# Doubles

## 1AC

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#### I look around and realize that I am different, I look like a terrorist. What does it mean to look like a terrorist? In contemporary America it means “looking” Arab, having brown skin. It is because of this that I am subject to the ever-present possibility of terroristic violence – Brown people have become the targets of constant surveillance

Adleman 13 (Lori, Associate at the United Nations Foundation, where she works on the Every Woman Every Child initiative, BA from Harvard,“Tim Wise on terrorism, privilege, and understanding the power of whiteness,” 4-19-13, Feministing, <http://feministing.com/2013/04/19/terrorism-and-privilege-understanding-the-power-of-whiteness/>)

In the wake of the Boston bombing and in the midst of a manhunt, we are harshly reminded that though bombs do not discriminate against race and gender, people do. We’ve already heard what we know now to be false reports that a “dark-skinned man” was behind the crime, and stories of a Saudi man being taken into custody in spite of being a victim, and not the perpetrator of the act. Brown people who weren’t even at the scene are being targeted, including a Muslim woman who was attacked Wednesday morning by a white man screaming that Muslims had been involved in the bombing. A Bangladeshi man in New York was attacked by four men mistaking him for “an Arab.” The largest mosque in Boston now has security guards posted outside of it, fearing violence in spite of the fact that at that time they still don’t know who was behind the bombings. Now that we have more (but not ALL) the facts, when sifting through all of the speculation and conversation about Boston, it’s important to remember not only that racism tinges the information we receive, but that white privilege also plays a huge part in shaping the dialogue around terrorist acts. In his piece, “Terrorism and Privilege: Understanding the Power of Whiteness,” Tim Wise reminds us that terrorism is just as white as it is brown. You’ve never heard of Tim McVeigh? That’s because no one attributes his race to his violence. That’s because he was white. “White privilege is knowing that since the bombers have turned out to be white, no one will call for whites to be profiled as terrorists as a result, subjected to special screening, or threatened with deportation. White privilege is knowing that since the Boston bombers have turned out to be white, we will not be asked to denounce them, so as to prove our own loyalties to the common national good. It is knowing that the next time a cop sees one of us standing on the sidewalk cheering on runners in a marathon, that cop will say exactly nothing to us as a result. White privilege is knowing that if you are a white student from Nebraska — as opposed to, say, a student from Saudi Arabia — that no one, and I mean no one would think it important to detain and question you in the wake of a bombing such as the one at the Boston Marathon.” So, now that we have found out who was behind the bombings, regardless of their race, let’s remember that one’s skin color has nothing to do with one’s propensity to violence.

#### Racism against Brown people in the United States has facilitated the creation of us as an ENEMY other, targeted as terrorists

Bhatia 8 (Sunil Bhatia, University of Pune, India, B.A., M.A.; Clark University, M.Ed., Ph.D., Professor of Human Development and

Human Development Department Chair at Connecticut College,“9/11 and the Indian Diaspora: Narratives of Race, Place and Immigrant Identity,” *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 1, February 2008, pp. 21-39)

Several prominent scholars working in the area of Asian-American Studies and Sociology have shown that after 9/11 many South Asian American citizens who resembled the enemy were racialised and constructed as non-American (Maira 28 S. Bhatia‘‘Imperial Feelings’’; Purkayastha). In particular these scholars have shown that the post-9/11 period has created a new category of identity in the USA that perceives Arabs, Muslims and Middle Eastern men as disloyal and non-patriotic citizens or as individuals who are part of terrorist networks (Maira ‘‘Imperial Feelings’’). The recent work of sociologist, Bandana Purkayastha, provides revealing insights about how post-9/11 moments produced a heightened state of racialisation for many South Asian citizens in the USA. I find her research useful because it provides the analytical framework to understand the larger structural forces that shaped my participants’ responses to the events of 9/11. After 9/11, there has been a conflation of South Asian Muslims and Arabs with terrorism and ‘‘Islamic Fundamentalism’’ and regardless of their nationality or religion many South Asians are being categorised as suspicious and having links to terrorists. Purkayastha notes that those who are perceived to have non-American traits during a sustained period of conflict and political crisis can face extremely dangerous consequences. US foreign policy toward the Middle East has often provided the framework and justification for the direct and indirect racial profiling of South Asian Muslim youth and adults in the USA. She writes: When other countries are seen as ‘‘threatening’’ to the United States, politically or economically, racialized individuals who look like ‘‘the enemy’’ to a section of majority group are subjected to higher levels discrimination and hate. Those caught in the spotlight remember their vulnerability at being under a significant level of public scrutiny, while those who turn on the light do not hold the impression beyond that moment. (42)

#### Racism directed at the enemy other is a result of the intersection of race and religion. The dominant American Christian mode of being in the United States creates a life threatening situation for anyone that can be identified as “terrorist.”

Beinart 13 (Peter, associate professor of journalism and political science at City University of New York and a senior fellow at the New America Foundation, “Are The Tsarnaevs White?,” 4-24-13, <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/04/24/are-the-tsarnaevs-white0.html>)

Think about American history and you can understand why. For centuries, Americans were legally segregated by race. Thus, when newcomers from the Middle East came to our shores, Americans had to decide which side of the line they were on. And in the struggle to be classified as white, Middle Eastern Christians had an advantage: Jesus. In the 1915 case Dow v. United States, a Syrian Christian successfully argued that he was white because Jesus, the original Middle Eastern Christian, was too. In 1925, in United States v. Cartozian, the Court designated Armenians as white because, “[a]lthough the Armenian province is within the confines of the Turkish Empire, being in Asia Minor, the people thereof have always held themselves aloof from Turks, the Kurds, and allied peoples, principally, it might be said, on account of their [Christian] religion.” In the 1942 case In Re Ahmed Hassan, a Michigan Court said a petitioner from Yemen was not white because, “Apart from the dark skin of the Arabs, it is well known that they are a part of the Mohammedan world and that a wide gulf separates their culture from that of the predominately Christian peoples of Europe.” Today, Americans still often link Islam and dark skin. What’s changed is which category we consider more dangerous. For much of American history, the problem with being Muslim was that you weren’t considered white. Since 9/11, by contrast, one of the problems with not being considered white is that you might be mistaken for Muslim. Thus, four days after the Twin Towers fell, Balbir Singh Sodhi, a Sikh gas station attendant, was gunned down in Mesa, Arizona by an assailant who had boasted of wanting to kill “ragheads.” Last December, a Hindu American named Sunando Sen was pushed into an oncoming subway train by a woman who explained, “I hate Hindus and Muslims ever since 2001.” Sodhi and Sen, needless to say, weren’t Muslim. They just looked Muslim because they had dark skin. Even the anti-Muslim epithets that have flourished since 9/11—for instance, “sand n…r”—have a racial connotation. And there’s evidence that Barack Obama’s dark skin is one (though not the only) reason so many Americans still think he’s a Muslim. In 2010, a Michigan State University psychologist named Spee Kosloff asked supporters of John McCain whether Obama was a Muslim. Then he asked them the same question after they filled out a card in which they listed their race. Once racially triggered, the percentage who called Obama a Muslim jumped 21 points. You can also glimpse this conflation of religion and race in the demand—which surfaces after every terrorist attack—to single out Muslims for special scrutiny at airports and the like. Often, the politicians and pundits most eager to profile Muslims are the same folks who in the 1980s and 1990s defended the “racial profiling” of blacks. And listening to them, you sometimes get the sense that they think the process would work the same way: just look to see who the Muslims are. In 2011, for instance, Long Island Congressman Peter King suggested that when deciding who police should target as potential terror suspects, a “person’s religious background or ethnicity can be a factor.” But if the problem is Muslims—a billion person religion with adherents from Malaysia to Mauritania—what does “ethnicity” have to do with it? King then offered a racial analogy: “If I’m told the White Citizens Council, the Ku Klux Klan, is going to attack Harlem, I’d be more suspicious of a white guy walking down around Harlem.” Last year, the atheist writer Sam Harris was even blunter: “We should profile Muslims, or anyone who looks like he or she could conceivably be Muslim.”

#### Indian has been coded as “terrorist” in the post 9-11 United States resulting in exclusion and demonization. The constant threat of death overhangs my every action.

Bhatia 8 (Sunil Bhatia, University of Pune, India, B.A., M.A.; Clark University, M.Ed., Ph.D., Professor of Human Development and

Human Development Department Chair at Connecticut College,“9/11 and the Indian Diaspora: Narratives of Race, Place and Immigrant Identity,” *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 1, February 2008, pp. 21-39)

My first interview occurred about three weeks after 9/11 with Raju, a 43-year-old biology professor. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, a Sikh man was killed in Arizona because he was mistakenly identified as an Arab. Another Sikh man travelling on a commuter train in New England was handcuffed and interrogated by the police because he was suspected of being a terrorist. In the wake of numerous attacks on Sikh families, many Sikh religious groups in New York and around the USA waged an expensive public relations campaign to educate the public about how Sikhism is different to Islam. Many Sikh leaders made attempts to emphasise that Sikhism is a peaceful religion that was founded in opposition to Islam. This public relations campaign also focused on the symbolic significance of the turban in Sikhism and other religions. The reputed weekly magazine, Newsweek, also carried a news item entitled ‘‘Turban 101’’ to distinguish the various kinds of turbans that are worn by religious groups across Asia. Raju was aware of all the recent attacks on several Sikh people: R: It’s a concern; it’s a concern that you know, we will be stereotyped. Uh, I would be stereotyped as an Arab, but um, you know, I’m kind of prepared for that, and I always place mirrors in my mind if someone were to come and tell me certain things, how I would react. The preparation is always to be, first to be very, very calm and not [...] and to really try to so what I’ve done actually, I just realized um is, I try to make that extra effort to connect with people. Give everyone and myself a sense that this is, you know all, we’re all one, that what you feel is very similar to what I feel regardless of what I look like. I: And in terms of how it plays out? R: [...] At the same time I will tell you one thing, I would not hesitate if I find that my life was in danger for any reason, I would not hesitate to (cut my hair), because of, you know because of having I believe responsibility and making sure that I, you know, (my children) I: But you would, there would be a sense of loss if you had to do that? During this interview, Raju acknowledged that if his life were in ‘‘danger’’ because of 9/11, he would cut his hair and not wear the pagadi (turban). His decision to not wear his pagadi would be primarily influenced by the fact that he has family responsibilities. Raju believed that he was a citizen of the world and was well integrated into American society, but after 9/11, he was forced to reconcile two conflicting views. On the one hand, Raju believed that he was assimilated in American society and, on the other hand, 9/11 had recast Raju’s cultural identity as suspicious and dangerous by the media and the larger public. Raju was raised in Britain and Canada and had considered himself as well adjusted within the mainstream American culture. He played squash with his American friends and had never doubted his place in American society. After the events of 9/11, media outlets, magazines and newspapers had repeatedly splashed pictures of Osama binLaden with his beard and turban. Raju was afraid that his beard and pagadi would become the object of scrutiny from his friends and neighbours especially from strangers in public places. Immediately after the events of 9/11, he was cautious about not being seen in public places such as the grocery store or the mall. My interviews with Neelam and her husband, Ranjit, echoed many views articulated by Raju. She observed, ‘‘But if this incident, which happened recently, is any indication, a lot of people in our neighbourhood didn’t even realise that we are any different.’’ The interesting part of this narrative is that their sense of difference suddenly emerged after 9/11, when Ranjit told his neighbour that they were being cautious about going out in public places. Neelam recalled: N: And when Ranjit told them ‘‘we are being careful not to go to other places, just to be on the safe side’’, they all were very embarrassed because they all, said, ‘‘oh, we never thought that you could be considered ...’’ And then they looked at him. ‘‘Yes, you could be, couldn’t you? (Laughing).’’ So, that was in fact, that was a very hard [...] to us, because it did not, so many of them, they all kept, came and said, ‘‘we are so sorry, but we just, it never occurred to us’’. I: That’s right. N: And that was, I think probably to me, that was much more of an acceptance ... I: Um hmm, uh hmm N: You know, we know, you are not terrorists (laughing). The most important part of the conversation occurs when the neighbours look at Neelam and Ranjit and say, ‘‘Yes, you could be, couldn’t you?’’ The question is what did the neighbours mean when they said, ‘‘Yes, you could be, couldn’t you?’’ What do Neelam and Ranjit represent in this context? It suddenly dawns on their neighbours that both Neelam and Ranjit could possibly be mistaken for being Arabs and that mistaken association could invite harm to them. The neighbours apologised to Ranjit and Neelam because they did not go out in pubic because of the possible threat of being identified as a terrorist. Why did the neighbours apologise? On whose behalf were they apologising? Ranjit and Neelam’s cultural identity suddenly moves in the zone of being different even though they were always ‘‘different’’. What is this new sense of difference that emerges from their ‘‘old’’ sense of being different? How is it that prior to 9/11, Ranjit and Neelam’s ‘‘Indianness’’ was not considered as being foreign by their neighbours? Why did Ranjit and Neelam’s neighbours apologise to them and then assure them that, ‘‘you know, we know, that you are not terrorists’’.

