rule, than that of reason and common Equity.’’ Such a ‘‘Criminal’’ has ‘‘declaredWar against allMankind, and therefore may be destroyed as a Lyon or a Tyger, one of those wild Savage Beasts, with whomMen can have no Society nor Security.’’ 5 The political, on this view, emerges only as the result of the Fall—that is, emerges only to fight the war against war, a war always initiated by a sinful or bestial other. It seeks to make itself superfluous by restoring or, more progressively, establishing for the first time this natural order of peace. Should one demur and find the perfect state to be less than advertised, then one’s demurral would most assuredly be recognized not as legitimate political opposition, but rather as evidence of greed, moral perversity, or some other pathological behavior. With its pacific presuppositions, liberalism, according to Schmitt, dissolves the specificity of the political and hides the necessarily asymmetric power relations that mark all political maneuverings. By way of an anthropological sleight of hand, liberalism represents itself as an ethos, a moral and economic emancipation, and not as what it really is, namely, a powerpolitical regime with traditional power-political aims. For Schmitt, distinctions, rather than the effacement of distinctions, structure the space within which we live, including the space of the political. Only within structured space, space literally marked by human activities, by human groupings and the boundaries they draw, do terms achieve their meanings. Norms, he repeatedly stated, are derived from situations, normal situations; they are not derived logically from underived first principles. Categories like ‘‘liberty’’ and ‘‘equality’’ can have political significance only when defined and delineated within the sphere of the political. They are neither natural nor innately human qualities; they are not self-evident truths. Consequently, Schmitt’s suspicion of liberalism, pacifism, or any other -ism that denies an initial and therefore ever-present potential war of all against all is a suspicion of those who wish to make their operative distinctions invisible, and thus incontestable, by claiming the immorality or illegality of all distinction. Schmitt’s insistence, then, on our ‘‘evil’’ nature is evidence neither of his existential misanthropy nor even, necessarily, of his conservative authoritarianism, but rather of his desire to secure the autonomy and necessity of that human mechanism called ‘‘the political.’’ To the question of whether there is a war, Schmitt emphatically answers ‘‘yes’’—by which he means to affirm not armed conflict or bloodshed as a virtue in and of itself, but rather the necessity of the view that the proverbial state of nature is, as Hobbes knew, a state marked by imperfection, and that this imperfection manifests itself as violence and the guilt associated with it. Schmitt, then, starts fromthe premise of imperfection and acknowledges an ontological priority of violence. If, he reasons, one starts with the rather biblical notions of sin and guilt, not natural innocence, then homogeneity, being contingent, historical, and not the least natural, must be predicated on heterogeneity. That is, citizenship or participation or community must be constructed, not assumed, and can only be local, circumscribed, not global. One recognizes one’s own in the face of the other and knows the comfort of inclusion only as the necessary result of exclusion—though in modern, functionally differentiated society, those inclusions and exclusions may be multiple, contradictory, and not necessarily tied to place. ‘‘An absolute human equality,’’ Schmitt writes in his Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, ‘‘would be an equality without the necessary correlate of inequality and as a result conceptually and practically meaningless, an indifferent equality. . . . Substantive inequalities would in no way disappear from the world and the state; they would shift into another sphere, perhaps separated from the political and concentrated in the economic, leaving this area to take on a new, disproportionately decisive importance.’’ 6 This, Schmitt’s, is not a popular sentiment, even if it echoes somewhat the Marxist distinction between a political and a social democracy, between a formal and substantial equality. But if one acknowledges that at least within modernity all inclusion requires exclusion, that inclusions and exclusions in addition to being unavoidable are also contingent and malleable, then rather than react with dismay, one might see in this ‘‘logical fact,’’ if fact it is, both the condition for the possibility of dissent and the condition for the possibility of recognizing in the one who resists and disagrees a fellow human being and thus legitimate political opponent, not a Lyon or Tyger or other Savage Beast. **For it is not that exclusions are miraculously made absent once distinctions are not formally drawn.** On the contrary, **unacknowledged distinctions, and those who are distinguished by them, simply go underground**, become invisible, **and grow stronger, more absolute, in their violent and explosive force.** When the retrograde and condemned distinction between the ‘‘Greek’’ and the ‘‘barbarian’’ becomes a simple, sanguine affirmation of humanity, this ideal affirmation actually turns out to be nothing other than a distinction drawn between all those who, by their right behavior, show themselves to be truly ‘‘human’’ and those who, alas, by their perverse dissent, have revealed themselves to be evildoers, to be ‘‘inhuman.’’ Deliberate, visible, ‘‘external’’ distinctions that demarcate a space in which a ‘‘we’’ can recognize its difference from a ‘‘they,’’ preferably without marking that difference in a necessarily asymmetrical manner, are to be preferred, in Schmitt’s world, to the invisible and unacknowledged distinctions that mark those who are exemplary humans from those who, by their political dissent, show themselves to be gratuitously perverse. For reasons, then, of making difference visible, Schmitt favors lines drawn in the sand, or, in the ‘‘mythical language’’ used in The Nomos of the Earth, ‘‘firm lines’’ in the ‘‘soil,’’ ‘‘whereby definite divisions become apparent,’’ and, above them, on the ‘‘solid ground of the earth,’’ ‘‘fences, enclosures, boundaries, walls, houses, and other constructs,’’ so that the ‘‘orders and orientations of human social life become apparent’’ and the ‘‘forms of power and domination become visible.’’7 In Nomos, Schmitt describes the now much maligned and seldom mourned European nation-state systemas ‘‘the highest form of orderwithin the scope of human power’’ (187). Historically, the territorial state developed as a response to the religious civil wars of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Once thought of as a unity called Christendom, Europe became fractured by the events of the Reformation and Counter- Reformation. The old asymmetrical distinction between believers and nonbelievers that governed the relationship not only between Christians and non-Christians, but also between Christian orthodoxy and heresy, now threatened to regulate the distinction between Catholics and Protestants. Yet, miraculously (one might be tempted to say), with the conclusion of religious warfare in 1648, a symmetrical relationship among the European nation-states prevailed—in theory, if not always in fact. It is this symmetrical ordering of internally differentiated Europe that Schmitt highlights. In effect—and Hobbes had already described it in these terms—the war of all individuals against all individuals in the state of nature, which perennially threatens to resurface within the state as civil discord, is elevated into a war of all states against all states in a second-order state of nature. In theory and practice, then, the individual is protected from arbitrary and irrational, because incalculable, violence by states acting as moral persons living in an unregulated but serendipitously achieved balance of power. We might best update Schmitt’s description of this order as an ideally anarchic, self-regulating coexistence of antagonistic powers, an emergent, horizontal self-organization of sovereign systems with no one system serving as sovereign over all the others—a plurality of states that refused to coalesce into one single state but rather achieved relative security without relinquishing autonomy. The ‘‘medium’’ of this self-organization was violence (war); yet, by virtue of mechanisms of reciprocity, by virtue, that is, of a similarly emergent self-regulation of violence called international law (the jus publicum Europaeum of which Schmitt sings his praises), the conduct of warfare among European states was restrained and controlled. Thus, the nation-state way of organizing earlymodern Europe served as the katechon, the political as restrainer, establishing relative stability and peace to stave off chaos and civil war. How is this possible? Despite its internal self-differentiation, Europe still saw itself as a unity because of a second major distinction, the one between Europe and the New World, where New World denotes the entire non-European world, but especially the newly ‘‘discovered’’ regions of the globe following Columbus’s three voyages. This distinction was asymmetrical; on the one side we find Christianity and culture, on the other only pagan ‘‘barbarians.’’ How did Europeans mark this difference between a self-differentiated ‘‘us’’ and a homogenous ‘‘them’’? Through violence. Only now, violence was regulated hierarchically by the traditional ‘‘just war’’ doctrine. Schmitt clearly marks the difference between symmetrical and asymmetrical modes of warfare (thus the difference between warfare ‘‘this side’’ versus the ‘‘other side’’ of so-called amity lines that separated Old Europe from the New World) as the difference between wars fought against ‘‘just enemies’’ and those fought for a ‘‘just cause.’’ The former recognize a commonality among combatants that allows for reciprocity; the latter does not. Wars fought against enemies one respects as occupiers of the same cultural ‘‘space,’’ no matter how subdivided, allows for the desirable constraints on the conduct of war. Wars fought against infidels, pagans, and barbarians, whether these barbarians deny the one God, the laws of nature, the truth of reason, or the higher morality of liberalism, are wars fought against those who are not to be respected or accorded the rights granted equals.8 To be in possession of truth, no matter how much that truth is debated internally, allows one to stand over against the other as a conglomerated unity. This self-differentiated unity can assume the restrained and restraining order of civilization because it has inoculated itself against outbreaks of ‘‘natural’’ and lawless violence by displacing them in the New World. America, as Hobbes and others imagined it, was the preeminent site of the feared state of nature; thus Europe was spared any recurrence of the civil wars that had previously ravaged it. What Schmitt describes as an enviable achievement—that is, the balanced order of restrained violence within Europe—presupposed the consignment of unrestrained violence to the rest of the world. That is, desired restraint was founded upon sanctioned lack of restraint. If Schmitt, by concentrating on the development of European international law after the religious civil wars, highlights an admirable local result of a disagreeable global process, this can be attributed to his explicit Eurocentrism. But even non- Eurocentrics may be dismayed by the twentieth-century reintroduction of unrestricted violence within Europe itself.The epitome of this return of the repressed may be the midcentury death camp, as Giorgio Agamben maintains, 9 but its initial breakthrough is the Great War of the century’s second decade. For how else can one explain that a traditional European power struggle that started in 1914 as a war fought for state interest should end in 1918–19 as a war fought by ‘‘civilization’’ against its ‘‘barbarian’’ other? And how else can one explain that we have been so eager to replicate this distinction in every war we have fought ever since? If, in other words, we are rightly horrified by the distinction between civilized and uncivilized when it is used to describe the relationship of Old Europe and its colonial subjects, and if we are rightly horrified by the distinction between the human and the in- or subhuman when it is used to discriminate against blacks, Jews, Gypsies, and other so-called undesirables, then why do we persist today in using these very distinctions when combating our latest enemies? Is it merely ironic or in fact profoundly symptomatic that those who most vehemently affirm universal symmetry (equality, democracy) are also more often than not the ones who opt for themost asymmetrical means of locating enemies and conducting war—that is, just wars fought for a just cause? But how are we to respond? For those who say there is no war and who yet find themselves witnessing daily bloodshed, Adornoian asceticism (refraining from participating in the nihilism of the political) or Benjaminian weak, quasi, or other messianism (waiting for the next incarnation of the historical subject [the multitudes?] or the next proletarian general strike [the event?]) would seem to be the answer. To this, however, those who say there is a war can respond only with bewilderment. Waiting for a ‘‘completely new politics’’ 10 and completely new political agents, waiting for the event and the rightmoment to name it, or waiting for universal ontological redemption feelsmuch like waiting for the Second Coming, or,more accurately, for Godot. And have we not all grown weary of waiting? The war we call ‘‘the political,’’ whether nihilist or not, happily goes on while we watch Rome burn. As Schmitt wrote of the relationship of early Christianity to the Roman Empire, ‘‘The belief that a restrainer holds back the end of the world provides the only bridge between the notion of an eschatological paralysis of all human events and a tremendous historical monolith like that of the Christian empire of the Germanic kings’’ (60).One does not need to believe in the virtues of that particular ‘‘historicalmonolith’’ to understand the dangers of eschatological paralysis. But as Max Weber observed firsthand, ascetic quietude leads so often, so quickly, and so effortlessly to the chiliastic violence that knows no bounds;11 and as we have lately observed anew, the millennial messianism of imperial rulers and nomadic partisans alike dominates the contemporary political landscape. The true goal of those who say there is no war is to eliminate the war that actually exists by eliminating those Lyons and Tygers and other Savage Beasts who say there is a war. This war is the truly savage war. It is the war we witness today. No amount of democratization, pacification, or Americanization will mollify its effects, because democratization, pacification, and Americanization are among the weapons used by those who say there is no war to wage their war to end all war. What is to be done? **If you** are one who **say**s **there is a war**, and if you say it not **because you** glory in it but because **you fear it** and hate it, **then your goal is to limit it and its effects, not eliminate it, which merely intensifies it, but limit it by drawing clear lines within which it can be fought, and clear lines between those who fight it and those who don’t, lines between friends, enemies, and neutrals, lines between combatants and noncombatants.** There are, of course, legitimate doubts about whether those ideal lines could ever be drawn again; nevertheless, the question that we should ask is not how can we establish perpetual peace, but rather a more modest one: Can symmetrical relationships be guaranteed only by asymmetrical ones? According to Schmitt, historically this has been the case. ‘‘The traditional Eurocentric order of international law is foundering today, as is the old nomos of the earth. This order arose from a legendary and unforeseen discovery of a new world, from an unrepeatable historical event. Only in fantastic parallels can one imagine a modern recurrence, such as men on their way to themoon discovering a new and hitherto unknown planet that could be exploited freely and utilized effectively to relieve their struggles on earth’’ (39). We have since gone to the moon and have found nothing on the way there to exploit. We may soon go to Mars, if current leaders have their way, but the likelihood of finding exploitable populations seems equally slim. Salvation through spatially delimited asymmetry, even were it to be desired, is just not on the horizon. And salvation through globalization, that is, through global unity and equality, is equally impossible, because today’s asymmetry is not so much a localization of the exception as it is an invisible generation of the exception from within that formal ideal of unity, a generation of the exception as the difference between the human and the inhuman outlaw, the ‘‘Savage Beast, with whom Men can have no Society nor Security.’’ We are, therefore, thrown back upon ourselves, which is to say, upon those artificial ‘‘moral persons’’ who act as our collective political identities.They used to be called states.What theywill be called in the future remains to be seen. But, if we think to establish a differentiated unity of discrete political entities that once represented for Schmitt ‘‘the highest form of order within the scope of human power,’’ then we must symmetrically manage the necessary pairing of inclusion and exclusion without denying the ‘‘forms of power and domination’’ that inescapably accompany human ordering.We must think the possibility of roughly equivalent power relations rather than fantasize the elimination of power from the political universe. This, conceivably, was also Schmitt’s solution.Whether his idea of the plurality of Großräume could ever be carried out under contemporary circumstances is, to be sure,more than a little doubtful, given that the United States enjoys a monopoly on guns, goods, and the Good, in the form of a supremely effective ideology of universal ‘‘democratization.’’ Still, we would do well to devise vocabularies that do not just emphatically repeat philosophically more sophisticated versions of the liberal ideology of painless, effortless, universal equality.The space of the political will never be created by a bloodless, Benjaminian divine violence. Nor is it to be confused with the space of the simply human. To dream the dreams of universal inclusion may satisfy an irrepressible human desire, but it may also always produce recurring, asphyxiating political nightmares of absolute exclusion.

