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#### A. Interpretation – targeted killing is distinct from signature strikes – precise definitions are key

Uebersax 12 (John, psychologist, writer and former RAND Corporation military analyst, "The Four Kinds of Drone Strikes," http://satyagraha.wordpress.com/2012/05/23/the-four-kinds-of-drone-strikes/)

We must begin with clear terms, and that is the purpose of the present article. Drone strikes, that is, the launching of explosive missiles from a remotely operated aerial vehicle, come in four varieties: targeted killings, signature strikes, overt combat operations, and covert combat operations. We shall consider each in turn.¶ Targeted killing. This occurs when a drone strike is used to kill a terrorist whose identity is known, and whose name has been placed on a hit list, due to being deemed a ‘direct and immediate threat’ to US security. The government would like people to think this means these strikes target a terrorist literally with his or her hand on a detonator. But, in actuality, the only real criterion is that the government believes the target is sufficiently closely affiliated with terrorist organizations (e.g., a propagandist or financier) to justify assassination. This is likely the rarest form of drone strike. However it receives the most publicity, because the government likes to crow when it kills a high-ranking terrorist.¶ Signature strikes. In signature strikes, the target is a person whose name is not known, but whose actions fit the profile (or ‘signature’) of a high-ranking terrorist. There is some ambiguity concerning the meaning of this term. Some use it in the sense just stated — i.e., a strike against an anonymous terrorist leader. Others use it more broadly to include killing of any non-identified militants, whether high-ranking or not. However from the moral standpoint it makes a major difference whether an anonymous targeted victim is a high-level leader, or simply an anonymous combatant. For this reason it is advantageous to restrict the term “signature strike” to the targeting of anonymous high-level leaders, and to assign strikes against anonymous non-leaders to the two further categories below.¶ Overt combat operation. This category includes drone strikes conducted as part of regular military operations. These strikes are presumably run by uniformed military personnel according to codes of military conduct, and are, logically and legally, not much different from ordinary air or artillery strikes. As a part of routine warfare, such strikes are subject to the provisions of the Geneva Conventions. Three items of the Geneva Conventions are of special interest here: (1) strikes should occur only in the context of a legally declared war; (2) they should be conducted by lawful combatants (which, many experts believe, excludes use of non-uniformed, civilian contractor operators); and (3) standard provisions concerning the need to report casualties, especially civilian casualties, are in effect.¶ Covert combat operation. Finally, there are covert combat operations. These, like the former category, are launched against usual military targets – e.g., any hostile militant, not just high-ranking ones. But why should these strikes be covert? The obvious answer is: to mask something shady. Covert combat strikes can evade all those irritating constraints on military tactics imposed by the Geneva Conventions, International Law, public opinion, and basic human decency.¶ The specific terms used above to distinguish these four kinds of strikes are admittedly arbitrary, and perhaps some other nomenclature would be more advantageous. But we need some fixed set of terms to refer to these fundamentally different kinds of strikes. Without such terms, the US government will continue to have its way by relying on public confusion and terminological sophistry. For example, if there is only a single generic term, the government may issue a claim such as “drone strikes comply with international law.” This is perhaps technically true for, say, overt military drone strikes, but it is not true for signature strikes. With more precise terms, it would be more difficult for the government to mislead the public.

#### B. Vote neg –

#### A. Precision – our interpretation is exclusive and has an intent to define – accurate reading of the resolution is a pre-requisite to fairness and education – they make the resolution meaningless

#### B. Limits – expanding the term to include unknown terrorist identities makes the term limitless, destroying in depth education

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#### The Executive of the United States should ban signature strikes carried out by Remotely-Piloted Vehicles.

#### Self-restraint solves and is more effective than the plan

Posner and Vermeule 10 (Eric A. Posner is the Kirkland and Ellis Professor of Law @ the University of Chicago School of Law and Editor of the Journal of Legal Studies, Adrian Vermeule is a legal scholar, Oxford University Press, “The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic”, Google Books)

A Preliminary Note on Law and Self-Binding Many of our mechanisms are unproblematic from a legal perspective, as they ¶ involve presidential actions that are clearly lawful. But a few raise legal questions; in ¶ particular, those that involve self-binding.**74** Can a president bind himself to respect ¶particular first-order policies? With qualifications, the answer is “yes, at least to the same ¶ extent that a legislature can.” Formally, a duly promulgated executive rule or order binds ¶ even the executive unless and until it is validly abrogated**,** thereby establishing a new ¶ legal status quo.75 The legal authority to establish a new status quo allows a president to ¶ create inertia or political constraints that will affect his own future choices. In a practical ¶ sense**,** presidents, like legislatures, have great de facto power to adopt policies that shape the legal landscape for the future. A president might commit himself to a long-term ¶ project of defense procurement or infrastructure or foreign policy, narrowing his own ¶future choices and generating new political coalitions that will act to defend the new rules ¶or policies.

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#### Obama will hold off a vote on Iran sanctions now---PC’s key---failure destroys regional and global U.S. power and cred

Leverett 1/20 (Flynt Leverett, professor at Pennsylvania State University’s School of International Affairs and is a Visiting Scholar at Peking University’s School of International Studies, and Hillary Mann Leverett, Senior Professorial Lecturer at the American University in Washington, DC and a Visiting Scholar at Peking University in Beijing, 1/20/14, “Iran, Syria and the Tragicomedy of U.S. Foreign Policy,” http://goingtotehran.com/iran-syria-and-the-tragicomedy-of-u-s-foreign-policy)

Regarding President Obama’s ongoing struggle with the Senate over Iran policy, Hillary cautions against premature claims of “victory” for the Obama administration’s efforts to avert new sanctions legislation while the Joint Plan of Action is being implemented. She points out that “the foes of the Iran nuclear deal, of any kind of peace and conflict resolution in the Middle East writ large, are still very strong and formidable. For example, the annual AIPAC policy conference—a gathering here in Washington of over 10,000 people from all over the country, where they come to lobby congressmen and senators, especially on the Iran issue—that will be taking place in very early March. There’s still a lot that can be pushed and played here.” To be sure, President Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry “have put a lot of political capital on the line.” No other administration has so openly staked out its opposition to a piece of legislation or policy initiative favored by AIPAC and backed by a bipartisan majority on Capitol Hill since the 1980s, when the Reagan administration successfully defended its decision to sell AWACs planes to Saudi Arabia. But, Hillary notes, if the pro-Israel lobby is able to secure a vote on the new sanctions bill, and to sustain the promised veto of said bill by President Obama, “that would be such a dramatic blow to President Obama, and not just on his foreign policy agenda, but it would be devastating to his domestic agenda.” So Obama “has a tremendous amount to lose, and by no means is the fight anywhere near over.” Of course, to say that Obama has put a lot of political capital on the line over the sanctions issue begs the question of whether he is really prepared to spend the far larger amounts of capital that will be required to close a final nuclear deal with Tehran. As Hillary points out, if Obama were “really trying to lead this country on a much more constructive, positive trajectory after failed wars and invasions in Iraq and Afghanistan and Libya—Libya entirely on President Obama’s watch—[he] would be doing a lot more, rather than just giving these lukewarm talks, basically trying to continue to kiss up to major pro-Israel constituencies, and then trying to bring in some of political favors” on Capitol Hill. Compare Obama’s handling of Iran and other Middle East challenges to President Nixon’s orchestration of the American opening to China—including Nixon’s willingness to “break the crockery” of the pro-Taiwan lobby—and the inadequacy of Obama’s approach become glaringly apparent. And that, Hillary underscores, is why we wrote our book, Going to Tehran—because “we think it’s absolutely essential for President Obama to do what Nixon did and go to Tehran, as Nixon went to China,” for “the Middle East is the make-or-break point for the United States, not just in our foreign affairs but in our global economic power and what we’re able to do here at home. If we can’t get what we’re doing in the Middle East on a much better, more positive trajectory, not only will we see the loss of our power, credibility, and prestige in the Middle East, but we will see it globally.”

#### It’s a war powers fight that Obama wins – but failure commits us to Israeli strikes

**Merry 1/1** (Robert W. Merry, political editor of the National Interest, is the author of books on American history and foreign policy, “Obama may buck the Israel lobby on Iran”, 2014, Washington Times, factiva)

Presidential press secretary Jay Carney uttered 10 words the other day that represent a major presidential challenge to the American Israel lobby and its friends on Capitol Hill. Referring to Senate legislation designed to force President Obama to expand economic sanctions on Iran under conditions the president opposes, Mr. Carney said: “If it were to pass, the president would veto it.” For years, there has been an assumption in Washington that you can’t buck the powerful Israel lobby, particularly the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, or AIPAC, whose positions are nearly identical with the stated aims of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Mr. Netanyahu doesn’t like Mr. Obama’s recent overture to Iran, and neither does AIPAC. The result is the Senate legislation, which is similar to a measure already passed by the House. With the veto threat, Mr. Obama has announced that he is prepared to buck the Israel lobby — and may even welcome the opportunity. It isn’t fair to suggest that everyone who thinks Mr. Obama’s overtures to Iran are ill-conceived or counterproductive is simply following the Israeli lobby’s talking points, but Israel’s supporters in this country are a major reason for the viability of the sanctions legislation the president is threatening to veto. It is nearly impossible to avoid the conclusion that the Senate legislation is designed to sabotage Mr. Obama’s delicate negotiations with Iran (with the involvement also of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and Germany) over Iran’s nuclear program. The aim is to get Iran to forswear any acquisition of nuclear weapons in exchange for the reduction or elimination of current sanctions. Iran insists it has a right to enrich uranium at very small amounts, for peaceful purposes, and Mr. Obama seems willing to accept that Iranian position in the interest of a comprehensive agreement. However, the Senate measure, sponsored by Sens. Robert Menendez, New Jersey Democrat; Charles E. Schumer, New York Democrat; and Mark Kirk, Illinois Republican, would impose potent new sanctions if the final agreement accords Iran the right of peaceful enrichment. That probably would destroy Mr. Obama’s ability to reach an agreement. Iranian President Hasan Rouhani already is under pressure from his country’s hard-liners to abandon his own willingness to seek a deal. The Menendez-Schumer-Kirk measure would undercut him and put the hard-liners back in control. Further, the legislation contains language that would commit the United States to military action on behalf of Israel if Israel initiates action against Iran. This language is cleverly worded, suggesting U.S. action should be triggered only if Israel acted in its “legitimate self-defense” and acknowledging “the law of the United States and the constitutional responsibility of Congress to authorize the use of military force,” but the language is stunning in its brazenness and represents, in the view of Andrew Sullivan, the prominent blogger, “an appalling new low in the Israeli government’s grip on the U.S. Congress.” While noting the language would seem to be nonbinding, Mr. Sullivan adds that “it’s basically endorsing the principle of handing over American foreign policy on a matter as grave as war and peace to a foreign government, acting against international law, thousands of miles away.” That brings us back to Mr. Obama’s veto threat. The American people have made clear through polls and abundant expression (especially during Mr. Obama’s flirtation earlier this year with military action against Bashar Assad’s Syrian regime) that they are sick and weary of American military adventures in the Middle East. They don’t think the Iraq and Afghanistan wars have been worth the price, and they don’t want their country to engage in any other such wars. That’s what the brewing confrontation between Mr. Obama and the Israel lobby comes down to — war and peace. Mr. Obama’s delicate negotiations with Iran, whatever their outcome, are designed to avert another U.S. war in the Middle East. The Menendez-Schumer-Kirk initiative is designed to kill that effort and cedes to Israel America’s war-making decision in matters involving Iran, which further increases the prospects for war. It’s not even an argument about whether the United States should come to Israel’s aid if our ally is under attack, but whether the decision to do so and when that might be necessary should be made in Jerusalem or Washington.

#### **The plan’s a perceived loss – it saps capital and causes defections**

Loomis 7 --- Department of Government at Georgetown

(3/2/2007, Dr. Andrew J. Loomis is a Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, “Leveraging legitimacy in the crafting of U.S. foreign policy,” pg 35-36, <http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/7/9/4/8/pages179487/p179487-36.php>)

Declining political authority encourages defection. American political analyst Norman Ornstein writes of the domestic context, In a system where a President has limited formal power, perception matters. The reputation for success—the belief by other political actors that even when he looks down, a president will find a way to pull out a victory—is the most valuable resource a chief executive can have. Conversely, the widespread belief that the Oval Office occupant is on the defensive, on the wane or without the ability to win under adversity can lead to disaster, as individual lawmakers calculate who will be on the winning side and negotiate accordingly. In simple terms, winners win and losers lose more often than not. Failure begets failure. In short, a president experiencing declining amounts of political capital has diminished capacity to advance his goals. As a result, political allies perceive a decreasing benefit in publicly tying themselves to the president, and an increasing benefit in allying with rising centers of authority. A president’s incapacity and his record of success are interlocked and reinforce each other. Incapacity leads to political failure, which reinforces perceptions of incapacity. This feedback loop accelerates decay both in leadership capacity and defection by key allies. The central point of this review of the presidential literature is that the sources of presidential influence—and thus their prospects for enjoying success in pursuing preferred foreign policies—go beyond the structural factors imbued by the Constitution. Presidential authority is affected by ideational resources in the form of public perceptions of legitimacy. The public offers and rescinds its support in accordance with normative trends and historical patterns, non-material sources of power that affects the character of U.S. policy, foreign and domestic.

#### Causes Israel strikes

Perr 12/24 (Jon Perr 12/24/13, B.A. in Political Science from Rutgers University; technology marketing consultant based in Portland, Oregon, has long been active in Democratic politics and public policy as an organizer and advisor in California and Massachusetts. His past roles include field staffer for Gary Hart for President (1984), organizer of Silicon Valley tech executives backing President Clinton's call for national education standards (1997), recruiter of tech executives for Al Gore's and John Kerry's presidential campaigns, and co-coordinator of MassTech for Robert Reich (2002). (Jon, “Senate sanctions bill could let Israel take U.S. to war against Iran” Daily Kos, [http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/12/24/1265184/-Senate-sanctions-bill-could-let-Israel-take-U-S-to-war-against-Iran#](http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/12/24/1265184/-Senate-sanctions-bill-could-let-Israel-take-U-S-to-war-against-Iran))

As 2013 draws to close, the negotiations over the Iranian nuclear program have entered a delicate stage. But in 2014, the tensions will escalate dramatically as a bipartisan group of Senators brings a new Iran sanctions bill to the floor for a vote. As many others have warned, that promise of new measures against Tehran will almost certainly blow up the interim deal reached by the Obama administration and its UN/EU partners in Geneva. But Congress' highly unusual intervention into the President's domain of foreign policy doesn't just make the prospect of an American conflict with Iran more likely. As it turns out, the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act essentially empowers Israel to decide whether the United States will go to war against Tehran.¶ On their own, the tough new sanctions imposed automatically if a final deal isn't completed in six months pose a daunting enough challenge for President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry. But it is the legislation's commitment to support an Israeli preventive strike against Iranian nuclear facilities that almost ensures the U.S. and Iran will come to blows. As Section 2b, part 5 of the draft mandates:¶ If the Government of Israel is compelled to take military action in legitimate self-defense against Iran's nuclear weapon program, the United States Government should stand with Israel and provide, in accordance with the law of the United States and the constitutional responsibility of Congress to authorize the use of military force, diplomatic, military, and economic support to the Government of Israel in its defense of its territory, people, and existence.¶ Now, the legislation being pushed by Senators Mark Kirk (R-IL), Chuck Schumer (D-NY) and Robert Menendez (D-NJ) does not automatically give the President an authorization to use force should Israel attack the Iranians. (The draft language above explicitly states that the U.S. government must act "in accordance with the law of the United States and the constitutional responsibility of Congress to authorize the use of military force.") But there should be little doubt that an AUMF would be forthcoming from Congressmen on both sides of the aisle. As Lindsey Graham, who with Menendez co-sponsored a similar, non-binding "stand with Israel" resolution in March told a Christians United for Israel (CUFI) conference in July:¶ "If nothing changes in Iran, come September, October, I will present a resolution that will authorize the use of military force to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear bomb."¶ Graham would have plenty of company from the hardest of hard liners in his party. In August 2012, Romney national security adviser and pardoned Iran-Contra architect Elliott Abrams called for a war authorization in the pages of the Weekly Standard. And just two weeks ago, Norman Podhoretz used his Wall Street Journal op-ed to urge the Obama administration to "strike Iran now" to avoid "the nuclear war sure to come."¶ But at the end of the day, the lack of an explicit AUMF in the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act doesn't mean its supporters aren't giving Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu de facto carte blanche to hit Iranian nuclear facilities. The ensuing Iranian retaliation against to Israeli and American interests would almost certainly trigger the commitment of U.S. forces anyway.¶ Even if the Israelis alone launched a strike against Iran's atomic sites, Tehran will almost certainly hit back against U.S. targets in the Straits of Hormuz, in the region, possibly in Europe and even potentially in the American homeland. Israel would face certain retaliation from Hezbollah rockets launched from Lebanon and Hamas missiles raining down from Gaza.¶ That's why former Bush Defense Secretary Bob Gates and CIA head Michael Hayden raising the alarms about the "disastrous" impact of the supposedly surgical strikes against the Ayatollah's nuclear infrastructure. As the New York Times reported in March 2012, "A classified war simulation held this month to assess the repercussions of an Israeli attack on Iran forecasts that the strike would lead to a wider regional war, which could draw in the United States and leave hundreds of Americans dead, according to American officials." And that September, a bipartisan group of U.S. foreign policy leaders including Brent Scowcroft, retired Admiral William Fallon, former Republican Senator (now Obama Pentagon chief) Chuck Hagel, retired General Anthony Zinni and former Ambassador Thomas Pickering concluded that American attacks with the objective of "ensuring that Iran never acquires a nuclear bomb" would "need to conduct a significantly expanded air and sea war over a prolonged period of time, likely several years." (Accomplishing regime change, the authors noted, would mean an occupation of Iran requiring a "commitment of resources and personnel greater than what the U.S. has expended over the past 10 years in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars combined.") The anticipated blowback?¶ Serious costs to U.S. interests would also be felt over the longer term, we believe, with problematic consequences for global and regional stability, including economic stability. A dynamic of escalation, action, and counteraction could produce serious unintended consequences that would significantly increase all of these costs and lead, potentially, to all-out regional war.

#### Impact is nuclear war

**Reuveny** **10** (Rafael – professor in the School of Public and Environmental affairs at Indiana University, Unilateral strike on Iran could trigger world depression, p. http://www.indiana.edu/~spea/news/speaking\_out/reuveny\_on\_unilateral\_strike\_Iran.shtml)

A unilateral Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would likely have dire consequences, including a regional war, global economic collapse and a major power clash. For an Israeli campaign to succeed, it must be quick and decisive. This requires an attack that would be so overwhelming that Iran would not dare to respond in full force. Such an outcome is extremely unlikely since the locations of some of Iran’s nuclear facilities are not fully known and known facilities are buried deep underground. All of these widely spread facilities are shielded by elaborate air defense systems constructed not only by the Iranians, but also the Chinese and, likely, the Russians as well. By now, Iran has also built redundant command and control systems and nuclear facilities, developed early-warning systems, acquired ballistic and cruise missiles and upgraded and enlarged its armed forces. Because Iran is well-prepared, a single, conventional Israeli strike — or even numerous strikes — could not destroy all of its capabilities, giving Iran time to respond. A regional war Unlike Iraq, whose nuclear program Israel destroyed in 1981, Iran has a second-strike capability comprised of a coalition of Iranian, Syrian, Lebanese, Hezbollah, Hamas, and, perhaps, Turkish forces. Internal pressure might compel Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority to join the assault, turning a bad situation into a regional war. During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, at the apex of its power, Israel was saved from defeat by President Nixon’s shipment of weapons and planes. Today, Israel’s numerical inferiority is greater, and it faces more determined and better-equipped opponents. Despite Israel’s touted defense systems, Iranian coalition missiles, armed forces, and terrorist attacks would likely wreak havoc on its enemy, leading to a prolonged tit-for-tat. In the absence of massive U.S. assistance, Israel’s military resources may quickly dwindle, forcing it to use its alleged nuclear weapons, as it had reportedly almost done in 1973. An Israeli nuclear attack would likely destroy most of Iran’s capabilities, but a crippled Iran and its coalition could still attack neighboring oil facilities, unleash global terrorism, plant mines in the Persian Gulf and impair maritime trade in the Mediterranean, Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Middle Eastern oil shipments would likely slow to a trickle as production declines due to the war and insurance companies decide to drop their risky Middle Eastern clients. Iran and Venezuela would likely stop selling oil to the United States and Europe. The world economy would head into a tailspin; international acrimony would rise; and Iraqi and Afghani citizens might fully turn on the United States, immediately requiring the deployment of more American troops. Russia, China, Venezuela, and maybe Brazil and Turkey — all of which essentially support Iran — could be tempted to form an alliance and openly challenge the U.S. hegemony. Replaying Nixon’s nightmare Russia and China might rearm their injured Iranian protege overnight, just as Nixon rearmed Israel, and threaten to intervene, just as the U.S.S.R. threatened to join Egypt and Syria in 1973. President Obama’s response would likely put U.S. forces on nuclear alert, replaying Nixon’s nightmarish scenario. Iran may well feel duty-bound to respond to a unilateral attack by its Israeli archenemy, but it knows that it could not take on the United States head-to-head. In contrast, if the United States leads the attack, Iran’s response would likely be muted. If Iran chooses to absorb an American-led strike, its allies would likely protest and send weapons, but would probably not risk using force. While no one has a crystal ball, leaders should be risk-averse when choosing war as a foreign policy tool. If attacking Iran is deemed necessary, Israel must wait for an American green light. A unilateral Israeli strike could ultimately spark World War III.

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#### The quest for security in an inherently chaotic and insecure world guarantees extinction

**Burke, 07** – Anthony, Ph. D in International Relations and Political Science from the Australian National University, Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations in the University of New South Wales, Political theorist and IR scholar, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason”, [Project](http://www.hopkins-debate.com/pdf/Burke.pdf) MUSE

In this struggle with the lessons of Vietnam, revolutionary resistance, and rapid geopolitical transformation, we are witness to an enduring political and cultural theme: of a craving for order, control and certainty in the face of continual uncertainty. Closely related to this anxiety was the way that Kissinger's thinking -- and that of McNamara and earlier imperialists like the British Governor of Egypt Cromer -- was embedded in instrumental images of technology and the machine: the machine as both a tool of power and an image of social and political order. In his essay 'The Government of Subject Races' Cromer envisaged effective imperial rule -- over numerous societies and billions of human beings -- as best achieved by a central authority working 'to ensure the harmonious working of the different parts of the machine'.60 Kissinger analogously invoked the virtues of 'equilibrium', 'manageability' and 'stability' yet, writing some six decades later, was anxious that technological progress no longer brought untroubled control: the Westernising 'spread of technology and its associated rationality...does not inevitably produce a similar concept of reality'.61 We sense the rational policymaker's frustrated desire: the world is supposed to work like a machine, ordered by a form of power and governmental reason which deploys machines and whose desires and processes are meant to run along ordered, rational lines like a machine. Kissinger's desire was little different from that of Cromer who, wrote Edward Said:...envisions a seat of power in the West and radiating out from it towards the East a great embracing machine, sustaining the central authority yet commanded by it. What the machine's branches feed into it from the East -- human material, material wealth, knowledge, what have you -- is processed by the machine, then converted into more power...the immediate translation of mere Oriental matter into useful substance.62 This desire for order in the shadow of chaos and uncertainty -- the constant war with an intractable and volatile matter -- has deep roots in modern thought, and was a major impetus to the development of technological reason and its supporting theories of knowledge. As Kissinger's claims about the West's Newtonian desire for the 'accurate' gathering and classification of 'data' suggest, modern strategy, foreign policy and Realpolitik have been thrust deep into the apparently stable soil of natural science, in the hope of finding immovable and unchallengeable roots there. …continued…There is a breathtaking, world-creating hubris in this statement -- one that, in many ways, came to characterise western modernity itself, and which is easily recognisable in a generation of modern technocrats like Kissinger. The Fall of Adam was the Judeo-Christian West's primal creation myth, one that marked humankind as flawed and humbled before God, condemned to hardship and ambivalence. Bacon forecast here a return to Eden, but one of man's own making. This truly was the death of God, of putting man into God's place, and no pious appeals to the continuity or guidance of faith could disguise the awesome epistemological violence which now subordinated creation to man. Bacon indeed argued that inventions are 'new creations and imitations of divine works'. As such, there is nothing but good in science: 'the introduction of great inventions is the most distinguished of human actions...inventions are a blessing and a benefit without injuring or afflicting any'.70  And what would be [hu]mankind's 'bread', the rewards of its new 'empire over creation'? If the new method and invention brought modern medicine, social welfare, sanitation, communications, education and comfort, it also enabled the Armenian genocide, the Holocaust and two world wars; napalm, the B52, the hydrogen bomb, the Kalashnikov rifle and military strategy. Indeed some of the 20th Century's most far-reaching inventions -- radar, television, rocketry, computing, communications, jet aircraft, the Internet -- would be the product of drives for national security and militarisation. Even the inventions Bacon thought so marvellous and transformative -- printing, gunpowder and the compass -- brought in their wake upheaval and tragedy: printing, dogma and bureaucracy; gunpowder, the rifle and the artillery battery; navigation, slavery and the genocide of indigenous peoples. In short, the legacy of the new empirical science would be ambivalence as much as certainty; degradation as much as enlightenment; the destruction of nature as much as its utilisation. If Bacon could not reasonably be expected to foresee many of these developments, the idea that scientific and technological progress could be destructive did occur to him. However it was an anxiety he summarily dismissed:...let none be alarmed at the objection of the arts and sciences becoming depraved to malevolent or luxurious purposes and the like, for the same can be said of every worldly good; talent, courage, strength, beauty, riches, light itself...Only let mankind regain their rights over nature, assigned to them by the gift of God, and obtain that power, whose exercise will be governed by right reason and true religion.71   By the mid-Twentieth Century, after the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, such fears could no longer be so easily wished away, as the physicist and scientific director of the Manhattan Project, J. Robert Oppenheimer recognised. He said in a 1947 lecture: We felt a particularly intimate responsibility for suggesting, for supporting and in the end in large measure achieving the realization of atomic weapons...In some sort of crude sense which no vulgarity, no humor, no over-statement can quite extinguish, the physicists have known sin, and this is a knowledge they cannot lose.72Adam had fallen once more, but into a world which refused to acknowledge its renewed intimacy with contingency and evil. [Hu]man's empire over creation -- his [or her] discovery of the innermost secrets of matter and energy, of the fires that fuelled the stars -- had not 'enhanced human power and dignity' as Bacon claimed, but instead brought destruction and horror. Scientific powers that had been consciously applied in the defence of life and in the hope of its betterment now threatened its total and absolute destruction. This would not prevent a legion of scientists, soldiers and national security policymakers later attempting to apply Bacon's faith in invention and Descartes' faith in mathematics to make of the Bomb a rational weapon. Oppenheimer -- who resolutely opposed the development of the hydrogen bomb -- understood what the strategists could not: that the weapons resisted control, resisted utility, that 'with the release of atomic energy quite revolutionary changes had occurred in the techniques of warfare'.73 Yet Bacon's legacy, one deeply imprinted on the strategists, was his view that truth and utility are 'perfectly identical'.74 In 1947 Oppenheimer had clung to the hope that 'knowledge is good...it seems hard to live any other way than thinking it was better to know something than not to know it; and the more you know, the better'; by 1960 he felt that 'terror attaches to new knowledge. It has an unmooring quality; it finds men unprepared to deal with it.'75 Martin Heidegger questioned this mapping of natural science onto the social world in his essays on technology -- which, as 'machine', has been so crucial to modern strategic and geopolitical thought as an image of perfect function and order and a powerful tool of intervention. He commented that, given that modern technology 'employs exact physical science...the deceptive illusion arises that modern technology is applied physical science'.76 Yet as the essays and speeches of Oppenheimer attest, technology and its relation to science, society and war cannot be reduced to a noiseless series of translations of science for politics, knowledge for force, or force for good.  Instead, Oppenheimer saw a process frustrated by roadblocks and ruptured by irony; in his view there was no smooth, unproblematic translation of scientific truth into social truth, and technology was not its vehicle. Rather his comments raise profound and painful ethical questions that resonate with terror and uncertainty. Yet this has not prevented technology becoming a potent object of desire, not merely as an instrument of power but as a promise and conduit of certainty itself. In the minds of too many rational soldiers, strategists and policymakers, technology brings with it the truth of its enabling science and spreads it over the world. It turns epistemological certainty into political certainty; it turns control over 'facts' into control over the earth.  Heidegger's insights into this phenomena I find especially telling and disturbing -- because they underline the ontological force of the instrumental view of politics. In The Question Concerning Technology, Heidegger's striking argument was that in the modernising West technology is not merely a tool, a 'means to an end'. Rather technology has become a governing image of the modern universe, one that has come to order, limit and define human existence as a 'calculable coherence of forces' and a 'standing reserve' of energy. Heidegger wrote: 'the threat to man does not come in the first instance from the potentially lethal machines and apparatus of technology. The actual threat has already affected man in his essence.'77 This process Heidegger calls 'Enframing' and through it the scientific mind demands that 'nature reports itself in some way or other that is identifiable through calculation and remains orderable as a system of information'. Man is not a being who makes and uses machines as means, choosing and limiting their impact on the world for his ends; rather man has imagined the world as a machine and humanity everywhere becomes trapped within its logic. Man, he writes, 'comes to the very brink of a precipitous fall...where he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve. Meanwhile Man, precisely as the one so threatened, exalts himself to the posture of lord of the earth.'78 Technological man not only becomes the name for a project of lordship and mastery over the earth, but incorporates humanity within this project as a calculable resource. In strategy, warfare and geopolitics human bodies, actions and aspirations are caught, transformed and perverted by such calculating, enframing reason: human lives are reduced to tools, obstacles, useful or obstinate matter. This tells us much about the enduring power of crude instrumental versions of strategic thought, which relate not merely to the actual use of force but to broader geopolitical strategies that see, as limited war theorists like Robert Osgood did, force as an 'instrument of policy short of war'. It was from within this strategic ontology that figures like the Nobel prize-winning economist Thomas Schelling theorised the strategic role of threats and coercive diplomacy, and spoke of strategy as 'the power to hurt'.79 In the 2006 Lebanon war we can see such thinking in the remark of a U.S. analyst, a former Ambassador to Israel and Syria, who speculated that by targeting civilians and infrastructure Israel aimed 'to create enough pain on the ground so there would be a local political reaction to Hezbollah's adventurism'.80 Similarly a retired Israeli army colonel told the Washington Post that 'Israel is attempting to create a rift between the Lebanese population and Hezbollah supporters by exacting a heavy price from the elite in Beirut. The message is: If you want your air conditioning to work and if you want to be able to fly to Paris for shopping, you must pull your head out of the sand and take action toward shutting down Hezbollah-land.'81Conclusion: Violent Ontologies or Peaceful Choices? I was motivated to begin the larger project from which this essay derives by a number of concerns. I felt that the available critical, interpretive or performative languages of war -- realist and liberal international relations theories, just war theories, and various Clausewitzian derivations of strategy -- failed us, because they either perform or refuse to place under suspicion the underlying political ontologies that I have sought to unmask and question here. Many realists have quite nuanced and critical attitudes to the use of force, but ultimately affirm strategic thought and remain embedded within the existential framework of the nation-state. Both liberal internationalist and just war doctrines seek mainly to improve the accountability of decision-making in security affairs and to limit some of the worst moral enormities of war, but (apart from the more radical versions of cosmopolitanism) they fail to question the ontological claims of political community or strategic theory.82 In the case of a theorist like Jean Bethke Elshtain, just war doctrine is in fact allied to a softer, liberalised form of the Hegelian-Schmittian ontology. She dismisses Kant's Perpetual Peace as 'a fantasy of at-oneness...a world in which differences have all been rubbed off' and in which 'politics, which is the way human beings have devised for dealing with their differences, gets eliminated.'83 She remains a committed liberal democrat and espouses a moral community that stretches beyond the nation-state, which strongly contrasts with Schmitt's hostility to liberalism and his claustrophobic distinction between friend and enemy. However her image of politics -- which at its limits, she implies, requires the resort to war as the only existentially satisfying way of resolving deep-seated conflicts -- reflects much of Schmitt's idea of the political and Hegel's ontology of a fundamentally alienated world of nation-states, in which war is a performance of being. She categorically states that any effort to dismantle security dilemmas 'also requires the dismantling of human beings as we know them'.84 Whilst this would not be true of all just war advocates, I suspect that even as they are so concerned with the ought, moral theories of violence grant too much unquestioned power to the is. The problem here lies with the confidence in being -- of 'human beings as we know them' -- which ultimately fails to escape a Schmittian architecture and thus eternally exacerbates (indeed reifies) antagonisms. Yet we know from the work of Deleuze and especially William Connolly that exchanging an ontology of being for one of becoming, where the boundaries and nature of the self contain new possibilities through agonistic relation to others, provides a less destructive and violent way of acknowledging and dealing with conflict and difference.85 My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy -- that it is rather the product of hegemonic forms of knowledge about political action and community -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies I have described here in fact dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing, argues Heidegger, 'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it drives out every other possibility of revealing...the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87 What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and security -- is a view that the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence. Many of the most destructive features of contemporary modernity -- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from calculative, 'empirical' discourses of scientific and political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being. Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe, policymakers' choices become necessities, their actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die. Viewed in this light, 'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It creates both discursive constraints -- available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic.

