# 1AC

Same as round 2.

# 2AC

## Case

### Threats real

####  (Change this tag if they say “your method of engaging veterans is bad” to say focusing on “how” we engage veteran is bad..)

Wendt, Handbook of IR, 2002 p. 68

It should be stressed that in advocating a pragmatic view we are not endorsing method-driven social science. Too much research in international relations chooses problems or things to be explained with a view to whether the analysis will provide support for one or another methodological ‘ism’. But the point of IR scholarship should be to answer questions about international politics that are of great normative concern, not to validate methods. Methods are means, not ends in themselves. As a matter of personal scholarly choice it may be reasonable to stick with one method and see how far it takes us. But since we do not know how far that is, if the goal of the discipline is insight into world politics then it makes little sense to rule out one or the other approach on a priori grounds. In that case a method indeed becomes a tacit ontology, which may lead to neglect of whatever problems it is poorly suited to address. Being conscious about these choices is why it is important to distinguish between the ontological, empirical and pragmatic levels of the rationalist-constructivist debate. We favor the pragmatic approach on heuristic grounds, but we certainly believe a conversation should continue on all three levels.

## T

### T

#### C/I Authority includes power to act or conduct an act

#### Hill 05 Free Legal Dictionary definition. <http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/authority> (Gerald and Kathleen Hill are co-authors of 25 books, including The People's Law Dictionary, Real Life Dictionary of the Law, Encyclopedia of Federal Agencies and Commissions, Facts On File Dictionary of American Politics, and the popular Hill Guides: Sonoma Valley: The Secret Wine Country, Napa Valley: Land of Golden Vines; Victoria and Vancouver Island: the Almost Perfect Eden; Northwest Wine Country; Santa Barbara and the Central Coast: California's Riviera; and Monterey and Carmel: Eden by the Sea. Gerald has practiced law for more than four decades in both San Francisco's financial district and the town of Sonoma, California. He has an A.B. from Stanford University and Juris Doctor from Hastings College of the Law of the University of California. He was Executive Director of the California Governor’s Housing Commission, drafted legislation, taught at Golden Gate University Law School, served as an arbitrator and pro tem judge, edited and co-authored Housing in California, was an elected trustee of a public hospital, and has testified before Congressional committees.)

authority n. permission, a right coupled with the power to do an act or order others to act. Often one person gives another authority to act, as an employer to an employee, a principal to an agent, a corporation to its officers, or governmental empowerment to perform certain functions. There are different types of authority including "apparent authority" when a principal gives an agent various signs of authority to make others believe he or she has authority, "express authority" or "limited authority" which spell out exactly what authority is granted (usually a written set of instructions), "implied authority" which flows from the position one holds, and "general authority" which is the broad power to act for another.

#### The “war powers authority” of the President is his Commander-in-Chief authority

Gallagher, Pakistan/Afghanistan coordination cell of the U.S. Joint Staff, Summer 2011

(Joseph, “Unconstitutional War: Strategic Risk in the Age of Congressional Abdication,” *Parameters*, http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/2011summer/Gallagher.pdf)

First, consider the constitutional issue of power imbalance. Central to the Constitution is the foundational principle of power distribution and provisions to check and balance exercises of that power. This clearly intended separation of powers across the three branches of government ensures that no single federal officeholder can wield an inordinate amount of power or influence. The founders carefully crafted constitutional war-making authority with the branch most representative of the people—Congress.4

The Federalist Papers No. 51, “The Structure of Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments,” serves as the wellspring for this principle. Madison insisted on the necessity to prevent any particular interest or group to trump another interest or group.5 This principle applies in practice to all decisions of considerable national importance. **Specific to war powers authority**, **the Constitution empowers the legislative branch with the authority to declare war but endows the Executive with the authority to act as Commander-in-Chief.**6 This construct designates Congress, not the president, as the primary decisionmaking body to commit the nation to war—a decision that ultimately requires the consent and will of the people in order to succeed. By vesting the decision to declare war with Congress, the founders underscored their intention to engage the people—those who would ultimately sacrifice their blood and treasure in the effort.

#### Commander in Chief powers are the justification for TK

Wheeler 13 “The AUMF fallacy” Marcy Wheeler, founder of EmptyWheel – a national security blog, PhD in comparative lit

<http://www.emptywheel.net/2013/02/18/the-aumf-fallacy/>

And ultimately, we should look to what Stephen Preston — the General Counsel of the agency that actually carried out the Awlaki killing — has to say about where the CIA gets its authorization to engage in lethal covert operations.

Let’s start with the first box: **Authority to Act under U.S. Law**.

First, we would confirm that **the contemplated activity is authorized by the President in the exercise of his powers under Article II of the U.S. Constitution, for example, the President’s responsibility as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief to protect the country from an imminent threat of violent attack**. This would not be just a one-time check for legal authority at the outset. Our hypothetical program would be engineered so as to ensure that, through careful review and senior-level decision-making, each individual action is linked to the imminent threat justification.

### sub

**Substantial means great in amount**

**Words and Phrases, 2** (Words and Phrases Permanent Edition, “Substantial,” Volume 40A, p. 448-486 October 2002, Thomson West)

N.D.Ala. 1957. The word “substantial” means considerable in amount, value, or the like, large, as a substantial gain. – Levenson v. U.S., 157, F.Supp. 224.

### Extra T

#### 2. the enforcement mechanism is a statory restriction

Black’s Law

“statutory restriction”, <http://thelawdictionary.org/statutory-restriction/>, accessed 6-2-13

Limits or controls that have been placed on activities by its ruling legislation.

## K

### Solider K

#### 6. Our discussion of war powers through the state is key to accountability and public inquiry, the alternative is disengagement and fails

Ewan E. **Mellor** – European University Institute, Political and Social Sciences, Graduate Student, Paper Prepared for BISA Conference 20**13**, “Why policy relevance is a moral necessity: Just war theory, impact, and UAVs”, online

**This section of the paper considers** more generally **the need for** just war **theorists to engage with policy debate about the use of force**, as well as to engage with the more fundamental moral and philosophical principles of the just war tradition. **It draws on John Kelsay’s conception of just war thinking as being a social practice**,35 **as well as on** Michael **Walzer’s understanding of the role of the social critic in society**.36 It argues that **the just war tradition is a form of “practical discourse” which is concerned with questions of “how we should act.**”37¶ Kelsay argues that:¶ [T]he criteria of jus ad bellum and jus in bello provide a framework for structured participation in a public conversation about the use of military force . . . citizens who choose to speak in just war terms express commitments . . . [i]n the process of giving and asking for reasons for going to war, those who argue in just war terms seek to influence policy by persuading others that their analysis provides a way to express and fulfil the desire that military actions be both wise and just.38¶ He also argues that “**good just war thinking involves continuous and complete deliberation**, in the sense that one attends to all the standard criteria at war’s inception, at its end, and throughout the course of the conflict.”39 **This is important as it highlights the need for** just war **scholars to engage with the ongoing operations in war and the specific policies that are involved**. The question of whether a particular war is just or unjust, and the question of whether a particular weapon (like drones) can be used in accordance with the jus in bello criteria, only cover a part of the overall justice of the war. **Without an engagement with the reality of war, in terms of the policies used in waging it, it is impossible to engage with the “moral reality of war,”**40 **in terms of being able to discuss it and judge it in moral terms**.¶ Kelsay’s description of just war thinking as a social practice is similar to Walzer’s more general description of social criticism. **The** just war **theorist, as a social critic, must be involved with his or her own society and its practices**. In the same way that the social critic’s distance from his or her society is measured in inches and not miles,41 **the** just war **theorist must be close to and must understand the language through which war is constituted, interpreted and reinterpreted**.42 **It is only by understanding the values and language that their own society purports to live by that the social critic can hold up a mirror to that society to**¶ **demonstrate its hypocrisy and to show the gap that exists between its practice and its values**.43 **The tradition** itself provides a set of values and principles and, as argued by Cian O’Driscoll, **constitutes a “language of engagement” to spur participation in public and political debate.**44 This language is part of “our common heritage, the product of many centuries of arguing about war.”45 These principles and this language provide the terms through which people understand and come to interpret war, not in a deterministic way but by providing the categories necessary for moral understanding and moral argument about the legitimate and illegitimate uses of force.46 **By spurring and providing the basis for political engagement the just war tradition ensures that the acts that occur within war are considered according to just war criteria and allows policy-makers to be held to account on this basis**.¶ **Engaging with the reality of war requires recognising that war is**, as Clausewitz stated, **a continuation of policy**. **War**, according to Clausewitz, **is subordinate to politics and to political choices and these political choices can, and must, be judged and critiqued**.47 ***Engagement and political debate are morally necessary as the alternative is disengagement and moral quietude, which is a sacrifice of the obligations of citizenship***.48 ***This engagement must bring*** just war ***theorists into contact with the policy makers and will require work that is accessible and relevant to policy makers***, **however this does not mean a sacrifice of critical distance or an abdication of truth in the face of power**. By engaging in detail with the policies being pursued and their concordance or otherwise with the principles of the just war tradition **the policy-makers will be forced to account for their decisions and justify them in just war language**. In contrast to the view, suggested by Kenneth Anderson, that “the public cannot be made part of the debate” and that “[w]e are necessarily committed into the hands of our political leadership”,49 **it is incumbent upon** just war **theorists to ensure that the public are informed and are capable of holding their political leaders to account**. To accept the idea that the political leadership are stewards and that accountability will not benefit the public, on whose behalf action is undertaken, but will only benefit al Qaeda,50 is a grotesque act of intellectual irresponsibility. As Walzer has argued, **it is precisely because it is “our country” that we are “especially obligated to criticise its policies**.”51

