## New plan

#### The United States federal government should statutory ban targeted killings carried out under Title 50.

## case

### AT truminites

No link. Not all of our authors are involved within the executive branch. We read a litany of other authors who have no affiliation with the govrment.

We are a link turn to this arg- we are a questioning of status quo drone polices, which is what their evidence says is key

Even if the trumanite approaches are bad, there is no alternative to constrain the exectuives power, only a top down approach solves.

#### The way in which we constructed our threats is true and good

Ole Weaver, International relations theory and the politics of European integration, 2000 p. 284-285

The other main possibility is to stress' responsibility. Particularly in a field like security one has to make choices a nd deal with the challenges and risks that one confronts – and not shy away into long-range or principled trans-formations. The meta political line risks (despite the theoretical commit¬ment to the concrete other) implying that politics can be contained within large 'systemic questions. In line with he classical revolutionary tradition, after the change (now no longer the revolution but the meta-physical trans¬formation), there will be no more problems whereas in our situation (until the change) we should not deal with the 'small questions' of politics, only with the large one (cf. Rorty 1996). However, the ethical demand in post-structuralism(e.g. Derrida's 'justice') is of a kind that can never be instantiated in any concrete political order – It is an experience of the undecidable that exceeds any concrete solution and reinserts politics. Therefore, politics can never be reduced to meta-questions there is no way to erase the small, particular, banal conflicts and controversies. In contrast to the quasi-institutionalist formula of radical democracy which one finds in the 'opening' oriented version of deconstruction, we could with Derrida stress the singularity of the event. To take a position, take part, and 'produce events' (Derrida 1994: 89) means to get involved in specific struggles. Politics takes place 'in the singular event of engage¬ment' (Derrida 1996: 83). Derrida's politics is focused on the calls that demand response/responsi¬bility contained in words like justice, Europe and emancipation. Should we treat security in this manner? No, security is not that kind of call. 'Security' is not a way to open (or keep open) an ethical horizon. Security is a much more situational concept oriented to the handling of specifics.It belongs to the sphere of how to handle challenges – and avoid 'the worst' (Derrida 1991). Here enters again the possible pessimism which for the security analyst might be occupational or structural. The infinitude of responsibility (Derrida 1996: 86) or the tragic nature of politics (Morgenthau 1946, Chapter 7) means that one can never feel reassured that by some 'good deed', 'I have assumed my responsibilities ' (Derrida 1996: 86). If I conduct myself particularly well with regard to someone, I know that it is to the detriment of an other; of one nation to the detriment of my friends to the detriment of other friends or non-friends, etc. This is the infinitude that inscribes itself within responsibility; otherwise there would he no ethical problems or decisions. (ibid.; and parallel argumentation in Morgenthau 1946; Chapters 6 and 7) Because of this there will remain conflicts and risks - and the question of how to handle them. Should developments be securitized (and if so, in what terms)? Often, our reply will be to aim for de-securitization and then politics meet meta-politics; but occasionally the underlying pessimism regarding the prospects for orderliness and compatibility among human aspirations will point to scenarios sufficiently worrisome that responsibility will entail securitization in order to block the worst. As a security/securitization analyst, this means acceptingthe task of trying to manage and avoid spirals and accelerating security concerns, to try to assist in shaping the continent in a waythat creates the least insecurity and violence - even if this occasionally meansinvoking/producing `structures' or even using the dubious instrument of securitization. In the case of the current European configuration, the above analysis suggests the use of securitization at the level of European scenarios with the aim of pre-empting and avoiding numerous instances of local securitization that could lead to security dilemmas and escalations, violence and mutual vilification.

#### Either way doesn’t cause wars

**Kaufman**, Prof Poli Sci and IR – U Delaware, **‘9**

(Stuart J, “Narratives and Symbols in Violent Mobilization: The Palestinian-Israeli Case,” *Security Studies* 18:3, 400 – 434)

Even when hostile narratives, group fears, and opportunity are strongly present, war occurs **only if these factors are harnessed.**Ethnic narratives and fears must combine to create significant ethnic hostility among mass publics. Politicians must also seize the opportunity to manipulate that hostility, evoking hostile narratives and symbols to gain or hold power by riding a wave of chauvinist mobilization. Such mobilization is often spurred by prominent events (for example, episodes of violence) that increase feelings of hostility and make chauvinist appeals seem timely. If the other group also mobilizes and if each side's felt security needs threaten the security of the other side, the result is a security dilemma spiral of rising fear, hostility, and mutual threat that results in violence. **A virtue of** this **symbolist theory is that symbolist logic explains why** ethnic **peace is more common than ethnonationalist war.**Even if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity exist, severe violence usually can still be avoided if ethnic elites skillfully define group needs in moderate ways and collaborate across group lines to prevent violence: this is consociationalism.17 War is likely only if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity spur hostile attitudes, chauvinist mobilization, and a security dilemma.

No risk of serial policy failure. Prefer specific internal links

#### DIA is structurally bad

**Boot 12** – (12/6, Max, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, consultant to the U.S. military, regular lecturer at the Army War College and the Command and General Staff College, “Better Spies, Not More,” Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/intelligence/better-spies-not-more/p29619?cid=rss-defense\_homelandsecurity-better\_spies,\_not\_more-120612)

The Defense Intelligence Agency is planning to dramatically expand the ranks of its covert "collectors" — a.k.a. case officers or, more popularly, spies. It has 500 or so and hopes to double that number.

There is nothing inherently wrong with this plan, which is being pushed by the DIA's new director, Army Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn. It is unlikely to lead to a militarization of U.S. foreign policy, as some fear — the military is already the dominant player in the intelligence community, with its control not only of the Defense Department's DIA but also the National Security Agency and other high-tech outfits.

The real question is, will a beefed-up DIA make up for the intelligence community's long-standing **difficulties in acquiring high-quality human intelligence?** On that score, unfortunately, there is real cause for doubt.

**The problem is that the intelligence community already suffers from a propensity to put quantity over quality, the former being easier to order up than the latter**. The CIA expanded dramatically after 9/11, but that has done nothing to prevent a series of embarrassing debacles, including Iraq's nonexistent weapons of mass destruction, the supposed halting of the Iranian nuclear program (claimed by a now-repudiated 2007 National Intelligence Estimate) and the September attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Libya. Even the CIA's basic tradecraft has been called into question by the inept "rendition" of a terrorist suspect from Italy in 2003 that resulted in the conviction, in absentia, of 22 CIA employees who left their fingerprints all over the operation.

### Invel miltrization inev

#### Irrelivent if other intel agencies. All of our internal links are based off of the CIA specifically.

#### Framing issue. Collapse of the cia collapse all intelligence other intel agencies

**Zegart** 4/16/**9 (**http://www.samefacts.com/2009/04/everything-else/dont-kill-the-cia/ Amy B. Zegart is co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, and professor of political economy at Stanford’s Graduate School of Business)

3. There’s a reason the CIA has the word “Central” in its name. It was created in 1947 to integrate all the disparate pieces of intelligence floating around military intelligence agencies, the State Dept. and the Justice Dept. In 1941, clues to the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor were scattered throughout the U.S. government, but no one agency had the job of putting them together. That became CIA’s mission. It may not have performed that mission well, but it’s the best we’ve got. 4. CIA is also the lead agency for human intelligence collection. And let’s face it, human intelligence is more important than ever. In the Cold War, most good intelligence involved counting things like Soviet missiles. Today, good intelligence requires getting inside our enemies’ heads. It doesn’t help much to know how many box cutters or truck bombs al Qaeda owns. President Obama seems to get what Yglesias does not: he needs the CIA now more than ever. He’s got the fullest plate in modern history, with two wars, one whopper economic crisis, terrorists, nuclear proliferators, and failing states. Intelligence does not predict the future, but it bounds the uncertainty of it to help the president make better decisions. Sometimes the CIA is tragically wrong. Sometimes it’s ugly. But make no mistake: the CIA is vital to protecting American lives and interests.

#### DIA is structurally bad

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### Cia remains the same

We solve. Bans CIAs ability to conduct targeted killing, which is what their evidence is about.

Not inevitable. All of our internal links are predicated off of a culture shift within the CIA. Giving up drones is key, and that is something their evidence is not assumptive of. That Zenko and X

Padros evidence says we refocus the CIA towards intel gaithering. Their evidence is not assumptive of new charter legistlation

### AT Book cooking

This evdiecine is only in the context of things the CIA has done in the past.

### Mazatie

### AT Shift fails (Kaplan)

We solve all of the warrents in this evndiecne. We ban all title 50 targeted killings, means the military cant just switch back.

#### Framing issue – perception is key – military control would assuage public fears.

**Khan 13** – (3/20, citing Jeh Johnson, JD, former General Counsel for the Defense Department, Taimur, “CIA should not control drone strikes, says former Pentagon legal chief,” http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/americas/cia-should-not-control-drone-strikes-says-former-pentagon-legal-chief)

The remarks from Jeh Johnson come five weeks after John Brennan, who oversaw the CIA's expansion of the targeted killing, was forced to defend the drone programme during his confirmation hearings to become CIA director.

With the legal process around targeted killings, especially of Americans, "shrouded in secrecy ... **many in the public fill the void by envisioning the worst**", Mr Johnson said in a speech at a national security conference at New York's Fordham University on Monday.

He said the public saw "dark images" of officials "in the basement of the White House acting … as prosecutor, judge, jury and executioner".

Instead, **he proposed that the military should take control of all drone and targeted-killing operations**, rather than the CIA, because this would make the process more transparent and address legal concerns.

As the Department of Defence general counsel until the end of last year, Mr Johnson signed off on every targeted killing by the military throughout president Barack Obama's first term. As a supporter of the use of drone strikes under the framework of Congress-approved war powers, his speech offered a rare window into the thinking among those in the administration's inner circles.

There is growing consensus across the political spectrum, among civil liberties groups as well as conservatives in Washington, that something must be done to **assuage fears about unchecked executive** killing power.

#### That’s key – military rules and institutional culture is transparent and trusted.

**Vogel 10** – (2010, Ryan, JD, Foreign Affairs Specialist, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, LLM Candidate, “DRONE WARFARE AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT,” DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y VOL. 39:1, google scholar)

A number of critics also point to the lack of accountability for CIA drone strikes as reason for concern. O’Connell, for example, claims that CIA personnel are not trained in the laws of war and do not take into account the constraints imposed by that legal framework when conducting strike operations.182 The military, in contrast, is trained in the laws of war and expected to comply with them, perform all operations under a strict command structure, and are held accountable for their actions under the Uniform Code for Military Justice. In addition, the military is subject to its own internal rules and regulations as well as the guidance from its commanders that further restrain its personnel.183 Of course, this is not to say that the CIA does not require its personnel to abide by many of the same rules with equal rigor and accountability—they certainly may. But the **public does not know what rules apply and neither does the enemy**, in contrast to the **military’s requirement for transparency** in promulgating its rules and regulations.

#### DOD is more accountable than the CIA

CSM, 13- “Does it matter who runs US drone program? Pentagon could supplant CIA.” http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2013/0320/Does-it-matter-who-runs-US-drone-program-Pentagon-could-supplant-CIA

That said, it is far easier for American citizens to compel the Pentagon to share data through FOIAs, Rowland points out. “The DoD may not be legally bound to provide certain data to Congress, but they are legally bound to provide it to the American public.” And should the program shift to the Pentagon, the congressional committees that oversee it could have more points of leverage. In particular, the armed services committee controls the purse strings for the DoD. This means that the House and Senate Armed Services Committees could strong-arm the Pentagon to share information. The intelligence committees, by contrast, could compel the CIA to do relatively little, Friedman argues. “In the end, where these formal powers reside may be less important than the fact that the armed services committee authorizers make budget decisions, so they have more pull to get what they want,” says Mr. Friedman of CATO. Most vital is that this potential move could spark a deeper conversation among lawmakers and the American public about secretive programs that warrant far more oversight than they have been getting, analysts say.

### Fight now

#### McCain has promised fights over drone transparency – triggers the link

Bennett 2/19 (John T., “McCain Vows New Fight Over Control of US Armed Drone Program”, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140219/DEFREG02/302190025/McCain-Vows-New-Fight-Over-Control-US-Armed-Drone-Program)

WASHINGTON — A senior US lawmaker intends to renew his fight to require the Obama administration to fully shift its armed drone program from the CIA to the Defense Department. Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., a senior Armed Services Committee member, told Defense News on Wednesday, just before Congress left for a weeklong recess, that he will push the issue when the panel crafts its 2015 Pentagon policy bill in coming months. “We’re going to have that debate,” McCain said in a brief interview. “There is no doubt about it.” McCain’s comments come weeks after he expressed disgust with language reportedly inserted into the classified portion of a Pentagon-funding section of an omnibus spending bill blocking the shift of the drone program from the CIA to the military. The administration of President Barack Obama last year signaled it wanted to move most — or all — of the program from the spy agency to the military. But that plan hit a number of legal and operational snags, and was not fully completed before Congress passed the omnibus. But McCain says the fight isn’t over. “I would like to make sure they are cooperating with other countries,” McCain said, referring to concerns among some lawmakers and analysts that the Obama administration avoids getting clearance from leaders of countries before flying drones into their airspace. “Mostly, I want to see it moved over to DoD. That’s my primary goal,” McCain said. Many analysts say that other than possibly taking up a new immigration reform measure, Congress likely is finished with major legislation this year. The mid-term election cycle is in full swing, and both parties seem content to battle it out back home after five years of bitter partisan fights here. But Congress is expected, as it has for 52 consecutive years, to pass a defense authorization bill. And McCain’s intentions will revive a battle between two powerful camps on Capitol Hill. Lawmakers on both sides of the debate have strong opinions about whether it is the job of the military or intelligence community to kill al-Qaida leaders and operatives. And behind the issue of whether the CIA should be firing missiles from remotely piloted aircraft is a simmering congressional turf war between the chambers’ Armed Services and Intelligence committees. If the Defense Department is handed control of the CIA’s armed drone fleet and strike missions against al-Qaida targets, it would also gain what intelligence analysts say is the program’s sizable budget and control over one of the White House’s primary tactics for combating the terrorist group. On one side are pro-military lawmakers like McCain. They believe the military should be the US entity charged with killing America’s foes, and that the CIA should get back to collecting and analyzing intelligence. On the other side are members like Senate Intelligence Committee Chairwoman Sen. Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif. These members, largely Democrats, are skeptical of the military’s ability to use what they see as the CIA’s rigorous decision process before carrying out armed strikes

## Nonviolence K

### 2ac

#### We get to weigh the impacts of the 1ac - This is good -

#### A. Plan focus – otherwise discussion gets shifted away from the topic

#### B. Ground – They moot 9 minutes of 1AC offense – makes debate lop sided and unproductive

#### C. Vague alts and floating piks are a reason to reject the critique – make the neg a moving target and lets them coopt aff offense

#### Doesn’t solve the aff- only stator restrictsions on the presdeident can solve the impacts isolated in the 1ac

#### Aff turns the K- another terrorist attack would cause more violence- 9/11 proves

#### Perm do the plan and embrae nonviolence- we are the best embracement of noneviolence because we prvent violence in the long term.

#### Maximizing all lives is the only way to affirm equality

Cummiskey 90 – Professor of Philosophy, Bates (David, Kantian Consequentialism, Ethics 100.3, p 601-2, p 606, jstor,)

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract "social entity." It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive "overall social good." Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Nozick, for example, argues that "to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has."30 Why, however, is this not equally true of all those that we do not save through our failure to act? By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, one fails to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? We have a duty to promote the conditions necessary for the existence of rational beings, but both choosing to act and choosing not to act will cost the life of a rational being. Since the basis of Kant's principle is "rational nature exists as an end-in-itself' (GMM, p. 429), the reasonable solution to such a dilemma involves promoting, insofar as one can, the conditions necessary for rational beings. If I sacrifice some for the sake of other rational beings, I do not use them arbitrarily and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. **Persons** may **have "dignity**, an unconditional and incomparable value" that transcends any market value (GMM, p. 436), **but**, as rational beings, persons **also** have **a fundamental equality which dictates that some must** sometimes **give way for the sake of others.** The formula of the end-in-itself thus does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. If one focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, then equal consideration dictates that one sacrifice some to save many. [continues] According to Kant, the objective end of moral action is the existence of rational beings. Respect for rational beings requires that, in deciding what to do, one give appropriate practical consideration to the unconditional value of rational beings and to the conditional value of happiness. Since agent-centered constraints require a non-value-based rationale, the most natural interpretation of the demand that one give equal respect to all rational beings lead to a consequentialist normative theory. We have seen that there is no sound Kantian reason for abandoning this natural consequentialist interpretation. In particular, a consequentialist interpretation does not require sacrifices which a Kantian ought to consider unreasonable, and it does not involve doing evil so that good may come of it. It simply requires an uncompromising commitment to the equal value and equal claims of all rational beings and a recognition that, in the moral consideration of conduct, one's own subjective concerns do not have overriding importance.

#### Perm do the plan and embrace nonviolence in all other instnaces.

#### Legal restraints on use of force are the best check against militarism---rejecting all intervention goes too far and won’t be accepted

Falk 1 (Richard, Professor Emeritus of International Law at Princeton University, "Defining a Just War", The Nation, 10-11, http://www.thenation.com/article/defining-just-war)

