### 1ac

#### The United States federal government should substantially increase restrictions on the war powers authority of the President of the United States to conduct targeted killing.

## 2ac

### Case proper

#### Thayer is part of the military-strategic studies complex

Morrissey 2011 (John, Director of the MA in Environment, Society and Development at NUI Galway and Acting Head of Geography, PhD (University of Exeter), "Architects of Empire: The Military–Strategic Studies Complex and the Scripting of US National Security," Antipode, Vol 43, No. 2)

Bradley Thayer is the senior analyst in international and national security at the National Institute for Public Policy in Fairfax, Virginia. For Thayer, the war on terrorism “provides the opportunity to increase significantly American military and economic power in the Middle East”; it was “only by invading Iraq” that the United States could “reach its strategic objectives in the region”; and since the US is “an imperial power”, it should rightfully “exert its influence in the region to bring about regional change” (2003:4, 15, 19). Thayer is just one of literally hundreds of national security “experts” within what can be called the “military–strategic studies complex” of the United States today. This complex is a powerful, well-funded assemblage of policy institutes, military colleges and university departments, all with close links to the US Department of Defense and specializing in Strategic Studies research, teaching and policy publications. Like the National Institute for Public Policy, many are located in and around Washington, DC and northern Virginia, and in post-9/11 America their proliferation can be read as an adjunct of the ascendant Pentagon of the Bush administration.

#### Realists agree Heg will inevitably decline- shifts in power are inevitable

**Snyder** PhD, Professor of Public Policy at the University of Maryland **10** – [Quddus Z. Snyder, “Systermic theory in an era of declining US hegemony,” http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/irworkshop/papers\_fall09/snyder.pdf]

Crucial to hegemonic stability theory is that the hegemon actually does things, or provides benefits. For example, Keohane has argued that after World War II the US provided three major sets of benefits in the area of international political economy: First, it provided a stable international monetary system which facilitated trade and payments; second, it provided a market for goods and permitted trade on an asymmetrical basis; and third, the US helped its allies gain access to Middle Eastern oil at stable prices.25 Sadly, all good things must come to an end. Central to the theory of hegemonic stability is that **the arrangement is ultimately unsustainable**. **The hegemon cannot maintain its dominance** in the face of mounting costs, losses in relative power, and inevitable overextension. Challengers will arise. The hegemonic cycle usually ends in war, and thereafter begins anew: “The conclusion of one hegemonic war is the beginning of another cycle of growth, expansion, and eventual decline.”26 **Virtually no realist believes that hegemony can persist indefinitely.**

#### Heg causes terrorism – US presence in the Middle East and 9/11 proves

Layne 9 (Christopher, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute, literary and national editor of the Atlantic, Review of International Studies (2009), 5/25/9, “America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore balancing has arrived”, Cambridge Journals)