#### Drone warfare has created public apathy making war inevitable, reinvigorating democratic resistance is the only solvency- turns the impact to the K

Judah A. Druck, B.A., Brandeis University, 2010; J.D. Candidate, Cornell Law School, 2013. Cornell University Law Review. “DRONING ON: THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION AND THE NUMBING EFFECT OF TECHNOLOGY-DRIVEN WARFARE”. http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/cornell-law-review/upload/Druck-final.pdf

The practical effects of this move toward a technology-driven, and therefore limited, proxy style of warfare are mixed. On the one hand, the removal of American soldiers from harm’s way is a clear benefit, 124 as is the reduced harm to the American public in general. For that, we should be thankful. But there is another effect that is less easy to identify: public apathy. By increasing the use of robotics and decreasing the probability of harm to American soldiers, modern warfare has “affect[ed] the way the public views and perceives war” by turning it into “the equivalent of sports fans watching war, rather than citizens sharing in its importance.” 125 As a result, the American public has slowly fallen victim to the numbing effect of technology-driven warfare; when the risks of harm to American soldiers abroad and civilians at home are diminished, so too is the public’s level of interest in foreign military policy. 126 In the political sphere, this effect snowballs into both an uncaring public not able (or willing) to effectively mobilize in order to challenge presidential action and enforce the WPR, and a Congress whose own willingness to check presidential military action is heavily tied to public opinion. 127 Recall, for example, the case of the Mayaguez, where potentially unconstitutional action went unchecked because the mission was perceived to be a success. 128 Yet we can imagine that most missions involving drone strikes will be “successful” in the eyes of the public: even if a strike misses a target, the only “loss” one needs to worry about is the cost of a wasted missile, and the ease of deploying another drone would likely provide a quick remedy. Given the political risks associated with making critical statements about military action, especially if that action results in success, 129 we can expect even less congressional WPR enforcement as more military engagements are supported (or, at the very least, ignored) by the public. In this respect, the political reaction to the Mayaguez seems to provide an example of the rule, rather than the exception, in gauging political reactions within a technology-driven warfare regime. Thus, when the public becomes more apathetic about foreign affairs as a result of the limited harms associated with technology-driven warfare, and Congress’s incentive to act consequently diminishes, the President is freed from any possible WPR constraints we might expect him to face, regardless of any potential legal issues. 130 Perhaps unsurprisingly, nearly all of the constitutionally problematic conflicts carried out by presidents involved smaller-scale military actions, rarely totaling more than a few thousand troops in direct contact with hostile forces. 131 Conversely, conflicts that have included larger forces, which likely provided sufficient incentive for public scrutiny, have generally complied with domestic law. 132 The result is that as wars become more limited, 133 unilateral presidential action will likely become even more unchecked as the triggers for WPR enforcement fade away. In contrast with the social and political backlash witnessed during the Civil War, World War I, the Vietnam War, and the Iraq War, contemporary military actions provide insufficient incentive to prevent something as innocuous and limited as a drone strike. Simply put, technology-driven warfare is not conducive to the formation of a substantial check on presidential action. 134

#### The way we discuss war policy is good

Stephen Lee (Cambridge University Press) March 1, 1996 “Morality, Prudence, and Nuclear Weapons” p. 327

The prospects for the delegitimation of nuclear weapons depends on the clarity of the crystal ball – that is, on the keenness and the immediacy with which the horrors of nuclear war are present in the minds of those who make decisions about military matters. When the vision is sharp, the mental connection between a possible act of aggression, whether nuclear or nonnuclear, and the potential for societal destruction is clear, and when that connection is clear, the aggression will likely be unthinkable. When each side believes that this connection is clear and strong fo the other, it comes to expect nonaggression from the other, and this allows its own inclination against aggression to become habitual. The problem is that time clouds the crystal ball, and an expectation that nuclear weapons would not be used y the other side in response to nonnuclear aggression clouds it further, and this weakens the connection. To promote the habits, one must counteract this obscuration. One way to do this is constantly remind people in general, and leaders in particular, of the horrors of nuclear war. Leaders must be continually scared straight. There must be an ongoing educational campaign to keep the potential destructivness of nuclear war ever-present in their minds. Those engaged in this campaign should not be deterred by critics who claim that the danger of nuclear war is something everyone knows about already and that talking about it succeeds only in frightening people.

#### Perm do both- the affirmaite if key to opening up the political space by increasing transpernecy, and encoperating public discussion. This is a prereq to the alt.

Gowder 2006 (Paul Gowder, J.D., Harvard Law School, 2006, “Secrecy as Mystification of Power: Meaning and Ethics in the Security State,” I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY, http://pangea-icic.ifai.org.mx/National%20Security/secrecy%20as%20mystification%20of%20power.pdf)

Secrecy defeats that claim to legitimacy too once we introduce time into the equation. The nature of claims to normative validity (like all claims analogous to truth claims) is that they are contingent on future knowledge and discourse.64 This is a common-sense principle: to validate anything by argumentation, we must be willing to permit ongoing inquiry to determine if new insight proves us wrong. Thus, Habermas’s universalization principle requires an opportunity for people in the future to participate in the discourse.65¶ Secrecy creates a path-dependence which operates to prevent future participants from engaging in a future discourse. It impairs data-gathering about the effects of secret policies, thus divesting future actors of the reasons they may consider in determining whether their representatives are serving them.66 This is surely inconsistent with our notions of democracy.

