## Off

We feel the 2AC needs to define these words before the plan has any functional effect

Vagueness is normally silly but:

“consultation”

“every possible circumstance”

“a prompt and full account”

“significant use”

is the most qualified plan text I’ve ever read

Three Impacts

1. Ground – allows the 2AC to spike out of links by clarifying what any or all of these phrases mean
2. Education – precision is important, vagueness makes clash impossible
3. Turns Case – the president not courts or congress will interpret the plan

George 2010 (Daniel, “That Is What We Said, but This Is What We Meant: Putting the Meaning Back into Use-of-Force Legislation”, George Washington Law Review, June 2010 Vol. 78 No. 4)

It is important to note that this proposal would only apply to authorizations for the use of force. Congress routinely delegates vague authority to the executive branch in the form of administrative decrees,101 and the courts are instructed to defer to the executive branch’s determination of the meaning of those statutes.102 The rea- son for that deference, however, is not present in cases such as those involving the Military Authorizations.103 Specifically, Congress grants authority to executive agencies, and courts defer to the meaning adopted by those agencies, because agencies have “great expertise” as a result of routine administration of the law within their particular and highly specialized jurisdictions.104 That same rationale does not apply in instances involving authorizations for the use of force; in such situa- tions, the President is not like an agency, blessed with greater under- standing and expertise than Congress in this particular area of law. The ongoing debate about the President’s authority during wartime105 makes this Note’s recommendation uniquely applicable to grants of authority to use military force.106

## Off

#### The United States federal government should require consultation in every possible circumstance prior to the use of cyber operations by President of the United States and require a prompt and full account of every significant cyber operation by the President of the United States.

#### **Here’s the difference - The CP removes the offense/defence weapons framing.**

#### **The term cyber weapon and offensive capabilities is a self-fulfilling prophecy – analytically meaningless and creates conflict.**

#### **Gotta change the language. The CP Solves .**

Scharf August 8, 2013 Post-grad history student, perpetual wanderer, guacamole enthusiast, and occasional blogger. https://medium.com/editors-picks/9ba10c60a815

What strikes me as the most interesting take-away from the Economist debate is the importance of lexicon. As the moderator has astutely observed, a large number of the contentions have spawned from linguistic disagreements. The ‘militarisation’ of the debate, which nearly single-handedly dictates represented therein, is highly contingent upon the language and media profile we bestow upon the issue. As a society, the ‘width’ of our definition of warfare has an enormous impact on how we perceive threat. The recent success of American ‘Honeypots’ (decoys target created for the purpose of detecting and analysing sources of cyber-attacks), appear to have justified previous allegations of the Chinese Army’s involvement in digital sabotage that spurred President Obama into signing a February 2013 Executive Order entitled ‘Executive Order — Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity’.³ As more and more legislation is formulated in Washington and other capitals across the globe, it has become increasingly essential to familiarise the public with the reality of the threat in order to avoid overzealous policy that follows in the wake of ignorance, fear, and hyperbole. Returning to the debate for a moment, in his concluding review moderator Edward Lucas remarks: I am glad we moved away from the questions of semantics. These are important, but the real question is what actions we take, not what words we use to describe them.This is a sentiment that I couldn’t possible agree with any less. In my opinion, semantics and the use of precise language occupy a space at the core of the debate over cyber-terrorism and cyber-warfare. The fact that we are continuing to struggle in producing a singular definition for concepts like ‘terrorism’ and ‘cyber-crime’ functions only to increase the importance of which words we use to frame the dialogue. It would seem as though Dr. Rid’s concluding remarks concur. Is the risk of cyberwar overrated? The answer, as several readers have pointed out, indeed hinges on terminology. But the argument—talk of cyberwar is wrong—is not just semantic. Language matters. Language frames ideas. And ideas are powerful: ideas determine how we see the problem, what we do to solve it, who we think should be in charge, and how governments spend taxpayers’ money.The emergence of cyber-warfare will popularise a whole new array of household vocabulary. Buzzwords like ‘viruses’, ‘worms’, ‘trojans’, and other techno-jargon have the potential to become much more than words parents use to dissuade their children from clicking pop-up advertisements. I wouldn’t be surprised to see a smattering of 21st century Wargames-esque films or the post-Craig James Bond wielding a threatening micro-SD chip in a theatre near you. The age of digital e-terrorism is approaching, ‘Pearl Harbour moment’ or not. You can bet on seeing a copy of Sun Tzu’s Art of Cyber-War grace the shelves of bookshops everywhere in the near future. As Dr. Rid has indicated, the importance of language to the debate is central and unavoidable. In our post-Iraq invasion world, we quite simply can not afford to allow sensationalism and cherry-picked intelligence to drive political decision-making and public opinion. The rhetoric that academics, politicians, and ‘experts’ use to engage the public discourse not only colours popular perceptions of the issue, but can often quite literally define it. This is exactly why the debate over the vocabulary we use in discussing cyber-war, cyber-crime, and cyber-terrorism is not simply an issue of semantics.