Terrorist organisations like Al-Qaeda are non-state actors, and as such, they are not, strictly speaking, engaged in ‘balancing’ the US (because balancing is a form of state behaviour). Yet, at the same time, the actions of groups like Al-Qaeda reflect some of the key attributes of balancing. After all, beyond connoting the idea of counterweight, balancing also signifies opposition, or resistance, to a hegemon. Terrorists may not be able to balance against the US, but they can engage in a related form of activity aimed at undermining American primacy by raising its costs. Organisations like Al-Qaeda may be non-state actors, but their actions are of a kind frequently found in international politics: the use of violence against a state(s) to attain clearly defined political objectives. Indeed the use of violence for such purposes is the hallmark of terrorism. As Bruce Hoffman says, terrorism is ‘about power: the pursuit of power, the acquisition of power, and the use of power to achieve political change’.38 Terrorism, moreover, is fundamentally an asymmetric form of conflict, because it is an instrument that the weak use against the strong.39 From this perspective, the 9/11 assault on the US was not a random, senseless, ‘irrational’ act of violence. In fact, the 9/11 attack was in keeping with the Clausewitzian paradigm of war: force was used against the US by its adversaries to advance their political objectives. As German military strategist Carl von Clausewitz himself observed, ‘War is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object’.40 Here, President Bush’s endlessly reiterated claim that the US was attacked because Islamic radicals ‘hate us because of our freedom’ betrayed a complete misunderstanding of the dynamics that underpin the clash between the US and Middle Eastern terrorists. For sure, there are Islamic radicals who, indeed, do hate the US for cultural, religious, and ideological reasons. But that is not why the US is a target for Islamic terrorists. 9/11 represented a violent counterreaction to America’s policies in the Middle East – especially its drive to dominate the region both geopolitically and culturally. As Michael Schuerer – who headed the CIA analytical team monitoring Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda – says, it is dangerous for the US to base its strategy for combating terrorism on the belief ‘that Muslims hate and attack us for what we are and think rather than for what we do’.41 In a similar vein, Richard K. Betts observed following the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center that, ‘It is hardly likely that Middle Eastern radicals would be hatching schemes like the destruction of the World Trade Center if the US had not been identified so long as the mainstay of Israel, the Shah of Iran, and conservative Arab regimes and the source of a cultural assault on Islam’.42 It is the US’ attempt to impose its primacy and preferences on the Middle East that fuels groups like Al-Qaeda and fans Islamic fundamental- ism. Terrorism is a form of ‘blowback’ against America’s preponderant role in international affairs. Despicable and brutal though it was, the 9/11 attack was undertaken with cool calculation to achieve well-defined geopolitical objectives. Underscoring this point, Scheurer observes that, ‘In the context of ideas bin Laden shares with his brethren, the military actions of Al-Qaeda and its allies are acts of war, not terrorism . . . meant to advance bin Laden’s clear, focused, limited, and widely popular foreign policy goals . . .’.43 Specifically, Al-Qaeda wants to compel the US to remove its military presence from the Persian Gulf, and force Washington to alter its stance on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.44 Al-Qaeda’s leaders also apparently hoped that the September 11 attacks would provoke a US overreaction, and thereby trigger an upsurge of popular discontent in the Islamic world that would lead to the overthrow of the Saudi monarchy and other pro-American regimes in the Middle East (Egypt, Pakistan, and Jordan, for example) and their replacement by fundamentalist Islamic governments.45 In other words, Al-Qaeda seeks to undermine US primacy, and thereby compel changes in America’s Middle Eastern grand strategy. The US presence on the ground in the Middle East also incites terrorists to attack American interests. In his study of suicide terrorist groups, Pape has found that ‘what nearly all suicide terrorist attacks have in common is a specific secular and strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland’.46 Al-Qaeda fits this pattern, and one of its principal objectives ‘is the expulsion of American troops from the Persian Gulf and the reduction of Washington’s power in the region’.47 Here, the Bush adminis- tration’s inflexible determination to maintain a long-term American military presence in Iraq is exactly the wrong policy to reduce terrorism. The Bush administration, of course, claimed that the US is fighting terrorism in Iraq. To make this point, it has grossly exaggerated the links between the insurgent group Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and Osama Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda organisation and, hence – in a blatant prevarication – tied AQI and the war in Iraq to 9/11.48 Bush repeatedly asserted that, in Iraq the US is fighting the same terrorists who attacked the US on 9/11. Of course, this claim overlooked the fact that AQI came into existence only after the March 2003 US invasion of Iraq, and that its links with Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda are, at best, tenuous. The Bush administration’s deliberate fabrications were designed to win Congressional and public support for a prolonged ‘surge’.49 When it first announced the surge, the administration said it would last through 2007. Instead it lasted well into 2008, and it is likely that there will be more US forces in Iraq in January 2009 than there were prior to the surge. And, even when the surge itself has ended, any draw-down of US forces will take place gradually.50 General David Petraeus, who served as senior American commander in Iraq during the surge and now heads CENTCOM (the US military command with overall responsibility for the Middle East) has repeatedly emphasised that the US commit- ment to Iraq is long-term in nature, and American military planners are preparing for a long-lasting ‘post-occupation’ US presence there.51 In fact, it is clear that the Bush administration never intended to withdraw from Iraq militarily and aimed for the US to retain permanent US military bases there. President Bush all but confirmed this in May 2007 when he said that he wanted the US to play the same kind of role in Iraq that it has in South Korea since the end of the Korean War.52 What will happen under the new US administration is unclear. During 2008, the government of Iraqi Nouri al-Maliki indicated that Baghdad wanted to set a timeline for US troop withdrawals. The Iraqi government refused to accede to the Bush administration’s desire to negotiate a long-term security agreement that would allow the US to maintain permanent bases in Iraq. Although the Bush administration had strongly opposed any suggestions that there should be a fixed timetable for US withdrawal from Iraq in July 2008, Bush’s position seemed to soften and the administration said the US would support a ‘time horizon’ for US troop withdrawals from Iraq as an ‘aspirational goal’.53 What the new US admin- istration will do about the US presence in Iraq is an open question, but based on the positions taken by Senator Barak Obama (D. Ill.) and Senator John McCain (R. Ariz.) during the 2008 US presidential campaign, it seems certain that there will be a significant American military presence in Iraq for some time to come. Instead of reducing American vulnerability to terrorism, the presence of US troops in Iraq and the Middle East increases it by reinforcing the widespread perception in the Islamic world that the US is pursuing a neo-colonial policy in the Middle East in furtherance of its own imperial ambitions. The huge US politico-military footprint in the Middle East region – including Iraq – is, along with America’s policy on the Israel/Palestinian issue, the primary driver of Middle Eastern terrorism. The admin- istration’s overall policy in the Middle East has inflamed anti-American sentiment, and turned the entire region into a source of recruits for various radical terrorist groups. Instead of solving this problem, staying in Iraq will exacerbate it.