I. ANTIWAR/PACIFIST APPROACH The pacifist position opposing even limited military action overlooks the nature of the threat and is thus irrelevant to meeting the central challenge of restoring some sense of security among our citizenry and in the world generally. Also, in the current setting, unlike in the civil rights movement and the interventionist conflicts of the cold war era (especially Vietnam), antiwar and pacifist stands possess little or no cultural resonance with the overwhelming majority of Americans. It may be that at later stages of the war this assessment will prove to have been premature, and even now Quaker, Christian, Gandhian and Buddhist forms of pacifism offer a profound critique of wars. These critiques should be seriously heeded, since they lend weight to the the view that the use of force should be marginal and kept to an absolute minimum. Certainly the spiritually motivated pacifist witness can be both inspirational and instructive, and help to mitigate and interrogate militarist postures. Another form of antiwar advocacy rests on a critique of the United States as an imperialist superpower or empire. This view also seems dangerously inappropriate in addressing the challenge posed by the massive crime against humanity committed on September 11. Whatever the global role of the United States--and it is certainly responsible for much global suffering and injustice, giving rise to widespread resentment that at its inner core fuels the terrorist impulse--it cannot be addressed so long as this movement of global terrorism is at large and prepared to carry on with its demonic work. These longer-term concerns--which include finding ways to promote Palestinian self-determination, the internationalization of Jerusalem and a more equitable distribution of the benefits of global economic growth and development--must be addressed. Of course, much of the responsibility for the failure to do so lies with the corruption and repressive policies of governments, especially in the Middle East, outside the orbit of US influence. A distinction needs to be drawn as persuasively as possible between inherently desirable lines of foreign policy reform and retreating in the face of terrorism. II. LEGALIST/UN APPROACH International treaties that deal with terrorism on civil aircraft call for cooperation in apprehending suspects and allow for their subsequent indictment and prosecution by national courts. Such laws could in theory be invoked to capture Osama bin Laden and his leading associates and charge them with international crimes, including crimes against humanity. A tribunal could be constituted under the authority of the United Nations, and a fair trial could then be held that would avoid war and the ensuing pain, destruction and associated costs. The narrative of apocalyptic terrorism could be laid before the world as the crimes of Nazism were bared at Nuremberg. But this course is unlikely to deal effectively with the overall threat. A public prosecution would give bin Laden and associates a platform to rally further support among a large constituency of sympathizers, and conviction and punishment would certainly be viewed as a kind of legal martyrdom. It would be impossible to persuade the United States government to empower such a tribunal unless it was authorized to impose capital punishment, and it is doubtful that several of the permanent members of the Security Council could be persuaded to allow death sentences. Beyond this, the evidence linking bin Laden to the September 11 attacks and other instances of global terrorism may well be insufficient to produce an assured conviction in an impartial legal tribunal, particularly if conspiracy was not among the criminal offenses that could be charged. European and other foreign governments are unlikely to be willing to treat conspiracy as a capital crime. And it strains the imagination to suppose that the Bush Administration would relinquish control over bin Laden to an international tribunal. On a more general level, it also seems highly improbable that the US government can be persuaded to rely on the collective security mechanisms of the UN even to the unsatisfactory degree permitted during the Gulf War. To be sure, the UN Security Council has provided a vague antiterrorist mandate as well as an endorsement of a US right of response, but such legitimizing gestures are no more than that. For better and worse, the United States is relying on its claimed right of self-defense, and Washington seems certain to insist on full operational control over the means and ends of the war that is now under way. Such a reliance is worrisome, given past US behavior and the somewhat militaristic character of both the leadership in Washington and the broader societal orientation in America toward the use of overwhelming force against the nation's enemies. Yet at this stage it is unreasonable to expect the US government to rely on the UN to fulfill its defensive needs. The UN lacks the capability, authority and will to respond to the kind of threat to global security posed by this new form of terrorist world war. The UN was established to deal with wars among states, while a transnational actor that cannot be definitively linked to a state is behind the attacks on the United States. Al Qaeda's relationship to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan is contingent, with Al Qaeda being more the sponsor of the state rather than the other way around. Undoubtedly, the world would be safer and more secure with a stronger UN that had the support of the leading states in the world. The United States has for years acted more to obstruct than to foster such a transformation. Surely the long-term effects of this crisis should involve a new surge of support for a reformed UN that would have independent means of financing its operations, with its own peacekeeping and enforcement capabilities backed up by an international criminal court. Such a transformed UN would generate confidence that it could and would uphold its charter in an evenhanded manner that treats people equally. But it would be foolish to pretend that the UN today, even if it were to enjoy a far higher level of US support than it does, could mount an effective response to the September 11 attacks. III. MILITARIST APPROACH Unlike pacifism and legalism, militarism poses a practical danger of immense proportions. Excessive reliance on the military will backfire badly, further imperiling the security of Americans and others, spreading war and destruction far afield, as well as emboldening the government to act at home in ways that weaken US democracy. So far the Bush Administration has shown some understanding of these dangers, going slowly in its reliance on military action and moving relatively cautiously to bolster its powers over those it views as suspicious or dangerous, so as to avoid the perception of waging a cultural war against Islam. The White House has itself repeatedly stressed that this conflict is unlike previous wars, that nonmilitary means are also important, that victory will come in a different way and that major battlefield encounters are unlikely to occur. Such reassurances, however, are not altogether convincing. The President's current rhetoric seems to reflect Secretary of State Colin Powell's more prudent approach, which emphasizes diplomacy and nonmilitary tactics, and restricts military action to Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime. Even here, there is room for dangerous expansion, depending on how the Al Qaeda network is defined. Some maximalists implicate twenty or more countries as supporters of terrorism. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, his deputy Paul Wolfowitz and others are definitely beating the drums for a far wider war; they seem to regard the attacks as an occasion to implement their own vision of a new world, one that proposes to rid the world of "evil" and advances its own apocalyptic vision. This vision seeks the destruction of such organizations as Hezbollah and Hamas, which have only minimal links to Al Qaeda and transnational terror, and which have agendas limited mainly to Palestinian rights of self-determination and the future of Jerusalem. These organizations, while legally responsible for terrorist operations within their sphere of concerns, but also subject to terrorist provocations, have not shown any intention of pursuing bin Laden's apocalyptic undertaking. Including such groups on the US target list will surely undermine the depth and breadth of international support and engender dangerous reactions throughout the Islamic world, and possibly in the West as well. Beyond this, there is speculation that there will be a second stage of response that will include a series of countries regarded as hostile to the United States, who are in possession of weapons of mass destruction but are not currently related to global terrorism in any significant fashion. These include Iraq, Libya and possibly even Syria, Iran and Sudan. To expand war objectives in this way would be full of risks, require massive military strikes inflicting much destruction and suffering, and would create a new wave of retaliatory violence directed against the United States and Americans throughout the world. If military goals overshoot, either by becoming part of a design to destroy Israel's enemies or to solve the problem of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the war against global terrorism will be lost, and badly. Just as the pacifist fallacy involves unrealistic exclusion of military force from an acceptable response, the militarist fallacy involves an excessive reliance on military force in a manner that magnifies the threat it is trying to diminish or eliminate. It also expands the zone of violence in particularly dangerous ways that are almost certain to intensify and inflame anti-Americanism. It should be kept in mind that war occasions deep suffering, and recourse to international force should be both a last resort and on as limited a scale as possible. But there is a fourth response, which has gained support among foreign policy analysts and probably a majority of Americans. IV. LIMITING MEANS AND ENDS Unlike in major wars of the past, the response to this challenge of apocalyptic terrorism can be effective only if it is also widely perceived as legitimate. And legitimacy can be attained only if the role of military force is marginal to the overall conduct of the war and the relevant frameworks of moral, legal and religious restraint are scrupulously respected. Excessive use of force in pursuing the perpetrators of September 11 will fan the flames of Islamic militancy and give credence to calls for holy war. What lent the WTC/Pentagon attack its quality of sinister originality was the ability of a fanatical political movement to take advantage of the complex fragility and vulnerability of advanced technology. Now that this vulnerability has been exposed to the world, it is impossible to insure that other extremists will not commit similar acts--even if Osama bin Laden is eliminated. The only way to wage this war effectively is to make sure that force is used within relevant frameworks of restraint. Excessive force can take several forms, like the pursuit of political movements remote from the WTC attack, especially if such military action is seen as indirectly doing the dirty work of eliminating threats to Israel's occupation of Palestinian territories and Jerusalem. Excessiveness would also be attributed to efforts to destroy and restructure regimes, other than the Taliban, that are hostile to the United States but not significantly connected with either the attack or Al Qaeda. The second, closely related problem of successfully framing a response is related to the US manner of waging war: The US temperament has tended to approach war as a matter of confronting evil. In such a view, victory can be achieved only by the total defeat of the other, and with it, the triumph of good. In the current setting, goals have not been clarified, and US leaders have used grandiose language about ending terrorism and destroying the global terrorist network. The idea of good against evil has been a consistent part of the process of public mobilization, with the implicit message that nothing less than a total victory is acceptable. What are realistic ends? Or put differently, what ends can be reconciled with a commitment to achieve an effective response? What is needed is extremely selective uses of force, especially in relation to the Taliban, combined with criminal law enforcement operations--cutting off sources of finance, destroying terrorist cells, using policing techniques abetted, to the extent necessary, by paramilitary capabilities. Also troubling is the Bush Administration's ingrained disdain for multilateralism and its determination to achieve security for the United States by military means--particularly missile defense and space weaponization. This unilateralism has so far been masked by a frantic effort to forge a global coalition, but there is every indication that the US government will insist on complete operational control over the war and will not be willing to accept procedures of accountability within the UN framework. The Administration has often said that many of the actions in this war will not be made known to the public. But an excessive emphasis on secrecy in the conduct of military operations is likely to make the uses of force more difficult to justify to those who are skeptical about US motives and goals, thus undercutting the legitimacy of the war. In building a global coalition for cooperative action, especially with respect to law enforcement in countries where Al Qaeda operates, the US government has struck a number of Faustian bargains. It may be necessary to enter into arrangements with governments that are themselves responsible for terrorist policies and brutal repression, such as Russia in Chechnya and India in Kashmir. But the cost of doing so is to weaken claims that a common antiterrorist front is the foundation of this alliance. For some governments the war against apocalyptic terrorism is an opportunity to proceed with their own repressive policies free from censure and interference. The US government should weigh the cost of writing blank checks against the importance of distinguishing its means and ends from the megaterrorist ethos that animated the September 11 attacks. There are some difficult choices ahead, including the extent to which Afghan opposition forces, particularly the Northern Alliance, should be supported in view of their own dubious human rights record. How, then, should legitimacy be pursued in the current context? The first set of requirements is essentially political: to disclose goals that seem reasonably connected with the attack and with the threat posed by those who planned, funded and carried it out. In this regard, the destruction of both the Taliban regime and the Al Qaeda network, including the apprehension and prosecution of Osama bin Laden and any associates connected with this and past terrorist crimes, are appropriate goals. In each instance, further specification is necessary. With respect to the Taliban, its relation to Al Qaeda is established and intimate enough to attribute primary responsibility, and the case is strengthened to the degree that its governing policies are so oppressive as to give the international community the strongest possible grounds for humanitarian intervention. We must make a distinction between those individuals and entities that have been actively engaged in the perpetration of the visionary program of international, apocalyptic terrorism uniquely Al Qaeda's and those who have used funds or training to advance more traditional goals relating to grievances associated with the governance of a particular country and have limited their targets largely to the authorities in their countries, like the ETA in Spain and the IRA in Ireland and Britain. Legitimacy with respect to the use of force in international settings derives from the mutually reinforcing traditions of the "just war" doctrine, international law and the ideas of restraint embedded in the great religions of the world. The essential norms are rather abstract in character, and lend themselves to debate and diverse interpretation. The most important ideas are: § the principle of discrimination: force must be directed at a military target, with damage to civilians and civilian society being incidental; § the principle of proportionality: force must not be greater than that needed to achieve an acceptable military result and must not be greater than the provoking cause; § the principle of humanity: force must not be directed even against enemy personnel if they are subject to capture, wounded or under control (as with prisoners of war); § the principle of necessity: force should be used only if nonviolent means to achieve military goals are unavailable. These abstract guidelines for the use of force do not give much operational direction. In each situation we must ask: Do the claims to use force seem reasonable in terms of the ends being pursued, including the obligation to confine civilian damage as much as possible? Such assessments depend on interpretation, but they allow for debate and justification, and clear instances of violative behavior could be quickly identified. The justice of the cause and of the limited ends will be negated by the injustice of improper means and excessive ends. Only the vigilance of an active citizenry, alert to this delicate balance, has much hope of helping this new war to end in a true victory.

#### Resisting war is useless – military deterrence provides an opportunity to expand peace

**Futterman**, **95** (J.A.H., Researcher at Lawrence Libermore Lab, Obscenity and Peace : Mediations on the Bomb http://www.dogchurch.org/scriptorium/nuke.html )

Internationally, peace requires empowerment of some groups that seem eager to earn the hatred of the civilized world — like the Palestinians. Now that nuclear deterrence and economic necessity have combined to bring about more freedom, empowerment, and therefore peace in Europe, the Middle East is one of the next hot-spots for triggering a nuclear war. In order to have peace, the world must empower the Palestinians to determine their political and economic destiny, while at the same time it must deter them from warring with Israel. Such empowerment and deterrence will require the active involvement of the Islamic nations who thus far have been unwilling to empower the Palestinians to engage in much beyond stone-throwing and terrorism. May the Palestinians awaken to how they have been used by their brethren. So we need to make peace, at home and abroad. Before you demonstrate to make your town a nuclear-free zone or to stop nuclear testing, [12] consider what you can do to enlarge someone's freedom, or to help them obtain the power to determine a better life for themselves. In other words, rather than fight against nuclear weapons or even against war, try making peace. Meanwhile, I do what I can to make waging unlimited war dangerous, and preparation for it expensive. I can provide palliative treatment, but you, physicians/patients, must heal yourselves. Or to put it more bluntly, as long as we continue to express our human nature in disenfranchising, disempowering ways, we will cling to armament -- nuclear or worse -- to distance ourselves from our own nearness to war.

#### Legal reforms restrain the cycle of violence and prevent error replication

Colm O’Cinneide 8, Senior Lecturer in Law at University College London, “Strapped to the Mast: The Siren Song of Dreadful Necessity, the United Kingdom Human Rights Act and the Terrorist Threat,” Ch 15 in Fresh Perspectives on the ‘War on Terror,’ ed. Miriam Gani and Penelope Mathew, <http://epress.anu.edu.au/war_terror/mobile_devices/ch15s07.html>

This ‘symbiotic’ relationship between counter-terrorism measures and political violence, and the apparently inevitable negative impact of the use of emergency powers upon ‘target’ communities, would indicate that it makes sense to be very cautious in the use of such powers. However, the impact on individuals and ‘target’ communities can be too easily disregarded when set against the apparent demands of the greater good. Justice Jackson’s famous quote in Terminiello v Chicago [111] that the United States Bill of Rights should not be turned into a ‘suicide pact’ has considerable resonance in times of crisis, and often is used as a catch-all response to the ‘bleatings’ of civil libertarians.[112] The structural factors discussed above that appear to drive the response of successive UK governments to terrorist acts seem to invariably result in a depressing repetition of mistakes.¶ However, certain legal processes appear to have some capacity to slow down the excesses of the counter-terrorism cycle. What is becoming apparent in the UK context since 9/11 is that there are factors at play this time round that were not in play in the early years of the Northern Irish crisis. A series of parliamentary, judicial and transnational mechanisms are now in place that appear to have some moderate ‘dampening’ effect on the application of emergency powers.¶ This phrase ‘dampening’ is borrowed from Campbell and Connolly, who have recently suggested that law can play a ‘dampening’ role on the progression of the counter-terrorism cycle before it reaches its end. Legal processes can provide an avenue of political opportunity and mobilisation in their own right, whereby the ‘relatively autonomous’ framework of a legal system can be used to moderate the impact of the cycle of repression and backlash. They also suggest that this ‘dampening’ effect can ‘re-frame’ conflicts in a manner that shifts perceptions about the need for the use of violence or extreme state repression.[113] State responses that have been subject to this dampening effect may have more legitimacy and generate less repression: the need for mobilisation in response may therefore also be diluted.

#### Political checks alone are ineffective – they have to be combined with legal restrictions

**Huq, 12** - Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School (Aziz, “BINDING THE EXECUTIVE (BY LAW OR BY POLITICS)”, August, <http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/400-ah-binding.pdf>) **PV = Posner and Vermeule**

This Part turns to the second element of the strong law/politics dichotomy: the thesis that political forces bind the executive in ways legal rules cannot. The “political” mechanisms identified by PV are organized around two concepts: credibility and popularity. Presidents want credibility and popularity, PV argue, and these preferences induce the executive branch to share authorities. Political incentives as a result “at least block the most lurid forms of executive abuse” in ways legal constraints cannot (p 5).149 In this Part, I argue that neither credibility nor popularity mechanisms can generate stable effects on executive behavior standing on their own. I focus here not solely on the question whether an executive under political constraints will diverge from median popular preferences, but also on whether it will violate deeply held deontological values, such as those embodied in generally recognized constitutional entitlements under the Bill of Rights. Considering the effect of political bonds upon both genres of “abuse” suggests that the political mechanisms limned by PV work best (or only) when they interact with legal limits on executive authority. The possibility of such complementary interactions will be taken up at greater length in Part IV.

#### Legal restraints work---exception theory is self-serving and wrong

William E. Scheuerman 6, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, Carl Schmitt and the Road to Abu Ghraib, Constellations, Volume 13, Issue 1

Yet this argument relies on Schmitt’s controversial model of politics, as outlined eloquently but unconvincingly in his famous Concept of the Political. To be sure, there are intense conflicts in which it is naïve to expect an easy resolution by legal or juridical means. But the argument suffers from a troubling circularity: Schmitt occasionally wants to define “political” conflicts as those irresolvable by legal or juridical devices in order then to argue against legal or juridical solutions to them. The claim also suffers from a certain vagueness and lack of conceptual precision. At times, it seems to be directed against trying to resolve conflicts in the courts or juridical system narrowly understood; at other times it is directed against any legal regulation of intense conflict. The former argument is surely stronger than the latter. After all, legal devices have undoubtedly played a positive role in taming or at least minimizing the potential dangers of harsh political antagonisms. In the Cold War, for example, international law contributed to the peaceful resolution of conflicts which otherwise might have exploded into horrific violence, even if attempts to bring such conflicts before an international court or tribunal probably would have failed.22¶ Second, Schmitt dwells on the legal inconsistencies that result from modifying the traditional state-centered system of international law by expanding protections to non-state fighters. His view is that irregular combatants logically enjoyed no protections in the state-centered Westphalian model. By broadening protections to include them, international law helps undermine the traditional state system and its accompanying legal framework. Why is this troubling? The most obvious answer is that Schmitt believes that the traditional state system is normatively superior to recent attempts to modify it by, for example, extending international human rights protections to individuals against states. 23 But what if we refuse to endorse his nostalgic preference for the traditional state system? Then a sympathetic reading of the argument would take the form of suggesting that the project of regulating irregular combatants by ordinary law must fail for another reason: it rests on a misguided quest to integrate incongruent models of interstate relations and international law. We cannot, in short, maintain core features of the (state-centered) Westphalian system while extending ambitious new protections to non-state actors.¶ This is a powerful argument, but it remains flawed. Every modern legal order rests on diverse and even conflicting normative elements and ideals, in part because human existence itself is always “in transition.” When one examines the so-called classical liberal legal systems of nineteenth-century England or the United States, for example, one quickly identifies liberal elements coexisting uneasily alongside paternalistic and authoritarian (e.g., the law of slavery in the United States), monarchist, as well as republican and communitarian moments. The same may be said of the legal moorings of the modern welfare state, which arguably rest on a hodgepodge of socialist, liberal, and Christian and even Catholic (for example, in some European maternity policies) programmatic sources. In short, it is by no means self-evident that trying to give coherent legal form to a transitional political and social moment is always doomed to fail. Moreover, there may be sound reasons for claiming that the contemporary transitional juncture in the rules of war is by no means as incongruent as Schmitt asserts. In some recent accounts, the general trend towards extending basic protections to non-state actors is plausibly interpreted in a more positive – and by no means incoherent – light.24¶ Third, Schmitt identifies a deep tension between the classical quest for codified and stable law and the empirical reality of a social world subject to permanent change: “The tendency to modify or even dissolve classical [legal] concepts…is general, and in view of the rapid change of the world it is entirely understandable” (12). Schmitt’s postwar writings include many provocative comments about what contemporary legal scholars describe as the dilemma of legal obsolescence. 25 In The Partisan, he suggests that the “great transformations and modifications” in the technological apparatus of modern warfare place strains on the aspiration for cogent legal norms capable of regulating human affairs (17; see also 48–50). Given the ever-changing character of warfare and the fast pace of change in military technology, it inevitably proves difficult to codify a set of cogent and stable rules of war. The Geneva Convention proviso that legal combatants must bear their weapons openly, for example, seems poorly attuned to a world where military might ultimately depends on nuclear silos buried deep beneath the surface of the earth, and not the success of traditional standing armies massed in battle on the open field. “Or what does the requirement mean of an insignia visible from afar in night battle, or in battle with the long-range weapons of modern technology of war?” (17).¶ As I have tried to show elsewhere, these are powerful considerations deserving of close scrutiny; Schmitt is probably right to argue that the enigma of legal obsolescence takes on special significance in the context of rapid-fire social change.26 Unfortunately, he seems uninterested in the slightest possibility that we might successfully adapt the process of lawmaking to our dynamic social universe. To be sure, he discusses the “motorization of lawmaking” in a fascinating 1950 publication, but only in order to underscore its pathological core.27 Yet one possible resolution of the dilemma he describes would be to figure how to reform the process whereby rules of war are adapted to novel changes in military affairs in order to minimize the danger of anachronistic or out-of-date law. Instead, Schmitt simply employs the dilemma of legal obsolescence as a battering ram against the rule of law and the quest to develop a legal apparatus suited to the special problem of irregular combatants.

#### **Only transparency is key to check presidentit- the alternative fails.**

RUDD 5- JEFFREY, Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Montana; University of Wisconsin-Madison, William and Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review, Spring, 29 Wm. and Mary Envtl. L. and Pol'y Rev. 551

Society should give up the unproductive pursuit of unifying theories purporting to explain the underlying structure of environmental law, policy, and regulation, and focus instead on the particular regulations and agency decision-making processes impeding the resolution of environmental conflicts. Practical solutions to regulatory problems develop in context, not through philosophical holism justified by "unifying" theories. Foundationalist 2 8 theories will never "screen off' 2 9 uncertainty or eliminate normative influences from regulatory decisions. Democratic principles should guide efforts to improve the quality of the environmental regulatory system and its decision-making organizations. The hopeless endeavor of searching for "unifying" principles diverts valuable time and energy away from a productive, democratic renaissance in environmental law and regulation. "The answer to the defects of democracy is not denial of the democratic idea."

### Warming addon

#### The only way to mitigate warming is through an international treaty in which the CIA plays a critical role. It’s reverse causal. Mitigation fails with poor intelligence management.

Bruhnke 13. Loius Bruhnke, Naval Postgraduate school. “Climate Change mitigation. Can the U.S. intelligence community help?” June 2013. <https://calhoun.nps.edu/public/bitstream/handle/10945/34635/13Jun_Bruhnke_Louis.pdf?sequence=1> (Associate Director and Regional Disaster Coordinator, North Coast Emergency Medical Services Agency.)