#### Vote neg to engage in a critical re-evaluation of securitization – this is the only way to re-engage in the political

**Cheeseman & Bruce, 96** (Graeme Cheeseman, Snr. Lecturer @ New South Wales, and Robert Bruce, 1996, Discourses of Danger & Dread Frontiers, p. 5-9)

This goal is pursued in ways which are still unconventional in the intellectual milieu of international relations in Australia, even though they are gaining influence worldwide as traditional modes of theory and practice are rendered inadequate by global trends that defy comprehension, let alone policy. The inability to give meaning to global changes reflects partly the enclosed, elitist world of profession security analysts and bureaucratic experts, where entry is gained by learning and accepting to speak a particular, exclusionary language. The contributors to this book are familiar with the discourse, but accord no privileged place to its ‘knowledge form as reality’ in debates on defense and security. Indeed, they believe that debate will be furthered only through a long overdue critical re-evaluating of elite perspectives. Pluralistic, democratically-oriented perspectives on Australia’s’ identity are both required and essential if Australia’s thinking on defense and security is to be invigorated. This is not a conventional policy book; nor should it be, in the sense of offering policy-makers and their academic counterparts sets of neat alternative solutions, in familiar language and format, to problems they pose. This expectation is itself a considerable part of the problem to be analyzed. It is, however, a book about policy, one that questions how problems are framed by policy-makers. It challenges the proposition that irreducible bodies of real knowledge on defense and security exist independently of their ‘context in the world’, and it demonstrates how security policy is articulated authoritatively by the elite keepers of that knowledge, experts trained to recognize enduring, universal wisdom. All others, from this perspective, must accept such wisdom to remain outside of the expert domain, tainted by their inability to comply with the ‘rightness’ of the official line. But it is precisely the official line, or at the least its image of the world, that needs to be problematised. If the critic responds directly to the demand for policy alternatives, without addressing this image, he or she is tacitly endorsing it. Before engaging in the policy debate the critics need to reframe the basic terms of reference tradition of democratic dialogue. More immediately, it ignores post-seventeenth century democratic traditions which insist that a good society must have within it some way of critically assessing its knowledge and the decisions based upon that knowledge which impact upon citizens of such a society. This is a tradition with a slightly different connotation in contemporary liberal democracies, which during the Cold War, were proclaimed different and superior to the totalitarian enemy precisely because they were institutional checks and balances upon power. In short, one of the major differences between ‘open societies’ and their (closed) counterparts behind the Iron Curtain was that the former encouraged the critical testing of the knowledge and decisions of the powerful and assessing them against liberal democratic principles. The latter tolerated criticism only on rare and limited occasions. For some, this represented the triumph of rational-scientific methods of inquiry and techniques of falsification. For others, especially since positivism and rationalism have lost much of their allure, it means that for society to become open and liberal, sectors of the population must be independent of the state and free to question its knowledge and power. One must be able to say ‘why’ to power and proclaim ‘no’ to power. Though we do not expect this position to be accepted by every reader, contributors to this book believe that critical dialogue is long overdue in Australia and needs to be listened to. For all its liberal democratic trappings, Australia’s security community continues to invoke closed monological narratives on defense and security. This book also questions the distinctions between policy practice and academic theory that informs conventional accounts of Australian security. One of its major concerns, particularly in chapters 1 and 2, is to illustrate how theory is integral to the practice of security analysis and policy prescription. The book also calls on policy-makers, academics and students of defense and security to think critically about what they are reading, writing and saying; to begin to ask, of their work and study, difficult and searching questions raised in other disciplines; to recognize, no matter how uncomfortable it feels, that what is involved in theory and practice is not the ability to identify a replacement for failed models, but a realization that terms and concepts – state sovereignty, balance of power, security, and so on – are contested and problematic, and that the world is indeterminate, always becoming what is written about it. Critical analysis which shows how particular kinds of theoretical presumptions can effectively exclude vital areas of political life from analysis has direct practical implications for policymakers, academics and citizens who face the daunting task of steering Australia through some potentially choppy international waters over the next few years. There is also much interest in the chapters for those struggling to give meaning to a world where so much that has long been taken for granted now demands imaginative, incisive reappraisal. The contributors, too, have struggled to find meaning, often despairing at the terrible human costs of international violence. This is why readers will find no single, fully formed panacea for the world’s ills in general, or Australia’s security in particular. There are none. Ever chapter, however in its own way, offers something more than is found in orthodox literature, often by exposing ritualistic Cold War defense and security mind-sets that are dressed up as new thinking. Chapters 7 and 9, for example, present alternative ways of engaging in security and defense practice. Others (chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8) seek to alert policymakers, academics and students to alternative theoretical possibilities that might better serve an Australian community pursuing security and prosperity in an uncertain world. All chapters confront the policy community and its counterparts in the academy with a deep awareness of the intellectual and material constraints imposed by dominant traditions of realism, but they avoid dismissive and exclusionary terms which often in the past characterized exchanges between policy-makers and their critics. This is because, as noted earlier, attention needs to be paid to the words and the thought process of those being criticized. A close reading of this kind draws attention to underlying assumptions, showing they need to be recognized and questioned. A sense of doubt (in place of confident certainty) is a necessary prelude to a genuine search for alternative policies. First comes an awareness of the need for new perspectives, then specific polices may follow. As Jim George argues in the following chapter, we need to look not as much at contending policies as they are made for us but challenging ‘the discursive process which gives [favored interpretations of “reality”] their meaning and which direct [Australia’s] policy/analytical/ military responses’. This process is not restricted to the small, official defense and security establishment huddled around the US-Australian War Memorial in Canberra. It also encompasses much of Australia’s academic defense and security community located primarily though not exclusively within the Australian National University and the University College of the University of New South Wales. These discursive processes are examined in detail in subsequent chapters as authors attempt to make sense of a politics of exclusion and closure which exercises disciplinary power over Australia’s security community. They also question the discourse of ‘regional security’, ‘security cooperation’, ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘alliance politics’ that are central to Australia’s official and academic security agenda in the 1990s. This is seen as an important task especially when, as it revealed, the disciplines of International Relations and Strategic Studies are under challenge from critical and theoretical debates ranging across the social sciences and humanities; debates that are nowhere to be found in Australian defense and security studies. The chapters graphically illustrate how Australia’s public policies on defense and security are informed, underpinned, and. This book, then, reflects and underlines the importance of Antonio Gramsci and Edward Said’s ‘critical intellectuals’. The demand, tacit or otherwise, that the policy maker’s frame of reference be accepted as the only basis for discussion and analysis ignores a three thousand year old tradition commonly associated with Socrates and purportedly integral to the Western legitimized by a narrowly-based intellectual enterprise which draws strength from contested concepts of realism and liberalism, which in turn seek legitimacy through policy-making processes. Contributors ask whether Australia’s policy-makers and their academic advisers are unaware of broader intellectual debates. Or resistant to them, or choose not to understand them, and why? To summarize: a central concern of this book is to democratize the defense and security theory/practice process in Australia so that restrictions on debate can be understood and resisted. This is a crucial enterprise in an analytical/ policy environment dominated by particularly rigid variants of realism which have become so powerful and unreflective that they are no longer recognized simply as particular ways of constituting the world, but as descriptions of the real-as reality itself. The consequences of this (silenced) theory-as-practice may be viewed every day in the poignant, distressing monuments to analytical/policy metooism at the Australian (Imperial) War Memorial in Canberra and the many other monuments to young Australians in towns and cities around the country. These are the flesh and blood installments of an insurance policy strategy which, tragically, remains integral to Australian realism, despite claims of a new mature independent identity in the 1990s. This is what unfortunately, continues to be at stake in the potentially deadly debates over defense and security revealed in this book. For this reason alone, it should be regarded as a positive and constructive contribution to debate by those who are the targets of its criticisms.

**1NC**

#### Plan circumvents the state secrets doctrine - Lawsuits release vital drone methods and intelligence –turns case

Murphy and Radsan 9 (Richard – AT&T Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law, and Afsheen – Professor, William Mitchell College of Law, “ARTICLE: DUE PROCESS AND TARGETED KILLING OF TERRORISTS”, November, 32 Cardozo L. Rev. 405, lexis)

In defense of this anomaly, there are obvious policy reasons for not allowing Bivens-style claims against American officials for targeted killings wherever they occur in the world. Among them, we do not want federal courts damaging national security through excessive, misdirected second-guessing of executive judgments; nor do we want [\*442] the litigation process to reveal information that national security requires to be kept secret. In Arar v. Ashcroft, a divided panel of the Second Circuit cited these "special factors" to disallow a plaintiff from bringing a Bivens claim against officials he alleged subjected him to extraordinary rendition. n209 But as the dissenting judge in Arar noted, these special factors lose much of their force once one acknowledges that a Bivens-style action needs to overcome formidable hurdles of fact and law. n210 As to practical hurdles, most people left alive by a Predator strike or other targeted killing would not turn to American courts for relief. Some would not sue because they are, in fact, the enemy - Osama bin Laden is not going to hire an American lawyer. n211 Others would not sue because doing so is beyond their means - a villager from the mountains of Afghanistan is not likely to hire an American lawyer either. As to legal hurdles, Boumediene itself poses a high one to lawsuits by non-U.S. citizens for overseas attacks. Here we may seem to contradict our earlier insistence that Boumediene presupposes some form of constitutional protection worldwide for everyone. n212 Yet Boumediene shows that the requirement of judicial process depends on a pragmatic analysis. n213 As part of its balancing, Boumediene made clear that courts should favor the interests of American citizens and of others with strong connections to the United States. n214 Although the Boumediene petitioners lacked the preference in favor of citizens, they persuaded a slim majority of the Court to extend constitutional habeas to non-resident aliens detained at Guantanamo. This result, however, took place under exceptional circumstances: among them, Guantanamo is de facto United States territory; n215 the executive had held detainees [\*443] there for years and claimed authority to do so indefinitely; and the Supreme Court doubted the fairness and accuracy of the CSRTs. n216 Absent such circumstances, Boumediene leaves courts to follow their habit of deferring to the executive on national security. For targeted killing, that may mean cutting off non-citizens from American courts. The state-secrets privilege poses another barrier to Bivens-style actions. This privilege allows the government to block the disclosure of information in court that would damage national security. n217 It could prevent a case from proceeding in any number of ways. For instance, the government could block plaintiffs from accessing or using information needed to determine whether a Predator attack had a sound basis through human or technical sources of intelligence. n218 By this trump card, the government could prevent litigation from seriously compromising intelligence sources and methods. n219 In addition, the doctrine of qualified immunity requires dismissal of actions against officials if a court determines they reasonably believed they were acting within the scope of their legal authority. n220 Defendants would satisfy this requirement so long as they reasonably [\*444] claimed they had authority under the laws of war (assuming their applicability). These standards are hazy, and a court applying them would tend to defer to the executive on matters of military judgment. n221 In view of so many practical and legal hurdles, some courts and commentators might be inclined to categorically reject all Bivens-style challenges to targeted killings. In essence, they might view lawsuits related to targeted killing as a political question left to the executive. n222 This view parallels Justice Thomas's that courts should not second-guess executive judgments as to who is an enemy combatant. n223 Contrary to Justice Thomas's view, the potency of the government's threshold defenses means that targeted-killing cases that make it to the merits would likely involve the most egregious conduct - for example, killing an unarmed Jose Padilla at O'Hare Airport on a shoot-to-kill order. For these egregious cases, a judicial check on executive authority is most necessary. In terms of a Mathews balancing, the question becomes whether the benefits of Bivens actions on targeted killings of terrorists outweigh the harms. The potential harm is to the CIA's sources and methods on the Predator program. Lawsuits might harm national security by forcing the disclosure of sensitive information. The states-secrets privilege should block this result, however. Lawsuits might also harm national security by causing executive officials to become risk-averse about actions needed to counter terrorist activities. Qualified immunity, however, should ensure that liability exists only where an official lacks any justification for his action. On the benefit side, allowing lawsuits to proceed would, in truly exceptional cases, serve the private interest of the plaintiff in seeking compensation and, perhaps more to the point given the incommensurability of death and money, would provide accountability. Still more important, all people have an interest in casting light on the government's use of the power to kill in a world-wide war in which combatants and targets are not easily identified.

#### Unmanned vehicle tech leadership is key to naval power

Landay et al. 4 (William E. Landay III – RDML (Rear Admiral), USN, Concurring with the following: Michael A. LeFever, RDML, USN Raymond A. Spicer, RDML, USN Roseanne M. Levitre, RDML, USN Steven J. Toma szeski, RADM, USN, Oceanographer of the Navy, Approved by Joseph A. Walsh and Roger M. Smith of US Navy, “The Navy Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (UUV) Master Plan”, 11/9, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/technology/uuvmp.pdf)

The Vision for UUVs and the Objective of the UUV Master Plan Today our naval forces enjoy maritime superiority around the world and find themselves at a strategic inflection point during which future capabilities must be pondered with creativity and innovation . Change must be embraced and made an ally in order to take advantage of emerging technologies, concepts, and doctrine; thereby preserving the nation’s global leadership. Sea Power 21 has additionally specified unmanned vehicles as force multipliers and risk reduction agents for the Navy of the future. Transformation applies to what we buy as well as how we buy and operate it–all while competing with other shifting national investment priorities. The growing use of unmanned systems– air, surface, ground, and underwater is continually demonstrating new possibilities. While admittedly futuristic in vision , one can conceive of scenarios where UUVs sense, track, identify, target, and destroy an enemy–all autonomously and tie in with the full net-centric battlespace. UUV systems will provide a key undersea component f o r FORCEnet, contributing to an integrated picture of the battlespace. Even though today’s planners, operators, and technologists cannot accurately forecast the key applications for U UVs in the year 2050, this plan provides a roadmap to move toward that vision. Pursuit of this plan’s updated recommendations beginning in the year 2004, will place increasingly large numbers of UUVs in the hands of warfighters. Thus, xvii UUV Master Plan UUVs can begin addressing near-term needs while im proving understanding of mid- to far-term possibilities. Even the most futuristic applications can evolve in a confident, cost-effective manner. This confidence is based on several factor s: the Sea Power 21 Sub-Pillar capabilities identified he readdress a broad ran g e of user needs; critical technologies are identified that will enable tomorrow’s more complex applications; and key principles and best practices are recommended that p r o v ide for a logical, flexible, and affordable development effort.

#### Great power war

Eaglen 11 (Mackenzie, Heritage Foundation Research Fellow for National Security Studies, Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, May, 16, 2011, “Thinking about a Day without Sea Power: Implications for U.S. Defense Policy”, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/05/thinking-about-a-day-without-sea-power-implications-for-us-defense-policy)

**Under a scenario of dramatically** reduced naval power**, the U**nited **S**tates woul**d** cease to be active **in any** international **alliances**. While it is reasonable to assume that land and air forces would be similarly reduced in this scenario, the lack of credible **maritime capability to move** their **bulk** and establish forward bases **would render** these fo**rces irrelevant, even if the Army and Air Force were retained at today’s levels**. In Iraq and Afghanistan today, 90 percent of material arrives by sea, although material bound for Afghanistan must then make a laborious journey by land into theater. China’s **claims on the South China Sea**, previously disputed by virtually all nations in the region and routinely contested by U.S. and partner naval forces, **are accepted** as a fait accompli, effectively **turning the region into a “Chinese lake**.” China establishes expansive oil and gas exploration with new deepwater drilling technology and secures its local sea lanes from intervention. Korea, unified in 2017 after the implosion of the North, **signs a mutual defense treaty with China and solidifies their relationship**. Japan **is** increasingly **isolated and** in 2020–2025 executes long-rumored **plans to create a**n indigenous **nuclear weapons capability**.[11] By 2025, Japan has 25 mobile nuclear-armed missiles ostensibly **targeting China**, toward which Japan’s historical animus remains strong. **China’s entente with Russia leaves the Eurasian landmass** dominated by Russia looking west **and China looking east** and south. Each cedes a sphere of dominance to the other and remains largely unconcerned with the events in the other’s sphere. **Worldwide**, trade in foodstuffs collapses. **Expanding populations** **in the Middle East** increase pressure **on their governments**, which are already stressed as the breakdown in world trade disproportionately affects food importers. **Piracy increases** worldwide, **driving** food **transportation costs** even **higher**. **In the Arctic, Russia** aggressively **asserts its dominance** **and** effectively **shoulders out other nations** with legitimate claims to seabed resources. **No naval power exists to counter Russia’s claims**. **India**, recognizing that its previous role as a balancer to China has lost relevance with the retrenchment of the Americans, **agrees to supplement Chinese naval power** in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf to protect the flow of oil to Southeast Asia. In exchange, **China agrees to exercise increased influence on** its client state **Pakistan**. The great typhoon of 2023 strikes Bangladesh, killing 23,000 people initially, and 200,000 more die in the subsequent weeks and months as the international community provides little humanitarian relief. Cholera and malaria are epidemic. **Iran dominates the Persian Gulf** and is a nuclear power. Its navy aggressively patrols the Gulf while the Revolutionary Guard Navy harasses shipping and oil infrastructure to force Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries into Tehran’s orbit. **Russia supplies Iran with** a steady flow of military technology and nuclear industry **expertise**. Lacking a regional threat, the Iranians happily control the flow of oil from the Gulf and benefit economically from the “protection” provided to other GCC nations. In Egypt, the decade-long experiment in participatory democracy ends with the ascendance of the Muslim Brotherhood in a violent seizure of power. The United States is identified closely with the previous coalition government, and riots break out at the U.S. embassy. Americans in Egypt are left to their own devices because the U.S. has no forces in the Mediterranean capable of performing a noncombatant evacuation when the government closes major airports. **Led by Iran, a coalition** of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq attacks Israel. Over 300,000 die in six months of fighting that includes a limited nuclear exchange between Iran and Israel. Israel is defeated, and the State of Palestine is declared in its place. Massive “refugee” camps are created to house the internally displaced Israelis, but a humanitarian nightmare ensues from the inability of conquering forces to support them. **The NATO alliance** is shattered**. The security of European nations depends** increasingly **on** the **lack of external threats and the nuclear capability of France, Britain, and Germany**, which overcame its reticence to military capability in light of America’s retrenchment. Europe depends for its energy security on Russia and Iran, which control the main supply lines and sources of oil and gas to Europe. Major European nations stand down their militaries and instead make limited contributions to a new EU military constabulary force. No European nation maintains the ability to conduct significant out-of-area operations, and Europe as a whole maintains little airlift capacity.

### 1NC Pakistan

#### Af-Pak drone strikes decreasing now – no high value targets left, public pressure is causing caution

Farshori 8/27/13 (Kokab, Voice of America News, "Are US Drone Strikes in Pakistan Winding Down?," http://www.voanews.com/content/drone-strikes/1737799.html)

WASHINGTON — For more than a decade, the United States has been using unmanned drones to strike at al-Qaida and Taliban militants in western parts of Pakistan that border on Afghanistan. The drone strikes, begun under President George W. Bush, dramatically increased after President Obama took office.¶ ¶ But now, more than four years later, the number of drone strikes is way down. ¶ ¶ According to the New America Foundation, which tracks the strikes, there have only been 17 drone strikes this year so far. In the first eight months of last year, there were 36 strikes, while the number of drone strikes in the first eight months of 2011 and 2010 there were 56 and 57 respectively. ¶ ¶ Under the Bush administration, there were 46 strikes in Pakistan from 2004 to 2008. The total number of strikes carried out by the Obama administration from 2009 to 2012 was 297. ¶ ¶ Experts in Washington offer a variety of reasons for the shrinking number of drone strikes in recent months. Stephen Tankel, a counter-terrorism expert and an assistant professor at American University in Washington D.C., says one of the reasons is that there aren’t many high-value targets left to be hit in the Pakistan and Afghanistan region. ¶ ¶ Tankel also says the pressure from Pakistan and international human rights organizations may be at play as well. ¶ ¶ “I think there is certainly pressure from Pakistan, from human rights organizations, and quite frankly from elements within the U.S. that the drone strikes should be reduced, if not ended entirely,” he said.

#### Pakistani stability high and will continue – multiple indicators prove

--successful election

--free press, indy judiciary

--military support

--Sharif economic policy

--improved Indo-Pak relations

Deford 13 (Mac, GlobalPost, "Sharif’s election gives US an opening to help stabilize Pakistan," http://www.globalpost.com/dispatches/globalpost-blogs/commentary/sharif-s-election-gives-us-opening-help-stabilize-pakistan)

OWL’S HEAD, Maine — There's not much good news coming out of the broader Middle East these days and so the successful election this past weekend in Pakistan is cause for at least muted elation. It is, after all, the first time in Pakistan's beleaguered 65-year history that a democratically elected government has been replaced by a democratically elected government.¶ So that's the good news. Toss in the fact that the voter turnout, the highest for parliamentary elections in nearly two generations, was spurred upward by women and younger voters, and was not deterred by Taliban attacks, then add that Pakistan does have a remarkably free press and a quite independent judiciary and, obviously, a military that now is willing to let democracy play out — and things don't look so bad.¶ Pakistan's support of extremist groups like the Taliban, and its high-level decision to keep Osama bin Laden hidden in plain sight, are the clearest evidence of Pakistan perversity.¶ Pakistan-US relations were so low last year that an article in the establishment journal Foreign Affairs suggested that the US should treat Pakistan the same way it treats other "hostile powers," such as Iran and North Korea.¶ As has been well documented, Dick Holbrooke, handpicked by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to oversee the Afghan-Pakistan theatre, got no support from the president for the two years he was in the role, until his death at the end of 2010.¶ A key part of the problem has been Obama's apparent belief — or at least the belief of his advisors — that Pakistan is a client state, that it needs us more than we need them.¶ A failed Pakistan or one infiltrated by the Taliban or other extremists could cause dangerous problems for the US. At the end of next year, we'll be pulling our last fighting forces out of Afghanistan. But it's never really been about Afghanistan. Pakistan is the key. Has the White House finally learned that?¶ The Arab Middle East faces decades of collapsing regimes, civil wars and even re-drawn borders. Obama's hands-off reaction to the most dangerous current aspect of the failed Arab Spring, Syria's bloody civil war, illustrates not just our relative retreat from our role as the world's night-watchman but as well a realistic assessment of the diminishing importance of the Middle East. And while Israel's concerns about a nuclear-armed Iran — and indeed Saudi Arabia's and its Gulf neighbors as well — may yet explode the area, the most dangerous region in today's world is Pakistan and its environs.¶ For starters, Pakistan has a couple hundred nuclear weapons. It has the Taliban, an insurgency movement that it mid-wifed and returned to haunt it. Strategically, Pakistan is the center of a complex web of relationships that entangle half the world's population.¶ The US sees China as a down-the-road threat to our primacy in Asia. India and China, the world's two most populous countries, have long been rivals, not so much because of their border clashes in the high Himalayas as their regional strategic ambitions.¶ As it moved out of its non-aligned leadership role, India aligned itself more closely with the US. China has long courted close relations with Pakistan, which has been reciprocated as an obvious way for both to counter India's pre-eminent position in the sub-continent.¶ Afghanistan only came into US purview through al-Qaeda and 9/11. But Pakistan has long exercised influence in Afghanistan, where the populous Punjab was arbitrarily split between the two by the Durand Line drawn up by the British colonial enterprise. India, naturally, has numerous consulates throughout Afghanistan for the primary purpose of offsetting Pakistan's influence.¶ The Taliban and nuclear weapons have created a potentially high stakes situation. A failed state, or just a couple of nuclear bombs in the wrong hands, would prompt a somewhat different response from the Obama administration than the understandable waffling on how to deal with Syria's chemical weapons.¶ So, as Nawaz Sharif takes control of Pakistan for the third time, what can the US hope for? And, more importantly, how can the US work with Sharif to reinforce Pakistan's stability? What must Obama do to keep Pakistan out of the "lost" column?¶ The good news is that Sharif, although a religious conservative and a two-time recipient of a military overthrow, is a sophisticated businessman who understands capitalism. He wants to improve relations with India; he wants to help the US negotiate a deal with the Afghan Taliban that would facilitate a peaceful US departure.¶ Pakistan has enormous economic problems: its infrastructure has been unable to keep pace with its rapid population growth; in the larger cities, electricity is cut 12 hours or more each day. Its education system is so weak that millions of Pakistani children end up at religious madrasas, often being taught extremist Islamism.¶ Sharif understands the economic problems that were as much as anything responsible for the overwhelming defeat of current Prime Minister Zardari's party. Sharif knows that for his party to remain in power, economic growth is essential.¶ He's realistic when it comes to India, hoping, as he did the last time he was prime minister, to improve relations. Indeed, he's invited his Indian counterpart to his inauguration. Better relations with India not only lower the overall military decibels but enhanced trade could provide a big boost to that economic bounce Sharif needs.

#### Indo-Pak relations increasing – stronger economic ties prove

Sharma 13 (Pranjal, Advisor at Prasar Bharati,”Sharif’s government gives boost to relations,” DNA, 7/17/2013, http://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/1862090/column-sharif-s-government-gives-boost-to-indo-pak-business-relations)

Usually when governments change, so do the economic policies of the country. In a remarkable show of maturity the recently elected government in Pakistan has decided to push ahead with economic reforms. More crucially, the Nawaz Sharif government is adding momentum to trade and investment relations between India and Pakistan. ¶ The process had begun in late 2011 with the first ever visit of the Pakistan trade minister to India. Soon after that there were business delegations while the governments on both sides encouraged changes in policy. ¶ Pakistan even accorded the MFN status to India at last as an important symbol of rising maturity on trade relations. This step aims to lower the tariffs of goods imported from India. Even India announced that it would welcome and encourage foreign direct investment from Pakistan. ¶ There was much anxiety about the future of Indo-Pak trade relations after Nawaz Sharif won the elections. The worry was that prime minister Sharif would go slow or reverse economic links since the process was initiated by his predecessor. At best he would postpone decisions that facilitate trade. And at worst, he would raise fresh barriers to cross border trade and investment. ¶ All such worries were belied. Sharif displayed great vision by fully endorsing the normalization of economic relations. ¶ Business has been quick to move ahead. A conference of leading industry heads was held in Islamabad in late June to take forward the process. Sharif met the first ever gathering of the Indo-Pakistan Joint Business Forum and urged it to work on a detailed roadmap for strengthening economic links. ¶ The joint business forum discussed agriculture and textile exports, trans-border gas pipeline, visa regime and enhancing banking processes. Other issues included air and rail connectivity to facilitate movement of professionals and goods. ¶ This private sector initiative has now moved into the next gear with the setting up of 10 teams that will identify specific steps in as many sectors. These include textile, agriculture and education where trade and transactions can begin soon. ¶ The frequency of business visits between the two countries is rising consistently. A delegation from Pakistan will soon finalise import of gas from India through a 120-km pipeline. Pakistan is ready to offer a sovereign guarantee to India’s Gail to construct the pipeline. In fact India will also export power to get Pakistan tide over its energy crisis. ¶ Moreover a company will soon be set up to begin work on bringing gas from Turkmenistan to Pakistan and India via Afghanistan. ¶ A few months ago, such developments would have been difficult to imagine. ¶ “Business and government on both sides are now working on the nitty gritty of policy changes that will remove irritants to trade,” says Sunil Kant Munjal, former president of CII and Jt MD of Hero MotoCorp who led the Indian business delegation to Pakistan. The Pakistan delegation was led by Syed Yawar Ali, chairman of Nestle Pakistan. ¶ The change in government in Pakistan has only firmed the resolve of the country to focus on economic development. Stronger business links with India and South Asia will play a critical role for Pakistan. ¶ As it prepares for elections next year, observers feel that India must maintain maturity and policy momentum to build on the work done so far. ¶ The author tracks India’s political economy and its engagement with the world.

#### U.S.-Pakistani ties are strong and resilient

Hindustan Times 08(9/7, “Pak-US ties resilient, will withstand difficulties: Haqqani.” Report from Asian News International. Lexis.)

Washington, Sept. 7 -- Pakistan's Ambassador to the United States, Hussain Haqqani has ruled out a cooling of ties between Islamabad and Washington in the wake of the recent attacks by international forces in Pakistan's tribal regions, saying bilateral ties are resilient and would withstand the difficulties coming in the way. Addressing the Carnegie Endowment for Peace here, Haqqani said that Pakistan expects the United States to persuade its NATO allies and Afghanistan to look upon it as a partner. As far as U.S. policy towards Pakistan was concerned, the envoy said Washington needed to recognize that Pakistan is a significant and important country under all circumstances. "It is a nuclear armed nation that has demonstrated its nuclear weapon capability. It is a nation of 160 million people, a majority Muslim country, and a strategically located nation on the crossroads of the Middle East, South Asia and Central Asia," the Daily Times quoted Haqqani, as saying. "Pakistan is important in its own right and it is time to engage Pakistan on a long-term basis," he added. He also said that there is no short-term solution to the menace of terrorism, and that dealing with this menace required much more than just a military component. "It will include political, ideological, and socio-economic components and those fighting terrorism will need to reach the phenomenon's roots," he argued. Turning to Pakistan's relations with both India and Afghanistan, Haqqani said these ties should not be viewed through the same single lens. "We need more Pakistanis to understand the American perspective and be sympathetic to it rather than enrage more Pakistanis against the US," he said.

#### Their impact is irresponsible fearmongering – there is NO capacity for terrorists to acquire and execute a nuclear attack

Mueller and Stewart 12 [John Mueller is Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science, both at Ohio State University, and Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute in Washington, D.C. Mark G. Stewart is Australian Research Council Professorial Fellow and Professor and Director at the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at the University of Newcastle in Australia, “The Terrorism Delusion”, International Security, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Summer 2012), pp. 81–110]

It seems increasingly likely that the official and popular reaction to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, has been substantially deluded—massively disproportionate to the threat that al-Qaida has ever actually presented either as an international menace or as an inspiration or model to homegrown amateurs. Applying the extensive datasets on terrorism that have been generated over the last decades, we conclude that the chances of an American perishing at the hands of a terrorist at present rates is one in 3.5 million per year—well within the range of what risk analysts hold to be “acceptable risk.”40 Yet, despite the importance of responsibly communicating risk and despite the costs of irresponsible fearmongering, just about the only official who has ever openly put the threat presented by terrorism in some sort of context is New York’s Mayor Michael Bloomberg, who in 2007 pointed out that people should “get a life” and that they have a greater chance of being hit by lightning than of being a victim of terrorism—an observation that may be a bit off the mark but is roughly accurate.41 (It might be noted that, despite this unorthodox outburst, Bloomberg still managed to be re-elected two years later.) Indeed, much of the reaction to the September 11 attacks calls to mind Hans Christian Andersen’s fable of delusion, “The Emperor’s New Clothes,” in which con artists convince the emperor’s court that they can weave stuffs of the most beautiful colors and elaborate patterns from the delicate silk and purest gold thread they are given. These stuffs, they further convincingly explain, have the property of remaining invisible to anyone who is unusually stupid or unfit for office. The emperor finds this quite appealing because not only will he have splendid new clothes, but he will be able to discover which of his officials are unfit for their posts—or in today’s terms, have lost their effectiveness. His courtiers, then, have great professional incentive to proclaim the stuffs on the loom to be absolutely magnificent even while mentally justifying this conclusion with the equivalent of “absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.” Unlike the emperor’s new clothes, terrorism does of course exist. Much of the reaction to the threat, however, has a distinctly delusionary quality. In Carle’s view, for example, the CIA has been “spinning in self-referential circles” in which “our premises were flawed, our facts used to fit our premises, our premises determined, and our fears justified our operational actions, in a self-contained process that arrived at a conclusion dramatically at odds with the facts.” The process “projected evil actions where there was, more often, muddled indirect and unavoidable complicity, or not much at all.” These “delusional ratiocinations,” he further observes, “were all sincerely, ardently held to have constituted a rigorous, rational process to identify terrorist threats” in which “the avalanche of reporting confirms its validity by its quantity,” in which there is a tendency to “reject incongruous or contradictory facts as erroneous, because they do not conform to accepted reality,” and in which potential dissenters are not-so-subtly reminded of career dangers: “Say what you want at meetings. It’s your decision. But you are doing yourself no favors.”42 Consider in this context the alarming and profoundly imaginary estimates of U.S. intelligence agencies in the year after the September 11 attacks that the number of trained al-Qaida operatives in the United States was between 2,000 and 5,000.43 Terrorist cells, they told reporters, were “embedded in most U.S. cities with sizable Islamic communities,” usually in the “run-down sections,” and were “up and active” because electronic intercepts had found some of them to be “talking to each other.”44 Another account relayed the view of “experts” that Osama bin Laden was ready to unleash an “11,000 strong terrorist army” operating in more than sixty countries “controlled by a Mr. Big who is based in Europe,” but that intelligence had “no idea where thousands of these men are.”45 Similarly, FBI Director Robert Mueller assured the Senate Intelligence Committee on February 11, 2003, that, although his agency had yet to identify even one al-Qaida cell in the United States, “I remain very concerned about what we are not seeing,” a sentence rendered in bold lettering in his prepared text. Moreover, he claimed that such unidentified entities presented “the greatest threat,” had “developed a support infrastructure” in the country, and had achieved both the “ability” and the “intent” to inflict “signi ficant casualties in the US with little warning.”46 Over the course of time, such essentially delusionary thinking has been internalized and institutionalized in a great many ways. For example, an extrapolation of delusionary proportions is evident in the common observation that, because terrorists were able, mostly by thuggish means, to crash airplanes into buildings, they might therefore be able to construct a nuclear bomb. Brian Jenkins has run an internet search to discover how often variants of the term “al-Qaida” appeared within ten words of “nuclear.” There were only seven hits in 1999 and eleven in 2000, but the number soared to 1,742 in 2001 and to 2,931 in 2002.47 By 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates was assuring a congressional committee that what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is “the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear.”48 Few of the sleepless, it seems, found much solace in the fact that an al-Qaida computer seized in Afghanistan in 2001 indicated that the group’s budget for research on weapons of mass destruction (almost all of it focused on primitive chemical weapons work) was $2,000 to $4,000.49 In the wake of the killing of Osama bin Laden, officials now have many more al-Qaida computers, and nothing in their content appears to suggest that the group had the time or inclination, let alone the money, to set up and staff a uranium-seizing operation, as well as a fancy, super-high-technology facility to fabricate a bomb. This is a process that requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators and other criminals, obtaining and transporting highly guarded material, setting up a machine shop staffed with top scientists and technicians, and rolling the heavy, cumbersome, and untested finished product into position to be detonated by a skilled crew—all while attracting no attention from outsiders.50 If the miscreants in the American cases have been unable to create and set off even the simplest conventional bombs, it stands to reason that none of them were very close to creating, or having anything to do with, nuclear weapons—or for that matter biological, radiological, or chemical ones. In fact, with perhaps one exception, none seems to have even dreamed of the prospect; and the exception is José Padilla (case 2), who apparently mused at one point about creating a dirty bomb—a device that would disperse radiation—or even possibly an atomic one. His idea about isotope separation was to put uranium into a pail and then to make himself into a human centrifuge by swinging the pail around in great arcs.51 Even if a weapon were made abroad and then brought into the United States, its detonation would require individuals in-country with the capacity to receive and handle the complicated weapons and then to set them off. Thus far, the talent pool appears, to put mildly, very thin.