#### As a “non-native” I have been subjected to the condition of prejudgment – anyone at any time can carry out the death sentence against the suspected terrorist because suspicion is the crime. Asserting the UNCONDITIONAL right to life becomes unthinkable in a permanent state of exception.

Goh 2006 [Irving Goh Fellow at Harvard University, “Disagreeing Preemptive/ Prophylaxis: From Philip K. Dick to Jacques Rancière” Fast Capitalism, 2.1 2006, http://www.uta.edu/huma/agger/fastcapitalism/2\_1/goh.html] At present, the time of the preemptive presents the targeted body without the chance, or the right, to offer a counter-hypothesis, so as to prove the preemptive erroneous. The targeted body of the preemptive is not offered, and cannot offer, a prophylaxis contra the preemptive so as to delay the elimination of the right to be alive. In other words, in the staging of the preemptive, there is no space for disagreement. His or her speech, phone or logos—the desperate cries (phone) of denial of any (future) wrongdoing; or the cries of injustice of a treatment towards another human being, articulated in a linguistic idiom rational and intelligible (logos); and the cries to surrender (including deferring one's own innocence for the sake of one's safety)—no longer matters. It is no longer heard, as in the case of the preemptive shooting in Miami. Even silence is not heard either, as in the case of the London shooting. The rush of a preemptive is a sonic barrage that drowns out any (silent) voice that seeks to defer it. The gap opened by a suspected body between itself and the law that promises the security of the territory is already too great. The law and its need to secure a terrifying peace cannot bear the widening or delaying of that interval by a further demand of a disagreeing counter-hypothesis or auto-prophylaxis. To allow the normalization of the fatal preemptive would be to institute the legitimization of an absolute or extreme biopolitics. According to Foucault, biopolitics is the control and management of individual bodies by the State through technics of knowledge (usually through surveillance) of those same bodies. In a biopolitical situation, the State holds the exceptional power to determine either the right to let live or make die the individual belonging to the State. Should the preemptive become a force of reason of contemporary life, one would terribly risk submitting the freedom of life and therefore an unconditional right to be alive to a biopolitical capture, handing over the right to let die to the State police and military powers. It would be a situation of abdicating the body as a totally exposed frontier of absolute war. For in the constant exposure of the imminent preemptive, the body at any time—when decided upon by military or police powers to be a security threat—becomes the point in which the space and time of conductibility of war collapse in a total manner. The preemptive reduces the body to a total space of absolute war. Virilio has suggested that the absolute destruction of an enemy in war is procured when the enemy can no longer hypothesize an alternate if not counter route or trajectory (of escape or counter-attack) from impending forces (1990: 17). In the sequence of executing the preemptive to its resolute end, the escaping body faces that same threat of zero hypothesis. There is no chance for that body to think (itself) outside the vortical preemptive. Preemptive bullets into the head would take away that chance of hypothesis. A spectral figure begins to haunt the scene now. And that is the figure of the homo sacer, who according to Agamben's analysis, is the one who in ancient times is killed without his or her death being a religious sacrifice, and the one whose killers are nonindictable of homicide. This figure is also the sign par excellence of the absolute biopolitical capture of life by the State, in which the decision to let live and make die is absolutely managed and decided by the State, and thereby the right to be alive is no longer the fact of freedom of existence for the homo sacer (Agamben 1998). For the right to be alive to be secured in any real sense from any political capture, for it to be maintained and guaranteed as and for the future of the human, the body cannot be allowed to return to this figure of the homo sacer. But victims of the preemptive irrepressibly recall the figure of the homo sacer. In the current legal proceedings of the London shooting, it has not been the fact that the police officers shot an innocent Brazilian that they will be charged. That charge remains absent. The charge of homicide against the officers remains elliptical. Instead, the plan has been to charge them for altering the police log book to conceal the fact that they had mistakenly identified the victim as a terror suspect. The possible turn of human life into the figure of homo sacer as decided by forces of the police or military under the overarching security measure of the preemptive divides the common space of existence. The space of existence becomes less than common now. The preemptive, as in the decision of a homo sacer, brings along with it a certain profiling of certain peoples, regardless of whether the force of law or the State would like to admit or not to such profiling measures. The law or the State would deny this unspoken profiling, but the evidence of its real imminence is felt by the peoples who would most likely fall under the category that the police or military would identify as a possible terror threat. And there is no denying that this profiling largely takes on an ethnic contour. And the fears of such a contouring are not unspoken. "Anyone with dark skin who was running for a bus or Tube could be thought to be about to detonate a bomb," expressed a concerned Labor peer Lord Ahmed for the U.K. Muslim community after the London shooting ("U.K. Muslims Feel 'Under Suspicion'" BBC News. 25 July 2005). The irreducible profiling in the culture of the preemptive is happening in the United States too. A New York Times article reports of a police-speak of "M.E.W.C's" under its intense surveillance—"Middle Eastern with a camera—perhaps taking pictures of a bridge, a hydropower plant or a reservoir" (Kershaw, New York Times. 25 July 2005). The nonnative ethnic community senses a state of emergency that works against them, that restricts their freedom of living on without fear. Indeed, after the London shooting, the BBC carried a report that said "many young Muslims were reluctant to leave their homes" ("U.K. Muslims Feel 'Under Suspicion'" BBC News. 25 July 2005). Their right to be alive becomes under siege as they "believed they could become victims of mistaken identity by armed police" (ibid.). They simply cannot hypothesize, innocent as they are of the intent of terror, a way to disprove the charge of the deadly preemptive that (mis)identifies or profiles them as possible terror suspects. As a Muslim living in Manchester says, "How do I know I won't just be picked up and labeled as a terrorist?" (ibid.). The possibility of a counter-hypothesis against the preemptive, and the unconditional right to be alive, become for these peoples, the unthinkable. That is what Anderton in Minority Report feels too once the naming of himself as a criminal-to-be and the decision of the preemptive capture of him have been disseminated. Even with a counter-proof that he will not commit a crime, he resigns to the fact that nothing can be done to reverse the precession of the preemptive, nothing to stop "precrime" from believing that he has not "the remotest intention of killing" (Dick 1997:329).

**Brown and Jewish bodies should not be targetedly killed**

#### The United States is increasingly militarized, with individuals challenging that militarization at risk of being branded a terrorist. Recognizing the value of all human life is a necessary first step to engaging the damaging social apparatus that underpins state genocidal practices. Only the affirmative has the hope of radically transforming our present course.

Campbell 3 (Horace, Professor of African American studies and political science at Syracuse University in New York. He is a member of the executive committee of the Black Radical Congress and chairperson of its international caucus, “Beyond Militarism and Terrorism in the Biotech Century: Toward a Culture of Peace and Transformation” Radical History Review 85, 2003, pages 24-36, Project Muse)