For over a century, earth scientists have contemplated the likely climatic disruptions that would occur should humans continue to increase the relative proportion of atmospheric carbon dioxide through their burning of fossil fuels. Mankind has already increased the amount of carbon dioxide, the most potent greenhouse gas, to levels beyond what the earth has experienced for at least 800-thousand—and likely—more than 15 million years. The earth’s oceans and atmosphere have departed from a state of chemical equilibrium established approximately 11-thousand years ago. There is ample evidence in the form of historically unprecedented planetary events, including the seasonal disappearance of millions of square miles of arctic sea ice, and frequent record breaking weather events, that **we have entered an age of environmental uncertainty precisely when globalization has irreversibly altered human social dynamics. This confluence of uncertainty and its attendant societal dislocations will worsen unless humans are able to stabilize the climate. Damage to the atmosphere is cumulative and pervasive, and climate change mitigation can only be accomplished through concerted international effort**. The result of a multiyear international discussion under the auspices of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the 1997 Kyoto Protocol represented the most important international effort to mitigate climate change to date. Economic fears, along with a disinformation campaign funded by industries reliant on fossil fuel combustion, resulted in widespread public misunderstanding about the expert consensus behind of the growing body of climate science, and in the U.S. failure to ratify the Kyoto treaty. The scientific and observable evidence of climate change and its perils continues to mount. At some future moment, it seems probable that **the U.S. will once again engage in some international effort** to reduce the ongoing human caused accumulation of atmospheric CO2. For lack of other practical alternatives, the U.S. is likely to pursue an approach similar to the Kyoto Protocol. Signatory commitments to Kyoto were not accompanied by any formal monitoring regime, and this **lack of a verification mechanism—along with other shortcomings—is often blamed for Kyoto’s limited achievements. It is likely that the design of any future international CO2 emissions limitation agreement (ICELA) will include a monitoring mechanism**. The Intelligence Community and Treaty Monitoring Most science based U.S. governmental institutions, including those that comprise and inform the national security establishment, recognize the unprecedented threat that CO2 emissions pose to the nation. The potential economic ramifications of reducing national CO2 emissions include the alteration of existing geopolitical relations. **The CIA** has already opened—and subsequently, in the face of persistent conservative Congressional criticism, closed—a **Climate Change Center. Among the stated objectives of this center was the verification of future international climate change agreements. Should the U.S. instigate or participate in a new Kyoto-type initiative, it is reasonable to assume that the Intelligence Community (IC) will be tasked with using its covert sources to identify treaty violations. This would present the IC with a unique opportunity to make an unprecedented contribution to the welfare of the nation and to the entire planet. Poorly managed, however, the IC’s monitoring activities could undermine the international trust on which any such effort will depend.**

#### Unmitigated climate changes risk extinction

Flournoy 11– (Dec. 2011, citing Feng Hsu, PhD in Engingeering Science, NASA scientist at Goddard Space Flight Center, former research fellow of Brookhaven National Laboratory in the fields of risk assessment, risk-based decision making, safety & reliability and mission assurances for nuclear power, space launch, energy infrastructure and other social and engineering systems, Don Flournoy, PhD, University of Texas, Project Manager for University/Industry Experiments for the NASA ACTS Satellite, Professor of Telecommunications, Scripps College of Communications, Ohio University, "Solar Power Satellites," January, Springer Briefs in Space Development, p. 10-1)

In the Online Journal of Space Communication , Dr. Feng Hsu, a  NASA scientist at Goddard Space Flight Center, a research center in the forefront of science of space and Earth, writes, “The evidence of global warming is alarming,” noting the potential for a catastrophic planetary climate change is real and troubling(Hsu 2010 ) . Hsu and his  NASA colleagues were engaged in monitoring and analyzing climate changes on a global scale, through which they received first-hand scientific information and data relating to global warming issues, including the dynamics of polar ice cap melting. After discussing this research with colleagues who were world experts on the subject, he wrote: I now have no doubt global temperatures are rising, and that global warming is a serious problem confronting all of humanity. No matter whether these trends are due to human interference or to the cosmic cycling of our solar system, there are two basic facts that are crystal clear: (a)there is overwhelming scientific evidence showing positive correlations between the level of CO2 concentrations in Earth’s atmosphere with respect to the historical fluctuations of global temperature changes; and (b) the overwhelming majority of the world’s scientific community is in agreement about the risks of a potential catastrophic global climate change. That is, if we humans continue to ignore this problem and do nothing, if we continue dumping huge quantities of greenhouse gases into Earth’s biosphere, humanity will be at dire risk (Hsu 2010 ) . As a technology risk assessment expert, Hsu says he can show with some confidence that the planet will face more risk doing nothing to curb its fossil-based energy addictions than it will in making a fundamental shift in its energy supply. “This,” he writes, “is because the risks of a catastrophic anthropogenic climate change can be potentially the extinction of human species, a risk that is simply too high for us to take any chances” (Hsu 2010 ) .

## Facts K

### 2ac

#### Our facts are real. The 1ac was 9 min of evidence citing statistics, emperics, and other things that make the up facts.

#### You link too- you use facts to assume facts do not exist.

#### Perm do the plan and recognize the facts presented in the 1ac could be false.

#### Here is mor evidence- our facts are true

**Knudsen 1**– PoliSci Professor at Sodertorn (Olav, Post-Copenhagen Security Studies, Security Dialogue 32:3)

Moreover, I have a problem with the underlying implication that it is unimportant whether states 'really' face dangers from other states or groups. In the Copenhagen school, threats are seen as coming mainly from the actors' own fears, or from what happens when the fears of individuals turn into paranoid political action. In my view, this emphasis on the subjective is a **misleading conception of threat**, in that it discounts an independent existence for what- ever is perceived as a threat. Granted, political life is often marked by misperceptions, mistakes, pure imaginations, ghosts, or mirages, but such phenomena **do not occur simultaneously** to large numbers of politicians, and **hardly most of the time**. During the Cold War, threats - in the sense of plausible possibilities of danger - referred to 'real' phenomena, and they **refer to 'real' phenomena** now. The objects referred to are often not the same, but that is a different matter. Threats have to be dealt with both ín terms of perceptions and in terms of the phenomena which are perceived to be threatening. The point of Waever’s concept of security is not the potential existence of danger somewhere but the use of the word itself by political elites. In his 1997 PhD dissertation, he writes, ’One can View “security” as that which is in language theory called a speech act: it is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real - it is the utterance itself that is the act.’24 The deliberate disregard of objective factors is even more explicitly stated in Buzan & WaeVer’s joint article of the same year.” As a consequence, the phenomenon of threat is reduced to a matter of pure domestic politics.” It seems to me that the security dilemma, as a central notion in security studies, then loses its foundation. Yet I see that Waever himself has no compunction about referring to the security dilemma in a recent article." This discounting of the objective aspect of threats shifts security studies to insignificant concerns. What has long made 'threats' and ’threat perceptions’ important phenomena in the study of IR is the implication that **urgent action may be required**. Urgency, of course, is where Waever first began his argument in favor of an alternative security conception, because a convincing sense of urgency has been the chief culprit behind the abuse of 'security' and the consequent ’politics of panic', as Waever aptly calls it.” Now, here - in the case of urgency - another baby is thrown out with the Waeverian bathwater. When real situations of urgency arise, those situations are challenges to democracy; they are actually at the core of the problematic arising with the process of making security policy in parliamentary democracy. But in Waever’s world, threats are merely more or less persuasive, and the claim of urgency is just another argument. I hold that instead of 'abolishing' threatening phenomena ’out there’ by reconceptualizing them, as Waever does, we should continue paying attention to them, because **situations with a credible claim to urgency will keep coming back** and then we need to know more about how they work in the interrelations of groups and states (such as civil wars, for instance), not least to find adequate democratic procedures for dealing with them.’

#### Even if our facts are false- Scenario planning is good. In a catastrophe-ridden world it’s vital to make predictions about the future.

Kurasawa, 2004

[Fuyuki, Professor of Sociology at York University, “Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention

and the Work of Foresight.” 2004, Constellations, Vol. 11, No. 4]

Independently of this room for maneuver and the chances of success. Humanitarian, environmental, and techno-scientific activists have convincingly shown that we cannot afford not to engage in preventive labor. contractualist justification, global civil society actors are putting forth a number of arguments countering temporal myopia on rational grounds. They make the case that no generation, and no part of the world, is immune from catastrophe. Complacency and parochialism are deeply flawed in that even if we earn a temporary reprieve, our children and grandchildren will likely not be so fortunate unless steps are taken today. Similarly, though it might be possible to minimize or contain the risks and harms of actions to faraway places over the short-term, parrying the eventual blowback or spillover effect is improbable. In fact, as I argued in the previous section, all but the smallest and most isolated of crises are rapidly becoming globalized due to the existence of transnational circuits of ideas, images, people, and commodities. Regardless of where they live, our descendants will increasingly be subjected to the impact of environmental degradation, the spread of epidemics, gross North-South socioeconomic inequalities, refugee flows, civil wars, and genocides. What may have previously appeared to be temporally and spatially remote risks are ‘coming home to roost’ in ever faster cycles. In a word, then, procrastination makes little sense for three principal reasons: it exponentially raises the costs of eventual future action; it reduces preventive options; and it erodes their effectiveness. With the foreclosing of long-range alternatives, later generations may be left with a single course of action, namely, that of merely reacting to large-scale emergencies as they arise. We need only think of how it gradually becomes more difficult to control climate change, let alone reverse it, or to halt mass atrocities once they are underway. Preventive foresight is grounded in the opposite logic, whereby the decision to work through perils today greatly enhances both the subsequent Moreover, I would contend that farsighted cosmopolitanism is not as remote or idealistic a prospect as it appears to some, for as Falk writes, “[g]lobal justice between temporal communities, however, actually seems to be increasing, as evidenced by various expressions of greater sensitivity to past injustices and future dangers.”36 Global civil society may well be helping a new generational self-conception take root, according to which we view ourselves as the provisional caretakers of our planetary commons. Out of our sense of responsibility for the well-being of those who will follow us, we come to be more concerned about the here and now.

#### Even if our facts are false, we shouldn’t risk it

Krieger 12 David, President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, "Fear of Nuclear Weapons", June 19, www.wagingpeace.org/articles/db\_article.php?article\_id=371

I was recently asked during an interview whether people fear nuclear weapons too much, causing them unnecessary anxiety. The implication was that it is not necessary to live in fear of nuclear weapons.¶ My response was that fear is a healthy mechanism when one is confronted by something fearful. It gives rise to a fight or flight response, both of which are means of surviving real danger.¶ In the case of nuclear weapons, these are devices to be feared since they are capable of causing terrifying harm to all humanity, including one’s family, city and country. If one is fearful of nuclear weapons, there will be an impetus to do something about the dangers these weapons pose to humanity.¶ But, one might ask, what can be done? In reality, there is a limited amount that can be done by a single individual, but when individuals band together in groups, their power to bring about change increases. Individual power is magnified even more when groups join together in coalitions and networks to bring about change.¶ Large numbers of individuals banded together to bring about the fall of the Berlin Wall, the breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of apartheid in South Africa. The basic building block of all these important changes was the individual willing to stand up, speak out and join with others to achieve a better world. The forces of change have been set loose again by the Arab Spring and the Occupy Movement across the globe.¶ When dangers are viewed rationally, there may be good cause for fear, and fear may trigger a response to bring about change. On the other hand, complacency can never lead to change. Thus, while fear may be a motivator of change, complacency is an inhibitor of change. In a dangerous world, widespread complacency should be of great concern. ¶ If a person is complacent about the dangers of nuclear weapons, there is little possibility that he will engage in trying to alleviate the danger. Complacency is the result of a failure of hope to bring about change. It is a submission to despair.¶ After so many years of being confronted by nuclear dangers, there is a tendency to believe that nothing can be done to change the situation. This may be viewed as “concern fatigue.” We should remember, though, that any goal worth achieving is worth striving for with hope in our hearts. A good policy for facing real-world dangers is to never give up hope and never stop trying.

#### Not a reason to reject the team. Even if some of our facts are incorrect, we introduced a majority of true facts.

## Anthro agamben

### 2ac

#### We get to weigh the impacts of the 1ac - This is good -

#### A. Plan focus – otherwise discussion gets shifted away from the topic

#### B. Ground – They moot 9 minutes of 1AC offense – makes debate lop sided and unproductive

#### C. Vague alts and floating piks are a reason to reject the critique – make the neg a moving target and lets them coopt aff offense

#### Case is a disad - conflict and terrorism are inevitable – even if it was due to antrho thought it’s too late to solve root cause - only way is directly through the plan – and that outweighs – default to our specific extinction level scenarios-

#### Aff turns the K- a nuclear war would destroy all life on the planet

#### Human life has intrinsic and objective value achieved through subjective pleasures – its preservation should be an a priori goal

Kacou 8 (Amien Kacou 8 WHY EVEN MIND? On The A Priori Value Of “Life”, Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, Vol 4, No 1-2 (2008) http://www.cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/92/184)

Furthermore, that manner of finding things good that is in pleasure can certainly not exist in any world without consciousness (i.e., without “life,” as we now understand the word)—slight analogies put aside. In fact, we can begin to develop a more sophisticated definition of the concept of “pleasure,” in the broadest possible sense of the word, as follows: it is the common psychological element in all psychological experience of goodness (be it in joy, admiration, or whatever else). In this sense, pleasure can always be pictured to “mediate” all awareness or perception or judgment of goodness: there is pleasure in all consciousness of things good; pleasure is the common element of all conscious satisfaction. In short, it is simply the very experience of liking things, or the liking of experience, in general. In this sense, pleasure is, not only uniquely characteristic of life but also, the core expression of goodness in life—the most general sign or phenomenon for favorable conscious valuation, in other words. This does not mean that “good” is absolutely synonymous with “pleasant”—what we value may well go beyond pleasure. (The fact that we value things needs not be reduced to the experience of liking things.) However, what we value beyond pleasure remains a matter of speculation or theory. Moreover, we note that a variety of things that may seem otherwise unrelated are correlated with pleasure—some more strongly than others. In other words, there are many things the experience of which we like. For example: the admiration of others; sex; or rock-paper-scissors. But, again, what they are is irrelevant in an inquiry on a priori value—what gives us pleasure is a matter for empirical investigation. Thus, we can see now that, in general, something primitively valuable is attainable in living—that is, pleasure itself. And it seems equally clear that we have a priori logical reason to pay attention to the world in any world where pleasure exists. Moreover, we can now also articulate a foundation for a security interest in our life: since the good of pleasure can be found in living (to the extent pleasure remains attainable),[17] and only in living, therefore, a priori, life ought to be continuously (and indefinitely) pursued at least for the sake of preserving the possibility of finding that good. However, this platitude about the value that can be found in life turns out to be, at this point, insufficient for our purposes. It seems to amount to very little more than recognizing that our subjective desire for life in and of itself shows that life has some objective value. For what difference is there between saying, “living is unique in benefiting something I value (namely, my pleasure); therefore, I should desire to go on living,” and saying, “I have a unique desire to go on living; therefore I should have a desire to go on living,” whereas the latter proposition immediately seems senseless? In other words, “life gives me pleasure,” says little more than, “I like life.” Thus, we seem to have arrived at the conclusion that the fact that we already have some (subjective) desire for life shows life to have some (objective) value. But, if that is the most we can say, then it seems our enterprise of justification was quite superficial, and the subjective/objective distinction was useless—for all we have really done is highlight the correspondence between value and desire. Perhaps, our inquiry should be a bit more complex.

#### Legal restraints work---exception theory is self-serving and wrong

William E. Scheuerman 6, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, Carl Schmitt and the Road to Abu Ghraib, Constellations, Volume 13, Issue 1

Yet this argument relies on Schmitt’s controversial model of politics, as outlined eloquently but unconvincingly in his famous Concept of the Political. To be sure, there are intense conflicts in which it is naïve to expect an easy resolution by legal or juridical means. But the argument suffers from a troubling circularity: Schmitt occasionally wants to define “political” conflicts as those irresolvable by legal or juridical devices in order then to argue against legal or juridical solutions to them. The claim also suffers from a certain vagueness and lack of conceptual precision. At times, it seems to be directed against trying to resolve conflicts in the courts or juridical system narrowly understood; at other times it is directed against any legal regulation of intense conflict. The former argument is surely stronger than the latter. After all, legal devices have undoubtedly played a positive role in taming or at least minimizing the potential dangers of harsh political antagonisms. In the Cold War, for example, international law contributed to the peaceful resolution of conflicts which otherwise might have exploded into horrific violence, even if attempts to bring such conflicts before an international court or tribunal probably would have failed.22¶ Second, Schmitt dwells on the legal inconsistencies that result from modifying the traditional state-centered system of international law by expanding protections to non-state fighters. His view is that irregular combatants logically enjoyed no protections in the state-centered Westphalian model. By broadening protections to include them, international law helps undermine the traditional state system and its accompanying legal framework. Why is this troubling? The most obvious answer is that Schmitt believes that the traditional state system is normatively superior to recent attempts to modify it by, for example, extending international human rights protections to individuals against states. 23 But what if we refuse to endorse his nostalgic preference for the traditional state system? Then a sympathetic reading of the argument would take the form of suggesting that the project of regulating irregular combatants by ordinary law must fail for another reason: it rests on a misguided quest to integrate incongruent models of interstate relations and international law. We cannot, in short, maintain core features of the (state-centered) Westphalian system while extending ambitious new protections to non-state actors.¶ This is a powerful argument, but it remains flawed. Every modern legal order rests on diverse and even conflicting normative elements and ideals, in part because human existence itself is always “in transition.” When one examines the so-called classical liberal legal systems of nineteenth-century England or the United States, for example, one quickly identifies liberal elements coexisting uneasily alongside paternalistic and authoritarian (e.g., the law of slavery in the United States), monarchist, as well as republican and communitarian moments. The same may be said of the legal moorings of the modern welfare state, which arguably rest on a hodgepodge of socialist, liberal, and Christian and even Catholic (for example, in some European maternity policies) programmatic sources. In short, it is by no means self-evident that trying to give coherent legal form to a transitional political and social moment is always doomed to fail. Moreover, there may be sound reasons for claiming that the contemporary transitional juncture in the rules of war is by no means as incongruent as Schmitt asserts. In some recent accounts, the general trend towards extending basic protections to non-state actors is plausibly interpreted in a more positive – and by no means incoherent – light.24¶ Third, Schmitt identifies a deep tension between the classical quest for codified and stable law and the empirical reality of a social world subject to permanent change: “The tendency to modify or even dissolve classical [legal] concepts…is general, and in view of the rapid change of the world it is entirely understandable” (12). Schmitt’s postwar writings include many provocative comments about what contemporary legal scholars describe as the dilemma of legal obsolescence. 25 In The Partisan, he suggests that the “great transformations and modifications” in the technological apparatus of modern warfare place strains on the aspiration for cogent legal norms capable of regulating human affairs (17; see also 48–50). Given the ever-changing character of warfare and the fast pace of change in military technology, it inevitably proves difficult to codify a set of cogent and stable rules of war. The Geneva Convention proviso that legal combatants must bear their weapons openly, for example, seems poorly attuned to a world where military might ultimately depends on nuclear silos buried deep beneath the surface of the earth, and not the success of traditional standing armies massed in battle on the open field. “Or what does the requirement mean of an insignia visible from afar in night battle, or in battle with the long-range weapons of modern technology of war?” (17).¶ As I have tried to show elsewhere, these are powerful considerations deserving of close scrutiny; Schmitt is probably right to argue that the enigma of legal obsolescence takes on special significance in the context of rapid-fire social change.26 Unfortunately, he seems uninterested in the slightest possibility that we might successfully adapt the process of lawmaking to our dynamic social universe. To be sure, he discusses the “motorization of lawmaking” in a fascinating 1950 publication, but only in order to underscore its pathological core.27 Yet one possible resolution of the dilemma he describes would be to figure how to reform the process whereby rules of war are adapted to novel changes in military affairs in order to minimize the danger of anachronistic or out-of-date law. Instead, Schmitt simply employs the dilemma of legal obsolescence as a battering ram against the rule of law and the quest to develop a legal apparatus suited to the special problem of irregular combatants.