#### Maintaining primacy guarantees war to attempt to maintain order – it’s in the job description.

Layne 7 [Christopher Layne, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute, 2007 ["The Case Against the American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415952034, p. 73-74]

In this chapter, I argue that primacy and empire is a strategy that will lead to bad consequences for the United States. Rather than bringing the United States peace and security, the pursuit of primacy and empire will result in a geopolitical backlash against the United States. It already has. The 9/11 attacks were a violent reaction against America’s primacy—and specifically against its imperial ambitions in the Middle East. Similarly, the quagmire in Iraq also is a direct consequence of U.S. imperial aspirations. And it will not end there. Because it is premised on the belief that the United States must embark on assertive policies to bring about regime change by imposing democracy abroad, the pursuit of primacy and empire will drag the United States into otherwise avoidable wars—what one proponent of the strategy has termed "savage wars for peace." Looking ahead, if the United States continues to follow its current strategy of primacy and empire, it almost certainly will find [end page 54] itself on a collision course with Iran (and possibly North Korea and Syria) and—more importantly—China.

#### That results in endless conflicts and guarantees a violent collapse in the future.

Eland 2 [Ivan Eland, Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, 2002 [“The Empire Strikes Out: The "New Imperialism" and Its Fatal Flaws,” Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 459, November 26, Available Online at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa459.pdf, Accessed 04-25-2007]

Because the strategy of empire equates national security with maintaining what some people have called "the functional equivalent of global containment," the emergence of balance-prone powers threatens a hegemon implicitly. 61 As such, a hegemon must take escalating steps to both ward off potential challenges and persuade security dependents that they are still protected. The chief danger here is strategic overextension because the maintenance of what is in essence a military protectorship is open-ended and requires an empire to continually enlarge the geographic scope of its security responsibilities. Indeed, stabilizing one region logically necessitates the stabilization of the neighbouring region to safeguard the first. For example, much of the impetus for the U.S.-led war in Kosovo was to protect investment in the fragile peace that the West imposed in Bosnia. The process of strategic overextension becomes self-reinforcing because, each time a hegemon expands its perimeter, new potential threats are encountered that demand further expansion. As political scientist Robert H. Johnson explains, political "uncertainty leads to self-extension, which leads in turn to new uncertainty and self-extension." 62 Maintaining empire, in other words, requires perpetually widening commitments. Afghanistan is already an obvious example of this process of self-extension. The fate of Hamid Karzai's government in Kabul, it is argued, now requires Washington to stabilize Central Asia, disentangle the Kashmir conflict, and resolve conflicts in the Middle East. 63 What is most alarming about this idea is that it leads to a virtually limitless foreign policy and a potentially exhausting proliferation of American security concerns. 64 § Marked 08:41 § The reason is that the consolidating logic of empire ultimately gives way to a universalistic conclusion. During the Vietnam War, Secretary of State Dean Rusk anticipated this view when he said that the United States "is safe only to the extent that its total environment is safe." 65 More than 100 years ago, British diplomat Lord Archibald Primrose of Rosebery recognized the basic unsoundness of such thinking: Scarcely any question can arise in any part of the world without involving British interests. This consideration, instead of widening, rather circumscribes the field of our actions. For did we not strictly limit the principle of intervention we should always be simultaneously engaged in some forty wars. 66 It would be an exaggeration to suggest that the United States will soon be drawn [end page 9] simultaneously into "some forty wars," but the logic of empire points in the direction of ever-increasing commitments and security burdens. Nineteenth-century British policy-makers, for example, believed India was vital to their interests. The British government, therefore, felt it necessary to safeguard land and sea routes to India, which necessitated propping up the Ottoman Empire; stabilizing the Mediterranean, Egypt, and South Africa; and assuming responsibility for the Persian Gulf. The result, says British military historian Correlli Barnett, "was a classic example of strategic overextension. Far from being a source of strength to England, India served only to weaken and distract her." 67