#### No retaliation

**Jenks-Smith & Herron, 05** (Hank and Kerry, professor and adjunct professor at George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. “United States Public Response to Terrorism: Fault Lines or Bedrock?” Review of Policy Research. September. Lexis)

Our final contrasting set of expectations relates to the degree to which the public will support or demand retribution against terrorists and supporting states. Here our data show that support for using conventional United States military force to retaliate against terrorists initially averaged above midscale, but did not reach a high level of demand for military action. Initial support declined significantly across all demographic and belief categories by the time of our survey in 2002. Furthermore, panelists both in 2001 and 2002 preferred that high levels of certainty about culpability (above 8.5 on a scale from zero to ten) be established before taking military action. Again, we find the weight of evidence supporting revisionist expectations of public opinion. Overall, these results are inconsistent with the contention that highly charged events will result in volatile and unstructured responses among mass publics that prove problematic for policy processes. The initial response to the terrorist strikes demonstrated a broad and consistent shift in public assessments toward a greater perceived threat from terrorism, and greater willingness to support policies to reduce that threat. But even in the highly charged context of such a serious attack on the American homeland, the overall public response was quite measured. On average, the public showed very little propensity to undermine speech protections, and initial willingness to engage in military retaliation moderated significantly over the following year.

### 1NC Norms

#### No reverse modeling - norms can’t solve

Saunders 13 **(**Paul, executive director of The Center for the National Interest and associate publisher of The National Interest. He served in the State Department from 2003 to 2005, “We Won't Always Drone Alone,” <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/we-wont-always-drone-alone-8177>)

A broader and deeper challenge is how others—outside the United States—will use drones, whether armed or unarmed, and what lessons they will draw from Washington’s approach. Thus far, the principal lesson may well be that drones can be extremely effective in killing your opponents, wherever they are, without risking your own troops and without sending soldiers or law enforcement personnel across another country’s borders. It seems less likely that others will adopt U.S.-style legal standards and oversight procedures, or that they will always ask other governments before sending drones into their airspace.¶ Based on their actions, it is almost as if Obama administration officials believe that the United States and its allies will have a long-term monopoly on drones. How else can one explain their exuberant confidence in launching drone attacks? However, the administration’s dramatic expansion in drone strikes—and their apparent effectiveness—will only further shorten Washington’s reign as the drone capital of the world by increasing the incentives to others eager to develop, refine or buy the technology.¶ Have Obama administration officials given any thought to what the world might look like when armed drones are more widespread and when Americans or U.S. allies and partners could become targets? To an outsider, there is little evidence of this kind of thinking in the administration’s use of drones.¶ This is a serious problem. According to an unclassified July 2012 report by the Government Accountability Office, at least 76 countries already have acquired unmanned aerial vehicles, known as UAVs or drones; the report also states that “countries of concern” are attempting to acquire advanced UAVs from foreign suppliers as well as seeking illegal access to U.S. technology. And a 2012 special report by the United Kingdom’s Guardian newspaper indicated that China has 10 or more models, though not all are armed. Other sources identify additional varieties in China. At least 50 countries are trying to build 900 different types of drones, the GAO writes.¶ More generally, the administration’s expanding use of drones is a powerful endorsement of not only the technology, but of the practice of targeted killing as an instrument of foreign and security policy. Having provided this powerful impetus, the United States should not be surprised if others—with differing legal standards and more creative efforts at self-justification—seize upon it once they have the necessary capabilities. According to the GAO, this is already happening—in government-speak, “while only a limited number of countries have fielded lethal or weaponized UAVs, this threat is anticipated to grow.” From this perspective, it is ironic that a president so critical of his predecessor’s unilateralism would practice it himself—particularly in a manner that other governments will find much easier to emulate than the Bush administration’s larger-scale use of force. How does the Obama administration plan to respond if and when China or Russia uses armed UAVs to attack groups they define as terrorists?

#### Low cost makes drone prolif inevitable - US policy not key

Lewis 12 (Michael, Associate Professor of Law at Ohio Northern University, "SYMPOSIUM: THE 2009 AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE MANUAL: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS: Drones and the Boundaries of the Battlefield," Spring, 47 Tex. Int'l L.J. 293, lexis)

The driving force behind the western militaries' development of drone technology was to minimize the number of human lives placed at risk to collect intelligence and to deliver small amounts of ordnance with some degree of precision. However, it is the relatively low cost of drones compared to that of modern combat aircraft that will drive the proliferation of drones over the next decade. More basic drones cost less than 1/20th as much as the latest combat aircraft and even the more advanced drones that feature jet propulsion and employ some stealth technology are less than 1/10th the cost. n13 With defense budgets around the world under increasing pressure, drones will be seen as an attractive alternative to manned aircraft for certain types of missions.

#### The US isn’t key to drone use or proliferation – tech advances and necessities mean that their development is inevitable

Anderson 11 (Kenneth, Professor at Washington College of Law, American University; and Hoover Institution visiting fellow, member of Hoover Task Force on National Security and Law; nonresident senior fellow, Brookings Institution, "What Kind of Drones Arms Race is Coming?," http://www.volokh.com/2011/10/09/what-kind-of-drones-arms-race-is-coming/)

It sounds like it must be true. But is it? There are a number of reasons to doubt that moves by other countries are an arms race in the sense that the US “created” it or could have stopped it, or that something different would have happened had the US not pursued the technology or not used it in the ways it has against non-state terrorist actors. Here are a couple of quick reasons why I don’t find this thesis very persuasive, and what I think the real “arms race” surrounding drones will be.¶ Unmanned aerial vehicles have clearly got a big push from the US military in the way of research, development, and deployment. But the reality today is that the technology will transform civil aviation, in many of the same ways and for the same reasons that another robotic technology, driverless cars (which Google is busily plying up and down the streets of San Francisco, but which started as a DARPA project). UAVs will eventually move into many roles in ordinary aviation, because it is cheaper, relatively safer, more reliable – and it will eventually include cargo planes, crop dusting, border patrol, forest fire patrols, and many other tasks. There is a reason for this – the avionics involved are simply not so complicated as to be beyond the abilities of many, many states. Military applications will carry drones many different directions, from next-generation unmanned fighter aircraft able to operate against other craft at much higher G stresses to tiny surveillance drones. But the flying-around technology for aircraft that are generally sizes flown today is not that difficult, and any substantial state that feels like developing them will be able to do so.¶ But the point is that this was happening anyway, and the technology was already available. The US might have been first, but it hasn’t sparked an arms race in any sense that absent the US push, no one would have done this. That’s just a fantasy reading of where the technology in general aviation was already going; Zenko’s ‘original sin’ attribution of this to the US opening Pandora’s box is not a credible understanding of the development and applications of the technology. Had the US not moved on this, the result would have been a US playing catch-up to someone else. For that matter, the off-the-shelf technology for small, hobbyist UAVs is simple enough and available enough that terrorists will eventually try to do their own amateur version, putting some kind of bomb on it.¶ Moving on from the avionics, weaponizing the craft is also not difficult. The US stuck an anti-tank missile on a Predator; this is also not rocket science. Many states can build drones, many states can operate them, and crudely weaponizing them is also not rocket science. The US didn’t spark an arms race; this would occur to any state with a drone. To the extent that there is real development here, it lies in the development of specialized weapons that enable vastly more discriminating targeting. The details are sketchy, but there are indications from DangerRoom and other observers (including some comments from military officials off the record) that US military budgets include amounts for much smaller missiles designed not as anti-tank weapons, but to penetrate and kill persons inside a car without blowing it to bits, for example. This is genuinely harder to do – but still not all that difficult for a major state, whether leading NATO states, China, Russia, or India. The question is whether it would be a bad thing to have states competing to come up with weapons technologies that are … more discriminating.

#### Covert action means no solvency

Lohmann 13 **(**Julia, director of the Harvard Law National Security Research Committee, BA in political science from the University of California, Berkeley, “Distinguishing CIA-Led from Military-Led Targeted Killings,” <http://www.lawfareblog.com/wiki/the-lawfare-wiki-document-library/targeted-killing/effects-of-particular-tactic-on-issues-related-to-targeted-killings/>)

The U.S. military—in particular, the Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and its subsidiary entity, the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)—is responsible for carrying out military-led targeted killings.¶ Military-led targeted killings are subject to various legal restrictions, including a complex web of statutes and executive orders. For example, because the Covert Action Statute does not distinguish among institutions undertaking covert actions, targeted killings conducted by the military that fall within the definition of “covert action” set forth in 50 U.S.C. § 413(b) are subject to the same statutory constraints as are CIA covert actions. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e). However, as Robert Chesney explains, many military-led targeted killings may fall into one of the CAS exceptions—for instance, that for traditional military activities—so that the statute’s requirements will not always apply to military-led targetings. Such activities are exempted from the CAS’s presidential finding and authorization requirements, as well as its congressional reporting rules.¶ Because such unacknowledged military operations are, in many respects, indistinguishable from traditional covert actions conducted by the CIA, this exception may provide a “loophole” allowing the President to circumvent existing oversight mechanisms without substantively changing his operational decisions. However, at least some military-led targetings do not fall within the CAS exceptions, and are thus subject to that statute’s oversight requirements. For instance, Chesney and Kenneth Anderson explain, some believe that the traditional military activities exception to the CAS only applies in the context of overt hostilities, yet it is not clear that the world’s tacit awareness that targeted killing operations are conducted (albeit not officially acknowledged) by the U.S. military, such as the drone program in Pakistan, makes those operations sufficiently overt to place them within the traditional military activities exception, and thus outside the constraints of the CAS.¶ Chesney asserts, however, that despite the gaps in the CAS’s applicability to military-led targeted killings, those targetings are nevertheless subject to a web of oversight created by executive orders that, taken together, largely mirrors the presidential authorization requirements of the CAS. But, this process is not enshrined in statute or regulation and arguably could be changed or revoked by the President at any time. Moreover, this internal Executive Branch process does not involve Congress or the Judiciary in either ex ante or ex post oversight of military-led targeted killings, and thus, Philip Alston asserts, it may be insufficient to provide a meaningful check against arbitrary and overzealous Executive actions.

#### Israel is the basis of global norms related to targeted killing

Fisher 7 (Jason, Judicial Clerk to the Honorable James O. Browning, United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, "Targeted Killing, Norms, and International Law," 45 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 711, lexis)

A norm may spread and gain in prominence if States emulate the behavior of some prestigious or otherwise well-known actor, or an actor especially relevant to a particular issue area that has adopted the norm, "even if the emulated actor is not attempting to communicate its behavior." n157 As the world's only superpower, the United States is prestigious and well-known, particularly with regard to matters concerning the use of force, an area in which its geo-strategic position has seen it involved to a unique extent. Similarly, Israel is a conspicuous State that possesses "a special relationship with the subject matter of" n158 terrorism. As such, U.S. and Israeli martial and counter-terrorism norms and behaviors are susceptible to emulation by other States. A targeted killing norm may spread outwards, then, from the United States or Israel, or both, to other States in the international system via emulation. Importantly, emulation builds upon [\*738] itself; as more States adopt a particular norm, the rate at which it is emulated is likely to increase as other States come to perceive adoption as "normal." n159 Moreover, because it is rational for actors to adopt innovations, including new norms, when they observe that they have already succeeded for others, targeted killing's exhibited effectiveness - to the extent that other States perceive it - may accelerate a targeted killing norm's emulation. n160 Such rationality may have been what initially led the United States, which has historically looked to Israel for counter-terrorism lessons, to adopt a norm permitting targeted killing after 9/11. n161

#### Drone prolif is slow and the impact is small

Zenko 13 (Micah, Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously, he worked for five years at the Harvard Kennedy School and in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service, and State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, “Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies,” January, Council Special Report No. 65, i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Drones\_CSR65.pdf‎)

Based on current trends, it is unlikely that most states will have, within ten years, the complete system architecture required to carry out¶ distant drone strikes that would be harmful to U.S. national interests.¶ However, those candidates able to obtain this technology will most¶ likely be states with the financial resources to purchase or the industrial¶ base to manufacture tactical short-range armed drones with limited¶ firepower that lack the precision of U.S. laser-guided munitions; the¶ intelligence collection and military command-and-control capabilities needed to deploy drones via line-of-sight communications; and crossborder¶ adversaries who currently face attacks or the threat of attacks¶ by manned aircraft, such as Israel into Lebanon, Egypt, or Syria; Russia¶ into Georgia or Azerbaijan; Turkey into Iraq; and Saudi Arabia into¶ Yemen. When compared to distant U.S. drone strikes, these contingencies¶ do not require system-wide infrastructure and host-state support.¶ Given the costs to conduct manned-aircraft strikes with minimal threat¶ to pilots, it is questionable whether states will undertake the significant¶ investment required for armed drones in the near term.

#### We’d win the drone war – no escalation

Zhou 13 (Dillon, Freelance writer and former research assistant @ Cyber Conflict Studies Association, "China Drones Prompt Fears of a Drone Race With the US," http://www.policymic.com/articles/19753/china-drones-prompt-fears-of-a-drone-race-with-the-us)

There are several facts that provide some solace to the U.S. as China's drones are far from being a real challenge to the American drone program.¶ First, the Chinese drones are nowhere as sophisticated as U.S. drones in their range and proper hardware for optic systems and motors to power the "dragons." The DSB report notes that the U.S. technical systems are almost unrivaled at present.¶ Second, China lacks the manpower to properly support their new fleet of drones. Whereas the U.S. has been training and honing a large force of UAV pilots, technicians and operation managers for 15 years.¶ Finally, the U.S. drone program is about 20 years ahead of the Chinese program. The current models on show are considered to be prototypes and not finished products. The Chinese also have not had a chance to gain real experience with their drones during real operation.

#### China and Russia will inevitably use – they cite Israel

Fisher 7 (Jason, Judicial Clerk to the Honorable James O. Browning, United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, "Targeted Killing, Norms, and International Law," 45 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 711, lexis)

The above discussion is not meant to suggest that the worldwide spread and acceptance of a targeted killing norm is preordained, rather only that it seems likely, at present, that the norm will achieve greater prominence. That prognosis could change, however, if a powerful State or group of States or collection of committed non-State actors with State support, or some combination thereof, acting as a norm entrepreneur, actively works to thwart the development of a norm permitting targeted killing for counter-terrorism purposes. n179 Several Arab and Middle Eastern States, the European Union, Russia, and others have made statements criticizing targeted killing after high-profile targeted killings have been carried out. n180 Yet none of them, it seems, has yet attempted to assume the position of norm entrepreneur and to engage in a sustained effort to end use of the tactic. Moreover, there is evidence that Russia and China, perhaps revealing their true preferences, have themselves employed targeted killing - Russia in its ongoing conflict with Chechen rebels and China in its hostilities with members of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement in Xinjiang province. n181 Currently, it does not appear that a norm entrepreneur with the status or relevance of the United States or Israel has emerged to challenge the targeted killing norm, something that would seem to be necessary if its present trajectory is to be altered.¶ A norm permitting the use of targeted killing for counter-terrorism purposes may be viewed as having already achieved a certain degree of prominence because of the status and visibility of the two States that are known to have adopted it: the United States and Israel. Furthermore, given the positioning of the United States and [\*742] Israel in the international system and the absence of a significant norm entrepreneur pushing in the opposite direction, it seems likely that, whether by emulation, restrained norm entrepreneurship, or both, a targeted killing norm will achieve even greater prominence.

#### SCS stable now and no escalation

Chaibi, 13 -- 3rd year visiting student from Princeton University in the Department of Engineering Science (Abraham, 2013, "The outlook for continuing stability in the South China Sea," http://politicsinspires.org/the-outlook-for-continuing-stability-in-the-south-china-sea/)

East Asia’s rapid economic and military development has captured global attention, but pundits are quick to point to the South China Sea, North Korea, and Taiwan as potential obstacles to the region’s continued growth. Analysis of news coverage demonstrates that regional economies and tensions have been growing in tandem. The South China Sea has historically been of particular interest because of the number of conflicting claims on the islands and sea-lanes it encompasses. China, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Taiwan, among others, have often engaged in bilateral disagreements with resulting spikes in diplomatic tension and even military confrontation. Of note, these conflicts have never escalated to a full-scale regional war. Direct extrapolation suggests that previous restraint in military interactions implies the nations involved do not consider the potential benefits sufficient to justify an upset to the balance of power. However, contemporary changes in economic and security conditions complicate the issue. While current tensions appear unlikely to lead to a full-scale military conflict, the diversion of national resources needed to maintain the status quo is substantial. Institutional changes to increase transparency; clarify US treaties with ASEAN nations; and increase states’ internal enforcement of international agreements, although initially costly, would allow the neighbouring states to redirect these resources to long-term growth. Historically, China has been involved in a majority of the military conflicts in the South China Sea. A 1947 Chinese map delineates China’s controversial claim to approximately 80% of the sea. China aggressively used its navy to conclude a dispute with Vietnam in the Battle of the Paracel Islands in 1974 and then in 1988 during the Johnson South Reef Skirmish for the Spratly Islands. Conflict was narrowly averted in 1995 when the Philippines chose not to shell fort-like Chinese military structures on Mischief Reef (China maintained they were only intended as shelter for fisherman); however, the Philippines continues to assert that this is an example of “creeping occupation”. This form of venting tensions, while far short of total war, is extremely costly over the long run; the combination of of resources, energy, and lives expended to establish a claim to the islands creates a significant and avoidable opportunity cost. These skirmishes are not merely an imprint of the 20th century but continue today as witnessed by the Chinese establishment of the Sansha garrison-city in 2012 and the Sino-Philippines stand-off in the Scarborough Shoal. What then is the evidence suggesting a continued reluctance to engage in full-scale military confrontation? Although in the past conflict has often arisen between economically interdependent nations (viz. the previous peak of global trade in 1914), the China-ASEAN relationship is one of fundamental interdependence of production, visible in the prevalence of international supply chaining in manufacturing processes, rather than solely trade and labour movement[i]. The burgeoning economic interdependence and growth of neighbouring states contributes a major incentive to prevent a conflagration. $5.3 trillion of trade, of which approximately 20% is US, transits the South China Sea annually and any interruption would not only severely restrict regional trade revenues, but would also very likely guarantee US military intervention[ii]. The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is becoming increasingly interconnected and 2015 will mark a key turning point with the opening of internal ASEAN borders for free movement of labor. The ASEAN bloc has also concluded a number of reconciliation agreements with China. Regarding security, both the 2002 Code of Conduct and the 2011 Guidelines to the Code of Conduct are intended to help coordinate diplomacy and maintain peace in South China Sea disputes. Economically China has been ASEAN’s largest trading partner since 2009, and at its opening in 2010 the ASEAN-China free trade area (ACFTA) became the largest in the world by population. These arrangements come at a time when growing estimates of the value of the natural resources contained in the South China Sea are generating pressures associated with ensuring energy security. Economic interdependence between China and ASEAN, however, is not the sole factor at play. In areas with considerable interstate tension sub-state actors have often contributed to the deterioration of international relations, most prominently with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand tipping Europe into World War I. Recent developments in state-level Chinese political and military discourse reflect a strong interest in cooperation. Chinese President Hu Jintao’s 2011 discussions with Filipino President Corazon Aquino firmly expressed the hope that “the countries concerned may put aside disputes and actively explore forms of common development in the relevant sea areas”[iii]. Additionally in 2011 the Chinese State Council Information Office released a white paper with a similar emphasis on joint development. Yet China is also reported to have developed internal fractures in its South China Sea policy, with a number of different ministries controlling paramilitary units that are not under express government oversight[iv]. For example, the Bureau of Fisheries Administration (BFA) now directs a relatively well-equipped law enforcement fleet that is tasked with patrolling Chinese-owned fishing areas. Such interest groups repeatedly instigate minor disputes with their ASEAN counterparts and the US navy that exacerbate state-level discussions and risk eventually drawing unintended consequences (characteristically, in 2004 two BFA vessels obstructed a US Navy surveillance ship in the Yellow Sea). The region has also seen a rise in high-tech militarization, with rapid development in areas ranging from aircraft carriers and submarines to cyber-espionage; this is likely to further increase due to the 2011 US “pivot to Asia” and military surge. The pivot is considered to be a sign that the US intends to continue playing a leadership role in East Asia, a strategy at odds with China’s vision[v]. An associated complication is the imprecise definition of US commitments to its ally nations in the event of disputes in contested territories, especially vis-à-vis the Philippines and Vietnam, and the possibility that alliances will be used to escalate a small battle into a regional affair. The US is making efforts to address these complications; for the first time since RIMPACS’s creation in 1971, China has been invited to participate in a US-led naval exercise. Positive near-term repercussions of growing US involvement have also been postulated; analysts suggest that one of the root causes behind Chinese interest in cooperation is the fear that aggression in the South China Sea will drive other parties to strengthen their ties with the US[vi]. The relative wealth of economic and diplomatic compromises on all sides presents a compelling argument that under current conditions, disputes in the South China Sea will continue to be restrained to small-scale skirmishes that do not threaten overall stability. This is not to say that the increase in regional tension is insignificant, but rather that the involved parties all have a strong interest in maintaining mutual growth and have demonstrated their willingness to make strategic sacrifices to maintain the status quo. Furthermore as China is the common link in the majority of the disputes, it is probable that it will be at the heart of any conflict — and China has frequently shown restraint in this regard (though not so, for example, in Tibet). In terms of China’s priorities, policy analysts tend to agree that if China were to begin a large-scale military campaign, Taiwan would most likely be the focus of its aggression[vii].

# 2NC

## K

### ­2NC Impact Overview

#### K outweighs the case

#### 1. World ordering – threat inflation is symbolic of our inability to accept that disorder is inevitable – that’s Burke – these utopian visions of a peaceful global community necessitate scapegoating and elimination of the other

#### 2. Even if their threats are real they have to win their way of approaching them is good – constantly fleeing from death makes live unlivable

**Baudrillard, 88** [Jean, America,1988, pg. 40-42]

Everywhere survival has become a burning issue, perhaps by some obscure weariness of life or a collective desire for catastrophe (though we should not take all this too seriously: it is also a playing at catastrophe). Certainly, this whole panoply of survival issues - dieting, ecology, saving the sequoias, seals or the human race - tends to prove that we are very much alive (just as all imaginary fairy-tales tend to prove that the real world is very real). But this is not so certain, for not only is the fact of living not really well-attested, but the paradox of this society is that you cannot even die in it any more since you are already dead. . . This is real suspense. And it is not simply an effect of living in the nuclear age, but derives from the ease with which we now live, which makes survivors of us all. If the bomb drops, we shall neither have the time to die nor any awareness of dying. But already in our hyper-protected society we no longer have any awareness of death, since we have subtly passed over into a state where life is excessively easy. The holocaust created an anticipatory form of such a condition. What the inmates of the concentration camps were deprived of was the very possibility of having control of their own deaths, of playing, even gambling with their own deaths, making their deaths a sacrifice: they were robbed of power over their own deaths. And this is what is happening to all of us, in slow, homeopathic doses, by virtue of the very development of our systems. The explosions and the extermination (Auschwitz and Hiroshima) still go on, though they have simply taken on a purulent, endemic form. The chain reaction continues nonetheless, the contagion, the unfolding of the viral and bacteriological process. The end of history was precisely the inauguration of this chain reaction. The obsessive desire for survival (and not for life) is a symptom of this state of affairs and doubtless also the most worrying sign of the degradation of the species. If you think about the forms that desire currently takes -antinuclear shelters, cryogenization, high-pressure therapy - you see that they are exactly the forms of extermination. To avoid dying, one chooses to withdraw into some protective bubble or other.

#### 3. Enemy creation – securitized logic creates an us-them dichotomy, where if we think someone is a threat, we’ll go and exterminate them because we think that they’re different from us – makes nuclear use inevitable – that’s Burke

#### The alternative is a critical re-evaluation of security.

#### Instead of looking to control the world and exterminate any sort of threat that we see under the realist lens, critically reflect on the psychological desire for security.

#### 4. Calculation – security necessitates dehumanization and instrumentalization of being – outweighs every impact even if threats are real

**Burke, 07** – Anthony, Ph. D in International Relations and Political Science from the Australian National University, Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations in the University of New South Wales, Political theorist and IR scholar, “What security makes possible: Some thoughts on critical security studies”, http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/ir/pubs/work\_papers/07-1.pdf

Even if threats are credible and existential, I do not believe that they warrant invoking the ‘state of exception’, which has in our time been more commonly enacted in the detention and rendition of terrorism suspects, immigration detention centres and the use of arbitrary arrest and deportation powers. The ‘state of exception’ also haunts much legial innovation in counter-terrorism policy. And, as Agamben, Judith Butler and Arendt have argued, such approaches have their roots in processes (namely colonialism and the Holocaust) that systematically dehumanized their victims producing lives that were ‘bare’, ‘ungreivable’, ‘unliveable’ and ‘superfluous’. If nothing else, it ought to raise serious doubts as to how securitization theory can be helpful in resignifying security as emancipation. It also precludes the ability to speak of human or environmental security in terms consistent with democratic political processes in a state of normalacy. The existential threat of human beings may be real enough, but it should generate a very different policy logic than outlined by the Copenhagen School. As Rocanne Lynn Doty and Karin Fierke have argued, the Copenhagen School’s conceptualization blocks the path to human security. This would seem to be implicit in the way Waever, in his 1995 article, attempts to provide security with ontological grounding. There he states that ‘as concepts, neither individual nor international security exist’:

### 2NC Framework

#### 1. The judge is an intellectual comparing competing methodologies that describe the world – if we win that security logic is bad then you must weigh our impacts first

#### 2. Education – we are academics not policymakers; debate is only a question of competing worldviews. Their calls for a ‘policy’ entrench dominant systems of thought and preclude new thinking – leads to serial policy failure – if we win their system is bad, it functions as an impact turn to the education in their system, because we only learn flawed education

#### \*3. We internal link turn their offense – the alt is key to better engagement in the political sphere where we enact better policies – that’s Cheeseman

#### \*4. Plan focus is bad—if we win reps are important, you should default neg

#### \*6. Their interp is worse – leads to word pik’s which link more to all their offense

#### \*7. Roleplaying is bad – kills agency

**Kappeler, 95** (Susanne, “The will to violence: the politics of personal behavior”, pg. 10-11)

We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of `collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equival­ent of a universal acquittal.' On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective `assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility leading to the well-known illusion of our apparent `powerlessness’ and its accompanying phe­nomenon, our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens even more so those of other nations have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somalia since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgement, and thus into underrating the respons­ibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls `organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually or­ganized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major powermongers: For we tend to think that we cannot `do' anything, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of `What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as `virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like `I want to stop this war', `I want military intervention', `I want to stop this backlash', or `I want a moral revolution." 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our `non-comprehension’: our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we `are' the war in our `unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the `fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don't' our readiness, in other words, to build ident­ities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the `others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape `our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence.

#### \*8. If we win framework we don’t need an alternative – the ballot is a referendum on whether the aff’s approach is a productive approach to academia – means it’s not about what the neg does, it’s about what the aff needs to do better

### 2NC Permutation

#### 1. That’s a link – the Cheeseman evidence criticizes the idea that we need a quick fix solution to every problem – the alt is key to successful policies

#### 2. Cross-apply framework – the ballot is a referendum on whether you buy the 1ACs description of the world – the alt can’t be permuted

#### 3. Theory – permutations must include 1AC representations, they're inseparable from the action of the plan. Severance makes the aff a moving target and being neg becomes impossible

#### 4. The plan cannot be detached from its discursive underpinnings

**Burke, 07** – Anthony, Ph. D in International Relations and Political Science from the Australian National University, Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations in the University of New South Wales, Political theorist and IR scholar, “Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence”, pgs 3-4

It is clear that traditionally coercive and violent approaches to security and strategy are both still culturally dominant, and politically and ethically suspect. However, the reasons for pursuing a critical analysis relate not only to the most destructive or controversial approaches, such as the war in Iraq, but also to their available (and generally preferable) alternatives. There is a necessity to question not merely extremist versions such as the Bush doctrine, Indonesian militarism or Israeli expansionism, but also their mainstream critiques - whether they take the form of liberal policy approaches in international relations (IR), just war theory, US realism, optimistic accounts of globalisation, rhetorics of sensitivity to cultural difference, or centrist Israeli security discourses based on territorial compromise with the Palestinians. The surface appearance of lively (and often significant) debate masks a deeper agreement about major concepts, forms of political identity and the imperative to secure them. Debates about when and how it may be effective and legitimate to use military force in tandem with other policy options, for example, mask a more fundamental discursive consensus about the meaning of security, the effectiveness of strategic power, the nature of progress, the value of freedom or the promises of national and cultural identity. As a result, political and intellectual debate about insecurity, violent conflict and global injustice can become hostage to a claustrophic structure of political and ethical possibility that systematically wards off critique.

#### 5. Footnoting DA—including the aff makes the K an afterthought

**Der Derian, 95** (James, Professor of Political Science – University of Massachusetts, International Theory: Critical Investigations, p. 374)

But what happens - as seems to be the case to this observer - when the 'we' fragments, 'realism' takes on prefixes and goes plural, the meaning of meaning itself is up for grabs? A stop-gap solution is to supplement the definitional gambit with a facile gesture. The IR theorist, mindful of a creeping pluralism, will note the 'essentially contested' nature of realism - duly backed up with a footnote to W. B. Gallie or W E. Connolly - and then get down to business as usual, that is, using realism as the best language to reflect a self-same phenomenon. This amounts to an intellectual plea of nolo-contendere: in exchange for not contesting the charge that the meaning of realism is contestable, the IR 'perp' gets off easy, to then turn around and commit worse epistemological crimes. In honor of the most notorious benefactor of nolo-contendere in recent American legal history, we might call this the 'Spiro-ette effect' in International Relations.

#### US interference messes with territorial resolutions – turns the advantage

Storey 13 -- PhD, Senior Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), Singapore (Ian, 2013, "Slipping Away? A South China Sea Code of Conduct Eludes Diplomatic Efforts," http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS\_Bulletin\_Storey\_Slipping\_Away.pdf)

Fifth, the growing competition between the United States and China in Asia has exacerbated divisions within ASEAN and called into question its aspirations for “centrality” in the evolving regional security architecture. Over the past few years, the United States has pursued diplomatic and security policies, such as relocating troops and equipment, to promote stability and reassure Southeast Asian countries of its commitment to the region that have fed China’s paranoid geopolitical views. When U.S. officials raise the South China Sea dispute at regional meetings such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit, the Chinese see this as “meddling” and part of a sustained effort to internationalize the problem. China views U.S. efforts to build the capacity of the Philippine armed forces as a way to strengthen Manila’s ability to confront China’s maritime agencies. The United States wants to discuss the South China Sea dispute bilaterally with China, but Beijing thinks it is none of Washington’s business. U.S. support for resolving the dispute multilaterally runs counter to China’s preference to resolve the disputes bilaterally with each individual claimant.

#### True cooperation is coopted by security logic

**Buzan & Waever, 09** Barry Buzan is Montague Burton Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and honorary professor at the University of Copenhagen and Jilin University, Ole Waever is a professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Review of International Studies, “Macrosecuritisation and security constellations: reconsidering scale in securitization theory,” http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=5502092&jid=RIS&volumeId=35&issueId=02&aid=5502088&bodyId=&membershipNumber=&societyETOCSession=&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0260210509008511

In a sense, this middle level model is rather like crude realist thinking about the balance of power, where the national security concerns of states A, B, C, D, etc. interact with each other on the basis of materialist calculations of threat. Actors and their securitisations remain essentially egotistical and self-centred, and the system atomised**.** In such a system only alliances provide any scope for actors to link their securitisations together, and in the realist framing alliances are necessarily temporary and instrumental. In some times and places this model comes close to reality. But when larger framings are in play, whether as secular or religious ‘universal’ ideologies, or as civilisational-scale identities, this purely egotistical model cannot capture the possibilities for large numbers of individual securitisations to become bound together into durable sets. Just as in regional security complex theory, securitisations can be bound together positively (where a group of actors share, or partly share, a definition of threat and referent object), or negatively (where actors, or groups of actors, construct each other as threats) in the process forming potentially durable patterns of security interdependence. We have already researched in detail how this type of security interdependence works at the regional level, 7 and part of what we want to do here is to push that logic beyond the regional level. Thinking along these lines opens the door to the concept of security constellations (hereafter, constellations) 8 which was designed to link across all of the levels and sectors in which securitisations occur. Constellations suggest strongly that larger patterns exist in the overall social structures of securitisation. Security constellations have not been much discussed in the CS literature, and one purpose of this article is to flesh out the content of the concept. So far, it has mostly been deployed in the context of discussion about regional security, where the idea is to set the regional level dynamics into those above and below them (for example, the India-Pakistan rivalry in the context of the Cold War above, and religious and ethnic divisions below). A regional security complex is always embedded in, and thus dependent on, the constant reproduction of social identities at lower levels and often also bound up with regional-global and occasionally inter-regional relations. Thus, a regional security complex – while its essential structure is defined by relations among units at the regional level and by the complex's external boundary – always exists within and as the core of a wider constellation. The concept of constellation serves to avoid a picture of isolated securitisations unrelated to social identities and political processes at other levels. At best, a securitisation analysis then includes the identity and political constitution of the particular referent object for an act of securitisation9, but since identities, politics and security practices are relational, deep understandings of processes of securitisation demand a concept for the larger social formation. In what follows we want to focus on, and elaborate, those elements of constellations that form on a scale above that of both the middle level and regions.