In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, and in the wake of the new fight against so-called terrorism, the U.S. population is confronted with militarization and hysteria. The unprecedented powers given to the country's repressive organs erode the basic rights guaranteed in the U.S. Constitution, while the massive rise in the defense budget lends more weight to the militarist elements in the society's leadership. The U.S. government uses the following definition of *terrorism*: "The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political **[End Page 24]** or social objectives." [1](http://80-muse.jhu.edu.proxy.uwlib.uwyo.edu/journals/radical_history_review/v085/85.1campbell.html#FOOT1) Under this definition, any group opposing the conservative militarists and the antiterrorist legislation, or out of favor with those in power, can be arbitrarily criminalized and deemed a terrorist. At the same time, the media is organized in a virtual information war by defining terrorism in a way that leaves the majority of the U.S. citizens living in fear and supporting the vast outlays for military expenditure. Starting from the premise that terrorism is unacceptable and that there must be a clear understanding of what constitutes terrorism, this reflection agrees with the assertion that "terrorism is the use of terrorizing methods of governing or resisting a government." [2](http://80-muse.jhu.edu.proxy.uwlib.uwyo.edu/journals/radical_history_review/v085/85.1campbell.html#FOOT2) It explores how militarism became entrenched in the political culture of the United States and the ways in which the celebration of genocide and wars contribute to the defense of a small minority. The challenge of the society is for the majority of the people, including people of color and women, to grasp the importance of the scientific and technological transformations and to build a new movement to redistribute power, making the society more democratic and moving control away from the one percent of the population who hold political power. I use the term *biotech century* in this essay to refer to the technological changes in biotechnology currently reshaping the meaning of life. [3](http://80-muse.jhu.edu.proxy.uwlib.uwyo.edu/journals/radical_history_review/v085/85.1campbell.html#FOOT3) Jeremy Rifkin explored the ways in which this biotech revolution is overtaking the world and redefining our very existence into something that can be controlled in a test tube. He laid out seven different aspects of what he calls the biotech century's "operational matrix": gene identification and manipulation; genetic patents; the gene industry; engineering and eugenics; sociobiology; genes and computers; and justification through nature. [4](http://80-muse.jhu.edu.proxy.uwlib.uwyo.edu/journals/radical_history_review/v085/85.1campbell.html#FOOT4) It is impossible to explore all of these developments, but the impact of genetic engineering and eugenics on the definition of life and on the idea of who has the right to live as a human being will prove fundamentally important here. This analysis examines the conditions for moving beyond the devaluation of human lives in order to achieve radical transformations creating new forms of community and association able to unleash the creativity of the human spirit. This will be necessary for the revitalization of society away from militarism and the worship of profit. The present global war on terrorism is having a fundamental impact on world politics, and it is within this period of major political, economic, military, and social struggles that my discussion seeks to participate in the support of peace and healing. The history of racial genocide and crimes against humanity has been recounted in so many places that an international constituency has formed, determined to push for peace and international justice. This constituency came together in the historic World Conference against Racism (WCAR) in Durban, South Africa, in September 2001. The forces against globalization, which had demonstrated their presence in Seattle, Nice, Gotenbourg, Genoa, Porto Alegre, and Durban, had exposed the fact that there was a positive force mobilized for peace. The WCAR was **[End Page 25]** of seminal importance in the understanding that there was a renewed sense of solidarity from the forces fighting for a culture of peace. There was a tacit agreement that the rebuilding of international solidarity constituted one of the essential conditions for the establishment of a world system more just than the one currently dominated by the United States. One component of the new peace movement is the demand for reparations. Militarism and the U.S. Capitalist System The major task of those who reject all forms of terrorism is to oppose the spread of U.S. military bases, military clients, intense military spending, and celebration of war at a time when the economic conditions of the vast majority of the population have worsened. Left unchallenged, military spending in the United States will exceed $2 trillion in the next four years. Despite the media's misinformation, which insists on a recovering economy, the majority of low-income people have great difficulty meeting their basic needs, lack adequate health care, and do not have access to relevant education. No less a person than president and former general Dwight Eisenhower warned how weapons manufacturers were shaping the domestic, foreign, and diplomatic policies of the United States. He was the first to use the formulation *military-industrial complex*. [5](http://80-muse.jhu.edu.proxy.uwlib.uwyo.edu/journals/radical_history_review/v085/85.1campbell.html#FOOT5) Since Eisenhower's conjuncture, this complex has expanded into the communication and information arenas. Militarism has been defined as "the pervasiveness in society of symbols, values and discourses validating military power, and preparation for war." [6](http://80-muse.jhu.edu.proxy.uwlib.uwyo.edu/journals/radical_history_review/v085/85.1campbell.html#FOOT6) Usually North American scholars point to Third World countries with authoritarian leaders as examples of militaristic societies. These manifestations of militarism represent one brand, but the militarism of the imperial state is even more formidable than the powers of Third World dictators. Karl Liebknecht, the German revolutionary, recognized the long history of warfare in all modes of production, but he also understood the specific relationship between "warfare and capitalism." [7](http://80-muse.jhu.edu.proxy.uwlib.uwyo.edu/journals/radical_history_review/v085/85.1campbell.html#FOOT7) Scholars still study the impact of German militarism and the interconnections between warfare, eugenics, and fascism to grasp the ways in which capitalist competition and greed fueled war, imperial expansion, and genocide. [8](http://80-muse.jhu.edu.proxy.uwlib.uwyo.edu/journals/radical_history_review/v085/85.1campbell.html#FOOT8) The same glorification of war has now emerged in American culture, the same capitalist competition and the same efforts to control the known and potential resources of the planet. In a slow and pedantic manner, the European Union has sought to deepen the capitalist competition by creating a single currency to compete with the U.S. dollar. Although globalization has been the focus of U.S. financial hegemony, with the resurgence of the European Union and the growing industrial and economic might of the fastest-growing economies, U.S. hegemony increasingly rests on the pillar of the military. An understanding of forward planning and war requires a fundamental grasp **[End Page 26]** of contemporary militarism as the U.S. corporate and bureaucratic leaders prepare the population for wars in all corners of the globe in its fight against the so-called axis of evil. [9](http://80-muse.jhu.edu.proxy.uwlib.uwyo.edu/journals/radical_history_review/v085/85.1campbell.html#FOOT9) At the present conjuncture, where the world metamorphoses from the century of physics and chemistry into the biotech century, far-reaching technological changes with major implications for militarism have taken place. The explosion of information systems forms one component of the general explosion of technological change in a society still guided by the ideas of monopoly-capitalism militarism (or the era of steel and railways). The mechanical representation of life that emanated from this period of Taylorism had its impact on all aspects of U.S. life, including the military. Now, however, forward planning is compounded by the laws of unforeseen circumstances and the complexity of the present international system. This complexity emanates from the multifaceted nature of life and the reality that social phenomena have become far removed from the kind of simplicity, predictability, and determinism associated with the Newtonian machine. Despite the tremendous technological changes that have occurred from the era of iron and steel through the nuclear era to the present era of biotechnology and hydrogen fuel cells, the methods of organizing social life are still based on the ideas of Adam Smith. Urban spaces and the organization of production, consumption, education, and leisure continue to center around the idea of the market's invisible hands, racial hierarchy, and male privilege without regard for the health and safety of the majority. At the level of the factory, the technological revolution has changed the nature of assembly-line production so that the massive number of workers needed at the end of the Second World War is no longer necessary. [10](http://80-muse.jhu.edu.proxy.uwlib.uwyo.edu/journals/radical_history_review/v085/85.1campbell.html#FOOT10)

#### Global capitalism has created a new set of racial circumstances. State policies such as H1B visa programs support systemic racism against Indian Americans, while at the same time African-Americans are exploited by domestic welfare to work programs. Understanding the methods of globalized capitalism in supporting racism requires a dual approach that avoids dangerous Black/White binaries

Banerjee 8 (Payal Banerjee, PhD, Syracuse University, Sociology, Assistant Professor in Sociology at Smith College, “Indian IT Workers and Black TANF Clients in the New Economy: A Comparative Analysis of the Racialization of Immigration and Welfare Policies in the U.S.,” *Race, Gender & Class* 15. 1/2 (2008): 98-114.)

The examination Indian immigrant and Black workers and the ways in which they are regulated by state policies from a comparative perspective, yields significant insights into the race, class, and gender dynamics operating in their respective locations in the U.S. labor market. Immigration restrictions inevitably involve dimensions of race-ethnicity, just as poverty in the U. S. is inextricable from race (Amott & Matthaei, 1991). In the cases analyzed here, visa and workfirst policies seem to reify labor market organization along the lines of race by placing greater leverage in the hands of typical employers of racialized groups. Indian immigrant IT workers and Black welfare clientele continue to confront, as did their predecessors, a historically racialized labor market in the U.S. Indian workers on the H-1B visa in IT occupations, constrained by immigration policy that limits their workplace rights in favor of the interests of capital, encounter a racially segregated IT field in which they, unlike many of their White or citizen counterparts, are excluded from the relatively stable, better-paying, or high-status posts. Comparably, yet distinctively, Black mothers disproportionately face a reformed welfare policy that thrusts them into the realm of low-wage and contingent jobs with employers who may discriminate against them and refuse to make concessions for improving workplace quality and treatment. The juxtaposition of these two labor and racial groups-one in the highskill and so called high-wage service sector and the other in the low-skill and lowwage segment-reveals coimbricated institutional mechanisms of exploitation and subordination organized around race, class, gender, and immigration status in the U.S. during the present era of advanced capitalism. Although not written in terms overtly identifiable as racist, immigration and welfare policies re-inscribe preexisting racial boundaries and racialized hiring practices that have proven so profitable to capital in the past. By placing immigrant IT workers in subordinate and dependant positions in relation to capital and the state, the provisions of the H-1B visa program help meet late capital's continuous demand for flexible and exploitable skilled labor for profit-maximization. WeIfare-to-work performs the same labor-supplying function in the low-wage market. Thus, beneath the transitions within the New Economy lies anti-immigrant and anti-poor sentiments that are most clearly expressed in the welfare and immigration acts of 1996, signed on August 22 and September 30 respectively. Together these acts ended entitlement to financial assistance for the economically disenfranchised and rescinded immigrants' entitlements to a plethora of federally implemented or sponsored social welfare programs and benefits (Fragomen, 1996). The socio-economic positioning of racial minority groups is linked not only by their comparable terms of employment, labor flexibilization, and experiences with exploitative interests of capital accumulation, but also by ideological, and indeed, legislative trends in terms of how state-endorsed policies impact upon people's lives on the basis of their race, class, and immigration status. This essay demonstrates how Indian immigrants in the high-wage/high-skill sector and Black working-class women in the low-wage/low-skill section of the economy share experiences of marginalization in tenuous jobs given the ways in which state policies organize their social position. By invoking the relationship between race and public policy as it shapes labor market experiences of minorities and immigrants of color, this paper raises questions about any neat demarcation between good and bad jobs in the New Economy. There is a significant body of literature that has examined the contours of racialization of low-wage work (Romero, 2002) and another corpus of scholarship that has looked into issues of discrimination and glass ceilings for skilled Indian immigrants (Fernandez, 1998; Verma, 2002). What we underscore through our analysis of how public policies racialize and feminize workers is that, despite differences in gender, class, and educational backgrounds, there are structural parallels in the racial politics of labor that what we need to account for to challenge the binaries between high- and lowskill work and racism in global capitalism. Discussions of race and labor issues in the U.S. have largely been concentrated on the experiences of Black and White people. Moreover, scholarly work on how race, gender, and class issues influence labor market outcomes in the U.S. has seldom explored the connections among neoliberal globalization, racial feminization of labor on a transnational scale, and the state's role in eroding the bargaining power of workers both in the global North and South (Ridzi & Banerjee, 2006). There is a need for future analyses to engage in a comparative approach, such as this research attempts with regard to Indian immigrants and Blacks in the U.S., and to raise questions about racialization in a manner that allows us to address not just inequalities of education or income, but also how state and institutional processes co-emerge and operate in a global context to inform the inequalities of race, gender, and class.

#### Radical critique now is necessary to halt the spread of authoritarianism and a permanent state of war. Challenging the spread of surveillance, indefinite detention, and pre-emptive strikes is crucial to stop the destruction of the planet.

Dawson 7 (Ashley, Prof English @ CUNY, and Malini Johar Schueller, Prof English Univ of FLA, “Introduction: Rethinking Empire Today,” in Exceptional State: Contemporary US Culture and the New Imperialism)

Similarly, belief in US technological dominance combines with an anxiety about shadowy terrorists breaking through high-tech security systems to legitimate spiraling forms of surveillance such as the Total Information Awareness program.69 Popular authoritarianism is, in other words, firmly linked to a formation of intersecting markers of identity whose instability must constantly be repressed by strident evocations of patriotism. To engage in the critique of contemporary US imperialism is therefore to examine and disturb the nexus of raced, gendered, and classed representations of imperial national identity articulated by the Bush regime. The political implications of such scholarly work arc clearer today than ever before. The Bush administration explicitly set out to cow critics of its policies by invoking a strident patriotism that viewed all dissent as treason. Scholarly work in the humanities has been particularly targeted for surveillance and disciplining with neocon ideologues such as Lynn Cheney and Daniel Pipes engaged in a project to purge US academia of progressive scholars. Witness Daniel Pipes's Web site Campus Watch, which published dossiers of eight supposedly anti-American Middle East studies faculty in an attempt to discredit their work.

