# 2AC

## T- Authority

#### We meet- we ban the president’s authority to conduct strikes using the CIA-and that’s Authority

**Chesney 12**  (2012, Robert, Charles I. Francis Professor in Law at the University of Texas School of Law, non-resident Senior Fellow of the Brookings Institution, “Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 50 Debate,” JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW and POLICY, Vol. 5:539)

Title 50 is a portion of the U.S. Code that contains a diverse array of statutes relating to national security and foreign affairs. These include the standing affirmative grants of authority through which Congress originally empowered the CIA to carry out its various functions. That set in turn includes the sweeping language of the so-called fifth function, which the executive branch has long construed to grant authority to engage in covert action. Separately, Title 50 also contains the statutes that define covert action, require presidential findings in support of them, and oblige notification of them to SSCI and HPSCI. As a result, Title 50 authority has also become a shorthand, in this case one that refers to the domestic law authorization for engaging in quintessential intelligence activities such as intelligence collection and covert action.

#### C/I Authority includes power to act or conduct an act

#### Hill 05 Free Legal Dictionary definition. <http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/authority> (Gerald and Kathleen Hill are co-authors of 25 books, including The People's Law Dictionary, Real Life Dictionary of the Law, Encyclopedia of Federal Agencies and Commissions, Facts On File Dictionary of American Politics, and the popular Hill Guides: Sonoma Valley: The Secret Wine Country, Napa Valley: Land of Golden Vines; Victoria and Vancouver Island: the Almost Perfect Eden; Northwest Wine Country; Santa Barbara and the Central Coast: California's Riviera; and Monterey and Carmel: Eden by the Sea. Gerald has practiced law for more than four decades in both San Francisco's financial district and the town of Sonoma, California. He has an A.B. from Stanford University and Juris Doctor from Hastings College of the Law of the University of California. He was Executive Director of the California Governor’s Housing Commission, drafted legislation, taught at Golden Gate University Law School, served as an arbitrator and pro tem judge, edited and co-authored Housing in California, was an elected trustee of a public hospital, and has testified before Congressional committees.)

authority n. permission, a right coupled with the power to do an act or order others to act. Often one person gives another authority to act, as an employer to an employee, a principal to an agent, a corporation to its officers, or governmental empowerment to perform certain functions. There are different types of authority including "apparent authority" when a principal gives an agent various signs of authority to make others believe he or she has authority, "express authority" or "limited authority" which spell out exactly what authority is granted (usually a written set of instructions), "implied authority" which flows from the position one holds, and "general authority" which is the broad power to act for another.

#### Funding restrictions are restrictions on authority , rooted in U.S. code

Richard F. Grimmett, Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, 2007 CRS, Congressional Use of Funding Cutoffs Since 1970 Involving U.S. Military Forces and Overseas Deployments

Uses by Congress of Funding Restrictions to Affect Presidential Policy Toward Foreign Military/Paramilitary Operations

Although not directly analogous to efforts to seek withdrawal of American military forces from abroad by use of funding cutoffs, Congress has used funding restrictions to limit or prevent foreign activities of a military or paramilitary nature. As such, these actions represent alternative methods to affect elements of presidentially sanctioned foreign military operations. Representative examples of these actions are in legislation relating to Angola and Nicaragua, which are summarized below. In 1976, controversy over U.S. covert assistance to paramilitary forces in Angola led to legislative bans on such action. These legislative restrictions are summarized below. ! The Defense Department Appropriations Act for FY1976, P.L. 94-212, signed February 9, 1976, provided that none of the funds “appropriated in this Act may be used for any activities involving Angola other than intelligence gathering....” This funding limitation would expire at the end of this fiscal year. Consequently, Congress provided for a ban in permanent law, which embraced both authorization and appropriations acts, in the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976. ! Section 404 of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, P.L. 94-329, signed June 30, 1976, stated that “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no assistance of any kind may be provided for the purpose, or which would have the effect, of promoting, augmenting, directly or indirectly, the capacity of any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual to conduct military or paramilitary operations in Angola, unless and until Congress expressly authorizes such assistance by law enacted after the date of enactment of this section.” This section also permitted the President to provide the prohibited assistance to Angola if he made a detailed, unclassified report to Congress stating the specific amounts and categories of assistance to be provided and the proposed recipients of the aid. He also had to certify that furnishing such aid was “important to the national security interests of the United States.” ! Section 109 of the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act for FY1976, P.L. 94-330, signed June 30, 1976, provided that “None of the funds appropriated or made available pursuant to this Act shall be obligated to finance directly or indirectly any type of military assistance to Angola.” In 1984, controversy over U.S. assistance to the opponents of the Nicaraguan government (the anti-Sandinista guerrillas known as the “contras”) led to a prohibition on such assistance in a continuing appropriations bill. This legislative ban is summarized below. ! The continuing appropriations resolution for FY1985, P.L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1935-1937, signed October 12, 1984, provided that “During fiscal year 1985, no funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement or individual.” This legislation also provided that after February 28, 1985, if the President made a report to Congress specifying certain criteria, including the need to provide further assistance for “military or paramilitary operations” prohibited by this statute, he could expend $14 million in funds if Congress passed a joint resolution approving such action.

#### Our interp is fair. They still get all of their off cases.

#### Their interp is overlimiting. Means we ony get 4 affs

#### Their interp kills fairness. Means aff never gets access to anything based on exercise of authority.

#### Their Interp kills education. Never learn about impacts of targeted killings. Only talk about legal authority.

## Extra T

1. We meet- its just an enforcement mechanism of the plan.

#### Restrictions must be enforceable- that is the plan

Elizabeth Boalt 5, Professor of Law Emeritus, University of California, Berkeley, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law The Journal of Appellate Practice and Process Fall, 20035 J. App. Prac. & Process 473, lexis

Four questions follow: (1) Are discouraging words "restrictions" on citation under Rule 32.1? (2) What difference, if any, does it make? (3) What is the risk of judicial resistance to [\*493] no-citation rules, through discouraging words or other means? and (4) Should discouraging words be forbidden?

1. Are Discouraging Words "Restrictions" under Rule 32.1?

The committee's statement notwithstanding, it is not clear that discouraging words have to be considered "restrictions" on citation under the proposed Rule 32.1. These words may be wholly admonitory - and unenforceable. The Fourth Circuit's rule, for example, states that citing unpublished opinions is "disfavored," but that it may be done "if counsel believes, nevertheless, that [an unpublished opinion] has precedential value in relation to a material issue in a case and that there is no published opinion that would serve as well." n129 On the question of what counsel "believes," surely counsel should be taken at her word; counsel's asserted belief that an unpublished opinion has precedential or persuasive value should not be considered a falsifiable fact. Hence no sanction should be available for violating the Fourth Circuit's rule, and the rule's discouraging language in turn would not be a "prohibition or restriction" that was barred by Rule 32.1 as presently drafted.

In the rules of some other circuits, however, the language disfavoring citation of unpublished opinions is unmoored from anyone's "belief" and arguably does impose an objective "prohibition or restriction" determinable by a court. n130 A court might find, for example, that the required "persuasive value with respect to a material issue that has not been addressed in a published opinion" n131 was not present, and hence that the citation was not permitted by the circuit rule.

With what result? It would follow, paradoxically, that the opinion could be cited - because the circuit rule would be struck down under Rule 32.1 as a forbidden "restriction" on citation.

The committee's double-negative drafting thus creates a Hall of Mirrors in which citation of an unpublished opinion [\*494] would be allowed either way. If the local rule's discouraging language is merely hortatory, it is not a "restriction" forbidden by Rule 32.1; but that doesn't matter, because such a rule does not bar the citation in the first place. If, on the other hand, the local rule's language has bite and is a "restriction," then Rule 32.1 strikes it down, and again the citation is permitted.

We are the only topical aff- we garuntee that the plan will not be circumvented, meaning we are the only true restriction on war powers.

They limit out Core affs- all affs require some form of enforcement mechanism, even if it is not specificed in the plan text.

2. Extra T is good- they not only get ground off of the plan’s enactment, but also ground off of the continual enformcemnt of the plan.

3. Evaluate the plan text in a vacuum- it doesn’t matter if our advantages are topical, only the plan text.

We are key to beating the XO counterplan- enforcement mechianisms give us specific ground that the counterplan cannot capture.

Don’t vote on potential abuse- make them prove that we hurt their strategy

At worse reject the extra topical parts of the plan

## T- war powers

#### We meet- the plan says

#### The “war powers authority” of the President is his Commander-in-Chief authority

Gallagher, Pakistan/Afghanistan coordination cell of the U.S. Joint Staff, Summer 2011

(Joseph, “Unconstitutional War: Strategic Risk in the Age of Congressional Abdication,” *Parameters*, http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/2011summer/Gallagher.pdf)

First, consider the constitutional issue of power imbalance. Central to the Constitution is the foundational principle of power distribution and provisions to check and balance exercises of that power. This clearly intended separation of powers across the three branches of government ensures that no single federal officeholder can wield an inordinate amount of power or influence. The founders carefully crafted constitutional war-making authority with the branch most representative of the people—Congress.4

The Federalist Papers No. 51, “The Structure of Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments,” serves as the wellspring for this principle. Madison insisted on the necessity to prevent any particular interest or group to trump another interest or group.5 This principle applies in practice to all decisions of considerable national importance. **Specific to war powers authority**, **the Constitution empowers the legislative branch with the authority to declare war but endows the Executive with the authority to act as Commander-in-Chief.**6 This construct designates Congress, not the president, as the primary decisionmaking body to commit the nation to war—a decision that ultimately requires the consent and will of the people in order to succeed. By vesting the decision to declare war with Congress, the founders underscored their intention to engage the people—those who would ultimately sacrifice their blood and treasure in the effort.

#### Commander in Chief powers are the justification for TK

Wheeler 13 “The AUMF fallacy” Marcy Wheeler, founder of EmptyWheel – a national security blog, PhD in comparative lit

<http://www.emptywheel.net/2013/02/18/the-aumf-fallacy/>

And ultimately, we should look to what Stephen Preston — the General Counsel of the agency that actually carried out the Awlaki killing — has to say about where the CIA gets its authorization to engage in lethal covert operations.

Let’s start with the first box: **Authority to Act under U.S. Law**.

First, we would confirm that **the contemplated activity is authorized by the President in the exercise of his powers under Article II of the U.S. Constitution, for example, the President’s responsibility as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief to protect the country from an imminent threat of violent attack**. This would not be just a one-time check for legal authority at the outset. Our hypothetical program would be engineered so as to ensure that, through careful review and senior-level decision-making, each individual action is linked to the imminent threat justification.

## 2ac Hout K

1. Framework- The plan should be the focus of the debate

#### Plan focus good

**a) key to topic specific education or they can keep running the same generic Ks every topic**

**b) key to aff ground—any other interp justifies K-ing/PICing out of one word in the 1AC—infinitely regressive and impossible to generate offense—counterinterp—get K with link to plan action, not only reps/discourse**

#### C. Academic debate regarding war powers is makes checks on excessive presidential authority effective---college students key

Kelly Michael Young 13, Associate Professor of Communication and Director of Forensics at Wayne State University, "Why Should We Debate About Restriction of Presidential War Powers", 9/4, public.cedadebate.org/node/13

Beyond its obviously timeliness, we believed debating about presidential war powers was important because of the stakes involved in the controversy. Since the Korean War, scholars and pundits have grown increasingly alarmed by the growing scope and techniques of presidential war making. In 1973, in the wake of Vietnam, Congress passed the joint War Powers Resolution (WPR) to increase Congress’s role in foreign policy and war making by requiring executive consultation with Congress prior to the use of military force, reporting within 48 hours after the start of hostiles, and requiring the close of military operations after 60 days unless Congress has authorized the use of force. Although the WPR was a significant legislative feat, 30 years since its passage, presidents have frequently ignores the WPR requirements and the changing nature of conflict does not fit neatly into these regulations. After the terrorist attacks on 9-11, many experts worry that executive war powers have expanded far beyond healthy limits. Consequently, there is a fear that continued expansion of these powers will undermine the constitutional system of checks and balances that maintain the democratic foundation of this country and risk constant and unlimited military actions, particularly in what Stephen Griffin refers to as a “long war” period like the War on Terror (http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674058286). In comparison, pro-presidential powers advocates contend that new restrictions undermine flexibility and timely decision-making necessary to effectively counter contemporary national security risks. Thus, a debate about presidential wars powers is important to investigate a number of issues that have serious consequences on the status of democratic checks and national security of the United States.¶ Lastly, debating presidential war powers is important because we the people have an important role in affecting the use of presidential war powers. As many legal scholars contend, regardless of the status of legal structures to check the presidency, an important political restrain on presidential war powers is the presence of a well-informed and educated public. As Justice Potter Stewart explains, “the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power…may lie in an enlightened citizenry – in an informed and critical public opinion which alone can protect the values of a democratic government” (http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC\_CR\_0403\_0713\_ZC3.html). As a result, this is not simply an academic debate about institutions and powers that that do not affect us. As the numerous recent foreign policy scandals make clear, anyone who uses a cell-phone or the internet is potential affected by unchecked presidential war powers. Even if we agree that these powers are justified, it is important that today’s college students understand and appreciate the scope and consequences of presidential war powers, as these students’ opinions will stand as an important potential check on the presidency.