#### Focus on short-term impacts is epistemologically bankrupt – greater attention to structural conditions and root causes is key.

**Bilgin & Morton, 04** [Pinar, Associate Professor of International Relations at Bilkent University, & Adam David, Lecturer in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Lancaster University, Politics, 24(3), “From ‘Rogue’ to ‘Failed’ States? The Fallacy of Short-termism,” p. 176-178]

Calls for alternative approaches to the phenomenon of state failure are often met with the criticism that such alternatives could only work in the long term whereas ‘something’ needs to be done here and now. Whilst recognising the need for immediate action, it is the role of the political scientist to point to the fallacy of ‘short-termism’ in the conduct of current policy. Short-termism is defined by Ken Booth (1999, p. 4) as ‘approaching security issues within the time frame of the next election, not the next generation’. Viewed as such, short-termism is the enemy of true strategic thinking. The latter requires policymakers to rethink their long-term goals and take small steps towards achieving them. It also requires heeding against taking steps that might eventually become self-defeating. The United States has presently fought three wars against two of its Cold War allies in the post-Cold War era, namely, the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Both were supported in an attempt to preserve the delicate balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Cold War policy of supporting client regimes has eventually backfired in that US policymakers now have to face the instability they have caused. Hence the need for a comprehensive understanding of state failure and the role Western states have played in failing them through varied forms of intervention. Although some commentators may judge that the road to the existing situation is paved with good intentions, a truly strategic approach to the problem of international terrorism requires a more sensitive consideration of the medium-to-long-term implications of state building in different parts of the world whilst also addressing the root causes of the problem of state ‘failure’. Developing this line of argument further, reflection on different socially relevant meanings of ‘state failure’ in relation to different time increments shaping policy-making might convey alternative considerations. In line with John Ruggie (1998, pp. 167–170), divergent issues might then come to the fore when viewed through the different lenses of particular time increments. Firstly, viewed through the lenses of an incremental time frame, more immediate concerns to policymakers usually become apparent when linked to precocious assumptions about terrorist networks, banditry and the breakdown of social order within failed states. Hence relevant players and events are readily identified (al-Qa’eda), their attributes assessed (axis of evil, ‘strong’/’weak’ states) and judgements made about their long-term significance (war on terrorism). The key analytical problem for policymaking in this narrow and blinkered domain is the one of choice given the constraints of time and energy devoted to a particular decision. These factors lead policymakers to bring conceptual baggage to bear on an issue that simplifies but also distorts information. Taking a second temporal form, that of a conjunctural time frame, policy responses are subject to more fundamental epistemological concerns. Factors assumed to be constant within an incremental time frame are more variable and it is more difficult to produce an intended effect on ongoing processes than it is on actors and discrete events. For instance, how long should the ‘war on terror’ be waged for? Areas of policy in this realm can therefore begin to become more concerned with the underlying forces that shape current trajectories. Shifting attention to a third temporal form draws attention to still different dimensions. Within an epochal time frame an agenda still in the making appears that requires a shift in decision-making, away from a conventional problem-solving mode ‘wherein doing nothing is favoured on burden-of-proof grounds’, towards a risk-averting mode, characterised by prudent contingency measures. To conclude, in relation to ‘failed states’, the latter time frame entails reflecting on the very structural conditions shaping the problems of ‘failure’ raised throughout the present discussion, which will demand lasting and delicate attention from practitioners across the academy and policymaking communities alike.

#### Drones are a means of technical control – causes serial policy failure

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The recent marriage of PGMs to drones, hailed as the newest “perfect weapon” in the air arsenal, has once again led to the usual fantasies about the arrival — finally, almost 100 years late — of clean, precise, and decisive war. Using drones, a military need not risk even a pilot’s life in its attacks. Yet the nature of war — its horrors, its unpredictability, its tendency to outlive its original causes — remains fundamentally unaltered by “precision” drone strikes. War’s inherent fog and friction persist. In the case of drones, that fog is often generated by faulty intelligence, the friction by malfunctioning weaponry or innocent civilians appearing just as the Hellfire missiles are unleashed. Rather than clean wars of decision, drone strikes decide nothing. Instead, they produce their share of “collateral damage” that only spawns new enemies seeking revenge. The fantasy of air war as a realm of technical decision, as an exercise in decisively finding, fixing, and dispatching the enemy, appeals to a country like the United States that idolizes technology as a way to quick fixes. As a result, it’s hardly surprising that two administrations in Washington have ever more zealously pursued drone wars and aerial global assassination campaigns, already killing 4,700 “terrorists” and bystanders. And this has been just part of our Nobel Peace Prize-winning president’s campaign of 20,000 air strikes (only 10% of which were drone strikes) in his first term of office. Yet despite — or perhaps because of — these attacks, our global war against al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and other groups like the Taliban appears no closer to ending. And that is, in part, because the dream of air power remains just that: a fantasy, a capricious and destructive will-o’-the-wisp. It’s a fantasy because it denies agency to enemies (and others) who invariably find ways to react, adapt, and strike back. It’s a fantasy because, however much such attacks seem both alluringly low-risk and high-reward to the U.S. military, they become a rallying cause for those on the other end of the bombs and missiles. A much-quoted line from the movie Apocalypse Now captured the insanity of the American air war in Vietnam. “I love the smell of napalm in the morning,” says an Air Cav commander played by Robert Duvall. “Smelled like… victory.” Updated for drone warfare, this line might read: “I love the sound of drones in the morning. Sounds like… victory.” But will we say the same when armed drones are hovering, not only above our enemies’ heads but above ours, too, in fortress America, enforcing security and conformity while smiting citizens judged to be rebellious? Something tells me this is not the dream that airpower enthusiasts had in mind.

#### **Alt solves the relations and norms advantage – plan replicates the impacts**

**Leander, 13** [Anna, LEANDER, Professor (MSO), Department of Management, Politics and Philosophy, Copenhagen Business School, “INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY: Symposium: Expertise, Uncertainty, and International Law,” Leiden Journal of International Law / Volume 26 / Issue 04, pp 811-831, DOI: <http://dx.doi.org.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu/10.1017/S0922156513000423>]

Targeted killings or extrajudicial executions? Is killing by drones an acceptable action to be regulated or an inadmissible crime outside the realm of legality? Atwood’s approach to drones is probed in this article by exploring how drones themselves weigh on the answers legal expertise gives to this pressing question. The argument is that the technological agency of drones is constituted as legal expertise in the context of the drone program that is in turn constituted by legal expertise both as a legally governable matter of ‘targeted killing’ and as a practice of ‘extrajudicial executions’ to be condemned and discontinued. The technological agency of drones is in other words involved in the co-constitutive processes linking legal expertise and the drone program.10 The analysis below shows this by insisting that drones (UAVs and their technological systems) have agency in the sense that of having ‘performative’ effects, or an ‘actant’ role. This ‘technological agency’ shapes the evolving ‘ﬁeld’ of legal expertise (who counts as a legal expert and on what basis) surrounding the drone program. More speciﬁcally, the technological agency of drones redraws the boundaries of legal expertise by consolidating the presence of the speciﬁc legal expertise associated with intelligence services and with commercial contractors and by generating a form of technologically originated legal expertise. The techno- logical agency of drones also shapes the basis of legal expertise. It makes transparency and secrecy pivotal. Contrary to what is often claimed, including recently in the pages of this journal,11 the consequence is not an unambiguous consolidation of the ‘targeted-killings’ position among legal experts as a targeted-killing ‘dispositif’ is formed. Rather, the agency of drones feeds into the controversy over the legal status of the drone program and intensiﬁes it. The article therefore concludes by underscoring that understanding the role of technological agency (the actant role of drones) is important for grasping the continuing disagreements over the legal status of the drone program but especially for seeing the scope for politics. To make this argument, the article begins by introducing the theoretical anchoring and core conceptual building blocks of the analysis.

#### South Asian conflict is a consequence of Historical processes and identity formations. This makes their empirical reading incomplete. Only an alt which attends to the cultural situatedness of security discourses stands a chance at comprehending the Phenomenon.

Das 10 (Runa, doctoral candidate and graduate instructor in the Department of Political Science at Northern Arizona University, “State, identity and representations of Nuclear (In)Securities in India and Pakistan,” Journal of Asian and African Studies, 45(2) 146-169)

According to mainstream realism, studies of nuclear policies belong to the domain of the empirical. From this objective epistemology, understanding nuclear threat perceptions or detonations may be devoid of subjective issues like a nation’s history, religion, culture and ideology. Yet, in this article, I have offered an interpretive approach to India and Pakistan’s nuclear policies which, following Campbell’s (1992) ‘representations of danger’ has analyzed the re-articulations of India and Pakistan’s nationalist identities, perceptions of (in)securities, and their nuclear policies. In rendering this analysis, I have accepted the realist premise that there exists anarchy in the international realm, which in a fundamental way adheres to these states’ abilities to articulate and maintain distinctions between the domestic and the foreign – which are taken as pre-existing and given. Once this distinction is accepted, the domain of International Relations acquires a hegemonic density requiring the consolidation of states’ boundaries vis-à-vis the constant presence (or production) of geo-strategic insecurities. Despite such realist compulsions of nations’ boundary-making exercises, I have deemed it important to explore in this article how India and Pakistan, while justifying their nuclear policies on the basis of certain geo-strategic (in)securities, have simultaneously drawn from their national histories, economic or developmental anxieties, and their political leaders’ ideologies (secular or cultural) to interpret their national selves and (in)securities. In rendering this analysis, I have highlighted how both the Indian and the Pakistani states’ identities, which in the case of Pakistan’s identity has remained Islamic in contrast to India’s secularmodern and Hindutva identities, have drawn from various interpretations of (in)securities ranging from developmental/economic, political/military, and cultural to justify their nuclear policies. While the transition of the Indian state’s (in)securities from economic/developmental to political/military has represented a transformation in the strategic thinking of the Indian state (that has departed from the Gandhian brand of moralistic politics to one of a defense-oriented/militarized India), which, some argue, has also laid the foundations for the BJP to go nuclear in 1998, yet the cultural rearticulation of nuclear (in)securities in India under the BJP marks a unique departure from the earlier phases that cannot be belittled. Likewise, what has been simultaneously interesting in the analysis of Pakistan’s nuclearization discourse is that unlike the pre-1998 years where Pakistan’s nuclear (in)security discourses vis-à-vis India have remained primarily political/military (despite some cultural references to an Islamic bomb), Pakistan’s nuclear (in)security discourses at the eve of May 1998 have became cultural – grounded specifically in terms of Pakistan’s ‘Islamic’ versus India’s ‘Hindu’ bomb. In exploring this discursive transition, I do not speculate whether the BJP’s nuclear security discourses guided by the Hindutva identity has spurred a similar culturally grounded re-articulation of nuclear (in)securities in the Pakistani polity. Rather, my point in the above analysis has been to show how at a particular conjectural moment of South Asian politics, that is at the eve of May 1998, the nuclear security discourses of India and Pakistan have drawn from cultural re-articulations of nationalist identities and (in)securities to justify their nuclear policies. In comprehending this shift in the representations of (and the linkages between) India and Pakistan’s nationalist identities, perceptions of (in)securities, and nuclear policies, I have also noted how the two states have drawn from realism (i.e. geo-strategic threats) and cultural representations of (in)securities (by re-writing national histories, religious and cultural identities) to explain their nuclear trajectories. What does the above analysis of South Asian nuclearization as studied through the combined frames of realism and critical constructivism imply for re-reading theories and practices of security in international politics? Following the critical constructivist premise that ‘insecurities are cultural in the sense that they are produced in and out of “the context within which people give meanings to their actions and experiences and make sense of their lives”…’ (Weldes et al., 1999: 1), I suggest that an empirical reading of danger as given, as suggested by the conventional International Relations theories, is incomplete. Rather, an analysis of (in)security must consider that what is real is also a form of representation, where certain context-bound judgments made by policy-makers self-consciously adopts an imagination of the Self and Other to define danger – mostly to suit their tasks of nation-making. As I have shown in this article, both the Indian and the Pakistani states, depending on their temporality and spatiality (i.e. their political/cultural milieu), have socially represented various forms of their national insecurities – as economic, political and cultural – to suit their ongoing tasks of nation-making – whether in a developmental, external Hobbesian, or a culturally-defined domestic political context. Comprehending (in)securities as cultural and social representations, also requires re-visiting conventional International Relations that views states as objective, sovereign entities in world politics that are distinct from their (in)securities. Instead, I suggest that states, in addition to being sovereign political entities in world politics – as required by the logic of realpolitik – are simultaneously social/cultural entities. As social/cultural entities, states’ identities are constituted by the ideological mindsets of their managers/political leaders who define their desired imaginations of nation-states and their corresponding perceptions of national (in)securities. Seen as a social/cultural entity, a state as a self/subject is not distinct from its insecurities; rather, as a self/subject it defines its insecurity, and is simultaneously the object that faces threat from its constructed insecurity. This subject/object constitution and interpellation of the Pakistani and the Indian states is evidenced in this case study where the ideological construct of these states – either as secularmodern, Hindu, or Islamic – have discursively interwoven corresponding representations of (in) securities – developmental, political/military and/or cultural – to consolidate their identities as ‘performatively’ constituted entities. In this sense, states and their dangers are also mutually constituted entities. Finally, I suggest that an analysis of insecurity, which, as I premise in this paper, is not an empirical phenomenon, requires attention to how dangers are discursively constituted. This requires a ‘how-possible’ approach to the study of security, that is, how discourses guided by codes of intelligibility or ideational frameworks of political leaders come to constitute a ‘field of knowledge’, where ‘an established common sense, made real in collective discourse … foregrounds some dangers while repressing … others’ (Weldes et al., 1999: 12). A key element of such discourse would also include drawing from a multiplicity of historical processes and engaging in ideological-cultural forms of representations to make security practices possible. How state-centric discourses of India and Pakistan guided by their decision-makers’ secular/religious codes of intelligibility have foregrounded certain notions of dangers, namely through the discursive projection of an ‘Islamic’ versus a ‘Hindu’ bomb particularly at the eve of May 1998 has remained a key point in this essay. This study therefore argues that the field of International Relations/Security Studies remains open to grasp the representational dynamics of securitization and that the significant yet understudied terrain of the cultural production of identity and insecurity in international relations merits attention. This requires engaging realism with critical constructivism to comprehend and connect the security dynamics of the local to the global (read: Western) levels.

#### Discourse of catastrophic terrorism is a tool of the military industrial complex to justify military intervention and endless war

**Mercier, 12** – Gilbert, Editor in Chief of Junkie News, Political Analyst, ‘Global War Economy: The Empire of the US Military Industrial Complex’, <http://newsjunkiepost.com/2012/08/30/global-war-economy-the-empire-of-the-us-military-industrial-complex/>

Arguably, ever since entering World War II, the United States of America’s economy has been a war economy. Starting or fostering wars became essentially, independently of geopolitical reasons, a “good” business proposition. The early 1940s marked the start of the era of systematic wars for profit. War defined as the ultimate capitalist enterprise. The extraordinary war efforts of World War II turned the United States into a giant global arms factory for the war in Europe and in the Pacific. It was even, cynically, credited as the main factor in ending the Great Depression of 1929. This trend continued at a slower pace, but without any real interruption, with the Korean war in the early 1950s, the Vietnam war in the 1960s until the early 1970s, and various proxy wars worldwide- including Afghanistan in the 1980s- against the Soviet Union. The event of 9/11/ 2001 gave American politicians the unique opportunity to start the perfect war on behalf of their friends and patrons of the military industrial complex. It is the endless war: the “war on terror” without any geographic boundaries, time frame or even thenecessity to have a well defined enemy. This permanent war business proposition is criminal in nature, but absolutely fool proof in terms of maximum returns on the investment. Money is made when the weapons are manufactured. They are used to kill million and to destroy countries which eventually will get rebuild through programs such as the Marshall Plan used in the aftermath of World War II in Europe. The blood thirsty machine that is the US industrial-military complex makes billion at all three phases of the war industry process: the manufacturing of ever more lethal and complex weapon systems, the destruction stage, and then finally the occupation and rebuilding phase in countries such as Germany, Japan, Korea, and more recently Iraq and Afghanistan. This war machine and its political associates always needs new conflicts. The United States of America is the uncontested juggernaut of the war business or war for profit, defining the economy of permanent war. According to a report released August 24, 2012 by the Congressional Research Service ( CRS), business has been booming for the industrial-military complex with export of US weapons abroad increasing more than three times from $21.4 billion in 2010 to $66.3 billion in 2011. This is the largest increase for a single year in the history of US arms export. The United States is, by far, the largest arm dealer of the planet with 78.1 percent of the overall market. The CRS report put Russia at a very distant second at $8.7 billion and Britain third at $3 billion.

### AT: Threats Real

#### 1. The aff can’t solve this – these underlying tensions will still exist and manifest to make their impacts inevitable – prefer root cause to proximate cause

#### 2. Their truth claims are not relevant – whether or not their threats actually exist doesn’t change whether or not the aff is paranoid about them – that’s Burke

#### Expertise is a narrative PRODUCED for explicit political purposes

**Taleb, 07** Scholar, Essayist, Public Intellectual, Statistician, Risk Engineer and Trader [Nassim, "‘The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable’," 4-22, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/22/books/chapters/0422-1st-tale.html>]

This combination of low predictability and large impact makes the Black Swan a great puzzle; but that is not yet the core concern of this book. Add to this phenomenon the fact that we tend to act as if it does not exist! I don't mean just you, your cousin Joey, and me, but almost all "social scientists" who, for over a century, have operated under the false belief that their tools could measure uncertainty. For the applications of the sciences of uncertainty to real-world problems has had ridiculous effects; I have been privileged to see it in finance and economics. Go ask your portfolio manager for his definition of "risk," and odds are that he will supply you with a measure that excludes the possibility of the Black Swan-hence one that has no better predictive value for assessing the total risks than astrology (we will see how they dress up the intellectual fraud with mathematics). This problem is endemic in social matters.

#### 3. Their impacts aren’t true – 3 disads to their methodology

#### A. Military DA – the military industrial complex has inflated their impacts

**Pieterse, 07** (Jan, Professor of Sociology – University of Illinois (Urbana), “Political and Economic Brinkmanship”, Review of International Political Economy, 14(3), p. 473)

Brinkmanship and producing instability carry several meanings. The American military spends 48% of world military spending (2005) and represents a vast, virtually continuously growing establishment that is a world in itself with its own lingo, its own reasons, internecine battles and projects. That this large security establishment is a bipartisan project makes it politically relatively immune. That for security reasons it is an insular world shelters it from scrutiny. For reasons of ‘deniability’ the president is insulated from certain operations (Risen, 2006). That it is a completely hierarchical world onto itself makes it relatively unaccountable. Hence, to quote Rumsfeld, ‘stuff happens’. In part this is the familiar theme of the Praetorian Guard and the shadow state (Stockwell, 1991). It includes a military on the go, a military that seeks career advancement through role expansion, seeks expansion through threat inflation, and in inflated threats finds rationales for ruthless action and is thus subject to feedback from its own echo chambers. Misinformation broadcast by part of the intelligence apparatus blows back to other security circles where it may be taken for real (Johnson, 2000). Inhabiting a hall of mirrors this apparatus operates in a perpetual state of self hypnosis with, since it concerns classified information and covert ops, limited checks on its functioning.

#### B. Bureaucracy DA – Interest groups and political incentives cause threat inflation

**Zenko & Cohen, 12** (Micah Zenko, fellow at the Center for Preventative Action at the Council on Foreign Relations AND Michael Cohen, Fellow at the Century Foundation, March/April 2012, "Clear and Present Safety: The United States Is More Secure Than Washington Thinks," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91(2))

There is just one problem. It is simply wrong. The world that the United States inhabits today is a remarkably safe and secure place. It is a world with fewer violentconflicts and greater political freedom than at virtually any other point in human history. All over the world, people enjoy longer life expectancy and greater economic opportunity than ever before. The United States faces no plausible existential threats, no great-power rival, and no near-term competition for the role of global hegemon. The U.S. military is the world’s most powerful, and even in the middle of a sustained downturn, the U.S. economy remains among one of the world’s most vibrant and adaptive. Although the United States faces a host of international challenges, they pose little risk to the overwhelming majority of American citizens and can be managed with existing diplomatic, economic, and, to a much lesser extent, military tools.   This reality is barely reflected in U.S. national security strategy or in American foreign policy debates. President Barack Obama’s most recent National Security Strategy aspires to “a world in which America is stronger, more secure, and is able to overcome our challenges while appealing to the aspirations of people around the world.” Yet that is basically the world that exists today. The United States is the world’s most powerful nation, unchallenged and secure. But the country’s political and policy elite seems unwilling to recognize this fact, much less integrate it into foreign policy and national security decision-making.  The disparity between foreign threats and domestic threat-mongering results from a confluence of factors. The most obvious and important is electoral politics. Hyping dangers serves the interests of both political parties. For Republicans, who have long benefited fromattacking Democrats for their alleged weakness in the face of foreign threats, there is little incentive to tone down the rhetoric; the notion of a dangerous world plays to perhaps their greatest political advantage. For Democrats, who are fearful of being cast as feckless, acting and sounding tough is a shield against GOP attacks and an insurance policy in case a challenge to the United States materializes into a genuine threat. Warnings about a dangerous world also benefit powerful bureaucratic interests. The specter of looming dangers sustains and justifies the massive budgets of the military and the intelligence agencies, along with the national security infrastructure that exists outside government -- defense contractors, lobbying groups, think tanks, and academic departments.   There is also a pernicious feedback loop at work. Because of the chronic exaggeration of the threats facing the United States,Washington overemphasizes military approaches to problems (including many that could best be solved by nonmilitary means). The militarization of foreign policy leads, in turn, to further dark warnings about the potentially harmful effects of any effort to rebalance U.S. national security spending or trim the massive military budget -- warnings that are inevitably bolstered by more threat exaggeration. Last fall, General Norton Schwartz, the U.S. Air Force chief of staff, said that defense cuts that would return military spending to its 2007 level would undermine the military’s “ability to protect the nation” and could create “dire consequences.” Along the same lines, Panetta warned that the same reductions would“invite aggression” from enemies. These are a puzzling statements given that the U.S. defense budget is larger than the next 14 countries’ defense budgets combined and that the United States still maintains weapons systems designed to fight an enemy that disappeared 20 years ago.

#### C. Psyche DA – the notion of enemies to destroy is nothing more than a projection of our psychological insecurities onto the other – causes a self-fulfilling prophecy and justifies annihilation

**Stein, 04** – Howard, Ph. D in Anthropology from the University of Pittsburgh, Professor at the University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center, Psychoanalytic Anthropologist and Psychohistorian, “Beneath the Crust of Culture: Psychoanalytic Anthropology and the Cultural Unconscious in American Life”, Questia

From September 11, the relative psychological “comfort” the Cold War had provided was no longer possible. American public officials urged citizens to lead a normal, consumerist life while being vigilant for terrorists and acts of terror. Paradoxically, many Americans felt psychologically safer, even “invincible,” under the threat of “mutually shared destruction” and “nuclear winter” than they current do waiting for the next terrorist act to occur. Sadly and tragically, one “psychogeographic” legacy of the Cold War – heir to earlier attitudes of Manifest Destiny and isolationism – was to make an attack on the continental U.S. unthinkable, unimaginable. Here, as often occurs, cultural “defenses” in fact endanger their inhabitants. They help to create the permissive psychological climate that makes the unthinkable thinkable (to those who would attack the U.S.) and do-able. We not only need enemies (Volkan, 1988), but we also create enemies by provoking them. We and our enemies project aggression, provoke aggression, and then justify our own aggression as defense. In a world divided into true believers and infidels, David Levine writes of the fatal psychological symbiosis of faithful and infidel: When the unfaithful self is projected onto external objects, the aggression we attribute to it becomes their aggression directed at us, their desire to destroy our faith. We must now mobilize aggression to protect ourselves against the infidel, notwithstanding the fact that the threat he poses is the threat of connection with our own split off and disavowed faithless selves. Since the infidel's rejection of the good object is also our own, the aggression we attribute to him is also our own aggression outside and experienced as a threat to us.

#### Reporting and academic work on critical infrastructure is prone to threat inflation

**Sorebo, 10** chief cybersecurity technologist and vice president – SAIC, consultant for the government and industry in cybersecurity and smart grid technology, MA – GW University, JD – Catholic U, 2/8/’10 (Gib, “The Many Shades of Project Grey Goose,” RSA Conference)

As I noted in my previous post about a recent 60 Minutes segment, we often rely on rumor and innuendo as the basis for journalism in critical infrastructure. If a current or former high-ranking public official says he heard something, then it must be true. Unfortunately, Project Grey Goose, whose stated objective was “to answer the question of whether there has been any successful hacker attacks against the power grid, both domestically and internationally,” falls victim to much of the same fear, uncertainty, and doubt. As in all media reports, there are factual bases for findings that exaggerated the true state of the electric grid. For example, theirstatement that “90% of the U.S. Department of Defense's (DOD) most critical assets are entirely dependent on the bulk power grid” is presumably taken from a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report noting that 85 percent of critical DoD assets rely on commercial electric power. However, the “entirely dependent” statement ignores the wide variety of backup generators that support these assets, and while not adequate, are nonetheless a significant contribution to the reliability of critical DoD assets. So rather than sounding the alarm that military bases, for the most part, do not have their own power plants, a better response would have been to suggest that the military expand the use of backup generators and micro-grid technology to augment commercial power as the GAO report does. Of course, that would not grab as many headlines. Similarly, the Grey Goose Report note that “[m]ost Grid asset owners and operators have been historically resistant to report cyber attacks against their networks as well as make the necessary investments to upgrade and secure their networks.” While it may be true that incidents are underreported, the implication that the electricity industry is deficient compared to other industrial sectors is misleading or even wrong. Most companies do not report security incidents unless legally required to or to mitigate the harm to their customers, and even then the evidence of an intrusion and theft of data had better be definitive. Lost laptops and backup tapes are one thing. You cannot say they are within your control if they go missing. However, organizations in general have a horrible record of even detecting when a successful attack has occurred let alone what was taken. Like many industries, the electricity industry has struggled to pinpoint the source of many disruptions associated with their network infrastructure. More often than not, the problems were inadvertent and not malicious. We can certainly do better, and with technologies like Smart Grid, we have to. However, calling out the electricity industry for failures that we’ve all been subjected to is not very productive. The other statements made about the vulnerabilities in the electricity sector are misleading. While North American Electric Reliability Corporation Critical Infrastructure Protection (NERC CIP) still does not apply to many aspects of the electrical grid for a variety of jurisdictional reasons, where it does apply, it is not voluntary, as the many utilities subjected to rigorous and painful audits can attest. The process may not be perfect, bututilities are being subjected to scrutiny. Moreover, anyone receiving stimulus grants under the Department of Energy’s Smart Grid grant program has to demonstrate a very rigorous approach to cyber security through the entire implementation life cycle. Finally, the report cites a litany of vulnerabilities discovered in various Smart Grid devices such as meters and perpetuates speculation about the potential impact on the grid without considering compensating security controls. Nowhere does the report cite names of vulnerable vendors nor does it provide any information about whether these vulnerable products have actually been implemented. It’s like saying that tests on personal computers showed that they were vulnerable to attack without identifying the operating system or the applications running on the device.

#### Prefer our disjunctive scenarios to their short-term conjunctive scenarios.

**Yudkowsky, 06** Eliezer Yudkowsky, 8/31/2006. Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence Palo Alto, CA. “Cognitive biases potentially affecting judgment of global risks,” Forthcoming in Global Catastrophic Risks, eds. Nick Bostrom and Milan Cirkovic, singinst.org/upload/cognitive-biases.pdf.

According to probability theory, adding additional detail onto a story must render the story less probable. It is less probable that Linda is a feminist bank teller than that she is a bank teller, since all feminist bank tellers are necessarily bank tellers. Yet human psychology seems to follow the rule that adding an additional detail can make the story more plausible. People might pay more for international diplomacy intended to prevent nanotechnological warfare by China, than for an engineering project to defend against nanotechnological attack from any source. The second threat scenario is less vivid and alarming, but the defense is more useful because it is more vague. More valuable still would be strategies which make humanity harder to extinguish without being specific to nanotechnologic threats - such as colonizing space, or see Yudkowsky (this volume) on AI. Security expert Bruce Schneier observed (both before and after the 2005 hurricane in New Orleans) that the U.S. government was guarding specific domestic targets against "movie-plot scenarios" of terrorism, at the cost of taking away resources from emergency-response capabilities that could respond to any disaster. (Schneier 2005.) Overly detailed reassurances can also create false perceptions of safety: "X is not an existential risk and you don't need to worry about it, because A, B, C, D, and E"; where the failure of any one of propositions A, B, C, D, or E potentially extinguishes the human species. "We don't need to worry about nanotechnologic war, because a UN commission will initially develop the technology and prevent its proliferation until such time as an active shield is developed, capable of defending against all accidental and malicious outbreaks that contemporary nanotechnology is capable of producing, and this condition will persist indefinitely." Vivid, specific scenarios can inflate our probability estimates of security, as well as misdirecting defensive investments into needlessly narrow or implausibly detailed risk scenarios. More generally, people tend to overestimate conjunctive probabilities and underestimate disjunctive probabilities. (Tversky and Kahneman 1974.) That is, people tend to overestimate the probability that, e.g., seven events of 90% probability will all occur. Conversely, people tend to underestimate the probability that at least one of seven events of 10% probability will occur. Someone judging whether to, e.g., incorporate a new startup, must evaluate the probability that many individual events will all go right (there will be sufficient funding, competent employees, customers will want the product) while also considering the likelihood that at least one critical failure will occur (the bank refuses - 7 - a loan, the biggest project fails, the lead scientist dies). This may help explain why only 44% of entrepreneurial ventures3 survive after 4 years. (Knaup 2005.) Dawes (1988) observes: 'In their summations lawyers avoid arguing from disjunctions ("either this or that or the other could have occurred, all of which would lead to the same conclusion") in favor of conjunctions. Rationally, of course, disjunctions are much more probable than are conjunctions.' The scenario of humanity going extinct in the next century is a disjunctive event. It could happen as a result of any of the existential risks discussed in this book - or some other cause which none of us foresaw. Yet for a futurist, disjunctions make for an awkward and unpoetic-sounding prophecy.

### 2NC Frame First

#### 5. Framing must come first – determines the outcomes of policy

**Calkivik 10** (Emine Asli Calkivik, PhD in political science from the University of Minnesota, October 2010, “Dismantling Security,” <http://purl.umn.edu/99479>)

The post-Cold War security environment and proliferating threat discourses in the absence of the “Soviet enemy” provide ample resource for scholars who focus on the representational practices that played role in the construction of threats to state security. For instance, Mutimer examines in detail the linguistic and metaphorical construction of threats to the United States and its allies through the “image of proliferation.”128 He points out the way in which a particular discursive framing of a problem—in this case, the construction of the use of chemical or biological weapons as a problem of proliferation as opposed to a problem of disarmament—shapes the constitution of identities and interests of the actors in question and gives way to particular patterns of foreign policy. The discourse of threats and their social production—as well as the construction of the objects of security as an inextricable aspect of security discourses—constitutes an important item on the agenda of critical investigations.129 In conventional analyses, the purported state of nature populated by instrumentally rational actors is taken as the departure point of analysis. Within this framework, the state acts as the primary source of authority, the guarantor of order, and the primary protector of the values and interests of these individuals. While the state is rendered the locus of security, security of the state gets equated to the security of the citizen. In contrast to the positing of the state as the locus of security with a neutrally given interest of survival, critical scholars argue that a concept like national security needs to be understood as a social construction rather than an objectively given fact. For instance, in her case study of the Cuban missile crisis, Jutta Weldes shows how a core concept such as the national interest is discursively constituted through representational practices and linguistic elements.130 Other investigations explore the working of security as a political practice, or the processes of construction of threats through institutional mobilization and knowledge production. Some of these scholars use “speech-act theory” to study how utterances of security constitute certain issues as security problems.131 A related line of analysis, conducted mostly from post-structural and postcolonial perspectives, is to trace the operation of power in its various guises and to map the hierarchical relations, highlighting the gaps and silences of hegemonic security narratives. In his Writing Security, David Campbell investigates how certain risks are interpreted as dangers, what power effects these interpretative articulations produce, and how they police the boundaries of the political community and produce obedient subjects.132 Going against the grain of state-centric, strategic accounts of war, scholars such as Michael Shapiro bring to focus the role of political violence in the construction of the geopolitical imaginary and the production/ affirmation of collective identity.133 Others focus on the international interventions that took place during the 1990s and discuss the ways in which these imperial investments are legitimated by the West through a moral discourse based on universal values.134 Other studies lay bare the historical biases, Eurocentric assumptions, and racialized or gendered content of conceptions, analyses, theories, and practices of security. Attending to the power of representation, they expose the links between economies of power and “truth” in the re/production of international hierarchies and in/securities. Problematizing the representation of post-colonial states as “failed” or lacking, and hence as a major threat to international security, some of these scholars demonstrate how these so-called failures were precisely the products of unequal encounters with Western colonialism, pointing out the ways in which these hierarchical relations were being reproduced through ongoing unequal economic, social, and military relations.135 They analyze the construction of the non-Western subject as the inferior other—“the Southern” or “the Oriental”—and attend to the ways in which these representations are mobilized to legitimate certain security practices and policies such as nuclear proliferation in the Third World.136 Introducing feminist perspectives into their analyses, other scholars expose the gender biases imbued in security practices, problematizing state security for rendering violence and insecurity from the perspective of women.137

### 2NC Alternative

#### Even if there are obstacles to the alt, our thought exercise is more productive than their stable production of the present – the alternative enables a different conception of security that can overcome inevitable conflict

**Burke, 07** – Anthony, Ph. D in International Relations and Political Science from the Australian National University, Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations in the University of New South Wales, Political theorist and IR scholar, “Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence”, pgs 68-69

This chapter is thus an exercise in thinking, which challenges the continuing power of political ontologies (forms of truth and being) that connect security, sovereignty, belonging, otherness and violence in ways that for many appear like enduring political facts, inevitable and irrefutable. Conflict, violence and alienation then arise not merely from individual or collective acts whose conditions might be understood and policed; they condition politics as such, forming a permanent ground, a dark substrata underpinning the very possibility of the present. Conflict and alienation seem inevitable because of the way in which the modem political imagination has conceived and thought security, sovereignty and ethics. Israel/ Palestine is chosen here as a particularly urgent and complex example of this problem, but it is a problem with much wider significance.