**Rejection of sovereign exception fails and results in more violence**

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But Rasch remains a Schmittian, not a Benjaminian. For him, **no interruption of the political principle of reason—the ultimate principle of political order, the nomos of the nomos, the principle of sovereign exception**, which he persuasively shows to be a case of the logical law of the excluded middle (Rasch 2002, 38–42)—**is possible without risking the collapse of the political into an eschatology of the end of the world, which is the same as an eschatology of radical origin: “to be liberated from the structure of sovereignty is to be returned to a natural state of innocence**” (48). **Rasch is suspicious of** Benjamin’s—and **Agamben’s**—**pure violence as the harbinger of a “completely new politics” that might in fact accomplish nothing but an exclusion of the political** (38). As he says in a different essay**, “the political does not exist to usher in the good life by eliminating social antagonism; rather, it exists to serve as the medium for an acceptably limited and therefore productive conflict in the inevitable absence of any final, universally accepted vision of the good life”** (Rasch n.d., 30–31). **Rasch opposes a politics of the katechon—a properly Schmittian politics of the containment of evil—to the messianic politics of the reestablishment of natural innocence that he detects in Agamben’s Homo Sacer**.12 Is there, in fact, in Agamben’s State of Exception, an “appeal to the ontological hope” of “infinite perfectibility” (Rasch n.d., 29)? And, a fortiori, is that also what is behind Derrida’s Voyous? The crucial question here concerns the determination of a practical understanding of the political beyond every messianic delusion. **Messianic delusion turns every politics into a kind of ultrapolitics whose political effectivity then wavers between the inane and the catastrophic**. An alternative question is: are onto-theological politics the only possible politics for our age? R E A S O N B E YOND R E A S O N Autoimmunity is said to refer to “this strange illogical logic through which a living being can spontaneously destroy, in an autonomous fashion, that which, in it, is destined to protect it against the other, to immunize it against the intrusive aggression of the other” (Derrida 2003, 173). Autoimmunity is therefore a kind of “death drive” (215) that can be related to the structure of betrayal as self-betrayal, which, as we saw, Lacan considers a radical structure of the human relationship to being. For Lacan, the abandonment of the ethical imperative not to give ground on one’s desire is ultimately an accommodation to the real from which there is no return; the path back of the “ordinary man” into his own business is blocked once he has paid the price of accommodation to the service of goods and has betrayed the structure of his desire: “once one has crossed that boundary . . . there is no way back. It might be possible to do some repair work, but not to undo it” (Lacan 1992, 321). This betrayal formalizes politics—just as it formalizes religion—for Lacan. Lacanian politics, to the extent that they are understood to be a politics of the subject, are framed by a postrevolutionary service of goods, in which a sublimated jouissance waits infinitely, and uselessly, for the formation of the universal State. Is an alternative frame for contemporary politics available? Both Derrida and Agamben radicalize Schmitt’s intuition regarding the necessity of a transformation in the concept of the political given the exhaustion of the political order of modernity. The political order of modernity has exhausted itself through autoimmunitary developments— something that Schmitt anticipated both in his partisan theory, through the projection of the figure of the total counterpartisan that follows “the inevitability of a moral compulsion,” and in his investigation of the notion of a nomos of the earth, which reaches an unexpected arrest in the notion of the Kantian unjust enemy. If both Derrida and Agamben can be said to be Schmittian to a certain extent, in spite of their fundamental antagonism to the German thinker, it is precisely insofar as both of them take as point of departure for their investigations of political sovereignty some of Schmitt’s crucial theories. Derrida makes it very clear through a sort of disavowing avowal: “One did not have to wait for Schmitt to know that the sovereign is he who decides exceptionally and performatively on the exception, he who guards or gives himself the right to suspend the law; or to know that this juridico-political concept, like all the others, secularizes a theological heritage” (2003, 211–12). And Agamben of course makes Schmitt a crucial reference in both Homo Sacer and State of Exception.13 Both of them are interested, not, like Rasch, in a reassertion of sovereignty as the only possible pragmatic framing for a conceptualization of the political today, but rather in a dismantling of the claims of sovereignty as ultimate political claims, or as the ultimate claims of the political. They want to explore the contemporary troubles of sovereignty, troubles in sovereignty—what Derrida can and does call in French mal de souveraineté (196). These troubles are autoimmunity troubles: sovereignty ultimately suffers from itself, as it is its action that ultimately dooms it to face, in a certain far-from-reassuring impotence, the absolute threat or the anomic terror of the real. Can we then think of politics not beyond sovereignty, but rather as not exhausted by the sovereign frame? Is there a position—a properly political position—that can establish a distance from sovereignty without dreaming, like the Lacanian ordinary man, of the messianic fulfillment of the universal State, when desire will coincide absolutely with itself (and when, therefore, there will be nothing but the sovereign, as sovereign desire)? If there is a position, if it is possible to work out a position that can think of sovereignty without being absolutely circumscribed by sovereignty, that position will have accomplished a derangement of onto-theology. It will not have gotten rid of it, just as it will not have gotten rid of sovereignty, but it will have displaced onto-theology, and its political translation as sovereignty theory, from the horizon of the political. Derrida uses the shorthand “nonsovereign god” for this possibility, echoing Heidegger but also displacing Heidegger.14 And **Agamben talks about the liberation of anomy, as a solicitation of the deep historical compromise of violence and the law. If violence becomes the “thing” of politics for Agamben, this is so to the extent that “human action” must “rescind the link between violence and the law” in order to expose the violence of the law, rather than the lawfulness of violence** (which is the Schmittian project). But the reference to human action is already revealing of a limit in **Agamben’s project**. Certainly human action is an unavoidable referent for politics. But Agamben is still under the Lacanian determination, if on the side of the hero. His project**, a liberation of pure violence, is a tragic project to the extent that it leads the hero towards** what Sophocles calls **até.** Of até Lacan says: “It is an irreplaceable little word. It designates the limit that human life can only briefly cross. The text of the Chorus is significant and insistent—ektos atas. Beyond this até, one can only spend a brief period of time, and that’s where Antigone wants to go. . . . One learns from Antigone’s own mouth testimony on the point she has reached: she literally cannot stand it any more. . . . She lives with the memory of the intolerable drama of the one whose descendence has just been destroyed in the figure of her two brothers. She lives in the house of Creon; she is subject to his law; and that is something she cannot bear” (Lacan 1992, 262–63). **Agamben, like the tragic hero, situates himself “with relation to the goal of desire”** (265), **namely, in the relentless pursuit of a liberation from the sovereign law that has created a permanent state of exception: the ineluctable violence of the state as the house of Creon. To liberate pure violence in order to destroy the law**: of this one could say what Lacan says of the tragic hero, namely, “he knows what he is doing. He always manages to cause things to come crashing down on his head” (275). Agamben defines the contemporary state as one in which “the norm rules, but it is not applied (it does not have force) and . . . acts that have no legal value acquire the force. . . . The state of exception is an anomic space, where what is set in place is a force of law without law . . . , where act and power are radically separated” (52). If the contemporary state, the contemporary embodiment of the law, is absolute exception, understood as absolute oppression, and if only a liberation of violence from its lawful capture can release an appropriate politics, this politics’ human action, like Antigone, stands in “as a pure and simple relationship of the human being to that of which he miraculously happens to be the bearer, namely, the signifying cut that confers on him the indomitable power of being what he is in the face of everything that may oppose him. Anything at all may be invoked in connection with this, and that’s what the Chorus does in the fifth act when it evokes the god that saves. Dionysos is this god; otherwise why would he appear here? There is nothing Dionysiac about the act and the countenance of Antigone. Yet she pushes to the limit the realization of something that might be called the pure and simple desire of death as such. She incarnates that desire” (282). **A politics of heroic desire, in the ineluctable fulfillment of the ethical imperative, might be conceived to be an antisovereign politics, but it is still a subjective politics of catastrophe. At the limit, the hero does not abandon the horizon of sovereignty: the hero simply inverts it, and puts it at the service of an intensely mystical jouissance**, “the passage that allows access to the justice that one of Benjamin’s posthumous fragments defines as a state of the world in which it appears as an absolutely inappropriatable and unjuridifiable good” (Agamben 2003, 83).

#### Perm do the plan and reject anthroproecnterism in all other instances

#### **Anthropocentrism is not the root cause of the violence we’re talking about – marginalization occurs for other reasons**

Hayward 97 – Dept of Politics, University of Edinburgh (Tim, Feb., “Anthropocentrism: A Misunderstood Problem,” Environmental Values, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 49-63, JSTOR)

V. WHAT IS WRONG WITH 'OVERCOMING ANTHROPOCENTRISM' The argument so far would suggest that the aim of completely overcoming anthropocentrism in ethics is at best of rhetorical value, since all it does is draw attention to problems which are in fact better conceptualised in narrower and more precise terms. I shall now argue, though, that even as rhetoric the critical employment of the term can be unhelpful, and even positively counterproduc- tive. Proposals for the 'rejection' of anthropocentrism are unhelpful because they cloud the real problem they think to address. The problem has to do with a lack of concern with nonhumans but the term anthropocentrism can all too plausibly be understood as meaning an excessive concern with humans.4 The latter, however, is not the problem at all. On the contrary, a cursory glance around the world would confirm that humans show a lamentable lack of interest in the well- being of other humans. Moreover, even when it is not other humans whose interests are being harmed, but other species or the environment, it would generally be implausible to suggest that those doing the harm are being 'human- centred'. To see this, one only has to consider some typical practices which are appropriately criticised. Some examples would be: hunting a species to extinc- tion; destroying a forest to build a road and factories; animal experimentation. In the case of hunting a species to extinction, this is not helpfully or appropriately seen as 'anthropocentrism' since it typically involves one group of humans who are actually condemned by (probably a majority of) other humans who see the practice not as serving human interests in general, but the interests of one quite narrowly-defined group, such as poachers or whalers. A similar point can be made regarding the destruction of the forest - for those who derive economic benefit from the destruction oppose not only the human interests of indigenous peoples whose environment is thereby destroyed, but also the interests of all humans who depend on the oxygen such forests produce. The case of animal experimentation, however, brings to the fore a feature which looks as if it could more plausibly be said to be anthropocentric: for if we suppose that the benefits of the experimentation are intended to accrue to any and all humans who might need the medicine or technique experimented, then there would seem to be a clear case of humans benefiting as a species from the use and abuse of other species. But the 'if is important here. A reason why I am inclined to resist calling this anthropocentrism is that the benefits may in fact not be intended or destined for humans generally, but only for those who can afford to pay to keep the drug company in profit. As in the other two cases, it is unhelpful to cover over this fundamental point and criticise humanity in general for practices carried out by a limited number of humans when many others may in fact oppose them. There is in any case no need to describe the practice as anthropocentric when it is quite clearly speciesist - it is not the concern with human welfare per se that is the problem here, but the arbitrary privileging of that welfare over the welfare of members of other species. So a reason why critiques of anthropocentrism are unhelpful is that the problems the term is used to highlight do not arise out of a concern of humans with humans, but from a lack of concern for non-humans. I earlier explained why this lack of concern is not appropriately termed anthropocentrism; I now add the further consideration that practices manifesting a lack of concern for nonhumans very often go hand in hand with a lack of concern for other humans too.

#### Emergencies don’t turn the case – their theory ignores too many other factors

Posner and Vermeule 3

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The ratchet theory and the panic theory have become fixed points in the debate ¶ about emergency powers, yet have escaped rigorous analysis. As we will show, both ¶ theories have conceptual, normative, and empirical difficulties. The ratchet theory lacks a ¶ mechanism that permits constitutional powers to rise and prevents them from falling, and ¶ makes implausible assumptions about the rationality of individuals who consent to ¶ constitutional changes during emergencies. Those who fear the ratchet’s power point to ¶ constitutional trends—such as the rise of executive power—that are the result of longterm technological and demographic changes, not of recurrent emergencies; and they ignore the possibility of constitutional trends in the opposite direction, such as the rise of ¶ individual rights. (If there is such a trend, it is not a ratchet process either; we include a ¶ critique of an optimistic variant of the emergency ratchet, in which a succession of ¶ emergencies causes government to display ever-increasing respect for civil liberties). As ¶ for the panic theory, it assumes that people can, while panicked, get outside themselves ¶ and constrain their own fear. Although people and officials panic, we have found little ¶ evidence that constitutions or other laws or institutions can control the panic, and cause ¶ people to lose their fear, or else choose, while panicked, laws that they would choose if ¶ they were not panicked. Finally, defenders of either theory do not examine their ¶ normative premises sufficiently: it is not clear that panics and ratchets, if they occur, are ¶ bad things. Fear is often the correct response to a threat; panics can shatter constitutional ¶ structures, but sometimes constitutional structures should be shattered. Ratchets put the ¶ status quo out of reach, but sometimes that is where it should be.

#### Rejecting anthropocentrism collapses biotechnology—prevents GMO crops

**Smith ‘8**

(Wesley, The Silent Scream of the Asparagus: Get ready for 'plant rights.' http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/2010625/posts?page=101)

Why is this happening? Our accelerating rejection of the Judeo-Christian world view, which upholds the unique dignity and moral worth of human beings, is driving us crazy. Once we knocked our species off its pedestal, it was only logical that we would come to see fauna and flora as entitled to rights. The intellectual elites were the first to accept the notion of "species-ism," which condemns as invidious discrimination treating people differently from animals simply because they are human beings. Then ethical criteria were needed for assigning moral worth to individuals, be they human, animal, or now vegetable. Rising to the task, leading bioethicists argue that for a human, value comes from possessing sufficient cognitive abilities to be deemed a "person." This excludes the unborn, the newborn, and those with significant cognitive impairments, who, personhood theorists believe, do not possess the right to life or bodily integrity. This thinking has led to the advocacy in prestigious medical and bioethical journals of using profoundly brain impaired patients in medical experimentation or as sources of organs. The animal rights movement grew out of the same poisonous soil. Animal rights ideology holds that moral worth comes with sentience or the ability to suffer. Thus, since both animals and humans feel pain, animal rights advocates believe that what is done to an animal should be judged morally as if it were done to a human being. Some ideologues even compare the Nazi death camps to normal practices of animal husbandry. For example, Charles Patterson wrote in Eternal Treblinka--a book specifically endorsed by People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals--that "the road to Auschwitz begins at the slaughterhouse." Eschewing humans as the pinnacle of "creation" (to borrow the term used in the Swiss constitution) has caused environmentalism to mutate from conservationism--a concern to properly steward resources and protect pristine environs and endangered species--into a willingness to thwart human flourishing to "save the planet." Indeed, the most radical "deep ecologists" have grown so virulently misanthropic that Paul Watson, the head of the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, called humans "the AIDS of the earth," requiring "radical invasive therapy" in order to reduce the population of the earth to under a billion. As for "plant rights," if the Swiss model spreads, it may hobble biotechnology and experimentation to improve crop yields. As an editorial in Nature News put it: The [Swiss] committee has come up with few concrete examples of what type of experiment might be considered an unacceptable insult to plant dignity. Thecommittee does not consider that genetic engineering of plants automatically falls into this category, but its majority view holds that it would if the genetic modification caused plants to "lose their independence"--for example by interfering with their capacity to reproduce.

#### Biogenetic Crops save billions

**Reason 2K**

(Ronald Bailey, Interview with Norman Borlaug: Noble Peace Price Winner and Professor at Texas A & M University, “Billions Served”, Aprilhttp://www.reason.com/news/show/27665.html)

Despite occasional local famines caused by armed conflicts or political mischief, food is more abundant and cheaper today than ever before in history, due in large part to the work of Borlaug and his colleagues. More than 30 years ago, Borlaug wrote, "One of the greatest threats to mankind today is that the world may be choked by an explosively pervading but well camouflaged bureaucracy." As REASON's interview with him shows, he still believes that environmental activists and their allies in international agencies are a threat to progress on global food security. Barring such interference, he is confident that agricultural research, including biotechnology, will be able to boost crop production to meet the demand for food in a world of 8 billion or so, the projected population in 2025. Meanwhile, media darlings like Worldwatch Institute founder Lester Brown keep up their drumbeat of doom. In 1981 Brown declared, "The period of global food security is over." In 1994, he wrote, "The world's farmers can no longer be counted on to feed the projected additions to our numbers." And as recently as 1997 he warned, "Food scarcity will be the **defining issue** of the new era now unfolding, much as ideological conflict was the defining issue of the historical era that recently ended." Borlaug, by contrast, does not just wring his hands. He still works to get modern agricultural technology into the hands of hungry farmers in the developing world. Today, he is a consultant to the International Maize and Wheat Center in Mexico and president of the Sasakawa Africa Association, a private Japanese foundation working to spread the Green Revolution to sub-Saharan Africa. REASON Science Correspondent Ronald Bailey met with Borlaug at Texas A&M, where he is Distinguished Professor in the Soil and Crop Sciences Department and still teaches classes on occasion. Despite his achievements, Borlaug is a modest man who works out of a small windowless office in the university's agricultural complex. A few weeks before the interview, Texas A&M honored Borlaug by naming its new agricultural biotechnology center after him. "We have to have this new technology if we are to meet the growing food needs for the next 25 years," Borlaug declared at the dedication ceremony. If the naysayers do manage to stop agricultural biotech, he fears, they may finally bring on the famines they have been predicting for so long.

**Key to space col—**

#### Anthro structurally inevitable

**Lee ‘8**

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(Wendy Lynne, “Environmental Pragmatism Revisited: Human-Centeredness, Language, and the Future of Aesthetic Experience,” Environmental Philosophy 5:1)

For Dewey, living organisms, including human beings, are defined by their adjustments—the endeavor to fialfill felt preferences—to an enviromnent with and within which we are in continuous interaction. To whatever extent the experience of pleasure is possible, argues Dewey, it is so through "an adjustment of our whole being with the condifions of existence" (1997,46). "Experience," he remarks, "occurs continuously, because the interaction of live creature and environing conditions is involved in the very process of living" (1997, 46). Felt preferences would then seem to be unchosen because "no creature lives merely under its skin"—that is, because such preferences describe those interactions between organism and environment that facilitate the "process of living," including pain and pleasure. Another way to put tbis is to say that felt preferences are an indigenous feature of species-specific experience. What follows from this for a creature capable of reason and deliberation, however, distinguishes most of human experience from at least most of the experience of nonhuman animals, namely, the capacity to differentiate specific experiences, reflect upon them, and value them accordingly. As Dewey remarks, "[e]xperience in this vital sense is defined by those situations and episodes that we spontaneously refer to as being 'real' experiences; those things of which we say in recalling them, 'that was an experience'" (1997, 47). Human beings, in short, can have an experience; we can recall its qualities as pleasiu-able or painful, we can desire a fiiture in which some version ofthat experience can be repeated (Dewey 1934, 35-38). While, for Dewey, most nonhuman animals lack the capacity to have an experience (1934, 35), his view does not thereby imply that human experience transcends the epistemic and existential conditions which give rise to its specific set of feh preferences (1934, 46). The distinction between human and nonhuman beings is not that we enjoy an objectivity nonhumans lack, but rather that our centeredness includes a capacity for epistemic engagement with the world they do not have. In this respect, human-centeredness is no more chosen than do the considered preferences built, upon felt-preferences imply any particular course of history—including the chauvinistic one we have created thus far. We are, simply, as anthropocentric as are the specific ways in which our subcutaneous organs and our capacity for reason interact with the perceptible, conceivable world.

#### Even if they win we just cause human death it still outweighs and turns their impact—human moral evolution will inevitably lead to an end to speciesism—If humans survive, we can ensure that animals and the earth survive

J. G. Matheny, Ph. D. candidate, Bloomberg School of Public Health, Johns Hopkins University, December 6, 2007, “Ought we worry about human extinction?,” online: http://jgmatheny.org/extinctionethics.htm

Moral philosophers have not written much about human extinction. This may be because they underestimate the potential benefits of human survival and/or the risks of human extinction. If we survive the next few centuries, humanity could allow Earth-originating life to survive a trillion years or more. If we do not survive, Earth-originating life will probably perish within a billion years. If prolonging the survival of Earth-originating life is morally important, then there may be nothing more important than reducing the near-term risks of human extinction. Keywords: extinction, population ethics, intergenerational justice, catastrophic risk, existential risk, risk analysis, animal welfare, environmental ethicsWord count: 3,400Introduction

It was only in the last century, with the invention of nuclear weapons, that the probability of human extinction could be appreciably affected by human action. Ever since, human extinction has generally been considered a terrible possibility. It’s surprising, then, that a search of JSTOR and the Philosopher’s Index suggests contemporary philosophers have written little about the ethics of human extinction. In fact, they seem to have written more about the extinction of other animals. Maybe this is because they consider human extinction impossible or inevitable; or maybe human extinction seems inconsequential compared to other moral issues.

In this paper I argue that the possibility of human extinction deserves more attention. While extinction events may be very improbable, their consequences are grave. Human extinction would not only condemn to non-existence all future human generations, it would also cut short the existence of all animal life, as natural events will eventually make Earth uninhabitable.The value of future lives. Leslie (1996) suggests philosophers’ nonchalance toward human extinction is due in large part to disagreements in population ethics. Some people suppose it does not matter if the number of lives lived in the future is small -- at its limit, zero.[2] In contrast, I assume here that moral value is a function of both the quality and number of lives in a history.[3] This view is consistent with most people’s intuition about extinction (that it’s bad) and with moral theories under which life is considered a benefit to those who have it, or under which life is a necessary condition for producing things of value (Broome, 2004; Hare, 1993; Holtug 2001, Ng, 1989; Parfit 1984; Sikora, 1978). For instance, some moral theories value things like experiences, satisfied preferences, achievements, friendships, or virtuous acts, which take place only in lives. On this view, an early death is bad (at least in part) because it cuts short the number of these valuable things. Similarly, on this view, an early extinction is bad (at least in part) because it cuts short the number of these valuable things. I think this view is plausible and think our best reasons for believing an early death is bad are our best reasons for believing an early extinction is bad. But such a view is controversial and I will not settle the controversy here.

I start from the premise that we ought to increase moral value by increasing both the quality and number of lives throughout history. I also take it, following Singer (2002), this maxim applies to all sentient beings capable of positive subjective feelings.