#### there are a litany of other people affected by drone policy and presidential military policy as a whole- the alt forcloses a discussion of those voices. we should consider civilan casualites too otherwise we are disregarding their voices- this is another net benefit to the perm

DEREK GREGORY, Department of Geography, University of British Columbia, “The everywhere war” This paper was accepted for publication in May 2011 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/store/10.1111/j.1475-4959.2011.00426.x/asset/j.1475-4959.2011.00426.x.pdf?v=1&t=hkind5qg&s=fede42c8a2c2eefd37163c1ed92c6f5f887cf207

For many, particularly in the United States, 9/11 was a moment when the world turned; for others, particularly outside the United States, it was a climactic summation of a longer history of American imperialism in general and its meddling in the Middle East in particular. Either way, it is not surprising that many commentators should have emphasised the temporality of the military violence that followed in the wake of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on that bright September morning: the ‘war on terror’ that became ‘the long war’. For the RETORT collective, the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq marked ‘the elevation – into a state of permanent war – of a long and consis- tent pattern of military expansionism in the service of empire’ (RETORT 2005, 80). Keen (2006) wrote of ‘endless war’, Duffield (2007) of ‘unending war’ and Filkins (2008) of ‘the forever war’. The sense of per- manence endures, and yet Engelhardt (2010, 2–3) ruefully notes that it remains difficult for Americans to understand ‘that Washington is a war capital, that the United States is a war state, that it garrisons much of the planet, and that the norm for us is to be at war somewhere at any moment’. Bacevich (2010, 225) traces this state of affairs to what he calls the ‘Wash- ington rules’ that long pre-date 9/11. These are ‘the conviction that the obligations of leadership require the United States to maintain a global military pres-ence, configure its armed forces for power projection, and employ them to impose changes abroad’, which he argues have formed ‘the enduring leitmotif of US national security policy’ for the last 60 years and ‘propelled the United States into a condition approximating perpetual war’. Each of these temporal formulations implies spatial formations. For RETORT (2005, 103) ‘military neo- liberalism’ is ‘the true globalization of our time’. The planetary garrison that projects US military power is divided into six geographically defined unified com- batant commands – like US Central Command, CENTCOM – whose Areas of Responsibility cover every region on earth and which operate through a global network of bases. If you think this unremark- able, ask yourself Bacevich’s question: how would the United States react if China were to mirror these moves? Think, too, of the zones in which the shadow of US military violence still falls: not just Afghanistan and Iraq, but also Iran, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen. Then think of the zones where the rhetoric of the ‘war on terror’ has been used by other states to legitimise repression: Chechnya, Libya, Palestine, the Philippines, Sri Lanka. And then think of the cities that have become displacements of the space of war, punctuation points in what Sassen (2010, 37) calls ‘a new kind of multi-sited war’: Casablanca, Lahore, London, Madrid, Moscow, Mumbai. All these lists are incomplete, but even in this truncated form they suggest the need to analyse not only ‘the forever war’ but also what we might call ‘the every- where war’. This is at once a conceptual and a material project whose scope can be indexed by three geo-graphs that trace a movement from the abstract to the concrete: Foucault’s (1975–6) prescient suggestion that war has become the pervasive matrix within which social life is constituted; the replacement of the concept of the battlefield in US military doctrine by the multi-scalar, multi-dimensional ‘battlespace’ with ‘no front or back’ and where ‘everything becomes a site of perma- nent war’ (Graham 2009, 389; 2010, 31); and the assault on the global borderlands where the United States and its allies now conduct their military opera- tions. The first two are never far from the surface of this essay, but it is the third that is my primary focus. Duffield (2001, 309) once described the borderlands as ‘an imagined geographical space where, in the eyes of metropolitan actors and agencies, the characteris- tics of brutality, excess and breakdown predominate’. There, in the ‘wild zones’ of the global South, wars are supposed to occur ‘through greed and sectarian gain, social fabric is destroyed and developmental gains reversed, non-combatants killed, humanitarian assis- tance abused and all civility abandoned’. This imagi- native geography folds in and out of the rhetorical distinction between ‘our’ wars – wars conducted by advanced militaries that are supposed to be surgical, sensitive and scrupulous – and ‘their’ wars. In reality, however, the boundaries are blurred and each bleeds into its other (Gregory 2010). Thus the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 combined a long- distance, high-altitude war from the air with a ground war spearheaded by the warlords and militias of the Northern Alliance operating with US infantry and Special Forces; counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq has involved the co-option of ragtag militias to supplement US military operations; and in Afghani- stan the US Army pays off warlords and ultimately perhaps even the Taliban to ensure that its overland supply chain is protected from attack (Report of the Majority Staff 2010). In mapping these borderlands – which are also shadowlands, spaces that enter European and Ameri- can imaginaries in phantasmatic form, barely known but vividly imagined – we jibe against the limits of cartographic and so of geopolitical reason. From Rat- zel’s view of der Krieg als Schule des Raumes to Lacoste’s stinging denunciation – ‘la géographie, ça sert, d’abord, à faire la guerre’ – the deadly liaison between modern war and modern geography has been conducted in resolutely territorial terms. To be sure, the genealogy of territory has multiple valences, and Ratzel’s Raum is not Lacoste’s espace, but a criti- cal analysis of the everywhere war requires carto- graphic reason to be supplemented by other, more abile spatialities. This is not only a matter of tran- scending the geopolitical, connecting it to the bio- political and the geo-economic, but also of tracking space as a ‘doing’, precarious, partially open and never complete. It is in something of this spirit that Bauman (2002, 83) identifies the ‘planetary frontier- lands’ as staging grounds of today’s wars, where efforts to ‘pin the divisions and mutual enmities to the ground seldom bring results’. In the course of ‘inter- minable frontierland warfare’, so he argues, ‘trenches are seldom dug’, adversaries are ‘constantly on the move’ and have become for all intents and purposes ‘extraterritorial’. I am not sure about the last (Bauman is evidently thinking of al Qaeda, which is scarcely the summation of late modern war), but this is an arresting if impressionistic canvas and the fluidity con- veyed by Bauman’s broad brush-strokes needs to be fleshed out. After the US-led invasion of Iraq it was commonplace to distinguish the Green Zone and its satellites (the US political-military bastion in Baghdad and its penumbra of Forward Operating Bases) from the ‘red zone’ that was everywhere else. But this cat- egorical division is misleading. The colours seeped into and swirled around one another, so that occupied Iraq became not so much a patchwork of green zones and red zones as a thoroughly militarised landscape saturated in varying intensities of brown (khaki): ‘intensities’ because within this warscape military and paramilitary violence could descend at any moment without warning, and within it precarious local orders were constantly forming and re-forming. I think this is what Anderson (2011) means when he describes insurgencies oscillating ‘between extended periods of absence as a function of their dispersion’ and ‘moments of disruptive, punctual presence’, but these variable intensities entrain all sides in today’s ‘wars amongst the people’ – and most of all those caught in the middle. This is to emphasise the emergent, ‘event-ful’ quality of contemporary violence, what Gros (2010, 260) sees as ‘moments of pure laceration’ that punc- ture the everyday, as a diffuse and dispersed ‘state of violence’ replaces the usual configurations of war. Violence can erupt on a commuter train in Madrid, a house in Gaza City, a poppy field in Helmand or a street in Ciudad Juarez: such is the contrapuntal geog- raphy of the everywhere war. It is also to claim that, as cartographic reason falters and military violence is loosed from its frames, the conventional ties between war and geography have come undone: that, as Münkler (2005, 3) has it, ‘war has lost its well-defined contours’. In what follows, I propose to take Münkler at his word and consider three borderlands beyond Afghanistan and Iraq that illuminate some of the ways in which, since 9/11, late modern war is being trans- formed by the slippery spaces within which and through which it is conducted. I focus in turn on ‘Af-Pak’, ‘Amexica’ and cyberspace, partly because these concrete instances remind us that the every-where war is also always somewhere (Sparke 2007, 117), and partly because they bring into view features of a distinctly if not uniquely American way of war. Af-Pak’ ‘Af-Pak’ is the cover term coined by the Obama administration, and probably by its Special Represen- tative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Hol- brooke, to describe the regional battlespace in which the United States pursues its armed conflict with the Taliban and al Qaeda. The term is widely disliked in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but its hyphen marks a pro- foundly ambiguous zone. The border was surveyed between 1894 and 1896 to delimit British colonial territories in India along the north-west frontier with Afghanistan. This so-called Durand Line bisected the cultural region of Pashtunistan, dividing villages and extended families with strong culture and kinship connections between them, and ever since the forma- tion of Pakistan in 1947, Afghanistan has insisted that the demarcation lapsed with the end of colonial rule. The established body of international law rejects the Afghan position, but Mahmud (2010) argues that the continued entanglements of law and colonial power show that in this post-colonial space law is still part of the problem rather than the solution because the border freeze-frames colonial demarcations. Not sur- prisingly, the borderlands are highly porous and many of their inhabitants routinely cross from Afghanistan into Pakistan and back without bothering about any border formalities. This includes the Taliban, whose movements are both episodic, fleeing hot pursuit from Afghanistan, and seasonal, returning from Pakistan when fighting resumes in the spring. This recent history has compounded the porosity of the region so that ‘Af-Pak’ also conjures up a shadowy, still more dispersed ‘risky geography’ that wires Afghanistan and Pakistan to ‘Londonistan’ and other European cities, and to terrorist cells and militant groups that threaten Europe and the continental United States (Amoore and de Goede 2011). Although the Taliban is predominantly Pashtun, it is not a monolith that straddles the border. The Taliban emerged in the early 1990s as an armed and predomi- nantly Pashtun response to the brutalising rule of the militias of the Northern Alliance who governed Afghanistan in the turbulent aftermath of the Soviet occupation in 1989. The Taliban sought to impose its own stringent version of Islamic law, and its advance drew thousands of veterans from the guerilla war against the Red Army and from Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan. The civil war that ensued was a bloody and protracted affair; hundreds of al-Qaeda fighters fought alongside Taliban troops, although the relations between the two were far from straightforward, and by the end of the decade Afghanistan had been virtually consumed by the violence. The insular, ultra- nationalist project of the Taliban was supported by Pakistan throughout the 1990s, and the neo-Taliban that regrouped after the US-led invasion of Afghani- stan has continued to seek an accommodation with Islamabad (Gregory 2004, 41–2). Its leadership council was driven from Kandahar and is now based in Quetta; its four regional military councils are based in Pakistan too, and it enjoys the support of Pakistan’s Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence. These affili- ations sharply distinguish the Afghan Taliban from the Pakistan Taliban, or Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP), which was formed in December 2007 as a loose coalition of militant Islamicist groups under Baitullah Mehsud. The Pakistan Taliban endorses the struggle against the US-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, but its primary target is the Pakistani state: it seeks to establish its own rule over the Feder- ally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) on the border. The Pakistan military has conducted a series of offen- sive operations against the TTP in those areas, punc- tuated by wavering truces, but the FATA continue to have a tense and attenuated relationship to Islamabad, and in Urdu they are known as ilaqa ghair, ‘alien’, ‘foreign’, or even ‘forbidden’ lands. These ambivalences have a direct impact on strikes by Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in the FATA. The attacks are carried out by armed MQ-1 Predators and MQ-9 Reapers launched from bases in Afghanistan (and until early this year in Pakistan too) but remotely controlled by the CIA from the continental United States. The Predator was jointly developed for the US Air Force and the CIA, and at the CIA’s request it was armed with Hellfire missiles in early 2001. After 9/11 President George W. Bush signed an authorisation that gave the CIA wide latitude in the ‘war on terror’ through the issue of ‘kill, capture or detain’ orders against members of al Qaeda. Its immediate conse- quence was the initiation in October of the same year of the program of extraordinary rendition conducted in the shadows of the global war prison: the seizure, incarceration and torture of terrorist suspects at ‘black sites’. This was subsequently supplemented by a program directed at killing named individuals – ‘High Value Targets’ – who were on a list compiled by the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center. The first UAV strike in Pakistan took place on 18 June 2004. The initial pace was slow, in part because the number of UAVs was limited but also because the target list was restricted and ground intelligence meagre. There were eight more strikes before the assassination of Benazir Bhutto on 27 December 2007 prompted Bush to expand the target list from al Qaeda to a wider array of individuals, and thus to increase the rate of strike; by the end of 2008 there had been 46 strikes in Pakistan. As extraordinary renditions were terminated and black sites closed, President Barack Obama widened the scope of the target list still further and dramatically stepped up the tempo; faster and more powerful Reapers were pressed into service, borrowed from Air Force operations in Afghanistan, and by the end of 2010 there had been a further 180 strikes. Baitullah Mehsud was assassinated by a Predator strike in August 2009 – after 16 unsuccessful strikes over 14 months that killed several hundred others (Mayer 2009) – but this seems to have been a rare success. The vast majority killed in the last 2 years have reportedly been ordinary foot soldiers – people ‘whose names were unknown or about whom the Agency had only fragmentary information’ (Cloud 2010), although it had no hesitation in declaring vir- tually none of them civilians – and this has led to doubts about the purpose and parameters of the cam- paign (Miller 2011). These operations raise troubling questions. Some arise from the resort to extra-judicial killing that the United States once condemned: if it is wrong to torture suspects, how can it be right to assassinate them? How secure is the evidential basis on which targeting decisions are made? Others arise from the use of UAVs and the time–space compressions pro- duced by the techno-cultural armature of this new mode of war, although I think that most of the criti- cism about video feeds reducing war to a video game is misplaced – these are profoundly immersive tech- nologies that have quite other (and more serious) con- sequences for killing – but in any case these concerns apply with equal force to the strikes carried out by the Air Force’s Predators and Reapers in Afghanistan that use the Pentagon’s Joint Integrated Prioritised Target List to ‘put warheads on foreheads’ (Gregory 2011). Still others arise from the legal apparatus that consti- tutes the extended war zone, and it is these that concern me here. Plainly the United States is not at war with Pakistan, and even though Islamabad gives the nod to the strikes – while closing its eyes to their effects – Murphy (2009, 10) claims that the authority of Islamabad to sanction US military actions in the FATA is far from clear. For its part, the Obama admin- istration represents the strikes as legitimate acts of self-defence against the Afghan Taliban who are engaged in a transnational armed conflict and seek sanctuary across the border and as effective counter- terrorism tactics against al Qaeda and its affiliates hiding in Pakistan. But these are inadequate responses for at least three reasons that all revolve around the battlespace as a grey zone. First, even though the Air Force may be involved to some degree, it is the CIA that plans and executes the strikes. The CIA was created in 1947 as a civilian agency to counterbalance the influence of the mili- tary. Since then there has been a general ‘civilianisa- tion’ of war in all sorts of ways, which includes the outsourcing of support services to contractors, and the CIA has been transformed from a civilian agency into ‘a paramilitary organisation at the vanguard of Ameri- ca’s far-flung wars’ operating from an ‘archipelago of fire-bases’ in Afghanistan and beyond (Mazzetti 2010; Shane et al. 2010). But the CIA does not operate under military control so that, as Singer (2010) observes, the clandestine air war in Pakistan is commanded not by an Air Force general but by ‘a former congressman from California’, Leon Panetta, the Director of the CIA. According to Horton (2010), this is ‘the first time in U.S. history that a state-of-the-art, cutting-edge weapons system has been placed in the hands of the CIA’. Hence Singer’s (2010) complaint that civilians are operating advanced weapons systems outside the military chain of command and ‘wrestling with complex issues of war’ for which they have neither the necessary training – this is a moot point: it may be that CIA operators follow similar procedures protocols to their Air Force counterparts, including the incorpora- tion of legal advisers into the kill-chain to endorse the ‘prosecution of the target’ (Etzioni 2010; Mckelvey 2011) – nor, according to the National Security Act, the legal authority. This is the most damaging objec- tion because it turns CIA operators into the category that Bush so confidently consigned to the global war prison after 9/11: unlawful combatants (O’Connell 2009). This is such an obvious point that Paust (2010, 45), who otherwise endorses the strikes as acts of self-defence, concludes that the CIA’s lawyers must be leftovers from the Bush administration ‘who have proven either to be remarkably ignorant of the laws of war or conveniently quiet and complicit during the Bush–Cheney program of serial and cascading crimi- nality’. These considerations radically transform the battlespace as the line between the CIA and the mili- tary is deliberately blurred. Obama’s recent decision to appoint Panetta as Secretary of Defense and have General David Petraeus take his place as Director of the CIA makes at least that much clear. So too do the braiding lines of responsibility between the CIA and Special Forces in the killing of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad in May 2011, which for that reason (and others) was undertaken in what Axe (2011) portrays as a ‘legal grey zone’ between two US codes, Title 10 (which includes the Uniformed Code of Military Justice) and Title 50 (which authorises the CIA and its covert operations) (Stone 2003). The role of the CIA in this not-so-secret war in Pakistan thus marks the for- mation of what Engelhardt and Turse (2010) call ‘a new-style [battlespace] that the American public knows remarkably little about, and that bears little relationship to the Afghan War as we imagine it or as our leaders generally discuss it’. Second, representing each drone strike as a sepa- rate act of self-defence obscures the systematic and cumulative nature of the campaign. Although the Obama administration insists that its targeting procedures adhere to the laws of armed conflict, the covert nature of a war conducted by a clandestine agency ensures that most of its victims are wrapped in blankets of secrecy. Accountability is limited enough in the case of a declared war; in an undeclared war it all but disappears. There is little or no recognition of civilian casualties, no inquiries into incidents that violate the principles of discrimination and proportionality, and no mechanism for providing compensation. The Cam- paign for Innocent Victims in Conflict reports from the FATA that: Drone victims receive no assistance from the Pakistani or US governments, despite the existence of Pakistani compensation efforts for other conflict-victims and US com- pensation mechanisms currently operating in Iraq and Afghanistan. Victims are left to cope with losses on their own while neither the Pakistani nor the US governments acknowledge responsibility for the strikes or the civilian status of those collaterally harmed. Rogers (2010, 64) The single exception to date has been the decision by Islamabad to compensate victims of a US drone strike in North Waziristan in March 2011. The details, such as they are, are revealing. Local people had gathered at a market with Taliban mediators to settle a dispute over a chromite mine; two UAVs launched four mis- siles that killed at least 40 people. Pakistan’s Prime Minister and the Chief of Army Staff both sharply condemned the strike as a reckless attack on civilians, including elders and children, but US officials insisted that the meeting was a legitimate terrorist target not ‘a bake sale’, ‘county fair’, ‘charity car wash’ or ‘the local men’s glee club’ (sic) (Masood and Shah 2011; Rodriguez 2011). As even this case shows, the advanced technology that makes the UAV campaign possible – the combination of sensor and shooter in a single platform – does not dispel the fog of war. Far from making the battlespace transparent, this new apparatus actively exploits another grey zone, the space between civilian and combatant that is peopled by the spectral figures that haunt the landscape of insurgency. Third, the legal logic through which the battlespace is extended beyond the declared zone of combat in Afghanistan is itself infinitely extendible. If the United States is fighting a global war, if it arrogates to itself the right to kill or detain its enemies wherever it finds them, where does it end? (Blank 2010–11). Human Rights Watch posed the key questions in a letter to Obama on 7 December 2010: While the United States is a party to armed conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq and could become a party to armed conflicts elsewhere, the notion that the entire world is automatically by extension a battleground in which the laws of war are applicable is contrary to international law. How does the administration define the ‘global battle- field’ and what is the legal basis for that definition? What, if any, limits exist on ordering targeted killings within it? Does it view the battlefield as global in a literal sense, allowing lethal force to be used, in accordance with the laws of war, against a suspected terrorist in an apartment in Paris, a shopping mall in London, or a bus station in Iowa City? Do the rules governing targeted killing vary from one place to another – for example, are different criteria used in Yemen and Pakistan?’ Human Rights Watch (2010) These bloody geographies exploit another grey zone. Legal opinions are sharply divided about the regula- tion of armed conflict between state and non-state actors that takes place beyond state borders (‘transna- tional armed conflicts’). It is those states that have most strenuously pressed for the regulation of intra- state wars and the establishment of international criminal tribunals for conflicts in Ruanda and the former Yugoslavia that have most vigorously insisted on being allowed the maximum freedom to conduct their own trans-border campaigns against non-state actors (Benvenisti 2010). Law and war have always been intertwined, and international law is often re-made through war – in fact operating at the margins of the law is one of the most powerful ways of chang- ing it – and the UAV strikes in Pakistan are evidently no exception. They seek at once to expand the battlespace and to contract the legal armature that regu- lates its constitution. I have argued elsewhere that the American way of war has changed since 9/11, though not uniquely because of it (Gregory 2010), and there are crucial continuities as well as differences between the Bush and Obama administrations: ‘The man who many considered the peace candidate in the last election was transformed into the war president’ (Carter 2011, 4). This requires a careful telling, and I do not mean to reduce the three studies I have sketched here to a single interpretative narrative. Yet there are connections between them as well as contradictions, and I have indicated some of these en route. Others have noted them too. Pakistan’s President has remarked that the war in Afghanistan has grave consequences for his country ‘just as the Mexican drug war on US borders makes a difference to American society’, and one scholar has suggested that the United States draws legal authority to conduct military operations across the border from Afghanistan (including the killing of bin Laden, codenamed ‘Geronimo’) from its history of extra-territorial opera- tions against non-state actors in Mexico in the 1870s and 1880s (including the capture of the real Geronimo) (Margolies 2011). Whatever one makes of this, one of the most persistent threads connecting all three cases is the question of legality, which runs like a red ribbon throughout the prosecution of late modern war. On one side, commentators claim that new wars in the global South are ‘non-political’, intrinsically predatory criminal enterprises, that cartels are morphing into insurgencies, and that the origins of cyber warfare lie in the dark networks of cyber crime; on the other side, the United States places a premium on the rule and role of law in its new counterinsurgency doctrine, accentuates the involvement of legal advisers in targeting decisions by the USAF and the CIA, and even as it refuses to confirm its UAV strikes in Pakistan provides arguments for their legality. The invocation of legality works to marginalise ethics and politics by making available a seemingly neutral, objective language: disagreement and debate then become purely technical issues that involve matters of opinion, certainly, but not values. The appeal to legality – and to the quasi-judicial process it invokes – thus helps to authorise a widespread and widening militarisation of our world. While I think it is both premature and excessive to see this as a transformation from governmentality to ‘militariality’ (Marzec 2009), I do believe that Foucault’s (2003) injunction – ‘Society must be defended’ – has been transformed into an unconditional imperative since 9/11 and that this involves an intensifying triangulation of the planet by legality, security and war. We might remember that biopolitics, one of the central projects of late modern war, requires a legal armature to authorise its interven- tions, and that necropolitics is not always outside the law. This triangulation has become such a commonplace and provides such an established base-line for contemporary politics that I am reminded of an inter- view with Zizek soon after 9/11 – which for him marked the last war of the twentieth century – when he predicted that the ‘new wars’ of the twenty-first century would be distinguished by a radical uncertainty: ‘it will not even be clear whether it is a war or not’ (Deich- mann et al. 2002). Neither will it be – nor is it – clear where the battlespace begins and ends. As I have tried to show, the two are closely connected. For this reason I am able to close on a less pessimistic note. As I drafted this essay, I was watching events unfold on the streets of Cairo and other Egyptian cities, just weeks after similar scenes in Tunisia. I hope that the real, lasting counterpoint to 9/11 is to be found in those places, not in Afghanistan, Pakistan or Iraq. For those events show that ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’ cannot be limited to the boastful banners of military adventur- ism, hung from the barrels of guns or draped across warships, and that ordinary people can successfully rise up against autocratic, repressive and corrupt regimes: including those propped up for so long by the United States and its European allies. Perhaps one day someone will be able to write about ‘the nowhere war’ – and not from Europe or North America.