#### Not inevitable – the world exists because we construct it that way – the alt solves

**Wendt, 99** – Alexander, Associate Professor of Political Science at Yale, Social Theory of International Politics, p. 331-2.

The underlying logic here is the self-fulfilling prophecy: by treating the Other as if he is supposed to respond a certain way Alter and Ego will eventually learn shared ideas that generate those responses, and then by taking those ideas as their starting point they will tend to reproduce them in subsequent interactions. Identities and interests are not only learned in interaction, in other words, but sustained by it. The mass of relatively stable interactions known as “society” depends on the success of such self-fulfilling prophecies in ever day life.’ Although he does not distinguish between the behavioral and construction effects of interaction, this idea is nicely captured by what Morton Deutsch calls “the crude law of social relations”: “[t]he characteristic processes and effects elicited by any given type of social relation tend also to induce that type of social relation,”44 to which we might add “mediated by power relations.” From the “Crude Law” can be drawn the conclusion that the most important thing in social life is how actors represent Self and Other. These representations are the starting point for interaction, and the medium by which they determine who they are, what they want, and how they should behave. Society, in short, is “what people make of it,” and as corporate “people” this should be no less true of states in anarchical society. Which brings us to the question of how states might learn the egoistic conceptions of security that underpin Hobbesian cultures. We have already shown how states might become egoists through natural selection and imitation. They might also do so through learning. The key is how Alter and Ego represent themselves in the beginning of their encounter, since this will determine the logic of the ensuing interaction. If Ego casts Alter in the role of an object to be manipulated for the gratification of his own needs (or, equivalently, takes the role of egoist for himself), then he will engage in behavior that does not take Alter’s security needs into account in anything but a purely instrumental sense. If Alter correctly reads Ego’s “perspective” he will “reflect” Ego’s “appraisal” back on himself, and conclude that he has no standing or rights in this relationship. This will threaten Alter’s basic needs, and as such rather than simply accept this positioning Alter will adopt an egoistic identity himself (egoism being a response to the belief that others will not meet one’s needs), and act accordingly toward Ego. Eventually, by repeatedly engaging in practices that ignore each other’s needs, or practices of power politics, Alter and Ego will create and internalize the shared knowledge that they are enemies, locking in a Hobbesian structure. The self-fulfilling prophecy here, in other words, is “Realism” [sic] itself.50 If states start out thinking like “Realists” then that is what they will teach each other to be, and the kind of anarchy they will make.

#### The alternative is the only way to rupture status quo political understanding

**Parker, 04** [Ian—Professor in the Discourse Unit at Manchester Metropolitan University and author of books on psychoanalysis, discourse, politics and culture, SLAVOJ ZIZEK A Critical Introduction, p 62-63]

There is clearly a political aspect to this subversive role of psychoanaly- sis. There is a connection with radical politics – which the early psychoanalytic movement in Freud’s day had often made – and with a radical political understanding of the way contemporary institutions try to tame psychoanalysis. There is also a connection with what we could see as a radical personal politics of self-understanding and transformation that the analysand embarks upon. Lacanian psychoanalysis is the practice of that self-understanding and transformation, and that is why it avoids quick fixes, suggestion or the attempt to bring about identification between analysand and analyst. This is why, although Lacanian psychoanalysis includes therapeutic moments, it goes far beyond the usual psychotherapeutic aims of developing coping strategies or recasting problems into opportunities by way of more positive thinking. Psychoanalysis is the space for ‘de- constructing’ how someone copes and how their problems are bound up with the way they think. For Zizek, another homologous space is that of cultural critique and political action. When Freudian concepts are embedded in language, psychoanalytic understanding of the relationship between what is forbidden, the truth and enjoyment can become a tool to tackle ideology. For Lacan in his later writing, for example, and for Zizek, the super-ego operates not only through prohibition but also through an obscene injunction to ‘enjoy’. It incites and contains jouissance, and it then functions as an incitement to ‘ironic distance’ that actually confirms the hold of the system upon individuals; thus the strategy of ‘overidentification’ elaborated by groups like Laibach in Slovenia is driven by a psychoanalytic under- standing of the way desire is structured in the service of ideology: ‘by bringing to light the obscene superego underside of the system, overiden- tification suspends its efficiency’.22

#### The alternative solves – as an analyst, you vote neg to interrogate the aff’s enemy creation which creates a fissure in their dominant war and violent paranoia. We must recognize our paranoid projections in order to challenge and reformulate current social hierarchies – peace is a state of mind and a way of thinking that only the alternative creates by conducting psychoanalysis on the aff

**Byles, 03**—English, U Cyprus (Joanna, Psychoanalysis and War: The Superego and Projective Identification, <http://www.clas.ufl.edu/ipsa/journal/articles/art_byles01.shtml>)

The problem for us today is how to create the psychological climate of opinion, a mentality, that will reject war, genocide, and terrorism as viable solutions to internal and external situations of conflict; to recognize our projections for what they are:dangerously irresponsible psychic acts based on superego hatred and violence. We must challenge the way in which the State superego can manipulate our responses in its own interests, even take away our subjectivities. We should acknowledge and learn to displace the violence in ourselves in socially harmless ways, getting rid of our fears and anxieties of the other and of difference by relating and identifying with the other and thus creating the serious desire to live together in a peaceful world. What seems to be needed is for the superego to regain its developmental role of mitigating omniscient protective identification by ensuring an intact, integrated object world, a world that will be able to contain unconscious fears, hatred, and anxieties without the need for splitting and projection. As Bion has pointed out, omnipotence replaces thinking and omniscience replaces learning. We must learn to link our internal and external worlds so as to act as a container of the other's fears and anxieties, and thus in turn to encourage the other to reciprocate as a container of our hatreds and fears. If war represents cultural formations that in turn represent objectifications of the psyche via the super-ego of the individual and of the State, then perhaps we can reformulate these psychic social mechanisms of projection and superego aggression. Here, that old peace-time ego and the reparative component of the individual and State superego will have to play a large part. The greater the clash of cultural formations for example, Western Modernism and Islamic Fundamentalism the more urgent the need. "The knowledge now most worth having" is an authentic way of internalizing what it is we understand about war and international terrorism that will liberate us from the history of our collective traumatic past and the imperatives it has imposed on us. The inner psychic world of the individual has an enormously important adaptive role to play here in developing mechanisms of protective identification not as a means of damaging and destroying the other, but as a means of empathy, of containing the other, and in turn being contained. These changes may be evolutionary rather than revolutionary, gradual ratherthan speedy. Peace and dare I say it contentment are not just an absence of war, but a state of mind. Furthermore, we should learn not to project too much into our group, and our nation, for this allows the group to tyrannize us, so that we follow like lost sheep. But speaking our minds takes courage because groups do not like open dissenters. These radical psychic changes may be evolutionary rather than revolutionary, gradual rather than speedy; however, my proposition that understanding the other so that we can reduce her/his motivation to kill requires urgent action. Peace is not just an absence of war, but a state of mind and, most importantly, a way of thinking.

#### Reject the affirmative’s security discourse – this untimely intervention is the only chance for a counter-discourse

**Calkivik, 10** – PhD in Poli Sci @ Univ Minnesota (Emine Asli, 10/2010, "DISMANTLING SECURITY," PhD dissertation submitted to Univ Minnesota for Raymond Duvall, http://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/99479/1/Calkivik\_umn\_0130E\_11576.pdf)

It is this self-evidence of security even for critical approaches and the antinomy stemming from dissident voices reproducing the language of those they dissent from that constitutes the starting point for this chapter, where I elaborate on the meaning of dismantling security as untimely critique. As mentioned in the vignette in the opening section, the suggestion to dismantle security was itself deemed as an untimely pursuit in a world where lives of millions were rendered brutally insecure by poverty, violence, disease, and ongoing political conflicts. Colored by the tone of a call to conscience in the face of the ongoing crisis of security, it was not the time, interlocutors argued, for self-indulgent critique. I will argue that it is the element of being untimely, the effort, in the words of Walter Benjamin, “to brush history against the grain” that gives critical thinking its power.291 It might appear as a trivial discussion to bring up the relation between time and critique because conceptions of critical thinking in the discipline of International Relations already possess the notion that critical thought needs to be untimely. In the first section, I will tease out what this notion of untimeliness entails by visiting ongoing conversations within the discipline about critical thought and political time. Through this discussion, I hope to clarify what sets apart dismantling security as untimely critique from the notion of untimeliness at work in critical international relations theory. The latter conception of the untimely, I will suggest, paradoxically calls on critical thought to be “on time” in that it champions a particular understanding of what it means for critical scholarship to be relevant and responsible for its times. This notion of the untimely demands that critique be strategic and respond to political exigency, that it provide answers in this light instead of raising more questions about which questions could be raised or what presuppositions underlie the questions that are deemed to be waiting for answers. After elaborating in the first section such strategic conceptions of the untimeliness of critical theorizing, in the second section I will turn to a different sense of the untimely by drawing upon Wendy Brown’s discussion of the relation between critique, crisis, and political time through her reading of Benjamin’s “Theses on the Philosophy of History.”292 In contrast to a notion of untimeliness that demands strategic thinking and punctuality, Brown’s exegesis provides a conception of historical materialism where critique is figured as a force of disruption, a form of intervention that reconfigures the meaning of the times and “contest[s] the very senses of time invoked to declare critique ‘untimely’.”293 Her exposition overturns the view of critique as a self-indulgent practice as it highlights the immediately political nature of critique and reconfigures the meaning of what it means for critical thought to be relevant.294 It is in this sense of the untimely, I will suggest, that dismantling security as a critique hopes to recover. I should point out that in this discussion my intention is neither to construct a theory of critique nor to provide an exhaustive review and evaluation of the forms of critical theorizing in International Relations. Rather, my aim is to contribute to the existing efforts that engage with the question of what it means to be critical apart from drawing the epistemological and methodological boundaries so as to think about how one is critical.295 While I do not deny the importance of epistemological questions, I contend that taking time to think about the meaning of critique beyond these issues presents itself as an important task. This task takes on additional importance within the context of security studies where any realm of investigation quickly begets its critical counterpart. The rapid emergence and institutionalization of critical terrorism studies when studies on terrorism were proliferating under the auspices of the so-called Global War on Terror provides a striking example to this trend. 296 Such instances are important reminders that, to the extent that epistemology and methodology are reified as the sole concerns in defining and assessing critical thinking297 or “wrong headed refusals”298 to get on with positive projects and empirical research gets branded as debilitating for critical projects, what is erased from sight is the political nature of the questions asked and what is lost is the chance to reflect upon what it means for critical thinking to respond to its times. In his meditation on the meaning of responding and the sense of responsibility entailed by writing, Jean-Luc Nancy suggests that “all writing is ‘committed.’” 299 This notion of commitment diverges from the programmatic sense of committed writing. What underlies this conception is an understanding of writing as responding: writing is a response to the voice of an other.In Nancy’s words, “[w]hoever writes responds” 300 and “makes himself responsible to in the absolute sense.”301 Suggesting that there is always an ethical commitment prior to any particular political commitment, such a notion of writing contests the notion of creative autonomy premised on the idea of a free, self-legislating subject who responds. In other words, it discredits the idea of an original voice by suggesting that there is no voice that is not a response to a prior response. Hence, to respond is configured as responding to an expectation rather than as an answer to a question and responsibility is cast as an “anticipated response to questions, to demands, to still-unformulated, not exactly predictable expectations.”302 Echoing Nancy, David Campbell makes an important reminder as he suggests that as international relations scholars “we are always already engaged,” although the sites, mechanisms and quality of engagements might vary.303 The question, then, is not whether as scholars we are engaged or not, but what the nature of this engagement is. Such a re-framing of the question is intended to highlight the political nature of all interpretation and the importance of developing an “ethos of political criticism that is concerned with assumptions, limits, their historical production, social and political effects, and the possibility of going beyond them in thought and action.”304 Taking as its object assumptions and limits, their historical production and social and political effects places the relevancy of critical thought and responsibility of critical scholarship on new ground. It is this ethos of critique that dismantling security hopes to recover for a discipline where security operates as the foundational principle and where critical thinking keeps on contributing to security’s impressing itself as a self-evident condition. Critical Theory and Punctuality Within the context of International Relations, critical thought’s orientation toward its time comes out strongly in Kimberley Hutchings’s formulation.305 According to Hutchings, no matter what form it takes, what distinguishes critical international relations theory from other forms of theorizing is “its orientation towards change and the possibility of futures that do not reproduce the hegemonic power of the present.”306 What this implies about the nature of critical thought is that it needs to be not only diagnostic, but also self-reflexive. In the words of Hutchings, “all critical theories lay claim to some kind of account not only of the present of international politics and its relation to possible futures, but also of the role of critical theory in the present and future in international politics.” 307 Not only analyzing the present, but also introducing the question of the future into analysis places political time at the center of critical enterprise and makes the problem of change a core concern. It is this question of change that situates different forms of critical thinking on a shared ground since they all attempt to expose the way in which what is presented as given and natural is historically produced and hence open to change. With their orientation to change, their efforts to go against the dominant currents and challenge the hegemony of existing power relations by showing how contemporary practices and discourses contribute to the perpetuation of structures of power and domination, critical theorists in general and critical security studies specialists in particular take on an untimely endeavor. It is this understanding of the untimely aspect of critical thinking that is emphasized by Mark Neufeld, who regards the development of critical approaches to security as “one of the more hopeful intellectual developments in recent years.”308 Despite nurturing from different theoretical traditions and therefore harboring “fundamental differences between modernist and postmodernist commitments,” writes Neufeld, scholars who are involved in the critical project nevertheless “share a common concern with calling into question ‘prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized.’” 309 The desire for change—through being untimely and making the way to alternative futures that would no longer resemble the present—have led some scholars to emphasize the utopian element that must accompany all critical thinking. Quoting Oscar Wilde’s aphorism—a map of the world that does not include Utopia is not even worth glancing at, Ken Booth argues for the need to restore the role and reputation of utopianism in the theory and practice of international politics. 310 According to Booth, what goes under the banner of realism—“ethnocentric self-interest writ large”311 — falls far beyond the realities of a drastically changed world political landscape at the end of the Cold War. He describes the new reality as “an egg-box containing the shells of sovereignty; but alongside it a global community omelette [sic] is cooking.”312 Rather than insisting on the inescapability of war in the international system as political realists argue, Booth argues for the need and possibility to work toward the utopia of overcoming the condition of war by banking on the opportunities provided by a globalizing world. The point that critical thought needs to be untimely by going against its time is also emphasized by Dunne and Wheeler, who assert that, regardless of the form it takes, “critical theory purport[s] to ‘think against’ the prevailing current” and that “[c]ritical security studies is no exception” to this enterprise.313 According to the authors, the function of critical approaches to security is to problematize what is taken for granted in the disciplinary production of knowledge about security by “resist[ing], transcend[ing] and defeat[ing]…theories of security, which take for granted who is to be secured (the state), how security is to be achieved (by defending core ‘national’ values, forcibly if necessary) and from whom security is needed (the enemy).”314 While critical theory in this way is figured as untimely, I want to suggest that this notion of untimeliness gets construed paradoxically in a quite timely fashion. With a perceived disjuncture between writing the world from within a discipline and acting in it placed at the center of the debates, the performance of critical thought gets evaluated to the extent that it is punctual and in synch with the times. Does critical thought provide concrete guidance and prescribe what is to be done? Can it move beyond mere talk and make timely political interventions by providing solutions? Does it have answers to the strategic questions of progressive movements? Demanding that critical theorizing come clean in the court of these questions, such conceptions of the untimely demand that critique respond to its times in a responsible way, where being responsible is understood in stark contrast to a notion of responding and responsibility that I briefly discussed in the introductory pages of this chapter (through the works of Jean-Luc Nancy and David Campbell). Let me visit two recent conversations ensuing from the declarations of the contemporary crisis of critical theorizing in order to clarify what I mean by a timely understanding of untimely critique. The first conversation was published as a special issue in the Review of International Studies (RIS), one of the major journals of the field. Prominent figures took the 25th anniversary of the journal’s publication of two key texts—regarded as canonical for the launching and development of critical theorizing in International Relations—as an opportunity to reflect upon and assess the impact of critical theory in the discipline and interrogate what its future might be. 315 The texts in question, which are depicted as having shaken the premises of the static world of the discipline, are Robert Cox’s 1981 essay entitled on “Social Forces, States, and World Orders”316 and Richard Ashley’s article, “Political Realism and Human Interests.”317 In their introductory essay to the issue, Rengger and Thirkell-White suggest that the essays by Cox and Ashley—followed by Andrew Linklater’s Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations318 —represent “the breach in the dyke” of the three dominant discourses in International Relations (i.e., positivists, English School, and Marxism), unleashing “a torrent [that would] soon become a flood” as variety of theoretical approaches in contemporary social theory (i.e., feminism, Neo-Gramscianism, poststructuralism, and post-colonialism) would get introduced through the works of critical scholars.319 After elaborating the various responses given to and resistance raised against the critical project in the discipline, the authors provide an overview and an assessment of the current state of critical theorizing in International Relations. They argue that the central question for much of the ongoing debate within the critical camp in its present state—a question that it cannot help but come to terms with and provide a response to—concerns the relation between critical thought and political practice. As they state, the “fundamental philosophical question [that] can no longer be sidestepped” by critical International Relations theory is the question of the relation between “knowledge of the world and action in it.”320 One of the points alluded to in the essay is that forms of critical theorizing, which leave the future “to contingency, uncertainty and the multiplicity of political projects” and therefore provide “less guidance for concrete political action”321 or, again, those that problematize underlying assumptions of thought and “say little about the potential political agency that might be involved in any subsequent struggles”322 may render the critical enterprise impotent and perhaps even suspect. This point comes out clearly in Craig Murphy’s contribution to the collection of essays in the RIS’s special issue. 323 Echoing William Wallace’s argument that critical theorists tend to be “monks,”324 who have little to offer for political actors engaged in real world politics, Murphy argues that the promise of critical theory is “partially kept” because of the limited influence it has had outside the academy towards changing the world.Building a different world, he suggests, requires more than isolated academic talk; that it demands not merely “words,” but “deeds.”325 This, according to Murphy, requires providing “knowledge that contributes to change.”326 Such knowledge would emanate from connections with the marginalized and would incorporate observations of actors in their everyday practices. More importantly, it would create an inspiring vision for social movements, such as the one provided by the concept of human development, which, according to Murphy, was especially powerful “because it embodied a value-oriented way of seeing, a vision, rather than only isolated observations.”327 In sum, if critical theory is to retain its critical edge, Murphy’s discussion suggests, it has to be in synch with political time and respond to its immediate demands. The second debate that is revelatory of this conception of the timing of critical theory—i.e., that critical thinking be strategic and efficient in relation to political time—takes place in relation to the contemporary in/security environment shaped by the so-called Global War on Terror. The theme that bears its mark on these debates is the extent to which critical inquiries about the contemporary security landscape become complicit in the workings of power and what critique can offer to render the world more legible for progressive struggles.328 For instance, warning critical theorists against being co-opted by or aligned with belligerence and war-mongering, Richard Devetak asserts that critical international theory has an urgent “need to distinguish its position all the more clearly from liberal imperialism.”329 While scholars such as Devetak, Booth,330 and Fierke331 take the critical task to be an attempt to rescue liberal internationalism from turning into liberal imperialism, others announce the “crisis of critical theorizing” and suggest that critical writings on the nature of the contemporary security order lack the resources to grasp their actual limitations, where the latter is said to reside not in the realm of academic debate, but in the realm of political practice.332 It is amidst these debates on critique, crisis, and political time that Richard Beardsworth raises the question of the future of critical philosophy in the face of the challenges posed by contemporary world politics.333 Recounting these challenges, he provides the matrix for a proper form of critical inquiry that could come to terms with “[o]ur historical actuality.”334 He describes this actuality as the “thick context” of modernity (“an epoch, delimited by the capitalization of social relations,” which imposes its own philosophical problematic—“that is, the attempt, following the social consequences of capitalism, to articulate the relation between individuality and collective spirit”335 ), American unilateralism in the aftermath of the attacks on September 11, 2001, and the growing political disempowerment of people worldwide. Arguing that “contemporary return of religion and new forms of irrationalism emerge, in large part, out of the failure of the second response of modernity to provide a secular solution to the inequalities of the nation-state and colonization,”336 he formulates the awaiting political task for critical endeavors as constructing a world polity to resist the disintegration of the world under the force of capital.It is with this goal in mind that he suggests that “responsible scholarship needs to rescue reason in the face irrational war”337 and that intellectuals need to provide “the framework for a world ethical community of law, endowed with political mechanisms of implementation in the context of a regulated planetary economy.”338 He suggests that an aporetic form of thinking such as Jacques Derrida’s—a thinking that “ignores the affirmative relation between the determining powers of reason and history”339 —would be an unhelpful resource because such thinking “does not open up to where work needs to be done for these new forms of polity to emerge.”340 In other words, critical thinking, according to Beardsworth, needs to articulate and point out possible political avenues and to orient thought and action in concrete ways so as to contribute to progressive political change rather than dwelling on the encounter of the incalculable and calculation and im-possibility of world democracy in a Derridean fashion. In similar ways to the first debate on critique that I discussed, critical thinking is once again called upon to respond to political time in a strategic and efficient manner. As critical inquiry gets summoned up to the court of reason in Beardsworth’s account, its realm of engagement is limited to that which the light of reason can be shed upon, and its politics is confined to mapping out the achievable and the doable in a given historical context without questioning or disrupting the limits of what is presented as “realistic” choices. Hence, if untimely critical thought is to be meaningful it has to be on time by responding to political exigency in a practical, efficient, and strategic manner. In contrast to this prevalent form of understanding the untimeliness of critical theory, I will now turn to a different account of the untimely provided by Wendy Brown whose work informs the project of dismantling security as untimely critique. Drawing from her discussion of the relationship between critique, crisis, and political time, I will suggest that untimely critique of security entails, simultaneously, an attunement to the times and an aggressive violation of their self-conception. It is in this different sense of the untimely that the suggestion of dismantling security needs to be situated. Critique and Political Time As I suggested in the Prelude to this chapter, elevating security itself to the position of major protagonist and extending a call to “dismantle security” was itself declared to be an untimely pursuit in a time depicted as the time of crisis in security. Such a declaration stood as an exemplary moment (not in the sense of illustration or allegory, but as a moment of crystallization) for disciplinary prohibitions to think and act otherwise—perhaps the moment when a doxa exhibits its most powerful hold. Hence, what is first needed is to overturn the taken-for-granted relations between crisis, timeliness, and critique. The roots krisis and kritik can be traced back to the Greek word krinõ, which meant “to separate”, to “choose,” to “judge,” to “decide.”341 While creating a broad spectrum of meanings, it was intimately related to politics as it connoted a “divorce” or “quarrel,” but also a moment of decision and a turning point. It was also used as a jurisprudential term in the sense of making a decision, reaching a verdict or judgment (kritik) on an alleged disorder so as to provide a way to restore order. Rather than being separated into two domains of meaning—that of “subjective critique” and “objective crisis”—krisis and kritik were conceived as interlinked moments. Koselleck explains this conceptual fusion: [I]t wasin the sense of “judgment,” “trial,” “legal decision,” and ultimately “court” that crisis achieved a high constitutionalstatus, through which the individual citizen and the community were bound together. The “for and against” wastherefore present in the original meaning of the word and thisin a manner that already conceptually anticipated the appropriate judgment. 342 Recognition of an objective crisis and subjective judgments to be passed on it so as to come up with a formula for restoring the health of the polity by setting the times right were thereby infused and implicated in each other.343 Consequently, as Brown notes, there could be no such thing as “mere critique” or “untimely critique” because critique always entailed a concern with political time: “[C]ritique as political krisis promise[d] to restore continuity by repairing or renewing the justice that gives an order the prospect of continuity, that indeed ma[de] it continuous.”344 The breaking of this intimate link between krisis and kritik, the consequent depoliticization of critique and its sundering from crisis coincides with the rise of modern political order and redistribution of the public space into the binary structure of sovereign and subject, public and private.345 Failing to note the link between the critique it practiced and the looming political crisis, emerging philosophies of history, according Koselleck, had the effect of obfuscating this crisis. As he explains, “[n]ever politically grasped, [this political crisis] remained concealed in historico-philosophical images of the future which cause the day’s events to pale.”346 It is this intimate, but severed, link between crisis and critique in historical narratives that Wendy Brown’s discussion brings to the fore and re-problematizes. She turns to Walter Benjamin’s “Theses on the Philosophy of History” and challenges conventional understandings of historical materialism, which conceives of the present in terms of unfolding laws of history.347 According to Brown, the practice of critical theory appeals to a concern with time to the extent that “[t]he crisis that incites critique and that critique engages itself signals a rupture of temporal continuity, which is at the same time a rupture in political imaginary.”348 Cast in these terms, it is a particular experience with time, with the present, that Brown suggests Benjamin’s theses aim to capture. Rather than an unmoving or an automatically overcome present (a present that is out of time), the present is interpreted as an opening that calls for a response to it. This call for a response highlights the idea that, far from being a luxury, critique is non-optional in its nature. Such an understanding of critical thought is premised on a historical consciousness that grasps the present historically so as to break with the selfconception of the age. Untimely critique transforms into a technique to blow up the present through fracturing its apparent seamlessness by insisting on alternatives to its closed political and epistemological universe.349 Such a conception resonates with the distinction that Žižek makes between a political subjectivity that is confined to choosing between the existing alternatives—one that takes the limits of what is given as the limits to what is possible—and a form of subjectivity that creates the very set of alternatives by “transcend[ing] the coordinates of a given situation [and] ‘posit[ing] the presuppositions’ of one's activity” by redefining the very situation within which one is active.”350 With its attempt to grasp the times in its singularity, critique is cast neither as a breaking free from the weight of time (which would amount to ahistoricity) nor being weighed down by the times (as in the case of teleology).351 It conceives the present as “historically contoured but not itself experienced as history because not necessarily continuous with what has been.”352 It is an attitude that renders the present as the site of “non-utopian possibility” since it is historically situated and constrained yet also a possibility since it is not historically foreordained or determined.353 It entails contesting the delimitations of choice and challenging the confinement of politics to existing possibilities. Rather than positing history as existing objectively outside of narration, what Brown’s discussion highlights is the intimate relation between the constitution of political subjectivity vis-à-vis the meaning of history for the present. It alludes to “the power of historical discourse,” which Mowitt explains as a power “to estrange us from that which is most familiar, namely, the fixity of the present” because “what we believe to have happened to us bears concretely on what we are prepared to do with ourselves both now and in the future.”354 Mark Neocleous concretizes the political stakes entailed in such encounters with history—with the dead—from the perspective of three political traditions: a conservative one, which aims to reconcile the dead with the living, a fascist one, which aims to resurrect the dead to legitimate its fascist program, and a historical materialist one, which seeks redemption with the dead as the source of hope and inspiration for the future.355 Brown’s discussion of critique and political time is significant for highlighting the immediately political nature of critique in contrast to contemporary invocations that cast it as a self-indulgent practice, an untimely luxury, a disinterested, distanced, academic endeavor. Her attempt to trace critique vis-à-vis its relation to political time provides a counter-narrative to the conservative and moralizing assertions that shun untimely critique of security as a luxurious interest that is committed to abstract ideals rather than to the “reality” of politics—i.e., running after utopia rather than modeling “real world” solutions. Dismantling security as untimely critique entails a similar claim to unsettle the accounts of “what the times are” with a “bid to reset time.”356 It aspires to be untimely in the face of the demands on critical thought to be on time; aims to challenge the moralizing move, the call to conscience that arrives in the form of assertions that saying “no!” to security, that refusing to write it, would be untimely. Rather than succumbing to the injunction that thought of political possibility is to be confined within the framework of security, dismantling security aims to open up space for alternative forms, for a different language of politics so as to “stop digging” the hole politics of security have dug us and start building a counter-discourse. Conclusion As an attempt to push a debate that is fixated on security to the limit and explore what it means to dismantle security, my engagement with various aspects of this move is not intended as an analysis raised at the level of causal interpretations or as an attempt to find better solutions to a problem that already has a name. Rather, it tries to recast what is taken-for-granted by attending to the conceptual assumptions, the historical and systemic conditions within which the politics of security plays itself out. As I tried to show in this chapter, it also entails a simultaneous move of refusing to be a disciple of the discipline of security. This implies overturning not only the silent disciplinary protocols about which questions are legitimate to ask, but also the very framework that informs those questions. It is from this perspective that I devoted two chapters to examining and clarifying the proposal to dismantle security as a claim on time. After explicating, in Chapter 4, the temporal structure that is enacted by politics of security and elaborating on how security structures the relation between the present and the future, in this chapter, I approached the question of temporality from a different perspective, by situating it in relation to disciplinary times in order to clarify what an untimely critique of security means. I tried to elaborate this notion of the untimely by exploring the understanding of untimeliness that informs certain conceptions of critical theorizing in International Relations. I suggested that such a notion of the untimely paradoxically calls on critical thought to be on time in the sense of being punctual and strategic. Turning to Wendy Brown’s discussion of the relation between critique and political time, I elaborated on the sense of untimely critique that dismantling security strives for—a critique that goes against the times that are saturated by the infinite passion to secure and works toward taking apart the architecture of security.

### 2NC Chechnya

#### They’d never – too worried about civil unrest

#### Israel is the basis of global norms related to targeted killing

Fisher 7 (Jason, Judicial Clerk to the Honorable James O. Browning, United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, "Targeted Killing, Norms, and International Law," 45 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 711, lexis)

A norm may spread and gain in prominence if States emulate the behavior of some prestigious or otherwise well-known actor, or an actor especially relevant to a particular issue area that has adopted the norm, "even if the emulated actor is not attempting to communicate its behavior." n157 As the world's only superpower, the United States is prestigious and well-known, particularly with regard to matters concerning the use of force, an area in which its geo-strategic position has seen it involved to a unique extent. Similarly, Israel is a conspicuous State that possesses "a special relationship with the subject matter of" n158 terrorism. As such, U.S. and Israeli martial and counter-terrorism norms and behaviors are susceptible to emulation by other States. A targeted killing norm may spread outwards, then, from the United States or Israel, or both, to other States in the international system via emulation. Importantly, emulation builds upon [\*738] itself; as more States adopt a particular norm, the rate at which it is emulated is likely to increase as other States come to perceive adoption as "normal." n159 Moreover, because it is rational for actors to adopt innovations, including new norms, when they observe that they have already succeeded for others, targeted killing's exhibited effectiveness - to the extent that other States perceive it - may accelerate a targeted killing norm's emulation. n160 Such rationality may have been what initially led the United States, which has historically looked to Israel for counter-terrorism lessons, to adopt a norm permitting targeted killing after 9/11. n161

#### China and Russia will inevitably use – they cite Israel

Fisher 7 (Jason, Judicial Clerk to the Honorable James O. Browning, United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, "Targeted Killing, Norms, and International Law," 45 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 711, lexis)

The above discussion is not meant to suggest that the worldwide spread and acceptance of a targeted killing norm is preordained, rather only that it seems likely, at present, that the norm will achieve greater prominence. That prognosis could change, however, if a powerful State or group of States or collection of committed non-State actors with State support, or some combination thereof, acting as a norm entrepreneur, actively works to thwart the development of a norm permitting targeted killing for counter-terrorism purposes. n179 Several Arab and Middle Eastern States, the European Union, Russia, and others have made statements criticizing targeted killing after high-profile targeted killings have been carried out. n180 Yet none of them, it seems, has yet attempted to assume the position of norm entrepreneur and to engage in a sustained effort to end use of the tactic. Moreover, there is evidence that Russia and China, perhaps revealing their true preferences, have themselves employed targeted killing - Russia in its ongoing conflict with Chechen rebels and China in its hostilities with members of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement in Xinjiang province. n181 Currently, it does not appear that a norm entrepreneur with the status or relevance of the United States or Israel has emerged to challenge the targeted killing norm, something that would seem to be necessary if its present trajectory is to be altered.¶ A norm permitting the use of targeted killing for counter-terrorism purposes may be viewed as having already achieved a certain degree of prominence because of the status and visibility of the two States that are known to have adopted it: the United States and Israel. Furthermore, given the positioning of the United States and [\*742] Israel in the international system and the absence of a significant norm entrepreneur pushing in the opposite direction, it seems likely that, whether by emulation, restrained norm entrepreneurship, or both, a targeted killing norm will achieve even greater prominence.