#### The affirmative’s constitution of security as an ideal and benevolent condition utilizes human life as a tool to calculate safety with response to a discursive ideal, not a material condition

Dillon 08 (Dillon, professor of security @ Lancaster, 2008 (Michael, “Underwriting Security” Security Dialogue 32.3)

This essay enframes ‘risk’ as a biopolitical security technology. It explains how biopolitics of security take life as their referent object of security, how the grid of intelligibility for biopolitics is economic and how, in the second half of the 20th century, life also came to be understood as emergent being. Contingency is constitutive especially of the life of emergent being and so the essay argues that a biopolitics of security which seeks ‘to make life live’ cannot secure life against contingency but must secure life through governmental technologies of contingency. Risk is one of these technologies. The essay also explains how it has come to pervade the biopolitics of security of the 21st century and how through the way in which risk is traded on the capital markets it has begun to acquire the properties of money. The essay closes by describing how the biopolitics of security differ from traditional prophylactic accounts of security and how these biopolitics of security exceed the liberal political thinking which rationalises and legitimates them.

#### Calculability results in the devaluation of human life

Dillon 99 (Michael Dillon, professor of politics and international relations at the University of Lancaster, April 1999, Political Theory, Vol. 27, No. 2, “Another Justice,” p. 164-5)

Quite the reverse. The subject was never a firm foundation for justice, much less a hospitable vehicle for the reception of the call of another Justice. It was never in possession of that self-possession which was supposed to secure the certainty of itself, of a self-possession that would enable it ultimately to adjudicate everything. The very indexicality required of sovereign subjectivity gave rise rather to a commensurability much more amenable to the expendability required of the political and material economies of mass societies than it did to the singular, invaluable, and uncanny uniqueness of the self. The value of the subject became the standard unit of currency for the political arithmetic of States and the political economies of capitalism. They trade in it still to devastating global effect. The technologisation of the political has become manifest and global. Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability. Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. Once rendered calculable, however, units of account are necessarily submissible not only to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation. Devaluation, logically, can extend to the point of counting as nothing. Hence, no mensuration without demensuration either. There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of holocaust. However liberating and emancipating systems of value-rights-may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted out, the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life. Herewith, then, the necessity of championing the invaluable itself. For we must never forget that, “we are dealing always with whatever exceeds measure.” But how does that necessity present itself? Another Justice answers: as the surplus of the duty to answer to the claim of Justice over rights. That duty, as with the advent of another Justice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the human way of being.

## Off

#### The 1AC is a performance of presumed accessibility and able body privilege - any attempt to separate the “content” of the 1AC from its “form” is a reason to vote negative – “what” they have “said” is just as important as “how” they have made it intelligible to themselves, us and you

Boys 2008 (Jos, “challenging the 'normal': towards new conceptual frameworks”, http://www.sowhatisnormal.co.uk/challenging)

This shifts the inquiry from representations (on the body, in the space) to relationships, processes and contexts. Any encounter is necessarily mediated by who is there, who is not, why they are there (or why not), what they bring to the situation and w hat they take away. Such events involve meanings-in-the-making through a process in space and over time. Importantly encounters are not just a space of sharing and recognition but also of conflict, differentiation and negotiation. They involve interpretations, talk, gestures, bodily relationships, and actions. So how do encounters work? In each case we now have two questions which allow the exploration of disability beyond being a stereotypical marker of identity or difference. What embodied knowledge and experience do we the participants bring to the encounter? What are the routine social and spatial practices which frame the encounter? Here, disabled and ‘non-disabled’ participants are not separated out; all have parity in the space of the encounter itself. But the impact of framing disabled people in ways not of their making remains central to the investigation. As Davis writes: Disability is not so much the lack of a sense or the presence of a physical or mental impairment as it is the reception and construction of that difference. Davis 2002 p50

#### The liberal subject constituted both **IN** and **BY** the 1AC is necessarily able bodied

Breckenridge and Volger 2001 (Carol Appadurai and Candace A, “The Critical Limits of Embodiment: Disability's Criticism”, Public Culture, Volume 13, Number 3, Fall 2011)

Disability studies teaches that an assumed able body is crucial to the smooth operation of traditional theories of democracy, citizenship, subjectivity, beauty, and capital. By assuming that the normative human is an able-bodied adult, for example, liberal theory can conflate political or economic interests with desires, political representation with having a voice in policy-making, social organization with voluntary association, and so on. Liberal theory naturalizes the political by making it personal. And the “person” at the center of the traditional liberal theory is not simply an individual locus of subjectivity (however psychologically fragmented, incoherent, or troubled). He is an able-bodied locus of subjectivity, one whose unskilled labor may be substituted freely for the labor of other such individuals, one who can imagine himself largely self-sufficient because almost everything conspires to help him take his enabling body for granted (even when he is scrambling for the means of subsistence). However, the mere possibility of a severely cognitively disabled adult citizen disrupts the liberal equations of representation and voice, desire and interest. Advocacy for the severely cognitively disabled is not a matter of voicing their demands. More generally, the intricate practical dialectics of dependence and independence in the lives of many disabled people unsettle ideals of social organization as freely chosen expressions of mutual desire.

#### Our argument is not just about physical access and disability identity – their forthcoming claims about education and fairness discount the benefit of disability consciousness by and for able bodied debaters

Breckenridge and Volger 2001 (Carol Appadurai and Candace A, “The Critical Limits of Embodiment: Disability's Criticism”, Public Culture, Volume 13, Number 3, Fall 2011)

No one is ever more than temporarily able-bodied. This fact frightens those of us who half-imagine ourselves as minds in a material context, who have learned to resent the publicness of race- or sex- or otherwise-marked bodies and to think theories of embodiment as theories about the subjectivity of able-bodied comportment and practice under conditions of systematic injustice. From this perspective, disability studies may be twice marginalized -- first, by able-bodied anxiety; second, by a tendency to treat disability as just another hindrance to social mobility, perhaps one best left to medical discourse or descriptive sociology. New work in disability studies, however, challenges established habits of thought about "having" a body. Disability studies dissolves deeply entrenched mind-and-body distinctions and further destabilizes the concept of the normal, whose charted internal ambiguities have themselves become too familiar. An ethics and a politics of disability are crucial to the work of the university -- pedagogically, theoretically, and institutionally. But reconfiguring knowledge in light of disability criticism is a project that is likely to take longer than making public space accessible.