Life’s prospectsThe human population is now 6 billion (6 x 109). There are perhaps another trillion (1012) sentient animals on Earth, maybe a few orders more, depending on where sentience begins and ends in the animal kingdom (Gaston, Blackburn, and Goldewijk, 2003; Gaston and Evans, 2004). Animal life has existed on Earth for around 500 million years. Barring a dramatic intervention, all animal life on Earth will die in the next several billion years. Earth is located in a field of thousands of asteroids and comets. 65 million years ago, an asteroid 10 kilometers in size hit the Yucatan , creating clouds of dust and smoke that blocked sunlight for months, probably causing the extinction of 90% of animals, including dinosaurs. A 100 km impact, capable of extinguishing all animal life on Earth, is probable within a billion years (Morrison et al., 2002). If an asteroid does not extinguish all animal life, the Sun will. In one billion years, the Sun will begin its Red Giant stage, increasing in size and temperature. Within six billion years, the Sun will have evaporated all of Earth’s water, and terrestrial temperatures will reach 1000 degrees -- much too hot for amino acid-based life to persist. If, somehow, life were to survive these changes, it will die in 7 billion years when the Sun forms a planetary nebula that irradiates Earth (Sackmann, Boothroyd, Kraemer, 1993; Ward and Brownlee, 2002). Earth is a dangerous place and animal life here has dim prospects. If there are 1012 sentient animals on Earth, only 1021 life-years remain. The only hope for terrestrial sentience surviving well beyond this limit is that some force will deflect large asteroids before they collide with Earth, giving sentients another billion or more years of life (Gritzner and Kahle, 2004); and/or terrestrial sentients will colonize other solar systems, giving sentients up to another 100 trillion years of life until all stars begin to stop shining (Adams and Laughlin, 1997). Life might survive even longer if it exploits non-stellar energy sources. But it is hard to imagine how life could survive beyond the decay of nuclear matter expected in 1032 to 1041 years (Adams and Laughlin, 1997). This may be the upper limit on the future of sentience.[4] Deflecting asteroids and colonizing space could delay the extinction of Earth-originating sentience from 109 to 1041 years. Assuming an average population of one trillion sentients is maintained (which is a conservative assumption under colonization[5]), these interventions would create between 1021 and 1053[billion] life-years. At present on Earth, only a human civilization would be remotely capable of carrying out such projects. If humanity survives the next few centuries, it’s likely we will develop technologies needed for at least one of these projects. We may already possess the technologies needed to deflect asteroids (Gritzner and Kahle, 2004; Urias et al., 1996). And in the next few centuries, we’re likely to develop technologies that allow colonization. We will be strongly motivated by self-interest to colonize space, as asteroids and planets have valuable resources to mine, and as our survival ultimately requires relocating to another solar system (Kargel, 1994; Lewis, 1996). Extinction risks Being capable of preserving sentient life for another 1041 years makes human survival important. There may be nothing more important. If the human species is extinguished, all known sentience and certainly all Earth-originating sentience will be extinguished within a few billion years. We ought then pay more attention to what Bostrom (2002) has called “existential risks” -- risks “where an adverse outcome would either annihilate Earth-originating intelligent life or permanently and drastically curtail its potential.” Such risks include: an asteroid or comet strikes Earth, creating enough debris to shut down photosynthesis for months; a supervolcano erupts, creating enough debris to shut down photosynthesis; a nearby supernova unleashes deadly radiation that reaches Earth; greenhouse gasses cause a radical change in climate; a nuclear holocaust creates enough debris to cause a “nuclear winter,” shutting down photosynthesis; a genetically engineered microbe is unleashed, by accident or design, killing most or all of humanity; or a high-energy physics experiment goes awry, creating a “true” vacuum or strangelets, destroying the Earth (Bostrom 2002; Bostrom and Cirkovic 2006; Leslie 1996, Posner 2004, Rees 2003). To me, most of these risks seem very unlikely. But dishearteningly, in their catalogs of these risks, Britain ’s Astronomer Royal, Sir Martin Rees (2003), gives humanity 50-50 odds of surviving the next few centuries, and philosophers John Leslie (1996) and Nick Bostrom (2002) put our chances at 70% and 75%, respectively.

Estimating the probabilities of unprecedented events is subjective, so we should treat these numbers skeptically. Still, even if the probabilities are orders lower, because the stakes are high, it could be justified to invest in extinction countermeasures. Matheny (2007) found that, even with traditional social discounting, investing in asteroid detection and mitigation is justified under standard cost-effectiveness analysis.Ought humanity be saved? Even accepting that future lives have value and that extinction risks can be cost-effectively reduced, there could still be reasons not to worry about human extinction. For instance, human lives might have negative moral value, in which case human extinction could be a good thing. This might have been Bertrand Russell’s sentiment when he wrote, “Although it is a gloomy view to suppose that life will die out, sometimes when I contemplate the things that people do with their lives I think it is almost a consolation.”[6] In the 20th century, more people, in absolute numbers, died of war, famine, and pestilence than ever before. But in the same century, more people did not die of war, famine, and pestilence than ever before. So even if we're especially pessimistic about average human welfare during the last century compared to others, it would be hard to argue that total welfare decreased. As long as average welfare was greater than zero – that is, the average life was preferable to suicide – then the century was a success for humanity. We will be capable of even greater moral nightmares in this century than in the last, but we will also be capable of securing greater welfare for a larger fraction of humanity. I suspect in this century, the average life will again be worth living, assuming we survive the century to judge. We should be more pessimistic when we review how nonhuman animals have fared in the last century. At present around 50 billion animals are raised and killed each year to feed humanity. (Many million animals are used for clothing, product testing, research, and entertainment, but their numbers are insignificant by comparison.) Since World War 2, with the invention of "factory farming," farm animals’ welfare has significantly deteriorated, as they now live in conditions that frustrate their most basic instincts (Singer, 2002, chapter 3). At the same time, we’re probably the only animal on Earth that routinely demonstrates compassion for other species. Such compassion is nearly universal in developed countries but we usually know too little, too late, for deeply ingrained habits, such as diets, to change. If improvements in other public morals were possible without any significant biological change in human nature, then the same should be true for our treatment of nonhuman animals, though it will take some time.

Even without any change in public morals, it seems unlikely we will continue to use animals for very long – at least, nowhere near 50 billion per year. Our most brutal use of animals results not from sadism but from old appetites now satisfied with **inefficient technologies** that have not fundamentally changed in 10,000 years. Ours is the first century where newer technologies -- plant or in vitro meats, or meat from brainless animals -- could satisfy human appetites for meat more efficiently and safely (Edelman et al, 2005). As these technologies mature and become cheaper, they will likely replace conventional meat. If the use of sentient animals survives much beyond this century, we should be very surprised. This thought is a cure for misanthropy. As long as most humans in the future don't use sentient animals, the vast number of good lives we can create would outweigh any sins humanity has committed or is likely to commit. Even if it takes a century for animal farming to be replaced by vegetarianism (or in vitro meats or brainless farm animals), the century of factory farming would represent around 1012 miserable life-years. That is one-billionth of the 1021 animal life-years humanity could save by protecting Earth from asteroids for a billion years.The century of industrialized animal use would thus be the equivalent of a terrible pain that lasts one second in an otherwise happy 100-year life. To accept human extinction now would be like committing suicide to end an unpleasant itch. If human life is extinguished, all known animal life will be extinguished when the Sun enters its Red Giant phase, if not earlier. Despite its current mistreatment of other animals, humanity is the animal kingdom’s best long-term hope for survival.

#### **The alt solves nothing and bites the K link harder – use of human benchmarks makes their non-anthropocentric value scheme impossible**

Hayward 97 – Dept of Politics, University of Edinburgh (Tim, Feb., “Anthropocentrism: A Misunderstood Problem,” Environmental Values, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 49-63, JSTOR)

But if the project of overcoming speciesism can be pursued with some expectation of success, this is not the case with the overcoming of anthropocentrism. What makes anthropocentrism unavoidable is a limitation of a quite different sort, one which cannot be overcome even in principle because it involves a non-contingent limitation on moral thinking as such. While overcoming speciesism involves a commitment to the pursuit of knowledge of relevant similarities and differences between humans and other species, the criteria of relevance will always have an ineliminable element of anthropocentrism about them. Speciesism is the arbitrary refusal to extend moral consideration to relevantly similar cases; the ineliminable element of anthropocentrism is marked by the impossibility of giving meaningful moral consideration to cases which bear no similarity to any aspect of human cases. The emphasis is on the 'meaningful' here: for in the abstract one could of course declare that some feature of the nonhuman world was morally valuable, despite meeting no determinate criterion of value already recognised by any human, but because the new value is completely unrelated to any existing value it will remain radically indeterminate as a guide to action. If the ultimate point of an ethic is to yield a determinate guide to human action, then, the human reference is ineliminable even when extending moral concern to nonhumans. So my argument is that one cannot know if any judgement is speciesist if one has no benchmark against which to test arbitrariness; and, more specifically, if we are concerned to avoid speciesism of humans then one must have standards of comparison between them and others. Thus features of humans remain the benchmark. As long as the valuer is a human, the very selection of criteria of value will be limited by this fact. It is this fact which precludes the possibility of a radically nonanthropocentric value scheme, if by that is meant the adoption of a set of values which are supposed to be completely unrelated to any existing human values. Any attempt to construct a radically non-anthropocentric value scheme is liable not only to be arbitrary - because founded on no certain knowledge - but also to be more insidiously anthropocentric in projecting certain values, which as a matter of fact are selected by a human, onto nonhuman beings without certain warrant for doing so. This, of course, is the error of anthropomorphism, and will inevitably, I believe, be committed in any attempt to expunge anthropocentrism altogether. But is admitting this unavoidable element of anthropocentrism not tanta- mount to admitting the unavoidability of human chauvinism? My claim is that it is not. What is unavoidable is that human valuers make use of anthropocentric benchmarks; yet in doing so, they may find that in all consistency they must, for instance, give priority to vital nonhuman interests over more trivial human interests. For the human chauvinist, by contrast, interests of humans must always take precedence over the interests of nonhumans. Human chauvinism does not take human values as a benchmark of comparison, since it admits no comparison between humans and nonhumans. Human chauvinism ultimately values humans because they are humans. While the human chauvinist may officially claim there are criteria which provide reasons for preferring humans - such as that they have language, rationality, sociality etc. - no amount of evidence that other beings fulfil these criteria would satisfy them that they should be afforded a similar moral concern. The bottom line for the human chauvinist is that being human is a necessary and sufficient condition of moral concern. What I am pointing out as the ineliminable element of anthropocentrism is an asymmetry between humans and other species which is not the product of chauvinist prejudice. To sum up, then, what is unavoidable about anthropocentrism is precisely what makes ethics possible at all. It is a basic feature of the logic of obligation: if an ethic is a guide to action; and if a particular ethic requires an agent to make others ' ends her ends, then they become just that - the agent' s ends. This is a non-contingent but substantive limitation on any attempt to construct a completely nonanthropocentric ethic. Values are always the values o/the valuer:3 so as long as the class of valuers includes human beings, human values are ineliminable. Having argued that this is unavoidable, I also want to argue that it is no bad thing.

## Antrho

### 2ac

#### We get to weigh the impacts of the 1ac - This is good -

#### A. Plan focus – otherwise discussion gets shifted away from the topic

#### B. Ground – They moot 9 minutes of 1AC offense – makes debate lop sided and unproductive

#### C. Vague alts and floating piks are a reason to reject the critique – make the neg a moving target and lets them coopt aff offense

#### Case is a disad - conflict and terrorism are inevitable – even if it was due to antrho thought it’s too late to solve root cause - only way is directly through the plan – and that outweighs – default to our specific extinction level scenarios-

#### Aff turns the K- a nuclear war would destroy all life on the planet

#### Human life has intrinsic and objective value achieved through subjective pleasures – its preservation should be an a priori goal

Kacou 8 (Amien Kacou 8 WHY EVEN MIND? On The A Priori Value Of “Life”, Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, Vol 4, No 1-2 (2008) http://www.cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/92/184)

Furthermore, that manner of finding things good that is in pleasure can certainly not exist in any world without consciousness (i.e., without “life,” as we now understand the word)—slight analogies put aside. In fact, we can begin to develop a more sophisticated definition of the concept of “pleasure,” in the broadest possible sense of the word, as follows: it is the common psychological element in all psychological experience of goodness (be it in joy, admiration, or whatever else). In this sense, pleasure can always be pictured to “mediate” all awareness or perception or judgment of goodness: there is pleasure in all consciousness of things good; pleasure is the common element of all conscious satisfaction. In short, it is simply the very experience of liking things, or the liking of experience, in general. In this sense, pleasure is, not only uniquely characteristic of life but also, the core expression of goodness in life—the most general sign or phenomenon for favorable conscious valuation, in other words. This does not mean that “good” is absolutely synonymous with “pleasant”—what we value may well go beyond pleasure. (The fact that we value things needs not be reduced to the experience of liking things.) However, what we value beyond pleasure remains a matter of speculation or theory. Moreover, we note that a variety of things that may seem otherwise unrelated are correlated with pleasure—some more strongly than others. In other words, there are many things the experience of which we like. For example: the admiration of others; sex; or rock-paper-scissors. But, again, what they are is irrelevant in an inquiry on a priori value—what gives us pleasure is a matter for empirical investigation. Thus, we can see now that, in general, something primitively valuable is attainable in living—that is, pleasure itself. And it seems equally clear that we have a priori logical reason to pay attention to the world in any world where pleasure exists. Moreover, we can now also articulate a foundation for a security interest in our life: since the good of pleasure can be found in living (to the extent pleasure remains attainable),[17] and only in living, therefore, a priori, life ought to be continuously (and indefinitely) pursued at least for the sake of preserving the possibility of finding that good. However, this platitude about the value that can be found in life turns out to be, at this point, insufficient for our purposes. It seems to amount to very little more than recognizing that our subjective desire for life in and of itself shows that life has some objective value. For what difference is there between saying, “living is unique in benefiting something I value (namely, my pleasure); therefore, I should desire to go on living,” and saying, “I have a unique desire to go on living; therefore I should have a desire to go on living,” whereas the latter proposition immediately seems senseless? In other words, “life gives me pleasure,” says little more than, “I like life.” Thus, we seem to have arrived at the conclusion that the fact that we already have some (subjective) desire for life shows life to have some (objective) value. But, if that is the most we can say, then it seems our enterprise of justification was quite superficial, and the subjective/objective distinction was useless—for all we have really done is highlight the correspondence between value and desire. Perhaps, our inquiry should be a bit more complex.

Anthropocentrism is inevitable and good

Grey 93 (William Grey, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Queensland, “Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology,” Australiasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 71, Number 4, Available Online at http://www.uq.edu.au/~pdwgrey/pubs/anthropocentrism.html, Accessed 07-27-2011)

The attempt to provide a genuinely non-anthropocentric set of values, or preferences seems to be a hopeless quest. Once we eschew all human values, interests and preferences we are confronted with just too many alternatives, as we can see when we consider biological history over a billion year time scale. The problem with the various non-anthropocentric bases for value which have been proposed is that they permit too many different possibilities, not all of which are at all congenial to us. And that matters. We should be concerned to promote a rich, diverse and vibrant biosphere. Human flourishing may certainly be included as a legitimate part of such a flourishing. The preoccupations of deep ecology arise as a result of human activities which impoverish and degrade the quality of the planet's living systems. But these judgements are possible only if we assume a set of values (that is, preference rankings), based on human preferences. We need to reject not anthropocentrism, but a particularly short term and narrow conception of human interests and concerns. What's wrong with shallow views is not their concern about the well-being of humans, but that they do not really consider enough in what that well-being consists. We need to develop an enriched, fortified anthropocentric notion of human interest to replace the dominant short-term, sectional and self-regarding conception. Our sort of world, with our sort of fellow occupants is an interesting and engaging place. There is every reason for us to try to keep it, and ourselves, going for a few more cosmic seconds.

#### Perm do the plan and reject anthroproecnterism in all other instances

#### Anthropocentrism key to survival and the environment

Hwang 2003 Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Seoul National University [Kyung-sig, “Apology for Environmental Anthropocentrism,” Asian Bioethics in the 21st Century, http://eubios.info/ABC4/abc4304.htm]

While our ability to affect the future is immense, our ability to foresee the results of our environmental interventions is not. I think that our moral responsibility grows with foresight. And yet, paradoxically in some cases grave moral responsibility is entailed by the fact of one's ignorance. If the planetary life-support system appears to be complex and mysterious, humble ignorance should indicate respect and restraint. However, as many life scientists have complained, these virtues have not been apparent in these generations. Instead they point out, we have boldly marched ahead, shredding delicate ecosystems and obliterating countless species, and with them the unique genetic codes that evolved through millions of years; we have altered the climate and even the chemistry of the atmosphere, and as a result of all this-what?[18] A few results are immediately to our benefit; more energy, more mineral resources, more cropland, convenient waste disposal. Indeed, these short-term payoffs motivated us to alter our natural environment. But by far the larger and more significant results, the permanent results, are unknown and perhaps unknowable. Nature, says poet, Nancy Newhall, "holds answers to more questions than we know how to ask." And we have scarcely bothered to ask.[19] Year and year, the natural habitants diminish and the species disappear, and thus our planetary ecosystem (our household) is forever impoverished. It is awareness of ecological crisis that has led to the now common claim that we need transvaluation of value, new values, a new ethic, and an ethic that is essentially and not simply contingently new and ecological. Closer inspection usually reveals that the writer who states this does not really mean to advance such a radical thesis, that all he is arguing for is the application of old, recognized, ethical values of the kind noted under the characterization of respect for persons, justice, honesty, promotion of good, where pleasure and happiness are seen as goods. Thus, although W. T. Blackstone writes; "we do not need the kind of transvaluation that Nietzsche wanted, but we do need that for which ecologists are calling, that is, basic changes in man's attitude toward nature and man's place in nature, toward population growth, toward the use of technology, and toward the production and distribution of goods and services." We need to develop what I call the ecological attitude. The transvaluation of values, which is needed, will require fundamental changes in the social, legal, political and economic institutions that embody our values. He concludes his article by explicitly noting that he does not really demand a new ethic, or a transvaluation of values. A human being is a hierarchical system and a component of super-individual, hierarchical system of sets. What is needed is not the denial of anthropocentrism, the placing of the highest value on humans and their ends and the conceiving of the rest of the nature as an instrument for those ends. Rather what is needed is the explicit recognition of these hierarchical systems and an ecological approach to science and the accumulation of scientific knowledge in which the myriad casual relationships between different hierarchical systems are recognized and put to the use of humanity. The freedom to use the environment must be restricted to rational and human use. If there is irrational use - pollution, overpopulation, crowding, a growth in poverty, and so on - people may wipe out hierarchies of life related to their own survival and to the quality of their own lives. This sort of anthropocentrism is essential even to human survival and a radical biotic egalitarianism would undermine conditions for that survival.[20] Rational anthropocentrism, one that recognizes the value of human life "transcends our individual life" and one in which we form a collective bond of identity with the future generations is essential is the process of human evolution.

#### **Anthropocentrism is not the root cause of the violence we’re talking about – marginalization occurs for other reasons**

Hayward 97 – Dept of Politics, University of Edinburgh (Tim, Feb., “Anthropocentrism: A Misunderstood Problem,” Environmental Values, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 49-63, JSTOR)

V. WHAT IS WRONG WITH 'OVERCOMING ANTHROPOCENTRISM' The argument so far would suggest that the aim of completely overcoming anthropocentrism in ethics is at best of rhetorical value, since all it does is draw attention to problems which are in fact better conceptualised in narrower and more precise terms. I shall now argue, though, that even as rhetoric the critical employment of the term can be unhelpful, and even positively counterproduc- tive. Proposals for the 'rejection' of anthropocentrism are unhelpful because they cloud the real problem they think to address. The problem has to do with a lack of concern with nonhumans but the term anthropocentrism can all too plausibly be understood as meaning an excessive concern with humans.4 The latter, however, is not the problem at all. On the contrary, a cursory glance around the world would confirm that humans show a lamentable lack of interest in the well- being of other humans. Moreover, even when it is not other humans whose interests are being harmed, but other species or the environment, it would generally be implausible to suggest that those doing the harm are being 'human- centred'. To see this, one only has to consider some typical practices which are appropriately criticised. Some examples would be: hunting a species to extinc- tion; destroying a forest to build a road and factories; animal experimentation. In the case of hunting a species to extinction, this is not helpfully or appropriately seen as 'anthropocentrism' since it typically involves one group of humans who are actually condemned by (probably a majority of) other humans who see the practice not as serving human interests in general, but the interests of one quite narrowly-defined group, such as poachers or whalers. A similar point can be made regarding the destruction of the forest - for those who derive economic benefit from the destruction oppose not only the human interests of indigenous peoples whose environment is thereby destroyed, but also the interests of all humans who depend on the oxygen such forests produce. The case of animal experimentation, however, brings to the fore a feature which looks as if it could more plausibly be said to be anthropocentric: for if we suppose that the benefits of the experimentation are intended to accrue to any and all humans who might need the medicine or technique experimented, then there would seem to be a clear case of humans benefiting as a species from the use and abuse of other species. But the 'if is important here. A reason why I am inclined to resist calling this anthropocentrism is that the benefits may in fact not be intended or destined for humans generally, but only for those who can afford to pay to keep the drug company in profit. As in the other two cases, it is unhelpful to cover over this fundamental point and criticise humanity in general for practices carried out by a limited number of humans when many others may in fact oppose them. There is in any case no need to describe the practice as anthropocentric when it is quite clearly speciesist - it is not the concern with human welfare per se that is the problem here, but the arbitrary privileging of that welfare over the welfare of members of other species. So a reason why critiques of anthropocentrism are unhelpful is that the problems the term is used to highlight do not arise out of a concern of humans with humans, but from a lack of concern for non-humans. I earlier explained why this lack of concern is not appropriately termed anthropocentrism; I now add the further consideration that practices manifesting a lack of concern for nonhumans very often go hand in hand with a lack of concern for other humans too.