## Top shelf

#### Doesn’t solve-

#### A. Doesn’t solve

Only congress can leverage the GAO

By Julian Sanchez, Julian Sanchez is a research fellow at the Cato Institute and a contributing editor for Reason magazine, Newsweek on July 29, 2010. “Why the Intelligence Community Needs GAO Oversight” http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/why-intelligence-community-needs-gao-oversight?print

The shroud of secrecy that necessarily shields intelligence work has always made robust internal oversight especially vital, even while rendering it exponentially more difficult. As the Post notes, even the handful of Defense Department “Super Users” meant to have a bird’s-eye view of all classified intelligence programs can’t keep track of the sprawl, or as one put it, “I’m not going to live long enough to be briefed on everything.”¶ Harried legislators on oversight committees are in an even more hopeless position. The most sensitive programs — such as the warrantless wiretapping that President George W. Bush authorized the NSA to carry out in the wake of 9/11 — may be disclosed only to a “Gang of Eight” senior legislators, barred from taking notes or seeking expert advice. Even when full committees are briefed, the intelligence agencies are often delinquent with statutorily mandatory reporting, and in any event members of Congress have scant incentive to commit scarce time and staff to cracking down on intelligence waste or inefficiency. You can’t rally public outrage behind the cause of reforming wasteful secret intelligence programs, and if you do manage to fix a problem, you don’t get to issue a self-congratulatory press release. The result is a pattern scholars have dubbed the “fire alarm” model of oversight: a spike of intense scrutiny following a major intelligence scandal, followed by long stretches of relative congressional apathy.¶ As intelligence scholar Jennifer Kibbe notes in a recent paper, fragmented jurisdiction compounds the problem. During the ’90s, Congress failed to review the FBI’s attempts at counterterrorism reform because the intelligence and judiciary committees each considered it the other’s authority. In theory, the intelligence committees have primary oversight authority. But when they don’t manage to pass a formal intelligence authorization bill, as they failed to do from 2006 – 09, budgetary control effectively falls to the appropriations subcommittees, which have only a tiny fraction of the cleared staff needed to do serious scrutiny of intelligence budgets.¶ Meanwhile, those exploding budgets increasingly line the coffers of private firms who provide not only an arsenal of spy gadgets, but some 30 percent of the staff at the intelligence agencies. Assuming that private contracts continue to account for about 70 percent of the intelligence budget, the firms in the secret sector are competing for some $50 billion annually in tax money. (By way of comparison, the global movie industry pulled in a hair under $30 billion in 2009.)¶ In a few cases — such as the scandal that brought down disgraced Rep. Randy “Duke” Cunningham — that cash has found its way directly back to government in the form of bribes. More often it greases the perfectly legal revolving door between senior intelligence positions and executive suites. Lt. Gen. James Clapper, President Obama’s nominee for director of national intelligence (DNI), is a former chairman of the largest intel contractors’ trade association, the Intelligence and National Security Alliance. So was his Bush-era predecessor Mike McConnell, who has since rejoined many of his old governmental colleagues at behemoth contractor Booz Allen Hamilton.¶ Combine thick bankrolls and thick secrecy with thin walls between the public and for-profit sides of the intel world, and you’ve got a perfect incubator for bloat and waste, a sector “so massive,” the Post concluded, “that its effectiveness is impossible to determine.”¶ In the rest of the federal government, responsibility for checking such excesses falls primarily to the watchdog GAO. And it’s a natural fit for the job of holding intelligence to account as well.¶ The GAO has the capacity Congress lacks: as of last year, the office had 199 staffers cleared at the top-secret level, with 96 holding still more rarefied “sensitive compartmented information” clearances. And those cleared staff have a proven record of working to oversee highly classified Defense Department programs without generating leaks. Gen. Clapper, the prospective DNI, has testified that the GAO “held our feet to the fire” at the Pentagon with thorough analysis and constructive criticism.¶ Unlike the inspectors general at the various agencies — which also do vital oversight work — the GAO is directly answerable to Congress, not to the executive branch. And while it’s in a position to take a broad, pangovernmental view, the GAO also hosts analysts with highly specialized economic and management expertise the IG offices lack. Unleashing GAO would be the first step in discovering what the Post couldn’t: whether the billions we’re pouring into building a surveillance and national security state are really making us safer.

#### Congress key to legal clarity

Mark David Maxwell, Colonel, Judge Advocate with the U.S. Army, Winter 2012, TARGETED KILLING, THE LAW, AND TERRORISTS, Joint Force Quarterly, http://www.ndu.edu/press/targeted-killing.html

The weakness of this theory is that it is not codified in U.S. law; it is merely the extrapolation of international theorists and organizations. The only entity under the Constitution that can frame and settle Presidential power regarding the enforcement of international norms is Congress. As the check on executive power, Congress must amend the AUMF to give the executive a statutory roadmap that articulates when force is appropriate and under what circumstances the President can use targeted killing. This would be the needed endorsement from Congress, the other political branch of government, to clarify the U.S. position on its use of force regarding targeted killing. For example, it would spell out the limits of American lethality once an individual takes the status of being a member of an organized group. Additionally, statutory clarification will give other states a roadmap for the contours of what constitutes anticipatory self-defense and the proper conduct of the military under the law of war. Congress should also require that the President brief it on the decision matrix of articulated guidelines before a targeted killing mission is ordered. As Kenneth Anderson notes, “[t]he point about briefings to Congress is partly to allow it to exercise its democratic role as the people’s representative.”74 The desire to feel safe is understandable. The consumers who buy SUVs are not buying them to be less safe. Likewise, the champions of targeted killings want the feeling of safety achieved by the elimination of those who would do the United States harm. But allowing the President to order targeted killing without congressional limits means the President can manipulate force in the name of national security without tethering it to the law advanced by international norms. The potential consequence of such unilateral executive action is that it gives other states, such as North Korea and Iran, the customary precedent to do the same. Targeted killing might be required in certain circumstances, but if the guidelines are debated and understood, the decision can be executed with the full faith of the people’s representative, Congress. When the decision is made without Congress, the result might make the United States feel safer, but the process eschews what gives a state its greatest safety: the rule of law.

#### Counter plan doesn’t solve and links to politics- the president will overreach his power

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With discretion comes distrust. n2 Voters and legislators grant the executive discretion, through action or inaction, and increase executive discretion during emergencies, because they believe that the benefits of doing so outweigh the risks of executive abuse. n3 By the same token, political actors will attempt to constrain the executive, or will simply fail to grant powers they otherwise would have preferred to grant, where they believe that the risks and harms of abuses outweigh any benefits in security or other goods. The fear of executive abuse arises from many sources, but the basic problem is uncertainty about the executive's motivations. The executive may, for example, be a power maximizer, intent on using legal or factual discretion to harm political opponents and cement his political position, or that of his political party; or he may be an empire builder, interested in expanding his turf at the expense of other institutions.