#### The body is a stock issue – it’s the both the source and method of all knowledge and meaning

Creal 1999 (Lee Davis, “THE "DISABILITY OF THINKING"

THE "DISABLED" BODY”, Course Paper for Ambiguous Bodies: Studies in Contemporary Sexuality, York University, http://www.broadreachtraining.com/advocacy/artcreal.htm)

In "Lived Bodies: Phenomenology and the Flesh," Elizabeth Grosz cites the work of Merleau-Ponty in her discussion of corporeal phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty, she says, seeks to understand the relationship between consciousness and nature and between interiority and exteriority. He reorients the tradition of the question "how can there be a world for a subject?" by locating subjectivity not in mind or consciousness but in the body; he argues that the mind and body are not separate entities but interrelated and that the mind is based on corporeal and sensory relations. The body, according to Merleau-Ponty, is a phenomenon experienced by the one who lives in it and it (the body) is the location which places one in the world and makes possible relationships between oneself and other objects and subjects. We understand and know our body only by living in it. It is a subject and lived reality for oneself and an object for others but it is never simply object nor simply subject. Merleau-Ponty says the body is "sense-bestowing" and "form-giving," and is "my being-to-the-world and as such is the instrument by which all information and knowledge is received and meaning is generated" (Grosz: 87). This resonates with Lennard Davis who says the body is not only a physical object but is "a way of organizing through the realm of the senses the variations and modalities of physical existence as they are embodied into being through a larger social/political Matrix" (Davis: 14).

#### The concept of “war” in the 1AC is disembodied

Burgoyne 2012 (Robert, “embodiment in the war film: paradise now and the hurt locker”, Journal of War and Culture Studies, Volume 5, Number 1)

Of the many cinematic forms that can be described as body genres, the warfilm is clearly a defining example, drawing its most memorable scenes and its most intensive cultural meanings from the way the body, both as agent and patient, as living and dead, is depicted. In no other genre is the liminality of the body represented in quite this way. Situated in a kind of shadow zone between organic life and national symbol, between sacrificial object and agent of sovereign violence, the body of the soldier conveys in visceral form a vision of history produced from intensive sensual impressions. From the early soundfilms depicting World War I to the portrayals of self-sacrifice and loss in Letters From Iwo Jima (Eastwood 2006) and Saving Private Ryan (Spielberg 1998), the body in the war film expresses in a singular way our immersion in history, framing the past in a way that foregrounds corporeal experience. … As the film progresses, its intensive focus on the body at risk as a medium of experience begins to accumulate a kind of latent charge, an affective after life suggested in the tone and imagery of many sequences. Although the spectacular and harrowing combat scenes of previous war films – the night patrol and the trenches, the bombardment and the assault, the mass choreography of battle and the gruesome intensity of individual combat – are missing, the film nevertheless defines the drama of the body at risk in a way that reinforces the traumatic cultural history embedded in the genre. The film’s almost anthropo-logical interest in violence as a form of embodied experience and imagination begins to read as a traumatic acting-out. The power of war to force meaning from embodied experience finally seems to evoke not just experiential excitement, but rather the search for extremes, as if this might provide an opening to a new imagining of war. In the imagery of the living body encased in Kevlar armour, the corpse turned into a bomb, and the liminal body locked into asuicide vest, we view a new cinematic iteration of what Kevin McDonald calls the ‘grammars of violence’ that define the war film genre (McDonald 2012).

#### Even if you don’t believe that we have a link to the “topic” or “plan” – we definitely have a link to what is happening in this room right now

Berube 2003 (Michael, “Citizenship and Disability: Disability is a matter of civil rights, even if the Supreme Court doesn't seem to agree.”, http://www.alternet.org/story/15809/citizenship\_and\_disability)

Imagine a building in which political philosophers are debating, in the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001, the value and the purpose of participatory parity over against forms of authoritarianism or theocracy. Now imagine that this building has no access ramps, no Braille or large-print publications, no American Sign Language interpreters, no elevators, no special-needs paraprofessionals, no in-class aides. Contradictory as such a state of affairs may sound, it's a reasonably accurate picture of what contemporary debate over the meaning of democracy actually looks like. How can we remedy this? Only when we have fostered equal participation in debates over the ends and means of democracy can we have a truly participatory debate over what "participatory parity" itself means. That debate will be interminable in principle, since our understandings of democracy and parity are infinitely revisable, but lest we think of deliberative democracy as a forensic society dedicated to empyreal reaches of abstraction, we should remember that debates over the meaning of participatory parity set the terms for more specific debates about the varieties of human embodiment. These include debates about prenatal screening, genetic discrimination, stem-cell research, euthanasia, and, with regard to physical access, ramps, curb cuts, kneeling buses, and buildings employing what is now known as universal design. Leftists and liberals, particularly those associated with university humanities departments, are commonly charged with being moral relativists, unable or unwilling to say (even after September 11) why one society might be "better" than another. So let me be especially clear on this final point. I think there's a very good reason to extend the franchise, to widen the conversation, to democratize our debates, and to make disability central to our theories of egalitarian social justice. The reason is this: a capacious and supple sense of what it is to be human is better than a narrow and partial sense of what it is to be human, and the more participants we as a society can incorporate into the deliberation of what it means to be human, the greater the chances that that deliberation will in fact be transformative in such a way as to enhance our collective capacities to recognize each other as humans entitled to human dignity. As Jamie reminds me daily, both deliberately and unwittingly, most Americans had no idea what people with Down syndrome could achieve until we'd passed and implemented and interpreted and reinterpreted a law entitling them all to a free appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment. I can say all this without appealing to any innate justification for human dignity and human rights, and I can also say this: Without a sufficient theoretical and practical account of disability, we can have no account of democracy worthy of the name. Perhaps some of our fellow citizens with developmental disabilities would not put the argument quite this way; even though Jamie has led me to think this way, he doesn't talk the way I do. But those of us who do participate in political debates, whether about school funding in a specific district or about the theory and practice of democracy at its most abstract, have the obligation to enhance the abilities of our children and our fellow citizens with disabilities to participate in the life of the United States as political and moral equals with their nondisabled peers-both for their own good, and for the good of democracy, which is to say, for the good of all of us.