#### Rejecting anthropocentric only reinforces a new hierarchy – that turns the k.

Lewis, George Washington University geography and regional science professor, 1992

[Martin, “Green Delusions: An Environmentalist Critique of Radical Environmentalism” <http://books.google.com/books?id=cMThEEHW2JYC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false>, p.18, accessed 7-10-12, TAP]

In marked contrast, the decoupling perspective endorsed here seeks to separate human activities from nature both in order to protect nature from humanity (for nature’s sake) and to allow continued technological progress (for humanity’s sake). This entails acknowledging a profound division between humankind and the rest of nature, a distinction that many greens allege is itself at the root of the ecological crisis. Yet the radical environmentalists who condemn this example of dualistic thinking merely substitute for it their own parallel gulf, one separating modern(or technologically oriented) human beings from nature. This in turn entails positing a radical discontinuity in human development, a dualism of human nature separating moderns from primals(or primitives). As I shall argue at length in this work’s conclusion, such a division of humankind is, in the end, both bigoted and empirically unsupportable. We would be better of admitting that while humankind is indeed of nature, instrinsically creative human nature is a phenomenon not found in nature’s other creations. In a Promethean environmental future, humans would accentuate the gulf that sets us apart from the rest of the natural world – precisely in order to preserve and enjoy nature at a somewhat distant remove. Our alternative is to continue to struggle within nature, and in so doing to distort its forms by our inescapably unnatural presence.

#### Human focused framework doesn’t oppress animals

Goldman, 2001

[Michael, "A Transcendental Defense of Specieism," Journal of Value Inquiry 35:59-69, Springer]

This argument is too simple. It is true that biology no longer directs our survival techniques, and does not even usefully delineate beings who need to be morally protected by means of some alleged genetic programming captured in the socibiological notion of "inclusive fitness." Nevertheless, the imperatives of biological life still exist, and have been transformed into the imperatives of material life, which is life still conditioned by the physical requirements of the body, but assured only by materially productive labor. It is the community of human beings, now understood as the global community that engages collectively in the production of life's needs. This is the most important way that the evolution of culture and productive dimensions of human life have rendered biological imperatives irrelevant. The human productive community is no longer local or tribal or familial; it is global. Consequently, if there are any biologically reproductive imperatives built into our genes, such as the drive for self-replication, they will not be satisfied by any individual behaviors, such as kin selection, that might have been biologically programmed to fulfill those imperatives under very different environmental conditions. There has not been enough time for evolutionary mechanisms to assure that biologically based or instinctive behavior has evolved to reflect the global dimensions of social reproductive interdependency. It is evident that at least one morally appropriate basis for rejecting racism and other forms of oppression is linked to this interdependence. Moral consideration, which must be extended in the first instance to beings with whom we are able to interact in social reproductive efforts, now must extend to the global community, for it is the well-being of the global community that is today a necessary condition for the existence of moral value. As Singer points out, this includes members of all races, genders, ages, ethnic, and religious backgrounds. Consequently, traditional forms of discrimination, which have as their consequence thwarting the ability to flourish, and thereby the ability to contribute to social reproduction, are rightfully to be abjured in any context that aspires to moral legitimacy, just as biological imperatives tend to compel us to abjure the mistreatment of our genetic kin. What this suggests, however, is that it is still possible to draw a line between the importance of human beings and the importance of animals such that human beings have unique priority when it comes to extending moral consideration. While almost any human being of any race, gender, religion, or ethnicity can cooperate in the social reproductive process, no animal can do so meaningfully. Individuals who can constructively contribute to the well being of humanity at the same time contribute to the possibility of moral value itself. They are therefore more valuable , in the sense of value relevant to making moral choice, than individuals who cannot do so, and in the nature of things, it is, for the most part, human beings who can constructively contribute.

**Turn—biotech—**

#### Rejecting anthropocentrism collapses biotechnology—prevents GMO crops

**Smith ‘8**

(Wesley, The Silent Scream of the Asparagus: Get ready for 'plant rights.' http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/2010625/posts?page=101)

Why is this happening? Our accelerating rejection of the Judeo-Christian world view, which upholds the unique dignity and moral worth of human beings, is driving us crazy. Once we knocked our species off its pedestal, it was only logical that we would come to see fauna and flora as entitled to rights. The intellectual elites were the first to accept the notion of "species-ism," which condemns as invidious discrimination treating people differently from animals simply because they are human beings. Then ethical criteria were needed for assigning moral worth to individuals, be they human, animal, or now vegetable. Rising to the task, leading bioethicists argue that for a human, value comes from possessing sufficient cognitive abilities to be deemed a "person." This excludes the unborn, the newborn, and those with significant cognitive impairments, who, personhood theorists believe, do not possess the right to life or bodily integrity. This thinking has led to the advocacy in prestigious medical and bioethical journals of using profoundly brain impaired patients in medical experimentation or as sources of organs. The animal rights movement grew out of the same poisonous soil. Animal rights ideology holds that moral worth comes with sentience or the ability to suffer. Thus, since both animals and humans feel pain, animal rights advocates believe that what is done to an animal should be judged morally as if it were done to a human being. Some ideologues even compare the Nazi death camps to normal practices of animal husbandry. For example, Charles Patterson wrote in Eternal Treblinka--a book specifically endorsed by People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals--that "the road to Auschwitz begins at the slaughterhouse." Eschewing humans as the pinnacle of "creation" (to borrow the term used in the Swiss constitution) has caused environmentalism to mutate from conservationism--a concern to properly steward resources and protect pristine environs and endangered species--into a willingness to thwart human flourishing to "save the planet." Indeed, the most radical "deep ecologists" have grown so virulently misanthropic that Paul Watson, the head of the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, called humans "the AIDS of the earth," requiring "radical invasive therapy" in order to reduce the population of the earth to under a billion. As for "plant rights," if the Swiss model spreads, it may hobble biotechnology and experimentation to improve crop yields. As an editorial in Nature News put it: The [Swiss] committee has come up with few concrete examples of what type of experiment might be considered an unacceptable insult to plant dignity. Thecommittee does not consider that genetic engineering of plants automatically falls into this category, but its majority view holds that it would if the genetic modification caused plants to "lose their independence"--for example by interfering with their capacity to reproduce.

#### Biogenetic Crops save billions

**Reason 2K**

(Ronald Bailey, Interview with Norman Borlaug: Noble Peace Price Winner and Professor at Texas A & M University, “Billions Served”, Aprilhttp://www.reason.com/news/show/27665.html)

Despite occasional local famines caused by armed conflicts or political mischief, food is more abundant and cheaper today than ever before in history, due in large part to the work of Borlaug and his colleagues. More than 30 years ago, Borlaug wrote, "One of the greatest threats to mankind today is that the world may be choked by an explosively pervading but well camouflaged bureaucracy." As REASON's interview with him shows, he still believes that environmental activists and their allies in international agencies are a threat to progress on global food security. Barring such interference, he is confident that agricultural research, including biotechnology, will be able to boost crop production to meet the demand for food in a world of 8 billion or so, the projected population in 2025. Meanwhile, media darlings like Worldwatch Institute founder Lester Brown keep up their drumbeat of doom. In 1981 Brown declared, "The period of global food security is over." In 1994, he wrote, "The world's farmers can no longer be counted on to feed the projected additions to our numbers." And as recently as 1997 he warned, "Food scarcity will be the **defining issue** of the new era now unfolding, much as ideological conflict was the defining issue of the historical era that recently ended." Borlaug, by contrast, does not just wring his hands. He still works to get modern agricultural technology into the hands of hungry farmers in the developing world. Today, he is a consultant to the International Maize and Wheat Center in Mexico and president of the Sasakawa Africa Association, a private Japanese foundation working to spread the Green Revolution to sub-Saharan Africa. REASON Science Correspondent Ronald Bailey met with Borlaug at Texas A&M, where he is Distinguished Professor in the Soil and Crop Sciences Department and still teaches classes on occasion. Despite his achievements, Borlaug is a modest man who works out of a small windowless office in the university's agricultural complex. A few weeks before the interview, Texas A&M honored Borlaug by naming its new agricultural biotechnology center after him. "We have to have this new technology if we are to meet the growing food needs for the next 25 years," Borlaug declared at the dedication ceremony. If the naysayers do manage to stop agricultural biotech, he fears, they may finally bring on the famines they have been predicting for so long.

**Key to space col—**

#### Animal experimentation and exploitation is critical to NASA zero-gravity birthing tests that are a pre-requisite to space colonization.

**Lakdawala 2K**

(Seema, BORN IN SPACE 3..2..1..BLASTOFF, http://www.cse.emory.edu/sciencenet/undergrad/SURE/Articles/2000\_art\_lakdawala.html)

Human kind has always had a need to explore, first the exploration of the new world and now as the majority of the world has been explored and mapped, we have set our sights a bit higher. We now have a craving for the outer limits; exploration of the solar systems of other galaxies isn’t very far away. Along with exploration comes colonization. As space exploration increases, the need for colonization will come soon. We have already begun taking preliminary steps with the NASA Space Station. Hopefully the Medaka fish birth and the research on zebra fish will give us the key we need to understand how to make it possible for future vertebrate animals to be born in space.

#### Colonization solves inevitable extinction.

**Matheny ‘7**

(Jason, PhD Student in School of Public Health @ Johns Hopkins, Risk Analysis: An International Journal, “Reducing the Risk of Human Extinction”, 27:5, Wiley InterScience)

As for astronomical risks, to escape our sun's death, humanity will eventually need to relocate. If we survive the next century, we are likely to build self-sufficient colonies in space. We would be motivated by self-interest to do so, as asteroids, moons, and planets have valuable resources to mine, and the technological requirements for colonization are not beyond imagination (Kargel, 1994; Lewis, 1996). Colonizing space sooner, rather than later, could reduce extinction risk (Gott, 1999; Hartmann, 1984; Leslie, 1999), as a species' survivability is closely related to the extent of its range (Hecht, 2006). Citing, in particular, the threat of new biological weapons, Stephen Hawking has said, "I don't think the human race will survive the next thousand years, unless we spread into space. There are too many accidents that can befall life on a single planet" (Highfield, 2001). Similarly, NASA Administrator, Michael Griffin (2006), recently remarked: "The history of life on Earth is the history of extinction events, and human expansion into the Solar System is, in the end, fundamentally about the survival of the species."

#### Anthro structurally inevitable

**Lee ‘8**

Lee, Department of Philosophy – Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania, ‘8

(Wendy Lynne, “Environmental Pragmatism Revisited: Human-Centeredness, Language, and the Future of Aesthetic Experience,” Environmental Philosophy 5:1)

For Dewey, living organisms, including human beings, are defined by their adjustments—the endeavor to fialfill felt preferences—to an enviromnent with and within which we are in continuous interaction. To whatever extent the experience of pleasure is possible, argues Dewey, it is so through "an adjustment of our whole being with the condifions of existence" (1997,46). "Experience," he remarks, "occurs continuously, because the interaction of live creature and environing conditions is involved in the very process of living" (1997, 46). Felt preferences would then seem to be unchosen because "no creature lives merely under its skin"—that is, because such preferences describe those interactions between organism and environment that facilitate the "process of living," including pain and pleasure. Another way to put tbis is to say that felt preferences are an indigenous feature of species-specific experience. What follows from this for a creature capable of reason and deliberation, however, distinguishes most of human experience from at least most of the experience of nonhuman animals, namely, the capacity to differentiate specific experiences, reflect upon them, and value them accordingly. As Dewey remarks, "[e]xperience in this vital sense is defined by those situations and episodes that we spontaneously refer to as being 'real' experiences; those things of which we say in recalling them, 'that was an experience'" (1997, 47). Human beings, in short, can have an experience; we can recall its qualities as pleasiu-able or painful, we can desire a fiiture in which some version ofthat experience can be repeated (Dewey 1934, 35-38). While, for Dewey, most nonhuman animals lack the capacity to have an experience (1934, 35), his view does not thereby imply that human experience transcends the epistemic and existential conditions which give rise to its specific set of feh preferences (1934, 46). The distinction between human and nonhuman beings is not that we enjoy an objectivity nonhumans lack, but rather that our centeredness includes a capacity for epistemic engagement with the world they do not have. In this respect, human-centeredness is no more chosen than do the considered preferences built, upon felt-preferences imply any particular course of history—including the chauvinistic one we have created thus far. We are, simply, as anthropocentric as are the specific ways in which our subcutaneous organs and our capacity for reason interact with the perceptible, conceivable world.

#### Even if they win we just cause human death it still outweighs and turns their impact—human moral evolution will inevitably lead to an end to speciesism—If humans survive, we can ensure that animals and the earth survive

J. G. Matheny, Ph. D. candidate, Bloomberg School of Public Health, Johns Hopkins University, December 6, 2007, “Ought we worry about human extinction?,” online: http://jgmatheny.org/extinctionethics.htm

Moral philosophers have not written much about human extinction. This may be because they underestimate the potential benefits of human survival and/or the risks of human extinction. If we survive the next few centuries, humanity could allow Earth-originating life to survive a trillion years or more. If we do not survive, Earth-originating life will probably perish within a billion years. If prolonging the survival of Earth-originating life is morally important, then there may be nothing more important than reducing the near-term risks of human extinction. Keywords: extinction, population ethics, intergenerational justice, catastrophic risk, existential risk, risk analysis, animal welfare, environmental ethicsWord count: 3,400Introduction

It was only in the last century, with the invention of nuclear weapons, that the probability of human extinction could be appreciably affected by human action. Ever since, human extinction has generally been considered a terrible possibility. It’s surprising, then, that a search of JSTOR and the Philosopher’s Index suggests contemporary philosophers have written little about the ethics of human extinction. In fact, they seem to have written more about the extinction of other animals. Maybe this is because they consider human extinction impossible or inevitable; or maybe human extinction seems inconsequential compared to other moral issues.

In this paper I argue that the possibility of human extinction deserves more attention. While extinction events may be very improbable, their consequences are grave. Human extinction would not only condemn to non-existence all future human generations, it would also cut short the existence of all animal life, as natural events will eventually make Earth uninhabitable.The value of future lives. Leslie (1996) suggests philosophers’ nonchalance toward human extinction is due in large part to disagreements in population ethics. Some people suppose it does not matter if the number of lives lived in the future is small -- at its limit, zero.[2] In contrast, I assume here that moral value is a function of both the quality and number of lives in a history.[3] This view is consistent with most people’s intuition about extinction (that it’s bad) and with moral theories under which life is considered a benefit to those who have it, or under which life is a necessary condition for producing things of value (Broome, 2004; Hare, 1993; Holtug 2001, Ng, 1989; Parfit 1984; Sikora, 1978). For instance, some moral theories value things like experiences, satisfied preferences, achievements, friendships, or virtuous acts, which take place only in lives. On this view, an early death is bad (at least in part) because it cuts short the number of these valuable things. Similarly, on this view, an early extinction is bad (at least in part) because it cuts short the number of these valuable things. I think this view is plausible and think our best reasons for believing an early death is bad are our best reasons for believing an early extinction is bad. But such a view is controversial and I will not settle the controversy here.

I start from the premise that we ought to increase moral value by increasing both the quality and number of lives throughout history. I also take it, following Singer (2002), this maxim applies to all sentient beings capable of positive subjective feelings.

Life’s prospectsThe human population is now 6 billion (6 x 109). There are perhaps another trillion (1012) sentient animals on Earth, maybe a few orders more, depending on where sentience begins and ends in the animal kingdom (Gaston, Blackburn, and Goldewijk, 2003; Gaston and Evans, 2004). Animal life has existed on Earth for around 500 million years. Barring a dramatic intervention, all animal life on Earth will die in the next several billion years. Earth is located in a field of thousands of asteroids and comets. 65 million years ago, an asteroid 10 kilometers in size hit the Yucatan , creating clouds of dust and smoke that blocked sunlight for months, probably causing the extinction of 90% of animals, including dinosaurs. A 100 km impact, capable of extinguishing all animal life on Earth, is probable within a billion years (Morrison et al., 2002). If an asteroid does not extinguish all animal life, the Sun will. In one billion years, the Sun will begin its Red Giant stage, increasing in size and temperature. Within six billion years, the Sun will have evaporated all of Earth’s water, and terrestrial temperatures will reach 1000 degrees -- much too hot for amino acid-based life to persist. If, somehow, life were to survive these changes, it will die in 7 billion years when the Sun forms a planetary nebula that irradiates Earth (Sackmann, Boothroyd, Kraemer, 1993; Ward and Brownlee, 2002). Earth is a dangerous place and animal life here has dim prospects. If there are 1012 sentient animals on Earth, only 1021 life-years remain. The only hope for terrestrial sentience surviving well beyond this limit is that some force will deflect large asteroids before they collide with Earth, giving sentients another billion or more years of life (Gritzner and Kahle, 2004); and/or terrestrial sentients will colonize other solar systems, giving sentients up to another 100 trillion years of life until all stars begin to stop shining (Adams and Laughlin, 1997). Life might survive even longer if it exploits non-stellar energy sources. But it is hard to imagine how life could survive beyond the decay of nuclear matter expected in 1032 to 1041 years (Adams and Laughlin, 1997). This may be the upper limit on the future of sentience.[4] Deflecting asteroids and colonizing space could delay the extinction of Earth-originating sentience from 109 to 1041 years. Assuming an average population of one trillion sentients is maintained (which is a conservative assumption under colonization[5]), these interventions would create between 1021 and 1053[billion] life-years. At present on Earth, only a human civilization would be remotely capable of carrying out such projects. If humanity survives the next few centuries, it’s likely we will develop technologies needed for at least one of these projects. We may already possess the technologies needed to deflect asteroids (Gritzner and Kahle, 2004; Urias et al., 1996). And in the next few centuries, we’re likely to develop technologies that allow colonization. We will be strongly motivated by self-interest to colonize space, as asteroids and planets have valuable resources to mine, and as our survival ultimately requires relocating to another solar system (Kargel, 1994; Lewis, 1996). Extinction risks Being capable of preserving sentient life for another 1041 years makes human survival important. There may be nothing more important. If the human species is extinguished, all known sentience and certainly all Earth-originating sentience will be extinguished within a few billion years. We ought then pay more attention to what Bostrom (2002) has called “existential risks” -- risks “where an adverse outcome would either annihilate Earth-originating intelligent life or permanently and drastically curtail its potential.” Such risks include: an asteroid or comet strikes Earth, creating enough debris to shut down photosynthesis for months; a supervolcano erupts, creating enough debris to shut down photosynthesis; a nearby supernova unleashes deadly radiation that reaches Earth; greenhouse gasses cause a radical change in climate; a nuclear holocaust creates enough debris to cause a “nuclear winter,” shutting down photosynthesis; a genetically engineered microbe is unleashed, by accident or design, killing most or all of humanity; or a high-energy physics experiment goes awry, creating a “true” vacuum or strangelets, destroying the Earth (Bostrom 2002; Bostrom and Cirkovic 2006; Leslie 1996, Posner 2004, Rees 2003). To me, most of these risks seem very unlikely. But dishearteningly, in their catalogs of these risks, Britain ’s Astronomer Royal, Sir Martin Rees (2003), gives humanity 50-50 odds of surviving the next few centuries, and philosophers John Leslie (1996) and Nick Bostrom (2002) put our chances at 70% and 75%, respectively.

Estimating the probabilities of unprecedented events is subjective, so we should treat these numbers skeptically. Still, even if the probabilities are orders lower, because the stakes are high, it could be justified to invest in extinction countermeasures. Matheny (2007) found that, even with traditional social discounting, investing in asteroid detection and mitigation is justified under standard cost-effectiveness analysis.Ought humanity be saved? Even accepting that future lives have value and that extinction risks can be cost-effectively reduced, there could still be reasons not to worry about human extinction. For instance, human lives might have negative moral value, in which case human extinction could be a good thing. This might have been Bertrand Russell’s sentiment when he wrote, “Although it is a gloomy view to suppose that life will die out, sometimes when I contemplate the things that people do with their lives I think it is almost a consolation.”[6] In the 20th century, more people, in absolute numbers, died of war, famine, and pestilence than ever before. But in the same century, more people did not die of war, famine, and pestilence than ever before. So even if we're especially pessimistic about average human welfare during the last century compared to others, it would be hard to argue that total welfare decreased. As long as average welfare was greater than zero – that is, the average life was preferable to suicide – then the century was a success for humanity. We will be capable of even greater moral nightmares in this century than in the last, but we will also be capable of securing greater welfare for a larger fraction of humanity. I suspect in this century, the average life will again be worth living, assuming we survive the century to judge. We should be more pessimistic when we review how nonhuman animals have fared in the last century. At present around 50 billion animals are raised and killed each year to feed humanity. (Many million animals are used for clothing, product testing, research, and entertainment, but their numbers are insignificant by comparison.) Since World War 2, with the invention of "factory farming," farm animals’ welfare has significantly deteriorated, as they now live in conditions that frustrate their most basic instincts (Singer, 2002, chapter 3). At the same time, we’re probably the only animal on Earth that routinely demonstrates compassion for other species. Such compassion is nearly universal in developed countries but we usually know too little, too late, for deeply ingrained habits, such as diets, to change. If improvements in other public morals were possible without any significant biological change in human nature, then the same should be true for our treatment of nonhuman animals, though it will take some time.