Where the executive is indeed ill motivated in any of these ways, constraining his discretion (more than the voters would otherwise choose) may be sensible. But the executive may not be ill motivated at all. Where the executive is in fact a faithful agent, using his increased discretion to promote the public good according to whatever conception of the public good voters hold, then constraints on executive discretion are all cost and no benefit. Voters, legislators, and judges know that different executive officials have different motivations. Not all presidents are power maximizers or empire builders. n4 Of course, the executive need not be pure of heart; his devotion to the public interest may in turn be based on concern for the judgment of history. But so long as that motivation makes him a faithful agent of the principal(s), he counts as well motivated.¶ The problem, however, is that the public has no simple way to know which type of executive it is dealing with. An ill-motivated executive will just mimic the statements of a well-motivated one, saying [\*867] the right things and offering plausible rationales for policies that outsiders, lacking crucial information, find difficult to evaluate -- policies that turn out not to be in the public interest. The ability of the ill-motivated executive to mimic the public-spirited executive's statements gives rise to the executive's dilemma of credibility: the well-motivated executive has no simple way to identify himself as such. Distrust causes voters (and the legislators they elect) to withhold discretion that they would like to grant and that the well-motivated executive would like to receive. Of course, the ill-motivated executive might also want discretion. The problem is that voters who would want to give discretion (only) to the well-motivated executive may choose not to do so, because they are not sure what type he actually is. The risk that the public and legislators will fail to trust a well-motivated president is just as serious as the risk that they will trust an ill-motivated president, yet legal scholars have felled forests on the second topic while largely neglecting the first. n5¶ Our aim in this Article is to identify this dilemma of credibility that afflicts the well-motivated executive and to propose mechanisms for ameliorating it. We focus on emergencies and national security but cast the analysis within a broader framework. Our basic claim is that the credibility dilemma can be addressed by executive signaling. Without any new constitutional amendments, statutes, or legislative action, law and executive practice already contain resources to allow a well-motivated executive to send a credible signal of his motivations, committing to use increased discretion in public-spirited ways. By tying [\*868] policies to institutional mechanisms that impose heavier costs on ill-motivated actors than on well-motivated ones, the well-motivated executive can credibly signal his good intentions and thus persuade voters that his policies are those that voters would want if fully informed. We focus particularly on mechanisms of executive self-binding that send a signal of credibility by committing presidents to actions or policies that only a well-motivated president would adopt.¶ The discussion is structured as follows. Part I lays out examples of the credibility dilemma, both historical and recent. Part II analyzes the credibility dilemma through the lens of principal-agent theory. Part III examines the attempted Madisonian solution to the credibility dilemma and explains why it is a failure, for the most part. Part IV suggests a series of mechanisms for credibly demonstrating the executive's good intentions. These mechanisms include independent commissions within the executive branch; bipartisanship in appointments to the executive branch, or more broadly the creation of domestic coalitions of the willing; the related tactic of counterpartisanship, or choosing policies that run against the preferences of the president's own party; commitments to multilateral action in foreign policy; increasing the transparency of the executive's decisionmaking processes; and a regime of strict liability for executive abuses. Not all of these mechanisms succeed, and some of them succeed under some conditions but fail under others.¶ Credibility is but one good that trades off against other goods, even from the standpoint of the well-motivated executive. The main cost of credibility is that it diminishes the president's control over policymaking. In Part IV, we attempt to identify the conditions under which one or the other mechanism can produce credibility benefits greater than the resulting costs.¶ I. Examples¶ Presidents always have some credibility, at least at the start of their term. People do not vote for candidates whom they do not believe, and so the winning candidate brings to the office some amount of credibility, which he may further enhance over time by keeping his promises or making predictions that are proven correct by events. Having built up capital, some presidents find it useful to engage in deception, and some have gotten away with it, at least in the short term. Prominent examples include FDR's claim during the 1940 election that he was determined to keep the United States out of war; n6 Eisenhower's [\*869] denial that U-2 spy planes overflew the Soviet Union; n7 (probably) Johnson's description of the Gulf of Tonkin incident; n8 Nixon's statements about military action relating to Cambodia; n9 (probably) Reagan's claim that he was unaware of the arms-for-hostages scheme; n10 and Clinton's denial that he had had a sexual relationship with Monica Lewinsky. n11 But deception is potentially a costly strategy, because revelation of the deception damages the president's credibility, making it more difficult for him to achieve his next set of goals.¶ For this reason, we focus on historical cases where the president avoids deception, where in fact he makes a true or roughly true statement about circumstances that the public cannot directly evaluate, but has trouble persuading the public to believe him. In these cases, the president needs to use mechanisms that enhance his credibility or, if he cannot, finds himself unable to act. We offer examples to illustrate the credibility dilemma, to illustrate a range of solutions to the dilemma -- some successful, some otherwise -- and to show that the mechanisms we will propose in Part IV have historical analogues or precedents.¶ A. FDR: The Nazi Threat¶ Franklin Delano Roosevelt understood the threat posed by Nazi Germany to the United States' long-term interests long before the U.S. public did. The public was preoccupied with the Great Depression and had powerful isolationist representatives in Congress. Because of popular sentiment, FDR could not commit U.S. military assistance to Britain and France, even after Germany invaded France and began [\*870] bombing London. n12 Marginal economic and military assistance could take place only through complicated subterfuges and was in any event of minimal value.¶ Even after Japan bombed Pearl Harbor and Nazi Germany declared war on the U.S., FDR had to move cautiously. The public supported war, but sought war primarily with Japan, while FDR correctly believed that Germany posed a greater threat to the United States than Japan did. In FDR's view, Japan could be, and should be, dealt with after the Atlantic alliance against Germany was solidified. Thus, although FDR had popular support on one level, he needed to devise ways to ensure support for his particular war aims and strategies, whose particular justifications would always remain at least partially obscure to the public. One of FDR's tactics for generating support was to invite prominent Republicans into his cabinet. For example, Henry Stimson was given the post of Secretary of War, and Frank Knox was made the Secretary of the Navy. n13 Provided with inside information, they would be able to blow the whistle if U.S. war strategy departed too much from what they believed was the public interest. But, as internationalists, they would also support the war.¶ B. Truman: Scaring Hell out of the Country¶ The Soviet Union had been the United States' ally during World War II, and many people, including FDR, expected or hoped that it would cooperate with the United States after the war as well. That the Soviet Union would have aggressive rather than pacific designs only gradually dawned on U.S. elites. By 1946, skepticism about Soviet motives was widespread in the U.S. government, but the U.S. public still labored under more genial impressions fostered by wartime propaganda. To counter the growing Soviet threat, President Harry S. Truman resolved to expend U.S. treasure to rebuild the economies of France, West Germany, Britain, and other potential allies, and to bind them together in a military defense pact. The former would require a lot of money; the latter would require the stationing of U.S. troops abroad. The U.S. public, however, was traditionally isolationist, and wished to enjoy the victory and the peace. n14 How could Truman persuade [\*871] the public that further sacrifice and foreign entanglements would be necessary to defend U.S. interests against a former ally?¶ Truman apparently could not simply explain to the public that the Soviet threat justified the Marshall Plan and North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the United States' first permanent foreign military alliance. The problem was that the public had no way to evaluate the Soviet threat. The U.S.S.R. had not actually used military force against U.S. troops, as the Japanese had five years earlier at Pearl Harbor. The Soviet Union was instead supporting communist insurgencies in Greece and Turkey, interfering in politics in Italy, violating its promise to respect democratic processes in Poland, engaging in espionage, and so forth. Experienced and perceptive observers saw a threat, but, generally speaking, the public was in no position to do so.¶ To enhance the credibility of his claims about the Soviet threat, Truman did two things. First, he recast the threat as an ideological challenge. Truman gave the threat an ideological dimension, deliberately "scaring hell out of the country." n15 Second, he made an alliance with a powerful Republican senator, Arthur Vandenberg, who could assure Truman that the Republicans would not object to his policies as long as he consulted them and allowed them some influence. As a former isolationist, Vandenberg's endorsement of Truman's policy of engagement must have enhanced the credibility of Truman's claims about the Soviet threat. n16¶ Both of these strategies succeeded, but neither was costless. Truman's characterization of the Soviet threat as an ideological challenge may have led to the McCarthy era and suppressed public debate about foreign policy. Truman's alliance with the Republicans meant, of course, that he would have less freedom of action. n17 [\*872] ¶ C. Bush I versus Bush II: The Iraqi Threat¶ George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush both went to war with Iraq, but they faced different threats and chose different responses. George H.W. Bush sought to drive Iraqi military forces out of Kuwait. His problem was persuading the U.S. public that a U.S. military response was justified. In retrospect, it might seem that he was clearly right, but at the time most experts believed that that a great number of U.S. troops would be killed. n18 This was the expected cost of a military response. On the benefit side, Bush could appeal to the sanctity of sovereign borders, but public sympathy for the rich Kuwaitis was limited. The United States' real concern was that Iraq would, with Kuwait's oil fields, become wealthy and powerful enough to expand its control over the region, threaten Saudi Arabia, dominate the Persian Gulf's oil reserves, and pose a long-term threat to the Western economies and the United States' influence in the Middle East. But all of these concerns are rather abstract, and it was never obvious that the public would accept this case. Indeed, the congressional authorization to use military force was far from unanimous in the House of Representatives. n19¶ The credibility of Bush's claims, however, was greatly aided by international support. The public support of nations with divergent interests showed that Bush's claim about the internationally destabilizing effects of Saddam Hussein's invasion was real and not imagined. Thus any claim that a U.S. military invasion was solely in Bush's partisan political interests, or in the interests mainly of oil companies, was seriously weakened. Formal United Nations approval and the military assistance of foreign states -- which was of mainly political, not military significance -- further solidified Bush's credibility. n20¶ Surface similarities aside, George W. Bush faced a different kind of threat. He feared that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), which he would give or sell to terrorist groups like al Qaeda. It was more difficult for George W. Bush to prove that Saddam had WMDs than for his father to prove that Saddam was a threat to the region, because any WMDs were hidden on Saddam's territory [\*873] while the invasion of Kuwait could be observed by all. George W. Bush followed the same strategy that his father did, albeit somewhat less enthusiastically: to enlist international support in order to bolster the credibility of his claim that Saddam continued to pose a major threat to U.S. and Western interests. But George W. Bush failed to persuade foreign countries that Saddam posed a great enough threat to justify a military invasion (although they largely agreed that he either had or probably had WMDs), and he did not obtain significant international support. n21 Ironically, George W. Bush, unlike his father, had strong congressional support, in part because opposition to the first war turned out to be a political liability, and the costs of the first war (unlike the second war) turned out to be minimal.¶ D. Clinton: Wag the Dog¶ Long before the attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. government understood that al Qaeda posed a threat to U.S. interests. The CIA had established a bin Laden office in 1996, and the Clinton administration was trying to develop an effective counterterrorism strategy. n22 In 1998, al Qaeda blew up U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, whereupon Clinton ordered cruise missile strikes on targets in Afghanistan and Sudan. Just three days earlier, however, Clinton had announced on national television that he had had an affair with Monica Lewinsky. Opponents charged that he ordered the strikes in order to distract the public from his domestic problems. n23 This came to be known as the Wag the Dog strategy after a movie that featured a similar subterfuge. n24 [\*874] ¶ Clinton's credibility problem was more acute than that of earlier presidents. FDR, Truman, and George H.W. Bush (as well as, later, George W. Bush) might embark on foreign adventures in order to enhance their prestige or to pay off interest groups or to distract the public from domestic problems. George W. Bush, for example, has been repeatedly accused of manipulating terrorism warnings in order to improve poll results or electoral outcomes. n25 But only in Clinton's case was it necessary for him to make an important and visible decision about foreign policy in the midst of a personal scandal in which he admitted that he engaged in deceit, with the result that his ability to conduct an effective terrorism defense was hampered by doubts about his credibility. n26 A more aggressive response to al Qaeda would have to wait until after September 11, 2001.¶ II. Theory¶ A. The Problem¶ The examples we discussed have a common structure: a nation or group, like Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, Iraq, or al Qaeda, poses a threat to U.S. interests. The threat is widely understood at a general level but the public does not understand important details: why the threat exists, its magnitude, what programs will best address it. The president believes that a particular program -- NSA surveillance, unlimited detention, military preparation -- is necessary and desirable for countering the threat, and let us assume that he is correct. At the same time, the program could be misused in various ways. It could be used to enhance the power of the president at the expense of legitimate political opponents; to pay off the president's supporters at the expense of the general public; or to spark an emotional but short-lived surge of patriotism that benefits the president during an important election but does not enhance security. The president can announce the [\*875] program and justify it in general terms, but he cannot design the program in such a way that its dangers to legitimate political opposition can be eliminated. n27 As a result, his claim that the program will be used only for national security, and not to enhance his power at the expense of political opponents, or to benefit allies, may not be believed.¶ Consider, for example, the policy of detaining suspected members of al Qaeda without charging them and without providing them with a trial. The public understands that al Qaeda poses a threat to national security but lacks the information necessary to evaluate the detention policy. The public does not know the magnitude of the continuing threat from al Qaeda: it might be the case that the group has focused its attention on foreign targets, that it no longer has the capacity to launch attacks on U.S. soil, that greater international cooperation and intelligence sharing has significantly reduced the threat, and so forth. The public also does not know whether the detainees are important members of al Qaeda, foot soldiers, or unconnected to al Qaeda; whether the dangerous detainees could be adequately incapacitated or deterred through regular criminal processes; whether the Bush administration obtains valuable intelligence from the detainees, as it claims, or not; whether the detainees are treated well or harshly; and numerous other relevant factors. Some of the relevant variables are public, but most are not; those that are public are nonetheless extremely difficult to evaluate. Consider the ambiguity over whether the suicides at Guantanamo Bay in June 2006 were driven by despair and harsh treatment, or were the result of a calculated effort by martyr-seeking Jihadists to score a propaganda coup. n28 As a general matter, the public does not even know whether the absence of major terrorist attacks on U.S. soil since September 11, 2001 resulted from the Bush administration's detention policy, at least partly resulted from this policy, occurred for reasons entirely independent of this policy such as (say) the military attack on Afghanistan, or occurred despite the detention policy, which, by alienating potential allies, perversely made a further attack more likely than it would otherwise have been.¶ Described in this manner, the president's credibility problem is the result of an agency relationship, where the president is the agent and the public is the principal. In agency models, the agent has the power to engage in an action that benefits or harms a principal. In a [\*876] typical version of these models, the principal first hires the agent and instructs the agent to engage in high effort rather than shirk. The agent then chooses whether to engage in high effort or shirk. High effort by the agent increases the probability that the principal will receive a high payoff, but some randomness is involved, so that the link between the agent's effort and the principal's payoff is stochastic rather than certain. If the agent's behavior can be observed and proven before a court, then the simple solution is for the two parties to enter a contract requiring the agent to engage in high effort. If the agent's behavior cannot be observed, then a contract requiring high effort is unenforceable, and instead the principal and agent might enter a contract that makes the agent's compensation a function of the principal's payoff. This gives the agent an incentive to use high effort, though depending on various conditions, this incentive might be weak. n29¶ Less important than the details of the agency model, and its various solutions, is the way that it clarifies the basic problem. The president is the agent and the public is the principal (sometimes we will think of the legislature as the principal, bracketing questions of agency slack between voters and legislators). The public cares about national security but also cares about civil liberties and the well-being of potential targets of the war on terror; its optimal policy trades off these factors. However, the public cannot directly choose the policy; instead, it delegates that power to the government and, in particular, the president. The president knows the range of options available, their likely effects, their expected costs and benefits -- thanks to the resources and expertise of the executive branch -- and so, if he is well motivated, he will choose the best measures available.¶ Thus a well-motivated executive, in our sense, is an executive who chooses the policies that voters would choose if they knew what the executive knows. n30 This definition does not require that the president's deeper motives be pure. For our purposes, a well-motivated president may be concerned with his historical reputation in the long run, as many presidents are. Because presidents know that in the long run most or all of their currently private information will be revealed, n31 a [\*877] concern with the judgment of history pushes presidents to make the decisions that future generations, knowing what the president knows now, will approve. To be sure, the concern with historical reputation is not perfectly congruent with doing what the current generation would approve of (with full information), because different generations have different values, as in the case of civil rights. The convergence is substantial, however, compared to far more harmful motivations a president might have, such as short-term empire-building or partisan advantage. Presidents with a concern for their long-run reputation may not be disinterested leaders, but they approach the ideal of faithful agency more closely than do presidents with no such concern.