#### The permutation is best- state action is necassary

Pinar Bilgin (Department of International Relations Bilkent University Ankara) 2005 “Regional Security in the Middle East” p. 60-1

Admittedly, providing a critique of existing approaches to security, revealing those hidden assumptions and normative projects embedded in Cold War Security Studies, is only a first step. In other words, from a critical security perspective, self-reflection, thinking and writing are not enough in themselves. They should be compounded by other forms of practice (that is, action taken on the ground). It is indeed crucial for students of critical approaches to re-think security in both theory and practice by pointing to possibilities for change immanent in world politics and suggesting emancipatory practices if it is going to fulfil the promise of becoming a 'force of change' in world politics. Cognisant of the need to find and suggest alternative practices to meet a broadened security agenda without adopting militarised or zero-sum thinking and practices, students of critical approaches to security have suggested the imagining, creation and nurturing of security communities as emancipatory practices (Booth 1994a; Booth and Vale 1997). Although Devetak's approach to the theory/practice relationship echoes critical approaches' conception of theory as a form of practice, the latter seeks to go further in shaping global practices. The distinction Booth makes between 'thinking about thinking' and 'thinking about doing' grasps the difference between the two. Booth (1997:114) writes: Thinking about thinking is important, but, more urgently, so is thinking about doing…. Abstract ideas about emancipation will not suffice: it is important for Critical Security Studies to engage with the real by suggesting policies, agents, and sites of change, to help humankind, in whole and in part, to move away from its structural wrongs. In this sense, providing a critique of existing approaches to security, revealing those hidden assumptions and normative projects embedded in Cold War Security Studies, is only a first (albeit crucial) step. It is vital for the students of critical approaches to re-think security in both theory and practice.

#### Removing the state of secrecy is key to stop threat construction

Masco 2

(Joseph – Prof Anthropology @ U Chicago; “Lie Detectors: On Secrets and Hypersecurity in Los Alamos”; Public Culture 14.3 (2002) 441-467)BHB

It is important, therefore, to recognize the social costs of legitimizing a new national discourse about the need to protect "America's secrets." The Wen Ho Lee affair was simply the first in a series of widely publicized U.S. "security scandals" in 1999-2000 involving a potential loss of classified information. Officials responded to these events by evoking "America's secrets" as a self-evident category, [End Page 463] one needing no further explanation but requiring total protection regardless of the cost to the nation. For example, in 2000, after John Deutch, former head of the CIA, acknowledged that he had illegally stored classified information about CIA covert activities on his unsecured home computer, and after a State Department laptop computer containing "above top secret" information was lost, Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright intoned: "This is inexcusable and intolerable. Such failures put our nation's secrets at risk." 13 That no one even bothered to question this open declaration from the State Department that the United States keeps "secrets" reveals perhaps the truest legacy of the Cold War—after all, the fact that states keep secrets is supposed to be a secret! But as America's first multigenerational, global conflict, the Cold War, with all its expansive new forms of secrecy, became nothing less than an organizing principle in American society. One cultural legacy of that nuclear standoff is that an "at war" mentality is now a basic feature of the U.S. national imaginary, one that is easily provoked, deployed, and acquiesced to. Correspondingly, the institutional legacy of the Cold War remains a vast military complex that constantly needs new threats to justify its continued relevance and expansion (in the 1990s: possible nuclear espionage, a potential North Korean missile, and "rogue" regimes, to name just a few; after 11 September 2001: the global "war on terror"). 14 Thus, it is important to see the recent security scandals not only in terms of their individual features, but also in terms of the role they play within a broader conflict in Washington over how to capitalize on the United States's current position as the world's sole military "superpower." The strategic manipulation of real or imagined "threat" is enabled by a secret governmentality (as the details are always "top secret"), but that secret governmentality is also further legitimated by the constant evocation of new threats (such as missing computer codes, phantom missiles, and potential terrorist acts). 15 If this circuit continues, then how the nuclear weapons complex [End Page 464] evolves in U.S. policy and practice, and how citizens are positioned in regard to U.S. national security over the next few decades, is very likely to be nothing less than an ever more strictly policed, ever more powerfully protected, nuclear secret.

#### Only representing views of veterans is bad- there are a litany of other people affected by drone policy and presidential military policy- the alt forcloses a discussion of those voices. we should consider civilan casualites too otherwise we are disregarding their voices- this is another net benefit to the perm

DEREK GREGORY, Department of Geography, University of British Columbia, “The everywhere war” This paper was accepted for publication in May 2011 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/store/10.1111/j.1475-4959.2011.00426.x/asset/j.1475-4959.2011.00426.x.pdf?v=1&t=hkind5qg&s=fede42c8a2c2eefd37163c1ed92c6f5f887cf207