Even without any change in public morals, it seems unlikely we will continue to use animals for very long – at least, nowhere near 50 billion per year. Our most brutal use of animals results not from sadism but from old appetites now satisfied with **inefficient technologies** that have not fundamentally changed in 10,000 years. Ours is the first century where newer technologies -- plant or in vitro meats, or meat from brainless animals -- could satisfy human appetites for meat more efficiently and safely (Edelman et al, 2005). As these technologies mature and become cheaper, they will likely replace conventional meat. If the use of sentient animals survives much beyond this century, we should be very surprised. This thought is a cure for misanthropy. As long as most humans in the future don't use sentient animals, the vast number of good lives we can create would outweigh any sins humanity has committed or is likely to commit. Even if it takes a century for animal farming to be replaced by vegetarianism (or in vitro meats or brainless farm animals), the century of factory farming would represent around 1012 miserable life-years. That is one-billionth of the 1021 animal life-years humanity could save by protecting Earth from asteroids for a billion years.The century of industrialized animal use would thus be the equivalent of a terrible pain that lasts one second in an otherwise happy 100-year life. To accept human extinction now would be like committing suicide to end an unpleasant itch. If human life is extinguished, all known animal life will be extinguished when the Sun enters its Red Giant phase, if not earlier. Despite its current mistreatment of other animals, humanity is the animal kingdom’s best long-term hope for survival.

#### **The alt solves nothing and bites the K link harder – use of human benchmarks makes their non-anthropocentric value scheme impossible**

Hayward 97 – Dept of Politics, University of Edinburgh (Tim, Feb., “Anthropocentrism: A Misunderstood Problem,” Environmental Values, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 49-63, JSTOR)

But if the project of overcoming speciesism can be pursued with some expectation of success, this is not the case with the overcoming of anthropocentrism. What makes anthropocentrism unavoidable is a limitation of a quite different sort, one which cannot be overcome even in principle because it involves a non-contingent limitation on moral thinking as such. While overcoming speciesism involves a commitment to the pursuit of knowledge of relevant similarities and differences between humans and other species, the criteria of relevance will always have an ineliminable element of anthropocentrism about them. Speciesism is the arbitrary refusal to extend moral consideration to relevantly similar cases; the ineliminable element of anthropocentrism is marked by the impossibility of giving meaningful moral consideration to cases which bear no similarity to any aspect of human cases. The emphasis is on the 'meaningful' here: for in the abstract one could of course declare that some feature of the nonhuman world was morally valuable, despite meeting no determinate criterion of value already recognised by any human, but because the new value is completely unrelated to any existing value it will remain radically indeterminate as a guide to action. If the ultimate point of an ethic is to yield a determinate guide to human action, then, the human reference is ineliminable even when extending moral concern to nonhumans. So my argument is that one cannot know if any judgement is speciesist if one has no benchmark against which to test arbitrariness; and, more specifically, if we are concerned to avoid speciesism of humans then one must have standards of comparison between them and others. Thus features of humans remain the benchmark. As long as the valuer is a human, the very selection of criteria of value will be limited by this fact. It is this fact which precludes the possibility of a radically nonanthropocentric value scheme, if by that is meant the adoption of a set of values which are supposed to be completely unrelated to any existing human values. Any attempt to construct a radically non-anthropocentric value scheme is liable not only to be arbitrary - because founded on no certain knowledge - but also to be more insidiously anthropocentric in projecting certain values, which as a matter of fact are selected by a human, onto nonhuman beings without certain warrant for doing so. This, of course, is the error of anthropomorphism, and will inevitably, I believe, be committed in any attempt to expunge anthropocentrism altogether. But is admitting this unavoidable element of anthropocentrism not tanta- mount to admitting the unavoidability of human chauvinism? My claim is that it is not. What is unavoidable is that human valuers make use of anthropocentric benchmarks; yet in doing so, they may find that in all consistency they must, for instance, give priority to vital nonhuman interests over more trivial human interests. For the human chauvinist, by contrast, interests of humans must always take precedence over the interests of nonhumans. Human chauvinism does not take human values as a benchmark of comparison, since it admits no comparison between humans and nonhumans. Human chauvinism ultimately values humans because they are humans. While the human chauvinist may officially claim there are criteria which provide reasons for preferring humans - such as that they have language, rationality, sociality etc. - no amount of evidence that other beings fulfil these criteria would satisfy them that they should be afforded a similar moral concern. The bottom line for the human chauvinist is that being human is a necessary and sufficient condition of moral concern. What I am pointing out as the ineliminable element of anthropocentrism is an asymmetry between humans and other species which is not the product of chauvinist prejudice. To sum up, then, what is unavoidable about anthropocentrism is precisely what makes ethics possible at all. It is a basic feature of the logic of obligation: if an ethic is a guide to action; and if a particular ethic requires an agent to make others ' ends her ends, then they become just that - the agent' s ends. This is a non-contingent but substantive limitation on any attempt to construct a completely nonanthropocentric ethic. Values are always the values o/the valuer:3 so as long as the class of valuers includes human beings, human values are ineliminable. Having argued that this is unavoidable, I also want to argue that it is no bad thing.

### 1ar

### 1ar-humans first

**Extinction is ethically bankrupt—values are relational and cannot exist without the human value**

**Fox 1987**

Michael Phil Prof @ Queens U, Canada “nuclear weapons and the ultimate environmental crisis,” Environmental Ethics, p. 175-178

#### Finally, deep ecologists, like Bill Devall and George Sessions, Arne Naess, and Paul Taylor, argue for a radical shift from homocentric or anthropocentric locus of valuation and ethical thinking to a biocentric or ecocentric one. That is, they are firmly committed to the position that nonhuman life forms have independent, intrinsic, or inherent value, that they possess value in and of themselves and without reference to human experiences, interests, or needs. It is claimed further by them that a revolution in value theory (axiology) is necessary to recognize this fact, and that humans must cultivate attitudes similar to those of native peoples in order to live in harmony with nature and to enable themselves to carry out their obligation to preserve and nurture other life forms for their own sake. If nonhuman life forms, as species or as individuals, possess intrinsic value, it follows that annihilating or decimating them is morally abhorrent. In short, the extinction or massive slaughter of Homo sapiens is not the gravest tragedy that the Earth could suffer. By assigning intrinsic value to other species, deep ecologists assert that other things have a right to continue existing even if we insist on obliterating ourselves in whole or in part. IV. Anthropocentric conclusions It is thought by some that a nonanthropocentric position, such as those just sketched, is needed in order to give purchase to concern over the wanton destruction of the Earth. Nuclear war is, or course, only one way in which the biosphere may be permanently damaged or destroyed by humans’ impact upon it. The greenhouse effect, pollution, and global deforestation are others one might mention. Nuclear war, however, is or may be unique depending on whether it is thought o have potentially omnicidal consequences. Some would maintain that we put a theory of environmental ethics to the supreme test and find it promising only if we can posit the view that in the absence of humans the biosphere would continue to possess value. As Norton points out, this position is often couched in termss of hypothetical "last people arguments," i.e. arguments that pose the question whether the last people on Earth should care about its fate after they are gone. The dangers and uncertainties of nuclear war do cast us in the uncomfortable role of hypothetical last people on Earth, and so we may well want to raise this question. There are really two questions. (1) Would nuclear devastation that falls short of biocide matter to those humans (if any) who survived nuclear war? (2) Should the prospect of widespread environmental destruction (biocidal or otherwise) matter to us now if omnicide also occurred and left behind no humans to experience the consequences? The answer to question (1) is obvious, since the surviving humans would experience a variety of negative effects on their lives even from limited environmental damage and long-term nuclear pollution of the biosphere. This can be understood in purely instrumental terms. The second question is not so easy to answer from the standpoint of the weak anthropocentrist who does not posit the intrinsic value of natural objects and processes. Here it is tempting to say that once human being are annihilated, nothing else matters. This is not because nothing else in nature can present occasion for value judgment to take place, but rather because once the only class of being to which anything can matter, or which alone can be said plausibly to have an axiological “point of view on the world” is removed from the scene no value judgments can take place and all talk of them is rendered pointless. In my view, value is neither subjective and ineffable nor objective and independent of consciousnesses that are capable of forming value judgments in response to certain features of experience. Value, rather, is a relational concept that has both subjective and objective elements. According to the relational theory, interactions with things of the world presents occasions for value judgments and values can be thought of as “existing” but only in the episodic state of reciprocity between objects and valuing beings. Such a standpoint allows for the fact that certain features of the world tend to elicit fairly uniform axiological responses from us. Yet it does not require that we attribute the values we posit entirely to the things themselves or to any of the qualities they possess. The paradox at the heart of this account, of course, is that if we ask, "Where do values reside?" the answer must be, "Nowhere. Neither in the world nor in the mind, but somewhere in between and in the interaction connecting them," for what else can it mean for a value to be a relational entity other than that it is something that connects X and Y., yet is neither X nor Y? None of this entails that animals, plants, and ecosystems do not matter or have no value, but it does entail that they have no value apart from interaction with valuing beings who have ex hypothesi, subtracted themselves form the picture. One can always assert the counterfactual claim that in the post-nuclear war period, nature would have value if valuing beings encountered it and had the appropriate sorts of experiences and thoughts; however. this assertion requires an act of imagination on the part of valuers who now exist and can contemplate possible futures, and is therefore a purely fanciful thought experiment that is of no real consequence. One could just as well speculate, in any event, that if beings capable of value judgments ever visited our planet after a nuclear holocaust, they would find it valueless whimpering wasteland, in whole and in part. What are the implications of all this value talk for the second question above? It might appear that anthropocentrism in environmental ethics, if built upon a relational theory of value of the kind I have outlined, is unable to sustain any concern for nature and the impact of human action upon the biosphere other than that which affects human interests. Certainly there is a predisposition on the part of a to argue that unless we ascribe intrinsic value to nature and to various nonhuman beings, we cannot explain ' why it would be wrong to despoil the environment through nuclear war or other means. But this approach is mistaken. Weak anthropocentrism can serve as a foundation for moral concern over the fate of the biosphere in two ways. First, there is an objective side to the value relation which deserves our respect and cultivation since it is inseparable from the valued experiences that make life worthwhile. Second, as Norton indicates, the recognition of our evolutionary continuity with other generate values (e.g., symbolic and cultural values) all foster a concern for the biosphere that is anthropocentric, yet one that is neither narrowly exploitative nor dependent on the dubious attribution of intrinsic value of the nonhuman world. If the environment can be seen in these ways as generative, inspirational, and rejuvenating, then there should be no lingering difficulty over the answer to the second question. It is, simply put, the intimacy we have with nature, as sensitive and dependent organisms that supports and sustains our concern for the fate of the Earth. It follows that nuclear war can be condemned in the strongest terms, and from an anthropocentric perspective, whether it results in omnicide, biocide, the decimation of human and/or nonhuman species and environment, or some combination of these

#### Reverence for human life is first priority

Schmahmann and Polachek 95

Partner and Associate in Legal Firm, 22 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 747

To some extent, it is a challenge to the value of civilization to dismiss the Judeo-Christian ethic as anthropocentric or speciesist [n27](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.466339.82986242574&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220851870623&returnToKey=20_T4504297941&parent=docview#n27) and thus deficient, and to minimize the significance of the capacity to express reason, to recognize moral principles, and to plan for ordered coexistence in a complex technological society. "The core of this book," Singer writes in Animal Liberation, "is the claim that to discriminate against beings solely on account of their species is a form of prejudice, immoral and indefensible in the same way that discrimination on the basis of race is immoral and indefensible." [n28](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.466339.82986242574&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220851870623&returnToKey=20_T4504297941&parent=docview#n28) Such an equation, however, allows Ingrid Newkirk, founder of People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), to state that "[s]ix million Jews died in concentration camps, but six billion broiler chickens will die this year in slaughter houses." [n29](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.466339.82986242574&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220851870623&returnToKey=20_T4504297941&parent=docview#n29) The only "pure" human being, Newkirk has theorized, is a dead one. "[O]nly dead people are true purists, feeding the earth and living beings rather than taking from them. . . . We know it is impossible to breathe without hurting or exploiting." [n30](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.466339.82986242574&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220851870623&returnToKey=20_T4504297941&parent=docview#n30) These forms of doctrinaire "animal rightism" ignore the value that society has placed on human life which enables society to function in an orderly fashion. In effect, the extreme positions of animal rights activists devalue human life and detract from human rights. [n31](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.466339.82986242574&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220851870623&returnToKey=20_T4504297941&parent=docview#n31) "The belief that human life, and only human life, is sacrosanct is a form of  [\*754]  speciesism," Singer writes. [n32](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.466339.82986242574&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220851870623&returnToKey=20_T4504297941&parent=docview#n32) But if the sacredness of all life is equivalent, what is one to make of animals that kill each other and the often arbitrary nature of life and death and survival of the fittest in the wild? What is one to make of the conflict between the seeming arbitrariness of the killing that takes place in nature and the ethical content of human existence that starts with the certainty that the life of every individual person is uniquely sacred? Sometimes the statements of contemporary radical environmentalists and animal rights activists display a profound misanthropy. "If radical environmentalists were to invent a disease to bring human population back to ecological sanity, it would probably be something like AIDS," writes one author using the pseudonym Miss Ann Thropy. [n33](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.466339.82986242574&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220851870623&returnToKey=20_T4504297941&parent=docview#n33) "Seeing no other possibility for the preservation of biological diversity on earth than a drastic decline in the number of humans, Miss Ann Thropy contends that AIDS is ideal for the task primarily because 'the disease only affects humans' and shows promise for wiping out large numbers of humans." [n34](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.466339.82986242574&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220851870623&returnToKey=20_T4504297941&parent=docview#n34) Ingrid Newkirk has commented that even if animal research resulted in a cure for AIDS, PETA would "be against it." [n35](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.466339.82986242574&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220851870623&returnToKey=20_T4504297941&parent=docview#n35) The point is that reverence for human life must be both the starting point and the reference point for any ethical philosophy and system of law that does not immediately become unhitched from its moorings in civilization. With respect to animals and their similarities to humans, Singer's dismissal of "fine phrases" notwithstanding, the fact that debate exists about the ethical consequences of such differences is almost distinction enough. It is we -- humans -- who are having the debate, not animals; and it is a unique feature of humankind to recognize ethical subtleties. This ability to recognize gradations and competing interests is what defines the rules that we live by and the system of rights and responsibilities that comprise our legal system. Animals cannot possess rights because animals are in no way a part  [\*755]  of any of these processes. On the other hand, any duties we may have respecting our treatment of animals derive from the fact that we are part of these processes. [n36](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.466339.82986242574&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1220851870623&returnToKey=20_T4504297941&parent=docview#n36)

#### Human rights should be preferred – animals lack the capacity for free moral judgment

Cohen 86 – Professor @ U of M

Carl, Professor @ UMich, <http://spot.colorado.edu/~heathwoo/phil1200,Spr07/cohen.pdf>

The attributes of human beings from which this moral capability arises have been described variously by philosophers, both ancient and modem: the inner consciousness of a free will (Saint Augustine); the grasp, by human reason, of the binding character of moral law (Saint Thomas); the self-conscious participation of human beings in an objective ethical order (Hegel); human membership in an organic moral community (Bradley); the development of the human self through the consciousness of other moral selves (Mead); and the underivative, intuitive cognition of the rightness of an action (Prichard). Most influential has been Immanuel Kant's emphasis on the universal human possession of a uniquely moral will and the autonomy its use entails. Humans confront choices that are purely moral; humans--but certainly not dogs or mice-- lay down moral laws, for others and for themselves. Human beings are self-legislative, morally autonomous Animals (that is, nonhuman animals, the ordinary sense of that word) lack this capacity for free moral judgment. They are not beings of a kind capable of exercising or responding to moral claims. Animals therefore have no rights, and they can have none. This is the core of the argument about the alleged rights of animals. The holders of rights must have the capacity to comprehend rules of duty, governing all including themselves. In applying such rules, the holders of rights must recognize possible conflicts between what is in their own interest and what is just. Only in a community of beings capable of self-restricting moral judgments can the concept of a right be correctly invoked. Humans have such moral capacities. They are in this sense self-legislative, are members of communities governed by moral rules, and do possess rights. Animals do not have such moral capacities. They are not morally self-legislative, cannot possibly be members of a truly moral community, and therefore cannot possess rights. In conducting research on animal subjects, therefore, we do not violate their rights, because they have none to violate.

## Michigan HK K

### FW we get impacts

#### We get to weigh the impacts of the 1ac - This is good -

#### A. Plan focus – otherwise discussion gets shifted away from the topic

#### B. Ground – They moot 9 minutes of 1AC offense – makes debate lop sided and unproductive

#### C. Vague alts and floating piks are a reason to reject the critique – make the neg a moving target and lets them coopt aff offense

#### Maximizing all lives is the only way to affirm equality

Cummiskey 90 – Professor of Philosophy, Bates (David, Kantian Consequentialism, Ethics 100.3, p 601-2, p 606, jstor,)

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract "social entity." It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive "overall social good." Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Nozick, for example, argues that "to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has."30 Why, however, is this not equally true of all those that we do not save through our failure to act? By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, one fails to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? We have a duty to promote the conditions necessary for the existence of rational beings, but both choosing to act and choosing not to act will cost the life of a rational being. Since the basis of Kant's principle is "rational nature exists as an end-in-itself' (GMM, p. 429), the reasonable solution to such a dilemma involves promoting, insofar as one can, the conditions necessary for rational beings. If I sacrifice some for the sake of other rational beings, I do not use them arbitrarily and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. **Persons** may **have "dignity**, an unconditional and incomparable value" that transcends any market value (GMM, p. 436), **but**, as rational beings, persons **also** have **a fundamental equality which dictates that some must** sometimes **give way for the sake of others.** The formula of the end-in-itself thus does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. If one focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, then equal consideration dictates that one sacrifice some to save many. [continues] According to Kant, the objective end of moral action is the existence of rational beings. Respect for rational beings requires that, in deciding what to do, one give appropriate practical consideration to the unconditional value of rational beings and to the conditional value of happiness. Since agent-centered constraints require a non-value-based rationale, the most natural interpretation of the demand that one give equal respect to all rational beings lead to a consequentialist normative theory. We have seen that there is no sound Kantian reason for abandoning this natural consequentialist interpretation. In particular, a consequentialist interpretation does not require sacrifices which a Kantian ought to consider unreasonable, and it does not involve doing evil so that good may come of it. It simply requires an uncompromising commitment to the equal value and equal claims of all rational beings and a recognition that, in the moral consideration of conduct, one's own subjective concerns do not have overriding importance.

### Prior Questions Fail

#### Prior questions fail and prevent productive politics

Owen 2 (David Owen, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7)

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

#### Prior questions will never be fully settled---must take action even under conditions of uncertainty

Molly Cochran 99, Assistant Professor of International Affairs at Georgia Institute for Technology, “Normative Theory in International Relations”, 1999, pg. 272

To conclude this chapter, while modernist and postmodernist debates continue, while we are still unsure as to what we can legitimately identify as a feminist ethical/political concern, while we still are unclear about the relationship between discourse and experience, it is particularly important for feminists that we proceed with analysis of both the material (institutional and structural) as well as the discursive. This holds not only for feminists, but for all theorists oriented towards the goal of extending further moral inclusion in the present social sciences climate of epistemological uncertainty. Important ethical/political concerns hang in the balance. We cannot afford to wait for the meta-theoretical questions to be conclusively answered. Those answers may be unavailable. Nor can we wait for a credible vision of an alternative institutional order to appear before an emancipatory agenda can be kicked into gear. Nor do we have before us a chicken and egg question of which comes first: sorting out the metatheoretical issues or working out which practices contribute to a credible institutional vision. The two questions can and should be pursued together, and can be via moral imagination. Imagination can help us think beyond discursive and material conditions which limit us, by pushing the boundaries of those limitations in thought and examining what yields. In this respect, I believe international ethics as pragmatic critique can be a useful ally to feminist and normative theorists generally.

### Reps shape policy making

#### Discourse doesn’t shape policy making

**Walt 13** ([Stephen M. Walt](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/author/Stephen%20M.%20Walt), is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University. “[Empty words](http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/03/25/empty_words),” March 25, 2013, Foreign Policy, Realist In an Ideological Age) GANGEEZY

And therein lies the test of competing theories. There is a broad school of thought in international relations -- often labeled "social constructivism" -- which maintains that discourse can be of tremendous importance in shaping the conduct of states. In this view, how leaders talk and how intellectuals write gradually shapes how we all think, and over time these discursive activities can exert a tremendous influence on norms, identities, and perceptions of what is right and what is possible. It is this view of the world that President Obama was channeling during his trip. By telling Israelis that he loved them and by telling both Israelis and Palestinians that the latter had just as much right to a state as the former, he was hoping to mold hearts and minds and convince them -- through logic and reason -- to end their century-old conflict. And make no mistake: He was saying that peace would require a powerful and increasingly wealthy Israel to make generous concessions, because the Palestinians have hardly anything more to give up. As Churchill put it, "in victory, magnanimity." Discourse does matter in some circumstances, of course, and perhaps Obama's words will prompt some deep soul-searching within the Israeli political establishment. But there is another broad family of IR theories -- the realist family -- and it maintains that what matters most in politics is power and how it is applied. In this view, national leaders often say lots of things they don't really mean, or they say things they mean but then fail to follow through on because doing so would be politically costly. From this perspective, words sometimes inspire and may change a few minds on occasion, but they are rarely enough to overcome deep and bitter conflicts. No matter how well-written or delivered, a speech cannot divert whole societies from a well-established course of action. Policies in motion tend to remain in motion; to change the trajectory of a deeply-entrenched set of initiatives requires the application of political forces of equal momentum. For realists like me, in short, halting a colonial enterprise that has been underway for over forty years will require a lot more than wise and well-intentioned words. Instead, it would require the exercise of power. Just as raw power eventually convinced most Palestinians that Israel's creation was not going to be reversed, Israelis must come to realize that denying Palestinians a state of their own is going to have real consequences. Although Obama warned that the occupation was preventing Israel from gaining full acceptance in the world, he also made it clear that Israelis could count on the United States to insulate them as much as possible from the negative effects of their own choices. Even at the purely rhetorical level, in short, Obama's eloquent words sent a decidedly mixed message. Because power is more important than mere rhetoric, it won't take long before Obama's visit is just another memory. The settlements will keep expanding, East Jerusalem will be cut off from the rest of the West Bank, the Palestinians will remain stateless, and Israel will continue on its self-chosen path to apartheid. And in the end, Obama will have proven to be no better a friend to Israel or the Palestinians than any of his predecessors. All of them claimed to oppose the occupation, but none of them ever did a damn thing to end it. And one of Obama's successors will eventually have to confront the cold fact that two states are no longer a realistic possibility. What will he or she say then?