¶ We also assume that the voters' ultimate preferences are fixed, so we put aside the possibility of presidential leadership that changes bedrock public values. However, voters' derived preferences may change as their information changes, and this further blurs the significance of changing public values over time. On this view, there is still scope for leadership, in the sense that a well-motivated president might choose a policy inconsistent with voters' current ill-informed preferences, but consistent with the new preferences voters will form as their information changes, perhaps as a result of the policy itself. FDR's behavior just before World War II is the model for presidential leadership in this sense. n32¶ As this discussion suggests, the well-motivated executive may or may not keep campaign promises, or adopt popular policies. All depends on circumstances -- on what the public would approve, if it knew what the president knows. A public that would condemn the president's policy P might, if it knew more, approve of P. The well-motivated president will want to adopt P in such circumstances, and will then face the problem of credibly signaling to the public that he favors the policy for good reasons that he cannot directly convey. Furthermore, we assume that the well-motivated executive will collect an optimal amount of information -- up to the point where the marginal benefits of further information gathering equal the marginal costs. n33 This does not mean [\*878] that the well-motivated executive always gets the facts right; he may turn out to be wrong. But it does mean that greater accuracy would not have been cost justified.¶ Against this benchmark of faithful agency, the problem is that a given president's motivations may or may not be faithful, and the public knows this. The public fears that, for various reasons, the president might choose policies that diverge from the public's optimal policies. These include:¶ 1. The president cares more about national security (or more about civil liberties, but we will, for simplicity, assume the former) than the public does. His "preferences" are different from those of the public.¶ 2. The president cares very little about national security and civil liberties; he mainly cares about maximizing his political power and, more broadly, political success -- success for himself, his party, or his chosen successor. With a view to political power and success, the president might maximize the probability of electoral success by favoring particular interest groups, voting blocs, or institutions at the expense of the public, or by adopting policies that are popular in the short term, as far as the next election cycle, but that are harmful in the long term, along with rhetoric that confuses and misleads.¶ The public knows that the president might have these or other harmful motivations, so when the president claims, for example, that a detention policy is essential to the war on terror but at the same time is not excessively harsh given its benefits, the public simply does not know whether to believe him.¶ Crucially, the risk that the public will fail to trust a well-motivated president is just as serious as the risk that it will trust an ill-motivated one. Imagine that a well-motivated president chooses the optimal policies. No terrorist attack occurs before the next election, but the public does not know whether this is because the president chose the optimal policies, the president chose bad policies and was merely lucky (as the terrorists for internal reasons chose to focus on foreign targets), or the president chose effective but excessively harsh policies. In the election, the public therefore has no particular reason to vote for this president and could easily vote him out of office and replace him with a worse president. A president who cares about electoral [\*879] success might therefore not choose the optimal policies, and even a well-motivated president might be reluctant to choose the optimal policies because of the risk that the public will misinterpret them and replace him with an ill-motivated president. Presidents need public support even when they do not face reelection; they need the public to prod Congress to provide the president with funds for his programs and statutory authorization when necessary. A well-motivated president will abandon optimal policies if he cannot persuade the public that they are warranted.¶ As we noted earlier, legal scholars rarely note the problem of executive credibility, preferring to dwell on the problem of aggrandizement by ill-motivated presidents. Ironically, this assumption that presidents seek to maximize power has obscured one of the greatest constraints on aggrandizement, namely, the president's own interest in maintaining his credibility. Neither a well-motivated nor an ill-motivated president can accomplish his goals if the public does not trust him. n34 This concern with reputation may put a far greater check on the president's actions than do the reactions of the other branches of the government.¶ B. Solutions¶ The literature on agency models and optimal contracting provides clues for solving the problem of executive credibility. This literature gives two basic pieces of advice. n35 The first piece of advice is to align preferences. An employer will do better if her employees obtain utility from doing whatever actions benefit the employer. Suppose, for example, an employer seeks to hire someone to build furniture in a factory. The pay is good enough to attract job candidates who do not enjoy building furniture, but clearly the employer does better by hiring people who like working with their hands, and take pleasure in constructing a high-quality product, than by hiring people who do not like working with their hands. We say that the first type of person has a preference for building high-quality furniture; this person is less likely to shirk than the other type of person.¶ In order to align preferences, employers can use various types of screening mechanisms or selection mechanisms that separate the good [\*880] types and the bad types. n36 An old idea is that job candidates who completed a training program -- here, in carpentry -- are more likely good types than job candidates who did not complete such a program. The reason is not that the training program improves skills, though it might, but that a person who enjoys carpentry is more likely to enter and complete such a program than a person who does not -- the program, in terms of time and effort, is less burdensome for the former type of person. The employer could use other mechanisms as well, of course. She could ask for evidence that the job candidate pursues woodworking as a hobby in his free time, or, simply, that he has held other jobs in similar factories, or jobs that involve carpentry or furniture construction. Another important screening mechanism is to compensate employees partly through in-kind components or earmarked funds that are worth more to good types than to bad types. In university settings, academic compensation is partly composed of research budgets that cannot be spent on personal consumption and that are worth more to good types (researchers) than to bad types (shirkers). n37¶ The second piece of advice is to reward and sanction. This is not as simple as giving the employee a bonus if she constructs good furniture and firing her if she does not; recall that we assume that the employer does not directly observe the quality of the agent's action. Consider the following version of our example. The employees both design and construct furniture; "high-quality" furniture is both made well and pleasing to the public, so that it sells well. The employer cannot tell by looking at a piece of furniture whether it is high quality, because she does not know the tastes of the public. An employee who uses a high level of effort is more likely to produce furniture that sells well, but an employee can in good faith misjudge public taste and produce furniture that sells poorly. Similarly, an employee who uses a low level of effort is less likely to produce furniture that sells well but nonetheless may succeed at times. Since the employer cannot observe the quality of the furniture, she cannot make the wage a function of its quality; if she pays a flat wage, then the employee does not have an incentive to engage in a high level of effort, because that involves more personal cost without producing any reward.¶ The main solution is to make the employee's compensation a function, in part, of the quantity of the sales of the goods that the employee [\*881] produces. The quantity of sales, unlike the quality of the furniture, is observable. If the pay is properly determined, then the employee will engage in a high level of effort because the expected gains from high sales exceed the cost of high effort. How closely pay should be correlated with sales depends on how risk averse the employee is, and it may be necessary, for ordinary people who are generally risk averse, to pay them at least a little even if sales are low, and somewhat more if sales are high.¶ An enormous literature develops and qualifies these results, and we will refer to relevant parts of it later as necessary rather than try to summarize it here. n38 For now, we want to briefly point out the relevance of these solutions to our problem of executive credibility.¶ The preference-alignment solution has clear applicability to the problem of executive credibility. To be sure, elections and other democratic institutions help ensure that the president's preferences are not too distant from those of the public, but they are clearly not sufficient to solve the executive credibility problem. Elections will never create perfect preference alignment, for well-known reasons, and in any event the well-motivated executive will do what the public would want were it fully informed, not what maximizes the chances of electoral success in the short run. Furthermore, we do not consider credibility-generating mechanisms that would require new constitutional or statutory provisions; of course, the president has little or no power to redesign electoral rules in order to enhance his credibility. We will instead focus, in Part IV, on how the president might use the existing electoral system to enhance his credibility in indirect ways -- by appointing subordinates, advisors, and commission members, and by supporting certain types of candidacies for electoral office.¶ The reward-and-sanction solution also is applicable to the problem of executive credibility, but we think it is of less importance and we will not address it in any detail. The problem that most concerns us -- threats to national security -- typically does not produce a clear outcome while the president is still in office. As noted above, Bush's war-on-terror policies might be optimal, insufficient, or excessive; we will not know for many years. And the public cannot enter a contract with the president that provides that he will receive a bonus if national security is enhanced and will be sanctioned if it is not enhanced. Consequently, Bush cannot enter a contract with the public that rewards him if his policies are good and punishes him if they are bad. [\*882] ¶ However, some signaling mechanisms have a reward-or-sanction component. A good job applicant can distinguish herself from a bad job applicant by agreeing to a compensation scheme that good types value and bad types disvalue. For example, if a good type of employee discounts future payoffs less than bad types, then good types will accept deferred compensation (such as pension contributions) that bad types reject. n39 Similarly, a well-motivated president can distinguish himself from an ill-motivated president by binding himself to a policy position that an ill-motivated president would reject -- for example, deficit reduction programs or Social Security reform that would mainly benefit future generations, long after the president leaves office. However, a president, unlike an ordinary employee, cannot bind himself by a judicially enforceable contract; therefore, this mechanism can work only if the president can engage in self-binding through informal means, as we will discuss below. n40¶ Note that either a well-motivated actor or an ill-motivated actor might use strategic devices to enhance her credibility. A bad actor might, for example, take actions to enhance the credibility of his threats. In a standard illustration, the "chicken" game occurs when two drivers race toward each other and the loser is the one who swerves to avoid death. In that game, each driver is threatening to drive straight, and the winner will be the one who can make his threat credible, because the other driver will then know that the only choice is to swerve or die. Credibility is a valuable adjunct to many different motivations, not just to socially beneficial ones.¶ But this is a different type of credibility problem than the one we are interested in. In the class of problems we address, the problem that faces the well-motivated actor is that others cannot distinguish or sort him at a glance from ill-motivated actors. "Bad types" can mimic "good types" through low-cost imitation and by saying all the right things. The good type needs some device whereby he can credibly signal that he is a good type. The only effective device, in general, is for the good type to undertake an action that imposes greater costs on bad types than on good types. If third parties understand the cost structure of the action, then this separates the two types, because the bad type's strategy of costlessly imitating the good type no longer works. In employment screening, for example, both the lazy worker and the hard worker will claim to be a hard worker. The employer might prefer candidates with good references, or an advanced degree, [\*883] on the theory that obtaining those things will be easier for the good type than the bad type.¶ Let us provide a little more structure to our analysis before describing our preferred mechanisms. Suppose that the president must choose a policy that will affect national security and civil liberties; this might include asking Congress to authorize him to engage in conduct like wiretapping or the use of military force. He makes this choice at the start of his first term, and the actual effect of his choice -- on national security and civil liberties -- will not be revealed to the public until after the next election. Terrorist attacks during the first term do not necessarily prove that he chose the wrong policies; nor does the absence of terrorist attacks during the first term prove that he chose the right policies. Only later will it become clear whether the president chose the optimal policies, perhaps many decades later. Thus, the public must vote for or against the president on the basis of the policy choice itself, not on the basis of its effect on their well-being. For expository convenience, we will assume that the president actually does make the optimal policy choice and that his problem is one of convincing the public that he has done so. Presidents who, for whatever reason, knowingly choose policies that the public would reject (if fully informed) obviously do not want to convince the public that this is what they are doing.¶ Our focus, then, is how the president who chooses the optimal policy, given the information available to him and the relevant institutional constraints, might use some additional mechanism to enhance the credibility of his claim that he chose the best policy. In the next Part, we will address why our current Madisonian system does not already solve the problem of executive credibility. In Part IV, we will analyze some mechanisms by which presidents can bootstrap themselves into credibility.¶ III. Madisonian Monitoring¶ In the standard separation of powers theory attributed to Madison, the executive's credibility dilemma is ameliorated by the separation of powers and institutional competition, which produce monitoring or oversight of executive discretion. Although the Madisonian system is not usually justified as a means of enhancing the executive's credibility, that is a byproduct of the system: if checks and balances discourage ill-motivated persons from running for office, or force them to adopt public-spirited policies once in office, then the executive's claims about his policies will be credible. Congressional and judicial oversight of executive action, on this account, will ensure that the executive exercises discretion only as directed by voter-principals, [\*884] acting through legislators who are simultaneously agents (of the voters) and principals (of the executive).¶ This account is no longer adequate, if it ever was. Legislators and judges are, for the most part, unable to effectively oversee or monitor the executive, especially in the domains of foreign policy and national security. As a result, they are forced to make the difficult choice of granting discretion that an ill-motivated executive would abuse, or withholding discretion that a well-motivated executive would use for good.¶ We do not suggest that the Madisonian system has entirely failed, only that it has partly failed, and that to the extent it has failed the executive's credibility dilemma becomes more acute. We will examine some of the principal institutional problems, beginning with legislative oversight and then turning to the courts.¶ A. Congress¶ In the Madisonian vision, legislators are simultaneously principals of the president, who is supposed to execute the statutes that legislators enact, and are also institutional competitors of the president, who has freestanding constitutional powers beyond the execution of statutes. Voters elect legislators, who either transmit voters' exogenously determined policy preferences to the executive through statutes or (in a deliberative conception of Madisonianism) refine public preferences through reasoned discussion and then instruct the executive accordingly. n41 We are agnostic on the question of whether the preference-based or deliberative version of the Madisonian vision is more persuasive, or exegetically more faithful to the Madison of the Federalist Papers. In either case, what matters here is that the combination of principal-agent relationships with institutional rivalry is supposed to produce valuable byproducts for the polity as a whole. Legislators have an interest in monitoring the president, not only to ensure that he faithfully executes the statutes they enact, but also to ensure that executive power does not swell beyond its constitutionally prescribed bounds and destroy the separation of legislative and executive powers.¶ Whether or not this picture was ever realistic, it is no longer so today. Many institutional factors hamper effective legislative monitoring of executive discretion. Consider the following problems. [\*885] ¶ 1. Information asymmetries.¶ Monitoring the executive requires expertise in the area being monitored. In many cases, Congress lacks the information necessary to monitor discretionary policy choices by the executive. Although the committee system has the effect, among others, of generating legislative information and expertise, n42 and although Congress has a large internal staff, there are domains in which no amount of legislative expertise suffices for effective oversight. Prime among these are areas of foreign policy and national security. Here legislative expertise is beside the point, because the legislature lacks the raw information that experts need to make assessments.¶ The problem would disappear if legislators could cheaply acquire information from the president, but they cannot. One obstacle is a suite of legal doctrines protecting executive secrecy and creating deliberative privileges n43 -- doctrines which may or may not be justified from some higher-order systemic point of view as means for producing optimal deliberation within the executive branch. Although such privileges are waivable, the executive often fears to set a bad institutional precedent. Another obstacle is the standard executive claim that Congress leaks like a sieve, so that sharing secret information with legislators will result in public disclosure. The credibility dilemma becomes most acute when, as in the recent controversy over surveillance by the National Security Agency, the executive claims that the very scope or rationale of a program cannot be discussed with Congress, because to do so would vitiate the very secrecy that makes the program possible and beneficial. In any particular case the claim might be right or wrong; legislators have no real way to judge, and they know that the claim might be made either by a well-motivated executive or an ill-motivated executive, albeit for very different reasons.¶ 2. Collective action problems.¶ Executive officials worry that, with many legislators on select intelligence committees, someone is bound to leak and it will be difficult to pinpoint the source. Aware of the relative safety that the numbers give them, leakers are all the more bold. This is an example of a larger problem, arising from the fact that there are many more legislators than top-level executive officials. Compared to the executive branch, [\*886] Congress finds it more costly to coordinate and to undertake collective action (such as the detection and punishment of leakers). To be sure, the executive too is a "they," not an "it." Much of what presidents do is to arbitrate internal conflicts among executive departments and to try to aggregate competing views into coherent policy over time. As a comparative matter, however, the contrast is striking: the executive can act with much greater unity, force, and dispatch than can Congress, which is chronically hampered by the need for debate and consensus among large numbers. This comparative advantage is a principal reason why Congress enacts broad delegating statutes in the first place, especially in domains touching on foreign policy and national security. In these domains, and elsewhere, the very conditions that make delegation attractive also hamper congressional monitoring of executive discretion under the delegation.¶ There may or may not be offsetting advantages to Congress's large numbers; perhaps the very size and heterogeneity of Congress make it a superior deliberator, whereas the executive branch is prone to suffer from various forms of groupthink. n44 But there are clear disadvantages to large numbers, insofar as monitoring executive discretion is at issue. From the standpoint of individual legislators, monitoring is a collective good. If rational and self-interested, each legislator will attempt to free-ride on the production of this good, and monitoring will be inefficiently underproduced. n45 More broadly, the institutional prerogatives of Congress are also a collective good. n46 Individual legislators may or may not be interested in protecting the institution of Congress or the separation of legislative from executive power; much depends on legislators' time horizons or discount rate, the expected longevity of a legislative career, and so forth. But it is clear that protection of legislative prerogatives will be much less in an institution composed of hundreds of legislators coming and going than if Congress were a single person. [\*887] ¶ 3. "Separation of parties, not powers." n47¶ Congress is, among other things, a partisan institution. Political scientists debate whether it is principally a partisan institution, or even exclusively so. n48 But Madison arguably did not envision partisanship in anything like its modern sense. n49 Partisanship undermines the separation of powers during periods of unified government. n50 Where the same party controls both the executive branch and Congress, real monitoring of executive discretion rarely occurs, at any rate far less than in an ideal Madisonian system. Partisanship may enhance monitoring during periods of divided government, as one house of Congress, say, investigates a president of the other party. However, monitoring is arguably most necessary during periods of unified government, because Congress is most likely to enact broad delegations when the President holds similar views; n51 and in such periods monitoring is least likely to occur. n52 The Congress of one period may partially compensate by creating institutions to ensure bipartisan oversight in future periods -- consider the statute that gives a partisan minority of certain congressional committees power to subpoena documents from the executive, albeit only nonprivileged documents n53 -- but these are palliatives. Under unified government, congressional leaders of the [\*888] same party as the president have tremendous power to frustrate effective oversight by the minority party.