#### Vote negative to reject the affirmative

Holmqvist 2012 (Caroline, “Automation and ‘undoing’: (re)thinking materialities and virtualities of war”, Paper presented at the Millennium Annual Conference on Materialism and World Politics)

Undoing contemporary war

In this final section, then, I would like to suggest a link between ‘undoing’ as an ontological centre to the human and the study of war in ontological terms. When Barkawi and Brighton write of the ‘excess of fighting’, they refer to ‘[fighting’s] ability to draw in and disrupt wider certitudes and coordinates of human life’, to ‘“cast into motion” subjects who are then alienated from themselves and come to know themselves and the world in new ways’ (Barkawi and Brighton, 2011: 136 (my emphasis)). Indeed, they find the essential nature of war to be both an actual and potential undoing: crucially, ‘an undoing of all that stands as essential in human orders’ (Ibid: 139). Both the ‘ontological structure’ and the ‘ontological status’ of war, in Barkawi and Brighton’s view, center on the ‘undoing of certitudes and (…) in the generation of new ones’ (Ibid: 139). The invoking of the idea of undoing by Barkawi and Brighton in this context is striking. Being undone by one another is a fundamentally human condition, we learn from Butler; it is what being human ontologically means. In an analogous move, Barkawi and Brighton invites us to consider the condition of undoing and unmaking of certitudes, ‘casting into motion’, as being intrinsic to the phenomenon of war.18One way of taking seriously the quest for research into war in ontological terms would be to take seriously research into the human in war – to ask, fundamentally, what it means to be a human being living the condition of war. This is precisely what Sylvester implores us to do as she considers what it means to study war in terms of lived experience. Undoing, unmaking, casting into motion – these ought to be core tenets in the exploration not only of war in ontological terms but also of the human in war. What I suggest, is that conceptually linking ontologies of war with ontologies of the human holds exciting prospects for a renewed study of war – and especially so if it involves countenancing with the material forces that shape and condition our existence. In such an endeavour, studying the experience of war would need to be centrally concerned with the experience of uncertainty – uncertainty as to what social and political orders will shape the future; uncertainty as to what forces, structures and technologies, human and non-human, will condition our existence and life together; and uncertainty, ultimately, as to what it means to be human. What then to be said of the lived experience of war’s generative capacities that Barkawi writes of, of war’s intrinsic capacity to unmake and cast into motion all kinds of ‘truths’? Massumi has this to say on war’s generative capacities (ontopower): ‘Operating on the level at which the capacity for action is in the making (…) focuses on a pre-decision process occurring in an interval of emergence antecedent to both information knowing and deliberative action. This is a point before knowability and action-ability have differentiated from one another. At that point, a modulation of perception is directly and immediately a change in the parameters of what a body can do, both in terms of how it can act and what it will know. This antecedent level of capacitation or potentialisation is protoepistemological and already ontological, in that it concerns changes in the body’s degree and mode of enablement in and toward its total situation or life environment. Any application of force at this level is onto power: a power through which being becomes. An ontopower is not a force against life, as any force-against-force must inevitably be at its point of application. It is a positive force. It is positively productive of the particular form a life will take next. It conditions life’s nextness. It is a force of life.’ (My emphasis. (Massumi, 2010) How could we possibly study the ‘power through which being becomes’ – let alone the lived experience of it? To this there is no simple answer but, as has been repeatedly argued in this article, doing so would certainly involve questioning simple assumptions about what constitutes the ‘material’ and what is ‘virtual’, and engaging in a materialism that is open, which does not foreclose the discursive but embraces it, and which allows us to unmask that ways in which we as an ontological condition of being human are, necessarily, undone by one another –materially as well as emotionally. It is not something we can opt out of; it is what being human means.19 These classical accounts fail to engage in particular with two dimensions of contemporary violence that are becoming more and more significant in war. The first is the relationship established with the victim. For both versions of the classical theory of violence, the victim remains invisible. The rational actor model limits the victim's role to a means to convey a message to a third party. The victim is equally absent in theories of frustration, which focus on the gap between reality and the actor's sense of entitlement. Yet the victim looms increasingly large in contemporary violence, from practices of extreme violence to the pervasive entry of digital cameras into war zones, associated with phenomena from jihad! websites to the uploading of images of death and mutilation by service personnel in Iraq. Second, the classical accounts attach surprisingly little importance to the experience of violence. In the rational actor account, violence is arrived at on the basis of calculation of cost and benefit; it is an instrument; not an experience. In theories of violence as frustration, violence is understood as a symptom of some other reality, such as uncontrolled modernisation or the collapse of traditional society. Today's· violence increasingly stands outside both the strategic choice and the irrational fanatic accounts. Understanding such violence requires a shift from theories of States to more complex accounts of embodied actors. While such a task is beyond the scope of this chapter, we can begin to build up analyses of different 'grammars of violence' and their corresponding modes of embodiment. In the contemporary context, where violence flows across borders in ways that are urgent to understand, these grammars highlight the importance of emerging public spheres and what we might call the 'frontiers of the subject'. Such transformations are not only at the centre of understanding new forms of violence such as those associated with the global jihad, but may be equally important in understanding transformations at work within the contemporary armed forces. As such, a clearer understanding of such grammars of violence may allow us to explore transformations central to emerging configurations-of war.