## Invisible Committee Kritik

### Non-unique

#### Global media society takes out any of their nationalism arguments – proves identification with the state doesn’t necessarily help determine identity or nationalism – ill finish that card here

**Urry ’10** John, Department of Sociology University of Lancaster, “Mobile sociology” British Journal of Sociology

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-4446.2009.01249.x/pdf

Further, most important developments in sociology have at least indirectly stemmed from social movements with ‘emancipatory interests’ fuelling a new or reconfigured social analysis. Examples of such mobilized groupings which at different historical moments have included the working class, farmers, the professions, urban protest movements, student’s movement, women’s movement, immigrant groups, environmental NGOs, gay and lesbian movement, ‘disabled’ groups and so on. The emancipatory interests of these groupings are not always directly reflected within sociology; more they have had a complex and refracted impact. But in that sense, sociology has been ‘parasitic’ upon these movements, thus demonstrating how the ‘cognitive practices’ of such movements have helped to constitute ‘public spaces for thinking new thoughts, activating new actors, generating new ideas’ within societies (Eyerman and Jamison 1991: 161; Urry 1995: ch. 2). Societies were organized through debate occurring within a relatively delimited national, public sphere. The information and knowledge produced by its universities centrally formed those debates and delimited possible outcomes. Disciplines were particularly implicated in contributing knowledge to such a public sphere, and indeed in constituting that sphere as part of a national civil society (Cohen and Arato 1992; Emirbayer and Sheller 1999). However, the increasingly mediatized nature of contemporary civil societies transforms all of this.