¶ 4. The limits of congressional organization.¶ Congress as a collective body has attempted, in part, to overcome these problems through internal institutional arrangements. Committees and subcommittees specialize in a portion of the policy space, such as the armed forces or homeland security, thereby relieving members of the costs of acquiring and processing information (at least if the committee itself maintains a reputation for credibility). n54 Intelligence committees hold closed sessions and police their members to deter leaks (although the sanctions that members of Congress can apply to one another are not as strong as the sanctions a president can apply to a leaker in the executive branch). Large staffs, both for committees and members, add expertise and monitoring capacity. And interest groups can sometimes be counted upon to sound an alarm when the executive harms their interests. n55¶ Overall, however, these arrangements are not fully adequate, especially in domains of foreign policy and national security, where the scale of executive operations is orders of magnitude larger than the scale of congressional operations. Congress's whole staff, which must (with the help of interest groups) monitor all issues, runs to some 30,000 persons. n56 As of 2005, the executive branch had some 2.6 million civilian employees, n57 in addition to almost 1.4 million in the active armed forces. n58 The sheer mismatch between the scale of executive operations and the congressional capacity for oversight, even aided by interest groups or by leakers within the bureaucracy, is daunting. Probably Congress is already at or near the limits of its monitoring capacity at its current size and budget. [\*889] ¶ 5. Congressional motivation and credibility.¶ Like the executive, Congress has a credibility problem. Members of Congress may be well motivated or ill motivated; the public does not know. Thus, when Congress passes a resolution criticizing presidential action or refuses to delegate power that he seeks, observers do not know whether Congress or the president is right. Ill-motivated members of Congress will constrain public-spirited presidents; thus the Madisonian cure for the problem of executive credibility could be worse than the disease.¶ Even if members of Congress are generally well motivated, Congress has a problem of institutional credibility that the president lacks. Although a voter might trust the member of Congress for whom she voted because she knows about his efforts on his district's behalf, she will usually know nothing about other members of Congress, so when her representative is outvoted, she might well believe that the other members are ill motivated. And, with respect to her own representative, he will often lack credibility compared to the president because he has much less information. Further, the reputation of congressional leaders is only very loosely tied to the reputation of the institution, while there is a closer tie between the president's reputation and the presidency. As a result, Congress is likely to act less consistently than the president, further reducing its relative credibility. Congressional lack of credibility undermines its ability to constrain the president: Congress can monitor the president and tell the public that the president has acted properly or improperly, but if the public does not believe Congress, then Congress's power to check the president is limited.¶ We neither make, nor need to make, any general empirical claim that Congress has no control over executive discretion. That is surely not the case; there is a large debate, or set of related debates, about the extent of congressional dominance. n59 We have reviewed the institutional problems piecemeal; perhaps some of them are mutually offsetting, although we do not see any concrete examples. Our assertion is just that there is at least a real gap, and during emergencies and wars [\*890] an even larger gap, between the extent of executive discretion and legislative capacity for monitoring. It is hard to say how great that gap is, but we know of no one who thinks it is nonexistent. Within that gap, the dilemma of executive credibility arises. To the extent that legislators cannot monitor the executive's exercise of discretion, they must either withhold discretion from an executive who might be well motivated, or grant discretion to an executive who might be ill motivated.¶ B. Courts¶ Similar problems afflict judicial oversight of the executive.¶ 1. Information asymmetries.¶ The gap between the executive and the judiciary, in information and expertise, is even wider than between the executive and Congress. Whereas many legislators have a narrowly defined field of policy expertise, particularly in the House, federal judges are mostly generalists, barring a few specialized courts. Furthermore, the partial insulation from current politics that federal judges enjoy, by virtue of life tenure and salary protection, brings with it a kind of informational impoverishment. n60 Legislators, who must please other people at least some of the time, interact with the outside world far more systematically than generalist judges, whose main source of information is the briefs and arguments of litigants. The credibility dilemma thus appears quite acutely in judicial proceedings. When the executive says that resolving a plaintiff's claim would require disclosure of "state secrets," n61 with dangerous consequences for national security, judges know that either an ill-motivated or a well-motivated executive might be making the claim and that they have no easy means to assess whether the claim is credible.¶ 2. Collective action problems and decentralization.¶ If congressional monitoring of executive discretion is hampered by collective action problems, judicial monitoring is hampered by a [\*891] similar condition, the decentralized character of the federal judiciary. The judiciary really is a "they," not an "it," and is decentralized along mainly geographic lines. Different judges on different courts will have different prior estimates of the executive's credibility, and hence different views of the costs and benefits of oversight and of the appropriate level of monitoring. The Supreme Court is incapable of fully resolving these structural conflicts. Because the Court presides over a large institutional system and lacks the capacity to review more than a fraction of cases submitted to it, its role is restricted by necessity to the declaration of general principles of law and episodic, ad hoc intervention in the system. n62¶ 3. The legitimacy deficit.¶ In the federal system, appointed judges are not overtly partisan, though they are sometimes covertly so. n63 The very condition that enables this relative lack of overt politicization -- that federal judges are, at least in one familiar conception, legal technocrats appointed for their expertise rather than elected on a partisan basis -- also creates a serious legitimacy deficit for the judiciary, understanding legitimacy in a strictly sociological sense. n64 Aroused publics concerned about issues such as national security sometimes have little tolerance for robust judicial oversight of executive discretion, which can always be condemned as "activism" by "unelected judges." This charge sometimes succeeds and sometimes fails, but for the judges it is always a concern that acts as a drag on attempts to monitor executive behavior.¶ 4. Judicial credibility.¶ Judges rely on executive officials to carry out their orders and Congress to fund them, and thus ultimately rely on the public to impose sanctions on the political branches when the political branches do not obey a court order. But the public will support the judiciary [\*892] only if the public believes that the judiciary is well motivated rather than ill motivated. Such is often the case, but the credibility of judges is not infinite. n65 Lingering public suspicion of elite decisionmaking places a cap on judicial credibility, and indeed the evidence suggests that judges are often motivated by ideology, at least when it comes to opinion assignment. n66 Thus, in extreme cases, as between a presidential determination that an emergency requires a course of action and a judge's claim to the contrary, the public might well believe the president. n67¶ Here too, we do not claim that judicial oversight is a total failure. Doctrinal lawyers focus, sometimes to excess, on a handful of great cases in which judges have checked or constrained discretionary executive action, even in domains involving foreign policy or national security. Cases such as Youngstown, n68 the Pentagon Papers case, n69 and recently Hamdan n70 head this list. Undoubtedly, however, there is a [\*893] large gap between executive discretion and judicial capacities, or even between executive discretion and the sum of congressional and judicial capacities working in tandem. In times of emergency, especially, both Congress and the judiciary defer to the executive. n71 Legislators and judges understand that the executive's comparative institutional advantages in secrecy, force, and unitariness are all the more useful during emergencies, so that it is worthwhile transferring more discretion to the executive even if it results in an increased risk of executive abuse. The result is that cases such as the ones we have listed are the exception, not the rule, at least during the heat of the emergency.¶ C. The Madisonian System and the Well-Motivated Executive¶ The Madisonian system of oversight has not totally failed. Sometimes legislators overcome the temptation to free ride; sometimes they invest in protecting the separation of powers or legislative prerogatives. Sometimes judges review exercises of executive discretion, even during emergencies. But often enough, legislators and judges have no real alternative to letting executive officials exercise discretion unchecked. The Madisonian system is a partial failure; compensating mechanisms must be adopted to fill the area of slack, the institutional gap between executive discretion and the oversight capacities of other institutions. Again, the magnitude of this gap is unclear, but plausibly it is quite large; we will assume that it is.¶ It is often assumed that this partial failure of the Madisonian system unshackles and therefore benefits ill-motivated executives. This is grievously incomplete. The failure of the Madisonian system harms the well-motivated executive as much as it benefits the ill-motivated one. Where Madisonian oversight fails, the well-motivated executive is a victim of his own power. Voters, legislators, and judges will be wary of granting further discretion to an executive whose motivations are uncertain and possibly nefarious. The partial failure of Madisonian oversight thus threatens a form of inefficiency, a kind of contracting failure that makes potentially everyone, including the voters, worse off.¶ Our central question, then, is what the well-motivated executive can do to solve or at least ameliorate the problem. The solution is for the executive to complement his (well-motivated) first-order policy goals with second-order mechanisms for demonstrating credibility to other actors. We thus do not address the different question of what voters, legislators, judges, and other actors should do about an execu [\*894] tive who is ill motivated and known to be so. That project involves shoring up or replacing the Madisonian system to block executive dictatorship. Our project is the converse of this, and involves finding new mechanisms to help the well-motivated executive credibly distinguish himself as such.¶ IV. Executive Signaling: Law and Mechanisms¶ We suggest that the executive's credibility problem can be solved by second-order mechanisms of executive signaling. In the general case, well-motivated executives send credible signals by taking actions that are more costly for ill-motivated actors than for well-motivated ones, thus distinguishing themselves from their ill-motivated mimics. Among the specific mechanisms we discuss, an important subset involves executive self-binding, whereby executives commit themselves to a course of action that would impose higher costs on ill-motivated actors. Commitments themselves have value as signals of benign motivations.¶ This departs from the usual approach in legal scholarship. Legal theory has often discussed self-binding by "government" or government officials. In constitutional theory, it is often suggested that constitutions represent an attempt by "the people" to bind "themselves" against their own future decisionmaking pathologies, or relatedly, that constitutional prohibitions represent mechanisms by which governments commit themselves not to expropriate investments or to exploit their populations. n72 Whether or not this picture is coherent, n73 it is not the question we examine here, although some of the relevant considerations are similar. n74 We are not concerned with binding the president so that he cannot abuse his powers, but with how he might bind himself or take other actions that enhance his credibility, so that he can generate support from the public and other members of the government. [\*895] ¶ Furthermore, our question is subconstitutional: it is whether a well-motivated executive, acting within an established set of constitutional and statutory rules, can use signaling mechanisms to generate public trust. Accordingly, we proceed by assuming that no constitutional amendments or new statutes will be enacted. Within these constraints, what can a well-motivated executive do to bootstrap himself to credibility? The problem for the well-motivated executive is to credibly signal his benign motivations. In general, the solution is to engage in actions that are less costly for good types than for bad types.¶ We begin with some relevant law, then examine a set of possible mechanisms -- emphasizing both the conditions under which they might succeed and the conditions under which they might not -- and conclude by examining the costs of credibility.¶ A. A Preliminary Note on Law and Self-Binding¶ Many of our mechanisms are unproblematic from a legal perspective, as they involve presidential actions that are clearly lawful. But a few raise legal questions; in particular, those that involve self-binding. n75 Can a president bind himself to respect particular first-order policies? With qualifications, the answer is yes, at least to the same extent that a legislature can. Formally, a duly promulgated executive rule or order binds even the executive unless and until it is validly abrogated, thereby establishing a new legal status quo. n76 The legal authority to establish a new status quo allows a president to create inertia or political constraints that will affect his own future choices. In a practical sense, presidents, like legislatures, have great de facto power to adopt policies that shape the legal landscape for the future. A [\*896] president might commit himself to a long-term project of defense procurement or infrastructure or foreign policy, narrowing his own future choices and generating new political coalitions that will act to defend the new rules or policies.¶ More schematically, we may speak of formal and informal means of self-binding:¶ 1. The president might use formal means to bind himself. This is possible in the sense that an executive order, if otherwise valid, legally binds the president while it is in effect and may be enforced by the courts. It is not possible in the sense that the president can always repeal the executive order if he can bear the political and reputational costs of doing so.¶ 2. The president might use informal means to bind himself. This is not only possible but frequent and important. Issuing an executive rule providing for the appointment of special prosecutors, as Nixon did, is not a formal self-binding. n77 However, there may be large political costs to repealing the order. This effect does not depend on the courts' willingness to enforce the order, even against Nixon himself. Court enforcement makes the order legally binding while it is in place, but only political and reputational enforcement can protect it from repeal. Just as a dessert addict might announce to his friends that he is going on a no-dessert diet in order to raise the reputational costs of backsliding and thus commit himself, so, too, the executive's issuance of a self-binding order can trigger reputational costs. In such cases, repeal of an executive order may be seen as a breach of faith even if no other institution ever enforces it.¶ In what follows, we will invoke both formal and informal mechanisms. For our purposes, the distinction between the authority to engage in de jure self-binding (legally limited and well-defined) and the power to engage in de facto self-binding (broad and amorphous) is secondary. So long as policies are deliberately chosen with a view to generating credibility, and do so by constraining the president's own future choices in ways that impose greater costs on ill-motivated [\*897] presidents than on well-motivated ones, it does not matter whether the constraint is formal or informal.¶ B. Mechanisms¶ What signaling mechanisms might a well-motivated executive adopt to credibly assure voters, legislators, and judges that his policies rest on judgments about the public interest, rather than on power maximization, partisanship, or other nefarious motives?¶ 1. Intrabranch separation of powers.¶ In an interesting treatment of related problems, Neal Katyal suggests that the failure of the Madisonian system counsels "internal separation of powers" within the executive branch. n78 Abdication by Congress means that there are few effective checks on executive power; second-best substitutes are necessary. Katyal proposes some mechanisms that would be adopted by Congress, such as oversight hearings by the minority party, but his most creative proposals are for arrangements internal to the executive branch, such as redundancy and competition among agencies, stronger employment protections for civil servants, and internal adjudication of executive controversies by insulated "executive" decisionmakers who resemble judges in many ways. n79¶ Katyal's argument is relevant because the mechanisms he discusses might be understood as signaling devices, but his overall approach is conceptually flawed on two grounds. First, the assumption that second-best constraints on the executive should reproduce the Madisonian separation of powers within the executive branch is never defended. The idea seems to be that this is as close as we can get to the first-best, while holding constant everything else in our constitutional order. But the general theory of second-best states that approaching as closely as possible to the first-best will not necessarily be the preferred strategy; n80 the best approach may be to adjust matters on other margins as well, in potentially unpredictable ways. If the Madisonian system has failed in the ways Katyal suggests, the best compensating [\*898] adjustment might be, for all we know, to switch to a parliamentary system. (We assume that no large scale changes of this sort are possible, whereas Katyal seemingly assumes that they are, or at least does not make clear his assumptions in this regard.) Overall, Katyal's view has a kind of fractal quality; each branch should reproduce within itself the very same separation of powers structure that also describes the whole system, but it is not explained why the constitutional order should be fractal.¶ Second, Katyal's proposals for internal separation of powers are self-defeating: the motivations that Katyal ascribes to the executive are inconsistent with the executive adopting or respecting the prescriptions Katyal recommends. n81 Katyal never quite says so explicitly, but he clearly envisions the executive as a power-maximizing actor, in the sense that the president seeks to remove all constraints on his current choices. n82 Such an executive would not adopt or enforce the internal separation of powers to check himself. Executive signaling is not, even in principle, a solution to the lack of constraints on a power-maximizing executive in the sense Katyal implicitly intends. Although an ill-motivated executive might bind himself to enhance his strategic credibility, as explained above, he would not do so in order to restore the balance of powers. Nor is it possible, given Katyal's premise of legislative passivity or abdication, that Congress would force the internal separation of powers on the executive. In what follows, we limit ourselves to proposals that are consistent with the motivations, beliefs, and political opportunities that we ascribe to the well-motivated executive, to whom the proposals are addressed. This limitation ensures that the proposals are not self-defeating, whatever their other drawbacks.¶ The contrast here must not be drawn too simply. A well-motivated executive, in our sense, would attempt to increase his power if fully informed voters would want him to do so. The very point of demonstrating credibility is to allow voters and legislators to increase the discretionary authority of the executive, where all will be made better off by doing so. Scholars such as Katyal, who implicitly distrust the executive, however, do not subscribe to this picture of executive motivations. Rather, they see the executive as an unfaithful agent of the voters; the executive attempts to maximize his power even where fully informed [\*899] voters would prefer otherwise. An actor of that sort will have no incentive to adopt proposals intended to constrain that sort of actor.¶ 2. Independent commissions.¶ We now turn to some conceptually coherent mechanisms of executive signaling. Somewhat analogously to Katyal's idea of the internal separation of powers, a well-motivated executive might establish independent commissions to review policy decisions, either before or after the fact. Presidents do this routinely, especially after a policy has had disastrous outcomes, but sometimes beforehand as well. Independent commissions are typically blue-ribbon and bipartisan. n83¶ We add to this familiar process the idea that the President might gain credibility by publicly committing or binding himself to give the commission authority on some dimension. For example, the president might publicly promise to follow the recommendations of such a commission, or to allow the commission to exercise de facto veto power over a policy decision before it is made, or might promise before the policy is chosen that the commission will be given power to review its success after the fact. To be sure, there will always be some wiggle room in the terms of the promise, but that is true of almost all commitments, which raise the costs of wiggling out even if they do not completely prevent it.