The American Council of Trustees and Alumni (acta), the group with which Lynne Cheney and Joe Lieberman are associated, issued a report entitled "Defending Civilization: How Our Universities Are Failing America." This report published its blacklist of forty professors and argued that colleges and university faculty were the weak link in America's response to September 11.70 More ominously, hr 3077 seeks to monitor Middle East studies through a board that includes members from the Department of Homeland Security. Given such repressive moves by the state, including the attempt by the Uni­versity of Colorado to fire professor Ward Churchill for the remarks he made about 9/11, we believe that we have a responsibility to challenge the seemingly inexorable slide of the United States toward belligerence and authoritarianism at home and abroad. Let us be very clear about one thing: imperial US policies threaten the future of humanity and the planet in the most immediate way. By providing prominent and emerging scholars with a venue to analyze the cul­tural contradictions of contemporary US imperialism, we intend to highlight and challenge the role of US culture in perpetuating popular authoritarianism. In addition, we believe that *Exceptional State* contributes to the struggle against the new imperialism by delineating strains of anti-authoritarian culture in the United States today that resonate and articulate solidarity with the emerging movement for global social justice. We thus intend our work to provide tools with which to dismantle coercive US power both domestically and interna­tionally. Although the past thirty years have offered scant hope, we believe that there are viable alternatives to a world of indefinite detentions, preemptive strikes, and perpetual warfare. **19-20**

#### Absolute rejection of state-sponsored murder is the only possible conclusion. State calculations of value inevitably render certain bodies invisible. Only by affirming the invaluable nature of life can we prevent trading bodies for security.

Dillon 99 (Michael, Professor of Politics and International Relations – University of Lancaster, “Another Justice”, Political Theory, 27(2), April, p. 164-165)

Quite the reverse. The subject was never a firm foundation for justice, much less a hospitable vehicle for the reception of the call of another Justice. It was never in possession of that self-possession which was supposed to secure the certainty of itself, of a self-possession that would enable it ultimately to adjudicate everything. The very indexicality required of sovereign subjectivity gave rise rather to a commensurability much more amenable to the expendability required of the political and material economies of mass societies than it did to the singular, invaluable, and uncanny uniqueness of the self. The value of the subject became the standard unit of currency for the political arithmetic of States and the political economies of capitalism. They trade in it still to devastating global effect. The technologisation of the political has become manifest and global. Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability. Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. Once rendered calculable, however, units of account are necessarily submissible not only to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation. Devaluation, logically, can extend to the point of counting as nothing. Hence, no mensuration without demensuration either. There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of holocaust. However liberating and emancipating systems of value-rights-may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted out, the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life. Herewith, then, the necessity of championing the invaluable itself. For we must never forget that, “we are dealing always with whatever exceeds measure.” But how does that necessity present itself? Another Justice answers: as the surplus of the duty to answer to the claim of Justice over rights. Tha**t** duty, as with the advent of another Justice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the human way of being.

##  2AC

### 2AC – Overview

#### **Rejecting the possibility that life can be calculated is crucial to avoid the repetition of the Holocaust – Nazi Germany sought to *immunize* the body politic and expunge the inhuman element. We stand on the cusp of a new bio-political expansion, remembering that genocide is NOT impossible and that the final solution is only a few steps away**

Esposito 12 (Esposito, R., Vice Director of the Istituto Italiano di Scienze Umane, Full Professor of Theoretical Philosophy, and the coordinator of the doctoral programme in Philosophy, R.N. Welch, and V. Lemm. Terms of the Political: Community, Immunity, Biopolitics: Community, Immunity, Biopolitics. Fordham University Press, 2012, p. 84-87)

We know that Michel Foucault interpreted this thanatopolitical dialectic in terms of biopolitics: As soon as power [potere] takes up life itself as an object of calculation and an instrument for its own ends, it becomes possible, at least in certain conditions, for power in decide in sacrifice one part of the population to benefit another. Without undermining the importance of Foucault's reading, I don't believe it explains everything. Why did Nazism, unlike all other forms of power past and present, push this homicidal possibility to its fullest realization? Why did it, and only it, reverse the proportion between life and death in favor of the latter, to the point of planning its own self-destruction? I suggest that the category of biopolitics must be merged with that of immunization. Only immunization lays bare the lethal knot that thrusts the protection of life toward its potential negation. Furthermore, through the figure of autoimmune disease, the category of immunization identifies the threshold beyond which the protective apparatus attacks the very body that it should protect. Moreover, the fact that the sickness from which Nazism intended to defend the German people wasn't just any disease but an infectious disease illustrates that immunization is the interpretative key most apt for understanding the specificity of Nazism. What Nazism wanted to avoid at all costs was the contagion of superior beings by inferior beings. The deadly battle that was waged and disseminated by the regimes propaganda placed the originally healthy body and blood of the German nation in opposition to the invasive germs that had penetrated the nation with the intent of sapping its unity and its very life. The repertoire that the Reich's ideologues employed to portray their alleged enemies and most of all the Jews is well known: They were, at once, "bacilli," "bacteria," "viruses" "parasites" and "microbes." Andrzej Kaminski recalls that even interned Soviets were at times defined in similar terms. Moreover, characterizing Jews as parasites is part of the secular history of (not exclusively) German anti-Judaism. Still, in the Nazi vocabulary, such a definition acquires a different meaning. It was as if something that had remained up to a certain point a loaded metaphor actually took on a physical shape [corpo]. This is the effect of the total biologization of the lexicon I referred to above: Jews do not resemble parasites, they do not behave like bacteria—they *are* such things. And they are treated as such. Thus the correct term for their massacre, which is anything but a sacred "holocaust," is extermination: something that is carried out against insects, rats, or lice. In this way, we must ascribe an entirely literal meaning to Himmler’s words to the SS officers at Kharkov that "anti-Semitism is like a dis-infestation. Removing lice is not an ideological question, but a question of hygiene [*pulizia*]. Moreover, Hitler himself used even more precise immunological terminology: "'The discovery of the Jewish virus is one of the great revolutions of this world. The battle in which we are engaged today is of the same sort as the battle waged, during the last century by Pasteur and Koch ... We shall regain our health only by eliminating the Jews.” We ought not blur the difference between this approach, which is bacteriological, and one that is simply racial. The final solution waged against the Jews has precisely such a biological-immunitarian characterization. Even the gas used in the camps flowed through shower pipes that were used tor disinfection; but disinfecting Jews was impossible, because they were the bacteria from which one needed to rid oneself. The identification between man and pathogens reached such a point that the Warsaw ghetto was intentionally built on an already contaminated site. In this way, like a self-fulfilling prophecy, Jews fell victim to the same sickness that had justified their ghettoization. Finally, they had really become infected and thus agents of infection. Doctors therefore had good reason to exterminate them. Naturally, this representation was in patent contrast with the Mendelian theory of the genetic, and therefore not contagious, character of racial determination. For precisely this reason, the only way to stop the impossible contagion seemed to be to eliminate all of its possible carriers, and not only them but also all Germans who may have already been contaminated, as well as all those who may have eventually been so in the future, and, once the war was lost and the Russians were a few kilometers from Hitler's bunker, quite simply everyone. Here the immunitary paradigm of Nazi biopolitics reaches the height of its auto-genocidal fury. As in the most devastating autoimmune disease, the defensive potential of the immune system turns against itself. The only possible outcome is generalized destruction. What about us? The sixty years that separate us from the end of those tragic events form a barrier that nevertheless appears difficult to overcome. It's truly difficult to imagine that it could happen again, at least in the ever-larger space that we still call the West. We wouldn't be theorists of immunization if we thought that the twelve-year Nazi experience failed to produce sufficient antibodies to protect us from its return. Still, such common sense rationalizations aren't able to bring to a close a discourse that, as we’ve said, remains with us. I'd even add that not only is the problem, or the terrifying laceration, opened by Nazism anything but definitively healed but, in a certain way, it seems to come closer to our condition the more our condition exceeds the confines of modernity. We might best measure the enduring relevance of Nazism's foundational presuppositions from the vantage point or the final collapse or Soviet communism. The relationship between the two is far from casual: The definitive consummation of the communist philosophy of history that favored the reemergence of the question of life was, after all, at the heart of Nazi semantics. Furthermore, never as today has *bíos* if not *zoé*, been the point of intersection for all political, social, economic, and technological practices. This is why, once the conceptual lexicon (if not the political exigency) of communism was worn out, we turned to reckon with that of Nazism, only to find it stamped across our foreheads. Whoever deluded him- or herself at the end of the war, or even in the postwar era, into thinking it was possible to reactivate the old categories of the democracies who emerged as the official winners of the battle got it all wrong. It's utopian to argue that the complexity of the globalized world, with its sharp imbalances in wealth, power, and demographic density, can be governed with the ineffectual instruments of international law or with those left over from the traditional sovereign powers. To do so would be to fail to understand that we're approaching a threshold that's just as dramatic as the one that separated the 1920s and 1930s. Just as then, though in a different way, the soldering of politics to life makes all of the traditional theoretical and institutional categories, beginning with that of representation, irrelevant. A glance at the panorama that inaugurates the beginning of the twenty-first century is enough to give us a striking picture: from the explosion of biological terrorism to the preventative war that attempts to respond to it on its own terrain, from ethnic—that is, biological—massacres to the mass migrations that sweep away the barriers that are intended to contain them, from technologies that invest not only individual bodies but also the traits of the species to psychopharmacology that modifies our vital behaviors, from environmental politics to the explosion of new epidemics, from the reopening of concentration camps in different areas of the world to the blurring of the juridical distinction between norm and exception—all of this while everywhere a new and potentially devastating immunitary syndrome breaks out once again, uncontrollably. As we’ve said, none of this replicates what happened from 1933 to 1945. But nothing is entirely external to the questions of life and death that were posed then. To say that we are, now more than ever, on the reverse side of Nazism means that it isn't possible to rid ourselves of it by simply averting our gaze. To truly overturn it, to throw it back into the hell whence it came, we must consciously cross through that darkness once again and respond quite differently to the same questions that gave rise to it.

### 2AC- Alt Links to Offense

#### Alternative Fails - Acknowledging the complexity of oppression and identity formation requires rejecting an either/or dichotomy of ethnicity and race. Jewish identity demonstrates the fluidity with which societies construct an “other” to be conveniently destroyed. We ignore this history at our peril.

Greenebaum 2000 (Jessica Greenebaum Ph.D. in Sociology, 2000. Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. Syracuse University., “Placing Jewish Women into the Intersectionality of Race, Class and Gender,” *Race, Gender & Class*, Vol. 6, No. 4, Race, Gender & Class: American Jewish Perspectives (1999), pp. 41-60)

Race and Ethnicity: Constructing Jews as 'not quite white9 As used by the social sciences, the categories race and ethnicity maintain an either/or dichotomy. On the one hand, people must choose between their race (biology) or their ethnicity (cultural defined) as their primary identity (yet, often these identities are forced upon - not a choice). On the other hand, the constructed categories race and ethnicity have been reduced to one, non-differentiated category (Oommen 1994:83-4). Either way, to simplify the categories is to simplify people and the identities they construct. Exploring the racial and ethnic identities of Jewish women help us to see the complex natures of these terms. The orthodoxy of race has traditionally concerned itself with "people of color" and many Christians consider Judaism 'just' a religion. Although this paper focuses on white (Ashkenazi) Jewish women in America, it is important to note that Sephardic and non-white Jews exist. These women suffer racial oppression in addition to religious and gender oppression. However, Sephardic Jews do not always feel welcomed in the community entitled 'people of color.' Robin Schaer (1993:20) explains her feelings of alienation from other people of color. Once I said I was Jewish, not Latina, I felt people's interest in me diminish. It was painful to realize that though my appearance remained the same, my value as a person within a self-consciously multi-cultural context lessened because I was a Jew. This experience denies the existence of Jewish women of color. Even within the group of white Jews complexities arise. Since, the category whiteness is historically and culturally located, the "...cultural construction race is unstable and has different meanings and different purposes in different times and places..." (Kaminsky 1994:7-8). People did not always consider Jews white - as they do today in America. Defining Jews as a race in itself was central to the rise of Nazism and the expansion of the 'political right' in Europe. Conversion could no longer correct the flawed Jew. A Jew was a Jew by blood, not religion or culture (Kren 1978:291). According to Colette Guillamin, "The change in the meaning of the term 'race' from nobility, blood, family, household, to Arab, Asiatic, Jew, Israelite, Negro, Black is one which passed almost unnoticed" (Guillamin 1995:44). The shift from legal category to genetic category displays the political construct of race, produced by the dominant group to create an 'othering' ideology. This occurred during Nazi Germany and continues to flourish in white supremacist ideology. White Jews are themselves victims of racism. Despite color or ethnicity, Jews are seen as a despised race by Aryan supremacist groups and are one of their two principal targets. And white Jews were killed en masse in Nazi Germany (Burstow 1 992: 1 9).