### 2NC External

#### The aff doesn’t provide real reform – continued crisis discourse allows a re-expansion of executive authority

**Scheuerman, 12** -- Professor of Political Science and West European Studies at Indiana University (William E., Summer 2012, "Emergencies, Executive Power, and the Uncertain Future of US Presidential Democracy," Law & Social Inquiry 37(3), EBSCO)

IV. REFORMISM'S LIMITS Bruce Ackerman, one of our country's most observant analysts of its clunky constitutional machinery, is similarly impatient with the "comforting notion that our heroic ancestors" created an ideal constitutional and political system (2010, 10). He even agrees that the US model increasingly seems to overlap with Schmitt's dreary vision of executive-centered plebiscitarianism motored by endless crises and emergencies (2010, 82). In sharp contrast to Posner and Vermeule, however, he not only worries deeply about this trend, but he also discards the unrealistic possibility that it might be successfully countered without recourse to legal and constitutional devices. Although Madison's original tripartite separation of powers is ill-adjusted to the realities of the modern administrative state, we need to reinvigorate both liberal legalism and checks and balances. Unless we can succeed in doing so, US citizens are likely to experience a "quantum leap in the presidency's destructive capacities" in the new century (2010, 119). Despite its alarmist tenor, for which he has been—in my view—unfairly criticized,'' Ackerman's position is grounded in a blunt acknowledgment of the comparative disadvantages of the US constitutional system. More clearly than any of the other authors discussed in this article, he breaks cleanly with the intellectual and constitutional provincialism that continues to plague so much legal and political science research on the United States. In part because as "late developers" they learned from institutional mistakes in the United States and elsewhere, more recently designed liberal democracies often do a better job than our Model T version at guaranteeing both policy effectiveness and the rule of law (2010, 120-22). Following the path-breaking work of his colleague Juan Linz, Ackerman offers a critical assessment of our presidential version of liberal democracy, where an independently elected executive regularly finds itself facing off against a potentially obstructionist Congress, which very well may seek to bury "one major presidential initiative after another" (2010, 5; see also Linz 1994). In the context of either real or imagined crises, executives facing strict temporal restraints (i.e., an upcoming election), while claiming to be the people's best protector against so-called special interests, will typically face widespread calls for swift (as well as legally dubious) action. "Crisis talk," in part endogenously generated by a flawed political system prone to gridlock rather than effective policy making, "prepares the ground for a grudging acceptance of presidential unilateralism" (2010, 6). Executives everywhere have much to gain from crisis scenarios. Yet incentives for declaring and perpetuating emergencies may be especially pronounced in our presidential system. The combination of temporal rigidity (i.e., fixed elections and terms of office) and "dual democratic legitimacy" (with both Congress and the president claiming to speak for "we the people") poses severe challenges to law-based government (Linz 1994). Criticizing US scholarship for remaining imprisoned in the anachronistic binary contrast of "US presidentialism vs. Westminster parliamentarism," Ackerman recommends that we pay closer attention to recent innovations achieved by what he describes as "constrained parliamentarism," basically a modified parliamentary system that circumvents the worst design mistakes of both Westminster parliamentarism and US presidentialism. As he has argued previously in a lengthy Harvard Law Review article, constrained parliamentarism—as found, for example, in recent democracies like Germany and Spain—locates law making in a Westminster-style popular assembly. But in contrast to the UK model, "legislative output is constrained by a higher lawmaking process" (2000, 666). The German Eederal Republic, for example, rests on a written constitution (e.g., the Basic Law) and has a powerful constitutional court. In Ackerman's view, constrained parliamentarism lacks many of the institutional components driving the growth of executive-dominated emergency govemment. Not surprisingly, he posits, it suffers to a reduced degree from many of the institutional pathologies plaguing US-style presidentialism. Ackerman argues that, in contrast, US-style presidential models have regularly collapsed elsewhere (e.g., in Latin and South American countries, where US-style presidentialism has been widely imitated [Linz and Valenzuela 1994]), devolving on occasion into unabated authoritarianism (2000, 646). Ackerman now seems genuinely concerned that a similar fate might soon befall its original version. Even if his most recent book repeats some earlier worries, he has now identified additional perils that he thinks deserve immediate attention. Not surprisingly, perhaps, his anxiety level has noticeably increased. Even Schmitt's unattractive vision of presidential authoritarianism appears "a little old-fashioned," given some ominous recent trends (2010, 82). To an extent unfathomable in Schmitt's day, the executive can exploit quasi-scientific polling data in order to gauge the public pulse. Presidents now employ a small but growing army of media gurus and consultants who allow them to craft their messages in astonishingly well-skilled—and potentially manipulative—ways. Especially during crisis moments, an overheated political environment can quickly play into the hands of a "White House propaganda machine generating a stream of sound bites" (2010, 33). Pundits and opinion makers already tend to blur the crucial divide between polling "numbers" and actual votes, with polls in both elite and popular consciousness tending not only to supplement but increasingly displace election results.'^ The decline of the print media and serious joumalism—about which Ackerman is understandably distressed—means that even the most fantastic views are taken seriously. Thus far, the Internet has failed to pick up the slack; it tends to polarize public opinion. Meanwhile, our primary system favors candidates who successfully appeal to an energized partisan base, meaning that those best able to exploit public opinion polling and the mass media, but out of sync with the median voter, generally gain the party nomination. Linz earlier pointed out that presidentialism favors political outsiders; Ackerman worries that in our emerging presidential model, the outsiders will tend to be extremists. Polling and media-savvy, charismatic, and relatively extreme figures will colonize the White House. In addition, the president's control over the massive administrative apparatus provides the executive with a daunting array of institutional weapons, while the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) and Office of Counsel to the President offer hyperpoliticized sites from which distinctly executive-centered legal and constitutional views now are rapidly disseminated. Ackerman raises some tough questions for those who deem the OLC and related executive organs fundamentally sound institutions that somehow went haywire under David Addington and John Yoo. In his view, their excesses represent a logical result of basic structural trends currently transforming both the executive and political system as whole. OLC's partisan and sometimes quasi-authoritarian legal pronouncements are now being eagerly studied by law students and cited by federal courts (2010, 93). Notwithstanding an admirable tradition of executive deference to the Supreme Court, presidents are better positioned than ever to claim higher political legitimacy and neutralize political rivals. Backed by eager partisan followers, adept at the media game, and well armed with clever legal arguments constructed by some of the best lawyers in the country, prospective presidents may conceivably stop deferring to the Court (2010, 89). Ackerman's most unsettling amendment to his previous views is probably his discussion of the increasingly politicized character of the military—an administrative realm, by the way, ignored by other writers here, despite its huge role in modern US politics. Here again, the basic enigma is that the traditional eighteenth-century tripartite separation of powers meshes poorly with twenty-first-century trends: powerful military leaders can now regularly play different branches of govemment against one another in ways that undermine meaningful civilian oversight. Top officers possess far-reaching opportunities "to become an independent political force—allowing them to tip the balance of political support in one direction, then another," as the competing branches struggle for power (2010, 49). For Ackerman, the emergence of nationally prominent and media-savvy figures such as Colin Powell and David Petraeus, who at crucial junctures have communicated controversial policy positions to a broader public,'^ suggests that this long-standing structural flaw has recently gotten worse. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1996, for example, transformed the chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from a mediator for the competing services into the military's principal—and hugely influential—spokesperson within the National Security Council (2010, 50). Not only does the military constitute a hugely significant segment of the administrative machinery, but it is now embodied—both in govemment and the public eye—in a single leader whose views carry tremendous weight. The fact that opinion surveys show that the officer corps is increasingly conservative in its partisan orientation, Ackerman notes, only adds to the dangers. Americans need not fear an imminent military putsch, along the lines that destroyed other presidential regimes elsewhere. Nonetheless, we would do well not to be "lulled into a false sense of security" (2010, 87). Having painted a foreboding portrait of institutional trends, Ackerman points to paths we might take to ward off the worst. In light of the obvious seriousness of the illness he has diagnosed, however, his antidotes tend to disappoint: he proposes that we treat cancer with some useful but limited home remedies. Like Shane, Ackerman wants to improve popular deliberation by reforming the mass media and institutionalizing "Deliberation Day" (2010, 125-40). Yet how such otherwise potentially appealing initiatives might counteract the symbiotic relationship between presidentialism and crisis government remains ambiguous. A modernized electoral college, for example, might simply engender executives better positioned to claim to stand in for "we the people" than their historical predecessors. Given Ackerman's own worries about plebiscitarianism, this reform might compound rather than alleviate our problems. More innovatively, Ackerman endorses the idea of a quasi-judicial check within the executive branch, a "Supreme Executive Tribunal" given the task of expeditiously determining the legality of proposed executive action, whose members would be appointed to staggered terms and subject to Senate confirmation. Forced to gain a seal of approval from jurists relatively insulated from sitting presidents, the executive tribunal would act more quickly than an ordinary court and thereby help put a "brake on the presidential dynamic before it can gather steam" (2010,143). Before the president could take the first political move and potentially alter the playing field, he or she might first have to clear the move with a body of legal experts, a requirement that presumably over time would work to undergird the executive branch's commitment to legality. The proposed tribunal could allow the president and Congress to resolve many of their standoffs more expeditiously than is typical today (2010, 146). Congressional representatives, for example, might rely on the tribunal to challenge executive signing statements. Existing exemptions for a significant number of major executive-level actors (e.g., the president's National Security Advisor) from Senate confirmation also need to be abandoned, while the military should promulgate a new Canon of Military Ethics, aimed at clarifying what civilian control means in contemporary real-life settings, in order to counteract its ongoing politicization. Goldwater-Nichols could be revised so as better to guarantee the subordination of military leaders to the Secretary of Defense (2010, 153-65). Ackerman also repeats his previous calls for creating an explicit legal framework for executive emergency action: Congress could temporarily grant the president broad discretionary emergency powers while maintaining effective authority to revoke them if the executive proved unable to gain ever more substantial support from the legislature (2010, 165-70; see also Ackerman 2006). Each of these suggestions demands more careful scrutiny than possible here. Nonetheless, even if many of them seem potentially useful, room for skepticism remains. Why, for example, would the proposed executive tribunal not become yet another site for potentially explosive standoffs between presidents and Congress? Might not highlevel political conflicts end up simply taking the forms of destructive (and misleadingly legalistic) duels? To the extent that one of the tribunal's goals is to decelerate executive decision making, its creation would perhaps leave our already sluggish and slow-moving political system even less able than at the present to deal with fast-paced challenges. Faced with time constraints and the need to gain popular support, executives might then feel even more pressed than at present to circumvent legality. As Ackerman knows, even as it presently operates, the Senate confirmation process is a mess. His proposal to extend its scope might simply end up reproducing at least some familiar problems. Last but not least, given the perils he so alarmingly describes, his proposed military reforms seem unsatisfying. Why not instead simply cut our bloated military apparatus and abandon US imperial pretensions? The obvious Achilles heel is that none of the proposals really deals head-on with what Ackerman himself conceives as the fundamental root of executive-centered government: an independently elected president strictly separated from legislative bodies with which he periodically clashes in potentially destructive ways. Despite Ackerman's ambition, his proposals do not provide structural reform: he concludes that US-based reformers should "take the independently elected presidency as a fixture" (2010, 124). Thus, presidential government is here to stay; reformers can also forget about significantly altering our flawed system of presidential primaries, activist government, and powerful military that intervenes frequently abroad (2010, 124). Given contemporary political developments, one can certainly appreciate why Ackerman is skeptical that the US system might finally be ripe for a productive institutional overhaul. Nonetheless, this just makes an already rather bleak book look even bleaker. His book's title. The Decline and Fall of the Arnerican Republic, is out of step with the somewhat upbeat reformist proposals detailed in its final chapters. Regretfully, the title better captures his core message. Only Ackerman's ultimately disturbing book both adeptly rejects the tendency among recent students of executive power to revert to constitutional nostalgia while forthrightly identifying the very real dangers posed by recent institutional trends. In an age of permanent or at least seemingly endless emergencies, where the very attempt to cleanly distinguish dire crises from "normal" political and social challenges becomes exceedingly difficult, the executive threatens to become an even more predominant— and potentially lawless—institutional player Unfortunately, US-style presidential democracy may be particularly vulnerable to this trend. Ackerman proves more successful than the other authors discussed here because he is best attuned to a rich body of comparative constitutional and political science scholarship that has raised legitimate doubts about the alleged virtues of US-style liberal democracy. Not surprisingly, some of his own reform ideas—for example, his proposed system of emergency law making—draw heavily on foreign examples, including Canada and new democracies such as South Africa. He convincingly argues that we might at least ameliorate the widespread tendency among presidents to manipulate crises for narrow partisan reasons, for example, by relying on the clever idea of a supermajoritarian escalator, which would require every legislative renewal of executive emergency authority to rest on ever more numerous supermajorities (2006). Ackerman is right to suggest that the United States needs to look abroad in order to improve our rather deficient system of emergency rule (Scheuerman 2006, 2008). Our system is broken; it is time to see what can be learned from others. Ackerman's latest book's overly cautious reformism thus seems especially peculiar in light of his own powerful and indeed enthusiastic defense of constrained parliamentarism, which he quite plausibly describes as potentially offering a superior approach to emergency government. The key point is not that we can be absolutely sure that the "grass is greener" in new democracies such as postwar Germany or post-Franco Spain; existing empirical evidence offers, frankly, a mixed picture. Contemporary Germany, for example, has certainly experienced its own fair share of emergency executive excesses (Frankenberg 2010). Scholars have criticized not only the empirical thesis that presidentialism and a strict separation of powers can help explain the substantial growth of executive discretion (Carolan 2009; Gross and Ni Aolain 2006), but also more farreaching assertions about their alleged structural disadvantages (Cheibub 2006). Still others argue that parliamentary regimes even of the "old type" (i.e., the UK Westminster model) have done relatively well in maintaining the rule of law during serious crises (Ewing and Gearty 2000; Bellamy 2007, 249-53). Unfortunately, we still lack wellconceived empirical studies comparing constrained parliamentarism with US-style presidentialism. Too much existing scholarship focuses on single countries, or relies on "foreign" cases but only in a highly selective and anecdotal fashion. Until we have more properly designed comparative studies, however, it seems inaccurate to assume a priori that core institutional features of US presidential democracy are well equipped to tackle the many challenges at hand. As I have tried to argue here, a great deal of initial evidence suggests that this simply is not the case. Admittedly, every variety of liberal democracy confronts structural tendencies favoring the augmentation of executive power: many of the social and economic roots (e.g., social acceleration) of executive-centered crisis govemment represent more-or-less universal phenomena, likely to rattle even well-designed constitutional systems. One can also easily imagine that in decades to come, extreme "natural" catastrophes— increasingly misnamed, because of their links to human-based climate change— justifying declarations of martial law or states of emergency will proliferate, providing novel possibilities for executives to expand their authority.^° So it would be naive to expect any easy constitutional or political-institutional fix. However, this sobering reality should not lead us to abandon creative institutional thinking. On the contrary, it arguably requires of us that we try to come up with new institutional models, distinct both from existing US-style presidentialism and parliamentarism, constrained or otherwise.

#### Covert action means no solvency

Lohmann 13 **(**Julia, director of the Harvard Law National Security Research Committee, BA in political science from the University of California, Berkeley, “Distinguishing CIA-Led from Military-Led Targeted Killings,” <http://www.lawfareblog.com/wiki/the-lawfare-wiki-document-library/targeted-killing/effects-of-particular-tactic-on-issues-related-to-targeted-killings/>)

The U.S. military—in particular, the Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and its subsidiary entity, the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)—is responsible for carrying out military-led targeted killings.¶ Military-led targeted killings are subject to various legal restrictions, including a complex web of statutes and executive orders. For example, because the Covert Action Statute does not distinguish among institutions undertaking covert actions, targeted killings conducted by the military that fall within the definition of “covert action” set forth in 50 U.S.C. § 413(b) are subject to the same statutory constraints as are CIA covert actions. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e). However, as Robert Chesney explains, many military-led targeted killings may fall into one of the CAS exceptions—for instance, that for traditional military activities—so that the statute’s requirements will not always apply to military-led targetings. Such activities are exempted from the CAS’s presidential finding and authorization requirements, as well as its congressional reporting rules.¶ Because such unacknowledged military operations are, in many respects, indistinguishable from traditional covert actions conducted by the CIA, this exception may provide a “loophole” allowing the President to circumvent existing oversight mechanisms without substantively changing his operational decisions. However, at least some military-led targetings do not fall within the CAS exceptions, and are thus subject to that statute’s oversight requirements. For instance, Chesney and Kenneth Anderson explain, some believe that the traditional military activities exception to the CAS only applies in the context of overt hostilities, yet it is not clear that the world’s tacit awareness that targeted killing operations are conducted (albeit not officially acknowledged) by the U.S. military, such as the drone program in Pakistan, makes those operations sufficiently overt to place them within the traditional military activities exception, and thus outside the constraints of the CAS.¶ Chesney asserts, however, that despite the gaps in the CAS’s applicability to military-led targeted killings, those targetings are nevertheless subject to a web of oversight created by executive orders that, taken together, largely mirrors the presidential authorization requirements of the CAS. But, this process is not enshrined in statute or regulation and arguably could be changed or revoked by the President at any time. Moreover, this internal Executive Branch process does not involve Congress or the Judiciary in either ex ante or ex post oversight of military-led targeted killings, and thus, Philip Alston asserts, it may be insufficient to provide a meaningful check against arbitrary and overzealous Executive actions.

## Pakistan

### 2NC Terror Defense

#### This impact is a joke – 1NC Mueller takes out the entire advantage

#### Your impact is all threat inflation and fearmongering – the newest data from al qaeda computers prove no time, money, or motive to make a nuke and use it – it’s too difficult – transporting nukes without letting anyone know is impossible

#### Even if there is an attack – it would be small scale and disorganized

Mueller and Stewart 12 [John Mueller is Senior Research Scientist at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Adjunct Professor in the Department of Political Science, both at Ohio State University, and Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute in Washington, D.C. Mark G. Stewart is Australian Research Council Professorial Fellow and Professor and Director at the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at the University of Newcastle in Australia, “The Terrorism Delusion”, International Security, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Summer 2012), pp. 81–110]

Calculating the Costs of the Counterterrorism Delusion Delusion is a quality that is difficult to quantify. Nevertheless, there may be a way to get a sense of its dimensions—or at least of its cost consequences. We have argued that terrorism is a limited problem with limited consequences and that the reaction to it has been excessive, and even delusional. Some degree of effort to deal with the terrorism hazard is, however, certainly appropriate—and is decidedly not delusional. The issue then is a quantitative one: At what point does a reaction to a threat that is real become excessive or even delusional? At present rates, as noted earlier, an American’s chance of being killed by terrorism is one in 3.5 million in a given year. This calculation is based on history (but one that includes the September 11 attacks in the count), and things could, of course, become worse in the future. The analysis here, however, suggests that terrorists are not really all that capable, that terrorism tends to be a counterproductive exercise, and that September 11 is increasingly standing out as an aberration, not a harbinger. Moreover, it has essentially become officially accepted that the likelihood of a large-scale organized attack such as September 11 has declined and that the terrorist attacks to fear most are ones that are small scale and disorganized.66 Attacks such as these can inflict painful losses, of course, but they are quite limited in their effect and, even if they do occur, they would not change the fatality risk for the American population very much.

## Norms

### 2NC No Modeling

#### Perceived benefits are all that matter

Barry 12 (Tom, the Director of the TransBorder Project at the Center for International Policy, “Drone Proliferation: Other Chapters and Other Challenges,” 1-17-12, http://www.cato-unbound.org/2012/01/17/tom-barry/drone-proliferation-other-chapters-other-challenges)

Thus far, in Congress and in the executive branch, we see mostly uncritical advocacy for increased drone deployment—on vivid display at the annual drone fairs sponsored jointly by the House Unmanned Systems Caucus and the Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International.[5]¶ It is widely accepted—in Congress, in the media, and by the public—that drone warfare has been an unqualified success. This perceived success—unsullied by the type of concerns raised by Cortright such as drone blowback—is key in driving drone proliferation around the world and at home. Representative Candice Miller, the Michigan Republican who chairs the Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security of the House Homeland Security Committee, is a self-declared “huge supporter” of UAVs and advocates deploying the “fantastic technology” that the U.S. military uses “in theater” at home.¶ “The UAVs are coming,” declared Miller in a recent oversight hearing, “and now you see our military sitting in a cubicle sometimes in Nevada, drinking a Starbucks, running these things in theater and being incredibly, incredibly successful.”

#### State’s interests trump

Metz 13 (Steven, defense analyst and the author of "Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy." His weekly WPR column, Strategic Horizons, appears every Wednesday 27 Feb 2013 World Politics Review “Strategic Horizons: The Strategy Behind U.S. Drone Strikes” <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12747/strategic-horizons-the-strategy-behind-u-s-drone-strikes>)

Both of these arguments are shaky. There is little or no evidence that nations facing a serious enemy base their response on U.S. actions. States do what they feel they have to do. The implication that if the United States did not use drones against insurgents other nations would not simply defies common sense. On the second point, there is no doubt that drone strikes create anger. Unfortunately, this does tend to be directed at the United States rather than at the extremists who elected to use human shields in the first place. But again there is no evidence that a significant number of potential terrorists or terrorist supporters were motivated exclusively or primarily by American drone strikes.

#### Restrictions won’t be modeled- precedent already set

Jacobson 13 **(**Mark R., senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. From 2009 to 2011, he served with NATO’s International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, “Column: Key Assumptions About Drones Are Based on Misconceptions,” http://www.vnews.com/opinion/4393278-95/drones-drone-armed-civilian]

Armed drones are neither as simple as model airplanes nor as complex as high-performance fighter jets. Of course, a remote-controlled helicopter that you can build in your garage is certainly not as capable as the $26.8 million MQ-9 Reaper, the primary U.S. hunter-killer drone. But drones are much less expensive than fighter aircraft, and in an age of increasing austerity, it is tempting for nations to consider replacing jets with drones. More than 50 countries operate surveillance drones, and armed drones will quickly become standard in military arsenals. The challenge is to consider what international rules, if any, should govern the use of armed drones. The United States is setting the precedent; our approach may define the global rules of engagement. Of course, we cannot expect other nations to adopt the oversight and restrictions we have. What doors are we opening for other nations’ use of drones? What happens when terrorist groups acquire them? The United States must prepare for being the prey, not just the predator.

#### US drone model is irrelevant

Wittes and Singh 12 (Benjamin, a Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution where he co-directs the Harvard Law School-Brookings Project on Security and Law, specializes in the legal issues surrounding international security and the war on terrorism, member of the Hoover Institution’s Task Force on National Security and the Law, Ritika, a research assistant on law and national security issues at the Brookings Institution. She graduated with majors in International Affairs and Government from Skidmore College, “Drones Are a Challenge — and an Opportunity,” 1-11-12, <http://www.cato-unbound.org/2012/01/11/benjamin-wittes-ritika-singh/drones-are-challenge-opportunity>)

Yes, as Cortright says, a great many other countries are getting into the drone game too—but this is less because the United States is paving the way than because this logic is obvious to those countries too. And this same logic, combined with the reality that robotic technologies are getting cheaper and easier to acquire even as their power increases, means that proliferation will happen irrespective of what the United States does. Indeed, the question is not whether we will live in a world of highly proliferated technologies of robotic attack. It is whether the United States is going to be ahead of this curve or behind it.

#### No international consensus or over drones – too hard for agreement

Carafano 13 (James Jay, vice president for foreign and defense policy studies @ Heritage, 3/25, “The Future of Drones,” http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-future-drones-8264)

4. Will we get new laws of war? No. The laws of war were written to be agnostic about technology. They do not need to be rewritten when a new capability appears. At most, as in the case of weapons of mass destruction, new regimes might be created to regulate or ban use. But when it comes to drones, there is really nothing exceptional about the technology they employ. Manned weapons systems use the same technologies. Why would you need new rules for one and not the other? Further, even if there was a reason to rewrite the laws of war, it won’t happen anytime soon. The UN has melted down over trying to agree on a conventional arms treaty. It is hard to believe any kind of consensus of drone war will emerge any time soon.

#### US-led norms over weapons fail - nukes prove

Fisher 7 (Jason, Judicial Clerk to the Honorable James O. Browning, United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, "Targeted Killing, Norms, and International Law," 45 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 711, lexis)

n164. Id. That is not to suggest, as realists would, that powerful States may simply impose their norms on others. Thomas, supra note 18, at 8. Prominence is necessary but not sufficient for a norm to succeed and power is an important aspect of norm prominence but it is not solely determinative of it. Florini, supra note 28, at 375. For example, consider the failure of the United States, acting as a norm entrepreneur, to "conventionalize" nuclear weapons and counter the beginnings of the nuclear taboo in the 1950s. Tannenwald, supra note 122, at 7, 23-26.

### 2NC SCS

#### Chaibi –

#### 1. empirics

#### 2. balance of power

#### 3. economics 5.3 trillion of trade

#### 4. scared of the US

#### No East China sea conflict

Rudd, 13 -- Former Prime Minister and Former Foreign Minister, Member, Australian Parliament, interview with Jonathan Tepperman (Kevin, 2013, "The Situation in North Korea and the Future of U.S.-China Relations," http://www.cfr.org/australasia-and-the-pacific/situation-north-korea-future-us-china-relations/p30230)

What ultimately drives this is a -- is a conflicting set of interests between rampant nationalisms on the one hand and, on the other hand, a pragmatic recognition by governments both in Beijing and Tokyo that conflict, for both of them, would be absolutely disastrous and would retard economic growth and stability in the wider region and would further (retard China's ?) -- primacy of China's own economic development objectives. Now, if they're the two competing poles in this debate, both in Tokyo and Beijing, rational foreign policy actors would conclude that rational self-interest and rational economic self-interest would ultimately (prevail ?). As you know, history cautions us against reaching those conclusions. And I think if you've seen the drift in the numbers, both in terms of Sino-Japanese trade numbers and Sino-Japanese investment numbers over the last six to nine months, the impact in real numbers is palpable and measurable in terms of the state of the China-Japan relationship. I think my friends in Beijing, when I have spoken with them, including the military, I think it's fair to say, are working very actively behind the scenes to find face-saving mechanisms by which this can be managed to the point of stability for the period ahead and then put into some longer-term process with the Japanese. However, when I was last in Beijing, which was prior to the -- (audio interference) -- lock-on incident, the -- it was very much a question within the Chinese minds about how one would do that without actually losing face on the national mistakes in the public discourse both about Japan and with Japan.

#### SCS tensions inevitable but no escalation

Meidan 12 -- analyst at Eurasia Group; research includes China's energy and environmental policies, policymaking, Chinese elite politics, and diplomacy; MA in political sciences and East Asian studies from the French Institute of Oriental Languages and Cultures (Michal, 8/7, "Guest post: Why tensions will persist, but not escalate, in the South China Sea," http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2012/08/07/guest-post-why-tensions-will-persist-but-not-escalate-in-the-south-china-sea/#axzz2GsDDT62R)

These tensions are likely to persist. And Beijing is not alone in perpetuating them. Vietnam and the Philippines, concerned with the shifting balance of powers in the region, are pushing their maritime claims more aggressively and increasing their efforts to internationalise the question by involving both ASEAN and Washington. Attempts to come up with a common position in ASEAN have failed miserably but as the US re-engages Asia, it is drawn into the troubled waters of the South China Sea. Political dynamics in China – with a once in a decade leadership transition coming up, combined with electoral politics in the US and domestic constraints for both Manila and Hanoi – all augur that the South China Sea will remain turbulent. No government can afford to appear weak in the eyes of domestic hawks or of increasingly nationalistic public opinions. The risk of a miscalculation resulting in prolonged standoffs or skirmishes is therefore higher now than ever before. But there are a number of reasons to believe that even these skirmishes are unlikely to escalate into broader conflict. First, despite the strong current of assertive forces within China, cooler heads are ultimately likely to prevail. While a conciliatory stance toward other claimants is unlikely before the leadership transition, China’s top brass will be equally reluctant to significantly escalate the situation, since this will send southeast Asian governments running to Washington. Hanoi and Manila also recognize that despite their need for assertiveness to appease domestic political constituencies, a direct confrontation with China is overly risky. Second, military pundits in China also realize that the cost of conflict is too high, since it will strengthen Washington’s presence in the region and disrupt trade flows. And even China’s oil company CNOOC, whose portfolio of assets relies heavily on the South China Sea, is diversifying its interests in other deepwater plays elsewhere, as its attempted takeover of Nexen demonstrates.

#### No SCS conflict

Economist 12 (9/22, "Could Asia really go to war over these?" http://www.economist.com/node/21563316)

Optimists point out that the latest scuffle is mainly a piece of political theatre—the product of elections in Japan and a leadership transition in China. The Senkakus row has boiled over now because the Japanese government is buying some of the islands from a private Japanese owner. The aim was to keep them out of the mischievous hands of Tokyo’s China-bashing governor, who wanted to buy them himself. China, though, was affronted. It strengthened its own claim and repeatedly sent patrol boats to encroach on Japanese waters. That bolstered the leadership’s image, just before Xi Jinping takes over. More generally, argue the optimists, Asia is too busy making money to have time for making war. China is now Japan’s biggest trading partner. Chinese tourists flock to Tokyo to snap up bags and designer dresses on display in the shop windows on Omotesando. China is not interested in territorial expansion. Anyway, the Chinese government has enough problems at home: why would it look for trouble abroad? Asia does indeed have reasons to keep relations good, and this latest squabble will probably die down, just as others have in the past. But each time an island row flares up, attitudes harden and trust erodes. Two years ago, when Japan arrested the skipper of a Chinese fishing boat for ramming a vessel just off the islands, it detected retaliation when China blocked the sale of rare earths essential to Japanese industry.

# 1NR

#### . CP is not object fiat – it doesn’t have the president restrict war power authority – it changes the use of that authority.

#### Even if it is object fiat – it’s justified in this instance - All of the literature is about executive versus legislative authority

#### 7. At worst, reject the argument not the team

#### Conditionality good – multiple tests key to education allows us to examine the affirmative from multiple angles

#### That’s o/w argumentative responsibility – they should take responsibility for policy and discourse

#### And no skew – we could also read 5 disads and 10 T violations – I think getting a cp and k is better

#### Key to fairness – neg ground is terrible this year

#### Stick us with our options

### Overview

#### Impact outweighs –

#### Israeli strikes are the only way to simultaneously trigger economic collapse, international backlash, and nuclear standoff—even if they have defense, crisis synergy overwhelms normal conflict resolution and leads to World War 3 – that’s Reuveny. It also says that the US response independently leads to miscalc due to high alert – draws in all major powers and escalates

#### Also faster – talks are on the brink now and our link is based on Israel’s response to diplomatic progress – none of their impacts are perception based

#### Strikes trigger biological warfare and draw in Russia and China

Morgan 9 (Dennis Ray Morgan, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Yongin Campus - South Korea, Futures, Volume 41, Issue 10, December 2009, Pages 683-693)

This scenario has gained even more plausibility since a January 2007 Sunday Times report [13] of an Israeli intelligence leak that Israel was considering a strike against Iran, using low-yield bunker busting nukes to destroy Iran’s supposedly secret underground nuclear facilities. In Moore’s scenario, non-nuclear neighboring countries would then respond with conventional rockets and chemical, biological and radiological weapons. Israel then would retaliate with nuclear strikes on several countries, including a pre-emptive strike against Pakistan, who then retaliates with an attack not only on Israel but pre-emptively striking India as well. Israel then initiates the ‘‘Samson option’’ with attacks on other Muslim countries, Russia, and possibly the ‘‘anti-Semitic’’ cities of Europe. At that point, all-out nuclear war ensues as the U.S. retaliates with nuclear attacks on Russia and possibly on China as well.11

#### Extinction

Sandberg 8 (Anders Sandberg, is a James Martin Research Fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University; Jason G. Matheny, PhD candidate in Health Policy and Management at Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health and special consultant to the Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center; Milan M. Ćirković, senior research associate at the Astronomical Observatory of Belgrade and assistant professor of physics at the University of Novi Sad in Serbia and Montenegro, 9/8/8, “How can we reduce the risk of human extinction?,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,<http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/how-can-we-reduce-the-risk-of-human-extinction>)

The risks from anthropogenic hazards appear at present larger than those from natural ones. Although great progress has been made in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world, humanity is still threatened by the possibility of a global thermonuclear war and a resulting nuclear winter. We may face even greater risks from emerging technologies. Advances in synthetic biology might make it possible to engineer pathogens capable of extinction-level pandemics. The knowledge, equipment, and materials needed to engineer pathogens are more accessible than those needed to build nuclear weapons. And unlike other weapons, pathogens are self-replicating, allowing a small arsenal to become exponentially destructive. Pathogens have been implicated in the extinctions of many wild species. Although most pandemics "fade out" by reducing the density of susceptible populations, pathogens with wide host ranges in multiple species can reach even isolated individuals. The intentional or unintentional release of engineered pathogens with high transmissibility, latency, and lethality might be capable of causing human extinction. While such an event seems unlikely today, the likelihood may increase as biotechnologies continue to improve at a rate rivaling Moore's Law.