### tix

#### No pol cap and agenda dead

Pitzke 9/18/13 (Marc, SPIEGEL Online International, "America's Deadly Weapons Obsession," lexis)

Once again, Washington looks away. Obama has gambled away his political capital anyway. The Syrian conflict has alienated him from even his own supporters in the Democratic Party. Larry Summers, the president's preferred candidate for chairman of the Federal Reserve, chose instead to remove himself from consideration. Immigration reform, Obama's next and last major project, is bound to be a stillbirth. And yet another, equally senseless debt drama is hovering on the periphery.

#### Debt ceiling compromise won't pass - Obama won't negotiate, GOP supports poison pill proposals, even Dems concede odds are low

Sherman and Bresnahan 9/18/13 (Jake and John, Politico, "Shutdown sparring a warm-up for debt fight," http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=73BF536B-7628-4040-BF19-E247BD75BDC9)

Asked to explain how the debt ceiling will get resolved, House Republican aides say that Obama’s refusal to negotiate on the debt ceiling is “untenable.”¶ They might be right. Senate Democratic leadership isn’t even sure Obama’s position that there must be a clean debt ceiling bill can pass Reid’s chamber.¶ “I am hopeful that our Republican colleagues who have stepped up to the plate in the past, mainstream Republican colleagues, will realize this is playing with fire,” Sen. Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.) said Wednesday when asked about the prospect of passing a clean debt ceiling. “But you can never underestimate the power of the hard right in the Republican Party these days.”¶ The Republican plan on the debt ceiling is skewed so far to the right that it’s likely to get little — if any — Democratic support. Boehner and his top lieutenants will have to come up with 217 GOP votes for their opening offer.¶ The plan appears designed for that. Just look at the conservative favorites in the mix for a debt ceiling package: construction of the Keystone XL pipeline, where Obama has demonstrated over the past few years he won’t get pushed around; tax reform, where Republicans refuse to increase revenue and Democrats refuse revenue neutrality; and a one-year delay of Obamacare, which the White House has flatly rejected.¶ If Boehner fails to get to 217 on what GOP aides call his “kitchen sink approach” to the debt ceiling hike, he will have to start over and seek Democratic backing. If successful, the battle shifts across the Capitol.¶ At that point, Reid and Senate Democratic leaders would face a difficult choice: Do they ignore the House GOP bill and raise the specter of catastrophic default on the $16.7 trillion U.S. debt? Or do they try to amend the bill, which means dealing with another round of votes on Obamacare and fiscal reform. Top Senate Democrats say they haven’t yet made up their minds about how to handle that.¶ And like the CR, Reid will need some Republicans to get any debt ceiling bill out of the Senate in the face of a likely Republican filibuster.¶ “I think it’s 50-50 on a government shutdown, but I can see a path how we avoid it,” said a senior Democratic aide. “It’s worse, maybe way worse, on the debt ceiling. And I don’t see any path there right now.”