 It is not so much that the mass media reflects what goes on elsewhere, so much as what happens in and through the media is what happens elsewhere. The sphere of public life that provided the context for knowledge produced within the academy is now increasingly mediatized (see Dahlgren 1995).Thrift describes the cosmopolitan mediatization of complexity science, especially as organized in and through the Sante Fe Institute (Thrift 1999). Debate is concerned as much with image, meaning, and emotion, as it is with written texts, cognition and science. The global economy of signs, of globally circulating information and images, is transforming the public sphere into an increasingly denationalized, visual and emotional public stage (Urry 2000: ch. 7; Knorr Cetina 1997).

### No impact

#### Biopolitical warfare has no impact – democratic checks ensure there is not an overabuse of power by the state – no constant warfare

**Dickenson 04 -** (Edward Ross, Univ of Cincinnati, Central European History Vol 37 No 1)

And it is, of course, embedded in a broader discursive complex (institutions, professions, fields of social, medical, and psychological expertise) that pursues these same aims in often even more effective and inescapable ways.89 In short, the continuities between early twentieth-century biopolitical discourse and the practices of the welfare state in our own time are unmistakable. Both are instances of the “disciplinary society” and of biopolitical, regulatory, social-engineering modernity, and they share that genealogy with more authoritarian states, including the National Socialist state, but also fascist Italy, for example. And it is certainly fruitful to view them from this very broad perspective. But that analysis can easily become superficial and misleading, because it obfuscates the profoundly different strategic and local dynamics of power in the two kinds of regimes. Clearly the democratic welfare state is not only formally but also substantively quite different from totalitarianism. Above all, again, it has nowhere developed the fateful, radicalizing dynamic that characterized National Socialism (or for that matter Stalinism), the psychotic logic that leads from economistic population management to mass murder. Again, there is always the potential for such a discursive regime to generate coercive policies. In those cases in which the regime of rights does not successfully produce “health,” such a system can —and historically does— create compulsory programs to enforce it. But again, there are political and policy potentials and constraints in such a structuring of biopolitics that are very different from those of National Socialist Germany. Democratic biopolitical regimes require, enable, and incite a degree of self-direction and participation that is functionally incompatible with authoritarian or totalitarian structures. And this pursuit of biopolitical ends through a regime of democratic citizenship does appear, historically, to have imposed increasingly narrow limits on coercive policies, and to have generated a “logic” or imperative of increasing liberalization. Despite limitations imposed by political context and the slow pace of discursive change, I think this is the unmistakable message of the really very impressive waves of legislative and welfare reforms in the 1920s or the 1970s in Germany.90 Of course it is not yet clear whether this is an irreversible dynamic of such systems. Nevertheless, such regimes are characterized by sufficient degrees of autonomy (and of the potential for its expansion) for sufficient numbers of people that I think it becomes useful to conceive of them as productive of a strategic configuration of power relations that might fruitfully be analyzed as a condition of “liberty,” just as much as they are productive of constraint, oppression, or manipulation. At the very least, totalitarianism cannot be the sole orientation point for our understanding of biopolitics, the only end point of the logic of social engineering. This notion is not at all at odds with the core of Foucauldian (and Peukertian) theory. Democratic welfare states are regimes of power/knowledge no less than early twentieth-century totalitarian states; these systems are not “opposites,” in the sense that they are two alternative ways of organizing the same thing. But they are two very different ways of organizing it. The concept “power” should not be read as a universal stifling night of oppression, manipulation, and entrapment, in which all political and social orders are grey, are essentially or effectively “the same.” Power is a set of social relations, in which individuals and groups have varying degrees of autonomy and effective subjectivity. And discourse is, as Foucault argued, “tactically polyvalent.” Discursive elements (like the various elements of biopolitics) can be combined in different ways to form parts of quite different strategies (like totalitarianism or the democratic welfare state); they cannot be assigned to one place in a structure, but rather circulate. The varying possible constellations of power in modern societies create “multiple modernities,” modern societies with quite radically differing potentials.91

### Democracy good

#### Democracy key to human rights – solves vtl

**Spagnoli 9** ([Filip Spagnoli](http://filipspagnoli.wordpress.com/author/filipspagnoli/), blog, which is mainly about human rights - including political and economic human rights such as the right to participate in government (democracy being a subset of human rights) and the right not to suffer poverty - seen from different perspectives, such as philosophy, art, politics (hence "P.a.p."), economics, statistics, law, psychology etc., “[Why Do We Need Human Rights? (10): Why Do We Need Democracy?](http://filipspagnoli.wordpress.com/2009/10/26/why-do-we-need-democracy/), [October 26, 2009](http://filipspagnoli.wordpress.com/2009/10/26/why-do-we-need-democracy/), <http://filipspagnoli.wordpress.com/2009/10/26/why-do-we-need-democracy/>)