For many, particularly in the United States, 9/11 was a moment when the world turned; for others, particularly outside the United States, it was a climactic summation of a longer history of American imperialism in general and its meddling in the Middle East in particular. Either way, it is not surprising that many commentators should have emphasised the temporality of the military violence that followed in the wake of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on that bright September morning: the ‘war on terror’ that became ‘the long war’. For the RETORT collective, the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq marked ‘the elevation – into a state of permanent war – of a long and consis- tent pattern of military expansionism in the service of empire’ (RETORT 2005, 80). Keen (2006) wrote of ‘endless war’, Duffield (2007) of ‘unending war’ and Filkins (2008) of ‘the forever war’. The sense of per- manence endures, and yet Engelhardt (2010, 2–3) ruefully notes that it remains difficult for Americans to understand ‘that Washington is a war capital, that the United States is a war state, that it garrisons much of the planet, and that the norm for us is to be at war somewhere at any moment’. Bacevich (2010, 225) traces this state of affairs to what he calls the ‘Wash- ington rules’ that long pre-date 9/11. These are ‘the conviction that the obligations of leadership require the United States to maintain a global military pres-ence, configure its armed forces for power projection, and employ them to impose changes abroad’, which he argues have formed ‘the enduring leitmotif of US national security policy’ for the last 60 years and ‘propelled the United States into a condition approximating perpetual war’. Each of these temporal formulations implies spatial formations. For RETORT (2005, 103) ‘military neo- liberalism’ is ‘the true globalization of our time’. The planetary garrison that projects US military power is divided into six geographically defined unified com- batant commands – like US Central Command, CENTCOM – whose Areas of Responsibility cover every region on earth and which operate through a global network of bases. If you think this unremark- able, ask yourself Bacevich’s question: how would the United States react if China were to mirror these moves? Think, too, of the zones in which the shadow of US military violence still falls: not just Afghanistan and Iraq, but also Iran, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen. Then think of the zones where the rhetoric of the ‘war on terror’ has been used by other states to legitimise repression: Chechnya, Libya, Palestine, the Philippines, Sri Lanka. And then think of the cities that have become displacements of the space of war, punctuation points in what Sassen (2010, 37) calls ‘a new kind of multi-sited war’: Casablanca, Lahore, London, Madrid, Moscow, Mumbai. All these lists are incomplete, but even in this truncated form they suggest the need to analyse not only ‘the forever war’ but also what we might call ‘the every- where war’. This is at once a conceptual and a material project whose scope can be indexed by three geo-graphs that trace a movement from the abstract to the concrete: Foucault’s (1975–6) prescient suggestion that war has become the pervasive matrix within which social life is constituted; the replacement of the concept of the battlefield in US military doctrine by the multi-scalar, multi-dimensional ‘battlespace’ with ‘no front or back’ and where ‘everything becomes a site of perma- nent war’ (Graham 2009, 389; 2010, 31); and the assault on the global borderlands where the United States and its allies now conduct their military opera- tions. The first two are never far from the surface of this essay, but it is the third that is my primary focus. Duffield (2001, 309) once described the borderlands as ‘an imagined geographical space where, in the eyes of metropolitan actors and agencies, the characteris- tics of brutality, excess and breakdown predominate’. There, in the ‘wild zones’ of the global South, wars are supposed to occur ‘through greed and sectarian gain, social fabric is destroyed and developmental gains reversed, non-combatants killed, humanitarian assis- tance abused and all civility abandoned’. This imagi- native geography folds in and out of the rhetorical distinction between ‘our’ wars – wars conducted by advanced militaries that are supposed to be surgical, sensitive and scrupulous – and ‘their’ wars. In reality, however, the boundaries are blurred and each bleeds into its other (Gregory 2010). Thus the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 combined a long- distance, high-altitude war from the air with a ground war spearheaded by the warlords and militias of the Northern Alliance operating with US infantry and Special Forces; counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq has involved the co-option of ragtag militias to supplement US military operations; and in Afghani- stan the US Army pays off warlords and ultimately perhaps even the Taliban to ensure that its overland supply chain is protected from attack (Report of the Majority Staff 2010). In mapping these borderlands – which are also shadowlands, spaces that enter European and Ameri- can imaginaries in phantasmatic form, barely known but vividly imagined – we jibe against the limits of cartographic and so of geopolitical reason. From Rat- zel’s view of der Krieg als Schule des Raumes to Lacoste’s stinging denunciation – ‘la géographie, ça sert, d’abord, à faire la guerre’ – the deadly liaison between modern war and modern geography has been conducted in resolutely territorial terms. To be sure, the genealogy of territory has multiple valences, and Ratzel’s Raum is not Lacoste’s espace, but a criti- cal analysis of the everywhere war requires carto- graphic reason to be supplemented by other, more abile spatialities. This is not only a matter of tran- scending the geopolitical, connecting it to the bio- political and the geo-economic, but also of tracking space as a ‘doing’, precarious, partially open and never complete. It is in something of this spirit that Bauman (2002, 83) identifies the ‘planetary frontier- lands’ as staging grounds of today’s wars, where efforts to ‘pin the divisions and mutual enmities to the ground seldom bring results’. In the course of ‘inter- minable frontierland warfare’, so he argues, ‘trenches are seldom dug’, adversaries are ‘constantly on the move’ and have become for all intents and purposes ‘extraterritorial’. I am not sure about the last (Bauman is evidently thinking of al Qaeda, which is scarcely the summation of late modern war), but this is an arresting if impressionistic canvas and the fluidity con- veyed by Bauman’s broad brush-strokes needs to be fleshed out. After the US-led invasion of Iraq it was commonplace to distinguish the Green Zone and its satellites (the US political-military bastion in Baghdad and its penumbra of Forward Operating Bases) from the ‘red zone’ that was everywhere else. But this cat- egorical division is misleading. The colours seeped into and swirled around one another, so that occupied Iraq became not so much a patchwork of green zones and red zones as a thoroughly militarised landscape saturated in varying intensities of brown (khaki): ‘intensities’ because within this warscape military and paramilitary violence could descend at any moment without warning, and within it precarious local orders were constantly forming and re-forming. I think this is what Anderson (2011) means when he describes insurgencies oscillating ‘between extended periods of absence as a function of their dispersion’ and ‘moments of disruptive, punctual presence’, but these variable intensities entrain all sides in today’s ‘wars amongst the people’ – and most of all those caught in the middle. This is to emphasise the emergent, ‘event-ful’ quality of contemporary violence, what Gros (2010, 260) sees as ‘moments of pure laceration’ that punc- ture the everyday, as a diffuse and dispersed ‘state of violence’ replaces the usual configurations of war. Violence can erupt on a commuter train in Madrid, a house in Gaza City, a poppy field in Helmand or a street in Ciudad Juarez: such is the contrapuntal geog- raphy of the everywhere war. It is also to claim that, as cartographic reason falters and military violence is loosed from its frames, the conventional ties between war and geography have come undone: that, as Münkler (2005, 3) has it, ‘war has lost its well-defined contours’. In what follows, I propose to take Münkler at his word and consider three borderlands beyond Afghanistan and Iraq that illuminate some of the ways in which, since 9/11, late modern war is being trans- formed by the slippery spaces within which and through which it is conducted. I focus in turn on ‘Af-Pak’, ‘Amexica’ and cyberspace, partly because these concrete instances remind us that the every-where war is also always somewhere (Sparke 2007, 117), and partly because they bring into view features of a distinctly if not uniquely American way of war. Af-Pak’ ‘Af-Pak’ is the cover term coined by the Obama administration, and probably by its Special Represen- tative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Hol- brooke, to describe the regional battlespace in which the United States pursues its armed conflict with the Taliban and al Qaeda. The term is widely disliked in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but its hyphen marks a pro- foundly ambiguous zone. The border was surveyed between 1894 and 1896 to delimit British colonial territories in India along the north-west frontier with Afghanistan. This so-called Durand Line bisected the cultural region of Pashtunistan, dividing villages and extended families with strong culture and kinship connections between them, and ever since the forma- tion of Pakistan in 1947, Afghanistan has insisted that the demarcation lapsed with the end of colonial rule. The established body of international law rejects the Afghan position, but Mahmud (2010) argues that the continued entanglements of law and colonial power show that in this post-colonial space law is still part of the problem rather than the solution because the border freeze-frames colonial demarcations. Not sur- prisingly, the borderlands are highly porous and many of their inhabitants routinely cross from Afghanistan into Pakistan and back without bothering about any border formalities. This includes the Taliban, whose movements are both episodic, fleeing hot pursuit from Afghanistan, and seasonal, returning from Pakistan when fighting resumes in the spring. This recent history has compounded the porosity of the region so that ‘Af-Pak’ also conjures up a shadowy, still more dispersed ‘risky geography’ that wires Afghanistan and Pakistan to ‘Londonistan’ and other European cities, and to terrorist cells and militant groups that threaten Europe and the continental United States (Amoore and de Goede 2011). Although the Taliban is predominantly Pashtun, it is not a monolith that straddles the border. The Taliban emerged in the early 1990s as an armed and predomi- nantly Pashtun response to the brutalising rule of the militias of the Northern Alliance who governed Afghanistan in the turbulent aftermath of the Soviet occupation in 1989. The Taliban sought to impose its own stringent version of Islamic law, and its advance drew thousands of veterans from the guerilla war against the Red Army and from Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan. The civil war that ensued was a bloody and protracted affair; hundreds of al-Qaeda fighters fought alongside Taliban troops, although the relations between the two were far from straightforward, and by the end of the decade Afghanistan had been virtually consumed by the violence. The insular, ultra- nationalist project of the Taliban was supported by Pakistan throughout the 1990s, and the neo-Taliban that regrouped after the US-led invasion of Afghani- stan has continued to seek an accommodation with Islamabad (Gregory 2004, 41–2). Its leadership council was driven from Kandahar and is now based in Quetta; its four regional military councils are based in Pakistan too, and it enjoys the support of Pakistan’s Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence. These affili- ations sharply distinguish the Afghan Taliban from the Pakistan Taliban, or Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP), which was formed in December 2007 as a loose coalition of militant Islamicist groups under Baitullah Mehsud. The Pakistan Taliban endorses the struggle against the US-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, but its primary target is the Pakistani state: it seeks to establish its own rule over the Feder- ally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) on the border. The Pakistan military has conducted a series of offen- sive operations against the TTP in those areas, punc- tuated by wavering truces, but the FATA continue to have a tense and attenuated relationship to Islamabad, and in Urdu they are known as ilaqa ghair, ‘alien’, ‘foreign’, or even ‘forbidden’ lands. These ambivalences have a direct impact on strikes by Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in the FATA. The attacks are carried out by armed MQ-1 Predators and MQ-9 Reapers launched from bases in Afghanistan (and until early this year in Pakistan too) but remotely controlled by the CIA from the continental United States. The Predator was jointly developed for the US Air Force and the CIA, and at the CIA’s request it was armed with Hellfire missiles in early 2001. After 9/11 President George W. Bush signed an authorisation that gave the CIA wide latitude in the ‘war on terror’ through the issue of ‘kill, capture or detain’ orders against members of al Qaeda. Its immediate conse- quence was the initiation in October of the same year of the program of extraordinary rendition conducted in the shadows of the global war prison: the seizure, incarceration and torture of terrorist suspects at ‘black sites’. This was subsequently supplemented by a program directed at killing named individuals – ‘High Value Targets’ – who were on a list compiled by the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center. The first UAV strike in Pakistan took place on 18 June 2004. The initial pace was slow, in part because the number of UAVs was limited but also because the target list was restricted and ground intelligence meagre. There were eight more strikes before the assassination of Benazir Bhutto on 27 December 2007 prompted Bush to expand the target list from al Qaeda to a wider array of individuals, and thus to increase the rate of strike; by the end of 2008 there had been 