#### Econ resilient, US isn’t key, and impact empirically denied

**Lamy ’11**(Pascal Lamy is the Director-General of the World Trade Organization. Lamy is Honorary President of Paris-based think tank Notre Europe. Lamy graduated from the prestigious Sciences Po Paris, from HEC and ÉNA, graduating second in his year of those specializing in economics. “System Upgrade” BY PASCAL LAMY | APRIL 18, 2011)

**The** bigger **test came with** the 2008-2009 Great Recession, **the first** truly **global recession** since World War II. When the international economy went into free fall, trade went right along with it. Production and supply are today thoroughly global in nature, with most manufactured products made from parts and materials imported from many other countries. These global value chains have a multiplier effect on trade statistics, which explains why, as the global economy contracted by 2 percent in 2009, trade volume shrank by more than 12 percent. This multiplier effect works the other way around as well: **Growth returned** to 4.6 percent and trade volume grew by a record 14.5 percent over the course of 2010. **Projections for trade** in 2011 **are** also **strong**, with WTO economists predicting that trade volume will rise 6.5 percent during the current year. This sharp rebound in trade has proved two essential things: **Markets stayed open despite ever-stronger pressures** to close them, and trade is an indispensible tool for economic recovery, particularly for developing countries, which are more dependent on trade. Shortly after the crisis broke out, we in the WTO began to closely monitor the trade policy response of our member governments. Many were fearful that pressures to impose trade restrictions would prove too powerful for governments to resist. But this is not what happened. Instead, **the system of rules and disciplines**, agreed to over 60 years of negotiations, **held firm**. In **a series of reports** prepared for WTO members and the G-20, we found that **governments acted with great restraint**. At no time did the trade-restrictive measures imposed cover more than 2 percent of world imports. Moreover, the measures used -- anti-dumping duties, safeguards, and countervailing duties to offset export or production subsidies -- were those which, in the right circumstances, are permissible under WTO rules. I am not suggesting that every safeguard measure or countervailing duty imposed during those difficult days was in compliance with WTO rules, but responses to trade pressures were generally undertaken within an internationally agreed-upon framework. Countries by and large resisted overtly noncompliant measures, such as breaking legally binding tariff ceilings or imposing import bans or quotas. As **markets stayed open, trade flows began to shift**, **and countries** that shrugged off the impact of the crisis and **continued to grow** -- **notably China, India, and Brazil** -- **became ever-more attractive markets for countries that were struggling**, **including** those in Europe and **North America**. Trade has been a powerful engine for growth in the developing world, a fact reflected in the far greater trade-to-GDP ratios we see there. In 2010, developing countries' share of world trade expanded to a record 45 percent, and this trend looks set to continue. Decisions made in Brasilia, Beijing, and New Delhi to open their respective economies to trade have been instrumental in enabling these countries to lift hundreds of millions of people out of poverty.

### XO

#### Deference bad -- security k-ish stuff

Gross 3 -- Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School (Oren, 2/13/2003, "Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?" <http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/112-5/GrossFINAL.pdf>)