# Case

## Preemption

#### No escalation

#### Media hype

Gartzke 2012(Erik, University of California, San Diego, December 7, "The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War on the Internet Back Down to Earth", http://dss.ucsd.edu/~egartzke/papers/cyberwar\_12062012.pdf)

A blitz of media, punditry and public pronouncements inform interested observers and policy makers that the next war is likely to be won or lost on the internet. Indeed, events such as the coordinated cyber attacks on Estonia and the Stuxnet worm seem to indicate that cyberwar has already begun. The sense of urgency surrounding cyberwar appears to be tied to perceptions that internet conflict is the newest phase in the ongoing revolution in military affairs, only this time the threat is directed at the sophisticated technological civilizations of the West, rather than at poor developing states or the recipients of inferior second-world military hardware. 1 To believe a growing number of pundits and practitioners, cyberwar threatens to render existing military advantages impotent, exposing those nations most dependent on comprehensive information infrastructures to devastating and unpredictable attacks. If powerful states largely immune to terrestrial invasion can have their military might blunted and their factories and cities idled by foreign hackers, then perhaps this latest technological revolution really does presage a “Pearl Harbor" in which the United States and other great powers will be targets, rather than perpetrators, of shock and awe. There is a problem with the growing consensus of impending cyber apocalypse, however: it is far from clear that conflict over the internet can actually function as war. Discussions of cyberwar commit a common fallacy of arguing from opportunity to outcome, rather than considering whether something that could happen is at all likely, given the motives of those who are able to act. Cyber pessimism rests heavily on capabilities (means), with little thought to a companion logic of consequences (ends). Much that could happen in the world fails to occur, largely because those capable of initiating action discern no benefit from doing so. Put another way, advocates have yet to work out how cyberwar actually accomplishes the objectives that typically sponsor terrestrial military violence. Absent a logic of consequences, it is di cult to believe that cyberwar will prove as devastating for world affairs and for developed nations in particular as many seem to believe.

#### No incentive

Gartzke 2012(Erik, University of California, San Diego, December 7, "The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War on the Internet Back Down to Earth", http://dss.ucsd.edu/~egartzke/papers/cyberwar\_12062012.pdf)

Even the most successful forms of cyberwar (such as cyber espionage) do not presage much of a transformation. Just as innovations in artillery and small arms made closed formations untenable, militaries, governments and societies will adapt. It would be ludicrous to suggest to modern infantry that their res would be more concentrated if they stayed in formation while on the march. Contemporary field commanders have become comfortable with the idea that perimeters are partial or notional, that air-land battle (and naval warfare for a much longer time) necessarily involves not fronts, but mobility; not frontal assaults, but maneuver. Similar concepts will pervade discussions of cyberwar. Static security is insecurity. It does not follow, however, that being vulnerable means one will be attacked, or that there is much that can be done to prevent aggression if it is initiated. Security in a modern, integrated world—both in terrestrial and cyber—Is a function more of the motives of opponents than of the ability to attack. Nations or groups that strike through the internet in minor ways may be ubiquitous. Those that threaten critical national security goals will be rare if for no other reason than that cyberwar is not really war in grand strategic terms. In this regard, the next Pearl Harbor is much more likely to occur at Pearl Harbor than in cyberspace.

## Law of Armed Conflict

#### 1) No escalation -

#### A) Cyber attacks won’t start until war will already happen—and damage is temporary and minimal

Gartzke 2012(Erik, University of California, San Diego, December 7, "The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War on the Internet Back Down to Earth", http://dss.ucsd.edu/~egartzke/papers/cyberwar\_12062012.pdf)

Beyond questions of means and motive, two basic features make cyber warfare different from other types of conflict. First, the bulk of damage contemplated by cyberwar is in all likelihood temporary. The assumption among many cyber-pessimists that the potential for creating harm is sufficient to make cyber space a suitable substitute for, or at least an alternative to, terrestrial conflict is simply incorrect. Shutting down the power grid, or preventing communication could be tremendously costly, but most such damage can be corrected quickly and with comparatively modest investment of tangible resources. Regardless, damage of this type is sunk. Losses experienced over a given time interval cannot be recovered whatever one's reactions and so should not have much direct impact on subsequent policy behavior. Harm inflicted over the internet or through any other medium will matter politically when it involves changes to the subsequent balance of power, or when it indicates enemy capabilities that must be taken into account in future plans. Precisely because cyberwar does not involve bombing cities or devastating armored columns, the damage inflicted will have a short-term impact on targets. 10 To accomplish meaningful objectives, cyber attacks must contribute to other aspects of a more conventional war effort. In order to affect the long-term balance-of-power, for instance, cyberwar must be joined to other, more traditional, forms of war. Temporary damage can be useful in two circumstances. First, compromising or incapacitating networks might afford an enemy valuable tactical, or even strategic, advantages. An opponent that cannot shoot, move, resupply or communicate will be easier to defeat. However, this still requires the advantaged party to act through some medium of combat to seize the initiative. Notions that cyber attacks will themselves prove pivotal in future war are reminiscent of World War I artillery barrages that cleared enemy trenches, but which still required the infantry and other arms to achieve a breakout. Whether an actor can benefit from cyberwar depends almost entirely on whether the actor is willing and able to combine a cyber attack with some other method—typically kinetic warfare—that can convert temporary advantages achieved over the internet into a lasting blow. Internet attacks thus other an assailant a “soft kill” that is valuable only when attackers intend and prosecute follow-on attacks with traditional military force to permanently weaken an enemy.