Regular readers will know that I see democracy as a human rights issue. The standard human rights texts (declarations, treaties and constitutions) [all provide](http://filipspagnoli.wordpress.com/2008/04/06/what-is-democracy-6/) a right of the people of a nation to take part in the government, choose representatives in free elections etc. As with human rights in general, many people are in favor of democracy, but are unable to say why, or are unable to agree on the reasons why they are in favor. Some people may not have a particular reason to favor democracy, apart from a pragmatic one: it has worked quite well, especially compared to other forms of government that have been tried before, and it’s such a fuss to change. Those who have reasons can be divided into two “camps”: those who view democracy as the best means to an independently valuable goal, and those who view democracy as intrinsically valuable. The former group is the most numerous (and includes me). An instrumental justification of democracy can take many different forms, depending on the ultimate goal that is supposed to be promoted by democracy. The most common forms are: Democracy promotes prosperity, economic growth and poverty reduction. Read more [here](http://filipspagnoli.wordpress.com/2008/05/20/human-rights-facts-20-from-democracy-to-prosperity/) and [here](http://filipspagnoli.wordpress.com/2009/03/16/human-rights-facts-106-democratization-and-economic-growth-why-democracy-is-good-for-the-economy/). Democracy promotes peace (internally and externally). See [here](http://filipspagnoli.wordpress.com/2008/05/12/what-is-democracy-17/), [here](http://filipspagnoli.wordpress.com/2008/05/23/what-is-democracy-20-democracy-is-peace-continued/) and [here](http://filipspagnoli.wordpress.com/2009/04/24/what-is-democracy-34-democracy-is-peace-continued/). Democracy leads to better political decisions. See [here](http://filipspagnoli.wordpress.com/2009/06/01/plato-aristotle-democracy-and-the-quality-of-political-decisions/), [here](http://filipspagnoli.wordpress.com/2009/04/10/what-is-democracy-33-government-of-the-stupid-by-the-stupid-and-for-the-stupid/) and [here](http://filipspagnoli.wordpress.com/2008/07/08/human-rights-quote-74-democracy-or-experts/). Democracy leads to less repression and more respect for human rights. See[here](http://filipspagnoli.wordpress.com/2009/06/05/the-influence-of-democracy-on-human-rights/), [here](http://filipspagnoli.wordpress.com/2009/06/19/human-rights-quote-135-democracy-and-free-speech/), [here](http://filipspagnoli.wordpress.com/2009/07/15/what-is-democracy-36-less-repression/), [here](http://filipspagnoli.wordpress.com/2008/04/06/what-is-democracy-5/) and [here](http://filipspagnoli.wordpress.com/2008/04/06/what-is-democracy-4/). I believe all of these statements are very persuasive, and taken together they form a very powerful justification of democracy (although we may need to agree on a very specific definition of democracy in order to be convinced by these statements – but that’s another discussion). The non-instrumental justification, the one that says that democracy is good, not because of what it produces, but because of what it is, is also very interesting and persuasive. It focuses on what happens to people when they participate in government, what happens when democracy takes place, not what happens after it has taken place. So instead of pointing to beneficial consequences of democracy – more prosperity, more peace etc. – it points to the benefits of community, association, participation, self-government, self-determination etc. and how these things improve people’s characters, virtues and happiness. Read more [here](http://filipspagnoli.wordpress.com/2008/08/11/what-is-democracy-23-a-way-of-life/). The only problem I have with this non-instrumental approach in which democracy is an end in itself, is that it tends to collapse into the instrumental approach: if democracy improves people’s character, then it’s also instrumental. It’s only an end in itself in the sense that it’s product doesn’t appear afterwards (like peace follows from democratic rule), but is simultaneous with it (people’s characters and virtues improve because of democracy, but only as long as democracy “happens”). However, often it’s quite irrelevant which type of justification of democracy we prefer, and how successful (or not) the chosen justification is. Such exercises can be no more than “preaching to the choir”, intellectually interesting but practically irrelevant. People who already accept democracy don’t need a philosophical explanation of why democracy is so wonderful. And people who don’t accept democracy are often immune to rational justifications or to philosophy in general. Good luck approaching the Taliban with a philosophy paper on the benefits of democracy… (In fact, good luck approaching them at all).

### State Good

Eric **Grynaviski 13**, Professor of Political Science at The George Washington University, “The Bloodstained Spear: Public Reason and Declarations of War”, International Theory, 5(2), Cambridge Journals

Conclusion

The burden of the argument, thus far, has been to show that no war is justified unless it has been justified. States have an obligation intent on war to ensure that third parties and the target are given reasons for the war, as well as a chance to respond and reason with the belligerent state. Furthermore, without a declaration of war, war is not a last resort and therefore belligerent states are fully responsible for the harms that wars inevitably do to the innocent.

One broader implication of the argument for declarations of war is to relate institutional solutions for moral questions. Some argue that declarations of war are an old and moribund **Grynaviski 13**ritual, antiquated and old-fashioned. Ian Holliday (2002, 565), noting the irregularity with which wars are declared, writes ‘we would not want to make a just war verdict hang on such a rare political practice’. This argument is deeply wrong. If declaring war is important, than we can and should criticize states for failing to do so. Others might suggest that even if states do declare war, they might still lie and misrepresent their case. Of course, there is nothing particular to declarations of war that would make misrepresentations of one's case more likely; we are pretty good at lying now. If arguments are given publicly, however, it might lead to a greater degree of precision in argumentation. This precision may make misrepresentations more noticeable. Alternatively, one might suspect that requiring states to declare war is not enough. Rather than simply requiring states to make a case, we should institutionalize rules of war so that states will pay a price if the cases they make are repugnant. These arguments, of course, do not exclude the importance of declarations. In fact, requiring that states explain their case is perfectly compatible with any reasonable institutional solution to the problem of war. Some mechanism to ensure that states make a case is probably an important condition for any of these schemes to work.