¶ Consider whether George W. Bush's credibility would have been enhanced had he appointed a blue-ribbon commission to examine the evidence for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq before the 2003 invasion, and publicly promised not to invade unless the commission found substantial evidence of their existence. Bush would have retained his preexisting legal authority to order the invasion even if the commission found the evidence inadequate, but the political costs of doing so would have been large. Knowing this, and knowing that Bush [\*900] shared that knowledge, the public could have inferred that Bush's professed motive -- elimination of weapons of mass destruction -- was also his real motive. Public promises that inflict reputational costs on badly motivated behavior help the well-motivated executive to credibly distinguish himself from the ill-motivated one.¶ The more common version of this tactic is to appoint commissions after the relevant event, as George W. Bush did to investigate the faulty reports by intelligence agencies that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. n84 If the president appoints after-the-fact commissions, the commissions can enhance his credibility for the next event -- by showing that he will be willing, after that event, to subject his statements to scrutiny by public experts. Here, however, the demonstration of credibility is weaker, because there is no commitment to appoint any after-the-fact commissions in the future, but merely a plausible inference that the president's future behavior will track his past behavior.¶ 3. Bipartisan appointments.¶ In examples of the sort just mentioned, the signaling arises from public position-taking. The well-motivated executive might produce similar effects through appointments to office. n85 A number of statutes require partisan balance on multimember commissions; presidents might approve them because they allow the president to commit to a policy that legislators favor, thus encouraging legislators to increase the scope of the delegation in the first place. n86 For similar reasons, presidents may consent to restrictions on the removal of agency officials, [\*901] because the restriction enables the president to commit to giving the agency some autonomy from the president's preferences. n87¶ Similar mechanisms can work even where no statutes are in the picture. As previously mentioned, during World War II, FDR appointed Republicans to important cabinet positions, making Stimson his Secretary of War. n88 Clinton appointed William Cohen, a moderate Republican, as Secretary of Defense in order to shore up his credibility on security issues. Bipartisanship of this sort might improve the deliberation that precedes decisions, by impeding various forms of herding, cascades, and groupthink; n89 however, we focus on its credibility-generating effects. By (1) expanding the circle of those who share the president's privileged access to information, (2) ensuring that policy is partly controlled by officials whose preferences differ from the president's, and (3) inviting a potential whistleblower into the tent, bipartisanship helps to dispel the suspicion that policy decisions rest on partisan motives or extreme preferences, which in turn encourages broader delegations of discretion from the public and Congress.¶ A commitment to bipartisanship is only one way in which appointments can generate credibility. Presidents might simply appoint a person with a reputation for integrity, as when President Nixon appointed Archibald Cox as special prosecutor (although plausibly Nixon did so because he was forced to do so by political constraints, rather than as a tactic for generating credibility). A person with well-known preferences on a particular issue, even if not of the other party or widely respected for impartiality, can serve as a credible whistleblower on that issue. Thus presidents routinely award cabinet posts to leaders of subsets of the president's own party, leaders whose preferences are known to diverge from the president's on the subject. One point of this is to credibly assure the relevant interest groups that the president will not deviate (too far) from their preferences.¶ More generally, the decision by presidents to bring into their administrations members of other parties, or persons with a reputation for bipartisanship and integrity, illustrates the formation of domestic [\*902] coalitions of the willing. Presidents can informally bargain around the formal separation of powers n90 by employing subsets of Congress, or of the opposing party, to generate credibility while maintaining a measure of institutional control. FDR was willing to appoint Knox and Stimson, but not to give the Republicans in Congress a veto. Truman was willing to ally with Arthur Vandenberg but not with all the Republicans; Clinton was willing to appoint William Cohen but not Newt Gingrich. George W. Bush likewise made a gesture towards credibility by briefing members of the Senate Intelligence Committee -- including Democrats -- on the administration's secret surveillance program(s), which provided a useful talking point when the existence of the program(s) was revealed to the public.¶ 4. Counter-partisanship.¶ Related to bipartisanship is what might be called counter-partisanship: presidents have greater credibility when they choose policies that cut against the grain of their party's platform or their own presumed preferences. n91 Only Nixon could go to China, and only Clinton could engineer welfare reform. Voters and publics rationally employ a political heuristic: the relevant policy, which voters are incapable of directly assessing, must be highly beneficial if it is chosen by a president who is predisposed against it by convictions or partisan loyalty. n92 Accordingly, those who wish to move U.S. terrorism policy towards greater security and less liberty might do well to support the election of a Democrat. n93 By the same logic, George W. Bush is widely suspected [\*903] of nefarious motives when he rounds up alleged enemy combatants, but not when he creates a massive prescription drug benefit.¶ Counter-partisanship can powerfully enhance the president's credibility, but it depends heavily on a lucky alignment of political stars. A peace-loving president has credibility when he declares a military emergency but not when he appeases; a belligerent president has credibility when he offers peace but not when he advocates military solutions. A lucky nation has a well-motivated president with a belligerent reputation when international tensions diminish (Ronald Reagan) and a president with a pacific reputation when they grow (Abraham Lincoln, who opposed the Mexican War). But a nation is not always lucky.¶ 5. Transparency.¶ The well-motivated executive might commit to transparency as a way to reduce the costs to outsiders of monitoring his actions. n94 The FDR strategy of inviting potential whistleblowers from the opposite party into government is a special case of this; the implicit threat is that the whistleblower will make public any evidence of partisan motivations. The more ambitious case involves actually exposing the executive's decisionmaking processes to observation. To the extent that an ill-motivated executive cannot publicly acknowledge his motivations or publicly instruct subordinates to take them into account in decisionmaking, transparency will tend to exclude those motivations from the decisionmaking process. The public will know that only a well-motivated executive would promise transparency in the first place, and the public can therefore draw an inference to credibility.¶ Credibility is especially enhanced when transparency is effected through journalists with reputations for integrity or with political [\*904] preferences opposite to those of the president. Thus, George W. Bush gave Bob Woodward unprecedented access to White House decisionmaking and perhaps even to classified intelligence, n95 with the expectation that the material would be published. This sort of disclosure to journalists is not real-time transparency -- no one expects meetings of the National Security Council to appear on C-SPAN -- but the anticipation of future disclosure can have a disciplining effect in the present. By inviting this disciplining effect, the administration engages in signaling in the present through (the threat of) future transparency.¶ There are complex tradeoffs here, because transparency can have a range of harmful effects. As far as process is concerned, decisionmakers under public scrutiny may posture for the audience, may freeze their views or positions prematurely, and may hesitate to offer proposals or reasons for which they can later be blamed if things go wrong. n96 As for substance, transparency can frustrate the achievement of programmatic or policy goals themselves. Where security policy is at stake, secrecy is sometimes necessary to surprise enemies or to keep them guessing. Finally, one must take account of the incentives of the actors who expose the facts -- especially journalists who might reward sources who give them access by portraying their decisionmaking in a favorable light. n97¶ We will take up the costs of credibility shortly. n98 In general, however, the existence of costs does not mean that the credibility-generating mechanisms are useless. Quite the contrary: where the executive uses such mechanisms, voters and legislators can draw an inference that the executive is well motivated, precisely because the existence [\*905] of costs would have given an ill-motivated executive an excuse not to use those mechanisms.¶ 6. Multilateralism.¶ Another credibility-generating mechanism for the executive is to enter into alliances or international institutions that subject foreign policy decisions to multilateral oversight. Because the information gap between voters and legislators, on the one hand, and the executive on the other, is especially wide in foreign affairs, there is also wide scope for suspicion and conspiracy theories. If the president undertakes a unilateral foreign policy, some sectors of the domestic public will be suspicious of his motives. All recent presidents have faced this problem. In the case of George W. Bush, as we suggested, many have questioned whether the invasion of Iraq was undertaken to eliminate weapons of mass destruction, or to protect human rights, or instead to safeguard the oil supply, or because the president has (it is alleged) always wanted to invade Iraq because Saddam Hussein attempted to assassinate his father. n99 In the case of Bill Clinton, some said that the cruise missile attack on Osama bin Laden's training camp in Afghanistan was a "wag the dog" tactic intended to distract attention from Clinton's impeachment. n100¶ A public commitment to multilateralism can close or narrow the credibility gap. Suppose that a group of nations have common interests on one dimension -- say, security from terrorism or from proliferation of nuclear weapons -- but disparate interests on other dimensions -- say, conflicting commercial or political interests. Multilateralism can be understood as a policy that in effect requires a supermajority vote -- or even a unanimous vote -- of the group to license intervention. The supermajority requirement ensures that only interventions promoting the security interest common to the group will be approved, while interventions that promote some political agenda not shared by the requisite supermajority will be rejected. Knowing this, domestic audiences can infer that interventions that gain multilateral approval do not rest on disreputable motives.¶ It follows that multilateralism can be either formal or informal. Action by the United Nations Security Council can be taken only under formal voting rules that require unanimous agreement of the permanent members. n101 Informally, in the face of increasing tensions [\*906] with Iran, George W. Bush's policy has included extensive multilateral consultations and a quasicommitment not to intervene unilaterally. Knowing that his credibility is thin after Iraq, Bush has presumably adopted this course in part to reassure domestic audiences that there is no nefarious motive behind an intervention, should one occur.¶ It also follows that multilateralism and bipartisan congressional authorization may be substitutes, in terms of generating credibility. In both cases the public knows that the cooperators -- partisan opponents or other nations, as the case may be -- are unlikely to share any secret agenda the president may have. The substitution, however, is only partial; as we suggested in Part III, the Madisonian emphasis on bipartisan authorization has proven insufficient. The interests of parties within Congress diverge less than do the interests of different nations, which makes the credibility gain greater under multilateralism. In eras of unified government, the ability of the president's party to put a policy through Congress without the cooperation of the other party (ignoring the threat of a Senate filibuster, a weapon that the minority party often hesitates to wield) often undermines the policy's credibility even if members of the minority go along. After all, the minority members may be going along precisely because they anticipate that opposition is fruitless, in which case no inference about the policy's merits should be drawn from their approval. Moreover, even a well-motivated president may prefer, all else equal, to generate credibility through mechanisms that do not involve Congress, if concerned about delay, leaks, or obstruction by small legislative minorities. Thus Truman relied on a resolution of the United Nations Security Council n102 rather than congressional authorization to prosecute the Korean War.¶ The costs of multilateralism are straightforward. Multilateralism increases the costs of reaching decisions, because a larger group must coordinate its actions, and increases the risks of false negatives -- failure to undertake justified interventions. A president who declines to bind himself through multilateralism may thus be either ill motivated and desirous of pursuing an agenda not based on genuine security [\*907] goals, or well motivated and worried about the genuine costs of multilateralism. As usual, however, the credibility-generating inference holds asymmetrically: precisely because an ill-motivated president may use the costs of multilateralism as a plausible pretext, a president who does pursue multilateralism is more likely to be well motivated.¶ 7. Legal liability.¶ For completeness, we mention that the well-motivated executive might in principle subject himself to legal liability for actions or outcomes that only an ill-motivated executive would undertake. Consider the controversy surrounding George W. Bush's telecommunications surveillance program, which the president has claimed covers only communications in which one of the parties is overseas, not domestic-to-domestic calls. n103 There is widespread suspicion that this claim is false. n104 In a recent poll, 26 percent of respondents believed that the National Security Agency listens to their calls. n105 The credibility gap arises because it is difficult in the extreme to know what exactly the Agency is doing, and what the costs and benefits of the alternatives are.¶ Here the credibility gap might be narrowed by creating a cause of action, for damages, on behalf of anyone who can show that domestic-to-domestic calls were examined. n106 Liability would be strict, because a negligence rule -- whether the Agency exerted reasonable efforts to avoid examining the communication -- requires too much information for judges, jurors, and voters to evaluate, and would just reproduce the monitoring problems that gave rise to the credibility gap in the first place. Strict liability, by contrast, would require a much narrower factual inquiry. Crucially, a commitment to strict liability would only be made by an executive who intended to minimize the incidence of (even unintentional and nonnegligent) surveillance of purely domestic communications. [\*908] ¶ However, there are legal and practical problems here, perhaps insuperable ones. Legally, it is hardly clear that the president could, on his own authority, create a cause of action against himself or his agents to be brought in federal court. It is well within presidential authority to create executive commissions for hearing claims against the United States, for disbursing funds under benefit programs, and so on; but the problem here is that there might be no pot of money from which to fund damages. The so-called Judgment Fund, out of which damages against the executive are usually paid, is restricted to statutorily specified lawsuits. n107 Even so, statutory authorization for the president to create the strict liability cause of action would be necessary, n108 as we discuss shortly. n109 Practically, it is unclear whether government agents can be forced to "internalize costs" through money damages in the way that private parties can, at least if the treasury is paying those damages. n110 And if it is, voters may not perceive the connection between governmental action and subsequent payouts in any event.¶ 8. The news conference.¶ Presidents use news conferences to demonstrate their mastery of the details of policy. Many successful presidents, like FDR, conducted numerous such conferences. n111 Ill-motivated presidents will not care [\*909] about policy if their interest is just holding power for its own sake. Thus, they would regard news conferences as burdensome and risky chores. The problem is that a well-motivated president does not necessarily care about details of policy, as opposed to its broad direction, and journalists might benefit by tripping up a president in order to score points. Reagan, for example, did not care about policy details, but is generally regarded as a successful president. n112 To make Reagan look good, his handlers devoted considerable resources trying to prepare him for news conferences, resources that might have been better used in other ways. n113¶ 9. "Precommitment politics." n114¶ We have been surveying mechanisms that the well-motivated executive can employ once in office. However, in every case the analysis can be driven back one stage to the electoral campaign for executive office. During electoral campaigns, candidates for the presidency take public positions that partially commit them to subsequent policies, by raising the reputational costs of subsequent policy changes. Under current law, campaign promises are very difficult to enforce in the courts. n115 But even without legal enforcement, position-taking helps to separate the well-motivated from the ill-motivated candidate, because the costs to the former of making promises of this sort are higher. To be sure, many such promises are vacuous, meaning that voters will not sanction a president who violates them, but some turn out to have real [\*910] force, as George H.W. Bush discovered when he broke his clear pledge not to raise taxes. n116¶ 10. The possibility of statutory commitments.¶ So far, we have proceeded on the austere assumption that no constitutional or statutory changes are allowed. We have confined ourselves to credibility-generating mechanisms that arise by executive signaling -- commitments that the executive could initiate by legal order or by public position-taking, without the permission of other institutions.¶ However, this restriction may stack the deck too heavily against the solutions we suggest. A central example of the credibility problem, after all, arises when voters and legislators want to enact statutes transferring further discretion to a well-motivated executive, but are not sure that that is the sort of executive they are dealing with. In such cases, there is no reason to exclude the possibility that the executive might ask Congress to provide him with statutory signaling mechanisms that he would otherwise lack. In the surveillance example, Congress is currently considering amendments to relevant statutes. n117 It is easy to imagine a well-motivated executive proposing that Congress explicitly ratify his authority to examine overseas communications, while also proposing -- as a demonstration of credibility -- that the ratification be bundled with oversight mechanisms, review by an independent agency or special court, or a statutory cause of action imposing strict liability for prohibited forms of surveillance.¶ C. The Costs of Credibility¶ The mechanisms we have discussed generate credibility, which is a benefit for voters and legislators who would like to increase the discretion of the well-motivated executive. What of the cost side? In each case, there are costs to generating credibility, although the character and magnitude of the costs differ across mechanisms.¶ Signaling is by definition costly. The presence of a cost is what distinguishes ill-motivated mimics, who are unwilling to incur the cost, from genuine good types. In this context, the inherent costliness of signaling means that the president must use time or resources to establish credibility with the public when, if voters were perfectly informed, that time and those resources could be expended directly on [\*911] determining and implementing policy. But costs can be reflected in more subtle ways as well. Many of these mechanisms rely on the participation of agents who themselves may be ill motivated. Whistleblowers can leak information in order to damage the administration or cry wolf when there is no partisanship, merely substantive disagreement. Journalists might produce images distorted by their own biases and strategic agendas. Miscellaneous costs arise in other ways as well. Multilateralism raises decision costs, transparency can harm deliberation, and so on. n118¶ Often the basic tradeoff facing presidents is that credibility is gained at the expense of control. Mechanisms such as creating independent commissions and pursuing multilateralism illustrate that to gain credibility, presidents must surrender part of their control over policy choices, partially constraining executive discretion in the present in return for more trust, which will then translate into more discretion in the future. The loss of control is a cost, even to the well-motivated executive. To be sure, the well-motivated executive may be more willing than the ill-motivated one to trade some loss of present control for increased future discretion, if the ill-motivated executive tends to be myopic or to discount the future more heavily. However, it is not clear that is so -- many terrifying dictators have been quite far-sighted -- and in any event everything depends upon the particulars of the case.