#### Turns case – sets a precedent to delegate authority – draws us into war

**Richman 13** (Sheldon, Counterpunch, “AIPAC's Stranglehold Congress Must Not Cede Its War Power to Israel”, <http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/12/27/congress-must-not-cede-its-war-power-to-israel/>)

The American people should know that pending right now in Congress is a bipartisan bill that would virtually commit the United States to go to war against Iran if Israel attacks the Islamic Republic. “The bill outsources any decision about resort to military action to the government of Israel,” Columbia University Iran expert Gary Sick wrote to Sen. Chuck Schumer (D-NY) in protest, one of the bill’s principal sponsors. The mind boggles at the thought that Congress would let a foreign government decide when America goes to war, so here is the language (PDF): If the government of Israel is compelled to take military action in legitimate self-defense against Iran’s nuclear weapon program, the United States Government should stand with Israel and provide, in accordance with the law of the United States and the constitutional responsibility of Congress to authorize the use of military force, diplomatic, military and economic support to the Government of Israel in its defense of its territory, people and existence. This section is legally nonbinding, but given the clout of the bill’s chief supporter outside of Congress — the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC [PDF]), leader of the pro-Israel lobby — that is a mere formality. Since AIPAC wants this bill passed, it follows that so does the government of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who opposes American negotiations with Iran and has repeatedly threatened to attack the Islamic Republic. Against all evidence, Netanyahu insists the purpose of Iran’s nuclear program is to build a weapon with which to attack Israel. Iran says its facilities, which are routinely inspected, are for peaceful civilian purposes: the generation of electricity and the production of medical isotopes. The bill, whose other principal sponsors are Sen. Robert Menendez (D-NJ) and Sen. Mark Kirk (R-IL), has a total of 26 Senate cosponsors. If it passes when the Senate reconvenes in January, it could provoke a historic conflict between Congress and President Obama, whose administration is engaged in negotiations with Iran at this time. Aside from declaring that the U.S. government should assist Israel if it attacks Iran, the bill would also impose new economic sanctions on the Iranian people. Obama has asked the Senate not to impose additional sanctions while his administration and five other governments are negotiating with Iran on a permanent settlement of the nuclear issue. A six-month interim agreement is now in force, one provision of which prohibits new sanctions on Iran. “The [Menendez-Schumer-Kirk] bill allows Obama to waive the new sanctions during the current talks by certifying every 30 days that Iran is complying with the Geneva deal and negotiating in good faith on a final agreement,” Ali Gharib writes at Foreign Policy magazine. That would effectively give Congress the power to undermine negotiations. As Iran’s foreign minister, Javad Zarif, told Time magazine, if Congress imposes new sanctions, even if they are delayed for six months, “The entire deal is dead. We do not like to negotiate under duress.” Clearly, the bill is designed to destroy the talks with Iran, which is bending over backward to demonstrate that its nuclear program has no military aims.

### U – 2NC – Top Shelf

#### 1NC Leverett says that even though the bill might pass, he’ll veto and use his political capital with Democrats to prevent an override – it will be a tough fight against the Israel lobby but with sustained pressure, he’ll win.

#### All our uniqueness args interact tightly with our war powers links –

#### Vote counts go our way – reasoning behind them is that Democrats are afraid to challenge Obama on national security ---the plan signals a break in that thinking

Rosner 1/23 (Shmuel Rosner, editor, writer and researcher based in Tel Aviv; Senior Political Editor for the Jewish Journal, 1/23/14, “Why Israel Should Worry about the Failure to Pass another Iran Sanctions Bill,” http://www.jewishjournal.com/rosnersdomain/item/why\_israel\_should\_worry\_about\_the\_failure\_to\_pass\_another\_iran\_sanctions\_bi)

There are two ways of looking at the current map of expectations and calculations regarding a new Iran sanctions bill: one is mathematical, the other one focuses on trends rather than numbers.¶ Looking at the numbers makes sense, as the vote is ultimately about numbers. Can the bill pass? Can it withstand a Presidential veto? These are the important questions. To answer them, using the approach taken by Greg Sargent and Ron Kampeas can be helpful. According to their counts “19 members of the Senate Democratic caucus opposed to a vote, versus 15 who might be assumed to support one, with 21 not accounted for”. This teaches us that “although 58 senators have co-sponsored the proposed legislation that would tighten the restrictions on doing business with the tyrannical Islamist regime”, as Jonathan Tobin writes, “the Obama administration seems to have acquired the upper hand in the battle”. There will not be enough votes to overcome a veto. And if the count keeps coming down as it has in recent days, there might not be enough votes to pass a bill in the Senate (the House is another story).¶ Looking only at the numbers is a mistake, though, as the more troubling picture arises when one looks at the trends behind those numbers.¶ Legislators seem very reluctant to challenge the Obama administration on matters of national security and foreign affairs. This can’t be good for an Israeli government that finds a much more sympathetic ear on the Hill than in the white House.

Obama’s political capital is holding Dems in line because Obama’s framing opposition around the idea that the Executive should be free from restrictions in foreign policy---the plan’s a loss on the vital argument

VOA 1/23 (Voice of America News, 1/23/14, “Support Slipping for Iran Sanctions in US Senate,” http://www.voanews.com/content/support-slipping-for-iran-sanctions-in-senate/1836453.html)

More Democratic senators are quietly signaling their opposition to a bill that spells out new sanctions against Iran if negotiations to limit the country’s nuclear program do not yield a final accord. The bill retains bipartisan support in both houses of Congress, but passage is seen as increasingly unlikely in the Democratic-led Senate amid an intense lobbying effort by the Obama administration to hold off on sanctions while international negotiations proceed. Senators Patty Murray and Elizabeth Warren are the latest Democrats to announce their opposition to the Iran sanctions bill currently before Congress. In a letter to constituents in Washington state, Murray said “the administration should be given time to negotiate a strong verifiable comprehensive agreement” on Iran’s nuclear program. At the same time, she pledged to work “to swiftly enact sanctions” if the talks ultimately fail. Similarly, a spokeswoman for Warren says the Massachusetts senator “does not support imposing additional sanctions through new legislation while diplomatic efforts to achieve a long-term agreement are ongoing.” The sanctions bill has 16 Democratic co-sponsors, near-unanimous support among Republicans, and the backing of politically potent pro-Israeli U.S. lobbying groups. But 11 Senate committee chairs, including Murray, currently oppose the bill. Among Democrats who signed on to the measure late last year, some have grown less vocal in their defense and promotion of the measure in recent weeks. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid has neither explicitly promised a vote on the bill, nor ruled it out. Congressional expert William Galston of the Brookings Institution says pressure from President Barack Obama appears to be swaying a growing number of Democratic lawmakers. “The White House is determined to prevent this from happening," he said. "The administration believes in the marrow of its bones that the executive branch is the lead negotiator in the matter and that it deserves a chance to conduct its own foreign policy." Iran says any new sanctions would violate last year’s interim nuclear accord and spell the end of negotiations. The White House has promised a presidential veto of any sanctions Congress may pass before negotiations run their course.

#### Assumes their lobe evidence – terrible doesn’t say pc just says dems are holding off – that’s our story

#### It’s losing steam

Johnson 1/29 (Luke – Huffington Post, “Senate Democrats Back Off Iran Sanctions Vote”,, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/29/senate-democrats-iran-vote\_n\_4688110.html)

WASHINGTON -- A controversial Iran sanctions bill is losing steam in the Senate, where at least three of its own Democratic cosponsors are warning that pushing the legislation now could thwart delicate international negotiations. "Now is not the time for a vote on the Iran sanctions bill," Sen. Chris Coons (D-Del.) said at a Wednesday event hosted by Politico. Coons said he still supports the measure, which would increase sanctions on Iran unless its government agrees to restrictions on its programs that go far beyond the demands of any of the countries involved in the talks. But he acknowledged that moving the bill now would interfere with a deal in place between Iran and six world powers, including the United States. Under that six-month deal, Iran has agreed to scale back its uranium enrichment in exchange for sanctions relief. Iranian leaders have already warned that congressional action involving new sanctions would sink the current deal, which would leave the U.S. with few options for resolving concerns with Iran other than going to war."I think, to the extent that we simply excite the distance and the tension between the Congress and administration on this, that doesn't serve our shared view of making certain that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapons capability," Coons said. Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand (D-N.Y.), a cosponsor of the sanctions bill, said in a statement to HuffPost on Wednesday, “After speaking with the President, I am comfortable giving him the additional time requested before this bill goes to the floor." Sen. Joe Manchin (D-W.Va.) echoed those sentiments Tuesday night. "I did not sign it with the intention that it would ever be voted upon or used upon while we were negotiating," Manchin said on MSNBC. "I signed it because I wanted to make sure the president had a hammer if he needed it and showed them how determined we were to do it and use it if we had to." He added that it’s better to "give peace a chance." The shifts signal a slowing in momentum for the bill among Democrats, who have faced a full-court press from a number of top administration officials, including President Barack Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry. During Tuesday night’s State of the Union address, Obama vowed to veto the bill if it landed on his desk and urged Congress to let international talks play out.

#### Pressure is causing Dems to back off

Jersualem Post 1/30 (“Obama marks initial success in keeping new Iran sanctions away”, 2014, http://www.jpost.com/Iranian-Threat/News/Obama-marks-success-in-keeping-new-sanctions-away-339824)

US President Barack Obama has succeeded in convincing several Democratic members of Congress not to push for immediate passage of a new sanctions bill on Iran, AFP reported on Thursday. The senators who were pushing for new sanctions against Iran backed off their stance following Obama's State of the Union address on Tuesday, in which he threatened to veto any such bill. Related: The measure to impose new sanctions reportedly had 59 likely votes, including of 16 Democrats. Senator Richard Blumenthal, a Connecticut Democratic, told AFP that he too backed down after feeling more comfortable with the current interim deal that was signed in Geneva on November 24 between Iran and six world powers. "I am strongly supporting the bill but I think a vote is unnecessary right now as long as there's visible and meaningful progress" Blumenthal said. Democratic Senator Chris Coons echoed Blumenthal, saying "now is not the time for a vote on an Iran sanctions bill." The White House has been pushing to stop such a measure from passing, fearing the that new sanctions would impede the diplomatic process that proved temporarily successful in Geneva. The Obama Administration's move against sanctions came as an annual US intelligence assessment was presented to the Senate Intelligence Committee on Wednesday.

#### PC means veto override – lobbying efforts prove

**Kampeas 1/24** (Ron – Washington, D.C. bureau chief of the Jewish Telegraphic Agency , Heritage Florida Jewish News, “Iran sanctions have majority backing in Senate, but not enough to override veto”

<http://www.heritagefl.com/story/2014/01/24/news/iran-sanctions-have-majority-backing-in-senate-but-not-enough-to-override-veto/2115.html>

WASHINGTON (JTA)—More than half the United States Senate has signed on to a bill that would intensify sanctions against Iran. But in a sign of the so-far successful effort by the White House to keep the bill from reaching a veto-busting 67 supporters, only 16 Democrats are on board. The number of senators cosponsoring the bill, introduced by Sens. Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) and Robert Menendez (D-N.J.), reached 58 this week, up from just 33 before the Christmas holiday break. Notably only one of the 25 who signed up in recent days—Sen. Michael Bennet (D-Colo.)—is a Democrat, a sign of intense White House lobbying among Democrats to oppose the bill. Backers of the bill say it would strengthen the U.S. hand at the negotiations. But President Obama has said he would veto the bill because it could upend talks now underway between the major powers and Iran aimed at keeping the Islamic Republic from obtaining a nuclear bomb. A similar bill passed this summer by the U.S. House of Representatives had a veto-proof majority. On Thursday, the White House said backers of the bill should be upfront about the fact that it puts the United States on the path to war. “If certain members of Congress want the United States to take military action, they should be up front with the American public and say so,” Bernadette Meehan, the National Security Council spokeswoman, said in a statement posted by The Huffington Post. “Otherwise, it’s not clear why any member of Congress would support a bill that possibly closes the door on diplomacy and makes it more likely that the United States will have to choose between military options or allowing Iran’s nuclear program to proceed.” A number of pro-Israel groups, led by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, are leading a full-court press for the bill’s passage, with prominent Jewish leaders in a number of states making calls and writing letters to holdouts. Dovish Jewish groups such as J Street and Americans for Peace Now oppose the bill.

#### Obama is the difference right now – passage unlikely

**Dyer 1/14** (Geoff – Washington Bureau for the Financial Times , “Barack Obama steps up lobby against new Iran sanctions bill” Financial Times, <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9a9a045c-7d44-11e3-a579-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2qfrkluW5>)

President Barack Obama has summoned Senate Democrats to the White House for a rare meeting on Wednesday as he seeks to head off a congressional rebellion that he fears could undermine his efforts at diplomacy with Iran. Just as US diplomats begin final-stage talks with Iran over its nuclear programme, Mr Obama is stepping up his intense lobbying within his own party to prevent Congress from passing new Iran sanctions legislation. At present, 16 Democrats are among the 59 senators who have sponsored a bill that would impose swingeing new restrictions on Iranian oil exports if Tehran violates the interim nuclear agreement that was finalised at the weekend. Iran has threatened to pull out of the talks if the bill is passed. Coming during one of the most difficult periods of his presidency, Mr Obama’s efforts to pressure Senate Democrats could become a defining moment in his often troubled relationship with Congress. Although Mr Obama has threatened to veto the legislation, 67 votes in the Senate would overcome a veto. Support in the House of Representatives is also expected to be vetoproof. At the same time, the sanctions bill is putting many Democrats in a delicate position at the start of an election year. The legislation is being pushed strongly by pro-Israel lobby groups, such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, which are influential among some party donors. Yet opinion polls show that Mr Obama’s diplomacy towards Iran is very popular among voters, especially Democrats.

#### Sanctions supports don’t have a veto-proof majority

Reuters 1/7 “Iran sanctions bill gains backers in Senate,” Israel Hayom, http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter\_article.php?id=14563

The Nuclear Weapon-Free Iran Act had about 48 co-sponsors in the 100-member Senate on Monday, up from 26 when the bill was introduced on Dec. 19, an Senate aide said.¶ "Expect that number to keep growing over next couple of days as folks who were out of town and staff get back in," the aide said.¶ The bill was introduced by Robert Menendez, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Mark Kirk, a Republican from Illinois.¶ "We expect several Democrats to kind of cross the picket line and come on board this week," the aide said.¶ While the bill has gained support, it remains uncertain if backers can put together the two-thirds majority in the Senate needed to override a veto by President Barack Obama.¶ The Obama administration has insisted the bill would damage delicate talks being held between Iran and world powers over the nuclear program. Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Zarif has said a new sanctions law would kill the interim agreement.¶ While senior Democrats in the Senate such as Menendez, from New Jersey, and Charles Schumer, from New York, support the new sanctions, there is a strong bloc of opposition in the party. Ten Democratic senators, all leaders of committees, sent a letter to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid last month expressing their opposition to the bill.

#### Err neg on veto overrides---they’re intrinsically unlikely, but Leverett says it’s still possible now---means we control uniqueness but it doesn’t overwhelm

Lindsay 13 **(**James, Senior Vice President, Director of Studies, and Maurice R. Greenberg Chair at the Council on Foreign Relations“Will Congress Overrule Obama’s Iran Nuclear Deal?” <http://blogs.cfr.org/lindsay/2013/11/25/will-congress-overrule-obamas-iran-nuclear-deal/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+jlindsay+%28James+M.+Lindsay%3A+The+Water%27s+Edge%29>)

Does this mean that Congress is going to take Iran policy out of Obama’s hands? Not quite. Any sanctions bill could be vetoed, something the president presumably would do to save his signature diplomatic initiative. The odds that sanctions proponents could override a veto aren’t good. Congress hasn’t overridden one in foreign policy since it imposed anti-apartheid sanctions on South Africa over Ronald Reagan’s objections back in 1986. In that respect, Obama is in a much stronger position than he was back in September when he sought to persuade Congress to authorize a military strike on Syria. Then the difficulties of passing legislation worked against him; now they work for him. One reason Obama should be able to make a veto stick is party loyalty. Many congressional Democrats won’t see it in their interest to help Republicans rebuke him, and he only needs thirty-four senators to stand by him. Senator Reid has already begun to soften his commitment to holding a sanction vote. As Majority Leader he has considerable freedom to slow down bills and to keep them from being attached to must-pass legislation that would be politically hard for Obama to veto.

### Uniqueness outweighs the link

#### Political capital frames this debate – it changed momentum but it’s still possible for a veto-override to occur

Millstein 1/29 (Seth, “Iran Sanctions In Trouble After Obama’s State of the Union Veto Threat”, 2014, http://www.bustle.com/articles/14090-iran-sanctions-in-trouble-after-obamas-state-of-the-union-veto-threat)

For anyone who doubts the power of the bully pulpit, here’s one reason not to. Earlier this month, it was reported that a new Iran sanctions bill was all but assured passage in the Senate. On Tuesday, President Obama announced in his State of the Union address Tuesday that if Congress passes that bill, he’ll veto it. Less than a day later, three Democrats who’d cosponsored that very bill suddenly reversed course and said that well, maybe it’s not so important to pass new sanctions right now after all. On Tuesday night, Joe Manchin told MSNBC that he’d like to “give peace a chance,” and didn’t support voting on the bill while the U.S.’s negotiations with Iran were still ongoing. When asked about the legislation in an interview Wednesday, Chris Coons said that “now is not the time for a vote on the Iran sanctions bill,” and the same day, Kirsten Gillibrand said that,“[a]fter speaking with the President, I am comfortable giving him the additional time requested before this bill goes to the floor.” This is a drastic turnaround from early January, when the bill’s supporters were boasting of a veto-proof majority. They’ve been saying this whole time that the legislation merely gives the White House the option to impose new sanctions if negotiations fail, but it’s actually much harsher than that. For example, the bill would require that the new sanctions go into place unless Obama himself can certify that Iran has never, directly or indirectly, at any point in the country’s history, supported a proposed or actualized terrorist attack against the United States. One could make a decent case that that’s already an impossible qualification to fulfill. Regardless of its contents, the very passage of any new sanctions bill would almost certainly drive Iran from the negotiating table and undo the many months of slow but steady diplomacy between the two countries. While it’s still possible that the bill’s supporters will round up enough votes for a veto-proof majority, that seems distinctly less likely now

#### Vote counts go neg – there aren’t 34 no votes so veto override can still occur

Wiegel 1/29 (David, “How Hubris (and J Street) Stalled the Iran Sanctions Bill”, 2014, http://www.slate.com/blogs/weigel/2014/01/29/how\_hubris\_and\_j\_street\_stalled\_the\_iran\_sanctions\_bill.html?wpisrc=burger\_bar)

The pressure didn't work; the fightback was on. Both Flake and Paul maintained neutrality, as more Democrats were quoted opposing the sanctions bill, if only for reasons of timing, wanting to let negotiations play out. Democrats like Coons and New Jersey Sen. Cory Booker were pressured from the left on social media. There still aren't 34 confirmed "no" votes on the legislation, but the campaign to make Harry Reid hold a vote on a winning resolution is over. For the moment.

#### That effort is successful in convincing Senate Democrats now – Obama’s personal credibility is reducing the influence of the lobby

**Dreyfus, 11/13/13** (Bob, The Nation, “Did the Israel Lobby Agree to Hold Off on New Iran Sanctions?”

<http://www.thenation.com/blog/177144/did-israel-lobby-agree-hold-new-iran-sanctions>

Today the leaders of the US negotiating team are on Capitol Hill, trying to dissuade senators from that sort of outright sabotage. Secretary of State John Kerry, along with Wendy Sherman, are meeting with members of the Senate Banking Committee and others to beg, plead and cajole the Capitol Hill busybodies, many of whom are strongly influenced by the Israel lobby and its chief arm, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. So far, it appears that the Democratic-controlled Senate, despite its AIPAC ties, is willing to go along with White House requests to avoid interfering in the talks. Reports The Wall Street Journal:

Proponents of tougher sanctions could seek avenues beside the Banking Committee to move a measure.… Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D., Nev.) is likely to oppose such a move, however. Mr. Reid on Tuesday warned against attempts to force “extraneous issues” into the debate over the defense bill.

Obama administration officials have been reaching out to a number of lawmakers in recent days to tamp down any momentum for new sanctions. Mr. Kerry has personally spoken with key senators while traveling in recent days, and was to speak to top Senate Democrats on Wednesday.

As for AIPAC itself, it issued a statement saying that it won’t accept any delays in sending a wrecking ball aimed at the talks. “AIPAC continues to support congressional action to adopt legislation to further strengthen sanctions, and there will absolutely be no pause, delay or moratorium in our efforts.”

The comment on “pause, delay or moratorium” follows an effort by the White House, which recently met with American Jewish organizations, to seek exactly that: a moratorium on new anti-Iran sanctions while the talks are underway. As the AP reported on October 29:

The White House has updated Jewish and pro-Israel groups about its talks with Iran amid concerns by some of the groups about the U.S. easing sanctions pressure on Iran over its nuclear program.

The American Israel Public Affairs Committee, the powerful pro-Israel lobbying group, attended the meeting along with the Anti-Defamation League, the American Jewish Committee, and the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations.

The White House’s National Security Council says senior officials told Jewish leaders that the U.S. will not let Iran obtain a nuclear weapon but wants to resolve the nuclear issue through diplomacy.

The Obama administration is asking Congress to hold off on new sanctions while it pursues diplomacy. But Israel and AIPAC are pressing the administration to retain harsh economic sanctions.

That’s tricky for AIPAC, and for Israel. Because if they defy the White House and push aggressively for new sanctions and fail, it will be a major, even unprecedented defeat for AIPAC—plus, it makes outright enemies of the Obama administration and the president himself. Scuttlebutt after the White House meeting suggested that the Jewish groups (AIPAC, the ADL and the AJC) had quietly agreed to allow the negotiations to unfold without the added interference of new sanctions.

Laura Rozen, reporting for Al-Monitor, penned a detailed report on the talks between the White House and the Jewish groups, at which Sherman was joined by Susan Rice, Obama’s national security adviser, and two top White House aides, Antony Blinken and Ben Rhodes.

Following the talks, there was conflicting information about whether or not the Jewish groups (which, collectively, make up the bosses of the Israel lobby) had agreed to a “pause” in their lobbying efforts. According to Haaretz, the liberal Israeli daily, the four groups did indeed agree to a moratorium:

Though they refrained from describing it as “a deal” or a quid pro quo, sources familiar with the meeting said they had agreed to a limited “grace period” only after hearing assurances from the Administration that it had no intention of easing sanctions or of releasing Iranian funds that have been “frozen” in banks around the world.

That was later denied by the same groups, according to The Jerusalem Post:

A report published in Haaretz on Friday claiming that US Jewish leaders have agreed to halt their lobbying efforts in support of a new sanctions bill against Iran has been roundly denied by their organizations.

“No one has given any commitment to make some public moratorium,” said sources with an organization represented at the meeting, “categorically denying” that any such commitment was given.

However, in an on-the-record interview with Haaretz, the ADL’s Abraham Foxman (who attended the White House gathering on October 29) confirmed the cease-fire:

ADL National Director Abe Foxman has confirmed that leaders of major Jewish organizations have agreed on a limited “time out” during which they will not push for stronger sanctions on Iran.

“That means that we are not lobbying for additional sanctions and we are not lobbying for less sanctions,” Foxman told Haaretz, as well as US media outlets.

Foxman was responding to a report in Haaretz on Friday that cited understandings reached among the leaders of four major Jewish organizations who participated in a Monday meeting at the White House with a group of senior White House officials led by National Security Adviser Susan Rice.

Foxman was specific, too:

Foxman made clear, however, that the hiatus is only tactical in nature. “We still believe that sanctions have worked and that additional sanctions would also work,” Foxman said, “but the Administration feels otherwise. They believe that further sanctions at this time would harm prospects for a diplomatic solution.”

“We didn’t change our positions and they didn’t change their positions. But we’re not going to be out there before the end of the next two meetings of the P5+1 with Iran.”

The risk for the Israel lobby is enormous. If it tries to wreck the talks and fails, because members of Congress—especially Democrats in the Senate—sanely agree to postpone a new round of sanctions, it will look powerless and ineffective. So it has to tread carefully, all while being pushed, hard, by Netanyahu and Co. in Israel.

According to Politico, Senate Democrats are willing to give the White House room to negotiate:

Banking Committee Chairman Tim Johnson (D-S.D.) said his panel will not draft new economic penalties toward Iran until the Senate has fully digested that briefing. Even then, Johnson said he will defer to his leadership and the White House to give him the green light. …

Two members of Democratic leadership, Sens. Patty Murray of Washington and Chuck Schumer of New York, both said they remain undecided on pursuing new sanctions and will continue to talk to top administration brass.

#### Veto override is still possible

Buonomo 1/30 (Thomas, “Americans Must Exercise Their Power to Check Congress on Iran Sanctions “, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/thomas-j-buonomo/americans-must-exercise-t\_b\_4699196.html)

In spite of the United States' unprecedented opportunity to reach a negotiated settlement with the Iranian government over its nuclear program, both Republicans and Democrats in Congress are determined to push ahead with sanctions, with 59 of 100 Senators co-sponsoring a bill that would undermine diplomacy if passed. President Obama vowed during his State of the Union speech to veto the bill if it passes but Congress could override his veto with a two-thirds majority of votes in the Senate (67 of 100) and more bellicose House (290 of 435), which passed its own bill last year and would almost certainly support the Senate bill. While two senators may be withdrawing their co-sponsorship of the legislation, the situation remains precarious. Iran in November agreed for the next six months to cap enrichment of its uranium to a level that could not be used to produce nuclear weapons, to open nuclear facilities previously inaccessible to IAEA inspectors, and to allow daily inspections at these sites. In return the Obama administration agreed to provide limited sanctions relief that could be quickly reversed if Iran breaks the terms of the deal. On January 20, Iran began implementation of this interim nuclear agreement, intended to allow time and political space for negotiations on a comprehensive deal planned to resume in mid-February. Many legislators, however, are attempting to force the Obama administration's hand on additional sanctions out of a mistaken belief that increasing economic pressure now will strengthen the U.S. negotiating position. Others appear to want to sabotage diplomacy altogether and use the pressure of sanctions to goad Iranian citizens to attempt an overthrow of their government.

#### Obama is using his political capital to be successful – the fight isn’t over

Collinson 1/29 (Stephen, “Obama repels new Iran sanctions push... for now”, 2014, http://news.yahoo.com/obama-repels-iran-sanctions-push-now-032127269.html)

Washington (AFP) - President Barack Obama appears to have prevailed, for now, in a campaign to stop Congress from imposing new sanctions on Iran he fears could derail nuclear diplomacy. Several Democratic senators who previously backed a bipartisan sanctions bill publicly stepped back after Obama threatened a veto during his State of the Union address Tuesday. Several sources familiar with behind-the-scenes maneuvring say a number of other Democratic senators signed up for more sanctions had privately recoiled from a damaging vote against their own president. According to some counts in recent weeks, the measure had 59 likely votes, including 16 Democrats, and was even approaching a two-thirds veto-proof majority in the 100-seat Senate. But latest developments appear to have checked that momentum. "I am strongly supporting the bill but I think a vote is unnecessary right now as long as there's visible and meaningful progress" in the Iran negotiations, Senator Richard Blumenthal told AFP, after expressing reservations earlier this month. Democratic Senator Chris Coons made a similar declaration at a post-State of the Union event hosted by Politico. "Now is not the time for a vote on an Iran sanctions bill," he said. Another Democratic Senator, Joe Manchin, hopes Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid will not bring it up. "I did not sign it with the intention that it would ever be voted upon or used upon while we're negotiating," Manchin told MSNBC television. "I signed it because I wanted to make sure the president had a hammer if he needed it and showed him how determined we were to do it and use it if we had to." The White House mounted an intense campaign against a bill it feared would undermine Tehran's negotiators with conservatives back home or prompt them to ditch diplomacy. Obama aides infuriated pro-sanctions senators by warning the measure could box America into a march to war to halt Tehran's nuclear program if diplomacy died. The campaign included a letter to Reid from Democratic committee chairs urging a vote be put off. Another letter was orchestrated from a group of distinguished foreign policy experts. Multi-faith groups weighed in and coordinated calls from constituents backing Obama on nuclear diplomacy poured into offices of key Democrats. The campaign appears for now to have overpowered the pro-sanctions push by hawkish senators and the Israel lobby, whose doubts on the Iran nuclear deal mirror those of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Senator Johnny Isakson, a Republican co-sponsor of the legislation, said: "It looks like we're kind of frozen in place." Those behind the anti-sanctions campaign though privately concede they may have won a battle, not a war. 'A crucial victory' The push for new sanctions will flare again ahead of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee's (AIPAC) annual conference in March, which Netanyahu is expected to address. It could also recur if the talks with Iran on a final pact extend past the six-month window set by the interim deal. But for now, groups that supported the push against sanctions are jubilant. "This is a major victory, a crucial victory for the American public who don't want to see a war," said Kate Gould of the Friends Committee on National Legislation. But she warned: "There'll be other efforts to try and sabotage the process."

### Link extension

#### Extend Loomis – plan trashes presidential authority by having congress define authority – that’s crucial because it creates the perception that the executive is not in control – that kills obama’s ability to delay iran sanctions – because key democrats will defect because they’ll fear Obama can’t make good on his promises

#### Obama fights the plan – strongly supports war powers

Rana 11 (Aziz – Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, “TEN QUESTIONS: RESPONSES TO THE TEN QUESTIONS”, 2011, 37 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 5099, lexis)

Thus, for many legal critics of executive power, the election of Barack Obama as President appeared to herald a new approach to security concerns and even the possibility of a fundamental break from Bush-era policies. These hopes were immediately stoked by Obama's decision before taking office to close the Guantanamo Bay prison. n4 Over two years later, however, not only does Guantanamo remain open, but through a recent executive order Obama has formalized a system of indefinite detention for those held there and also has stated that new military commission trials will begin for Guantanamo detainees. n5 More important, in ways small and large, the new administration remains committed to core elements of the previous constitutional vision of national security. Just as their predecessors, Obama officials continue to defend expansive executive detention and war powers and to promote the centrality of state secrecy to national security.

#### Clawson makes this claim

#### The Obama team accuses those with whom they disagree of wanting war, posing the issue as: negotiate, or pass the legislation and leave war as the only option. That enrages many in Congress who point out that the administration

#### 1NC Leverett – Says Obama has political capital he is utilizing with Senate Democrats – that’s effective

#### Obama retains political capital on foreign policy

**Ziaberi 1/24**­ (Kourosh – interview with Kaveh Afrasiabi, the author of several books on Iran’s foreign policy and a former advisor of Center for Strategic Research , “Congress New Sanctions Bill Scuttles the Geneva Deal” Iran Review, <http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/Congress-New-Sanctions-Bill-Scuttles-the-Geneva-Deal.htm>)

Q: Can we interpret the conflicts and disputes between the White House and the Congress as a power struggle which has manifested itself in the nuclear standoff? Is it that the complexity of the decision-making hierarchy in the United States has resulted in a conflict between the government and the two chambers of the Congress?

A: Well, certainly this can be viewed from many different angles, such as the ‘checks’ and balance’ and Congressional role in foreign policy, not to mention traditional party politics. Since the Clinton Administration, Congress has organically inserted itself in the Iran policy and even more so during the “Obama era,” as a result of which White House’s moves on Iran are subject to intense congressional scrutiny. But, given Secretary John Kerry’s long tenure in the Senate, compared to the first Obama administration, I would say that the second Obama administration has a greater sway on Congress’s foreign policy input, otherwise the Geneva deal would not have survived the criticisms.

#### Obama fights the plan and saps his political capital – controversy and policy trade-offs

Holman 13 (Kwame, “ACLU, Congress Await Obama's Next Action on Overseas Drone Strikes”, 3/29, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2013/03/aclu-others-await-presidents-next-action-on-overseas-drone-strikes.html)

As the American Civil Liberties Union's chief Washington lobbyist, Chris Anders spends a lot of time with members of Congress and their staffs. But he says no one seems to know when President Barack Obama will fulfill his promise to engage Congress and the public on the controversial use of U.S. drone attacks to kill terror suspects. "I was just in a meeting yesterday with a couple of key congressional staff who've asked the White House if they have a proposal, if they have anything they want to engage on and they got nothing back in response," Anders said by phone Thursday as he rode in a taxi to a Capitol Hill meeting. "The administration has not given Congress any guidance on what [it's] looking for other than a promise that the president would be providing a longer explanation of the targeted killing program and explaining it to the country," said Anders. In October 2012 on The Daily Show, Mr. Obama said of the U.S. drone strike program, "we've got to ... put a legal architecture in place, and we need Congressional help in order to do that, to make sure that not only am I reined in but any president's reined in, in terms of some of the decisions that we're making." The highly secret drone program dates to the George W. Bush administration, but the vast majority of away-from-the-battlefield strikes -- largely in Pakistan and Yemen -- have occurred under Mr. Obama. The strikes have generated anti-American sentiment in both those countries. The New America Foundation counts more than 420 targeted strikes in the last eight years which killed between 2,426 and 3,969 people, overwhelmingly militants, as well as up to 368 civilians. A year ago, after an American-born suspected terrorist, Anwar al-Awlaki, was killed by a U.S. drone in Yemen, Attorney General Eric Holder endorsed the strikes as legally permissible. "The use of force in foreign territory would be consistent with ... international legal principles if conducted, for example, with the consent of the nation involved -- or after a determination that the nation is unable or unwilling to deal effectively with a threat to the United States," Holder said in a speech at the Northwestern University School of Law. "The U.S. government's use of lethal force in self-defense against a leader of al Qaida or an associated force who presents an imminent threat of violent attack would not be unlawful -- and therefore would not violate the Executive Order banning assassination," Holder said. The ACLU's Anders calls that an "elastic" interpretation of self-defense. And the administration has been reluctant to share the specific legal memoranda that certify their assertions. During the confirmation process for new CIA director John Brennan, documents certifying the legality of strikes on Americans on foreign soil were shown to members of the House and Senate Intelligence committees. But Anders says there are six more legal memos that claim perhaps even broader authority to attack non-Americans outside the U.S. that the administration has not shared. The ACLU has sued the government to get them. "What Congress needs to see are the other six legal opinions because if they saw [them] they would have a much better idea of the breadth of the legal authority the president is claiming to use drones and other lethal force away from the battlefield," Anders said. "It's telling that there isn't a single country in the entire world that agrees with the U.S's claims of authority to use lethal force away from the battlefield. So the U.S. is on its own. My guess is if the rest of the legal opinions dealing with non-citizens were publicly disclosed we would find that they're even farther afield from where the law is and ... that is why they haven't been disclosed." In recent weeks, supporters of President Obama, including Senate Majority Whip Dick Durbin, D-Ill., and former Clinton administration official John Podesta, have urged the president to involve Congress and open up about the drone program and its justifications. Meanwhile, fresh polls show the drone strikes are increasingly unpopular with the public, potentially cutting into Mr. Obama's political strength in coming policy battles with Congress.