#### Cyberwar only augments traditional warfare—it doesn’t cause conflict

Gartzke 2012(Erik, University of California, San Diego, December 7, "The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War on the Internet Back Down to Earth", http://dss.ucsd.edu/~egartzke/papers/cyberwar\_12062012.pdf)

#### There is no reason to believe that cyberwar will be any more useful as an isolated instrument of coercive foreign policy. An attack that causes temporary harm will inevitably be followed by countermeasures and heightened vigilance, as has happened for example in Estonia in the after- math of the 2007 attacks. For cyber aggression to have lasting effects, a virtual attack must be combined with physical intervention. Knocking out communications or power infrastructure could cause tremendous disruption, but the ability to quickly recover from such attacks implies that the consequences in terms of the balance of national power would be negligible. The need to follow virtual force with physical force in order to achieve lasting political effects suggests that the application of cyber warfare independent of conventional forms of warfare will be of tertiary importance in strategic and grand strategic terms. If one cannot foresee circumstances where physical aggression is plausible independent of cyberwar, then cyberwar is also unlikely to constitute a critical threat. A second element of the logic of cyberwar has to do with influence. Rather than attacking directly, an actor can use the potential to harm (deterrence or compellence). The ability to shut down the U.S. energy grid, say, might be used to compel U.S. officials to refrain from aggressive policies or actions, or to persuade the United States to make diplomatic concessions. Yet, the problem with the standard deterrence or compellence logic in the context of potential cyber attacks, as I have already pointed out, is that revealing a given set of cyber capabilities heavily degrades their usefulness. Deterrence or compellence are therefore marginal as “pure” actions in cyberspace. Indeed, concerns that nations will not be able to deter cyber aggression amount to a recognition that neither will cyber threats prove very effective as threats or inducements. Again, actions in cyberspace can be combined with initiatives in physical space, but this just reinforces the fact that, rather than a distinct form of conflict, cyberwar is basically tied to conventional forms of warfare.

#### 2) No impact to China

#### A) interdependence checks cyber war

Austin and Gady 2012(Greg, professorial fellow at the EastWest Institute and senior visiting fellow in the department of War Studies at King’s College London, and Franz-Stefan, associate and foreign policy analyst at the EastWest Institute, "Cyber Detente Between the united States and China: Shaping the Agenda", http://www.ewi.info/system/files/detente.pdf)

That said, the two countries’ economies, though very different in many respects, are each highly dependent on a global Internet and shared communications platforms and hardware. While the Chinese economy is not as dependent on the Internet as the U.S., economy is, the difference between the two is fast shrinking. China’s export-driven economy and its trade in financial services make it as vulnerable to cyber attack as the United States. This interdependence—despite occasional outbursts of confrontational rhetoric coming from both Beijing and Washington— can be leveraged to promote stability in bilateral relations. In fact, this is already happening. We can think of this interdependency as a bal-ance of cyber power. If one accepts that both governments make rational calculations, than this new interconnectedness can be exploited to make conflict less likely. In today’s interconnected, digitalized world, the “opportunity cost” associated with embarking on a confrontational course will deter both parties from engaging in open hostile actions. This of course does not preclude cyber espionage, intellectual property theft, or even what some analysts have called the “long game,” i.e. the slow and gradual infiltration of strategically significant economic ICT systems by hackers on both sides.

#### B) No cross-domain escalation

Sanders 7/6 (Doug Sanders, author and journalist, “Our Computers Are Not Going to Kill Us: Cyber War is Military Fiction,” http://dougsaunders.net/2013/07/our-computers-are-not-going-to-kill-us-cyber-war-is-military-fiction/)