46 strikes in Pakistan. As extraordinary renditions were terminated and black sites closed, President Barack Obama widened the scope of the target list still further and dramatically stepped up the tempo; faster and more powerful Reapers were pressed into service, borrowed from Air Force operations in Afghanistan, and by the end of 2010 there had been a further 180 strikes. Baitullah Mehsud was assassinated by a Predator strike in August 2009 – after 16 unsuccessful strikes over 14 months that killed several hundred others (Mayer 2009) – but this seems to have been a rare success. The vast majority killed in the last 2 years have reportedly been ordinary foot soldiers – people ‘whose names were unknown or about whom the Agency had only fragmentary information’ (Cloud 2010), although it had no hesitation in declaring vir- tually none of them civilians – and this has led to doubts about the purpose and parameters of the cam- paign (Miller 2011). These operations raise troubling questions. Some arise from the resort to extra-judicial killing that the United States once condemned: if it is wrong to torture suspects, how can it be right to assassinate them? How secure is the evidential basis on which targeting decisions are made? Others arise from the use of UAVs and the time–space compressions pro- duced by the techno-cultural armature of this new mode of war, although I think that most of the criti- cism about video feeds reducing war to a video game is misplaced – these are profoundly immersive tech- nologies that have quite other (and more serious) con- sequences for killing – but in any case these concerns apply with equal force to the strikes carried out by the Air Force’s Predators and Reapers in Afghanistan that use the Pentagon’s Joint Integrated Prioritised Target List to ‘put warheads on foreheads’ (Gregory 2011). Still others arise from the legal apparatus that consti- tutes the extended war zone, and it is these that concern me here. Plainly the United States is not at war with Pakistan, and even though Islamabad gives the nod to the strikes – while closing its eyes to their effects – Murphy (2009, 10) claims that the authority of Islamabad to sanction US military actions in the FATA is far from clear. For its part, the Obama admin- istration represents the strikes as legitimate acts of self-defence against the Afghan Taliban who are engaged in a transnational armed conflict and seek sanctuary across the border and as effective counter- terrorism tactics against al Qaeda and its affiliates hiding in Pakistan. But these are inadequate responses for at least three reasons that all revolve around the battlespace as a grey zone. First, even though the Air Force may be involved to some degree, it is the CIA that plans and executes the strikes. The CIA was created in 1947 as a civilian agency to counterbalance the influence of the mili- tary. Since then there has been a general ‘civilianisa- tion’ of war in all sorts of ways, which includes the outsourcing of support services to contractors, and the CIA has been transformed from a civilian agency into ‘a paramilitary organisation at the vanguard of Ameri- ca’s far-flung wars’ operating from an ‘archipelago of fire-bases’ in Afghanistan and beyond (Mazzetti 2010; Shane et al. 2010). But the CIA does not operate under military control so that, as Singer (2010) observes, the clandestine air war in Pakistan is commanded not by an Air Force general but by ‘a former congressman from California’, Leon Panetta, the Director of the CIA. According to Horton (2010), this is ‘the first time in U.S. history that a state-of-the-art, cutting-edge weapons system has been placed in the hands of the CIA’. Hence Singer’s (2010) complaint that civilians are operating advanced weapons systems outside the military chain of command and ‘wrestling with complex issues of war’ for which they have neither the necessary training – this is a moot point: it may be that CIA operators follow similar procedures protocols to their Air Force counterparts, including the incorpora- tion of legal advisers into the kill-chain to endorse the ‘prosecution of the target’ (Etzioni 2010; Mckelvey 2011) – nor, according to the National Security Act, the legal authority. This is the most damaging objec- tion because it turns CIA operators into the category that Bush so confidently consigned to the global war prison after 9/11: unlawful combatants (O’Connell 2009). This is such an obvious point that Paust (2010, 45), who otherwise endorses the strikes as acts of self-defence, concludes that the CIA’s lawyers must be leftovers from the Bush administration ‘who have proven either to be remarkably ignorant of the laws of war or conveniently quiet and complicit during the Bush–Cheney program of serial and cascading crimi- nality’. These considerations radically transform the battlespace as the line between the CIA and the mili- tary is deliberately blurred. Obama’s recent decision to appoint Panetta as Secretary of Defense and have General David Petraeus take his place as Director of the CIA makes at least that much clear. So too do the braiding lines of responsibility between the CIA and Special Forces in the killing of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad in May 2011, which for that reason (and others) was undertaken in what Axe (2011) portrays as a ‘legal grey zone’ between two US codes, Title 10 (which includes the Uniformed Code of Military Justice) and Title 50 (which authorises the CIA and its covert operations) (Stone 2003). The role of the CIA in this not-so-secret war in Pakistan thus marks the for- mation of what Engelhardt and Turse (2010) call ‘a new-style [battlespace] that the American public knows remarkably little about, and that bears little relationship to the Afghan War as we imagine it or as our leaders generally discuss it’. Second, representing each drone strike as a sepa- rate act of self-defence obscures the systematic and cumulative nature of the campaign. Although the Obama administration insists that its targeting procedures adhere to the laws of armed conflict, the covert nature of a war conducted by a clandestine agency ensures that most of its victims are wrapped in blankets of secrecy. Accountability is limited enough in the case of a declared war; in an undeclared war it all but disappears. There is little or no recognition of civilian casualties, no inquiries into incidents that violate the principles of discrimination and proportionality, and no mechanism for providing compensation. The Cam- paign for Innocent Victims in Conflict reports from the FATA that: Drone victims receive no assistance from the Pakistani or US governments, despite the existence of Pakistani compensation efforts for other conflict-victims and US com- pensation mechanisms currently operating in Iraq and Afghanistan. Victims are left to cope with losses on their own while neither the Pakistani nor the US governments acknowledge responsibility for the strikes or the civilian status of those collaterally harmed. Rogers (2010, 64) The single exception to date has been the decision by Islamabad to compensate victims of a US drone strike in North Waziristan in March 2011. The details, such as they are, are revealing. Local people had gathered at a market with Taliban mediators to settle a dispute over a chromite mine; two UAVs launched four mis- siles that killed at least 40 people. Pakistan’s Prime Minister and the Chief of Army Staff both sharply condemned the strike as a reckless attack on civilians, including elders and children, but US officials insisted that the meeting was a legitimate terrorist target not ‘a bake sale’, ‘county fair’, ‘charity car wash’ or ‘the local men’s glee club’ (sic) (Masood and Shah 2011; Rodriguez 2011). As even this case shows, the advanced technology that makes the UAV campaign possible – the combination of sensor and shooter in a single platform – does not dispel the fog of war. Far from making the battlespace transparent, this new apparatus actively exploits another grey zone, the space between civilian and combatant that is peopled by the spectral figures that haunt the landscape of insurgency. Third, the legal logic through which the battlespace is extended beyond the declared zone of combat in Afghanistan is itself infinitely extendible. If the United States is fighting a global war, if it arrogates to itself the right to kill or detain its enemies wherever it finds them, where does it end? (Blank 2010–11). Human Rights Watch posed the key questions in a letter to Obama on 7 December 2010: While the United States is a party to armed conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq and could become a party to armed conflicts elsewhere, the notion that the entire world is automatically by extension a battleground in which the laws of war are applicable is contrary to international law. How does the administration define the ‘global battle- field’ and what is the legal basis for that definition? What, if any, limits exist on ordering targeted killings within it? Does it view the battlefield as global in a literal sense, allowing lethal force to be used, in accordance with the laws of war, against a suspected terrorist in an apartment in Paris, a shopping mall in London, or a bus station in Iowa City? Do the rules governing targeted killing vary from one place to another – for example, are different criteria used in Yemen and Pakistan?’ Human Rights Watch (2010) These bloody geographies exploit another grey zone. Legal opinions are sharply divided about the regula- tion of armed conflict between state and non-state actors that takes place beyond state borders (‘transna- tional armed conflicts’). It is those states that have most strenuously pressed for the regulation of intra- state wars and the establishment of international criminal tribunals for conflicts in Ruanda and the former Yugoslavia that have most vigorously insisted on being allowed the maximum freedom to conduct their own trans-border campaigns against non-state actors (Benvenisti 2010). Law and war have always been intertwined, and international law is often re-made through war – in fact operating at the margins of the law is one of the most powerful ways of chang- ing it – and the UAV strikes in Pakistan are evidently no exception. They seek at once to expand the battlespace and to contract the legal armature that regu- lates its constitution. I have argued elsewhere that the American way of war has changed since 9/11, though not uniquely because of it (Gregory 2010), and there are crucial continuities as well as differences between the Bush and Obama administrations: ‘The man who many considered the peace candidate in the last election was transformed into the war president’ (Carter 2011, 4). This requires a careful telling, and I do not mean to reduce the three studies I have sketched here to a single interpretative narrative. Yet there are connections between them as well as contradictions, and I have indicated some of these en route. Others have noted them too. Pakistan’s President has remarked that the war in Afghanistan has grave consequences for his country ‘just as the Mexican drug war on US borders makes a difference to American society’, and one scholar has suggested that the United States draws legal authority to conduct military operations across the border from Afghanistan (including the killing of bin Laden, codenamed ‘Geronimo’) from its history of extra-territorial opera- tions against non-state actors in Mexico in the 1870s and 1880s (including the capture of the real Geronimo) (Margolies 2011). Whatever one makes of this, one of the most persistent threads connecting all three cases is the question of legality, which runs like a red ribbon throughout the prosecution of late modern war. On one side, commentators claim that new wars in the global South are ‘non-political’, intrinsically predatory criminal enterprises, that cartels are morphing into insurgencies, and that the origins of cyber warfare lie in the dark networks of cyber crime; on the other side, the United States places a premium on the rule and role of law in its new counterinsurgency doctrine, accentuates the involvement of legal advisers in targeting decisions by the USAF and the CIA, and even as it refuses to confirm its UAV strikes in Pakistan provides arguments for their legality. The invocation of legality works to marginalise ethics and politics by making available a seemingly neutral, objective language: disagreement and debate then become purely technical issues that involve matters of opinion, certainly, but not values. The appeal to legality – and to the quasi-judicial process it invokes – thus helps to authorise a widespread and widening militarisation of our world. While I think it is both premature and excessive to see this as a transformation from governmentality to ‘militariality’ (Marzec 2009), I do believe that Foucault’s (2003) injunction – ‘Society must be defended’ – has been transformed into an unconditional imperative since 9/11 and that this involves an intensifying triangulation of the planet by legality, security and war. We might remember that biopolitics, one of the central projects of late modern war, requires a legal armature to authorise its interven- tions, and that necropolitics is not always outside the law. This triangulation has become such a commonplace and provides such an established base-line for contemporary politics that I am reminded of an inter- view with Zizek soon after 9/11 – which for him marked the last war of the twentieth century – when he predicted that the ‘new wars’ of the twenty-first century would be distinguished by a radical uncertainty: ‘it will not even be clear whether it is a war or not’ (Deich- mann et al. 2002). Neither will it be – nor is it – clear where the battlespace begins and ends. As I have tried to show, the two are closely connected. For this reason I am able to close on a less pessimistic note. As I drafted this essay, I was watching events unfold on the streets of Cairo and other Egyptian cities, just weeks after similar scenes in Tunisia. I hope that the real, lasting counterpoint to 9/11 is to be found in those places, not in Afghanistan, Pakistan or Iraq. For those events show that ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’ cannot be limited to the boastful banners of military adventur- ism, hung from the barrels of guns or draped across warships, and that ordinary people can successfully rise up against autocratic, repressive and corrupt regimes: including those propped up for so long by the United States and its European allies. Perhaps one day someone will be able to write about ‘the nowhere war’ – and not from Europe or North America.