There exists a tension of “tragic dimensions” between democratic values and responses to emergencies. 58 Democratic nations faced with serious terrorist threats must “maintain and protect life, the liberties necessary to a vibrant democracy, and th e unity of the society, the loss of which can turn a healthy and diverse nation into a seriously divided and violent one.” 59 At the same time, exigenci es and acute crises directly challenge the most fundamental conc epts of constitutional democracy. The question then arises to what extent, if any, violations of fundamental democratic values can be justified in the name of the survival of the democratic, constitutional order itself; and if they can be justified, to what extent a democratic, constitutional gove rnment can defend the state without transforming itself into an authoritarian regime. Take, for example, the notion that a government must be of limited powers, a government of laws, not of men (or women). 60¶ When an extreme exigency arises it almost invariably leads to the strengthening of the executive branch not only at the expense of the other two branches, but also at the expense of individual rights, liberties, and freedoms. The government’s ability to act swiftly, secretly, and decisively against a threat to the life of the nation becomes supe rior to the ordinary principles of limitation on governmental powers and individual rights. 61 Crises tend to result in the expansion of governmental powers, the concentration of powers in the hands of the executive, and the concomitant contraction of individual freedoms and liberties. 62 Enhanced and newly created powers are asserted by, and given to, the government as necessary to meet the challenge to the community. Concepts such as separation of powers and federalism are likely to be among the first casualties when a nation needs to respond to a national emergency, as by engaging in a war against terrorism. 63 The executive branch assumes a leading role in countering the crisis, with the other two branches pu shed aside (whether of their own volition or not). 64 The increase in governmental powers leads, in turn, to a contraction of traditional individual rights, freedoms, and liberties. 65 While such expansions and concentrations of powers are not unique to times of crisis, but rather are part of the modernization of society and the need for governmental involvement in an eve r-growing number of areas of human activity, 66 it can hardly be denied that such phenomena have been accelerated tremendously (and, at times, initiated) during emergencies. 67¶ Our acceptance of the growing role of the executive branch as natural may be attributed, in part, to our conditioning during times of emergency. Thus, two seemingly antithetical vectors are in a constant tug-of-war. The existence of restrictions and li mitations on governmental powers is a fundamental attribute of democratic regimes. The ideals of democracy, individual rights, legitimacy, accountability, and the rule of law suggest that even in times of acute danger, govern ment is limited, both formally and substantively, in the range of activities that it may pursue in order to protect the state. However, grave terrorist threats directly challenge this organizing principle. The notion of raison d’état privileges the exercise of a wide panoply of measures by the state faced with challenges to its very existence. 68 Terrorists seek to exploit this fundamental conundrum facing their victims. In most cases, terrorist gr oups and organizations do not believe they can win by sheer force. They are no real physical or military match to well-organized states. 69 The threats they pose are not existential in the sense that they do not put in real danger the very existence of the victim state. Instead, terrorism presents its real threat in provoking democratic regimes to embrace and employ authoritarian measures 70 that (1) weaken the fabric of democracy; (2) discredit the government domestically as well as internationally; (3) alienate segments of the population from their government, thereby pushing more people to support (passively, if not outright actively) the terrorist organizations and their cause; and (4) undermine the government’s claim to th e moral higher ground in the battle against the terrorists, while gaining legitimacy for the latter. 71 The most critical danger from terrorism is “not that democracies would fail to defend themselves, but rather that they would (and did) do so far too well” and, in so doing, become “less democratic.” 72 This overreaction may result in the “barbarization” 73 of society not only in that terrorism from “below” may be transplanted by institutionalized terror from “above,” 74 but also in that use of power and force is legitimated as a means for settling disputes. 75

### WOT Disad

#### Terrorism discourse privileges national security, intervention, and causes serial policy failure

Bartolucci 12 -- research fellow and lecturer in the politics of terrorism at Bradford University (Valentina, 12/15/12, "Terrorism rhetoric under the Bush Administration: Discourses and effects," Journal of Language and Politics 11(4), EBSCO)