**2AC A2 Wilderson**

**Wilderson’s conception of social death is based off of a flawed methodology which interrupts the transformative potential of the African Diaspora**

**BÂ 2011** – Portsmouth University (SAËR MATY, “The US Decentred: From Black Social Death to Cultural Transformation,” Cultural Studies Review, volume 17 number 2 September 2011)

A few pages into Red, White and Black, I feared that it would just be a matter of time before **Wilderson’s black‐as‐social‐death idea** and multiple attacks on issues and scholars he disagrees with **run** (him) **into (theoretical) trouble**. This happens in chapter two, ‘The Narcissistic Slave’, where he critiques black film theorists and books. For example, Wilderson declares that Gladstone Yearwood’s Black Film as Signifying Practice (2000) ‘betrays a kind of conceptual anxiety with respect to the historical object of study— ... it clings, anxiously, to the film‐as‐text‐as‐legitimateobject of Black cinema.’ (62) He then quotes from Yearwood’s book to highlight ‘just how vague the aesthetic foundation of Yearwood’s attempt to construct a canon can be’. (63) And yet Wilderson’s highlighting is problematic because it overlooks the ‘Diaspora’ or ‘African Diaspora’, a key component in Yearwood’s thesis that, crucially, neither navel‐gazes (that is, at the US or black America) nor pretends to properly engage with black film. Furthermore, Wilderson separates the different waves of black film theory and approaches them, only, in terms of how a most recent one might challenge its precedent. Again, his approach is problematic because it does not mention or emphasise the inter‐connectivity of/in black film theory. As a case in point, Wilderson does not link Tommy Lott’s mobilisation of Third Cinema for black film theory to Yearwood’s idea of African Diaspora. (64) Additionally, of course, Wilderson seems unaware that Third Cinema itself has been fundamentally questioned since Lott’s 1990s’ theory of black film was formulated. Yet another consequence of **ignoring the African Diaspora** is that it **exposes Wilderson’s corpus of films as unable to carry the weight of the transnational argument he attempts to advance.** Here, **beyond the US‐centricity** or ‘social **and political specificity of [his] filmography’**, (95) I am talking about Wilderson’s choice of films. For example, Antwone Fisher (dir. Denzel Washington, 2002) is attacked unfairly for failing to acknowledge ‘a grid of captivity across spatial dimensions of the Black “body”, the Black “home”, and the Black “community”’ (111) while films like Alan and Albert Hughes’s Menace II Society (1993), overlooked, do acknowledge the same grid and, additionally, problematise Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act (STEP) policing. The above examples expose the fact of Wilderson’s dubious and questionable conclusions on black film. **Red, White and Black is particularly undermined by Wilderson’s** propensity for **exaggeration and blinkeredness**. In chapter nine, ‘“Savage” Negrophobia’, he writes: The philosophical anxiety of Skins is all too aware that through the Middle Passage, African culture became Black ‘style’ ... Blackness can be placed and displaced with limitless frequency and across untold territories, by whoever so chooses. Most important, there is nothing real Black people can do to either check or direct this process ... Anyone can say ‘nigger’ because anyone can be a ‘nigger’. (235)7 Similarly, in chapter ten, ‘A Crisis in the Commons’, Wilderson addresses the issue of ‘Black time’. Black is irredeemable, he argues, because, at no time in history had it been deemed, or deemed through the right historical moment and place. In other words, the black moment and place are not right because they are ‘the ship hold of the Middle Passage’: ‘the most coherent temporality ever deemed as Black time’ but also ‘the “moment” of no time at all on the map of no place at all’. (279) Not only does Pinho’s more mature analysis expose this point as preposterous (see below), **I** also **wonder what Wilderson makes of the countless** historians’ and sociologists’ **works on slave ships, shipboard insurrections and/during the Middle Passage**,8 or of groundbreaking jazz‐studies books on cross‐cultural dialogue like The Other Side of Nowhere (2004). Nowhere has another side, but **once Wilderson theorises blacks as socially and ontologically dead while dismissing jazz as ‘belonging nowhere** and to no one, simply there for the taking’, (225**) there seems to be no way back.** It is therefore hardly surprising that Wilderson ducks the need to provide a solution or alternative to both his sustained bashing of blacks and anti‐ Blackness.9 Last but not least, Red, White and Black ends like a badly plugged announcement of a bad Hollywood film’s badly planned sequel: ‘How does one deconstruct life? Who would benefit from such an undertaking? The coffle approaches with its answers in tow.’ (340)

**This logic of social death replicates the violence of the middle passage – this takes out their arguments and is an impact turn to the alt**

**Brown 2009** – professor of history and of African and African American Studies specializing in Atlantic Slavery (Vincent, “Social Death and Political Life in the Study of Slavery,” http://history.fas.harvard.edu/people/faculty/documents/brown-socialdeath.pdf)

But this was not the emphasis of Patterson’s argument. As a result, those he has inspired have often conflated his exposition of slaveholding ideology with a description of the actual condition of the enslaved. Seen as a state of being, the concept of **social death is** ultimately **out of place in the political history of slavery. If studies** of slavery would **account for the** outlooks and **maneuvers of the enslaved as** an **important** part of that history, **scholars would do better to keep in view** the struggle against alienation rather than alienation itself. To see social death as a productive peril entails a subtle but significant shift in perspective, from seeing slavery as a condition to viewing enslavement as a predicament, in which **enslaved Africans and their descendants never ceased to pursue a politics of belonging, mourning, accounting, and regeneration**. In part, the usefulness of social death as a concept depends on what scholars of slavery seek to explain—black pathology or black politics, resistance or attempts to remake social life? For too long, debates about whether there were black families took precedence over discussions of how such families were formed; disputes about whether African culture had “survived” in the Americas overwhelmed discussions of how particular practices mediated slaves’ attempts to survive; and scholars felt compelled to prioritize the documentation of resistance over the examination of political strife in its myriad forms. But of course, because slaves’ social and political life grew directly out of the violence and dislocation of Atlantic slavery, these are false choices. And we may not even have to choose between tragic and romantic modes of storytelling, for history tinged with romance may offer the truest acknowledgment of the tragedy confronted by the enslaved: it took heroic effort for them to make social lives. There is romance, too, in the tragic fact that although scholars may never be able to give a satisfactory account of the human experience in slavery, they nevertheless continue to try. If scholars were to emphasize the efforts of the enslaved more than the condition of slavery, **we might at least tell richer stories about how the endeavors of the weakest and most abject have at times reshaped the world. The history of their** social and political **lives lies between resistance and oblivion, not in the nature of their condition but in their continuous struggles to remake it. Those struggles are slavery’s bequest to us.**

### A2: No Method

#### The affirmative’s presentation of experiences opens up the possibility of connection and collaboration, it is an effective critical consciousness

Osajima 7 (Keith Osajima is a professor and Director of the Race and Ethnic Studies Program at the University of Redlands. REPLENISHING THE RANKS: Raising Critical Consciousness Among Asian Americans; JOURNAL OF ASIAN AMERICAN STUDIES (JAAS), February, Volume 10, No. 1; p. 64

First, respondents described the importance of obtaining information and conceptual tools that helped them to cognitively understand how their lives and the lives of others are shaped by larger historical and social structural forces. An Asian American Studies course on a college campus was the most common source of relevant information, but as we have seen exposure can take place in many venues. People can learn from reading on their own, from student groups, and from multimedia sources. Second, breaking through isolation and interrupting the tendency to explain their life experiences solely in individual terms reflects a social dimension to conscientization. Contact and conversation with other Asian Americans was often the most effective way to help respondents make connections between their lives, the experiences of others, and information on the Asian American experience. Connections to key mentors and peers provided a safe environment in which to think and question further. Third, respondents described important affective aspects of conscientization. When respondents talked about important moments in their education or key social support that made a difference, invariably they referred to how they felt about these experiences. They were angered by the realization that their schooling had not taught them about racism or the Asian American experience. They felt inspired by the experiences of other Asian Americans who struggled to overcome harsh conditions. They were excited to learn more. Fourth, respondents’ commitment to Asian American issues was deepened when they transformed understanding into action. Involvement in protests, organizing, programming, teaching, and research gave respondents a chance to extend their knowledge and learn from efforts to make change. Finally, the study indicates that conscientization occurs when the discrete elements work in combination. No respondent described his or her conscientization in terms of a single element. It was not a purely intellectual or cognitive experience in a classroom, absent of social or affective elements. Nor was it a purely social or affective experience without information and conceptual tools. Instead, respondents described multifaceted and interrelated experiences that reinforced each other, inspiring further thinking and commitment to action. For activists seeking to raise the critical consciousness of Asian Americans, the study’s findings carry implications for practice. For some, combining elements in a single venue, like an introductory course or a training program, will be the main focus. In these cases, the study suggests that the course or program should offer substantive content and concepts to lay the cognitive foundation needed for people to see themselves in relation to the world. It also should include social activities to break isolation and opportunities for people to share stories with each other in a non-judgmental, safe environment. On a broader level, the study suggests that there is a value in and need to offer a range of experiences across campus and community to increase the likelihood that students will combine, on their own, elements that contribute to conscientization. Pressure to have one person, course, or program that single-handedly transforms students’ lives subsides when we recognize that the interrelated process of conscientization benefits from contributions across diverse segments of the community. The importance of combining influences also casts new light on how different parts of the campus and community can work collaboratively to raise critical consciousness. Breaking from binary constructions that often pit academic programs against student life activities, or divide academe from community, the study shows how conscientization arises when people are exposed to and combine lessons learned from a variety of sources. This process implies that increased appreciation for the work done across campus and community, along with greater coordination of influences, is an important dimension of conscientization.