The international system likely will not include robust, impartial international institutions that can make enforceable decisions about war and peace in the near future. Declarations of war are a tool that might actually be appropriated by states, especially if the public and the international community demand them. Half-formed cosmopolitan proposals, while interesting thought exercises, may deflect attention from practical measures///

 that can be reached here and now. Declarations may be only first steps, but they are important ones. Moral arguments make a difference, even if that difference is too often small. They mattered during slavery, decolonization, and have altered citizenship policies in Israel, the Ukraine, and elsewhere (Checkel 2001; Crawford 2002). Moreover, forcing states to explain the moral case may make unjust wars less likely by preventing executives from overselling conflicts (Goodman 2006) or by leading states to face hypocrisy costs if they intervene despite target states’ concessions on just cause or inflict humanitarian causalities in wars declared for humanitarian reasons (Finnemore 2009).

A broader implication relates to public reason and just war thinking. Showing that poorly justified, undeclared wars are unjust highlights the way that public reason conditions our understanding of just war theory. This argument is not new. In the last year of his life, Cicero (1913, 37) elaborated a theory of war that emphasized discussion and persuasion. His claim, discussed above, is worth reiterating: ‘there are two ways of settling a dispute; first, by discussion; second, by physical force; and since the former is characteristic of man, the latter of the brute, we must resort to force only in case we may not avail ourselves of discussion’. Cicero's approach to war highlights mechanisms of public diplomacy – the importance of maintaining agreements with enemies, the use of declarations of war to inform enemies of the rationale for war, and discussion and diplomacy to peacefully resolve conflict – to explain the conditions under which a resort to force is justified. Cicero's comments presaged his end; when Anthony's men executed Cicero, they cut off his hands – the device used by Cicero to write criticisms of Anthony – and nailed them to rostra (the platform in the forum where speakers could be heard).

Cicero's distinction between force and argument is central to his thinking about the conditions under which violence is justly used. After Cicero, the centrality of discussion and argument fades, disappearing by the 20th century. Consider several recent examples. Jean Bethke Elshtain (2003, 19) – a noted just war theorist – describes terrorists as groups that are unwilling to accept compromises and refuse diplomacy: ‘terrorists are not interested in the subtleties of diplomacy or in compromise solutions. They have taken leave of politics’. Michael Walzer (1977), a just war theorist often credited for the revival of moral thinking about war after Vietnam, barely mentions obligations to settle disputes through negotiation in his key text Just and Unjust Wars. More amusingly in many ways, moral philosophers often construct hypothetical examples designed to showcase the types of moral dilemmas involved in war that unrealistically exclude the possibility of successful diplomacy. David Rodin (2002, 80), for example, describes a person trapped at the bottom of a well who has to decide whether to shoot a ray gun at a fat man falling into the well above his head, knowing that if he does not shoot the ray gun he will die. Discussion with the fat man – of course – is impossible; he is falling and no longer has control over his actions.22

Modern discussions of ethics in war usually discount diplomatic solutions. In doing so, they are rooted in an extraordinarily pessimistic version of realism, where only power and force have the ability to settle conflict. When painting war as a solution to pressing concerns related to self-defense against terrorists who have no interest in compromise, or the rescue of populations from genocide by regimes who will take any delay as cause to continue killing innocents, diplomacy does not loom large as a central component of just war reasoning.

## Puar Kritik

### Scenario-Planning Good

#### Predictions and scenario building are valuable for decision-making, even if they’re not perfect

**Garrett 12**

Banning, In Search of Sand Piles and Butterflies, director of the Asia Program and Strategic Foresight Initiative at the Atlantic Council.