We tend to believe them. To those of us who grew up in the early decades of the Internet, reading William Gibson and watching Tron, the idea of a distinct and tangible “cyberspace,” as Mr. Gibson coined it, seems believable. If war is hell in meatspace, then imagine what it will be like when it moves into the online world, where all our communications and private data are stored, where the machines that control our entire lives can be hacked. If the Internet is everywhere, wouldn’t a cyberwar be a total war?¶ Once we started believing this, the whole world seemed to confirm it. An online virus was used by Israel and the United States to disable a uranium-enrichment facility in Iran. China uses a facility to steal data from the West. France, Britain and the United States, as we’ve recently learned, are mass-harvesting the online communications and phone calls of foreigners (and possibly their own citizens), and the man who revealed this, Edward Snowden, is in the midst of a globe-trotting flight across the settings of vintage James Bond movies. If this is what cyber cold war looks like, how horrid would real cyberwars be?¶ We can imagine them, and make movies about them, but the reality is far more mundane and less threatening.¶ That’s the conclusion made by Thomas Rid, an expert on cybersecurity and intelligence at the department of war studies at London’s King’s College. His forthcoming book’s straight-up title, Cyber War Will Not Take Place, is a call for sanity: There is no distinct “online world,” and the many forms of online crime and mischief are not a threat to our existence or our civilization.¶ “Cyber war has never happened in the past, it does not occur in the present, and it is highly unlikely that it will disturb our future,” Mr. Rid writes.¶ Instead, he says, “the opposite is taking place: a computer-enabled assault on violence itself. All past and present political cyberattacks – in contrast to computer crime – are sophisticated versions of three activities that are as old as human conflict itself: sabotage, espionage and subversion … In several ways, cyberattacks are not creating more vectors of violent interaction; rather, they are making previously violent interactions less violent.”¶ People who understand distributed systems and networks realize this: It may be possible, if hundreds of people work on the problem for years, to damage a single centrifuge facility using a virus – but still only if there’s also a human sabotage agent placed on site. To destroy or disable an entire country’s or region’s infrastructure using lines of code or electromagnetic pulses would be impossible – or, at least, given the need for human agents at each target, it would be the same as using bombs to do so (and bombs would be quicker and easier).

#### C) China NFU now

Yunzhu 13 (Major General Yao Yunzhu is the director of China-America Defense Relations, Academy of Military Science, China US Focus, " China Will Not Change Its Nuclear Policy", http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/china-will-not-change-its-no-first-use-policy/, April 22, 2013)

First, unlike previous editions which all have the title “China’s National Defense”, the latest edition has the specific title: “The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces”, indicating that the white paper’s format may have changed from a comprehensive elaboration to a more focused discussion on a specific subject. Major General Chen Zhou, a senior researcher and a key author of the white paper, explained in an interview that this is the first white paper that adopts a thematic approach, so that the subject can be dealt with more thoroughly. Compared with previous editions, this year’s white paper has no section on “National Defense Policy”, which usually carries the nuclear policy and the statement of the NFU commitment.¶ Second, in the section on the “Building and Development of China’s Armed Forces”, the force structure, missions and roles of the PLA Second Artillery Force are specified, stating that its nuclear component is “responsible for deterring other countries from using nuclear weapons against China, and carrying out nuclear counterattacks.” This is in full conformity with China’s NFU policy. In the section on “Defending National Sovereignty, Security and Territorial Integrity”, the preparedness of the Second Artillery Force “in peacetime”, “under a nuclear threat”, and “under a nuclear attack” are respectively described, and the alert posture of the Second Artillery Force is also in full compliance with China’s NFU nuclear policy. It is safe to say that the latest white paper provides more detailed information on how the PLA Second Artillery Force carries out the Nation’s NFU policy. ¶ In addition, the most recent re-affirmation of the NFU policy by a Chinese head of state was made by former President Hu Jintao at the March 2012 Nuclear Summit in Seoul. And it has been reiterated in all necessary policy documents and official statements since. There is no sign that China is going to change a policy it has wisely adopted and persistently upheld for half a century.¶

#### No major war—

#### Deterrence and economics prevent

Mandelbaum ’99 (Michael, American Foreign Policy Professor in the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins, 2-25, Council on Foreign Relations Great Debate Series, “Is Major War Obsolete?” http://www.ciaonet.org/conf/cfr10/)

Good points. First, it is the case that I’m arguing for obsolescence and not deterrence. To argue that nuclear weapons deter and will continue to deter may be correct; I think it is correct, but it’s uninteresting. It’s not an argument worth coming out on a cold February evening to hear. Second, it is, I think, easy enough to argue plausibly that the economic motive is a false one; that is, any of the scenarios in which a major power would go to war for economic reasons would end up a losing proposition. The lesson of the Cold War is that the way you get rich is by participating in the international division of labor or, as it’s sometimes called, the world market.

#### Economic interdependence and democratic values prevent

Nye ‘4 (Joseph, Kennedy School of Government Dean and Professor of International Relations at Harvard, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, p. 20)

However, in a global economy even the United States must consider how the use of force might jeopardize its economic objectives. After its victory in World War II the United States helped to re structure Japan’s economy, but it is hard to imagine that the United States today could effectively threaten force to open Japanese markets or change the value of the yen. Nor can one easily imagine the United States using force to resolve disputes with Canada or Europe. Unlike earlier periods, islands of peace where the use of force is no longer an option in relations among states have come to characterize relations among most modern liberal democracies, and not just in Europe. The existence of such islands of peace is evidence of the increasing importance of soft power where there are shared values about what constitutes acceptable behavior among similar democratic states. In their relations with each other, all advanced democracies are from Venus. Even nondemocratic countries that feel fewer popular moral constraints on the use of force have to consider its effects on their economic objectives. War risks deterring investors who control flows of capital in a globalized economy.31 A century ago, it may have been easier to seize another state’s territory by force than “to develop the sophisticated economic and trading apparatus needed to derive benefit from commercial exchange with it.” 32 But it is difficult to imagine a scenario today in which, for example, Japan would try to or succeed in using military force to colonize its neighbors. As two RAND analysts argue, “In the information age, ‘cooperative’ advantages will become increasingly important. Moreover, societies that improve their abilities to cooperate with friends and allies may also gain competitive advantages against rivals.” 33

#### Lack of physical capability and political will prevent

Xintian ‘4 (Yu, President of the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, International Review, http://www.siis.org.cn/en/index.aspx)

The future trends of war and peace can be judged as follows. Firstly, world war will not break out in the foreseeable future. Only great powers are qualified to launch world wars, but they have no physical capability, nor political will to confront each other. Although some assume that the counter-terrorism is the beginning of World War III, but the assumption is a consensus. The current conflicts are basically regional or subregional ones, while most nations are generally in a state of peace. However, people at large feel insecure, or they have raised their standard of security. That is because globalization has lead to closer relations among people, and at the same time, the threats of today are indeed more dispersed.