### 2AC – Perm/No Tradeoff

#### Examining the historic oppression of Jewish people doesn’t trade off with a focus on Racism, infusing a recognition of Anti-Semitism into the dialogue is necessary to challenge contemporary white supremacy – rejecting our affirmative to focus on racial oppression is the ultimate self-defeating strategy, only the permutation offers the possibility for radical critique

Greenebaum 2000 (Jessica Greenebaum Ph.D. in Sociology, 2000. Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs. Syracuse University., “Placing Jewish Women into the Intersectionality of Race, Class and Gender,” *Race, Gender & Class*, Vol. 6, No. 4, Race, Gender & Class: American Jewish Perspectives (1999), pp. 41-60)

As stated earlier, feminists do not want to deal with yet "another issue" (anti- Semitism) that divides feminists. Others reject the need to fight specifically against anti-Semitism since they equate anti-Semitism with racism. But, while anti-Semitism and racism fall under the umbrella category of oppression, they are not identical. First of all, racism only focuses on people of color, and as stated earlier, Jews do not easily fit this category. Secondly, condensing these two forms of oppression into one category can be insulting to both experiences. African Americans did not lose one-third of their population to a Holocaust; and similarly, American Jews were never slaves in the land in which they currently reside and which continues to block their success (while we should remember that Jews were also slaves in Egypt, this is not comparable to the African experience in America). While racism and anti-Semitism diverge; they are not "equal" oppressions. Jenny Bourne argues that "the politics of equal oppressions, in sum, is ahistorical in that it equates oppressions across the board without relating each to its specific history..." (Bourne 1987:16). Institutionalized racism currently exists in our economic system of Capitalism, the law and the judicial system, as well as our educational and health care systems (Bourne 1987: 14-15). However, to ignore anti-Semitism on the basis that Jews are "less oppressed" also ignores history. While Jews do not experience the same daily exploitation, we must remember that Jews consistently experienced persecution throughout history (the crusades, Spanish Inquisition, 19th century Pogroms, and the Holocaust are only a few examples). According to Stein, there is a revival of anti-Semitism in the world resulting from the end of the Cold War. The downfall of the Soviet Union has banished the idea of a 'world enemy.' Thus, America needs to recreate a new enemy, "conversely, resurgent anti-Semitism is a marker of the collapse of old, once-reliable boundaries (Stein 1 994:45). Stein argues that there has been a switch to a domestic cold war since we still have not found a replacement enemy for the Soviet Union. The dynamics in Europe, as well, have turned politically 'right. ' Whether or not a recurrence of anti- Semitism is a response to the geopolitical changes, Stein still makes some interesting points concerning Jews and anti-Semitism. He claims that "if Jews did not exist, it would be necessary to invent them, for what is eternal is their function in the unconscious of the world. Jews are an idea, a mental representation, as well as a people" (Stein 1994:42). Rather than a narcissistic assumption of group importance (Stein 1 994:42), I believe this shows the pertinence of destroying group hatred of any kind, for any group can become the "Jew." Pedraza-Bailey points to this 'othering' dynamic of immigrants all over the world being equated with the social position of the Jew. The Chinese in Southeast Asia were often called "the Jews of the East," Asians in East Africa "the Jews of Africa," and most recently, Cubans "The Jews of the Caribbean" (Pedraza-Bailey 1990: 56). Although we can infer from this quote that anti-Semitism is not just a 'Jewish' problem, the resistance to anti-Semitism as a focus of oppression still exists. People of color often claim that Jewish focus on anti-Semitism is racist, as if Jews cannot work on both of these issues simultaneously. In actuality, since anti- Semitism and racism, as well as classism and sexism, are fundamentally connected under a system of domination, we must fight all together. Thus, we cannot have a dialogue that blames the other (Jew or black) for being more anti-Semitic or racist than the average "white" Christian. While individual Jewish racism and black anti- Semitism do exist, we must place it in a context of our white supremacist society (Hooks 1995:210). All people in our society internalize hatred and are capable of being racist or anti- Jewish since our culture makes a habit of socially constructing "the other." While power is a necessary ingredient, individuals do not need to be in a power position to hold anti-Jewish sentiment.

**2AC Black/White Binary**

#### Their focus on the unique nature of the Black experience marginalizes other minority groups and reifies the Black/White binary. Their discursive approach shapes scholarship and practice.

**Luna**, Fall **2003** (Eduardo – J.D. from the University of California, Berkeley, How the Black/White Paradigm Renders Mexicans/Mexican Americans and Discrimination Against Them Invisible, Berkeley La Raza Law Journal, p. Lexis-Nexis)

Thomas Kuhn, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, details the manner in which paradigms influence the structure and interpretation of knowledge. n6 While there are limits to what we can know, paradigms are commonly used in the sciences. They influence our understanding of **all knowledge** and fields of study; **interpretations of race and ethnic relations are no exception**. n7 Scholars of race/ethnic relations in the United States frequently employ paradigms to structure their arguments. n8 Paradigms **determine** what **information** is **relevant** and establish intellectual boundaries. However, because they limit the field of relevant information, paradigms necessarily render scholarship incomplete. Because the [\*227] Black/White binary paradigm limits analysis concerning race/ethnic relations almost **exclusively** to **Black contributions and experiences**, scholarship utilizing the paradigm is also **incomplete**. Although others exist, today the Black/White paradigm is the most **pervasive** and **influential** in **shaping our understanding of race/ethnicity** in the United States. n9 Scholars of race/ethnic relations, and mainstream Americans in general, have focused almost exclusively on Black experiences in, and contributions to, civil rights struggles. The common thread of the Black/White paradigm is that race/ethnicity consists, either exclusively or **primarily**, of Whites and Blacks. n10 The Black/White paradigm **limits the relevancy of race/ethnic relations** to include **only the experiences of Blacks**; it **omits the experiences of other minority communities**. n11 This omission is not problematic in and of itself. After all, if Blacks were the only significant contributors to civil rights or public school desegregation, then scholarship utilizing the Black/White paradigm would accurately reflect those contributions. However, this is not the case. Despite common misconceptions, Mexicans/Mexican Americans have contributed significantly to general civil rights struggles and specifically to public school desegregation. n12 B. How the Black/White Paradigm Renders Latinos Invisible As this Article will discuss, Mexicans/Mexican Americans have not only struggled to end segregation for their own community, but have also contributed to similar efforts to promote the civil rights of Blacks. n13 Furthermore, it is worth noting that Mexicans'/Mexican Americans' contributions were neither sporadic nor insignificant. Rather, these contributions have contributed to civil rights efforts generally, and desegregation specifically, for as long as their Black counterparts. n14 This fact is worth noting because it more completely describes the civil rights history of the United States. Lamentably, scholars all too often overlook this chapter in the book of legal history. Furthermore, discussion of Mexican/Mexican American contributions to civil rights is particularly important because some legal scholars, including several of the most eminent, have characterized non-Black minorities' contributions to civil rights as secondary to those of Blacks at best, and at worst, have omitted their contributions altogether. For instance, Cornell West describes non-Black minorities' contributions to civil rights as "slight though significant." n15 [\*228] West's description of Latino, Asian, and Native American contributions is important for a number of reasons. First, despite the context of West's characterization, a brief paragraph where he argues that "a prophetic framework encourages a coalition strategy," n16 his statement exemplifies the misconception that Latino civil rights struggles are minimal. Students of civil rights history **read scholarship** by renowned authors like West to **guide them through their study of the subject**. With this in mind, it is no mystery that students' understanding of the subject **frequently mirrors the incomplete texts from which they read**. If the history of civil rights is **inaccurately written**, then how can we expect students to understand it any differently? As long as civil rights scholarship is **incompletely written**, students and their scholarship will **reflect** the aforementioned **flaws** and fail to include the continuing civil rights struggles of Mexicans/Mexican Americans and other communities of color. Second, for better or worse, the scholarship of renowned authors limits what is considered relevant in a field of study. n17 Scholarship by well-known authors tends to be regarded as definitive. As a result, laypersons and students alike often **fail to discern the scholarships' omissions**. Because race/ethnicity scholarship is **heavily influenced by the Black/White paradigm**, it often fails to include the history of non-Black communities of color. Therefore, whether they like it or not, celebrated civil rights authors cannot afford to omit or marginalize the contributions of Mexicans/Mexican Americans and other non-Black communities of color. Current race/ethnicity scholarship is embarrassingly incomplete and does a disservice to the many people who struggled in the Civil Rights Movement and to those who study it today. Having accepted the adulation and economic benefits that come with academic celebrity, it is appropriate to hold such authors to the highest standards of accuracy and completeness. n18 Despite a rich legal history, race/ethnicity scholarship is virtually void of descriptions of the struggles of Mexicans/Mexican Americans. Perhaps the most unsettling aspect of this omission is that it is deliberate. C. Justifications for the Black/White Paradigm: The Deliberate Omission of Mexican/Mexican American Civil Rights History Among the common justifications scholars offer for deliberately omitting Mexican/Mexican American civil rights history is that Mexicans/Mexican Americans do not suffer from discrimination. If Mexicans/Mexican Americans are not omitted completely, they are often only marginally covered as compared to the treatment afforded to Blacks. For instance, Andrew Hacker in his celebrated book Two Nations: Black and White, Separate, Hostile, Unequal describes Mexicans/Mexican Americans, Asians/Asian Americans and other immigrant groups as less affected by discrimination because, "**none of the presumptions of inferiority associated with Africa and slavery are imposed on these other ethnicities**." n19 [\*229] Hacker's assertion is flawed. True, immigrant communities do not have the same association with slavery that Blacks do, but a history of slavery exists nonetheless. n20 Mexicans/Mexican Americans and other immigrants do not suffer any less from discrimination than Blacks do. In fact, socioeconomic indicators suggest that racial/ethnic discrimination has currently waged a greater toll on Mexicans/Mexican Americans than Blacks. Latinos are the largest minority group in the United States. n21 Additionally, socioeconomic indicators, such as poverty, median household income, school segregation and access to universities suggest that Mexicans/Mexican Americans currently suffer most from discrimination. n22 While immigrant groups may not be subject to the presumptions of inferiority based on an association with slavery, they suffer from discrimination nonetheless. Their position at the bottom of the socioeconomic hierarchy makes this evident. n23 The omission of Mexicans'/Mexican Americans' civil rights struggles suggests that they have not suffered from discrimination, or even worse, that Mexicans/Mexican Americans never resisted discrimination. **Neither is true**. Another justification for the Black/White paradigm is "black exceptionalism." Describing this claim, Angela Harris, a professor of law at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law (Boalt Hall), writes, "African Americans play a unique and central role in American social, political, cultural, and economic life, and have done so since the nation's founding." n24 I do not dispute that Black exceptionalism presents a strong justification for the Black/White paradigm. The Black community has uniquely shaped contemporary understandings of race. Additionally, I agree with both Harris's and Hacker's assertions that Blacks' **unique association with slavery** has **influenced subsequent discrimination** based on race/ethnicity in the United States **like no other community**. However, the claim becomes dangerous where it **exclusively focuses** on the Black experience at the **expense of omitting the experiences of others**.