#### weigh consequences default to util

**Gvosdev 5** – Rhodes scholar, PhD from St. Antony’s College, executive editor of The National Interest (Nikolas, The Value(s) of Realism, SAIS Review 25.1, pmu

As the name implies, realists focus on promoting policies that are achievable and sustainable. In turn, the morality of a foreign policy action is judged by its results, not by the intentions of its framers. A foreign policymaker must weigh the consequences of any course of action and assess the resources at hand to carry out the proposed task. As Lippmann warned, Without the controlling principle that the nation must maintain its objectives and its power in equilibrium, its purposes within its means and its means equal to its purposes, its commitments related to its resources and its resources adequate to its commitments, it is impossible to think at all about foreign affairs.8 Commenting on this maxim, Owen Harries, founding editor of The National Interest, noted, "This is a truth of which Americans—more apt to focus on ends rather than means when it comes to dealing with the rest of the world—need always to be reminded."9 In fact, Morgenthau noted that "there can be no political morality without prudence."10 This virtue of prudence—which Morgenthau identified as the cornerstone of realism—should not be confused with expediency. Rather, it takes as its starting point that it is more moral to fulfill one's commitments than to make "empty" promises, and to seek solutions that minimize harm and produce sustainable results. Morgenthau concluded: [End Page 18] Political realism does not require, nor does it condone, indifference to political ideals and moral principles, but it requires indeed a sharp distinction between the desirable and the possible, between what is desirable everywhere and at all times and what is possible under the concrete circumstances of time and place.11 This is why, prior to the outbreak of fighting in the former Yugoslavia, U.S. and European realists urged that Bosnia be decentralized and partitioned into ethnically based cantons as a way to head off a destructive civil war. Realists felt this would be the best course of action, especially after the country's first free and fair elections had brought nationalist candidates to power at the expense of those calling for inter-ethnic cooperation. They had concluded—correctly, as it turned out—that the United States and Western Europe would be unwilling to invest the blood and treasure that would be required to craft a unitary Bosnian state and give it the wherewithal to function. Indeed, at a diplomatic conference in Lisbon in March 1992, the various factions in Bosnia had, reluctantly, endorsed the broad outlines of such a settlement. For the purveyors of moralpolitik, this was unacceptable. After all, for this plan to work, populations on the "wrong side" of the line would have to be transferred and resettled. Such a plan struck directly at the heart of the concept of multi-ethnicity—that different ethnic and religious groups could find a common political identity and work in common institutions. When the United States signaled it would not accept such a settlement, the fragile consensus collapsed. The United States, of course, cannot be held responsible for the war; this lies squarely on the shoulders of Bosnia's political leaders. Yet Washington fell victim to what Jonathan Clarke called "faux Wilsonianism," the belief that "high-flown words matter more than rational calculation" in formulating effective policy, which led U.S. policymakers to dispense with the equation of "balancing commitments and resources."12 Indeed, as he notes, the Clinton administration had criticized peace plans calling for decentralized partition in Bosnia "with lofty rhetoric without proposing a practical alternative." The subsequent war led to the deaths of tens of thousands and left more than a million people homeless. After three years of war, the Dayton Accords—hailed as a triumph of American diplomacy—created a complicated arrangement by which the federal union of two ethnic units, the Muslim-Croat Federation, was itself federated to a Bosnian Serb republic. Today, Bosnia requires thousands of foreign troops to patrol its internal borders and billions of dollars in foreign aid to keep its government and economy functioning. Was the aim of U.S. policymakers, academics and journalists—creating a multi-ethnic democracy in Bosnia—not worth pursuing? No, not at all, and this is not what the argument suggests. But aspirations were not matched with capabilities. As a result of holding out for the "most moral" outcome and encouraging the Muslim-led government in Sarajevo to pursue maximalist aims rather than finding a workable compromise that could have avoided bloodshed and produced more stable conditions, the peoples of Bosnia suffered greatly. In the end, the final settlement was very close [End Page 19] to the one that realists had initially proposed—and the one that had also been roundly condemned on moral grounds.