http://www.acus.org/disruptive\_change/search-sand-piles-and-butterflies

 “Disruptive change” that produces “strategic shocks” has become an increasing concern for policymakers, shaken by momentous events of the last couple of decades that were not on their radar screens – from the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 9/11 terrorist attacks to the 2008 financial crisis and the “Arab Spring.” These were all shocks to the international system, predictable perhaps in retrospect but predicted by very few experts or officials on the eve of their occurrence. This “failure” to predict specific strategic shocks does not mean we should abandon efforts to foresee disruptive change or look at all possible shocks as equally plausible. Most strategic shocks do not “come out of the blue.” We can understand and project long-term global trends and foresee at least some of their potential effects, including potential shocks and disruptive change. We can construct alternative futures scenarios to envision potential change, including strategic shocks. Based on trends and scenarios, we can take actions to avert possible undesirable outcomes or limit the damage should they occur. We can also identify potential opportunities or at least more desirable futures that we seek to seize through policy course corrections. We should distinguish “strategic shocks” that are developments that could happen at any time and yet may never occur. This would include such plausible possibilities as use of a nuclear device by terrorists or the emergence of an airborne human-to-human virus that could kill millions. Such possible but not inevitable developments would not necessarily be the result of worsening long-term trends. Like possible terrorist attacks, governments need to try to prepare for such possible catastrophes though they may never happen. But there are other potential disruptive changes, including those that create strategic shocks to the international system, that can result from identifiable trends that make them more likely in the future—for example, growing demand for food, water, energy and other resources with supplies failing to keep pace. We need to look for the “sand piles” that the trends are building and are subject to collapse at some point with an additional but indeterminable additional “grain of sand” and identify the potential for the sudden appearance of “butterflies” that might flap their wings and set off hurricanes. Mohamed Bouazizi, who immolated himself December 17, 2010 in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia, was the butterfly who flapped his wings and (with the “force multiplier” of social media) set off a hurricane that is still blowing throughout the Middle East. Perhaps the metaphors are mixed, but the butterfly’s delicate flapping destabilized the sand piles (of rising food prices, unemployed students, corrupt government, etc.) that had been building in Tunisia, Egypt, and much of the region. The result was a sudden collapse and disruptive change that has created a strategic shock that is still producing tremors throughout the region. But the collapse was due to cumulative effects of identifiable and converging trends. When and what form change will take may be difficult if not impossible to foresee, but the likelihood of a tipping point being reached—that linear continuation of the present into the future is increasingly unlikely—can be foreseen. Foreseeing the direction of change and the likelihood of discontinuities, both sudden and protracted, is thus not beyond our capabilities. While efforts to understand and project long-term global trends cannot provide accurate predictions, for example, of the GDPs of China, India, and the United States in 2030, looking at economic and GDP growth trends, can provide insights into a wide range of possible outcomes. For example, it is a useful to assess the implications if the GDPs of these three countries each grew at currently projected average rates – even if one understands that there are many factors that can and likely will alter their trajectories. The projected growth trends of the three countries suggest that at some point in the next few decades, perhaps between 2015 and 2030, China’s GDP will surpass that of the United States. And by adding consideration of the economic impact of demographic trends (China’s aging and India’s youth bulge), there is a possibility that India will surpass both China and the US, perhaps by 2040 or 2050, to become the world’s largest economy. These potential shifts of economic power from the United States to China then to India would likely prove strategically disruptive on a global scale. Although slowly developing, such disruptive change would likely have an even greater strategic impact than the Arab Spring. The “rise” of China has already proved strategically disruptive, creating a potential China-United States regional rivalry in Asia two decades after Americans fretted about an emerging US conflict with a then-rising Japan challenging American economic supremacy. Despite uncertainty surrounding projections, foreseeing the possibility (some would say high likelihood) that China and then India will replace the United States as the largest global economy has near-term policy implications for the US and Europe. The potential long-term shift in economic clout and concomitant shift in political power and strategic position away from the US and the West and toward the East has implications for near-term policy choices. Policymakers could conclude, for example, that the West should make greater efforts to bring the emerging (or re-emerging) great powers into close consultation on the “rules of the game” and global governance as the West’s influence in shaping institutions and behavior is likely to significantly diminish over the next few decades. The alternative to finding such a near-term accommodation could be increasing mutual suspicions and hostility rather than trust and growing cooperation between rising and established powers—especially between China and the United States—leading to a fragmented, zero-sum world in which major global challenges like climate change and resource scarcities are not addressed and conflict over dwindling resources and markets intensifies and even bleeds into the military realm among the major actors. Neither of these scenarios may play out, of course. Other global trends suggest that sometime in the next several decades, the world could encounter a “hard ceiling” on resources availability and that climate change could throw the global economy into a tailspin, harming China and India even more than the United States. In this case, perhaps India and China would falter economically leading to internal instability and crises of governance, significantly reducing their rates of economic growth and their ability to project power and play a significant international role than might otherwise have been expected. But this scenario has other implications for policymakers, including dangers posed to Western interests from “failure” of China and/or India, which could produce huge strategic shocks to the global system, including a prolonged economic downturn in the West as well as the East. Thus, looking at relatively slowly developing trends can provide foresight for necessary course corrections now to avert catastrophic disruptive change or prepare to be more resilient if foreseeable but unavoidable shocks occur. Policymakers and the public will press for predictions and criticize government officials and intelligence agencies when momentous events “catch us by surprise.” But unfortunately, as both Yogi Berra and Neils Bohr are credited with saying, “prediction is very hard, especially about the future.” One can predict with great accuracy many natural events such as sunrise and the boiling point of water at sea level. We can rely on the infallible predictability of the laws of physics to build airplanes and automobiles and iPhones. And we can calculate with great precision the destruction footprint of a given nuclear weapon. Yet even physical systems like the weather as they become more complex, become increasingly difficult and even inherently impossible to predict with precision. With human behavior, specific predictions are not just hard, but impossible as uncertainty is inherent in the human universe. As futurist Paul Saffo wrote in the Harvard Business Review in 2007, “prediction is possible only in a world in which events are preordained and no amount of actions in the present can influence the future outcome.” One cannot know for certain what actions he or she will take in the future much less the actions of another person, a group of people or a nation state. This obvious point is made to dismiss any idea of trying to “predict” what will occur in the future with accuracy, especially the outcomes of the interplay of many complex factors, including the interaction of human and natural systems. More broadly, the human future is not predetermined but rather depends on human choices at every turning point, cumulatively leading to different alternative outcomes. This uncertainty about the future also means the future is amenable to human choice and leadership. Trends analyses—including foreseeing trends leading to disruptive change—are thus essential to provide individuals, organizations and political leaders with the strategic foresight to take steps mitigate the dangers ahead and seize the opportunities for shaping the human destiny. Peter Schwartz nearly a decade ago characterized the convergence of trends and disruptive change as “inevitable surprises.” He wrote in Inevitable Surprises that “in the coming decades we face many more inevitable surprises: major discontinuities in the economic, political and social spheres of our world, each one changing the ‘rules of the game’ as its played today. If anything, there will be more, no fewer, surprises in the future, and they will all be interconnected. Together, they will lead us into a world, ten to fifteen years hence, that is fundamentally different from the one we know today. Understanding these inevitable surprises in our future is critical for the decisions we have to make today …. We may not be able to prevent catastrophe (although sometimes we can), but we can certainly increase our ability to respond, and our ability to see opportunities that we would otherwise miss.