**This paradigm actively places non-black minorities as aliens within society – that results in racial exclusion and socially constructs multiple threats**

**Lugay 5** (Arvin – J.D., University of California, Berkeley School of Law, “Book Review: "In Defense of Internment": Why Some Americans Are More "Equal" than Others”, 2005, 12 Asian L.J. 209, lexis)

**This black/white paradigm** **is further complicated by other racial groups**; the paradigm deals with those who are neither black nor white **by construing them as aliens**. One of the critical features of the legal status and racial identity of non-black racial minorities is **the notion of "foreignness.**" n119 This previously underexamined dimension of the relationship between race and law sheds light not only on the Japanese American internment, but on contemporary debate as well. n120 "Most important in this development has been the persistence of the view **that even American-born non-Whites were somehow "foreign**.'" n121 Natsu Tailor Saito explains that, The Japanese American internment cases could not be explained merely by race or, alternately, by alienage. Acts that could not be justified in the name of race **were done in the name of alienage** and vice versa. There was overlap and slippage, a legalistic sleight of hand. The racialized identification of Japanese Americans as foreign - regardless of their citizenship - allowed for otherwise **unlawful actions to be taken** against United States citizens. n122 Michelle Malkin relies heavily on the racialization of Japanese Americans (in the context of the internment) and Arab Americans (in the context of the "War on Terror") as disloyal foreigners to justify her dismissal of civil liberties. Malkin and American legal history share a larger racial ideology that defines American national identity through the exclusion of people who do not fit a certain white racial paradigm. Critical race theory teaches that the law not only reflects social institutions such as race, **but also actively constructs them**. n123 The law has helped define the boundaries of racial groups. n124 Far from being a matter of skin color or biology, critical race theory defines race as a social construct. Professor Ian F. Haney Lopez lists four important facets to the social construction of race: First, humans rather than abstract social forces produce races. Second, as human constructs, races constitute an integral part of a whole social fabric that includes gender and class relations. Third, the meaning-systems [\*223] surrounding race change quickly rather than slowly. Finally, races are constructed relationally, against one another, rather than in isolation. n125 In the American legal context, racial differences are societal creations that justify the retention of power by one group - **whites** - over other groups, **those who are not white**. n126 Courts have struggled to define race and have not successfully done so because they have ignored the historical significance of the social creation of racial difference as a hegemonic device. n127 Historically, our government and legal system have often officially approved of the presumption that non-white immigrants are disloyal. n128 This has helped to inscribe disloyalty as a racial characteristic. n129 This presumption of disloyalty is an underlying rationale for the creation of laws that **ensured the exclusion of non-white immigrant** out-groups. These laws kept such groups from becoming legally and socially integrated into the predominantly white American social fabric. Such laws include the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 (which barred entry of Chinese laborers into the United States), n130 citizenship laws that prevented many non-white immigrants from gaining U.S. citizenship, n131 and the Alien Land Laws (which prevented people incapable of proving loyalty through citizenship from owning land). n132 In the case of the Japanese internment, federal law denied Japanese naturalization and prevented their immigration; state law prevented property ownership and intermarriage with Whites; and economic discrimination limited professional and employment opportunities. n133 Courts used these exclusionary laws to justify further oppression. For example, the Supreme Court in Hirabayashi reasoned that Japanese Americans posed an even greater security threat precisely because they had been historically excluded and oppressed by the United States. n134 As Jerry [\*224] Kang described, "the Court said: because America has treated you badly, you have reason to be disloyal; therefore, America now has reason to treat you still more badly, by restricting your civil rights." n135 Kang labels this phenomenon the "vicious cycle" in which "tomorrow's burdens will be justified by the resentment caused by today's burdens." n136 The boundaries of the nation continue to be constructed **through excluding certain groups**. n137 Discourses of democracy used to support the U.S. war effort against terrorism rests on an image of anti-democracy, in the form of those who seek to destroy the "American way of life." n138 The "imagined community" of the American nation, constituted by loyal citizens, relies on separating itself from the "**Middle Eastern terrorist**" or the "**Yellow Peril**" to fuse its identity at moments of crisis. n139 Yet this policy of **continued exclusion merely generates a** "**vicious cycle**" that **fails to increase security** by breeding additional resentment among communities of non-white immigrants and naturalized citizens. A more effective way to increase national security would be to decrease resentment among immigrants and naturalized citizens of color by breaking the "vicious cycle" of exclusion and unequal burden sharing of the cost of national security. If traditionally excluded groups are allowed to share the benefits of American citizenship that are granted to white citizens, they would have the same incentive as white citizens to protect national security. Arguments for the continued exclusion of outgroups must rest on an assumption of deep, inherent difference. This assumption ignores that people of color have as much to lose from poor national security as do White Americans. Such assumptions rely on a white supremacist paradigm that subordinates and denies the inherent dignity of people of color. The only way to break the "vicious cycle" is to eliminate the underlying paradigm of white supremacy. One way this dominant white racial paradigm subordinates people of color is by racializing them as perpetual foreigners who are presumptively disloyal to America. This subordination creates white citizen "insiders," as opposed to colored immigrant "foreigners/outsiders**." The paradigm can be challenged** **by acknowledging its existence** in American laws and social norms while **simultaneously asserting the dignity of people of color**. Once this has been achieved, we can begin to effectively bring exclusionary laws into compliance with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

## 1AR

### 1AR Black/White Binary

#### Wilderson conceives of black people and white people as essentially opposed and he conceives of all other racial groups as “junior partners” to black people.

Bruker 11 (Malia, screenwriter and documentary filmmaker, Journal of Film and Video 63.4, winter, p. 66-68, Ebsco)

Wilderson’s central tenet is the impossibility of analogizing the suffering of black people with that of any other race or group of people since the continued gratuitous violence that characterizes black existence is found nowhere else in history. The structural, noncontingent violence on the black body and psyche has continued from the Middle Passage through slavery and the Jim Crow era and continuing on to today’s ghettos and prison-industrial complex. So although the meaning of suffering for whites (or non-blacks), with few exceptions, is based on issues of exploitation and alienation, the ontology of suffering for blacks is based on issues of “accumulation and fungibility” (14, original quote Saidiya Hartman). In Wilderson’s theory, this condition of being owned and traded is not simply an experience, like, for example, the experience of wage exploitation, but it is the essence and ontology of blackness. For Wilderson, this contrast in white and black essential positioning, and the white creation of and parasitism on the situation, is so polarizing that the relationship between whites and blacks, or “Masters and Slaves” (10), can only be considered an antagonism, as opposed to a negotiable, solvable conflict. § Marked 09:34 § Afro-pessimist theory is difficult and taxing for those who would like to imagine the relations between whites, blacks, and Native Americans as better-off, improving, or even fixable. Wilderson is neither simple nor soothing, with dense academic style and an unapologetic disinclination to posit solutions, as his conclusion addresses. “To say we must be free of air, while admitting to knowing no other source of breath, is what I have tried to do here” (338). But Wilderson seems clear in his writing and in interviews that his book is intended as a way of opening up new avenues of dialogue on race in America, and readers will certainly find his work thought-provoking and worth the time it may take to process. Wilderson addresses the inability of most film and political theory to adequately portray the reality of the structures of these relations. He asserts that a new wave of theorists (bell hooks, James Snead, Manthia Diawara) improved Black film theory by taking the discussion beyond the realm of “positive/negative” (60) representations, working more importantly on interrogating film “as an apparatus or institution in relation to the derelict institutional status of Black people” (64). But Wilderson asserts that these theorists fail to address or recognize the utter impossibility of black agency in civil society’s institutions. Wilderson aligns himself with Afro-pessimists such as Hortense Spillers, Ronald Judy, David Marriott, Saidiya Hartman, Orlando Patterson, and Jared Sexton, whom he references throughout the book. In the lengthy and dense chapter “The Narcissistic Slave,” Wilderson builds heavily on the work of Franz Fanon to argue against the possibility of Lacan and Lacanian film theory to apply to black people. “Whereas Lacan was aware of how language ‘precedes and ex- ceeds us,’ he did not have Fanon’s awareness of how violence also precedes and exceeds Blacks” (76). Wilderson sees Lacan’s process of full speech for whites as contingent on the black Other as a frame of reference, “which remonumentalizes the (White) ego” and “is an accomplice to social stability, despite its claims to the contrary” (75). In more understandable terms, Wilderson examines films created by and involving “Reds, Whites, and Blacks,”1 analyzing narrative strategies and cinematic techniques to explore the structure of relations. Directed by Denzel Washington, Antwone Fisher is a film based on the harrowing experiences and process of self-awareness of the real Antwone Fisher of Los Angeles, California. In a quick and pointed chapter, Wilderson takes exception to Washington’s assessment of the causes of suffering for this particular black man in America. Although Fisher’s childhood was fraught with abandonment, neglect, and abuse, for Wilderson this is the life of a slave in the master’s world, characterized by gratuitous violence and captivity. He highlights the narrative order of Antwone Fisher that would place the blame elsewhere, specifically on “bad” black women, “self-generating catalysts” (104) of their people’s failed familial structures. Wilderson characterizes Haile Gerima’s Bush Mama, made during the Black Liberation Army years of the 1970s, as an astute and direct response to the noncontingent, or gratuitous, violence that characterizes black life in America. Bush Mama follows the energy-drained and desolate Dorothy through her navigations of the welfare system; her fight for her family, torn apart by an unjust prison/policing/military system; and her interactions with the residents of south-central Los Angeles. Wilderson applauds Bush Mama’s unique ability to capture the essence of black female suffering as a symptom of her object positioning in (white) civil society. Wilderson finds it far superior to the white feminism that locates all women’s struggles at the level of wage relations or focuses on “access to and transformation of existing institutions” (135). Gerima seems to blame the dominant society’s institutions as the perpetrators of violence against the black woman’s body and womanhood in a number of scenes that Wilderson analyzes. The abortion clinic that Dorothy’s welfare officer insists she visit, full of poor women of color; the bedroom where Dorothy’s daughter is raped by an on-duty police officer; and the jail cell where Dorothy is beaten to the point of miscarriage of her baby all point to the institutional, gratuitous violence that Wilderson considers the essence of the black position in the United States. Almost a third of this 341-page book focuses on Native American cinema and political theory. Wilderson writes that because reparations or restoration of all that Native Americans have lost would result in the downfall of white society, “Reds” are positioned antagonistically to whites. Native American maintenance of cartographic integrity and natal relations prevents a true analogy to the suffering of blacks, who were stripped of those capacities, but the near genocide of their race positions them antagonistically to whites. However, because most metacommentary on Native American ontology focuses on ideas of sovereignty rather than genocide, this antagonism is often ratcheted down to the level of conflict. Wilderson outlines the work of Native American theorists Vine Deloria Jr., Leslie Silko, and Taiaiake Alfred, assessing how ideas of land restoration, religion, kinship, and governance dominate discussions on the ontology of Native American suffering. He finds solidarity with Ward Churchill, who has kept the modality of genocide as his primary argument, and he suggests that black and Native American theorists must confer and organize along their shared, albeit different, antagonistic positions to white civil society. In this vein, Wilderson acknowledges that Skins, directed by Native American Chris Eyre, contains elements of a suffering that is analogous to that of blacks, specifically through the character of Mogie Yellow Lodge (played by Graham Greene). However, he is ultimately dissatisfied by Eyre’s locating of the essential Native American struggle in the central character Rudy Yellow Lodge, whose suffering is based around spirituality and sovereignty. In Skins’ narrative techniques, Wilderson also interprets a Native American “negrophobia” (221) that prevents a shared antagonistic position with blacks. Although some of Rudy’s rage and angst is directed at the exploitative white-owned liquor store that fuels Native American alcoholism, he is also an active and angry force against the Native American teens who mimic typical black behavior. Investigating the dialogue, mise-en-scène, and director’s commentary, Wilderson perceives in Eyre’s work a fear that Native Americans might enter into the void that is blackness. Although this section on Native American political theory is exhaustive and provides a new and interesting dynamic to the white/black antagonism, it is of note that Wilderson considers all other non-blacks “junior partners” (33) in civil society, staking some claim to the hegemonic power that whites wield. Although it may be true that no other racial group in the United States has the same ontological struggles, for some readers it may seem an oversight to describe groups such as undocumented immigrants as “junior partners” when they are currently facing what most liberatory activists would characterize as slave-like working conditions, mass roundups, inhumane Immigration and Customs Enforcement detention facilities, and draconian legislation.