#### We should use this academic space to discuss and avoid extinction threats

Louis Rene, Beres (Prof. of International Law at Purdue) 2003 , Journal and Courier, June 5

The truth is often disturbing. Our impressive American victories against terrorism and rogue states, although proper and indispensable, are inevitably limited. The words of the great Irish poet Yeats reveal, prophetically, where our entire planet is now clearly heading. Watching violence escalate and expand in parts of Europe and Russia, in Northern Ireland, in Africa, in Southwest Asia, in Latin America, and of course in the Middle East, we discover with certainty that "... the centre cannot hold/Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world/The blood-dimmed tide is loosed/and everywhere The Ceremony of innocence is drowned." Our response, even after Operation Iraqi Freedom, lacks conviction. Still pretending that "things will get better," we Americans proceed diligently with our day-to-day affairs, content that, somehow, the worst can never really happen. Although it is true that we must go on with our normal lives, it is also true that "normal" has now become a quaint and delusionary state. We want to be sure that a "new" normal falls within the boundaries of human tolerance, but we can't nurture such a response without an informed appreciation of what is still possible. For us, other rude awakenings are unavoidable, some of which could easily overshadow the horrors of Sept. 11. There can be little doubt that, within a few short years, expanding tribalism will produce several new genocides and proliferating nuclear weapons will generate one or more regional nuclear wars. Paralyzed by fear and restrained by impotence, various governments will try, desperately, to deflect our attention, but it will be a vain effort. Caught up in a vast chaos from which no real escape is possible, we will learn too late that there is no durable safety in arms, no ultimate rescue by authority, no genuine remedy in science or technology. What shall we do? For a start, we must all begin to look carefully behind the news. Rejecting superficial analyses of day-to-day events in favor of penetrating assessments of world affairs, we must learn quickly to distinguish what is truly important from what is merely entertainment. With such learning, we Americans could prepare for growing worldwide anarchy not as immobilized objects of false contentment, but as authentic citizens of an endangered planet. Nowhere is it written that we people of Earth are forever, that humankind must thwart the long-prevailing trend among all planetary life-forms (more than 99 percent) of ending in extinction. Aware of this, we may yet survive, at least for a while, but only if our collective suppression of purposeful fear is augmented by a complementary wisdom; that is, that our personal mortality is undeniable and that the harms done by one tribal state or terror group against "others" will never confer immortality. This is, admittedly, a difficult concept to understand, but the longer we humans are shielded from such difficult concepts the shorter will be our time remaining. We must also look closely at higher education in the United States, not from the shortsighted stance of improving test scores, but from the urgent perspective of confronting extraordinary threats to human survival. For the moment, some college students are exposed to an occasional course in what is fashionably described as "global awareness," but such exposure usually sidesteps the overriding issues: We now face a deteriorating world system that cannot be mended through sensitivity alone; our leaders are dangerously unprepared to deal with catastrophic deterioration; our schools are altogether incapable of transmitting the indispensable visions of planetary restructuring. To institute productive student confrontations with survival imperatives, colleges and universities must soon take great risks, detaching themselves from a time-dishonored preoccupation with "facts" in favor of grappling with true life-or-death questions. In raising these questions, it will not be enough to send some students to study in Paris or Madrid or Amsterdam ("study abroad" is not what is meant by serious global awareness). Rather, all students must be made aware - as a primary objective of the curriculum - of where we are heading, as a species, and where our limited survival alternatives may yet be discovered. There are, of course, many particular ways in which colleges and universities could operationalize real global awareness, but one way, long-neglected, would be best. I refer to the study of international law. For a country that celebrates the rule of law at all levels, and which explicitly makes international law part of the law of the United States - the "supreme law of the land" according to the Constitution and certain Supreme Court decisions - this should be easy enough to understand. Anarchy, after all, is the absence of law, and knowledge of international law is necessarily prior to adequate measures of world order reform. Before international law can be taken seriously, and before "the blood-dimmed tide" can be halted, America's future leaders must at least have some informed acquaintance with pertinent rules and procedures. Otherwise we shall surely witness the birth of a fully ungovernable world order, an unheralded and sinister arrival in which only a shadowy legion of gravediggers would wield the forceps.

“Blind” metaphors always exploit and diminish the experiences of those who live it

Gallagher ‘6 [Deborah, PhD – College of Education – UNI, “On Using Blindness as Metaphor and Difficult Questions: A Response to Ben-Moshe,” *Disability Studies Quarterly*, v26, #2, <http://www.dsq-sds.org/article/view/690/867>]

**Blindness cannot be used as a signifier or metaphor without ultimately saying something about blindness itself**. **Blindness**, like all great novels, **is dangerous in this respect**. As Ben-Moshe well understands (hence her discomfort with the superficial depictions), it all depends upon what the reader brings to the text. **The physical condition of blindness**, as it is appropriated in this novel, **can be understood as tragic and pathological, or "a quality that brings up the 'real human spirit' within people** (be it good or evil)" (this issue). "What," she implores, "does Saramago tell readers by using blindness as a signifier? Not just about humanity and society, but what does it say about blindness itself?" (this issue). Her answer, it seems, is that Saramago's use of blindness as signifier is primarily an inauspicious one. In examining possible interpretations from a social science perspective, Ben-Moshe points out strong parallels that can be drawn between the cataclysmic social breakdown in the novel and other historical atrocities, among them certainly the Holocaust as well as recent civil wars and genocidal campaigns in Kosovo, Uganda, the Congo, and Rwanda. On the emotional level, Blindness is no easy novel to read. The main characters are subjected to virtually every form of human degradation–starvation, filth, rape, death, and horror are dispatched in daily (and nightly) allotments. Having read works of both fiction and nonfiction depicting such brutalities, I was surprised to realize that my hands were shaking as I turned the pages. The pairing of such atrocities with the condition of blindness seems enough to induce, even urge, us to regard Saramago's Blindness as an ableist text, "not a story about people who are blind, but an ableist metaphor that appropriates blindness as its signifier" (Ben-Moshe, this issue). Accordingly, blindness might be understood as a narrative prosthesis that, not unlike disability simulations, distorts experience and constructs blind people as the Other. **Ben-Moshe deems the** novel's **appropriation of blindness "a familiar trope" used uncritically: blindness is used to signal death and tragedy, or**, "blindness simultaneously **signifies** in Saramago's novel...**the opposite of ignorance**. Blindness is an 'all knowing' quality, the blind who 'see' more than the sighted" (this issue). **The latter use raises the specter of an inverted stereotype– "the blind" are the only ones with true (in)sight. Thus, either way, it seems we arrive at the same destination, and** the novel **cannot escape it**s indictment as a text that **both exploits and diminishes the condition of, and therefore the people who experience, blindness.**

1. Voting Issue – Ableist Speech strengthens oppression and destroys the purposes of public debate – the impacts trump the other warrants in their arguments