### Threats real

#### Threats real and not constructed—rational risk assessment goes aff

**Knudsen 1**– PoliSci Professor at Sodertorn (Olav, Post-Copenhagen Security Studies, Security Dialogue 32:3)

Moreover, I have a problem with the underlying implication that it is unimportant whether states 'really' face dangers from other states or groups. In the Copenhagen school, threats are seen as coming mainly from the actors' own fears, or from what happens when the fears of individuals turn into paranoid political action. In my view, this emphasis on the subjective is a **misleading conception of threat**, in that it discounts an independent existence for what- ever is perceived as a threat. Granted, political life is often marked by misperceptions, mistakes, pure imaginations, ghosts, or mirages, but such phenomena **do not occur simultaneously** to large numbers of politicians, and **hardly most of the time**. During the Cold War, threats - in the sense of plausible possibilities of danger - referred to 'real' phenomena, and they **refer to 'real' phenomena** now. The objects referred to are often not the same, but that is a different matter. Threats have to be dealt with both ín terms of perceptions and in terms of the phenomena which are perceived to be threatening. The point of Waever’s concept of security is not the potential existence of danger somewhere but the use of the word itself by political elites. In his 1997 PhD dissertation, he writes, ’One can View “security” as that which is in language theory called a speech act: it is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real - it is the utterance itself that is the act.’24 The deliberate disregard of objective factors is even more explicitly stated in Buzan & WaeVer’s joint article of the same year.” As a consequence, the phenomenon of threat is reduced to a matter of pure domestic politics.” It seems to me that the security dilemma, as a central notion in security studies, then loses its foundation. Yet I see that Waever himself has no compunction about referring to the security dilemma in a recent article." This discounting of the objective aspect of threats shifts security studies to insignificant concerns. What has long made 'threats' and ’threat perceptions’ important phenomena in the study of IR is the implication that **urgent action may be required**. Urgency, of course, is where Waever first began his argument in favor of an alternative security conception, because a convincing sense of urgency has been the chief culprit behind the abuse of 'security' and the consequent ’politics of panic', as Waever aptly calls it.” Now, here - in the case of urgency - another baby is thrown out with the Waeverian bathwater. When real situations of urgency arise, those situations are challenges to democracy; they are actually at the core of the problematic arising with the process of making security policy in parliamentary democracy. But in Waever’s world, threats are merely more or less persuasive, and the claim of urgency is just another argument. I hold that instead of 'abolishing' threatening phenomena ’out there’ by reconceptualizing them, as Waever does, we should continue paying attention to them, because **situations with a credible claim to urgency will keep coming back** and then we need to know more about how they work in the interrelations of groups and states (such as civil wars, for instance), not least to find adequate democratic procedures for dealing with them.’

#### Threat construction isn’t sufficient to cause wars

**Kaufman**, Prof Poli Sci and IR – U Delaware, **‘9**

(Stuart J, “Narratives and Symbols in Violent Mobilization: The Palestinian-Israeli Case,” *Security Studies* 18:3, 400 – 434)

Even when hostile narratives, group fears, and opportunity are strongly present, war occurs **only if these factors are harnessed.**Ethnic narratives and fears must combine to create significant ethnic hostility among mass publics. Politicians must also seize the opportunity to manipulate that hostility, evoking hostile narratives and symbols to gain or hold power by riding a wave of chauvinist mobilization. Such mobilization is often spurred by prominent events (for example, episodes of violence) that increase feelings of hostility and make chauvinist appeals seem timely. If the other group also mobilizes and if each side's felt security needs threaten the security of the other side, the result is a security dilemma spiral of rising fear, hostility, and mutual threat that results in violence. **A virtue of** this **symbolist theory is that symbolist logic explains why** ethnic **peace is more common than ethnonationalist war.**Even if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity exist, severe violence usually can still be avoided if ethnic elites skillfully define group needs in moderate ways and collaborate across group lines to prevent violence: this is consociationalism.17 War is likely only if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity spur hostile attitudes, chauvinist mobilization, and a security dilemma.

### Legal restrictions work

#### Legal restraints work---exception theory is self-serving and wrong

William E. Scheuerman 6, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, Carl Schmitt and the Road to Abu Ghraib, Constellations, Volume 13, Issue 1

Yet this argument relies on Schmitt’s controversial model of politics, as outlined eloquently but unconvincingly in his famous Concept of the Political. To be sure, there are intense conflicts in which it is naïve to expect an easy resolution by legal or juridical means. But the argument suffers from a troubling circularity: Schmitt occasionally wants to define “political” conflicts as those irresolvable by legal or juridical devices in order then to argue against legal or juridical solutions to them. The claim also suffers from a certain vagueness and lack of conceptual precision. At times, it seems to be directed against trying to resolve conflicts in the courts or juridical system narrowly understood; at other times it is directed against any legal regulation of intense conflict. The former argument is surely stronger than the latter. After all, legal devices have undoubtedly played a positive role in taming or at least minimizing the potential dangers of harsh political antagonisms. In the Cold War, for example, international law contributed to the peaceful resolution of conflicts which otherwise might have exploded into horrific violence, even if attempts to bring such conflicts before an international court or tribunal probably would have failed.22¶ Second, Schmitt dwells on the legal inconsistencies that result from modifying the traditional state-centered system of international law by expanding protections to non-state fighters. His view is that irregular combatants logically enjoyed no protections in the state-centered Westphalian model. By broadening protections to include them, international law helps undermine the traditional state system and its accompanying legal framework. Why is this troubling? The most obvious answer is that Schmitt believes that the traditional state system is normatively superior to recent attempts to modify it by, for example, extending international human rights protections to individuals against states. 23 But what if we refuse to endorse his nostalgic preference for the traditional state system? Then a sympathetic reading of the argument would take the form of suggesting that the project of regulating irregular combatants by ordinary law must fail for another reason: it rests on a misguided quest to integrate incongruent models of interstate relations and international law. We cannot, in short, maintain core features of the (state-centered) Westphalian system while extending ambitious new protections to non-state actors.¶ This is a powerful argument, but it remains flawed. Every modern legal order rests on diverse and even conflicting normative elements and ideals, in part because human existence itself is always “in transition.” When one examines the so-called classical liberal legal systems of nineteenth-century England or the United States, for example, one quickly identifies liberal elements coexisting uneasily alongside paternalistic and authoritarian (e.g., the law of slavery in the United States), monarchist, as well as republican and communitarian moments. The same may be said of the legal moorings of the modern welfare state, which arguably rest on a hodgepodge of socialist, liberal, and Christian and even Catholic (for example, in some European maternity policies) programmatic sources. In short, it is by no means self-evident that trying to give coherent legal form to a transitional political and social moment is always doomed to fail. Moreover, there may be sound reasons for claiming that the contemporary transitional juncture in the rules of war is by no means as incongruent as Schmitt asserts. In some recent accounts, the general trend towards extending basic protections to non-state actors is plausibly interpreted in a more positive – and by no means incoherent – light.24¶ Third, Schmitt identifies a deep tension between the classical quest for codified and stable law and the empirical reality of a social world subject to permanent change: “The tendency to modify or even dissolve classical [legal] concepts…is general, and in view of the rapid change of the world it is entirely understandable” (12). Schmitt’s postwar writings include many provocative comments about what contemporary legal scholars describe as the dilemma of legal obsolescence. 25 In The Partisan, he suggests that the “great transformations and modifications” in the technological apparatus of modern warfare place strains on the aspiration for cogent legal norms capable of regulating human affairs (17; see also 48–50). Given the ever-changing character of warfare and the fast pace of change in military technology, it inevitably proves difficult to codify a set of cogent and stable rules of war. The Geneva Convention proviso that legal combatants must bear their weapons openly, for example, seems poorly attuned to a world where military might ultimately depends on nuclear silos buried deep beneath the surface of the earth, and not the success of traditional standing armies massed in battle on the open field. “Or what does the requirement mean of an insignia visible from afar in night battle, or in battle with the long-range weapons of modern technology of war?” (17).¶ As I have tried to show elsewhere, these are powerful considerations deserving of close scrutiny; Schmitt is probably right to argue that the enigma of legal obsolescence takes on special significance in the context of rapid-fire social change.26 Unfortunately, he seems uninterested in the slightest possibility that we might successfully adapt the process of lawmaking to our dynamic social universe. To be sure, he discusses the “motorization of lawmaking” in a fascinating 1950 publication, but only in order to underscore its pathological core.27 Yet one possible resolution of the dilemma he describes would be to figure how to reform the process whereby rules of war are adapted to novel changes in military affairs in order to minimize the danger of anachronistic or out-of-date law. Instead, Schmitt simply employs the dilemma of legal obsolescence as a battering ram against the rule of law and the quest to develop a legal apparatus suited to the special problem of irregular combatants.

### Militarism good

**US militarism prevents international instability and full scale great power war**

Brooks et al 12 (“Don’t Come Home, America: The Case Against Retrenchment” Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth, Stephen G. Brooks is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College. John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. He is also a Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University. William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, International Security 37:3, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/IS3703\_Brooks%20Wohlforth%20Ikenberry.pdf)

Even if deep engagement’s costs are far less than retrenchment advocates claim, they are not worth bearing unless they yield greater benefits. We focus here on the strategy’s major security benefits; in the next section, we take up the wider payoffs of the United States’ security role for its interests in other realms, notably the global economy—an interaction relatively unexplored by international relations scholars. A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their in centive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power damp ens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with inºuential variants of real ist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war.

### Legal solves violence

#### Legal reforms restrain the cycle of violence and prevent error replication

Colm O’Cinneide 8, Senior Lecturer in Law at University College London, “Strapped to the Mast: The Siren Song of Dreadful Necessity, the United Kingdom Human Rights Act and the Terrorist Threat,” Ch 15 in Fresh Perspectives on the ‘War on Terror,’ ed. Miriam Gani and Penelope Mathew, <http://epress.anu.edu.au/war_terror/mobile_devices/ch15s07.html>

This ‘symbiotic’ relationship between counter-terrorism measures and political violence, and the apparently inevitable negative impact of the use of emergency powers upon ‘target’ communities, would indicate that it makes sense to be very cautious in the use of such powers. However, the impact on individuals and ‘target’ communities can be too easily disregarded when set against the apparent demands of the greater good. Justice Jackson’s famous quote in Terminiello v Chicago [111] that the United States Bill of Rights should not be turned into a ‘suicide pact’ has considerable resonance in times of crisis, and often is used as a catch-all response to the ‘bleatings’ of civil libertarians.[112] The structural factors discussed above that appear to drive the response of successive UK governments to terrorist acts seem to invariably result in a depressing repetition of mistakes.¶ However, certain legal processes appear to have some capacity to slow down the excesses of the counter-terrorism cycle. What is becoming apparent in the UK context since 9/11 is that there are factors at play this time round that were not in play in the early years of the Northern Irish crisis. A series of parliamentary, judicial and transnational mechanisms are now in place that appear to have some moderate ‘dampening’ effect on the application of emergency powers.¶ This phrase ‘dampening’ is borrowed from Campbell and Connolly, who have recently suggested that law can play a ‘dampening’ role on the progression of the counter-terrorism cycle before it reaches its end. Legal processes can provide an avenue of political opportunity and mobilisation in their own right, whereby the ‘relatively autonomous’ framework of a legal system can be used to moderate the impact of the cycle of repression and backlash. They also suggest that this ‘dampening’ effect can ‘re-frame’ conflicts in a manner that shifts perceptions about the need for the use of violence or extreme state repression.[113] State responses that have been subject to this dampening effect may have more legitimacy and generate less repression: the need for mobilisation in response may therefore also be diluted.

### State engmanget good

#### Engaging the state is critical to solve global challenges: Engagement refocuses energies through citizen participation in national institutions that solve for war as well as environmental and social challenges

Sassen 2009

[ColumbiaUniversity, istheauthorof TheGlobalCity (2ndedn, Princeton, 2001), Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton, 2008) and A Sociology of Globalisation (Norton,2007), among others, 2009, The Potential for a Progressive State?,)

Using state power for a new global politics These post-1980s trends towards a greater interaction of national andglobal dynamics are not part of some unidirectional historical progres-sion. There have been times in the past when they may have been as strong in certain aspects as they are today (Sassen, 2008a: chapter 3). But the current positioning of national states is distinctive precisely because 270 Saskia Sassen the national state has become the most powerful complex organizational entity in the world, and because it is a resource that citizens, confined largely to the national, can aim at governing and using to develop novel political agendas. It is this mix of the national and the global that is so full of potential. The national state is one particular form of state: at the other end of this variable the state can be conceived of as a technical administrative capability that could escape the historic bounds of narrow nationalisms that have marked the state historically, or colonialism as the only form of internationalism that states have enacted. Stripping the state of the particularity of this historical legacy gives me more analytic freedom in conceptualising these processes and opens up the possibility of the denationalised state.As particular components of national states become the institutional home for the operation of some of the dynamics that are central to glob-alisation they undergo change that is difficult to register or name. In my own work I have found useful the notion of an incipient denation-alising of specific components of national states, i.e. components that function as such institutional homes. The question for research then becomes what is actually ‘national’ in some of the institutional compo-nents of states linked to the implementation and regulation of economic globalisation. The hypothesis here would be that some components of national institutions, even though formally national, are not national in the sense in which we have constructed the meaning of that term overthe last hundred years.This partial, often highly specialised or at least particularised, dena-tionalisation can also take place in domains other than that of economic globalisation, notably the more recent developments in the humanrights regime which allow national courts to sue foreign firms and dictators, or which grant undocumented immigrants certain rights. Denationalisation is, thus, multivalent: it endogenises global agendas of many different types of actors, not only corporate firms and financial markets, but also human rights and environmental objectives. Those confined to the national can use national state institutions as a bridge into global politics. This is one kind of radical politics, and only one kind, that would use the capacities of hopefully increasingly denationalized states. The existence and the strengthening of global civil society organ-isations becomes strategic in this context. In all of this lie the possibilities of moving towards new types of joint global action by denationalized states–coalitions of the willing focused not on war but on environmental and social justice projects.

#### The state is necessary- non state actors can’t create effective change.

**Lobel 07**

[Orly Lobel, Assistant Professor of Law, University of San Diego, “THE PARADOX OF EXTRALEGAL ACTIVISM: CRITICAL LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND TRANSFORMATIVE POLITICS”, 2007, http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/lobel.pdf, \\wyo-bb]

Moreover, the need to frame questions relating to work, welfare, and poverty in institutional arrangements and professional jargon and to comply with various funding block grants has made some issues, such as the statistical reduction of welfare recipients, more salient, whereas other issues, such as the quality of jobs offered, have been largely eliminated from policymakers’ consideration. Despite aspects of the reform that were hailed as empowering for those groups they were designed to help, such as individual private training vouchers, serious questions have been raised about the adequacy of the particular policy design because resources and institutional support have been found lacking.171 The reforms require individual choices and rely on the ability of private recipients to mine through a vast range of information. As in the areas of child care, health care, and educational vouchers, critics worry that the most disadvantaged workers in the new market will not be able to take advantage of the reforms.172 Under such conditions, the goal of eliminating poverty may be eroded and replaced by other goals, such as reducing public expenses. Thus, recalling the earlier cooptation critique, once reforms are envisioned, even when they need not be framed in legalistic terms, they in some ways become reduced to a handful of issues, while fragmenting, neglecting, and ultimately neutralizing other possibilities. At this point, the paradox of extralegal activism unfolds. While public interest thinkers increasingly embrace an axiomatic rejection of law as the primary form of progress, their preferred form of activism presents the very risks they seek to avoid. The rejected “myth of the law” is replaced by a “myth of activism” or a “myth of exit,” romanticizing a distinct sphere that can better solve social conflict. Yet these myths, like other myths, come complete with their own perpetual perils.

The myth of exit exemplifies the myriad concerns of cooptation.

### AT: Militarism

#### No risk of militarism escalating – alt doesn’t solve it

Gray 7—Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, graduate of the Universities of Manchester and Oxford, Founder and Senior Associate to the National Institute for Public Policy, formerly with the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hudson Institute (Colin, July, “The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration”, <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ssi10561/ssi10561.pdf>)

7. A policy that favors preventive warfare expresses a futile quest for absolute security. It could do so. Most controversial policies contain within them the possibility of misuse. In the hands of a paranoid or boundlessly ambitious political leader, prevention could be a policy for endless warfare. However, the American political system, with its checks and balances, was designed explicitly for the purpose of constraining the executive from excessive folly. Both the Vietnam and the contemporary Iraqi experiences reveal clearly that although the conduct of war is an executive prerogative, in practice that authority is disciplined by public attitudes. Clausewitz made this point superbly with his designation of the passion, the sentiments, of the people as a vital component of his trinitarian theory of war. 51 It is true to claim that power can be, and indeed is often, abused, both personally and nationally. It is possible that a state could acquire a taste for the apparent swift decisiveness of preventive warfare and overuse the option. One might argue that the easy success achieved against Taliban Afghanistan in 2001, provided fuel for the urge to seek a similarly rapid success against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. In other words, the delights of military success can be habit forming. On balance, claim seven is not persuasive, though it certainly contains a germ of truth. A country with unmatched wealth and power, unused to physical insecurity at home—notwithstanding 42 years of nuclear danger, and a high level of gun crime—is vulnerable to demands for policies that supposedly can restore security. But we ought not to endorse the argument that the United States should eschew the preventive war option because it could lead to a futile, endless search for absolute security. One might as well argue that the United States should adopt a defense policy and develop capabilities shaped strictly for homeland security approached in a narrowly geographical sense. Since a president might misuse a military instrument that had a global reach, why not deny the White House even the possibility of such misuse? In other words, constrain policy ends by limiting policy’s military means. This argument has circulated for many decades and, it must be admitted, it does have a certain elementary logic. It is the opinion of this enquiry, however, that the claim that a policy which includes the preventive option might lead to a search for total security is **not at all convincing**. Of course, folly in high places is always possible, which is one of the many reasons why popular democracy is the superior form of government. It would be absurd to permit the fear of a futile and dangerous quest for absolute security to preclude prevention as a policy option. Despite its absurdity, this rhetorical charge against prevention is a stock favorite among prevention’s critics. It should be recognized and dismissed for what it is, a debating point with little pragmatic merit. And strategy, though not always policy, **must be nothing if not pragmatic**.

#### Current system is best

**Cohen 11** (CSIS Group Report, Craig S. Cohen, Jon B. Alterman, Ernest Z. Bower, Victor D. Cha, Heather A. Conley, Stephen J. Flanagan, Bonnie S. Glaser, Michael J. Green, Andrew C. Kuchins, Haim Malka, Teresita C. Schaffer, “Capacity and Resolve: Foreign Assessments of US Power,” <http://csis.org/files/publication/110613_Cohen_CapacityResolve_Web.pdf>)

We are now entering the third decade of a new international system—let me call it the post– Cold War era. This international system is unique in that it comprises a single global superpower—the United States—but with a number of regional powers, several of which operate beyond the boundaries of their regions. Brazil is South America’s indisputable power. India dominates South Asia. In Europe we see for the first time the emergence of the supranational state of the European Union—an economic superpower to be sure, but not yet a diplomatic or military superpower. But this will emerge. Europe also has the phenomenon of Russia—a remaining military superpower (largely because of nuclear weapons), but not an economic superpower. In West Asia there is an uneasy balance among Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and a rising Turkey. In East Asia we have two superpowers—China and Japan. Both are now economic superpowers, and China is certainly a military superpower. Japan’s military alliance with the United States rounds out its economic power base although it is still recovering from the terrible recent events following the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear spillage. For this third international epoch, I pose the same questions we asked of the earlier epochs. Is this a stable international system—that is, will it be prone to resolve differences among the power centers through peaceful means or violent means—and is it a durable system? First, on the question of stability, I believe that a careful analysis will reveal it is an inherently stable system. The global superpower has no incentive to enter conflict with a regional superpower because, although it might win that military exchange, it would sap all its energies doing so and permit other regional superpowers to fill the vacuum. No regional superpower would conceivably find it advantageous to go to war with the global superpower.