## Util

#### Maximizing all lives is the only way to affirm equality

Cummiskey 90 – Professor of Philosophy, Bates (David, Kantian Consequentialism, Ethics 100.3, p 601-2, p 606, jstor,)

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract "social entity." It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive "overall social good." Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Nozick, for example, argues that "to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has."30 Why, however, is this not equally true of all those that we do not save through our failure to act? By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, one fails to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? We have a duty to promote the conditions necessary for the existence of rational beings, but both choosing to act and choosing not to act will cost the life of a rational being. Since the basis of Kant's principle is "rational nature exists as an end-in-itself' (GMM, p. 429), the reasonable solution to such a dilemma involves promoting, insofar as one can, the conditions necessary for rational beings. If I sacrifice some for the sake of other rational beings, I do not use them arbitrarily and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. **Persons** may **have "dignity**, an unconditional and incomparable value" that transcends any market value (GMM, p. 436), **but**, as rational beings, persons **also** have **a fundamental equality which dictates that some must** sometimes **give way for the sake of others.** The formula of the end-in-itself thus does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. If one focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, then equal consideration dictates that one sacrifice some to save many. [continues] According to Kant, the objective end of moral action is the existence of rational beings. Respect for rational beings requires that, in deciding what to do, one give appropriate practical consideration to the unconditional value of rational beings and to the conditional value of happiness. Since agent-centered constraints require a non-value-based rationale, the most natural interpretation of the demand that one give equal respect to all rational beings lead to a consequentialist normative theory. We have seen that there is no sound Kantian reason for abandoning this natural consequentialist interpretation. In particular, a consequentialist interpretation does not require sacrifices which a Kantian ought to consider unreasonable, and it does not involve doing evil so that good may come of it. It simply requires an uncompromising commitment to the equal value and equal claims of all rational beings and a recognition that, in the moral consideration of conduct, one's own subjective concerns do not have overriding importance.

## 2ac - wake

#### Immigration reform is dead – Boehner won’t allow a vote and HC pounds the bill

Paul Roderick **Gregory**, Contributor, “President Obama's Loss Of Trust Over Obamacare Imperils Immigration Reform,” **11/06**/2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/paulroderickgregory/2013/11/06/veracity-and-lost-presidencies/

The President’s “misspeaking” on his Obama Care pledges have doomed any chance of immigration reform, or any other major reform, for that matter. Obama may go into campaign mode on immigration reform to gain Hispanic votes, but it will be only talk. There can be no comprehensive reform of anything – immigration, entitlements, or the national debt — if legislators and, more importantly, the voters do not trust the President’s word. Obama has declared immigration reform his top legislative priority for the rest of his term. In June of 2012, the Senate passed the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, which spends more on border security, provides provisional legal status and eventual pathway to citizenship for people living in the country illegally, and outlines reforms for the existing visa programs for immediate relatives and skilled workers. House Speaker John Boehner declared the Senate bill a nonstarter////

 and expressed hope that the House would produce its own bill. A House bi-partisan group of four Republicans and four Democrats began drafting such a plan but has subsequently fallen apart with only one Republican remaining. The chances of passage of any comprehensive immigration reform during the Obama years are about zero. Irrespective of your views, comprehensive immigration reform requires a high degree of trust. Under the Senate bill, the president must enforce border security, decide the disposition of criminal undocumented workers, and set visa regulations, among other things. The Republican s in Congress cannot take the political risk of passing immigration reform to see parts of it enforced, other parts ignored, and yet other parts made unrecognizable by executive order. One Republican member of the collapsed bi-partisan House team put it this way (House immigration group collapses): “If past actions are the best indicators of future behavior; we know that any measure depending on the president’s enforcement will not be faithfully executed,…It would be gravely irresponsible to further empower this administration by granting them additional authority or discretion with a new immigration system.” The Obama administration has made a practice of not enforcing legislation it does not like (DOMA, no child left behind, medical marijuana, gay spousal benefits, to name a few) and by executing other initiatives by executive action (de facto execution of the Dream act). Added to this history of selective enforcement, we have the problem of the President’s veracity. Can we take the President’s solemn pledge to raise border security to legislated levels seriously after he broke an even more solemn promise to the American people on his legacy Obama Care legislation (If you like your policy or your doctor you can keep them). After George W. Bush was reelected, he declared he would use his political capital to reform social security. He failed because of deep rooted opposition to change but also because his credibility had been damaged by the oft-repeated charge: “Bush lied.” Unless Obama restores his credibility with the American people, he must forego any major initiatives. Major changes come about only when there is trust in the nation’s chief executive. Stated one Republican House member after he resigned from the bi-partisan immigration drafting group: “The American people do not trust the president to enforce laws, and we don’t either.” The mainstream media could not ignore Obama’s two Obama Care “misspokes.” The legitimate public outrage was too great. Will media awareness that Obama has been untrue on Obama Care raise their curiosity about earlier incidents – the millions of stimulus jobs, the Benghazi video, no-tax-increase pledges, and so on – and cause them to see the pattern? Obama has gone to the well too often. He has three years to restore a modicum of credibility. If We the People can no longer believe what he says, his will be a lost presidency.