This article has attempted to provide the reader with a first glimpse of some of the main rhetorical features of Bush’s speeches on terrorism and counter-terrorism. The large majority of the structures and devices present in Bush’s discourse on terrorism are commonly adopted in political and ideological text and talk, such as positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation, over-lexicalisation, and the use of hyperboles and repetitions. More interestingly, however, are the effects deriving from the adoption of these linguistic features. Limitation of civil freedoms has occurred virtually everywhere. The target of state opponents facilitated by the discourse has occurred in countries as diverse as Spain, Russia, Algeria, Sri Lanka and India. Worldwide, the constant reiteration in the discourse of an incoming ‘terrorism attack’ of catastrophic proportions has led to the privileging of ‘national security’ even to the detriment of human rights. The reduction of personal and civil freedoms in the name of the fight against ‘terrorism’ has also been considerable and not only in the U.S., but also in Europe, Israel, Russia, and elsewhere (Anderson 2003). Indeed, such an essentialising, absolutist, highly moralising discourse has made virtually impossible the capacity for dissent because of the risk of being considered ‘disloyal’, ‘a terrorist supporter’ and alike (see also Kellner 2002). For instance, Attorney General John Ashcroft reportedly said that “critics of the Bush administration ‘only aid terrorists’ because such commentary “gives ammunition to America’s enemies, and pause to America’s friends” (Coe et al. 2004, 249). The discourse with its constant reiteration of incoming threats and the representation of the world divided between good/bad nations and good/bad people in a civilisational fight, has brought with it a pervasive feeling of fear. Such a feeling has been nourished by the warnings (colour coded) issued by several governments and the pervasiveness of the borderless and timeless ‘terrorism evil’ in public and media discussions. Furthermore, the discourse has also led to the a priori dismissal of non-violent alternatives to § Marked 08:47 § rather exalt a zero sum approach. The discourse ultimately creates an “erosion of public morality” (Jackson 2007, 425) and leads to the acceptance of extreme measures, including torture and other abuses, believed to be necessary to win the ‘war on terrorism’. At the same time, the exceptional measures adopted throughout the world in order to fight ‘terrorism’ have contributed to a climate that has certainly caused more violence than enabled its reduction, leading to a logic that encourages hostility and to the preventive adoption of armed violence to fight against ‘terrorism’. In conclusion, it can be said that, at the policy level, framing events as ‘terrorism’ and individuals and groups as ‘terrorists’ has been proved to be counterproductive. Framing terrorists as ‘outlaws of justice and humanity’ brings evil into play and instantly precludes possibilities of comprehension and dialogue. A strong ‘response’ is thus deemed necessary, based on force rather than negotiation. Such an understanding often brings the state to an ‘over-reaction’ that is ultimately counterproductive for the state itself. Dividing individuals and groups between ‘good’ and ‘evil’, ‘civilised’ and ‘uncivilised’ not only mischaracterises complex topics but also brings an erosion of public cohesion and promotes a culture of suspicion in which anyone anywhere can be labeled an ‘enemy’. Furthermore, it is accompanied by a pervasive sense of unease and anxiety given the completely random character of the threat. This article, however, does not want to conclude in suggesting the complete suppression of the label of ‘terrorism’ in academic or political debates. That option in fact would be counterproductive in academia for the reason that the researcher writing about ‘terrorism’ without calling it ‘terrorism’ would be automatically marginalised, and unrealistic in the political arena for its consolidation in public debates. Rather, a more cautious use of the term, an acknowledgment of its loaded political meaning, and of the assumptions surrounding it, are suggested. Thus, instead of framing all violent encounters of sub-national groups against the state as ‘terrorism’, a case-by-case framing should then be preferred. In this way, for instance, events that resemble nothing more than ordinary crime should be labelled as such and dealt with through a legalistic approach. Furthermore, labelling someone or something as ‘terrorist’ or ‘terrorism’ should bring to mind the possible effects of such labelling as to carefully assess if the benefits of adopting it surpass the negative effects.

#### Turns pakistan

**Boyle 2013** [Michael J., Assistant professor of political science at La Salle University, “The costs and consequences of drone warfare,” International Affairs 89: 1 (2013) pg. 14, ableist edited]

The escalation of drone strikes in Pakistan to its current tempo—one every few days—directly contradicts the long-term American strategic goal of boosting the capacity and legitimacy of the government in Islamabad. Drone attacks are more than just temporary incidents that erase all traces of an enemy. They have lasting political effects that can weaken existing governments, undermine their legitimacy and add to the ranks of their enemies. § Marked 08:47 § These political effects come about because drones provide a powerful signal to the population of a targeted state that the perpetrator considers the sovereignty of their government to be negligible. The popular perception that a government is powerless to stop drone attacks on its territory can be devastating to the incumbent regime, and can embolden its domestic rivals to challenge it through violence. Such continual violations of the territorial integrity of a state also have direct consequences for the legitimacy of its government. Following a meeting with General David Petraeus, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari described the political costs of drones succinctly, saying that ‘continuing drone attacks on our country, which result in loss of precious lives or property, are counterproductive and difficult to explain by a democratically elected government. It is creating a credibility gap.’75 Similarly, the Pakistani High Commissioner to London Wajid Shamsul Hasan said in August 2012 that what has been the whole outcome of these drone attacks is that you have directly or indirectly contributed to destabilizing or undermining the democratic government. Because people really make fun of the democratic government—when you pass a resolution against drone attacks in the parliament and nothing happens. The Americans don’t listen to you, and they continue to violate your territory.76

The appearance of powerlessness in the face of drones is corrosive to the appearance of competence and legitimacy of the Pakistani government. The growing perception that the Pakistani civilian government is unable to stop drone attacks is particularly dangerous in a context where 87 per cent of all Pakistanis are dissatisfied with the direction of the country and where the military, which has launched coups before, remains a popular force.77