#### Desire for peace and development prevent

Pan ‘3 (Research fellow at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, SIIS Journal No. 3, http://www.siis.org.cn/en/index.aspx)

Based on scientific estimation of the current world situation and international system, China explicitly put forward the idea of a period of important strategic opportunities. As early as the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping proclaimed that peace and development are two major themes, tendencies, and trends of contemporary world.ix[9] According to China’s latest judgment of characteristics of this era, the Report at the 16th Party Congress further emphasized, “Peace and development remain the themes of our era.”x[10] Not only is a new world war unlikely in the foreseeable future, military rivalry among great powers resulting from regional conflicts is also less likely. Not only are peace and development a strong desire of the world people, the end of the world dominated by bipolar hegemons, as well as the evolution of economic globalization, also provide favorable opportunities for the people to quench this desire. The goals of peace and development will be achieved by the way of solving problems of peace and development, with the means of peace and development, and in the process of peace and development.

#### ( ) Great power peace

Zakaria ‘9 (Fareed, PhD Poli Sci @ Harvard, Editor of Newsweek, 12/12/09, “The Secrets of Stability,” Newsweek, http://www.newsweek.com/id/226425)

Beyond all this, though, I believe there's a fundamental reason why we have not faced global collapse in the last year. It is the same reason that we weathered the stock-market crash of 1987, the recession of 1992, the Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian default of 1998, and the tech-bubble collapse of 2000. The current global economic system is inherently more resilient than we think. The world today is characterized by three major forces for stability, each reinforcing the other and each historical in nature. The first is the spread of great-power peace. Since the end of the Cold War, the world's major powers have not competed with each other in geomilitary terms. There have been some political tensions, but measured by historical standards the globe today is stunningly free of friction between the mightiest nations. This lack of conflict is extremely rare in history. You would have to go back at least 175 years, if not 400, to find any prolonged period like the one we are living in. The number of people who have died as a result of wars, civil conflicts, and terrorism over the last 30 years has declined sharply (despite what you might think on the basis of overhyped fears about terrorism). And no wonder—three decades ago, the Soviet Union was still funding militias, governments, and guerrillas in dozens of countries around the world. And the United States was backing the other side in every one of those places. That clash of superpower proxies caused enormous bloodshed and instability: recall that 3 million people died in Indochina alone during the 1970s. Nothing like that is happening today. Peace is like oxygen, Harvard's Joseph Nye has written. When you don't have it, it's all you can think about, but when you do, you don't appreciate your good fortune. Peace allows for the possibility of a stable economic life and trade. The peace that flowed from the end of the Cold War had a much larger effect because it was accompanied by the discrediting of socialism. The world was left with a sole superpower but also a single workable economic model—capitalism—albeit with many variants from Sweden to Hong Kong. This consensus enabled the expansion of the global economy; in fact, it created for the first time a single world economy in which almost all countries across the globe were participants. That means everyone is invested in the same system. Today, while the nations of Eastern Europe might face an economic crisis, no one is suggesting that they abandon free-market capitalism and return to communism. In fact, around the world you see the opposite: even in the midst of this downturn, there have been few successful electoral appeals for a turn to socialism or a rejection of the current framework of political economy. Center-right parties have instead prospered in recent elections throughout the West.

### Sovlecny

#### Aff can’t solve – patriotic hackers make crisis management impossible

Owens et al 9

(William A. Owens, as an Admiral in the United States Navy and later Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, \*\*Kenneth W. Dam, served as Deputy Secretary of the Treasury from 2001 to 2003, where he specialized in international economic development, \*\*Herbert S. Lin, Senior Scientist and Study, “Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities” 4/27/2009, <http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/NRC-Report.pdf>, KB)

Past experience strongly indicates that conflict or increased tension ¶ between two nations will result in the “patriotic hackers” of both nations ¶ (and perhaps their allies) taking action intended to harass or damage the ¶ other side. Such activities are not under the direct control of the national ¶ government, and as discussed in Section 7.2.3.3 may well interfere with ¶ the efforts of that government to manage the crisis vis-à-vis the other ¶ side.4¶ Indeed, the government of a targeted nation is likely to believe ¶ that a cyberattack conducted on it is the result of deliberate adversarial ¶ action rather than the actions of “unauthorized” parties. Thus, unauthorized activities of the patriotic hackers of Zendia against the United States ¶ may lead the United States to believe that the Zendian government has ¶ launched a cyberattack against it. A U.S. cyberattack against Zendia may ¶ be seen by the Zendian government as a cyber first strike against it.¶ Yet another complication involving patriotic hackers is the possibility ¶ that they might be directed by, inspired by, or tolerated by their government (or a rogue section within it), but in ways in which the government’s ¶ hand is not easily visible. Under such circumstances, hostile acts with ¶ damaging consequences could continue to occur (with corresponding ¶ benefits to the nation responsible) despite official denials. At the very ¶ least, the possibility that patriotic hackers may be operating could act as ¶ a plausible cover for government-sponsored cyberattacks, even if there ¶ were in fact no patriotic hackers doing anything.