Wheelchair Dancer, 4/28/8

(“On Making Argument: Disability and Language”, <http://cripwheels.blogspot.com/2008/04/on-making-argument-disability-and.html> Accessed: 2/10/11 GAL)
If you are feeling a little bit of resistance, here, I'd ask you to think about it. If perhaps what I am saying feels like a burden -- too much to take on? a restriction on your carefree speech? -- perhaps that feeling can also serve as an indicator of how pervasive and thus important the issue is. As a community, we've accepted that commonly used words can be slurs, and as a rule, we avoid them, hopefully in the name of principle, but sometimes only in the name of civility. Do you go around using derivatives of the b**\*ch** word?If you do, I bet you check which community you are in**....** Same thing for the N word**.** These days, **depending on your age,** you might say something is retarded **or spastic,** but you probably never say that it's gay. I'd like to suggest that society as a whole has not paid the same kind of attention to disabled people's concerns about language. By not paying attention to the literal value, the very real substantive, physical, psychological, sensory, and emotional experiences that come with these linguistic moves, we have created a negative rhetorical climate. In this world, it is too easy for feminists and people of colour to base their claims on argumentative strategies that depend, as their signature moves, on marginalizing the experience of disabled people and on disparaging their appearance and bodies. Much of the blogosphere discourse of the previous weeks has studied the relationships between race, (white) feminism and feminists, and WOC bloggers. To me, the intellectual takeaway has been an emerging understanding of how, in conversation, notions of appropriation, citation, ironization, and metaphorization can be deployed as strategies of legitimation and exclusion. And, as a result, I question how "oppressed, minoritized" groups differentiate themselves from other groups in order to seek justice and claim authority. Must we always define ourselves in opposition and distance to a minoritized and oppressed group that can be perceived as even more unsavory than the one from which one currently speaks?
As I watched the discussion about who among the feminist and WOC bloggers has power and authority and how that is achieved, I began to recognise a new power dynamic both on the internet and in the world at large. Feminism takes on misogyny. The WOC have been engaging feminism. But from my point of view, a wide variety of powerful feminist and anti-racist discourse is predicated on negative disability stereotyping. There's a kind of hierarchy here: the lack of awareness about disability, disability culture and identity, and our civil rights movement has resulted in a kind of domino effect where disability images are the metaphor of last resort: the bottom, the worst. Disability language has about it a kind of untouchable quality -- as if the horror and weakness of a disabled body were the one true, reliable thing, a touchstone to which we can turn when we know we can't use misogynistic or racist language. When we engage in these kinds of argumentative strategies, we exclude a whole population of people whose histories are intricately bound up with ours. When we deploy these kinds of strategies to underscore the value of our own existence in the world, we reaffirm and strengthen the systems of oppression that motivated us to speak out in the first place.

#### Discourse doesn’t shape policy making

**Walt 13** ([Stephen M. Walt](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/author/Stephen%20M.%20Walt), is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. “[Empty words](http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/03/25/empty_words),” March 25, 2013, Foreign Policy, Realist In an Ideological Age) GANGEEZY

And therein lies the test of competing theories. There is a broad school of thought in international relations -- often labeled "social constructivism" -- which maintains that discourse can be of tremendous importance in shaping the conduct of states. In this view, how leaders talk and how intellectuals write gradually shapes how we all think, and over time these discursive activities can exert a tremendous influence on norms, identities, and perceptions of what is right and what is possible. It is this view of the world that President Obama was channeling during his trip. By telling Israelis that he loved them and by telling both Israelis and Palestinians that the latter had just as much right to a state as the former, he was hoping to mold hearts and minds and convince them -- through logic and reason -- to end their century-old conflict. And make no mistake: He was saying that peace would require a powerful and increasingly wealthy Israel to make generous concessions, because the Palestinians have hardly anything more to give up. As Churchill put it, "in victory, magnanimity." Discourse does matter in some circumstances, of course, and perhaps Obama's words will prompt some deep soul-searching within the Israeli political establishment. But there is another broad family of IR theories -- the realist family -- and it maintains that what matters most in politics is power and how it is applied. In this view, national leaders often say lots of things they don't really mean, or they say things they mean but then fail to follow through on because doing so would be politically costly. From this perspective, words sometimes inspire and may change a few minds on occasion, but they are rarely enough to overcome deep and bitter conflicts. No matter how well-written or delivered, a speech cannot divert whole societies from a well-established course of action. Policies in motion tend to remain in motion; to change the trajectory of a deeply-entrenched set of initiatives requires the application of political forces of equal momentum. For realists like me, in short, halting a colonial enterprise that has been underway for over forty years will require a lot more than wise and well-intentioned words. Instead, it would require the exercise of power. Just as raw power eventually convinced most Palestinians that Israel's creation was not going to be reversed, Israelis must come to realize that denying Palestinians a state of their own is going to have real consequences. Although Obama warned that the occupation was preventing Israel from gaining full acceptance in the world, he also made it clear that Israelis could count on the United States to insulate them as much as possible from the negative effects of their own choices. Even at the purely rhetorical level, in short, Obama's eloquent words sent a decidedly mixed message. Because power is more important than mere rhetoric, it won't take long before Obama's visit is just another memory. The settlements will keep expanding, East Jerusalem will be cut off from the rest of the West Bank, the Palestinians will remain stateless, and Israel will continue on its self-chosen path to apartheid. And in the end, Obama will have proven to be no better a friend to Israel or the Palestinians than any of his predecessors. All of them claimed to oppose the occupation, but none of them ever did a damn thing to end it. And one of Obama's successors will eventually have to confront the cold fact that two states are no longer a realistic possibility. What will he or she say then?

#### \*Democratic skepticism is necessary to reign in executive war making, only way to engage the source of militarism. Not engaging the executive allows the war to continue

David Cole, 12- “Confronting the Wizard of Oz: National Security, Expertise, and Secrecy”. Professor at the Georgetown University Law Center. Connecticut Law Review, Volume 44, Number 5, July 12. http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2093&context=facpub

How one strikes the balance between liberty and security is a decision that may be informed by experts, but is ultimately a normative question about the kind of society we want to live in—and that is quintessentially not a decision for experts, but for the people. Second, even if we bracketed the oft-competing rights concerns, and all we cared about was effective security, deference to experts operating with secret information behind closed doors might well be counterproductive. Experts are in no way immune from groupthink and other decisional biases, and the smaller the circle of actors with the requisite knowledge to act, the less likely it is that such errors will be corrected. 23 Moreover, as the 9/11 Commission found, barriers to the sharing of information can greatly undermine the soundness of security strategies. 24 Stovepiping is an inevitable consequence of specialization and classification (because only those with a clearance and a “need to know” can then gain access to the information), and makes it less likely that even the experts themselves will have access to all the information relevant to their decisions. 25 Thus, greater transparency may be a benefit not merely from the vantage point of democratic legitimacy, as Rana illustrates, but also from the normative perspective of striking an appropriate balance, and from the pragmatic standpoint of improving security. Rana calls our attention to some of the deep philosophical undercurrents that have come to define modern attitudes toward national security. The issues are too important to be left to experts, but until we challenge our assumptions about the propriety of doing so, he argues, no formal legal solution will succeed. I am sympathetic to Rana’s concerns, and seek to support his argument with the three principal points made here. First, it is critical to consider the particular role that secrecy, itself controlled by experts, plays in constructing and perpetuating “expertise,” and in shielding the experts from democratic assessment. Second, when it comes to weighing security against other values, such as privacy, liberty, and human dignity, the experts deserve skepticism, not deference. And third, security decisions themselves are often undermined by the barriers that secrecy and specialization raise. Like the Wizard of Oz, national security experts operate behind a large screen, and that screen bars us from realizing, as Rana insists, that we are all capable of making the necessarily normative judgments about security and liberty that implicate not only the survival of our polity, but its survival in the form we choose.

#### No root cause of war – decades of research votes aff

Greg Cashman (Professor of Political Science at Salisbury State University) 2000 “What Causes war?: An introduction to theories of international conflict” pg. 9

Two warnings need to be issued at this point. First, while we have been using a single variable explanation of war merely for the sake of simplicity, multivariate explanations of war are likely to be much more powerful. Since social and political behaviors are extremely complex, they are almost never explainable through a single factor. Decades of research have led most analysts to reject monocausal explanations of war. For instance, international relations theorist J. David Singer suggests that we ought to move away from the concept of “causality” since it has become associated with the search for a single cause of war; we should instead redirect our activities toward discovering “explanations”—a term that implies multiple causes of war, but also a certain element of randomness or chance in their occurrence.