#### Obama fights the plan and generates targeted killing controversy – opens up criticism of executive abuse

McKelvey 11 (Benjamin – Executive Development Editor on the Editorial Board of the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, “NOTE: Due Process Rights and the Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: The Unconstitutional Scope of Executive Killing Power”, 2011, 44 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 1353, lexis)

A. The Obama Administration's Reassurances Are Circular and Unsatisfactory The Obama Administration has addressed the controversy over targeted killing in an effort to assuage concerns over the program's constitutionality, including concerns over due process protections. n162 However, the Administration's explanations do little but reiterate the gaping hole in guaranteed due process protections if Americans are [\*1374] targeted with lethal force. n163 In fact, the Administration's attempts to justify the current response emphasize the desperate need for a clear articulation of the law and a mechanism for constitutional safeguards. n164 Harold Koh, the Legal Adviser to the Department of State, addressed the criticisms of targeted killing in a speech at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law in March 2010. n165 Koh addressed the concern that "the use of lethal force against specific individuals fails to provide adequate process and thus constitutes unlawful extrajudicial killing." n166 First, he asserted that a state engaged in armed conflict is not required to provide legal process to military targets. n167 Koh then attempted to reassure the critics of targeted killing that the program was conducted responsibly and with precision. n168 He said that the procedures for identifying targets for the use of lethal force are "extremely robust," without providing any explanation or details to substantiate this claim. n169 He then argued that "in my experience, the principles of proportionality and distinction ... are implemented rigorously throughout the planning and execution of lethal operations to ensure that such operations are conducted in accordance with international law." n170 Koh dismissed constitutional claims over targeted killing by simply suggesting that the program is legal and responsible. n171 But this response only begs the question over targeted killing: what mechanisms are in place to prevent the unsafe and irresponsible use of this extraordinary power? Asserting that the program is legal and responsible without substantiating this assertion rests on notions of blind faith in executive prudence and responsibility, and provides no grounds for reassurance. n172 The Obama Administration's assurances regarding the targeted killing program are unsatisfactory because they fail to address the primary concern at issue: the possibility that an unchecked targeted killing power within the Executive Branch is an invitation for abuse. n173 Without some form of independent oversight, there is no mechanism for ensuring the accurate and legitimate use of targeted killings in narrowly tailored circumstances. n174

### Logical policy maker

#### Infinitely regressive – disad is a political cost of the affirmative – that means its intrinsic – that means that the distinction between intrinsic and non-intrinsic is not clear enough to make for good judge decision-making – squeezes out other intrinsic disads

#### And counter-interpretation – the judge is one member in congress – not all of congress – means they do not have control over other bills – only can vote based on their cost benefit analysis – and cost benefit analysis best – it’s how debate works, key to argumentative clash and critical decision-making

### c-o

#### Presidential war power battles expend capital – it’s immediate and forces a trade-off

O’Neil 7 (David – Adjunct Associate Professor of Law, Fordham Law School, “The Political Safeguards of Executive Privilege”, 2007, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 1079, lexis)

a. Conscious Pursuit of Institutional Prerogatives The first such assumption is belied both by first-hand accounts of information battles and by the conclusions of experts who study them. Participants in such battles report that short-term political calculations consistently trump the constitutional interests at stake. One veteran of the first Bush White House, for example, has explained that rational-choice theory predicts what he in fact experienced: The rewards for a consistent and forceful defense of the legal interests of the office of the presidency would be largely abstract, since they would consist primarily of fidelity to a certain theory of the Constitution... . The costs of pursuing a serious defense of the presidency, however, would tend to be immediate and tangible. These costs would include the expenditure of political capital that might have been used for more pressing purposes, [and] the unpleasantness of increased friction with congressional barons and their allies. n182 Louis Fisher, one of the leading defenders of the political branches' competence and authority to interpret the Constitution independently of the courts, n183 acknowledges that politics and "practical considerations" typically override the legal and constitutional principles implicated in information disputes. n184 In his view, although debate about congressional access and executive privilege "usually proceeds in terms of constitutional doctrine, it is the messy political realities of the moment that usually decide the issue." n185 Indeed, Professor Peter Shane, who has extensively studied such conflicts, concludes that their successful resolution in fact depends upon the parties focusing only on short-term political [\*1123] considerations. n186 When the participants "get institutional," Shane observes, non-judicial resolution "becomes vastly more difficult." n187

#### Obama is pushing to delay new Iranian sanctions, but it will be a huge fight and Congress could scuttle a deal

**CBS News, 11/13/13** (“Obama administration seeks time from Congress for Iran diplomacy”

<http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162-57612230/obama-administration-seeks-time-from-congress-for-iran-diplomacy/>

The Obama administration is pleading with Congress to allow more time for diplomacy with Iran, but faces sharp resistance from Republican and Democratic lawmakers determined to further squeeze the Iranian economy and wary of yielding any ground in nuclear negotiations. Back from a week of nuclear talks in Geneva and tense consultations with nervous Middle East allies, Secretary of State John Kerry arrived Wednesday on Capitol Hill to join Vice President Joe Biden in presenting the administration's case to their ex-colleagues in the Senate on Wednesday and ask them to hold off on a package of new, tougher Iran sanctions under consideration. Kerry told reporters as he arrived for the briefing that new sanctions "could be viewed as bad faith by the people we are negotiating with. It could destroy the ability to be able to get an agreement. And it could actually wind up setting us back in dialogue that has taken 30 years to be able to achieve." Still, Kerry added, "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed here." "The fact is, you know, we didn't put sanctions in place for the sake of sanctions; we did it to be able to negotiate, and to negotiate a final agreement," he said. "What we have negotiated, we believe, is a very strong protocol which will restrict Iran's ability to be able to grow its program." A House committee, meanwhile, held a hearing to vent its frustration with Kerry and an Obama administration they believe should adopt a far tougher line with Tehran. "The Iranian regime hasn't paused its nuclear program," said Rep. Ed Royce, a Republican and the House Foreign Affairs Committee chairman. "Why should we pause our sanctions efforts as the administration is pressuring Congress to do?" President Obama's disagreement with many if not most members of Congress concerns tactics, not substance: Each wants to stop Iran from reaching the capacity to produce nuclear weapons, and even hard-line hawks say they'd prefer diplomacy to U.S. military intervention. Almost everyone recognizes that Washington and its partners will have to offer some relief from the punitive measures that have crippled Iran's economy in exchange for concrete Iranian actions to roll back and dismantle elements of the nuclear program. But the road map for achieving what has been a central U.S. foreign policy goal for more than a decade is hotly politicized, with fierce debate over the parameters and sequencing of any deal. The Obama administration has offered Iran an initial opportunity to recoup some of the billions of dollars in frozen overseas assets if it begins the process, while insisting that the most severe restrictions would remain in place until Tehran conclusively eliminates fears that it is trying to assemble an atomic arsenal. Some legislators worry Obama is moving too quickly. Iran maintains that its uranium enrichment is for energy production and medical research, not for any covert military objective. But until the recent election of President Hassan Rouhani, it refused to compromise in talks with world powers. Responding to Rouhani's promise of flexibility, Obama has staked significant international credibility on securing a diplomatic agreement. His telephone chat with Rouhani in September was the first direct conversation between U.S. and Iranian leaders in more than three decades. The unprecedented outreach has angered U.S. allies such as Israel and Saudi Arabia. And lawmakers are deeply skeptical. "This is a decision to support diplomacy and a possible peaceful resolution to this issue," White House press secretary Jay Carney told reporters Tuesday. "The American people justifiably and understandably prefer a peaceful solution that prevents Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, and this agreement, if it's achieved, has the potential to do that. The American people do not want a march to war." The administration sees itself on the cusp of a historic breakthrough, so much so that Obama hastily dispatched Kerry to Switzerland last week for the highest-level nuclear negotiations to date. The talks broke down as Iran demanded formal recognition of what it says is its right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes, and as France sought stricter limits on Iran's ability to make nuclear fuel and on its heavy water reactor to produce plutonium, according to diplomats. Still, officials said significant progress was made. The U.S., Britain, China, France, Germany, Iran and Russia will send top nuclear negotiators back to Geneva next week to see whether they can push the ball forward. And on Wednesday, Obama spoke by telephone with French President Francois Hollande. The two countries "are in full agreement" on Iran, the White House said in a statement. However, the administration is worried Congress could make an agreement more difficult.

### PC Key – 2NC

#### Key to influence

RollCall 1-16 [By Humberto Sanchez; “As Obama Presses Senate, Reid Holds Cards Close on Iran”; 1/16/2014; http://blogs.rollcall.com/wgdb/reid-holds-cards-close-on-iran-as-obama-presses-senate/]

President Barack Obama and his administration are engaged in an all-out press to get the Senate to back off a new round of Iran sanctions which they believe risk unraveling talks and could even prompt war — including a personal appeal to Senate Democrats on Wednesday night. So far, the White House efforts appear to be holding the line, although Sen. Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev., continues to hold his cards close to the vest on when, or whether, he might allow a vote on the bipartisan bill by Sens. Robert Menendez, D-N.J., and Mark S. Kirk, R-Ill., that had been heading toward a veto-proof majority. “He did spend a little time on the Iran issue,” Reid said of the president. “As I said Tuesday … people on both sides of this issue are working in good faith to try to come up with a result that’s favorable result,” Reid said. “The result is going to be the fact the Iran is not going to get a nuclear weapon.” Sen. Charles E. Schumer, D-N.Y., who is a co-sponsor of the bill, said, “We are united in our goal to not have a nuclear Iran and the new agreement is only in effect for a day or two. That’s all I’d say on that.”

#### PC is key – 30 Democratic Senators are in play and open to persuasion

**Sargent 12/20** (Greg – write the Plum Line blog for the Washington Post , “Divide deepens among Democrats on Iran”, 2013, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2013/12/20/divide-deepens-among-democrats-on-iran/>)

That raises an interesting question: What if this bill comes to a vote and goes down in the Senate? Already, Democrats are divided on the push for a new sanctions bill. Senators Robert Menendez and Chuck Schumer are leading the push for the bill, and they have been joined by 11 other Democratic Senators. On the other hand, 10 Dem Senators — all committee chairs — have come out against the sanctions bill, arguing in a letter to Harry Reid that “new sanctions would play into the hands of those in Iran who are most eager to see the negotiations fail.” That leaves at least 30 Dem Senators who may be up for grabs. This means that, in addition to the organizing that Boxer is undertaking, you’re all but certain to see more pressure be brought to bear on Democrats to back off of Congressional action right now. (There is also pressure on them to support the new sanctions bill, but the organizing that’s taking place against it is getting less attention.) As HuffPo reported yesterday, liberal groups like MoveOn and CREDO are already pillorying senators Menendez and Schumer for undermining the negotiations and playing into GOP efforts to fracture Dem unity on Iran. Pressure will probably be brought to bear on undecided Dems, too. Senate aides say they are not ready to predict whether the Iran sanctions bill will or won’t pass. Right now 13 Republicans have signed on to the Menendez-Schumer bill. But you could conceivably see Republican Senators like Rand Paul and Mike Lee, who have been more suspicious of the use of American power abroad than neocons or GOP internationalists have traditionally been, come out against the bill. I’ve asked Senator Paul’s office where he stands and haven’t received an answer. What will he say? There will also be tremendous pressure brought to bear from both sides on Harry Reid, who has yet to say whether he’ll allow it to come to a vote. If more Dems come out against the bill, it will become harder for him to bring it to a vote. It remains very possible that the bill will pass the Senate, and if the White House is right, that could imperil the chances of a long term diplomatic breakthrough. But it’s also possible the bill will fail, which would be a major rebuke to the hawks.

#### And capital is key to that effort – it’s not just about bargaining – it’s about focus – the plan’s expenditure prevents Obama from maintaining a consistent message and it means he’ll lose the ability to ask for favors

**Moore 9/10/13** (Heidi – Guardian's US finance and economics editor. , “Syria: the great distraction” The Guardian, <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/10/obama-syria-what-about-sequester>)

Political capital – the ability to horse-trade and win political favors from a receptive audience – is a finite resource in Washington. Pursuing misguided policies takes up time, but it also eats up credibility in asking for the next favor. It's fair to say that congressional Republicans, particularly in the House, have no love for Obama and are likely to oppose anything he supports. That's exactly the reason the White House should stop proposing policies as if it is scattering buckshot and focus with intensity on the domestic tasks it wants to accomplish, one at a time.

#### Political capital is key to the credibility of the veto threat

**Slezak 7** (Nicole – University of California, Los Angeles , “The Presidential Veto: A Strategic Asset,” <http://www.thepresidency.org/storage/documents/Vater/Slezak.pdf>)

Spitzer states that the veto is the “key presidential weapon,”13 and I suggest that it offers him a strategy to take both the defensive and the offensive against an often divided and combative Congress. The president takes the defensive by waiting for legislation to be sent to him from Congress and then vetoing legislation that is unacceptable and offensive to his administration’s goals. The veto is a way for the president to “go public” and to show his dislike for the legislation through his veto message. In addition, he can prove to Congress that unless they amend the legislation in accordance with his suggestions, he will not pass the bills that they send him. Gattuso speaks on this matter by stating, “The veto, moreover, is a very effective device for grabbing the public’s attention and focusing it on the President’s struggle to pursue policies on behalf of all the people and against special interests. A veto message may be a President’s most effective bully pulpit.”14 However, the veto is more than a tool to block, and the president may also take the offensive by using the veto threat. Aside from the conventional use of the veto (blocking legislation from passing), it can also be used in this more subtle and less potentially damaging way. The veto threat is a special tool that allows the president to warn Congress of a veto before the legislation is even presented to him. The veto threat stems from the power that the veto has built over the centuries and which relies heavily on a president’s possession of political capital. If the president is in the fourth year of his term, when Congress is most likely to be confrontational, the president should not use the veto threat as often as he did in the first year of his term. This is due to the fact that when a president enters office he is riding on the mandate of his election and has a large amount of political capital to spend. This is why Spitzer warns that, “like a veto itself, a threat applied too often loses its potency, and a threat not considered credible is not a threat at all.”15 Once the president makes the decision to make a veto threat and does so, there are four outcomes that are possible. Congress can decide to shape the legislation in a manner that is acceptable to the president so that he will sign it into public law, Congress can construct a compromise with the president and pass an altered bill, the president can give in and sign the bill if Congress sends it unchanged, or neither side can compromise and will lead to Congress passing the bill unchanged and the president vetoing it.16 In order to take advantage of the strategic uses of the veto, both in its defensive and offensive applications, it must be determined what factors lead a president to veto or pass legislation. To do this, I will assess what factors scholars believe influence a president’s decision to veto legislation. To determine if these widely supported factors are important in the president’s decision to veto, they will be tested to determine whether they are statistically significant. Once it is known what factors truly cause the president to veto legislation, and which actually matter, it will help the president create a reliable veto strategy. The veto strategy is a model to help the president assess when the use of the veto will maximize effectiveness. This allows the president to calculate when it is an opportune time to risk political capital and a potential override in order to veto legislation, or when he should avoid losing capital and attempt to bargain with Congress or simply pass legislation.

### Sanctions = Strikes – 2NC

#### The bill shatters international enforcement and greenlights an Israeli strike

Krass 12/31 (Richard Klass, retired USAF Colonel; Lt. General (USA Ret.) Robert Gard, the chairman of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, contributed to this piece, Huffington Post, “The Road to Wars”, 2013, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/richard-klass/the-road-to-wars_b_4524280.html>)

Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has introduced legislation that sets the United States on the road to war with Iran and the road to an internal war within the Democratic Party. The bill (S.1881), which has many Democratic co-sponsors, increases the chances for war in two major ways. First, it undercuts ongoing negotiations to build on the first-step nuclear agreement with Iran by adding additional sanctions before the current six month negotiating period plays out. Iran has threatened to withdraw from these negotiations if a bad faith act, such as adding new sanctions, transpires. The U.S. would do the same if, for example, Iran's parliament passed legislation to open a new nuclear production facility. If the first-step deal collapses, there will be no problem in quickly instituting new sanctions. And there will certainly be calls for military action, no matter how short-term the results would be. But if the collapse is triggered by a U.S. unilateral action, the coalition now enforcing those sanctions could well collapse. This undermining of the president's negotiating authority and international cooperation is as unprecedented as it is dangerous. The second danger in this bill is that it encourages an Israeli attack on Iran. The bill states that "... if the Government of Israel is compelled to take military action in legitimate self-defense against Iran's nuclear weapon program, the United States Government should stand with Israel and provide ..., diplomatic, military, and economic support to the Government of Israel in its defense of its territory, people, and existence...." While the language is "should," not "must," and there are bows to the Constitution and congressional authority, this is a clear signal to Israel that it can count on U.S. support for a "unilateral" air strike. And Iran cannot be blamed if it takes it that way. No one should doubt who will determine if the Iranian program provides an existential threat to Israel. The Israeli government's position is that any enrichment in Iran is such a threat. Yet reaching any agreement with Iran will undoubtedly require some residual domestic enrichment capability. Military experts agree that Israel would need substantial U.S. help for any effective attack. This would include not only intelligence and aerial refueling, but also combat search and rescue for downed Israeli pilots, possible suppression of enemy air defenses and other direct combat missions. In short, war. This language, while not requiring that the U.S. support an Israeli attack, certainly will be taken that way in Israel and Iran. Also, it just might be enough to doom a diplomatic settlement and unleash the dogs of war.

#### New sanctions wreck the deal and cause Israeli strikes

**McGeough, 1/5/14 –** chief foreign correspondent for the Sydney Morning Herald (Paul, “US, Iranian hardliners work to give war a chance” Sydney Morning Herald, <http://www.smh.com.au/comment/us-iranian-hardliners-work-to-give-war-a-chance-20140104-30amw.html>)

They're the congressional hardliners, a bit like the fundamentalists in Iran, who would love to scupper the opening deal agreed in November by Iran and the so-called P5+1 countries, under which Tehran has agreed to a six-month freeze of its nuclear program in return for nominal relief from crippling sanctions. They have dressed up their intervention as a helping hand for the idiots at the negotiating table - the threat of more sanctions is just what is needed, the vandals reckon, to force Iran to cave in. The P5+1 are not to be brushed off lightly. The P5 bit are the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council - the US, Russia, China, France and Britain. The 1 is Germany. You'd think that, if these six could agree tentatively on steps towards fixing an intractable problem, it might be constructive for Congress' bellyachers to have wound down for their postprandial Christmas nap. Instead, in the week before Christmas, more than two dozen senators, from both parties, put up a bill demanding even harsher sanctions on Iran. They have ignored White House pleas and intelligence assessments that their bill, likely to be debated in the next week or so, undermines the chances of a final agreement with Iran. Apart from being against the spirit of the interim deal, under which there would be no new sanctions, the senators' bill also demands that, in any final agreement, Iran must dismantle its uranium enrichment program. But Iranians know their history and there's been nothing well meant in the blows they've been dealt by Washington - the CIA's overthrow of the democratically elected Mosaddegh government in 1953 and the reinstalling of the shah and his SAVAK secret police, American support for Iraq after it began the 1980s war with Iran and former president George W. Bush's inclusion of Iran in his ''axis of evil''. Iranians might be forgiven for thinking the latest sanctions bill in DC is a continuation of that malevolent history. They're not on their own - some thoughtful international commentators and analysts see it that way, too. But, even with all that history, the significantly changed mood in Tehran after Hassan Rouhani's election as president demands that the international community explore all steps short of war to resolve this crisis. Hence there's a conclusion being drawn in some quarters that the Senate push is calculated to make agreement impossible. And, because the senators are opposed to a nuclear Iran, the only conclusion to be drawn is that they want to force President Barack Obama's hand on the military option. There was no surprise then that this ''tit'' by the American senators was met with a ''tat'' from their Iranian counterparts - hardliners who oppose the interim deal and anything that looks like concessions by Iran to the international community. So they have drafted their own legislation to be debated in the Iranian parliament, calling for any new sanctions to be met by an escalation in Iran's uranium enrichment to a near bomb-grade level of 60 per cent. In both countries, we have influential rejectionists who rely on each other to make their worst prognostications believable. Neither side is interested in a diplomatic solution. Citing the respective attitudes to Israel, Bill Keller portrays this self-serving dynamic in his blog for The New York Times: ''To the Iranian hard core, Israel is a nuclear-armed interloper and America's conjoined infidel twin; to their American counterparts, Israel's values and interests are inextricable from our own and Benjamin Netanyahu is a more trustworthy defender of our security than Barack Obama.'' Keller draws a dismal, scary conclusion: ''A failure of negotiations would delight both of them - American hawks because Israel could get on with the business of bombing; Iranian hawks because there's nothing like an attack by the infidels to unify a fractious public behind an authoritarian regime.''

#### Deal will be approved on Iran’s side---Rouhani will overcome conservative opposition

Al-Jazeera 1-7, “Iran's Rouhani defends nuclear deal,” 1/7/14, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/01/iran-rouhani-defends-nuclear-deal-201417113340152307.html

Iran's President Hassan Rouhani has defended a nuclear deal with world powers amid continued domestic criticism.

Rouhani said on Tuesday that the deal, which promises moderate sanction relief in return for temporarily curbing Iran's nuclear drive, would not be derailed by opposition in government.

"It required brave decision-making ... We should not and do not fear the fuss made by the few people or a small percentage", Rouhani said in remarks broadcast live on state television.

"The initial agreement with the six major powers on the nuclear issue was not a simple task but very difficult and complicated," he said.

Rouhani's defence came after repeated criticism by opposition in parliament and the powerful Revolutionary Guards of the deal signed in November.

The agreement requires Iran to roll back parts of its nuclear drive for six months, in exchange for modest sanctions relief and a promise by Western powers not to impose new sanctions.

Critics have primarily questioned if the Islamic Republic benefits from the deal, and if fewer concessions could have been made by the negotiating team, led by Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran's foreign minister.

In recent weeks, elements in the conservative-dominated parliament have sought to form a committee to supervise the negotiating process but to no avail.

However, Rouhani appears to enjoy the backing of supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who retains control of all final decisions regarding the matter.

"In all important and sensitive steps along the way, the supreme leader has backed the government and its policies," Rouhani said.

Iran's economy has been hard hit by international sanctions, while the vital oil exports have been more than halved by US and European embargoes.

The deal - which is yet to come into force- is aimed at creating a window of diplomatic opportunity for Iran and the P5+1 group of world powers, comprising the US, Britain, France, China and Russia plus Germany, to find a lasting solution to the decade-long standoff over Iran's nuclear activities.

In Tehran, meanwhile, legislators are readying a bill that would oblige the government to enrich uranium to 60 percent if Iran is hit by new sanctions.

Talks to remove remaining obstacles before the deal is implemented will resume in Geneva, Switzerland, on Thursday.

#### Hard-liners are on board --- recent change in talk strategy

AP 12/31/13, Associated Press, “Iran Hard-Liners Join Team of Nuclear Negotiators,” ABC News, http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/report-iran-deal-reached-nuclear-details-21379226

Iran has boosted its team in charge of nuclear talks with world powers, adding what are believed to be hard-liners and conservatives in an apparent effort to silence critics of the landmark interim accord reached in Geneva in November.¶ The semi-official news agencies Fars and Mehr reported on Wednesday that new members have joined the high council, which directs strategies in the talks and which is led by the country's moderate President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif.¶ The agencies did not identify the new members, saying only that representatives of "all branches of power and other senior figures" are now on the council.¶ The development comes a day after Iran and Western negotiators reported they were nearing an understanding on the details of implementing the Geneva accord.¶ The deal puts strong limits on Iran's uranium enrichment program in return for an easing of some international sanctions on Tehran for six months while a permanent deal is negotiated. The United States and its allies believe Iran's nuclear program is aimed at producing a nuclear weapon, a claim that Tehran denies, saying it is intended only for peaceful purposes.¶ Over the past month, experts from Iran and the so-called "5+1" countries — the U.S., Britain, France, Russia, China and Germany — have held several rounds of talks in Geneva to work out details on carrying out the agreement. The most recent session was on Monday, and on Tuesday, both sides reported progress in the talks.¶ Rouhani has faced criticism from hard-liners at home over the Geneva deal, with many claiming the contents of the talks were kept secret and that they were excluded from the process. Some have called it a "poison chalice" for Iran.¶ Zarif has defended the process, saying Iran's top leadership had approved the Geneva deal in its entirety ahead of the signing but that the secrecy on the content was necessary to ensure the talks would not be derailed.¶ "The team advising on nuclear negotiations will be strengthened for the next round of talks," prominent hard-line lawmaker Ismaeil Kowsari was quoted by Mehr as saying. "Things were not in our favor in the previous round, as they should have been."¶ Iranian hard-liners believe Tehran has offered too many concessions in return for too little in the Geneva deal. But Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has the final say on all state matters, has backed the nuclear negotiating team, even calling its members "sons of the Revolution."

### Impact – Turns Cred/Coop

#### Failed deal turns credibility which jacks norms and decimates allied coop

**Leverett, 11/10/13 -** senior fellow at the New America Foundation in Washington, D.C. and a professor at the Pennsylvania State University School of International Affairs(Flynt, “Nuclear Negotiations and America’s Moment of Truth About Iran” <http://www.campaigniran.org/casmii/?q=node/13358>)

America’s Iran policy is at a crossroads. Washington can abandon its counterproductive insistence on Middle Eastern hegemony, negotiate a nuclear deal grounded in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and get serious about working with Tehran to broker a settlement to the Syrian conflict. In the process, the United States would greatly improve its ability to shape important outcomes there. Alternatively, America can continue on its present path, leading ultimately to strategic irrelevance in one of the world’s most vital regions—with negative implications for its standing in Asia as well. U.S. policy is at this juncture because the costs of Washington’s post-Cold War drive to dominate the Middle East have risen perilously high. President Obama’s self-inflicted debacle over his plan to attack Syria after chemical weapons were used there in August showed that America can no longer credibly threaten the effective use of force to impose its preferences in the region. While Obama still insists “all options are on the table” for Iran, the reality is that, if Washington is to deal efficaciously with the nuclear issue, it will be through diplomacy. In this context, last month’s Geneva meeting between Iran and the P5+1 brought America’s political class to a strategic and political moment of truth. Can American elites turn away from a self-damaging quest for Middle Eastern hegemony by coming to terms with an independent regional power? Or are they so enthralled with an increasingly surreal notion of America as hegemon that, to preserve U.S. “leadership,” they will pursue a course further eviscerating its strategic position? The proposal for resolving the nuclear issue that Iran’s foreign minister, Javad Zarif, presented in Geneva seeks answers to these questions. It operationalizes the approach advocated by Hassan Rohani and other Iranian leaders for over a decade: greater transparency on Iran’s nuclear activities in return for recognizing its rights as a sovereign NPT signatory—especially to enrich uranium under international safeguards—and removal of sanctions. For years, the Bush and Obama administrations rejected this approach. Now Obama must at least consider it. The Iranian package provides greater transparency on Tehran’s nuclear activities in two crucial respects. First, it gives greater visibility on the conduct of Iran’s nuclear program. Iran has reportedly offered to comply voluntarily for some months with the Additional Protocol (AP) to the NPT—which it has signed but not yet ratified and which authorizes more proactive and intrusive inspections—to encourage diplomatic progress. Tehran would ratify the AP—thereby committing to its permanent implementation—as part of a final deal. Second, the package aims to validate Iran’s declarations that its enrichment infrastructure is not meant to produce weapons-grade fissile material. Iran would stop enriching at the near-20 percent level of fissile-isotope purity needed to fuel the Tehran Research Reactor and cap enrichment at levels suitable for fueling power reactors. Similarly, Iran is open to capping the number of centrifuges it would install—at least for some years—at its enrichment sites in Natanz and Fordo. Based on conversations with Iranian officials and political figures in New York in September (during Rohani and Zarif’s visit to the UN General Assembly) and in Tehran last month, it is also possible to identify items that the Iranian proposal almost certainly does not include. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei has reportedly given President Rohani and his diplomats flexibility in negotiating a settlement—but he has also directed that they not compromise Iran’s sovereignty. Thus, the Islamic Republic will not acquiesce to American (and Israeli) demands to suspend enrichment, shut its enrichment site at Fordo, stop a heavy-water reactor under construction at Arak, and ship its current enriched uranium stockpile abroad. On one level, the Iranian package is crafted to resolve the nuclear issue based on the NPT, within a year. Iran’s nuclear rights would be respected; transparency measures would reduce the proliferation risks of its enrichment activities below what Washington tolerates elsewhere. On another level, though, the package means to test America’s willingness and capability to resolve the issue on this basis. It tests this not just for Tehran’s edification, but also for that of other P5+1 states, especially China and Russia, and of rising powers like India and South Korea. America can fail the Iranian test in two ways. First, the Obama administration—reflecting America’s political class more broadly—may prove unwilling to acknowledge Iran’s nuclear rights in a straightforward way, insisting on terms for a deal that effectively suborn these rights and violate Iranian sovereignty. There are powerful constituencies—e.g., the Israel lobby, neoconservative Republicans, their Democratic “fellow travelers,” and U.S.-based Iran “experts”—that oppose any deal recognizing Iran’s nuclear rights. They understand that acknowledging these rights would also mean accepting the Islamic Republic as an enduring entity representing legitimate national interests; to do so, America would have to abandon its post-Cold War pretensions to Middle Eastern hegemony. Those pretensions have proven dangerously corrosive of America’s ability to accomplish important objectives in the Middle East, and of its global standing. Just witness the profoundly self-damaging consequences of America’s invasion and occupation of Iraq, and how badly the “global war on terror” has eviscerated the perceived legitimacy of American purposes in the Muslim world. But, as the drama over Obama’s call for military action against Syria indicates, America’s political class remains deeply attached to imperial pretense—even as the American public turns away from it. If Washington could accept the Islamic Republic as a legitimate regional power, it could work with Tehran and others on a political solution to the Syrian conflict. Instead, Washington reiterates hubristic demands that President Bashar al-Assad step down before a political process starts, and relies on a Saudi-funded “Syrian opposition” increasingly dominated by al-Qa’ida-like extremists. If Obama does not conclude a deal recognizing Iran’s nuclear rights, it will confirm suspicions already held by many Iranian elites—including Ayatollah Khamenei—and in Beijing and Moscow about America’s real agenda vis-à-vis the Islamic Republic. It will become undeniably clear that U.S. opposition to indigenous Iranian enrichment is not motivated by proliferation concerns, but by determination to preserve American hegemony—and Israeli military dominance—in the Middle East. If this is so, why should China, Russia, or rising Asian powers continue trying to help Washington—e.g., by accommodating U.S. demands to limit their own commercial interactions with Iran—obtain an outcome it does not actually want?

#### Turns terror

Brookes, National security affairs senior fellow, 07

(Peter, 4-2-07, “Iran Emboldened: Tehran Seeks to Dominate Middle East Politics”, DOA: 10-10-13, <http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2007/04/iran-emboldened-tehran-seeks-to-dominate-middle-east-politics>, llc)

According to the U.S. State Department, Iran continues to be the world's most active state sponsor of terrorism. At the request of senior Iranian leadership, Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) support Palestinian terrorist groups such as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command with funding, training and weapons. Hezbollah - a Lebanese Shiite terrorist group - is a particular favorite. In fact, Iran established Hezbollah to parry Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon. Tehran may fund Hezbollah to the tune of $100 million per year. Last summer, Tehran's military support for Hezbollah was evident. Iran likely gave Hezbollah the green light to ambush an Israeli patrol and kidnap soldiers, which ultimately kicked off the monthlong conflict. In the ensuing days, Hezbollah indiscriminately fired as many as 10,000 Iran-supplied rockets and missiles into Israel. In addition, many were stunned when a C-802 cruise missile struck an Israeli naval vessel off the coast of Lebanon. While the shooter was never identified, the Chinese C-802 is in Iran's inventory. It could have been fired by either Hezbollah or the IRGC. Today, Hezbollah, with Iranian and Syrian support, is threatening to topple Lebanon's democratically elected government unless it is given additional cabinet seats - potentially giving it veto power over Beirut's decisions. Iran would love to add Lebanon to Syria as a client state in its effort to form an arc of Iranian influence across the region. Iran has made a number of not-so-veiled threats that it would deploy its irregular forces and terrorist allies against the U.S. and American interests, if necessary. This is likely not an idle threat. American blood is already on the hands of Iran and its terrorist proxies as a result of the 1983 Beirut Marine barracks attack and the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia, and in Iraq today. It is almost without question that Tehran sees its ability to hold U.S. interests at risk across the globe - including in the U.S. - as leverage against American military action over its nuclear program or meddling in Iraq. Perhaps the most frightening scenario is that Iran might transfer weapons of mass destruction capability to a terrorist ally. While this is risky behavior, it is a possibility. Iran could transfer nuclear capability to a Hezbollah-dominated government in Lebanon, or a Hamas-led Palestinian Authority, significantly increasing the threat to Israeli security. Osama bin Laden has not been shy about his desire for WMD or al-Qaida's readiness to use them. The insurgency's recent use of chlorine gas in Iraq is evidence of a terrorist group's willingness to employ WMD

#### Strikes cause war with Russia

Tarpley 5 (Webster Griffin,- activist and historian, 8/29/ <http://inn.globalfreepress.com/modules/news/article.php?storyid=743> )

In the case of Iran, the use of nuclear weapons by the US would have a dangerous complication: Iran is an important neighbor and trading partner of the Russian Federation, which is helping with Iran’s nuclear power reactor program. The threatened US/Israeli raid on Iran might kill Russian citizens as well. Such a US attack on Iran might prod the Russian government into drawing its own line in the sand, rather than sitting idle as the tide of US aggression swept closer and closer to Russia’s borders, as one country after another in central Asia was occupied. In other words, a US attack on Iran bids fair to be the opening of World War III, making explicit was already implicit in the invasion of Iraq. The Iran war project of the neocons is the very midsummer of madness, and it must be stopped.