#### Focusing on Anti-Black thought re-entrenches the Black-White paradigm and marginalizes alternative forms of oppression

Westley 99 (Robert – Associate Professor of Law, Tulane Law School, “INTER-GROUP SOLIDARITY: MAPPING THE INTERNAL/EXTERNAL DYNAMICS OF OPPRESSION: Introduction Lat Crit Theory and the Problematics of Internal/External Oppression: A Comparison of Forms of Oppression and InterGroup/IntraGroup Solidarity”, July 1999, 53 U. Miami L. Rev. 761, lexis)

Sticking to the task at hand meant that it was necessary to defer certain exchanges. But the incitement to critical dialogue represented by these writings, I believe, is a general feature of this collection. In Social and Legal Repercussions of Latinos' Colonized Mentality, Laura M. Padilla argues, for example, that internalized racism and oppression explains the support by some Latinas/os of repressive anti-Latino policies and anti-Black social behavior. Backed up by compelling examples, her argument is nonetheless complicated by the critical race theory of hegemony and its relationship to racial domination. n1 As critical race [\*762] theorist Kimberle Crenshaw explains, the concept of hegemony has been used to account for "the continued legitimacy of American society by revealing how legal consciousness induces people to accept or consent to their own oppression." n2 But in relating the concept of hegemony to the dynamics of racial oppression, Crenshaw finds that coercion rather than consent better explains the way in which people of color are drawn into the ideology of the dominant class. n3 This reworking of the Du Boisian double consciousness thesis emphasizes the historical ways in which people of color resist rather than give in to their own oppression but are faced by a lack of options. Padilla picks up on the psychological dimensions of internalized oppres sion and racism among Latinas/os to examine the political and social consequences of giving in to the master narrative according to which being a white English-speaker is better than being a Latina/o bilingual or Spanish-speaker. In Padilla's psychological exploration, the concept of hegemony implicitly re-emerges at the level of the sociopolitical con sciousness of some Latinas/os who fail to resist dominant ideology, not through lack of options, but through social conditioning and defaulting to majority rhetoric. The re-emergence of neo-Marxian hegemony analysis in its pristine critical legal studies form, n4 as Padilla recognizes, leads to the recon structive paradox: If identification with domination entails self-depricat ing criticism and a discriminatory mentality along the axis of "light" and "dark," then how is it possible to reverse the polarity of racial valuation? Put differently, where being dark-skinned or black is the color of subju gation among those who are raced as Latina/o, how is it possible for the Latina/o community to reclaim and embrace its own African and indige nous elements? Thus, the problem of self-hatred within the Latina/o community presents a dilemma of both intra-group and inter-group transformation. Transformation seems to require identification with subordinated elements within the Latina/o community while at the same time rejecting subordination, whereas identification with domination involves rejection of the subordinated themselves and acceptance of sub ordination. The paradox lies not only in the inability to see oneself among the excluded but also in the belief that such exclusion is legiti [\*763] mate or necessary. The pervasive confirmation of the aims and values of domination implied by hegemony analysis makes it seem impossible to depart the enchanted circle of internalized racism and oppression. n5 There is no easy solution to this paradox, although part of the solu tion would certainly entail analysis and rejection of white racism. The belief that to be light or white is intrinsically and aesthetically better than to be dark or black is a dynamic that reflects white normativity and leads to internalized oppression within communities of color. n6 Adher ence to color hierarchies, as a retrograde acquiescence to the imperatives of Anglo supremacy, inhibits the formation of solidarity among and between Latina/os and other communities of color. Thus, critiquing the construction of whiteness as normative seems integral to the project of reconstituting Latina/os and other communities of color in solidarity. However, the critique of white racism may only be an initial stage in the process of eliminating internalized oppression. For her part, Padilla views the problem of reconstructing antiracist political consciousness as a matter of defining the Latina/o community in terms of self-analysis and solidarity. Starting at the group level, Padilla suggests that sustained development of critical alliances within the Latina/o community is an important first step in overcoming inter nalized oppression. Through solidarity with others who are critical of status quo racism, Padilla believes that an ethic of community accept ance can be nurtured. At the individual level, Padilla suggests that intro spection on the meaning of being Latina/o can bring about revaluation of self and community. The subordinated when they identify with domina tion identify with their own stereotype, foreclosing an encounter with the self as belonging to a community of persons united by a unique experience of oppression. Self-analysis, it is proposed, fosters the insight among individuals that stereotypes of Latinas/os serve to opera tionalize their oppression. To the extent that it raises the problematic of Latina/o self-hatred from an intracommunity standpoint, Padilla's is a privileged critique in reference to which those defined as outside the community may only obtain secondhand access. By contrast, in BlackCrit Theory and The Problem of Essentialism, Dorothy E. Roberts takes on the more open- textured issue of racial particularization implied by Lat Crit, and ques tions whether it would be essentialist to speak of "Black Crit" where the [\*764] focus of analysis is on Black women's experience. Roberts reminds us of the importance of the derivation of the antiessentialism critique and posits that her use of the title "women of color" is intended as an anties sentialist gesture, even though the subject of analysis is in fact Black women. For Roberts, essentialism pertains to the treatment of intra group realities as uniform and universal. Thus, the resort to racial par ticularity is not intrisically essentialist so long as occupation of the center of analysis remains open to the articulation of intergroup com monalities and differences, as well as the occasional decentering of par ticular racial subjects. The matter of decentering the Black subject in particular has gar nered special attention and importance in Lat Crit discourse under the rubric of the Black-White paradigm. n7 The Black-White paradigm refers to the tendency in mainstream discussions of race **to treat race as a binary opposition between Black and White**. This racial lens, of course, leaves those who are non Black and nonwhite out of the picture and on the margins. Lat Crit itself can be seen as in part an attempt to shift the central focus of analysis away from the monotony of Black-White rela tions and onto the Latina/o community. The Black-White paradigm critique challenges the marginalization of non Black/non White racial experience. However, the Black-White paradigm critique is frought with its own dangers of excess and mischaracterization of rgace relations. For her part, Roberts poses the question troublesome to the Black-White paradigm critique of who should take responsibility for the Black-White paradigm. Critique of the Black-White paradigm should hold Whites account able for the manifold ways in which the problem of racism in dominant discourse is characterized **exclusively as a problem of anti Black racism**, **thus marginalizing the racial oppression of non Black, nonwhites**. § Marked 09:35 § In other words, the critique of the Black-White paradigm should not be used as an instrument for castigating Blacks who focus their efforts on resistance to antiBlack racism; rather, it should occasion a broader anal ysis of and opposition to the racisms that **affect various communities of color**, including Latina/os. Recognizing that the Black-White paradigm is a shorthand expression for obsessive attentiveness to antiBlack racism does not make attentiveness to antiBlack racism a critical blindspot, nor should it imply that Blacks and Whites are co-equal partners in the nar [\*765] rative exclusion of nonBlack nonWhites from the story of racial oppres sion. Indeed, the paradigm itself must be seen as a measure of the extent to which an antiBlack sociopolitical environment generates the idealiza tion of Blacks as the racial group most necessary for Whites to avoid. Roberts is concerned that avoidance of Blacks in an antiBlack sociopolitical context is dangerous. She argues, for instance, that the Black-White paradigm, rather than benefitting Blacks, instead benefits whites in the market for reproduction assistance and adoption. The para digm, which undoubtedly exists, is thus seen as the locus of negative white obsession with the avoidance of Blacks, an avoidance that may get repeated within minority Black-White paradigm critiques. Echoing Padilla's point about antiBlack social behavior among some Latinas/os, Roberts believes that the Black-White paradigm actually inhibits recog nition and formation of political identities that embrace Blackness as an element of its community self-definition. Therefore, it seems likely that inclusive recognition of multiple and overlapping community identifica tions, such as that which may be embodied by the black Latina/o, may help to alleviate the binarism of dominant racial discourse.

#### Reject their description of race in terms of the Black/White binary paradigm – coaltional ptx can solve

Perea 97 (Juan F., Professor of Law, University of Florida College of Law, California Law Review, 85 Calif. L. Rev. 1213, “The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race,” October, Lexis)

The point of critical theory generally is to demonstrate shortcomings in our current understandings of legal and social structures and perhaps to suggest alternatives that improve upon these shortcomings. One implication of this Article is that, to the extent that critical theory has focused on questions of race, it is still tightly bound by the Black/White binary paradigm. Although this is much less true of critical race theory in particular, as some writers have focused on the points of view and histories of many racialized American groups, a true paradigm shift away from the Black/White paradigm will only occur when such scholarship is more widely promulgated and accepted than is currently the case. My review of important literature on race establishes the existence of the Black/White binary paradigm and its structuring of writing on race. The "normal science" of race scholarship specifies inquiry into the relationship between Blacks and Whites as the exclusive aspect of race relations that needs to be explored and elaborated. As a result, much relevant legal history and information concerning Latinos/as and other racialized groups is simply omitted from books on race and constitutional law. The omission of this history is extraordinarily damaging to Mexican Americans and other Latinos/as. By omitting this history, students get no understanding that Mexican Americans have long struggled for equality. The absence of Latinos/as from histories of racism and the struggle against it enables people to maintain existing stereotypes of Mexican Americans. These stereotypes are perpetuated even by America's leading thinkers on race. Ignorance of Mexican-American history allows Andrew Hacker to proclaim that Hispanics are passive "spectators" in social struggle, n212 and allows Cornel West to imply that Latino/a struggles against racism have been "slight though significant." n213 To the extent that the legitimacy of claims for civil rights depends on a public perception of having engaged in struggle for them, the omission of this legal history also undermines the legitimacy of Latino/a claims for civil rights. This may explain why courts treat Latino/a claims of discrimination with such indifference. Paradigmatic descriptions and study of White racism against Blacks, with only cursory mention of "other people of color," marginalizes all people of color by grouping them, without particularity, as somehow [\*1258] analogous to Blacks. "Other people of color" are deemed to exist only as unexplained analogies to Blacks. Thus, scholars encourage uncritical readers to continue to assume the paradigmatic importance of the Black/White relationship and to ignore the experiences of other Americans who also are subject to racism in profound ways. Critical readers are left with many important questions: Beyond the most superficial understanding of aversion to non-White skin color, in what ways is White racism against Blacks explanatory of or analogous to White racism against Latinos/as, Asian Americans, Native Americans, and others? Given the unique historical legacy of slavery, what does a deep understanding of White-Black racism contribute to understanding racisms against other "Others?" Why are "other people of color" consistently relegated to parenthetical status and near-nonexistence in treatises purporting to cover their fields comprehensively? It is time to ask hard questions of our leading writers on race. It is also time to demand better answers to these questions about inclusion, exclusion, and racial presence, than perfunctory references to "other people of color." In the midst of profound demographic changes, it is time to question whether the Black/White binary paradigm of race fits our highly variegated current and future population. Our "normal science" of writing on race, at odds with both history and demographic reality, needs reworking.