### Psycho – Alt Fails

#### The kritik is a disempowering lure – it causes an avoidance of praxis with the false belief that we can create real change through confrontation with symbolic meaning

**Johnston 5**, Professor of Philosophy at New Mexico, 2005 (<http://www.scribd.com/doc/12604934/the-cynics-fetish-slavoj-zizek-and-the-dynamics-of-bolief>)

However, the absence of this type of Lacan-underwritten argument in Zizek's socio­political thought indicates something important. Following Lacan, Zizek describes instances of the tactic of 'lying in the guise of truth" and points to late-capitalist cynicism as a key example of this (here, cynically knowing the truth that 'the System" is a vacuous sham produces no real change in behavior, no decision to stop acting as if this big Other is something with genuine substantiality).Zizek proclaims that, "the starting point of the critique of ideology has to be full acknowledgement of the fact that it is easily possible to *lie in the guise of truth."* Although the Lacanian blurring of the boundary between theoretical thinking and practical action might very well be completely true, accepting it as true inevitably risks strengthening a convenient alibi—the creation of this alibi has long been a *fait accompli* for which Lacan alone could hardly be held responsible—**for the worst sort of intellectualized avoidance of *praxis.* Academics can convincingly reassure themselves that their inaccessible, abstract musings**, the publications of which are perused only by their tiny self-enclosed circle of "ivory lower" colleagues, **aren't irrelevant obscurities made possible by tacit complicity with a certain socio-economic *status quo****,* **but, rather, radical political interventions that promise sweeping changes of the predominating situation. If working on signifiers is the same as working in the streets, then** why dirty one's hands **bothering with the latter?** Consequently, if Zizek is to avoid allowing for a lapse into this comfortable academic illusion, an illusion for which Lacan could all too easily be perverted into offering rationalizing excuses, he must eventually stipulate a series of "**naive" extra-theoretical/extra-discursive actions** (actions that will hopefully become acts after their enactment) as part of a coherent political platform for the embattled Left His rejection of Marx's positive prescriptive program as anachronistic is quite justified. But, in the wake of Zizeks clearing of the ground for something New in politics, there is still much to be done A brief remark by Zizek hints that, despite his somewhat pessimistic assessment of traditional Marxism, he basically agrees with the Marxist conviction that the demise of capitalism is an inevitable, unavoidable historical necessity—"The ultimate answer to the reproach that the radical Left proposals are Utopian should thus be that, today, the true Utopia is the belief that the present liberal-democratic capitalist consensus could go on indefinitely, without radical changes."" This hurling of the charge of utopianism back at those making it is quite convincing. In fact, any system proclaiming to be the embodiment of 'the end of history" invariably appears to be Utopian. Given what is known about the merciless march of history, believing that an ultimate, unsurpassable socio-political arrangement finally has arrived is almost impossible. So, one should indeed accept as true the unlikelihood of capitalism continuing on indefinitely; it must eventually give way to something else, even if this "x" cannot be envisioned clearly from within the present context. Nonetheless, Zizek's own theorizing calls for a great deal of cautious reservation about the consequences of embracing this outlook as true, of falling into the trap of (to invoke this motif once more) lying in the guise of truth. Just as the combination of a purely negative, critical Marxism with the anticipation of the event of the act-miracle threatens to turn into an intellectual fetish (in the Zizekian ideological sense of something that renders the present reality bearable), so too might acknowledging the truth of capitalism's finitude have the same unfortunate side-effect. One can tolerate today's capitalism, because one knows that it cannot last forever; one can passively and patiently wait it out (at one point. Zizek identifies this anticipation of indeterminate change-yet-to-come as a disempowering lure, although he doesn't explicitly acknowledge that **his own work on ideology** sometimes **appears to be enthralled by just such a lure**). In both cases, the danger is that the very analyses developed by Zizek in his assault upon late-capitalist ideology **might serve to facilitate the sustenance of the cynical distance whose underlying complicity with the present state of affairs he describes so well.**

### Death Drive

#### Accepting the death drives kills responsibility

Lear 2000Jonathan Lear, Philosophy Professor at the University of Chicago, 2000

Happiness, Death, and the Remainder of Life, Page 131-132

By 1920 Freud is ready to break up what he has come to see as a fantasized unity of mental functioning. The mind can no longer be understood in terms of the pleasure principle, but instead of living with the gap, he posits a “beyond.” It is in this way that Freud takes himself to be explaining aggression. Aggression is now interpreted as the death drive diverted outward. It is precisely this move which locks us into an inescapably negative teleogy. Let us just assume (for the sake of argument, though I think it true) that humans are aggressive animals, and that dealing with human aggression is a serious psychological and social problem. The question remains: how might one deal with it? But if, as Freud does, one interprets aggression as the most obvious manifestation of one of the two primordial forces in the universe, the answer would seem to be: there is no successful way. My first inclination is to say that this leads to a pessimistic view of the human condition; but this isn’t really the issue. My second inclination is to say it leads to a limited view of the human condition; but even this doesn’t get to the heart of the problem. The point here is not to endorse an ontic optimism – that if we didn’t adopt this view, we could shape life in nonaggressive ways – but to confront an ontological insight: that Freud’s interpretation is an instance of bad faith. The metaphysical basicness of the death drive implies a kind of metaphysical intractability to the phenomenon of human aggression. As a matter of empirical fact, humans may be aggressive animals – and the fact of human aggression may be difficult to deal with. It may be experienced as intractable. But to raise this purported intractability to a metaphysical principle is to obliterate the question of responsibility. And it is to cover over – by precluding – what might turn out to be a significant empirical possibilities.